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1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby Avarachan » 10 Aug 2017 07:51

ramana wrote:I always wondered about the timing of the 1965 war. According to Sidney Griffin in Crisis Games, the war eas gamed to begin in September 1966. The book foreward says book is based on a classified version of the game. We know Philip Talbot was working on his book on the War that changed the Indian sub-continent as he told K.S garu. Writing a book takes time!

Everyone says Ayub Khan fast forwarded the date by a year due to his own fears.

Something that India did or put in motion panicked the powers and triggered this war.

I think I got the trigger.
LBS authorized the Subterranean Nuclear Explosion Program (SNEP) in early 1965 after China test in October 1964.
India got language agitation, 1965 War, LBS dead in Tashkent, Bhabha dead in Switzerland in 1966, NOT in 1968.

http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/s ... /1016715/0

Even this did not end the PM's woes. A shrewd judge of his own party's mood, he realised that he had to mobilise its support and felt this could be best done through the executive committee of the Congress Parliamentary Party that had become very conscious of its power after virtually forcing Nehru to sack Krishna Menon. Under Shastri, it had become even more assertive. He chose to mollify it by announcing that Bhabha had assured him that nuclear explosives could be used both "destructively as well as constructively". For instance, an underground nuclear explosion could "drill a tunnel across a mountain or construct a canal for people's welfare". So he was authorising a Subterranean Nuclear Explosion Project (SNEP).

Unfortunately, soon afterwards erupted the virulent language crisis, followed by the Kutch conflict and the 1965 war with Pakistan. On January 11, 1966, Shastri died at Tashkent. A fortnight later, Bhabha was killed in a plane crash near Mont Blanc that may not have been an accident. For a long while interest was diverted from SNEP and the Chinese bomb.



I'm reposting a comment of mine from March 2017:

It seems that in 1965, approximately, Prime Minister Shastri made the decision to test a nuclear weapon so as to make India a nuclear-weapon state (NWS) according to the NPT. That's why both he and Dr. Homi Bhabha were murdered by the CIA in January 1966. (The NPT was opened up for signature in 1968, and the cut-off date to conduct a nuclear test and be recognized as an NWS was January 1, 1967.) That's why the Indian government has proceeded so cautiously for the past few decades. This is also why Prime Minister Modi (BJP) has shown great respect for the legacy of Prime Minister Shastri (Congress Party).


When I was a student, I wondered why the Indian government seemed to sit on its hands and do nothing while it was left out in the cold regarding the NPT. Now I know better: the Indian government was planning to enter the NPT as an NWS. To prevent that, the CIA launched a destabilization and assassination campaign.

Older Indians should tell younger Indians what happened. Knowledge of this has radically re-shaped my understanding of Indian history and politics. By the way, this is why the Indian government seems to behave so erratically ... Indian leaders know that if they're predictable, they'll be killed. India has to move forward while zig-zagging. To move forward in a straight line is too dangerous, given the international security environment and the reality that India's not a police state.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby Mort Walker » 10 Aug 2017 08:07

^^^There are accounts that the KGB was listening to LBS's room in Tashkent and heard him in the process of death, but did nothing to save him. It is very likely the Soviets poisoned LBS and Bhabha was killed by a combined US and British intel operation.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby niran » 10 Aug 2017 08:57

Mort Walker wrote:It is very likely the Soviets poisoned LBS and Bhabha was killed by a combined US and British intel operation.

BhaBha was killed by Combined merican and pasta people, pasta missplaced marker beacon as soon as the plane crashed they booted up new beacon at original spot.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby suryag » 10 Aug 2017 19:26

Who is pasta sir ?

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby Kashi » 10 Aug 2017 19:35

Italians I guess...

