1965 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

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ramana
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Re: 1965 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

Chapter 14 gives the list of gallantry awards and we hardly knew about many of them.
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/archives/ ... pter14.pdf
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Re: 1965 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

Chapter 12 gives the final assessment. Quite brutal.
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/archives/ ... pter12.pdf
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Re: 1965 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by Rakesh »

Unheard tale of INDIAN AIR FORCE deep strike in PAKISTAN

ramana
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Re: 1965 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

On shelling of Dwarka port and importance of the port.

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/histo ... #gsc.tab=0

Best comment in the article:
After the day break, the villagers started bringing the shells from their fields after digging them out of the ground carrying them on their shoulders. We collected almost 25 to 30 shells. They were displayed in front the Guard Room for the public to take a look. The amusing thing about them was that they bore the marking “INDIAN ORDINANCE” and were dated 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943, 1945, 1946 and so on. These shells were all pre-partition ammunition that was given to Pakistan during the partition in 1947. It turned out that the Indian ammunition was LOYAL to India. None of them exploded to harm its country.
In fairness, the ammo would be 20 to 25 years old and usually, its shelf life is 10 years!!!
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Re: 1965 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

The SNEB 68mm rockets fired from Hunters, Mystere, Canberra etc:

http://www.ordtech-industries.com/2prod ... /LR68.html
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Re: 1965 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

ACM P.C. Lal account of the 1965 war from IAF higher command perspective.

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/histo ... #gsc.tab=0
A critical look at the 1965 operations
Written by Air Chief Marshal P C Lal

Air Chief Marshal P C Lal at the National Security Lecture 1973 at the USI.



Early in 1965, Pakistan attacked us in Kutch, in Western India. The attack caught the armed forces unawares. The Army took the field without any prior planning or preparation. Its reaction was fast but there was no joint Army-Air Force plan, and all that the Air Force could do was to provide logistic support with light aircraft. The possibility of tactical support was considered after the fighting began. It was then realised that our bases were so far from the battle zone that our aircraft would have to operate at extreme range with reduced weapon loads while Pakistani aircraft could dominate the entire combat area from bases close by. Given time, we could also have improvised an airfield or two In or near Kutch, but the fighting ended before that. The incident was soon defused but, apparently, not before It had encouraged Pakistan in the belief that the time had come to settle the Kashmir dispute by force of arms.

Then In August and September 1965 came the Second Kashmir War. It began with skirmishes in the valley by so-called freedom fighters, in reality, agents of Pakistan. These were followed, towards the end of August, by an all-out attack by Pakistani armour in the Chamb area of Jammu province, with the obvious objective of cutting the Jammu-Srinagar highway. Our Army, working under the restrictions of the Cease Fire Agreement, was lightly equipped in that sector and though it fought valiantly, its AMX tanks were no match for the more powerful Pakistani Pattons. While there was some hope of the Army holding the Pakistani attack on its own, there was no talk of bringing the Air Force Into the conflict. But on 1st September, with the Pakistanis pressing forward from Jaurian, General Chaudhuri, the Army Chief, was compelled to ask for air support.

There had been no prior joint planning for such an eventuality. Air Marshal Arjan Singh, the Air Chief, had on his own alerted the airbases in the Punjab. When the call came, a force of fighter bombers from Pathankot mounted a strike on the Pakistanis within minutes of being ordered to do so. It was a touch-and-go affair because the demand for air support came late in the afternoon and the strike had to be mounted in an area with which our pilots were not familiar. With only a few minutes of daylight left, they could have missed the battle zone or attacked the wrong targets. Fortunately, they did neither and so helped to bring the Pakistani force to a halt.

At this point, it is interesting to consider in somewhat greater detail why there was no prior planning of Army -Air operations even though, as General Chaudhari said In his 1971 National Security Lecture, he expected the Pakistanis to attack In Kashmir after the Kutch Incident. Basically, I think. It was because he and his commanders were wedded to the idea that military operations were principally an Army affair and that the other services could only operate on the fringe, as it were, with an occasional bonus from the Air Force. This was compounded by a big-brother attitude towards the Air Force which led to its being treated with a certain amount of indulgence but prevented it from being accepted as a vital and equal partner in war. Matters were further complicated by the belief that If the Indian Air Force took part In the fighting then the Pakistani Air Force would do likewise, thus Increasing the likelihood of a general war between the two countries instead of a localised conflict in J & K. There was a good deal of truth in this, of course, but this was a possibility from which there was no escape. Indeed, this was a possibility that could not be ignored for Pakistan had already been warned that any attack on Jammu and Kashmir would be treated as an attack on India. With a political direction as clear as that on the record, it was incumbent on the Chiefs of Staff to have their plans ready for such a contingency. The fact that they did not is indicative of the thinking at the time.

