1965 India Pakistan War: History

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Aditya_V
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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Aditya_V » 13 Nov 2019 19:21

Given Pakistani Mentality your thesis makes absolute sense. They wanted a new Mughal Empire.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Sanju » 13 Nov 2019 19:48

Rohitvats, very well written. It also ties into the link by Ramana ji on Crisis Games, where this scenario was War Gamed.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ArjunPandit » 13 Nov 2019 19:50

RV/Ramanaji what do you think of Indonesia's threat on A&N islands??

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ArjunPandit » 13 Nov 2019 19:51

Aditya_V wrote:Given Pakistani Mentality your thesis makes absolute sense. They wanted a new Mughal Empire.

every pakistani i meet misses the taj and red fort quite fondly...this ties up with their mindset

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ramana » 13 Nov 2019 21:49

ArjunPandit wrote:RV/Ramanaji what do you think of Indonesia's threat on A&N islands??


Sukarno was getting too big for his shoes and could be thinking of that.
He already had named the Indian Ocean as Indonesian Ocean.
I am more interested in the foreign intelligence service that gave inputs to the Admiral.

Was it UK or US?

Reason is in October there was a coup attempt in Indonesia and it was crushed by Gen. Suharto and that ended the Sukarno grandiose rhetoric.

Also around March 1965 KSA shifted to US $ and stopped using the Gulf Rupee minted by RBI for their use.*

Too bad we don't have old timers still visiting BRF.

* NaMo recent visit to KSA re-established the rupee via RuPay card in the KSA and Gulf.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ArjunPandit » 13 Nov 2019 22:11

^^i would bet one of my kidneys on that it was UK

ramana
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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ramana » 13 Nov 2019 22:46

IN has a habit of chasing ghost ships.
Even during 26/11 they went off chasing some US reports of terrorists on a boat.
And came back and blamed the information.

As we know there is lot of background activity going on in 1965, wouldn't put it past the US to use UK to pass the information.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby nachiket » 14 Nov 2019 02:07

rohitvats wrote:As one reads more about 1965, one thing becomes clear:

- the decision to attack into Pakistan in the Lahore sector (even before the Sialkot Sector on 8th September), had a much wide ranging implication than simply taking the pressure off the Chhamb sector.

- It most probably prevented the proverbial 4th Battle of Panipat!

-.....

- Shortest route towards Delhi is the Fazilka, Malout, Sirsa, Hisar, Rohtak and then, Delhi.

.....

- The bombast about having tea at Red Fort had some basis to it, even if it was quite outlandish.

......


Excellent analysis Rohit saar. One question. Why do you think this axis - Fazilka-Sirsa-Delhi was not sufficiently protected despite beign the shortest route to the capital? It is a scary situation. Was it simply a lack of enough troops and equipment to cover all fronts or a lack of understanding of paki mentality back then?

As for the 4th Battle of Panipat, I remember reading this article on the Battle of Asal Uttar which has a good background of the situation at the time: https://medium.com/indian-defence/battl ... d289cd6798

There the author mentions that even that battle itself could have easily turned into the 4th battle of Panipat saved by the determined defense of our troops and leadership of officers like Maj.Gen Gurbaksh SIngh, Col. Vaidya, Brig. Theograj etc. along with numerous errors made by the pakis. The excerpt which mentions this:

Phase 1 entailed 11 Infantry Division to establish a bridgehead across the obstacle system in the area of Khem Karan. In Phase 2, 1 Armoured Division was to break out from the bridgehead in three axes.
The first was by 4 Armoured Brigade with two armoured regiments and a mechanized infantry battalion along Valtoha- Fatehabad and then astride the Sobraon branch canal, to capture the bridges of the Beas. This would cut off West Punjab from rest of India and sever XI corps main Line of Communications and supply.
The second axis was 3 Armoured Brigade with two armoured regiments and a mechanized infantry battalion along Khem Karan-Bhikkiwind-Taran Taran astride Kasur branch canal, to capture Jandiala Guru as also cut off the Grand Trunk road connecting Amritsar with Jallandhar.
The third axis entailed providing flank protection by 5 Armoured Brigade with one armoured regiment and an infantry battalion advancing west of axis Kasur — Khem Karan- Bhikkiwind.
It was planned to take Harike Bridge by 8th September and reach Beas Bridge by the evening of 9th.
If successful this would cut off Punjab West of the Beas,and allow for the encirclement and destruction of XI Corps by attacks from both flanks and rear,followed by the capture of Amritsar.The road to Delhi –a mere 24 hour drive would be open with no substantial reserves standing in the way. It had the potential to be what has been called India’s ‘Fourth Battle of Panipat’ in the plains of Punjab.



It also contains this piece about artillery which ties into what you said about the PA's artillery arm

Furthermore Pakistani artillery was trained to use the american method of using pre-timed fuzes ,so that projectiles fired at different trajectories would arrive at a target at very short interval for maximum destruction.This also allowed Pakistani artillery to disperse their guns a bit more and they also had better weapon locating equipment.Pakistani artillery performed very well throughout the war causing numerous casualities,particularly in the defensive battles against advancing indian forces. In Asal uttar their performance was to be lacklustre due to lack of proper deployment,co-operation and absence of proper intelligence on Indian positions



Like you said, PA's hand was forced when they had to use 1st Armored to attack at Khem Karan and the lack of preparation affected their performance severely, including their otherwise excellent artillery. If they had had the freedom to attack where they had originally intended and trained for, the results might have been disastrous for us. Just goes to show how much of a difference initiative can make in a war, even overriding advantages in numbers, firepower and technology sometimes.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby fanne » 14 Nov 2019 02:29

you always learn something. I know this is 2019, do we have something on Falzalika -Delhi axis? I would imagine, they would first go after chicken neck than this....plus we are way bigger than the enemy in size, equipment, morale etc. But still do we have any corps or brigade guarding against these eventualities (or one of the reserves will stay back for these kinds of surprises?

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ramana » 14 Nov 2019 02:45

There is a reason why UB says think like a Paki.
The name Gibraltar was chosen to tie to the two brothers Tareq and Amr who were sent to conquer Egypt. Gibralter is from Jebel al Tareq. Fort Tareq.

Even Kargil.the code name was Operation Badr. I leave that as homework.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Atmavik » 14 Nov 2019 02:57

fanne wrote:you always learn something. I know this is 2019, do we have something on Falzalika -Delhi axis? I would imagine, they would first go after chicken neck than this....plus we are way bigger than the enemy in size, equipment, morale etc. But still do we have any corps or brigade guarding against these eventualities (or one of the reserves will stay back for these kinds of surprises?


The apaches should be based in suratghar.

They did not choose this sector in 71. This would have been much better than attacking jaisalmer. Although Musharraf mentions some grand SSG plan that was cancelled as niazi surrendered. Not sure how true it is as he often talks from his Musharraf

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ramana » 14 Nov 2019 03:11

nachiket the OWR Chapter 12 notes say 75% of all IA casualties were from shelling.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby nachiket » 14 Nov 2019 03:16

ramana wrote:nachiket the OWR Chapter 12 notes say 75% of all IA casualties were from shelling.

That is for the entire war right? The excerpt I posted was about Asal Uttar only. Even there a majority of our casualties might have been due to Artillery, that would not be surprising. Still, despite having superior equipment and training, lack of preparation and coordination (a consequence of the last minute change of plans precipitated by our attack) had a detrimental effect on their performance in that they could not avert disaster. Our artillery performed really well on the other hand due to the opposite circumstances.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby nachiket » 14 Nov 2019 03:22

Atmavik wrote:The apaches should be based in suratghar.