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby ramana » 11 Aug 2017 03:37

Mort Why would Soviets kill LBS? It was whoever induced heart attack. Listening to guest house is normal for host country.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby Mort Walker » 11 Aug 2017 20:31

^^^Soviets at the time thought weak leadership in India would cause communists to gain upper hand. They may have thought India could be in their orbit like Egypt was. It's important to remember what was playing out on the world stage in late 1965. The US was trying to contain communism and the Chinese fell out with the Russians.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby Avarachan » 12 Aug 2017 03:50

I think the Soviets are innocent ... The Anglo-Americans didn't need the Soviets' help to murder the Prime Minister. (As is well known, the US-UK had many Indian assets.) Involving the Soviets would endanger the operation ... With covert operations, it's not wise to involve more people than absolutely necessary. Also, for what it's worth, retired CIA officer Robert Crowley claimed that the CIA killed both Shastri and Bhabha. (Crowley was the assistant deputy director for operations--that's second-in-command at the Directorate of Operations--so he's a credible source.)

Known as 'The Crow' within the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
Robert T. Crowley ('Bob' Crowley) joined the CIA at its inception and
spent his entire career in the Directorate of Plans, also know as the
'Department of Dirty Tricks,' Crowley was one of the tallest man ever
to work at the CIA. Born in 1924 and raised in Chicago , Crowley grew
to six and a half feet when he entered the U.S. Military Academy at
West Point in N.Y. as a cadet in 1943 in the class of 1946. He never
graduated, having enlisted in the Army, serving in the Pacific during
World War II. He retired from the Army Reserve in 1986 as a lieutenant
colonel.

Bob (Robert) Crowley first contacted journalist Gregory Douglas in
1993 and they began a series of long and often very informative
telephone conversations that lasted for four years. In 1996, Crowley
told Douglas that he believed him to be the person that should
ultimately tell Crowley 's story but only after Crowley 's death.
Douglas, for his part, became so entranced with some of the material
that Crowley began to share with him that he secretly began to record
their conversations, later transcribing them word for word, planning
to incorporate some, or all, of the material in later publications.

In 1998, when Crowley was slated to go into the hospital for
exploratory surgery, he had his son, Greg, ship two large foot lockers
of documents to Douglas with the caveat that they were not to be
opened until after Crowley 's death. These documents, totaled an
astonishing 15,000 pages of CIA classified files involving many covert
operations, both foreign and domestic, during the Cold War.

While CIA drug running, money-launderings and brutal assassinations
are very often strongly rumored and suspected, it has so far not been
possible to actually pin them down but it is more than possible that
the publication of the transcribed and detailed Crowley-Douglas
conversations will do a great deal towards accomplishing this.

These many transcribed conversations are relatively short because
Crowley was a man who tired easily but they make excellent reading.
There is an interesting admixture of shocking revelations on the part
of the retired CIA official and often rampant anti-social (and very
entertaining) activities on the part of Douglas but readers of this
new and on-going series are gently reminded to always look for the
truth in the jest!

END OF BACKGROUND

Conversations with 'the Crow' - Part 14

JOURNALIST GREGORY DOUGLAS (GD): I am a man of sorrows and
acquainted with rage, Robert. How about the Company setting off a
small A-bomb in some hitherto harmless country and blaming it on mice.

FORMER CIA OFFICER ROBERT T CROWLEY (RTC): Now that's something we
never did. In fact, we prevented at least one nuclear disaster.

JOURNALIST GREGORY DOUGLAS: What? A humanitarian act? Why, I am
astounded, Robert. Do tell me about this.

FORMER CIA OFFICER ROBERT T CROWLEY: Now, now, Gregory, sometimes
we can discuss serious business. There were times when we prevented
terrible catastrophes and tried to secure more peace. We had trouble,
you know, with India back in the 60s when they got uppity and started
work on an atomic bomb. Loud mouthed cow-lovers bragging about how
clever they were and how they, too, were going to be a great power in
the world. The thing is, they were getting into bed with the Russians.
Of course, Pakistan was in bed with the chinks so India had to find
another bed partner. And we did not want them to have any kind of
nuclear weaponry because God knows what they would have done with it.
Probably strut their stuff like a Washington nigger with a brass
watch.
Probably nuke the Pakis. They're all a bunch of neo-coons
anyway. Oh yes, and their head expert was fully capable of building a
bomb and we knew just what he was up to. He was warned several times
but what an arrogant prick that one was. Told our people to ****** off
and then made it clear that no one would stop him and India from
getting nuclear parity with the big boys. Loud mouths bring it all
down on themselves. Do you know about any of this?