{ I disagree in hindsight. Both Kutch and Kashmir started out as ground actions and it was IA that had to respond quickly. Besides MAF Arjan Singh has stated clearly that there was a telephonic agreement in March 1965 not to involve IAF to prevent escalation. He also clarified in 2007 it was for Kutch only. Yet reading the accounts of many IAF officers, the 1965 orders were not to attack PAF airfields and to attack targets of opportunity. ACM Lal must be aware of the orders. Yet he writes this above critique!
IA had to ask for air support on 1 September as Pakistan had launched Operation Grand Slam. To keep harping on no joint plans is beating a dead horse. Till 1 September the war was ground action only! Ok after IA seeking support IAF sent obsolete Vampires without air cover knowing that PAF Sabres were there. How about that? And let us talk about how much difference IAF did make in the 1965 war? The exception was Chamb and the supply train attack en route to Asal Uttar, not much unlike in 1971 Longewala. Most of the sorites were like Duke of York flying CAP instead of attacking PAF airbases. IAF took 30 years to recognize Sq. Ldr. Devayya shooting down an F-104. No interest in finding out what happened to him! Except for a chance bar recounting in the UK, it would never be known. And even then he was awarded MVC and not the PVC for his extreme bravery.
It was ACM PC Lal's bitterness at Gen. J.N. Chaudhri that set the tone for the relationship between IA and IAF even now and spoils the CDS and theater commands reforms.}



The events In the Chamb-Jaurlan sector leading to the call for air support took matters out of the Army's hands. At that stage, the Government had to decide whether to enlarge the area of conflict, and it did so without hesitation. That, indeed, appeared to be the only way to divert Pakistani forces from the vulnerable Jammu-Srinagar highway, the loss of which would have jeopardised the defence of the Valley. With the decision to fight Pakistan outside J & K, the Army had to move up forces from peacetime stations, some from the Deccan and further south, and formulate an operational plan at short notice.

{Again what took out of the Army's hands? In case ACM did not know IA units had been moved from peacetime locations long ago as Operation Riddle which was formulated right during Rann of Kutch. The fact Ist Armoured was launched on 6th Sept is proof of that. It was not a sudden move after 1st September. Launching Operation Riddle was the contingency plan even during Rann of Kutch.}

During the five days that elapsed between the Government decision and the date set for Implementing it, there was some discussion of how the Army and the Air Force should operate. On the Army side, the notion persisted that it would fight on its own, with the Air Force providing an occasional bonus; and in the Air Force, where I was Vice-Chief, we thought of fighting mainly an air war against the PAF and what we considered to be strategic targets, assigning relatively low priority to support the Army. Separate plans were hastily drawn up by each Service with no Joint consultation worth the name. And again, no tasks were envisaged for the Navy.

{So by his own account as a participant in planning in the five days before 6th September, there were no joint plans. And IAF assigned low priority to support for Army! And despite the IAF's decision to attack strategic targets the orders issued on 6th September to IAF were to not attack airfields but attack target of opportunity. Strange way to attack strategic targets of PAF. }


Please note that In 1965, the higher defence organisation was functioning and the Chiefs of Staff Committee met regularly under the chairmanship of General Chaudhuri. Officers In positions of authority had read and studied and taught the procedures for inter-service co-operation. It was not realised, however, that even when the general drill is known, each particular task still requires a great deal of preparatory work, that the persons taking part need to be trained for It, and that supporting facilities have to be arranged for In advance, and this has to be done for every contingency that can be envisaged. Flexibility in battle Is gained only through long and arduous preparation.

That we discovered when we entered Pakistan. Soon the Army found that it could not fight entirely on its own, for the PAF was constantly harassing It. The Army needed air defence and tactical support but no detailed arrangements-had been made for either. The Air Force was willing to help and it did all it could but in the absence of joint plans, large gaps remained in the air cover in the combat zone. Neither did the air operations, through which we hoped to immobilize the PAF and reduce Pakistan's ability to make war, achieve much for we had no well thought out target system for the purpose. Having had some responsibility for all this, I must confess that the air war became a somewhat hit-and-miss affair, that depended heavily on finding targets of opportunity for its success. The aircrew performed magnificently, doing all that was expected of them and more; had there been a coherent joint war plan, we would have derived much fuller benefit from their courage and sacrifice.