They did not choose this sector in 71. This would have been much better than attacking jaisalmer. Although Musharraf mentions some grand SSG plan that was cancelled as niazi surrendered. Not sure how true it is as he often talks from his Musharraf

That the pakis did not attempt it in 1971 goes to suggest that this weakness must have been remedied by then. But the paki choice of Longewala was a good one because we were vulnerable there as it turned out. Even in Kargil they chose the time and location right for the attack. The actual execution of the plan was flawed both times. They seem to be good at finding out chinks in our armor but are bad at exploiting them.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ramana » 14 Nov 2019 03:39

Plot this in Google maps

Shortest route towards Delhi is the Fazilka, Malout, Sirsa, Hisar, Rohtak and then, Delhi.


https://www.google.com/maps/search/Fazi ... a=!3m1!4b1

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Sanju » 14 Nov 2019 23:11

nachiket wrote:
Atmavik wrote:The apaches should be based in suratghar.

They did not choose this sector in 71. This would have been much better than attacking jaisalmer. Although Musharraf mentions some grand SSG plan that was cancelled as niazi surrendered. Not sure how true it is as he often talks from his Musharraf

That the pakis did not attempt it in 1971 goes to suggest that this weakness must have been remedied by then. But the paki choice of Longewala was a good one because we were vulnerable there as it turned out. Even in Kargil they chose the time and location right for the attack. The actual execution of the plan was flawed both times. They seem to be good at finding out chinks in our armor but are bad at exploiting them.


Which suggests to me that they get help in finding these chinks in our armour and for obvious reasons, no help in the execution.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ramana » 15 Nov 2019 01:28

Sanju, Reminds me of the outrage the IAF Canberra pilot had in 1965 at a Group Captain at Air Hq who was spying for TSP. Yes they get quite a lot of vulnerability information.

Nachiket, In 1971 TSP did try Fazilka. The sad story is we have hazar unit accounts and individual stories but not the big picture and the why of the strategy.

If we step back from our whines on JNC generalship, he put the best tank forces(1st Armored) and hit the Pakis in Sialkot and used the secondary tanks as reserve towards Lahore and it turned out it decimated the 1 st (P) Armored.


If 1st Armored and 1st Corps had better leaders it could have achieved a lot more.

This is the big picture.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Gerard » 15 Nov 2019 02:38

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XXV, SOUTH ASIA

267. Record of Meeting - Washington, December 15, 1965, 5:40 p.m.
PRESIDENT’S COMMENTS TO US ADVISERS CONCERNING PRIVATE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT Ayub

On Kashmir the President said he had told Ayub to do his best at Tashkent and that if Tashkent failed we would try something else as Goldberg indicated last night. But he should not be under any illusions that we can force a settlement. If we were able to we would have done so already.

The President told Ayub that we were not going to let Pakistan tell us how to handle India. We will give India food or anything else we want. Our Indian policy is our business. Ayub said he fully understood this but what if the Indians tried to knock us off? The President said we would not let them.

[Page 512]
The President indicated that if Pakistan wanted close relations with us there could be no serious relationship with the ChiComs. We could not live with that. At the same time we understood certain relationships just as a wife could understand a Saturday night fling by her husband so long as she was the wife. Ayub got the point.


The President thought that Ayub was much chastened. He had gone on an adventure and been licked. He felt very uncomfortable now, so much so that the President commented that he hated to see a proud man humble himself so. Ayub was subdued, troubled, pathetic and sad. So much so that even Mrs. Johnson had commented on it.


https://history.state.gov/historicaldoc ... 68v25/d267

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Gerard » 15 Nov 2019 02:48

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XXV, SOUTH ASIA

175. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson - Washington, August 28, 1965, 10:30 a.m.
Pak/Indian Roundup. Kashmir is still bubbling merrily and could blow up. U Thant fears the whole 1949 cease-fire agreement may collapse. He wanted to report blaming the Paks for starting the mess, but the Paks threatened to withdraw from the UN if he did. Nor are the Indians too eager to take Kashmir to the UN lest the whole question of its status be reopened (which is what the Paks want).

Bowles sees mounting pressures for Indian retaliation and urges we call the Pak bluff that they aren’t involved, lest they be encouraged to think they are getting away with the game. In fact, we have [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] a most reliable report that both the Kashmir infiltration and the earlier Rann of Kutch affair are part of a “well-organized plan” to force a Kashmir settlement. This plan was checked out with both the Chicoms and Indos. Worth reading (Tab A).2


https://history.state.gov/historicaldoc ... 68v25/d175

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XXV, SOUTH ASIA

178. Memorandum for the Record - Washington, September 2, 1965, 9:30 a.m.
Meeting with the President on Kashmir, 2 September 1965, 9:30 am

Secretary Rusk described how Kashmir could erupt into a major fracas; perhaps the most serious problem could be communal rioting; there was a risk that millions could be killed. So every effort must be made to stop the fighting. The Pakistanis had started the current affair with a massive infiltration of several thousand men. Then the Indians crossed the CFL in a mop-up operation, especially to pinch off a dangerous salient. Now the Paks had escalated by throwing in their regular army in an apparent attempt to cut the road to Srinagar.


https://history.state.gov/historicaldoc ... 68v25/d178

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Gerard » 15 Nov 2019 02:50

Some real gems in that state department archive

In telegram 503 from New Delhi, September 7, Bowles reported on a conversation that morning with L.K. Jha, Secretary to the Prime Minister. He asked Jha if the situation was beyond recovery or if diplomatic efforts might yet prevent full-blown war. Jha responded that a cease-fire was possible if the Pakistani infiltrators were removed from Kashmir, if the cease-fire line and the UN apparatus to enforce it were revamped to avoid further violations, and if Pakistan agreed to take the pressure off the Kashmir issue until an atmosphere could be reestablished in which reasonable negotiations were possible. Jha also noted that after the border war with China in 1962 and subsequent Chinese and Pakistani propaganda about the fighting qualities of the Indian army, Shastri was determined in the present conflict to establish India as a nation of vitality, purpose, and strength. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27 INDIA–PAK)

Pak/Indian Roundup. The military situation remains confused. Apparently the Paks have held the Indian thrust into the Punjab. An Indian thrust into East Pakistan seems imminent, if not underway.2 Neither party shows any signs of response to cease-fire appeals as yet.
Intelligence reports as of September 6 indicated a build-up of Indian forces all along the border with East Pakistan. (White House telegram CAP 65565 to the LBJ Ranch in Texas, September 7; ibid., Country File, India, Vol. V, Cables, 6/65–9/65)

https://history.state.gov/historicaldoc ... 68v25/d191

A. Principles

1.
India is more important than Pakistan and there is enough hope in India to justify continued support by food and economic aid if the Indians in turn are reasonable with us.
2.
Within this priority we still need not lose Pakistan if we can show the Paks the emptiness of the Chinese route and the reality of continued Western economic support.
3.
We should not kid ourselves about any early Kashmir settlement. American fidgeting over Kashmir will only make us trouble with India and arouse false hopes in Pakistan. The most we can do is what Goldberg is doing: press for acceptance by both sides of the process of peaceful discussion as against the process of trial by arms. (We emphasize this point because it would help wonderfully in this town if you [Page 446]were to announce this conclusion as your own. Kashmir-fixers are a plentiful and dangerous commodity.)
4.
We cannot tie our economic aid to positive progress on Kashmir. We can tie it to reasonable progress in the observance of the UN ceasefire resolution and to the acceptance of political process. We can also tie it to other basic US interests such as:
a.
Keeping the Paks out of Chinese arms;
b.
Keeping the Indians from unbalanced surrender to the Soviets (although Soviet help in itself is not intolerable);
c.
Keeping the Indians away from nuclear weapons;
d.
Pressing both countries toward better economic and agricultural policies.

https://history.state.gov/historicaldoc ... 68v25/d234

Gerard
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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Gerard » 15 Nov 2019 03:12

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XXV, SOUTH ASIA

230. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson - Washington, October 1, 1965, 6 p.m.

