1965 India Pakistan War: History

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ramana
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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby ramana » 21 Feb 2018 04:39

ramana wrote:I have been asking Mihir to look at Canberra raids in 1965 and 1971.

If you can help gather data would be helpful.



Looking in BRF archives I found these three articles on the Canberra


The Canberras in 1965 War:

The Canberras in 1965 War

Combat Diary of a Tusker:

Combat Diary of a Tusker War diary of No 5 Squadron from Agra.

The Night Raiders: Good Morning Peshawar

Canberras over Psheawar

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby Aditya_V » 21 Feb 2018 15:40

Is there any good narration on the AN-12 bombing of the SUi Gas fields in 1971?

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby ramana » 21 Feb 2018 21:17

Different thread no?

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby Aditya_V » 23 Feb 2018 10:49

Ok, hopefully will see that write up somewhere.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby ramana » 08 Mar 2018 07:59

Between this book
ramana wrote:An excellent book at tells the Behind The scenes by Maj. Gen Jogindar Singh.

If you are in India please buy this book.


and Capt. Amarinder Singh we understand 1965 war much better.

I urge all BRF to purchase at least Capt. AS book from Amazon.

If you find Behind the Scene go for it.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby Philip » 08 Mar 2018 08:56

Will not jump the gun about the book.Let it get moving.I am assisting.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby ramana » 08 Mar 2018 09:40

Philip what do you mean?
On phone?

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby Philip » 12 Mar 2018 22:38

Has Shiv contacted you?

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby ramana » 13 Mar 2018 21:47

Philip wrote:Has Shiv contacted you?



No. Not yet.

why not email me at ramana.brf at geemail


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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby ArjunPandit » 15 Mar 2018 02:42

^^and you share that too, this article can itself be made into a long nailbiting tv series, alas ....

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby Philip » 15 Mar 2018 12:21

Will do R.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby ramana » 15 Mar 2018 19:58


jaysimha
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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby jaysimha » 19 Mar 2018 17:06

The General Who Saved Punjab in the 1965 War
LT GEN HARBAKSH SINGH, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, WESTERN COMMAND, WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR OPERATIONS IN J&K AND PUNJAB DURING THE 1965 WAR
By Gurmeet Kanwal
https://www.indianarmy.nic.in/writereaddata/documents/Articles1965/Gurmeetkanwal230915.pdf




OPERATION GIBRALTAR was Fundamentally Flawed
by
By Maj Gen P K Chakravorty (Retd) and Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd)
https://www.indianarmy.nic.in/writereaddata/documents/Articles1965/PkchakGurmeet%20Kanwal230915.pdf

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby jaysimha » 23 Mar 2018 13:14

Consolidating the 7 articles found on army website on the subject. ( 1 or 2 may be re-post, MBD)


The Indian Air Force Under Air Marshal Arjan Singh
By Air Marshal VK Bhatia (Retd)
https://www.indianarmy.nic.in/writereaddata/documents/Articles1965/arjunindopakwar230915.pdf


1965 War: Pakistan’s Strategic Blunder
By Maj Gen PK Chakravorty (Retd)
https://www.indianarmy.nic.in/writereaddata/documents/Articles1965/PKChakravorty230915.pdf


Operations in the Chhamb and Sialkot Sectors
https://www.indianarmy.nic.in/writereaddata/documents/Articles1965/Ltgensatishnambiar230915.pdf


Indian Navy and the Indo-Pak War of 1965
https://www.indianarmy.nic.in/writereaddata/documents/Articles1965/Indianavy230915.pdf


IAF More than Willing
https://www.indianarmy.nic.in/writereaddata/documents/Articles1965/Jimmybhatia230915.pdf

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby Philip » 23 Mar 2018 13:43

In the initial stages,there was some "blue on blue" fire which took some casualties on our side,forcing us to halt some planned offensive ops,making us take a more cautious attitude. But there is one insider's personal observations,not reflecting well on the then COAS!

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spot ... rmy-staff/
1965: Assessment of Chief of the Army StaffBy Lt Gen Harbakhsh SinghIssue Book Excerpt: In the Line of Duty | Date : 27 Jan , 2018
Click to buy

I feel an assessment of the then Chief of the Army Staff, General Chowdhary, is called for.