{ IA needed air defence from PAF. Obviously, the IAF targets should be PAF airbases to prevent PAF attacks on IA. What targets of opportunity is ACM talking about? Transportation for PA ie bridges, rail links oil stores etc should be attacked. That is not a target of opportunity. I wonder if he was thinking of planes flying around and attacking what they can find?}


Our advance Into Pakistan caught the Pakistani forces by surprise. I Imagine they had not thought the Indian Government and Armed Forces capable of swift decisions and speedy action. The initial successes of our Army were soon checked by stiff resistance, a notable feature of which was the close co-operation between the Pakistani Army and Air Force. The two of them had obviously done their homework well for our jawans reported that the PAF were quick to appear whenever the Pakistani ground forces were In difficulties and gave them most effective support. This was the more remarkable because unlike our set-up. In which all three Service Chiefs and their Headquarters were based at Delhi, the Pakistani Air Chief was located at Peshawar, the Army Chief at Islamabad, near Rawalpindi, and the Naval Chief at Karachi. The fact that their forces managed to work well together speaks well for their mutual understanding, which is more important than physical proximity. Furthermore, since Pakistan had been the one to start the fighting In J & K, it Is to be presumed that Its Service Chiefs had given some thought to the possibility of a more widespread conflict and prepared for It accordingly.

{Looks like poor excuses for the self-admitted hit and miss performance.}

Despite Its preparations, however, Pakistan failed to make any inroads In J & K and just about held its own elsewhere. We advanced up to the Ichhogil canal. West Pakistan's first line of defence, and towards Sialkot. Pakistani forces came into Indian territory around Gadra Road in Rajasthan. Except for a single PAF attack on an Indian Air Force base near Calcutta, there was no fighting In the east. Our Navy had no operational tasks but suffered a sea-borne attack at Dwarka In the west. The fighting was brought to a halt by 22nd September, the Army having been engaged in combat for nearly a month and a half and the Air Force for 22 days. At the turn of the year came the Tashkent agreement, negotiated by our then Prime Minister, the late Mr Lal Bahadur Shastri.

{Ok about the Calcutta air raid. How come the planes were all lined up as if for a parade? No awareness of the base commander that there is a war going on and there is active PAF in East Pakistan? Things were heating up since Rann of Kutch in April 1965. Also why Pathankot base commander denied the Gnat squadron permission to fly CAP despite repeated requests? What stopped him? Was it the fear of escalation in higher command? Above para is a glib statement when it is the IA that bore the brunt of the fighting in August and stopped the Intruders and captured Haji Pir pass and that led to Operation Grand Slam being launched.}


In retrospect, it is clear that the 1965 war was successful as a defensive action, for it managed to preserve the status quo In Kashmir, but the operations In the Punjab and Rajasthan were Inconclusive. We failed to make a real dent In Pakistan's forces, both on the ground and in the air. The Navy being far removed from Kashmir took no part In the fighting.

{On the contrary 1965 was really a war in Punjab and showed Pak that it can't win a long war. And why does he keep harping IN took no role when it was clear from beginning to confine the war to land and air and to only the Western Sector?}

With the benefit of hindsight, we can now see what part the higher defence organisation played in the 1965 war. Frankly, I do not think It made any significant contribution. I say this after careful thought, knowing that one of our distinguished Army Chiefs, General J N Chaudhuri, was then Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Even at the risk of his displeasure, I must say that he failed to get the organisation working as It should have done. The General himself admits as much, without meaning to. In the published version of the National Security lectures that he delivered in this institution In 1971. He said In those lectures that he saw the Kutch incident as a prelude to an attack by Pakistan in Jammu. and Kashmir, and he, therefore, began the Army's preparations well in advance. He omits to mention that the Air Force and the Navy were kept in the dark about this.{Were the IAF and IN removed from Delhi or were they wearing blinders and could not see war clouds?} He goes on to say that he often discussed the threat with the Defence Minister and the Prime Minister and that, once in a while, he took the Air Chief along with him. {i]{So what efforts did the Air Chief start after those meetings? This belies ACM Lal's assertion that IAF was kept out of the planning.}[i/]The impression conveyed Is that he looked upon the Impending conflict as an Army affair, in which the use of the Air Force would be Incidental. To my mind, this reflects an attitude long prevalent in the Army, and only recently dissipated, to the effect that Its larger size and greater age gave It a commanding superiority over the other services and Invested It with the sole right to decide how wars should be fought. I may be reading too much Into a single statement, but to me It is axiomatic that effective co-operation between the Services can grow only out of mutual trust and full understanding of each others capabilities and limitations. I think that was lacking In 1965.