Indian Attitudes. Embassy Delhi emphasizes that Indian success has united the nation and produced a new surge of nationalist fervor. Bowles and his UK colleague flatly assert that in this mood the Indians are highly unlikely to compromise on Kashmir. Instead continued hold-up of US aid is rapidly being interpreted as political pressure on India to give up Kashmir.

Embassy Delhi contends that if we hold up everything much longer it will dangerously stimulate the growing sentiment to go-it-alone in Delhi, which will only benefit the Soviets. According to Bowles, we face a critical opportunity either to maximize US influence in a newly self-reliant India or to face a rapid decline in this influence and an accelerating shift towards the USSR.


https://history.state.gov/historicaldoc ... 68v25/d230

ramana
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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ramana » 15 Nov 2019 06:27

Gerard,
Thanks. Keep them.coming.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Gerard » 15 Nov 2019 07:30

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XXV, SOUTH ASIA

21. Message From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the Ambassador to India (Bowles) - Washington, February 27, 1964.
Bundy and I can’t help but feel that Orpheus engine for HF–242 is our secret weapon for sidetracking Soviet MIG and possibly SAM deals.3 You yourself have pointed out how going ahead with HF–24 would also pander to Indian nationalism, while being the course least painful to the Paks. This track is also a lot easier than SAMs from here, which are out.

We understand that if UK would only get Bristol to put two of the test engines into flyable conditions, it should cost less than $1 million. Bristol of course is holding out for commitment on full develop ment [Page 47]and tooling up cost first but surely HMG could make them see the light. Why shouldn’t this be top priority claim on UK military aid?

We’ve been touting this here, and have gotten DOD to raise in London. But it badly needs another big push from you and Gore-Booth now, if we’re not to shut the barn door just after the horse is gone. Needless to say, our intervention is private to you.4


https://history.state.gov/historicaldoc ... -68v25/d21

Gerard
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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Gerard » 15 Nov 2019 07:43

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XXV, SOUTH ASIA

241. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson - Washington, October 30, 1965, 3 p.m.

Pak/Indian Roundup. While the two sides are still glaring at each other and sticking to rigid propaganda positions, there is considerable movement behind the scene.

There are many signs that the Paks are finally hoisting aboard that they have gotten themselves into a pretty mess, and that if hostilities resumed they’d take a licking. As a result they are now more eager for a withdrawal than for simultaneous talks on settling Kashmir.

This has also led to increasing Pak eagerness to get back in our good graces. Now Shoaib as well as Bhutto are signaling that Ayub is eager to come here soon; indeed Shoaib says Ayub now realizes that a considerable shift in Pak policy will be necessary to get back on a firm footing with us. We even have a report that Ayub intends to sack Bhutto in time.

So the Paks are moving our way. If we sit tight, Ayub should be ready to hear sweet reason within another month or two. However, the Paks are still threatening to move toward the ChiComs (and have leaked that Peiping has offered a tank factory). They also are still hinting that we must give Ayub something first, so he doesn’t have to come here as a beggar.

The Indians, who regard themselves as victors, show less flexibility. Knowing they have the upper hand, they’ve been scaring the Paks with threats to reopen the war if Pakistan won’t lay off Kashmir.

Meanwhile, they are refusing to even discuss Kashmir in New York on the grounds that the issue is closed. Their private and public utterances still indicate acute suspicion that the US and UK are trying to pressure them into giving up the fruits of victory. My own reading is that this mood will last until Shastri can hear from you personally where we stand. According to recent envoys, he’s still eager to come around 10 December.


https://history.state.gov/historicaldoc ... 68v25/d241

Gerard
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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Gerard » 15 Nov 2019 07:49

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XXV, SOUTH ASIA

242. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India - Washington, November 5, 1965, 7:21 p.m.

841. We note that on same day Security Council has adopted new resolution2 strengthening appeal for effective ceasefire and strongly supporting SYG proposals for arranging withdrawals, Shastri (according Reuters) told Parliament ceasefire agreement “cannot stand in way of our troops regaining territories treacherously occupied by Pakistan after ceasefire came into effect.” Shastri also quoted as saying “our taking remedial measures cannot be considered violation of ceasefire agreement.” Other tickers report All India Radio and PTI as saying Pakistan troops “massing” on Rajasthan border. All this suggests Karachi’s concern that Indians contemplating action along Rajasthan border may be well justified.

We believe GOI should be made aware in no uncertain terms our view that Shastri’s position if accurately reported by Reuters, clearly inconsistent with SC resolution and Indian actions of type Shastri seems to contemplate would demonstrate India not now interested in reestablishment of peaceful conditions in which economic development of subcontinent can move forward. This would have inevitable effect upon current USG policy review regarding subcontinent. Indian failure respond to SYG proposal to send Sarmento to arrange withdrawal plans another indication that Indians not meeting their obligation to re-establish peace on subcontinent.

We count on you to get across these ideas soonest at place where it will do most good.


https://history.state.gov/historicaldoc ... 68v25/d242

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Gerard » 15 Nov 2019 07:52

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XXV, SOUTH ASIA

252. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State - Karachi, November 26, 1965, 1405Z.
1.
During meeting with AID Director Williams in Rawalpindi, November 24, Finance Minister Shoaib stated that President Ayub had deep-seated suspicion that American CIA was attempting to undermine his position and bring about his downfall. Shoaib said he had been[Page 475]working with Ayub in preparation for the visit to Washington, but that he had not been able to remove Ayub’s suspicion or even entirely plumb its full extent. It was a central point being actively played upon by those who advocated an alternative course in Pakistan foreign policy orientation, Shoaib said. He asked that this information be conveyed to the Ambassador and Secretary of State and he (Shoaib) recommended that reassurance to Ayub on this point be undertaken by President Johnson as “the first order of business” during the forthcoming visit.
2.
Shoaib also said that the feeling was growing in Pindi that the US had let Pakistan down despite membership in SEATO and CENTO and specific pledges against Indian aggression. These points were being made in National Assembly and they were becoming harder to counter. US arms supplied to India had been used against Pakistan. Shoaib observed that he would meet again with President Ayub that evening and appeared to be inviting counter arguments. Williams replied that the US Government had fully met its pledge to come to Pakistan’s assistance in a situation where the origin of hostilities was confused. We had produced the cease-fire at a time when it was desperately needed and we had “taken India’s food supply by the throat,” with short rein month-to-month approval, in support of the cease-fire. The ratio of US arms assistance was ten to one in favor of Pakistan over India and no country had received such generous economic assistance as Pakistan. The US was Pakistan’s best friend by any standard of reasoning, AID Director Williams concluded.
3.
Shoaib expressed concern about the increased military budget. He was afraid an enlarged army would become a permanent factor, but he said he was powerless to resist diversion of financial resources to defense, given the present mood and the need to replenish arms lost in the war. Williams hoped that no significant arrangement for arms from Communist China would be concluded before President Ayub’s visit to Washington. Shoaib was visibly disturbed, saying that Pakistan had to replenish arms from somewhere; the Indians were building up and reportedly getting US arms from Israel and Formosa. Shoaib said he had kept out of the attempts to make alternative arrangements for arms, but he appeared to accept validity of the point that a major arms deal with Communist China would prejudice the success of Ayub’s visit to the US.


https://history.state.gov/historicaldoc ... 68v25/d252

Gerard
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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Gerard » 15 Nov 2019 07:57

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XXV, SOUTH ASIA

256. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson in Texas - Washington, December 1, 1965, 7:42 p.m.