I will be the first to admit that he had a very sharp brain, and could speak and write well, in English. His greatest failing was that he had an exalted opinion of himself. ‘He often passed smart alec remarks and doubted the intelligence of everyone (around him. As a soldier, I regret to say, he left much to be desired.

How else can you explain that throughout the duration of the War with Pakistan, he visited my Headquarters only thrice, that is on the 10th, the 14th and the 20th of September. And yet, on the early morning of the 23rd of September, soon after the cease-fire was announced, he was the first one to go to the Ichhogil Canal, with a photographer, and have his photograph taken for the press? Subsequently, to prove that he had participated fully in the War he had a book written by a well-known journalist which was completely fictitious.
:rotfl:
.
During the war, I believe, General Chowdhary used to issue handouts about what was happening in the war without ever having visited the frontline. Every evening, he would ring me up, and my set reply was: “nothing to worry about; all is well”. Once he suggested to me that he was not getting enough information, and that he, therefore, proposed to send two Lieutenant Colonels from his Headquarters to the Front Formations to get the latest news.

I challenged him that if he did that, I would put those Officers under arrest. He could get all the information he needed from my Headquarters, besides which, of course, he was free to go anywhere in the front, himself. I am sure, my Headquarters were sending Situation Reports to his Headquarters regularly. His problem was his huge ego. He considered himself a world authority on Armour, and I used to argue with him that though I could not claim to be an authority on Armour, I knew what it could do- and what it could not do; and that was enough from my point of View.

It may be reiterated that despite my regular pleas that any reserve forces to be committed against Sialkot must be launched from the area of Gurdaspur, so that initially they would be available to me as a reserve on the Punjab front, in case something went wrong there, General Chowdhary raised these reserve forces as I Corps, under Pat Dunn, and decided to launch them against Sialkot from Samba area, leaving me without any reserves on the Punjab front. And, as I have mentioned somewhere earlier, I was not told anything about these plans, nor even invited to the co-ordinating conference at which these plans were made. And yet, before their launching, I Corps was handed over to me for the conduct of the operations! :rotfl:

Since he had nothing else to do, General Chowdhary, as Chief of the Army Staff, without consulting me, started writing citations for senior officers – Army and Corps Commanders – with a view to giving them the award of Padma Bhushan. He had arranged with the Defence Minister, Mr Chavan, that he himself would be awarded the Padma Vibhushan.

One day, he rang me up to say that he was recommending senior officers – that is Army and Corps Commanders – for the award of Padma Bhushan, but in the list he had left out Kashmir Katoch whom he had originally been very fond of. You may remember that Kashmir Katoch, General Officer Commanding, XV Corps, would ring him up directly, for instructions, at the early stages of the Operations, by-passing me, his Army Commander, until I put my foot down. During the operations, he had somehow fallen out of favour with General Chowdhary; who did not wish to recommend him for the award.

I made it quite clear to him that if he was recommending PatDunn’s name for the award, then he could not leave out Kashmir Katoch, because, according to my assessment, Kashmir Katoch had done better than Pat Dunn. Since I refused to budge on the matter, he relented, and finally included Kashmir Katoch’s name also for the award.

I made it quite clear to him (the then Defence Minister) that General Chowdhary had hardly taken any part in the fighting and did not deserve to be awarded a Padma Vibhushan.
I was intensely worked up over the whole affair of the awards, and sought an interview with the Defence Minister, Mr Chavan, to discuss the matter. I made it quite clear to him that General Chowdhary had hardly taken any part in the fighting and did not deserve to be awarded a Padma Vibhushan.

He told me that in his case the award was only of symbolic value; and tried to mollify me by saying that the Government of India was considering me for a special award, and, had besides, decided to give me the rank of a full General. Mr Lal Bahadur Shastri, the then Prime Minister, died in Tashkent, soon thereafter, as did Mr Chavan, so nothing came of the special awards that I had been promised though I was given the Padma Vibhushan after retirement. This is what they call the luck of the draw!