In any case, the Air Force and Navy, not having been alerted about the possibility of another war over Kashmir, no inter-service contingency plans were drawn up, nor was any course of action agreed upon with the Air Force in the event of Its being called out to support the Army.{i]{ Here the higher command attitude of someone telling them war is on the horizon and not seeing the signs is most problematic. That is the bigger failure. Trying to shift the blame on IA is sad.}[/i] This mental block against consultation and joint planning continued right through the phase of guerrilla activity and was only partly removed when Pakistani armour threatened to cut the Jammu-Srinagar highway. It was at that critical stage, on 1st September 1965, that the Air Force was asked for air support, which It gave at short notice. Complaints from our forward troops about the limited extent of air cover in the war that followed were well-founded, for in the absence of precise plans the Air Force had simply maintained Its normal forces at its bases in Punjab and in Jammu and Kashmir. To do Its job properly, some redeployment of squadrons and of logistic and communication facilities should have been effected before the commencement of hostilities. {IAF could have done this in the five days after 1 September but did not shows the Vice Chief's responsibility.} Had the joint planners been able to do their work In advance, I am certain more positive results would have been achieved In 1965. However, apart from preserving the status quo in Kashmir, the 1965 war was valuable for the many practical lessons it taught us In the conduct of operations from the highest level to combat in the field. In the years that followed these lessons were absorbed and applied.
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Re: 1965 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

https://twitter.com/ramana_brf/status/1 ... 1GAbw&s=19

Very informative thread on Battle of Punjab in 1965...
The war was fought in both West and East Punjab mainly. Kashmir was a sideshow.
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Re: 1965 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

It would be good for military analysts to study the Pakistan strategy in 1965, 1971, and 1999 at a higher level.
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Re: 1965 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by ArjunPandit »

ramana wrote:It would be good for military analysts to study the Pakistan strategy in 1965, 1971, and 1999 at a higher level.
all the more important to revisit it in light of a long drawn war in rus/ukr war...bring those goddarn artillery guns and tejas in large no.s asap
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Re: 1965 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

A treasure trove of papers on the 1965 war by former officers.
Need to read and digest the lessons and information.

https://indianarmy.nic.in/Site/FormTemp ... ov0aWdfQ==
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Re: 1965 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

IAF more than willing: AM VK Bhatia:

https://indianarmy.nic.in/writereaddata ... 230915.pdf

Pakistan's Strategic Blunder by Maj Gen Chakravorty

https://indianarmy.nic.in/writereaddata ... 230915.pdf
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Re: 1965 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

Air Marshal Tiwary on IAF support to Army

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spot ... -than-paf/

Air Marshal Tiwary on IAF operations:

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spot ... -1965-war/
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Re: 1965 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by SRajesh »

A friend of mine sent some info
Just wanted to check with Indian Army History Buffs
Is it true that PM Shastri disbanded Muslim Regiment in the Indian Army after 30,000 defected to Pak during the war with their arms and ammunition!!
Also did Banditiji suppress perfidy of the Shanthidooth in that killing their brother Gurkha officers and soldiers during 1947 war!! in the Muslim Regiment
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Re: 1965 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by shaun »

Rsatchi wrote:A friend of mine sent some info
Just wanted to check with Indian Army History Buffs
Is it true that PM Shastri disbanded Muslim Regiment in the Indian Army after 30,000 defected to Pak during the war with their arms and ammunition!!
Also did Banditiji suppress perfidy of the Shanthidooth in that killing their brother Gurkha officers and soldiers during 1947 war!! in the Muslim Regiment
I don't think any Muslim regiment was there at that time , maybe feeding paki propaganda
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Re: 1965 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by Aditya_V »

As far I know there was never a "Muslim Regiment" in the Indian army and such History has been generated by Whatsapp University
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Re: 1965 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by SRajesh »

Aditayji
Thanks for the clarification.
I have informed the chap to stop forwarding such scurrilous messages.
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Re: 1965 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by ArjunPandit »

Rsatchi wrote:A friend of mine sent some info
Just wanted to check with Indian Army History Buffs
Is it true that PM Shastri disbanded Muslim Regiment in the Indian Army after 30,000 defected to Pak during the war with their arms and ammunition!!
Also did Banditiji suppress perfidy of the Shanthidooth in that killing their brother Gurkha officers and soldiers during 1947 war!! in the Muslim Regiment
there were muslim dominated regiments till 47-48 which moved to pk post partition ..those left, esp like gilgit scouts, had shown their true colors
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Re: 1965 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by rohitvats »