CAP 65788. We’ve landed Shastri too. His private secretary has asked Bowles if the first week in February is convenient to you. This is in response to our suggestion that mid-January, as he earlier proposed, was bad for you but that any time after the 20th would be fine.

Shastri has apparently been maneuvered (by Ayub’s acceptance) into going to Tashkent at the end of the year.2 This is an added reason for his eagerness to sign up with you first lest we misunderstand. In fact, however, Tashkent may prove a blessing in disguise. When Ayub hits you on Kashmir, you can say work it out with Shastri at Tashkent. If (remote chance) the Soviets do work out a Kashmir deal, we’ll gain as much from it as the Soviets. More likely, the Soviets will find themselves in the same box we’ve been in.

We suggest you take up Shastri visit with Rusk tomorrow, and decide on a firm date.

On Indian food, it looks as though a combination of the short rein strategy, Freeman’s recent prods, and India’s own desperate straits have finally made them think big. We like Freeman’s strategy, but suspect that you’ll want to keep Indians on a short rein tactically till you and Shastri strike the bargain. This is do-able, provided that our monthly interim shipments are big enough to keep India afloat till then. So we’d again argue for a quick monthly OK of as much as Freeman thinks desirable (plus the interim fertilizer loan—which we’d see as shrewd but not essential).


https://history.state.gov/historicaldoc ... 68v25/d256

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Gerard » 15 Nov 2019 07:59

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XXV, SOUTH ASIA

258. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson - Washington, December 6, 1965, 6 p.m.

India Food Catastrophe. Freeman’s best expert is just back with the considered judgment of the people out there that the food crisis is even more catastrophic than previously estimated.2 The shortfall will [Page 485]probably run as high as 20 million tons instead of 10–12 million (we’re shipping at an annual rate of 6 million). Some famine and starvation seem inevitable, almost despite whatever we do. The whole crisis is now public, with major coverage in the Sunday papers here.

On the longer term front, you’ve seen Bowles’ report (Delhi 1430)3 that Indian cabinet bought almost all of the Subramaniam/Freeman recommendations. They will be announced Tuesday. India is also allocating $52 million equivalent to buying fertilizer.

Recommended US Response. We are already past the 4 December deadline if the pipeline is not to be interrupted. The tactics of our response should be to go big enough to seem generously responsive, yet limited enough to retain full bargaining leverage. The sheer magnitude of India’s food crisis makes this easy.

A.
Make the next allocation 2 or 3 months. The case for a longer period is to reduce panic and hoarding in India by showing that the US will come through. A secondary reason for 3 months is to carry us through Shastri visit, so he won’t have to come beg. However, we could stick with 2 months or even one if we went big on amount.
B.
500,000 tons per month would now seem utterly incommensurate with the need (which may be three times higher). With some famine inevitable, should we open ourselves to accusations later that we share the responsibility for having shipped less than Indian capacity to receive? Given all the crisis publicity, our response won’t look credible any longer if we keep shipments at 500,000 tons. However, port capacity gives us a ceiling well below the need; thus, going to 750,000 tons would show responsiveness, while still making India come to us. Even one month of this would look much better than 2–3 months at 500,000. Bell favors staying at 500,000 Title I but adding on 250,000 Title II disaster relief. We pay the freight on the latter, but it looks better and protects us against Krishna Menon-type allegations that we charged money for food when Indians were starving.
C.
$50 million Fertilizer Loan will save 4 million tons of grain we’d otherwise be pressed to give later, though it alone will not meet the immediate problem in the months before the new crop comes in. Bell feels strongly that we should tie conditions to this loan which will force Subramaniam to carry out his promises.
[Page 486]
If Subramaniam comes through publicly, we recommend a reciprocal White House statement (attached)4 tailored to your decisions above. It should get a good reaction here and abroad, make the Indians your debtors, and usefully remind Ayub we won’t play Kashmir politics with food. But it still leaves India’s food crisis unsolved (and only we can solve it), so keeps Shastri coming to you.


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Gerard
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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Gerard » 15 Nov 2019 08:05

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XXV, SOUTH ASIA

265. Memorandum of Conversation- Washington, December 14, 1965, 7:15 p.m.

President Ayub then went on to say that there was absolutely no military alliance between Pakistan and Communist China and that he had told the President the same thing that day. He said that Pakistan could only exist with the protection of a larger country. “We are in an alliance with the United States”, he said. He hoped that this alliance would act as a deterrent to other countries seeking to dominate Pakistan. Pakistan’s objective is to see that no one aggresses against it and her alliance with the United States is not intended to be a threat against any country but simply a deterrent to possible aggression.

Continuing, President Ayub said that Pakistan had never given a thought to a military alliance with China and that in any event Pakistan has always thought that Communist China “couldn’t bring much against India.” He said that he did not know the situation along the vast borders between India and Communist China but had difficulty reconciling India’s military buildup with the dangers of Chinese aggression.

Mr. Ball said that he had talked to the President and that they had discussed the Tashkent meeting. We hope that something productive can come out of the meeting between President Ayub and Prime Minister Shastri. In our view the Soviets have a certain influence with India and he noted that the Soviets appear to be trying to increase their influence in Pakistan. There was, therefore, the possibility that the Soviets were beginning to use their influence to bring about an understanding between India and Pakistan. We welcomed an initiative of this kind and wished it well.2

At this point, Ayub commented that he had already understood this from a conversation between Ambassador Goldberg and Foreign [Page 508]Minister Bhutto. He said that Pakistan was quite prepared to go along with this initiative of the Soviet Union since it was a member of the Security Council, but he hoped that the United States and Britain would also take an initiative. He hoped that we would judge our relationship with Pakistan on the basis of a fundamental common interest, i.e., peace on the subcontinent, and that we should consider using our influence to bring this about. Pakistan was not irrevocably attached to the plebiscite. Arbitration might be acceptable. He said that even if there were a Kashmir settlement but no general reduction in weapons there would be a waste of effort in both India and Pakistan and both countries would be impoverished. Should there be war, both societies would be shattered and internal Communism would have its day. He then went back to his earlier point that there was nothing to stop the United States from taking the initiative and that the United States has more of a stake in the subcontinent than the Soviet Union.