The main reason why such large numbers of armed intruders were able to infiltrate, almost unnoticed, so far behind into the interior of Jammu and Kashmir and achieve a certain amount of success in destroying bridges and ambushing vehicle-convoys, was due to the fact that the various agencies responsible for dealing with such contingencies such as the Army Intelligence, the State Militia battalions, the Armed Police battalions, the Jammu and Kashmir Police, and so on, were not under one unified command.

They had their respective ‘Empires’, and many of them were not willing to accept any help, guidance or direction from the Army. Even those, who were deployed for the defence of the cease-fire line, did not fall fully within the purview of the regional military commanders. The result was that the channel of command, military decisions, and more particularly, the acquisition and dissemination of information, was actually tenuous, circuitous and generally too long to fructify. Besides, there were’ the inevitable professional jealousies among these agencies which detracted from the smooth and harmonious functioning of defence arrangements in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

Through the inter-cession of the United Nations Organisation, the 1965 War with Pakistan, came to an end at midnight, 22nd September, 1965. After dark on the 22nd of September, with the advent of the cease-fire, the Pakistani side fired off all the ammunition left over with them, and there was a tremendous din. What is more, the Pakistani Forces occupied all the areas in the no-man’s land adjacent to the Front. I had warned the Corps Commanders concerned about this, but, it seems, they did nothing to prevent it. This is where we always lose out; while we play ‘fair’, Pakistan’s attitude is entirely different.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby Philip » 23 Mar 2018 14:05

The full story of the capture of the Ichogil Canal.had we continued fighting Lahore would've fallen and who knows what that effect would've had on the morale of the Paki troops.They might'e fled POK!

http://www.rediff.com/news/special/the- ... 150914.htm
The Hero of the Battle of Dograi

Last updated on: September 14, 2015 16:16 IST
Lieutenant Colonel Desmond Hayde was awarded the Mahavir Chakra, the second highest honour in war-time, for winning one of the toughest battles ever fought by the Indian Army.

In a brilliant and gruesome assault, what he and his men achieved that September 50 years ago, had never been seen before.
Archana Masih/Rediff.com salutes the maverick soldier's soldier.

Lt Col Desmond Hayde meets Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri in the Indo-Pak War of 1965
IMAGE: Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri greets Lieutenant Colonel Desmond Hayde in Dograi. Photograph: Kind courtesy Indian Army Facebook

In a cemetery in Bareilly, Uttar Pradesh, quietly rests a war hero that many may not know of -- a man born in Ireland, who led India in its bloodiest, yet finest, infantry battle in the 1965 Indo-Pak War.

It was an epic battle where 86 Indian soldiers died fighting a better fortified Pakistan army before the Indian flag could be raised in Dograi, on the outskirts of Lahore.

Led by Lieutenant Colonel Desmond E Hayde, whose Haryanavi was better than his clipped Hindi, the 3 Jat battalion of 550 men defeated an enemy which had double the number of soldiers.

They fought with guns, grenades, bayonets and bare hands, clearing every gulley, street, house and pill box (a concrete above-the-ground bunker) in an assault so courageous that it found its way into Haryanvi folklore.

For his personal courage and exemplary leadership, Lieutenant Colonel Hayde was awarded the Mahavir Chakra, the second highest honour in battle.

A portrait of Lieutenant Colonel Hayde painted by the legendary painter M F Husain.

IMAGE: Lieutenant Colonel Hayde, who retired as a brigadier, painted by M F Husain. Photograph: Kind courtesy Indian Army Facebook Page

He is also perhaps the only soldier to be painted by the famed M F Husain on the battlefield. And it was during an address to his battalion, that Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, gave India one of its best known slogans 'Jai Jawan! Jai Kisan!

The colonel, who retired as a brigadier after 30 years in the Indian Army, bequeathed the Husain painting, along with his medal, citation and typewriter to the Jat Regiment that he loved so dearly.

When he died two years ago at 87, he was buried in a cemetery near the regiment's headquarters in Bareilly. Alongside him rests his wife Sheela, a Garhwali girl he had met in Bareilly as a young officer.

"He got a hero's farewell with full military honours. His regiment worshipped him," says Colonel Kunwar Ajay Singh, who knew him for more than thirty years.

"He was a maverick. One of those old style army officers who was in a different league. He felt that he had to work with his men and be with his men to be a leader of men."