JOURNALIST GREGORY DOUGLAS: Not my area of interest or expertise.
Who is this joker, anyway?

FORMER CIA OFFICER ROBERT T CROWLEY: Was, Gregory, let's use the
past tense if you please. Name was Homi Bhabha. That one was
dangerous, believe me. He had an unfortunate accident. He was flying
to Vienna to stir up more trouble when his BOEING 707 had a bomb go
off in the cargo hold and they all came down on a high mountain way up
in the Alps . No real evidence and the world was much safer.

JOURNALIST GREGORY DOUGLAS: Was Bhabha alone on the plane?

FORMER CIA OFFICER ROBERT T CROWLEY: No it was a commercial Air
India flight.

JOURNALIST GREGORY DOUGLAS: How many people went down with him?

FORMER CIA OFFICER ROBERT T CROWLEY: Ah, who knows and frankly, who
cares?

JOURNALIST GREGORY DOUGLAS: I suppose if I had a relative on the
flight I would care.

FORMER CIA OFFICER ROBERT T CROWLEY: Did you?

JOURNALIST GREGORY DOUGLAS: No.

FORMER CIA OFFICER ROBERT T CROWLEY: Then don't worry about it. We
could have blown it up over Vienna but we decided the high mountains
were much better for the bits and pieces to come down on. I think a
possible death or two among mountain goats is much preferable than
bringing down a huge plane right over a big city.

JOURNALIST GREGORY DOUGLAS: I think that there were more than
goats, Robert.

FORMER CIA OFFICER ROBERT T CROWLEY: Well, aren't we being a
bleeding-heart today.

JOURNALIST GREGORY DOUGLAS: Now, now, it's not an observation that
is unexpected. Why not send him a box of poisoned candy? Shoot him in
the street? Blow up his car? I mean, why ace a whole plane full of
people?

FORMER CIA OFFICER ROBERT T CROWLEY: Well, I call it as it see it.
At the time, it was our best shot. And we nailed Shastri as well.
Another cow-loving rag head. Gregory, you say you don't know about
these people. Believe me, they were close to getting a bomb and so
what if they nuked their deadly Paki enemies? So what? Too many people
in both countries. Breed like rabbits and full of snake-worshipping
twits.
I don't for the life of me see what the Brits wanted in India .
And then threaten us? They were in the sack with the Russians, I told
you. Maybe they could nuke the Panama Canal or Los Angeles . We don't
know that for sure but it is not impossible.

JOURNALIST GREGORY DOUGLAS: Who was Shastri?

FORMER CIA OFFICER ROBERT T CROWLEY: A political type who started
the program in the first place. Bhabha was a genius and he could get
things done so we aced both of them. And we let certain people there
know that there was more where that came from. We should have hit the
chinks too, while we were at it but they were a tougher target. Did I
tell you about the idea to wipe out Asia 's rice crops? We developed a
disease that would have wiped rice off the map there and it's their
staple diet. The ****** rice growers here got wind of it and raised
such a stink we canned the whole thing. The theory was that the
disease could spread around and hurt their pocketbooks. If the Mao
people invade Alaska , we can tell the rice people it's all their fault.

JOURNALIST GREGORY DOUGLAS: I suppose we might make friends with
them.

FORMER CIA OFFICER ROBERT T CROWLEY: With the likes of them? Not at
all, Gregory. The only thing the Communists understand is brute force.
India was quieter after Bhabha croaked.
We could never get to Mao but
at one time, the Russians and we were discussing the how and when of
the project. Oh yes, sometimes we do business with the other side.
Probably more than you realize.