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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Gerard » 15 Nov 2019 08:10

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XXV, SOUTH ASIA

289. Memorandum for Record - Washington, February 2, 1966.
The President indicated that he was “terribly proud” of what India did at Tashkent in moving toward reconciliation with the Paks. “Shastri died the right way in the cause of peace, not at the end of a gun barrel.” Ambassador Nehru replied that Mrs. Gandhi had asked him to tell the President that “India was going all-out to make Tashkent work.” The Indians hoped to withdraw well before 25 February. They were also proposing resumption of ministerial meetings and of transit overflights. Meanwhile, anti-Pak propaganda had been stopped.

The President discussed Ayub’s problems, remarked that one of these was that he had ended up almost an “advocate of India”. But Ayub had many difficulties with his own people. When he came to the US he was a chastened man, but also a proud one. He didn’t rebel or even argue, when the President told him he had to settle with India. Nehru remarked that what the President had done with Ayub had had considerable effect on Tashkent. The President hoped that Ayub wouldn’t lose his job as a result; Bhutto and others seemed to be a serious threat. Nehru said that the Indians realized they had to help Ayub, but India had a few problems of its own at home with hard- liners.

The Ambassador then made “two specific emergency requests.” The first was food. The US had given India 1.5 million tons in December, and the last would be shipped this week. Could the US give a firm public commitment on more, to cover at least till the end of June? If the US were unable to make a public commitment, it would promote hoarding and riots—as in Kerala. Of course, the Kerala crisis was partly food and partly politics. He explained that if the Indian people lacked confidence that sufficient wheat was coming, they would not give up their own stocks of rice and wheat for distribution. If India could have 5 million tons of wheat now, “it would take us up through June.” Second, the Ambassador claimed that there had been a freeze on all US aid, including what was pledged last year—about $500 million was outstanding. The Indian economy was running out of raw material. Factories were operating way below capacity and unemployment was up. Since it took eight months between the signing of a loan agreement and the actual arrival of the goods involved, India’s economic problems were bleak unless aid was started up again. These two problems were [Page 559]so urgent that the Prime Minister had asked Nehru to take them up right away. India also intended to talk with the World Bank shortly about its broader economic problems.


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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Gerard » 15 Nov 2019 08:14

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XXV, SOUTH ASIA

295. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State - Karachi, February 16, 1966, 1420Z.
In response to remarks by Governor Harriman, Ayub noted that Indian pressure of 1.2 million men under arms fantastically reduces Pak abilities enlarge its military and political commitments. Pak very security at stake. Pak greatly interested in Vietnam situation. In Peiping and Moscow, Ayub pointed out US had interests in Asia as world power. Pak will continue at least plead for moderation. Anytime ChiCom or Sov leaders pass through “we shall certainly continue these efforts.” Regarding matter of contribution Ayub noted that if Pak to do so it would incur enmity of Sov Union and Chinese and put itself in impossible situation with India as avowed enemy while US unable really underwrite Pak liabilities. (FonMin Bhutto noted parenthetically that following resumption of bombing GOP had not issued any adverse statement although India, member of ICC, had.)

Elsewhere Ayub noted Pak has accepted commitments and risks far beyond its military and economic power, vide instance U–2 incident. For sake US friendship Pak incurred wrath of USSR despite latter’s capacity destroy Pak. Pak was asked in 1961 contribute battalion for Laos and replied with offer of brigade. Unfortunately owing present problem with India, Pak ability do anything like that greatly reduced.

Ayub went on delineate difficulty Pak situation geographically split with 1400 miles of “not very friendly India” between wings. India constant open threat. If any of Pak’s big neighbors move, Paks in difficulty. Then too Pak is ideological state bordered by Communist neighbors USSR and China. Security important, but also a country must have good social and economic programs. Pakistan has been cited by many as outstanding example of effective economic development. US has been major contributor and Pak deeply grateful.

Tashkent, Indo-Pak Relations and Arms

Pak bedeviled by problem of how to find peace with India. Tashkent declaration (TD) good start which requires diplomatic followup. Pak has every intention follow through. Tashkent in interest whole region. Pak wants live in peace and only hopes India does too. But [Page 572]what is sense of fabulous Indian expenditures for armaments? Before 1962 India had ten divisions. Now has 21 plus three recently organized and talking about additional seven. Indians spending $2.6 million [billion?] for military purposes. Much of military equipment not suitable for use in Himalaya against Chinese. Some reduction in armed forces indicated in interests of all. In another connection Ayub enjoined VP tell Indians Paks “want peace” and indicated great achievement for all would ensue if US could persuade India be reasonable.

VP reminded Ayub of US gratitude concerning statesmanlike Tashkent. He pledged US would do everything possible to insure implementation of UNSC Sept 20 resolution and TD provisions. US does understand Pak problem and President Johnson greatly disturbed at possibility of arms race on sub-continent. [garble—He feels] India committed to TD and that India concerned over possibility ChiCom attack.


VP informed Ayub of US decision to relax ban on military shipments to permit some purchases non-lethal equipment. Ayub wondered what Pak to do with its fighters when US had given only three months supply of spare parts. “We can’t leave Pak defenseless; no country can allow that. If we can’t get what we must have from you then we must go elsewhere.” VP noted US taking look at whole picture and that as Tashkent proceeds it can take new look. US not trading but working with reality. We can take further look this spring or early summer and spring is just around corner.


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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Gerard » 15 Nov 2019 08:19

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XXV, SOUTH ASIA

299. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson - Washington, March 16, 1966.
India may, at any time, decide to embark on a nuclear weapons program. While we do not expect such a decision soon, barring major unexpected changes in the situation the US Intelligence Board estimates that on balance India probably will do so within the next few years. I concur in this assessment. At the same time, it remains in the interests of the United States to curb nuclear proliferation, and an Indian decision to manufacture nuclear weapons would increase the probability that other countries would also decide to do so.

I believe that we should, therefore, attempt to head off an Indian decision to produce nuclear weapons. To do so, we might in time have to be more responsive to Indian security needs, preferably in some way that will minimize our own commitment. However, we must recognize that this response would almost certainly involve an increased and more specific US commitment in the subcontinent and would entail important costs in terms of probable reactions of other states. The enclosed staff study2 reviews briefly our efforts to deal with this problem, defines the issue and sets forth the broad alternatives, and outlines some illustrative arrangements that could be considered if it is eventually decided to offer some form of nuclear sharing to India. I do not propose that you should now decide upon any one of these alternatives. These alternatives, including the possible nuclear sharing arrangements, are intended merely to illustrate for your background the possible general lines of action which may have to be considered.

I propose that when Mrs. Gandhi comes to Washington you let her know that we are sympathetic to her policy of using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only, and to her efforts to give priority to India’s economic needs and development.

I believe you should indicate that you agree that nuclear powers should try to work out some arrangements to safeguard the security interests of non-nuclear powers. As she is aware, we have raised the [Page 583]matter privately with the Soviet Union, and it has also been a subject of continuing discussion at Geneva.

I believe you should also say that in any case if a growing Chinese Communist nuclear capability should ever pose a serious threat to India, you hope she would frankly discuss the question with us so that we could examine together possible means to meet that threat without nuclear proliferation and without Indian assumption of the heavy economic and other burdens of a nuclear weapons program.

Implicit in the over-all question of assurances to India is the basic issue of what degree of nuclear support the United States is willing to proffer to non-nuclear nations. In this connection I recommend that you not offer India any bilateral nuclear assurances at this time.

You might also wish to tell Mrs. Gandhi that we are prepared to make available to her periodically (as we did for Prime Minister Shastri) intelligence on the Chinese Communist nuclear capability.