Lieutenant Colonel Hayde, the commanding officer of 3 Jat in the 1965 WarOn the night of September 21, 1965 before his small battalion marched 8 kilometres from their trenches to Dograi, where the Pakistan army had entrenched itself, Lieutenant Colonel Hayde made only two demands of his men.

'Ek bhi aadmi pichhe nahin hatega! (Not a single man will turn back!)'

The second: 'Zinda ya murda, Dograi mein milna hai! (Dead or alive, we have to meet in Dograi!)


He warned his men against retreating. 'Even if all of you run away, I shall continue to stand on the battlefield alone,' Rachna Bisht Rawat writes in her must read book on the men and battles of the war -- 1965, Stories from the Second Indo-Pak War.

IMAGE: Lieutenant Colonel Hayde was the commanding officer of 3 Jat, one of the highest decorated regiments of the 1965 War. Photograph: Kind courtesy Indian Army Facebook Page

With just a single battalion, the daring commanding officer defeated the enemy battalion, which was supported by a tank squadron and one more battalion.

For what they accomplished that night, 3 Jat received three Mahavir Chakras, four Vir Chakras and seven Sena Medals.

"Brigadier Hayde never spoke about the Maha Vir Chakra or the Battle of Dograi. He thought of it as a job he had to do and he did it," says Colonel Singh, the managing director of a school which is run on the property bequeathed for the purpose by the brigadier in Kotdwar, Uttarakhand.

"He never even travelled on a free ticket that the government grants (for winners of gallantry medals). He was a rough, rugged, tough, guy for whom every day of life was the Indian Army."

Later this week, the school will be renamed Hayde Heritage. His three sons, one of whom retired as a lieutenant colonel from the Indian Army, will arrive from the UK and Canada to attend the ceremony.

The son of Anglo Indian parents whose father worked for the Railways, Brigadier Hayde's rules in life were very simple, and embibed from the motto the Indian Military Academy had sent him out with:

The country comes first, your men come second and self comes last.


"I have seen senior officers -- almost all have goals of self career progression -- but here was a man who had no iota of self," says Colonel Singh, who was encouraged and coached by Brigadier Hayde to join the Indian Army.


"That is the reason that even after he passed away in 2013, men from his regiment still call. He always thought of how the army and the lives of jawans could be improved, writing letters to the officials, the army chief, his own regiment etc."

Even in his 80s, if he was invited for an army function, he would call his gaadiwala (a hired car that he often used for outside travel) and set course.

Brigadier Hayde was no ordinary soldier, like so many other extraordinary men who fought so bravely in that month of September, 50 years ago.

Heroes like Havildar Abdul Hamid, Colonel A B Tarapore, Major Ranjit Dayal, Colonel Salim Caleb, Squadron Leader A B Devaiyya and many others -- men who need to be remembered but rarely are.

Ordered to breach the Ichogil canal, a deep and wide reservoir in Pakistan that ran parallel to the boundary, Colonel Hayde's battalion first took Dograi on the night of September 6-7.

It was for this action that he won the Mahavir Chakra, announced on the battlefield itself.

But 3 Jat had to fall back because rest of the units detailed to support them in the offensive, could not reach in time because of lack of information. Colonel Hayde and his men stood their ground alone till ordered by the brigade headquarters to retreat.

The miscommunication resulted in the removal of a major general, while 3 Jat had to wait in bunkers 8 kilometres behind enemy lines till they got the next orders for launching an assault on Dograi.

The wait was almost two weeks. By then Pakistan had converted Dograi into a fortress.

Lieutenant Colonel Hayde receives the Mahavir Chakra from President Dr S Radhakrishnan

IMAGE: Lieutenant Colonel Hayde is awarded the Mahavir Chakra from President Dr S Radhakrishnan. Photographs: Kind courtesy Indian Army Facebook Page

It was in this scarred backdrop, that Colonel Hayde and his troops were given the task of re-taking Dograi. And they did -- company by company, combat by combat, inch by inch -- in a gruesome battle in which one fifth of the battalion was killed.

The death count on the opposite side was nearly 300.