Rsatchi wrote:A friend of mine sent some info
Just wanted to check with Indian Army History Buffs
Is it true that PM Shastri disbanded Muslim Regiment in the Indian Army after 30,000 defected to Pak during the war with their arms and ammunition!!
Also did Banditiji suppress perfidy of the Shanthidooth in that killing their brother Gurkha officers and soldiers during 1947 war!! in the Muslim Regiment
- There has never been a Muslim Regiment in either the British Indian Army (BIA) or independent India's Army.
- Some British infantry battalions might have had 50% Muslims but the British were clever enough to ensure that within each battalion, there were counter-weight at sub-unit level.
- For example, under BIA, an infantry battalion might have a Company each of Punjabi Musalman. Balochis (Muslims), Hindu Jats and Hindu Rajput or Sikhs.
- This reduced the probability of a battalion revolting or mutiny as a whole.
-------
- The other part of your question actually refers to the incidence of mutiny and desertion by Muslim troops of Jammu & Kashmir State Forces.
- In many a cases, the Muslim troops of the J&K State Force battalions actively colluded with Pakistanis and simply handed over their posts to the advancing Pakistani proxies or the Pakistan Army elements.
- Many critical areas of J&K that we lost before intervention by Indian in 1947 was because of the betrayal of Muslim troops and officers.
- It is also true that in many a cases, they killed the Hindu (Dogra and Gurkha) and Sikh troops of in their battalions
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Re: 1965 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

I have read many books on the Patton M-48 tank.
Most of them don't mention the mauling at Assal Uttar.
However, go into depth about Israeli usage of much-modified Pattons!!
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Re: 1965 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by nachiket »

ramana wrote:I have read many books on the Patton M-48 tank.
Most of them don't mention the mauling at Assal Uttar.
However, go into depth about Israeli usage of much-modified Pattons!!
There were Pattons on both sides during the Six day war. The Jordanians used M-48's too. Difference being the Israelis had upgunned theirs with the 105mm L7 gun. The same one we used to upgun our Centurions. The Jordanian Pattons got mauled badly by Israeli centurions. Eventually it matters who is using the tank and how.
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Re: 1965 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

Err IA did not have the up-gunned 105mm L7 Centurions. They fought with 84mm guns.
The first L7 guns were on the Vijayanta and later T-55s.
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Re: 1965 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

Now that 67 years have passed since the 1965 war, we should examine if the IA and IAF had a strategy to defeat the Pakistani forces.
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Re: 1965 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

I have to read this book.



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Re: 1965 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

My years with IAF by ACM PC Lal
1971 War: Planning for Operations

Read more at:
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spot ... rations/2/
But in 1965, we had discovered that overemphasis on the role of the bomber, and faith in its effectiveness, had led the Air Force not to give enough importance to the need for supporting the Army in the field with tactical air support. This is despite the fact that during World War II, the IAF had essentially provided tactical air support to the Army in Burma. The bomber was hardly seen in the Burmese theatre. There were a few Mitchell bombers operated by the Americans and, of course, there were ..
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Re: 1965 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by fanne »

The CAS conundrum has a very simple solution -
But,
Let me lay out the problem first
1. IAF may not want to do CAS (it has said on may occasion that it does not want to be extended/ariel artillery)
2. It has no real CAS plane (the last dedicated CAS - Mig 27 is long gone, we now have multi-purpose planes, that can do some long distance, costly CAS)
3.CAS is risky and perhaps not worth the return (interdiction perhaps is more effective)
4. On a wider front, if you want to do CAS, you may need many many planes, and then there is still more danger of startifiying own forces)
5. All in all, IA should not expect CAS support for big war, on a small scale war like Kargil, IAF may oblige

The solution - cheap drones (and attack helis) , by the thousands...they provide surveillance, sensor to shooter cycle is almost 0 if using suicide drone or drones that drop grenades. Look at UA/Russian war, cheap drones (not more than $100, 1/10th the price of 1 bofors shell) dropping grenades on soldiers hidden in deep trenches, one soldier at a time. These drones then can be reused. Give both drone and anti drone capability to front line troops. And these are small drones, unlike their bigger and costlier cousines, they are not vulnerable to SAM or Aircraft. The SAM missile perhaps costs 10 times more than the drone, and aircraft cannot fly so low and pick them (their radar signature will be miniscule, almost reaching stealth signature).
It is the future, actually it is the present in the UA/Russia war. They may not win the war by themselves (yet), but they are giving tactical victories.
Also these surveillance drones with smart shells from artillery is your CAS for at least 30-50 KM from the front line.
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Re: 1965 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

A very insightful book

"Behind the Scene: An Analysis of India's Military Operations, 1947-1971"
By Maj General Jogindar Singh
What does a high practitioner of the military art and sciences, a successful commander and trainer of men, and an outstanding general staff officer find in his thirty-two years of service and two wars? First, that political guidance and military strategic thinking are virtually absent in our affairs of the state. Higher direction of war is well below the poverty line. Singh autopsies the 1965 war as the main example of this poverty. Startlingly, he shows that when the war was joined, a fair proportion of field commanders who failed had already been found wanting in the eastern theatre in 1962. Higher direction was tentative and ad hoc at the Army HQ level. At the theatre level, forward command was being exercised by the theatre commander at battalion levels, who was unable and unwilling to read the big picture and act on wide open operational possibilities being presented on a plate by the enemy. This book lays to rest many operational ghosts of 1965.
Foreward is by FM Manekshaw