Secretary McNamara and Mr. Foster concur in this recommendation. (The Joint Chiefs of Staff would prefer not to offer India at this time any nuclear assurances beyond those given by you in October, 1964.) We would of course wish to continue to examine other possible arrangements outlined in the enclosed study. We will continue to study these alternatives.3


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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Gerard » 15 Nov 2019 08:23

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XXV, SOUTH ASIA

306. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson - Washington, March 27, 1966, 3 p.m.

Final Notes on Gandhi Visit. This is my valedictory as your Mid-East hand, but fittingly so because I don’t think there’s been a more important substantive meeting since Kennedy met Khrushchev in Vienna. The flow of people and memos citing this as a historic opportunity to settle on a new course with 500 million Asians suggests that this is more than a Chet Bowles promotion.

Moreover, I think that we finally have the Indians where you’ve wanted them ever since last April—with the slate wiped clean of previous commitments and India coming to us asking for a new relationship on the terms we want. Circumstances helped (famine and the Pak/Indian war), but seldom has a visit been more carefully prepared, nor the Indians forced more skillfully to come to us (note how little press backlash about US pressure tactics—when it’s been just that for almost a full year).

The proof is that India is now talking positively about buying all the World Bank reforms; its line is now that it wants to go boldly in this direction, but can only do so if the consortium will help pay the inevitable cost. This is precisely where we wanted to maneuver the Indians—into saying they’ll help themselves if we’ll respond in turn.

The Nature of the Economic Bargain. This is aptly described in Dean Rusk’s memo2 at Tab A. I’d only add two points. First, I’d break away from the old pledge figure (435) and talk privately in terms of around a half billion dollars from all US sources—it sounds more generous while the arithmetic is the same—plus at least half a billion in food. This is over $1 billion—a generous response in anyone’s league.

Second, I’d stress that this can be a self-enforcing bargain—in two critical respects. Most of our dollar loan aid plus debt rollover (and the consortium’s as well) can be tied directly to import liberalization, as we did with the Paks. If India doesn’t liberalize to our taste, it just doesn’t get the dough. Similarly, you have already proved how our holding back on PL–480 can force India into revolutionizing its agriculture. Once the famine is licked, I’m for continuing to ride PL–480 with a short rein—it will be painful but productive. If these points don’t add up to requiring self-help, I’ll eat them.

[Page 594]
That tough-minded George Woods and the World Bank are with us is reassuring. You’ve read the VP’s report on his talk with Woods,3 and at Tab B is Gaud’s memo4 on his views. Woods talks about “double or nothing” being the only sensible course on India aid, and it’s true that on any per capita basis our aid to India is very low (less than a dollar per person ex-food), while India’s own self-help contribution to its development is higher than that of almost any other LDC (twice that of Pakistan).

But as I explained the other day I think we can get real results in the next two years without going to Congress for a lot more money. Debt rollover is the backdoor financing key, and it’s the same as aid. If India takes off as a result of our strategy, then we’ll have a solid case to take to the Hill.

Political Conditions. We’re not going to get as much from Indira on the political side, especially on Vietnam and Pakistan. She’s new at being PM, scared of the coming elections, and lacking as yet in the confidence in her own position which would let her talk big. But we have a strong ally moving India toward us on these matters—Mao Tse-tung. Just as he forced the Soviets in our direction, he’s done the same with India. So the Indians are increasingly serious about China, and all we need do is nudge this trend along.

On Pakistan, the one thing that really gravels Indians—Dinesh Singh and B. K. Nehru are prime examples—is that we “equate” 500 million Indians with 100 million Paks. If you would just tell Mrs. Gandhi that we can count, it would reassure her enough about our basic intentions, that she’d stop any carping about our aid to the Paks.

If she raises military aid, I’d short circuit this by saying that it’s far less important than economic issues and we plan no decisions for a while, beyond perhaps allowing sales. Nor do we intend to re-arm Pakistan to where it can threaten India. In fact, we favor both countries putting a ceiling on military outlays; we don’t intend to finance an arms race indirectly via US economic aid. But India too must realize that forcing the Pak military to depend on Peking for arms would be folly from India’s own viewpoint.

She’s also ready to say in spades that India has no intention of taking over Pakistan. Get her to say so, and you can use it as powerful reassurance to Ayub. It’s the best you can get him, because she simply [Page 595]can’t give anything now on Kashmir (and it only creates useless trouble for us to try).

Emergency food is the trickiest problem. What’s needed is both to give her reasonable confidence that Uncle Sam will help generously and to keep enough pressure on her to seek other help and push on with reforms. The best bet is to say you’ll put it up to the Congress. But you should know that all your Executive Branch advisers are deeply worried lest Hill debate get out of hand, and create a sour aftermath to a successful visit. Even the sober Ellsworth Bunker reminded me of the 1951 experience when Mr. Truman went up for a $190 million food loan to India; Bunker said the violent criticisms voiced in the debate set back our political relations far more than the food helped fill bellies. Ellender talking about sacred cows certainly won’t help. You might ask Bunker about this.

You’re the judge on Congress. I’d only urge that we design the message to create the least flap and give you the most room to maneuver. This means avoiding tight formulas which box us in, since the worst of the famine is yet to come. Also, what happens if you ask for only 3.5 million tons of wheat/milo, and then want to authorize another tranche around September when Congress is out of session?

Visit tactics. All those who know her urge you see her alone first, put her at her ease, and then trigger her spiel by asking where she sees India going.

If she says the right things, you have a whole range of responses. I’d be generous but general, telling her that if she does what she says we’ll respond in kind. We’ll abide by what India works out with the World Bank (up to around a half billion—including debt rollover and EXIM).

The experts say there’s a strong case for moving quickly in May/June, before India gets caught up in its election campaign and Indira loses room to maneuver. So you might urge that she send her economics ministers pronto to talk with the World Bank.

I’m also sending up State’s briefing books, which have all the facts and background. You might want to reread the Strategy and Talking papers. I’ll have an agenda for tomorrow’s 10 a.m. pre-briefing session, at which we can clear up any last-minute points.


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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Gerard » 15 Nov 2019 08:29

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XXV, SOUTH ASIA

170. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson - Washington, August 19, 1965, 5 p.m.
Kashmir crisis. This mess may yet get much worse, which could change the whole bidding on visits. The Pak infiltration effort to stir up a local revolt seems to have failed so far, but the Paks are still at it and the Indians are retaliating.


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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XXV, SOUTH ASIA

176. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson - Washington, August 31, 1965, 4 p.m.
We just got some very disturbing reports that Paks have decided to escalate in Kashmir by throwing in regulars, because they can’t otherwise cope with Indian retaliation across the cease-fire line.

[Page 343]
The rationale is that the Paks, having failed to spark a “war of liberation” via a Kashmiri uprising, may now feel they’ve got to enter the lists directly to forestall a humiliating failure. CIA believes that the Pak generals are very unhappy with their bum intelligence and with the failure of the Ayub/Bhutto gambit to stir up Kashmir.

But Pak escalation would trigger a critical Pak/Indian crisis—though still one big step short of a Pak/Indian war. There’s a case for sitting back a while longer and letting both Paks and Indians face up to the awesome risks involved. These might make both more malleable vis-à-vis us. On the other hand, the chances of an explosion are great enough so that we ought to push the UN hardest to intervene—and perhaps the UK too. We could supplement by private blasts at both Paks and Indians. My impression is that we’re not moving fast enough on this one (Goldberg was to see U Thant today, but we didn’t yet have the new alarming reports).