In a blog post, many years later, an army officer referred to what Colonel Hayde had told a correspondent when asked what makes soldiers fight such gruesome wars.
'The colonel pointed to his second in command, Major Shekhawat and said: "Major Shekhawat fights because he holds nothing dearer than the respect and standing he enjoys in the eyes of his men, family, and community back home. His fear of losing that standing overcomes his fear of death.
"The men, of course, fight because Major Shekhawat fights."

Major Shekhawat retired as a colonel. He lost four of his fellow officers in Dograi that night.

Brigadier Hayde in the school that is run on his property in Kotdwar

IMAGE: Brigadier Hayde (wearing a hat) with children at the Heritage Academy, Kotdwar, the school that was established on land he donated. Photograph: Kind courtesy, 1965: Stories from Second Indo-Pak War by Rachna Bisht Rawat. Penguin-Random House.
After his retirement in 1978, Brigadier Hayde moved to Kotdwar in the Garhwal hills, his wife's hometown.

Till the end, he followed a very precise schedule. Having breakfast at 7 am, thereafter walking up to his study -- researching the history of the Jats, the 1965 and 1971 wars etc -- and eating supper by 7.30 pm.

"Our offices were adjacent," recalls Colonel Singh. "If I had to meet Brigadier Hayde, I had to take an appointment and I'll be damned if I was late even by a minute."

"He was a man who sought no popularity. He could be blunt and at times was not taken well. For him, there was no grey. Only black or white."

The brigadier set up the ex-servicemen league in Kotdwar and readily helped people from his paltan. He wrote a book on the Battle of Dograi and completed his memoirs, which is yet to be published.

"He used to come across as someone who was not too fond of kids or company, but started enjoying their presence on campus," says Colonel Singh.

"His other passion was stray dogs. He adopted so many of them. In fact 2, 3 of them would be in his bed."

The war hero remained a soldier right till his end, and battled skin cancer, like only a gallant fauji could. Sometimes, even surprising doctors with the way he went about life in spite of the virulent disease that was eating him away.

Exactly a month before he died, he circled September 25 on a calendar and hung it on the wall.
"He said, look September 25th will be my last day and I told him, 'Sir, what nonsense are you speaking'," Colonel Singh recalls.
"But he was absolutely right."
Two days after after winning one of Indian Army's toughest battles on September 23, 1965, the hero of Dograi passed away 48 years later.

There will be a ceremony to commemorate Brigadier Desmond Hayde and the golden jubilee of the 1965 war in Kotdwar this week. It will be worth our while that we salute this authentic Indian hero and the brave Indian soldiers who fought the Battle of Dograi, wherever we are.


PS: Here's a quote from the enemy's forum acknowledging the crossing and capture of the canal.

However, it is incorrect that Indian troops did not cross the Ichhogil Canal. You might like to look up the Rlvant records, especially that of 3 Jat under Desmond Hayde:

India crossed the International Border on the Western front on 6 September, marking an official beginning of the war.[26] On 6 September, the 15th Infantry Division of the Indian Army, under World War II veteran Major General Prasad, battled a massive counterattack by Pakistan near the west bank of the Ichogil Canal (BRB Canal), which was a de facto border of India and Pakistan. The General's entourage itself was ambushed and he was forced to flee his vehicle. A second, this time successful, attempt to cross the Ichhogil Canal was made over the bridge in the village of Barki, just east of Lahore. These developments brought the Indian Army within the range of Lahore International Airport. As a result, the United States requested a temporary ceasefire to allow it to evacuate its citizens in Lahore. However, the Pakistani counterattack took Khem Karan from Indian forces which tried to divert the attention of Pakistanis from Khem Karan by an attack on Bedian and the adjacent villages.
The thrust against Lahore consisted of the 1st Infantry Division supported by the three tank regiments of the 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade; they quickly advanced across the border, reaching the Ichhogil (BRB) Canal by 6 September. The Pakistani Army held the bridges over the canal or blew up those it could not hold, effectively stalling any further advance by the Indians on Lahore. One unit of the Indian Jat Regiment, 3 Jat, had also crossed the Ichogil canal and captured[27] the town of Batapore (Jallo Mur to Pakistan) on the west side of the canal. The same day, a counter offensive consisting of an armoured division and infantry division supported by Pakistan Air Force Sabres forced the Indian 15th Division to withdraw to its starting point. Although 3 Jat suffered minimal casualties, the bulk of the damage being taken by ammunition and stores vehicles, the higher commanders had no information of 3 Jat's capture of Batapore and misleading information led to the command to withdraw from Batapore and Dograi to Ghosal-Dial. This move brought extreme disappointment[28] to Lt-Col Desmond Hayde, CO of 3 Jat. Dograi was eventually recaptured by 3 Jat on 21 September, for the second time but after a much harder battle due to Pakistani reinforcements.