BTW it shows the rot in MoD from Independence onwards.
It was a rotten structure by 1955.
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Re: 1965 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

Need to get this book.
https://play.google.com/books/reader?id ... .PR8&hl=en

"Behind the Scene" by Maj Gen Jogindar Singh.
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Re: 1965 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by chetak »

ramana wrote:A very insightful book

"Behind the Scene: An Analysis of India's Military Operations, 1947-1971"
By Maj General Jogindar Singh
What does a high practitioner of the military art and sciences, a successful commander and trainer of men, and an outstanding general staff officer find in his thirty-two years of service and two wars? First, that political guidance and military strategic thinking are virtually absent in our affairs of the state. Higher direction of war is well below the poverty line. Singh autopsies the 1965 war as the main example of this poverty. Startlingly, he shows that when the war was joined, a fair proportion of field commanders who failed had already been found wanting in the eastern theatre in 1962. Higher direction was tentative and ad hoc at the Army HQ level. At the theatre level, forward command was being exercised by the theatre commander at battalion levels, who was unable and unwilling to read the big picture and act on wide open operational possibilities being presented on a plate by the enemy. This book lays to rest many operational ghosts of 1965.
Foreward is by FM Manekshaw

BTW it shows the rot in MoD from Independence onwards.
It was a rotten structure by 1955.

That is why the babooze in the MOD, like always, continue to show an incredible sense of entitlement, a needless power swagger and the constant need to belittle, micromanage and dominate

If anyone in the country has misunderstood the meaning of the term "civilian control", it is these pompous misfits.

It was neverwho and menon who presided over the birthing of such a legacy

these MOD babooze seem pretty quiet after doklam and galwan, and intent on maintaining a low profile as a survival technique
SRajesh
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Re: 1965 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by SRajesh »

chetak wrote:
ramana wrote:A very insightful book

and menon
Chetakji
I always thought that the genesis of this schism between the Executive and Army started with the ?? fallout between Menon and Gen Thimayya.
Banditji sided with Menon and as they say rest is history :((
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Re: 1965 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

chetak, Menon is a convenient pinata.
The rot in MoD was earlier than that.
In fact from HM Patel the first defense secretary whose mandate was to find resources for the Soviet-style Five Year Plans.
So he cut the resources ignoring the threats.
And once he established the dominance of Civil Service the officers fell in line like crabs in a barrel.
VK Singh's DOB fracas. It was all in the Military.
I submit that just some bleach was sprinkled to disinfect some areas.
Look at how long it took to appoint CDS and his successor.
Had to bring back a retired officer.
Or IAF continued import craziness, short sight wrt drones, and opposition to theater commands.
IN fiasco wrt Vikrant lift and insitence of second IAC of larger tonnage.
This is despite their own studies that three ships of a class are the minimum needed to build in Indian shipyards.
And a carrier aviation admiral joining Boeing as a marketing shill without cooloff after retiring.
chetak
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Re: 1965 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by chetak »

^^^^^^^

sirji,

you missed the khali pulao that was being cooked in the langar of the raincoat haveli

the VK Singh fiasco has its genesis there, with channels of influence running to and from other langars

Simply put, he was in the way and they needed a change in the line of succession
chetak
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Re: 1965 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by chetak »

Rsatchi wrote:
chetak wrote:

and menon
Chetakji
I always thought that the genesis of this schism between the Executive and Army started with the ?? fallout between Menon and Gen Thimayya.
Banditji sided with Menon and as they say rest is history :((
Rsatchi ji,

The "blame" for 1962 was largely localised to the uniformed with ungel menon playing a side role to divert/blunt any criticism of our nobel contender and world leader sri sri neverwho maharaj

the babooze came into their own a little later in the day where they inveigled their way as the preferred single point contact between politicos and the spit and polish generals who made these guys very uncomfortable. It was sri sri neverwho maharaj created the atmosphere for the babooze to pave the way and burrow into the MOD and he also encouraged the ecosystem to take root and embed itself

yes, we did have some decisive politicos as defence ministers but that did not translate to them being tactically or strategically aware or even knowledgeable enough to process what the uniforms were telling them, and there were no paltu kuta thinktankis in those days

And, at that time, we had to navigate through some really dense and pig headed uniforms too.