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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Gerard » 15 Nov 2019 08:34

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XXV, SOUTH ASIA

177. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State - New Delhi, September 1, 1965, 1635Z.
446. At 2000 hrs Delhi time today I called on ForMin Swaran Singh and Foreign Secy C.J. Jha and registered urgent plea for Indian restraint in dealing with Pakistan armored attack which was launched this morning north of Jammu.2 I made following points:

1.
Paks were clearly guilty of training large number of guerrilla infiltrators and sending them across cease-fire line and deep into Kashmir Valley.
2.
Although India’s action in seizing control of key infiltration points and breaking up supply lines on Pak side of cease-fire line may have been logical from purely military point of view it was serious political mistake. Paks already embarrassed by failure of their guerrilla effort were almost bound to react elsewhere and this they have now done.
3.
India now faces historic decision which will affect her future and that of South Asia for generation to come. Counter thrust by India at some more favorable point either on cease-fire line or international boundary, will almost certainly touch off war that would soon be out of control. If on other hand India makes it clear that it has no desire to extend fighting and earnestly seeks peaceful solution, situation may still be brought under control.
Swaran Singh, while defending India’s thrust across cease-fire line as militarily necessary to stop infiltration, accepted my analysis, and asserted that India has no further moves in mind and is prepared to meet Pakistan more than half way.

However, supported by C.S. Jha, he strongly protested use by Paks of US Patton tanks, and asked what we would do to carry out our assurances that we would not permit US military equipment to be used against India unless India were clearly the aggressor. I replied I had fully informed my government and I was certain that situation would be carefully investigated.

Swaran Singh continued to press his point, asserting that only US was in position to restrain Pak Army which thanks to its American equipment had certain advantages over Indians particularly in tanks and planes.

I then switched conversation back to central point, i.e. that India had big decision to make; counter thrust in response to today’s action by Paks or reasonable posture that could save subcontinent from bitter conflict. Whatever arguments of tactical military necessity might be advanced, I was profoundly hopeful that political judgments would be overriding. Even if Paks refuse to negotiate and choose path toward war, India’s position at least would be clear and world-wide support would be assured in whatever might follow.

Bowles


Four hours earlier, General Chadhury, Chief of the Indian Army Staff, had called in General Johnson, Chief of the U.S. Military Supply Mission in India, and informed him that Pakistan had launched an attack spearheaded by a regiment of MAP-supplied M-48 Patton tanks in the Chhamb area at the juncture of the cease-fire line in Kashmir and the international border between the two countries. Chadhury stated that India was not using any U.S.-supplied military equipment in the conflict. At the time of Chadhury’s report, Pakistani forces were about 3 miles across the cease-fire line. (Telegram 444 from New Delhi, September 1; ibid.) When Defense Minister Chavan reported the attack in the Indian Parliament at noon on the following day, he indicated that Pakistani forces had driven 5 miles across the cease-fire line. (Telegram 455 from New Delhi, September 2; ibid


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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Gerard » 15 Nov 2019 08:55

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XXV, SOUTH ASIA

180. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India - Washington, September 3, 1965, 6:38 p.m.
Ambassador Nehru called on Secretary September 3 under instructions discuss Kashmir situation and Pak use of MAP equipment in fighting. Nehru’s opening presentation made following points: a) he reviewed development current fighting in Kashmir, as seen by GOI, beginning with infiltration Pak guerrillas; said Paks apparently trying cut both Jammu-Poonch road and Jammu-Srinagar road. If former road cut, India would lose contact with major segment of cease-fire line (CFL); if latter road cut GOI would lose contact with whole of Kashmir. Nehru said GOI could not allow Paks to cut road to Srinagar. If Paks do, India will have to move across international boundary in Punjab to cut off Pak forces on Srinagar road; b) Nehru said he had not yet received word on GOI reply to SYG’s appeal; added that his general instructions this regard are that GOI quite prepared to respect CFL if Paks do. However, GOI cannot accept distinction between “forces in civilian clothes and regular forces.” Nehru then said GOI cannot withdraw unless Paks do; c) re Pak use of MAP equipment Nehru reviewed discussions he had had on this subject with Secretary and Assistant Secretary Talbot during Kutch dispute. Nehru said “We have to know where we stand on this once and for all. Here is clear cut case of your assurances not being fulfilled.” He said questions of assurances is a matter between India and US, and not between India and Pakistan.

Nehru then said, speaking personally rather than under instructions, “How are we to get a cease-fire? They (i.e. Paks) have your equipment and probably military advantage in Kashmir. If Paks do not [Page 349]stop, as we told them years back, India will attack across international border. We will have to do that unless you can stop them.”

In reply Secretary said USG very much aware of MAP aspect of problem; said he had been talking to the President about this and we have discussed it with GOP. Secretary said he did not want to give off cuff reply on MAP assurances questions. Secretary then said larger problem is to get peace established regardless of weapons being used. That is why we are supporting the SYG’s appeal for cease-fire. When Nehru interjected that MAP assurances question was related but separate issue, Secretary acknowledged point but said if fighting continues both sides are going to use whatever equipment they have. Secretary added that MAP equipment now in US ports not relevant to question of fighting. Secretary then said that if larger problem of fighting solved in context SYG’s appeal, smaller problems will fall into place. Secretary expressed hope that GOI will announce publicly today acceptance of SYG’s appeal. He notes that SYG’s private report and General Nimmo’s report included question of infiltrators. Secretary said it very important for Delhi to make it clear that GOI accepts SYG’s appeal.

Nehru asked how peace could be achieved unless Paks accept SYG’s appeal; said Paks have not yet done so. Secretary said if GOI accepts and Paks do not then UN machinery comes into play to get acceptance and compliance on the ground. Nehru asked how sanctions would be applied to Paks if they only say yes to SYG’s appeal and do not actually comply. Secretary responded that for seventeen years neither India nor Pakistan has heeded our advice on Kashmir dispute and said we cannot control tanks from ten thousand miles away. Secretary said he could not be more precise at this time as to what USG would do if Paks do not comply with SYG’s appeal; said if it gets to that point where he could be more precise he would let Nehru know.

Secretary then asked whether infiltrators had expected popular uprising in Kashmir and said it our understanding that infiltrators were rather easily blunted and contained by GOI. If this the case, why did India move across CFL? Nehru replied that India had moved across CFL at main infiltration points to prevent further infiltration and cut off those infiltrators already on Indian side of CFL. Nehru said India had no intention of invading Azad Kashmir to re-occupy territory and that moves only designed to protect against infiltration.

Nehru asked for clarification of news report he had seen that USG investigating reports of use of MAP equipment by both sides. Secretary replied we have had allegations concerning both sides and added we had sent couple of observers to investigate.

Secretary returned to question of SYG’s appeal, saying it would put GOI in strong position to come back promptly with affirmative reply. He added that if only one side accepts SYG’s appeal this would [Page 350]not adversely affect its position on ground but in terms of UN and international machinery it would tend to shift things in favor of the side which accepts SYG appeal.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Gerard » 15 Nov 2019 08:58

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XXV, SOUTH ASIA

181. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State - New Delhi, September 4, 1965, 1237Z.
Comment: I do not dare predict how Indians in last analysis will react. In spite of Shastri’s calm appearance, mood here in Delhi is one of frustrated militance; there is strong feeling even among normally sober people that once new ceasefire is established, Paks will turn to some new form of military harassment and that process will go on indefinitely.