More gripping accounts at:
http://sainiksamachar.nic.in/englisharc ... -15/h5.htm
Last edited by ramana on 03 Apr 2018 23:26, edited 1 time in total.
Reason: Added extra high lights. ramana

ramana
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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby ramana » 28 Mar 2018 10:34

Asal Uttar-1

and

Asal Uttar-2

Very good account of the whole battle.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby ramana » 03 Apr 2018 08:15

A daughter remembers

In memory of Lt. Gen Harbaksh Singh WAC

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby ramana » 03 Apr 2018 08:46


IAF’s role in Khem Karan

Even during the epic tank battle at Khem Karan, or the Battle of Asal Uttar, the IAF played an important role. The Pakistani tank reinforcements were cut off as Wg Cdr William Goodman’s formation destroyed 26 tanks on a train and Flt Lt Tirlochan Singh ‘Tango’ claimed another eight. The Mystere IV-A fighters, based at Pathankot, had a potent anti-armour rocket pods with 38x68 mm hollow-charge rockets that pierced through the armour plating and exploded inside the tank.


http://www.tribuneindia.com/mobi/news/s ... 25191.html

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby ramana » 04 Apr 2018 02:28

Some issues that the British put up with in the development of the Centurion tank



Detailing the development history of the Centurion


...
With war across Europe in full swing, the British War Office issued a requirement - under the designation of "A41" - for a new heavy cruiser tank in 1943. The excellent German "88" flak gun - at this point in the war now being used just as effectively as an anti-tank gun - forced the British to rethink their tank design formula and request a combat system that could withstand a direct hit from such a weapon. Additionally, the requirement called for a reliable battlefield implement with a maximum weight no greater than 40 tons to operate in conjunction with the 40-ton transport trailers available to the British Army at the time. As such, the new tank design would have to be well-protected along its critical facings with an appropriate displacement of armor which, in effect, would make for a heavier tank. Due to the carrying limitations of existing transport trailers (designated Mark I and Mark II) in the British Army inventory, the original 40-ton weight limit proved somewhat unfeasible for the armor requirement and was thusly expanded. Instead of limiting the design of their new tank proper - a tank the War Office believed would be a complete success from the beginning - it was decided to build all-new, heavy-class trailers instead.

....

can read the rest in the link....
...

Britain's Centurion: The Best Cold War Tank?

When someone mentions a list of the best tanks in history, the names are always the same: Tiger, T-34, M-1 Abrams. And always from the same nations: Germany, Russia, America.

But great tanks from Great Britain? Though the British were the ones to develop armored fighting vehicles in World War I, British tanks of the Second World War can generally be described in one word: awful.

There were tanks that could barely move without breaking down. Tanks that were fast but too thinly armored, or heavily armored but too slow. Tanks with radios that didn’t work. Tanks with guns that could shoot armor-piercing shells at other tanks, but not high-explosive rounds at infantry and antitank guns.

The British had some successes here and there: the heavy Matildas that tore through lighter Italian armor in 1940, the Crocodile flamethrower tanks whose very presence terrified German troops into surrendering, or the “Funny” engineering tanks that proved invaluable at D-Day. But on the whole, British tanks like the Crusader proved a disappointment.

There were reasons behind the failure. British railroads were too narrow to transport big vehicles the size of the German Tiger. British tactics were faulty, favoring gallant charges by tanks acting without infantry or artillery support. The British tank corps of World War II was schizophrenic, caught between those who wanted fast, light cruiser tanks that were essentially cavalry horses on treads, and those who wanted heavy, slow infantry tanks to help the foot soldiers breach enemy trenches. In the end, many British units were equipped with Lend-Lease American Shermans, a mediocre vehicle that at least was reliable.