The IB was being run by opinionated clowns with no idea of the big picture and there was general mistrust all around and the babooze then, on seeing the vacuum created, sort of oozed into the gaps and to the delight of the dhotiwallas, these babooze took charge and became a buffer between the spit and polish generals and the dhotiwalla's preferred single point contact as well

In the initial stages, Modi was no better but doklam opened his eyes and the immense damage done by decades of having utterly ignorant babooze "negotiating" with the combat hardened cheeni army officers and that too without using maps, verifying ground positions, or having knowledge of the terrain, hit this govt like a savage punch to the solar plexus.

These days, there is a somewhat more professional set up in play with specialized and knowledgeable people manning critical positions (with communication lines running right up to the field formations), and a higher formation (civil + Mil) which coordinates the big picture scenarios.

The coordination between diplomatic coherence and military threat perception/mitigation is agile and proactive, rather than disjointed and reactive

CDS has effectively emasculated the babooze and and that is why they are playing dirty games while using one service as a catspaw to front for them

Theaterisation of the Indian forces is not a happy prospect for many of our neighbours and other so called global partners. There is a BIF component to this opposition.

notice how the aman ki tamasha and the lootyens/khan market gangs have completely quietened down but attacks on India/Modi are increasingly happening and also originating from entities outside of India.
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Re: 1965 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

Anyway OT for this thread.
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Re: 1965 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

ramana
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Re: 1965 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

Many lessons of Assal Uttar:

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/1965 ... sal-uttar/

Urge people to read this one.
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Re: 1965 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

Tribute to AVM Bishnoi Vr C bar


https://twitter.com/TheBrownBeagle/stat ... DV99A&s=19

He blew up the ammo train that carried supplies for Pattons that took part in Assal Uttar.

He also rocketed the Governors House in Dacca leading to the surrender in 1971.
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Re: 1965 war India- Pakistan: 50 years anniversary

Post by Kersi »

shiv wrote:
Shaun wrote:A nation that forgets its past can function no better than an individual with amnesia - David C McCullough

Shiv Sir , trying to find the easy way , out !! :D please recommend some books .
I would start with both of Jagan's books - i.e the 1965 air war book and the book "Eagles over Bangladesh"

Now we all know that the IAF now has Su-30, Mirage, Jag, MiG 21 etc. We also know the range, payload, capability etc of all those planes. Our discussions are based on those data points with zero inkling of the real issues faced by war fighters which are far removed from 99% of our discussions.

For example if an Indian jingo in 1965 of about age 25 had access to the internet and could discuss the PAF and IAF capabilities - he would have been able to say how the PAF had radar cover. They had a proven fighter in the F-86 Sabre armed with Sidewinders. The had F-104s. They had well dispersed air bases protected by AA batteries. But India on the other hand had more aircraft of X, Y Z capability. No radar. No AAMs. No Supersonic fighter. But if you read the actual book you realize that it was not these theoretical capabilities we discuss so much on BRF that mattered but things that we don't even imagine. And you read about innovations that turned the tide somewhere and sheer grit elsewhere. No one even knows how navigation was done with pinpoint accuracy at night using compass, torch and stopwatch. What's so great about this? What is great is that while it puts a heavy workload on the pilot it negates any advantage that an opponent with better nav-attack systems may think he has because the other guy does not have it. So there goes one "tech advantage" - the price paid is better training to work under adverse conditions. Why does this matter? Read the books. India faces adverse conditions of types that one cannot guess until we read about Indian pilots in Indian wars rather than US pilots in Australian blogs.

You have to read the books to understand the limitations and capabilities and they are nothing like the book descriptions of specs. Increasingly BRF is filling up with theoretical jingo discussions of weapons systems and capabilities and personal likes an dislikes are often settled by simply cursing some retired Air marshal and calling him a bribe taker. This actually brings BRF quality down to the lowest possible level because the people who say those things have not read anything at all about how an air force fights its war even when books are available. if they had an inkling they would possibly put in more effort to see the Air Marshal's viewpoint. One of the most amusing newbie naive things that one hears often on BRF is how "combat flying" is tough and routine flying just does not cut it. This only shows complete ignorance. Why? Read the books. Sometimes I feel our admins have not done their reading - unlike the older dedicated BR stalwarts like Rupak, Jagan, Rakesh and Seetal. This is not good for BRF which shows itself as a crass forum of nincompoops who think they know it all - bandwagoning on some old timer's self praise claiming that BRF is ahead of the curve. It is not in so many ways. We need excellence, but we seem to have dispensed with it.

Sorry for the rant.
THIS IS NOT A RANT

THIS IS RAW BUT UNPALATABLE TRUTH
Kersi
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Re: 1965 war India- Pakistan: 50 years anniversary

Post by Kersi »

SSridhar wrote:Another article about this double MVC winner.