Faced with this situation Shastri has taken strong and not unreasonable position, i.e., that Nimmo report which makes no bones about Pakistan’s responsibility for training and sending in large guerrilla unit should be made public and that based on facts established by this report, Paks should then agree to remove infiltrators from Valley and from Jammu. Indians and Pak troops should at such stage be withdrawn to their own side of ceasefire line, and then some new policing system involving adequate personnel and perhaps establishment of mile wide neutral belt would be set up in place of present ineffective system.

However this combination is admittedly difficult one for Paks to swallow since they have officially denied there are any infiltrators from Pakistan on Indian-held territory and are still insisting that whole Valley is in wild revolt against Indians under leadership of non-existent Kashmir revolutionary govt.

I again suggest that if Indians come through with reasonable presentation at Security Council as I earnestly hope they will, Paks can [Page 354]be persuaded to agree to ceasefire only by application of some kind of sanctions by US, by US and UK, or by UN generally.

https://history.state.gov/historicaldoc ... 68v25/d181

Gerard
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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Gerard » 15 Nov 2019 08:59

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XXV, SOUTH ASIA

182. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson - Washington, September 4, 1965, 4 p.m.

Pak/Indian SitRep. While the Pak Army thrust toward the only key road into Kashmir was halted temporarily, they seem to be resuming their drive. Meanwhile both nations are in effect mobilizing. Another issue is whether the Indians will retaliate or try the UN cease-fire route.

Bowles is doing a bang-up job of pleading restraint with the Indians. He’s telling them that war would set back both countries for a generation. The Indian reply to the SYG’s cease-fire appeal is fuzzy and argumentative, but it does seem largely responsive to the SYG so long as the withdrawal includes the Pak infiltrators who started the affair.

Meanwhile the Indians are raising a public storm over Pakistan’s “US-supplied” tanks and planes. This is inevitable, and will build up quite a head of steam. We’ll get insistent queries in the SC on it.

As for the Paks, they seem hell bent on forcing a Kashmir negotiation—whatever the cost. They see themselves as compelled to this desperate gamble by their inability to get any negotiated settlement over the last 17 years. Thus the odds are that the Paks won’t accept the cease-fire appeal unless it includes a new Kashmir negotiation. It is essentially an exercise in brinkmanship. All this seems clear from Bhutto’s hortatory speech saying this is hour of reckoning, and in effect rejecting the 1949 CFL which the UN and the rest of us are frantically attempting to restore.

State may propose you send a friendly reply to Ayub’s letter,2 for delivery by McConaughy when he sees Ayub Monday.3 It would urge [Page 355]compliance with the SYG’s appeal. This makes sense, but the real issue is whether McConaughy should also take a vigorous stand on use of our MAP equipment and US/Pak relations, or should simply listen.

The State experts now fear that a vigorous stand might drive the Paks to even more desperate action. I wouldn’t underestimate these risks; there’s a good case for playing it cautiously at a time when passions are running so high. But my own sense is that one reason the Paks are causing such trouble is that they don’t yet realize what thin ice they’re on with us. Thus sobering words from McConaughy and then the British (who see Ayub Tuesday) would serve more as a restraint than as a goad. So my instinct would be for McConaughy to hit Ayub at least on US/Pak relations, as an indirect means of sobering him on Kashmir. But playing it cautiously at a moment of high tension may be the safer course.

https://history.state.gov/historicaldoc ... 68v25/d182

Gerard
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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Gerard » 15 Nov 2019 09:02

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XXV, SOUTH ASIA

186. Memorandum Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency - OCI No. 2316/65 - Washington, September 6, 1965.
POSSIBLE SINO-PAKISTANI MILITARY ARRANGEMENT

1.
A series of clandestine reports received since early 1964 indicates a possible secret Sino-Pakistani mutual defense agreement of some kind. It seems probable, however, that any such understanding would be very loose and cast in terms which provide Peiping maximum latitude in deciding when or whether it might come into force.
2.
It appears from the reports that US involvement in support of Indian military operations would be a key element in any Chinese undertaking to help Pakistan. China’s behavior toward Pakistan, although very friendly, has been marked by caution in matters which involve mutual defense questions. Chinese commentary on the Rann of Kutch crisis appeared calculated to provide political backing for Pakistan while avoiding any commitment of Chinese military support. In the present Kashmir fighting, Chinese commentary has so far been [Page 360]largely limited to reportorial accounts of the clashes which are slanted to show that the Indians are the culpable party.2
3.
We believe, nonetheless, that some secret understanding exists between Peiping and Rawalpindi. Moreover, we foresee that however loose and “uncommitted” the Chinese may have kept themselves, the understanding gives Pakistan something which Rawalpindi can consider an “ace in the hole” in the present confrontation. At minimum, this could produce a feeling of greater confidence in Rawalpindi than is warranted either by the terms of the understanding or Pakistan’s present military advantage in the Jammu area. At worst, it could make Pakistan utterly foolhardy.
4.
A chronological record of the reporting on this subject is at annex.3

https://history.state.gov/historicaldoc ... 68v25/d186

Gerard
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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Gerard » 15 Nov 2019 09:04

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XXV, SOUTH ASIA

188. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan - Washington, September 6, 1965, 2:28 p.m.
290. Rawalpindi’s 37.2 You should respond as follows to GOP request for USG action pursuant our assurances to Pakistan:

(1)
Like Ayub, we are deeply disturbed at most drastic and grave turn that has occurred in the situation between India and Pakistan. Point has now been reached that risks disaster for both Pakistan and India. Situation requires most sober reassessments both Pakistan and Indian leadership before it too late;
(2)
In accordance with our assurances to Pakistan we are acting urgently, as we said we would, to meet this common danger by full support for immediate UN action to end the hostilities; that must be first objective of all concerned;
(3)
We regard Indian military strike across Punjab frontier as most serious development. To meet situation effectively, however, Paks and we need to be completely frank with each other. We must view India’s attacks across Pak border in over-all context events past few weeks. It clear from UNSYG report3 that immediate crisis began with substantial infiltration of armed men from the Pakistan side. We aware India first put regular forces across CFL but Pak responses thereto in Chhamb area struck at points India considered vital, and Indians have long asserted (a) they could not tolerate continued Pak offensive, and (b) if Pakistan should strike India’s vital interests, India would have no choice but to respond in area of its own choosing. GOP must have been well aware of risk involved in its own actions in Jammu and Kashmir;
(4)
To have any chance of averting immediate prospect of sheer disaster for both Pakistan and India, which would also have grave repercussions for Free World security in Asia, appeal of UNSC must be honored by both parties. We urgently ask Pakistan’s cooperation by immediate and full acceptance of UNSC’s resolutions.4 This will assist us to act effectively.
(5)
We are fully aware, as President indicated in his letter to Ayub,5 relationship unresolved Kashmir dispute to present tension. But neither we nor any other friends both parties can assist in coping with this or other root causes of Indo-Pak tensions without immediate and respected cease-fire and withdrawal of forces both sides.
(6)
We have appealed to Shastri for India’s immediate cooperation with UN efforts.
(7)
Our subsequent actions will depend in first instance on response both countries to UN efforts.6

https://history.state.gov/historicaldoc ... 68v25/d188


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