British armor had been roughly handled in North Africa, yet the Normandy campaign in the summer of 1944 was the real nightmare. British and American crews dreaded coming to grips with the heavily armored German Panthers and Tigers, whose powerful cannons inflicted huge losses on Allied armor.


And then in 1945, the British got it right. The Centurion may have been the best tank overall during the 1950s and 1960s. Though fielded just a few months after World War II ended, the Centurion proved such a good design that it is still in service today with the Israeli and other armies.

The Centurion was a better tank than its contemporaries, the American M-48 Patton and Soviet T-54 and T-55. The Patton was faster, had a better combat fuel range, and was more maneuverable, with a maximum speed of thirty miles per hour versus twenty-two for the Centurion. But the Centurion’s flat plate armor was tougher than the Patton’s cast armor, and its 105-millimeter gun was much better than the Patton’s ninety-millimeter gun (so much so that the Israelis replaced the ninety-millimeters on their Pattons with the L-7)....

Two armies used the Centurion with particular effect. In the 1965 India-Pakistan War, Indian Centurions faced Pakistani M-48 Pattons. At a cost of just twenty-nine tanks, India destroyed 144 Pakistani tanks, including numerous Pattons. So many tanks were destroyed at the Battle of Khem Karan that the site was known as the “graveyard of the Pattons.”



To sum up the Centurion rolled flat plate armor was better than the Patton cast steel armor. I will post the tensile strength for the two types of alloy steel used by both. I have it at home computer.

The Patton had the better gun but at longer range.
The ranges at which Indian armor engaged the Pak Patton tanks negated this.
And due to the softer armor, for the Patton they got destroyed.
And due to the three round firing technique the Indian tanks got three rounds in 15 sec and all were hits.

Many after the battle pictures have the IA soldiers pointing to the holes where the rounds defeated the armor.
Pictures mostly show two holes closely spaced showing the accurate shooting by the tank gunners.

Now it makes sense why the AMX-13 and the upgunned Shermans of Deccan Horse were able to defeat the Patton armor. Both had the old German Panzer derivative French 75-50N high velocity tank gun.


Wiki Links;

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Centurion_(tank)


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M48_Patton

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby Rakesh » 25 May 2018 05:22

https://twitter.com/indiandefence11/sta ... 6696205312 ---> Indian Army 7th Infantry Division soldiers posing with captured Pakistani weapons after Battle of Barki during 1965 Indo-Pak War. The weapons includes M20 Super-Bazooka, M40 recoilless rifle, Bren LMG, M1 Garands, M1918A2 BARs, STEN SMGs, SMLEs and two-inch mortars.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ramana » 31 May 2018 00:10

In retrospective I think LBJ pushed for NPT with cut-off date of 1968 to exclusively keep out India.
This is a result of 1965 war.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Primus » 31 May 2018 16:56

This is a great thread, thanks for posting all this information. I grew up reading stories of all the heroes of the '65 war. For me that was even more important than the '71 event where we won so comprehensively. I Remember LBS calling for saving 3 paisa a day and skipping one meal a week, which I did diligently during those difficult times. My cousins in Delhi used to take food and gifts to the Railway station and wait for the trains carrying the jawans to the battlefront. I grew up in the South so did not live through the 'blackouts' and such, but it was an emotionally charged few weeks for a youngster.

I used to have the Hindi versions of the books written about these battles and their heroes in my younger days. Just ordered Rawat's book now. It is available on Amazon.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Rakesh » 11 Jun 2018 23:48

https://twitter.com/indiandefence11/sta ... 3911173120 ---> Indian Army Gunners firing a BL 5.5" medium field gun during the 1965 Indo-Pak War. The BL 5.5 inch gun was a British artillery gun introduced during the middle of the WW-2 to equip medium batteries and was used to equip every Indian battery during wars against Pakistan.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ramana » 12 Jun 2018 00:43

I don't know what he means 'used to equip every Indian battery"

It was used to equip only the medium batteries.

The light batteries still had 25 pounder gun.

The medium batteries were equipped with 130mm gun as the 5.5" didn't have the range fro counter battery fire against the US supplied 155mm guns that Pakis had.

More over 5.5' was not very accurate.


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