The pilot who ‘shot’ Pakistan - Pankaja Srinivasan, The Hindu
Fifty years ago, when he leapt into his Canberra, a twin-engine jet bomber fitted with cameras, and flew into Pakistan on a top secret mission, then Squadron Leader Jag Mohan Nath already had a Maha Vir Chakra awarded to him for the earlier 1962 operations. He had flown into Aksai Chin and Tibet and returned with valuable inputs on the ground situation and enemy troop activities there, both before and during the Indo-China conflict.

Three years later, in September 1965, he was awarded another Maha Vir Chakra, this time for his role in the Indo-Pak conflict. The Maha Vir Chakra is the second highest military decoration in India, after the Param Vir Chakra, and is awarded for acts of gallantry.

Today, as India observes the 50th anniversary of the 1965 India-Pakistan War, Wing Commander Nath is the only living Indian Air Force officer to be decorated twice with this honour. On a recent visit to Coimbatore, where he first came as a cadet to Air Force Administrative College in 1948 for his initial training, he recalls the 30 reconnaissance missions he flew into Pakistan.

Mr. Nath — Jaggi to colleagues — is frail and stooped at age 85. Speaking softly, he recalls that his missions were so secret that only one other person knew about them: the then air force chief, Air Chief Marshal Arjan Singh.

As Mr. Nath describes his flights, his hands deftly demonstrate the loops and barrel rolls he did in his Canberra aircraft, as he dodged and ducked, to avoid being shot down by Pakistani Sabres. The terrain was mountainous, blips on his instrument panel told him there were four enemy aircraft on his tail, the fuel gauge was running empty and when he re-entered Indian territory he was almost shot down by his own comrades who mistook him for the enemy!

Vital visuals

In those reconnaissance sorties, he flew in broad daylight almost skimming trees so that the Pakistani radar could not detect his aircraft. Then, when he felt there was something to be captured on camera, he climbed to 12,000 feet to get the best pictures. “I would be exposed for full five minutes,” he says. Mr. Nath’s black-and-white pictures yielded a treasure trove of information. Indian jets scrambled to destroy a powerful radar in Badin near Karachi, and the army almost reached Lahore.

About a month into the conflict, Jaggi was once again deployed deep into Pakistan territory to find out about fighter aircraft based in Samungli near Quetta in western Pakistan. “I flew over Leia (now Laya) in Pakistan. I was born there. That is my village. I went to school there,” he says. {What a man !}

Growing up in his village, Mr. Nath watched the planes high in the sky. “I couldn’t take my eyes off them. My uncle told me, ‘you should become a pilot!’”

His family members were all doctors, but Mr. Nath wanted to be involved with planes. As it happened, he found himself at Red Fort, Delhi, where recruitments were on and he joined the Indian Air Force.

Top secret assignments

Mr. Nath’s hush-hush assignments and bravery took him to rooms of the chiefs of the three services, political leaders and bureaucrats during the conflict. He was witness to what he describes as “astoundingly bad decisions, miscalculations and errors in judgment.” But those are nothing when he thinks of the incredible courage and grace under fire that his comrades displayed, many of whom lost their lives. Mr. Nath left the Indian Air Force in 1969, and joined Air India.

As he leaves for home in Mumbai, Mr. Nath shows a book on heroism that he is reading: Elephant Company by Vicki Croke, a story of man-elephant bonding that saved lives in World War II. “I was gifted this book by Ian,” he says, unable to recall the last name of the Pakistani pilot whom he befriended in Dubai. “He joined the Pakistani Air Force the same year as I did.”
Image
Then Squadron Leader JM Nath receiving his second Maha Vir Chakra for his 1965 operations from President S. Radhakrishnan — Photos: Special Arrangement, Courtesy The Hindu
I had the privilage of meeting Group Captain Nath at a book launch in Mumbai, several years ago. He spoke briefly about his flying over China before and during 1962 war. At a ripe old age of 90+ he was still very critical about JL Nehru. Even though he had actually flown over China and saw hardly any Chinese aircraft or any anti-aircraft guns, JLN refused to believe him. JLN thought it was a cooked-up story to bring IAF into the war
ramana
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Re: 1965 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

Nehruji was a victim of cognitive dissonance wrt China.
All his mental views had broken down an he was denying the facts and letting his view cloud his judgment.
And India has paid for his mental collapse.
ramana
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Re: 1965 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

Rakesh wrote:Unheard tale of INDIAN AIR FORCE deep strike in PAKISTAN


Met Red 2 Navigator mentioned in above Youtube of this strike on Peshawar
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