JOURNALIST GREGORY DOUGLAS: Now that I know about. High level
amorality. They want secrets from us and you give them some of them in
return for some of their secrets, doctored of course. That way, both
agencies get credit for being clever.

FORMER CIA OFFICER ROBERT T CROWLEY: Well, you've been in that game
so why be so holy over a bunch of dead ragheads?

JOURNALIST GREGORY DOUGLAS: Were all the passengers Indian atomic
scientists?

FORMER CIA OFFICER ROBERT T CROWLEY: Who cares, Gregory? We got the
main man and that was all that mattered. You ought not criticize when
you don't have the whole story.

JOURNALIST GREGORY DOUGLAS: Well, there were too many mountain
goats running around, anyway. Then might have gotten their hands on
some weapons from Atwood and invaded Switzerland .

FORMER CIA OFFICER ROBERT T CROWLEY: You jest but there is truth in
what you say. We had such a weight on us, protecting the American
people, often from themselves I admit. Many of these stories can never
be written, Gregory. And if you try, you had better get your wife to
start your car in the morning.
# # #

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby Mort Walker » 12 Aug 2017 10:58

^^^I don't know about that source, but will look it up when I have the chance. What is known is the US and Soviets were from the late 1940s through 1970s involved in all sorts of really nasty activities to destabilize governments.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby Amber G. » 13 Aug 2017 01:40

...Also, for what it's worth, retired CIA officer Robert Crowley claimed that the CIA killed both Shastri and Bhabha.

To be clear, Robert Crowley NEVER claimed .. or even anything close to claiming --- this!

The closest this CT comes is some news paper publishes (in 2008 - MORE THAN 40 years later) "a transcript" of a telephone conversation between a "Gregory Douglas" and Robert Crowley where Douglas claims that Crowley said such and such... (IOW NO tapes, NO documents even remotely collaborating the fact that Crowley (or anyone else in CIA or any other reputable guy - there is ZERO evidence that the "transcript" is real ) said this..

I remember 1966.. that Wednesday of the plane crash pretty well. I was with some TIFR guys and this was a very sad news. (I happen to have met Bhabha and knew him ).. only strange theory around that time was, some said, he travelled on a Wednesday which according to his mother was an unlucky day and some suggested him not to fly that day. Of course this was absurd as Bhabha did not believe in such things... The CIA CT is, in my opinion even more absurd. (I have known many of colleagues of Bhabha over the years and can tell you that NONE of the people I know ever talked about conspiracy..)

BTW Bhabha had very good relationship and reputation with US scientists in those days. (There were many Indian physicists and Bhabha's students in US in those days). Bhabha had very good relationship with Nehru and thus there was good cooperation between US and India .. (All that changed in 1968 and became even worse post 1971 for obvious reasons..)

The untimely death of Bhabha had another effect. GOI and US were thinking of making IIT Kanpur a top rated school for nuclear physics and talks were going on between top US institutes and GOI for this. Unfortunately after Bhabha's death the initiative died.
(Recently I saw a book (Fourth IIT) where more details about this is given)

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby disha » 13 Aug 2017 05:23

I think even more absurd is to believe this

...only strange theory around that time was, some said, he travelled on a Wednesday which according to his mother was an unlucky day and some suggested him not to fly that day. Of course this was absurd as Bhabha did not believe in such things...


Given the fact that CIA penetrated the Kerala police to bring down the career of brilliant ISRO engineers and given the fact that CIA was involved in regime change all across the world and given the very fact that Patrice Lumumba was murdered by CIA and its belgian cronies just 3 days before Kennedy's inauguration and further CIA was involved in covert wars in Laos (even before vietnam) and its various involvements in covert assassinations all over the world to meet ostensible political goals of US until Ford signed the declaration in 1976 clearly indicates that CIA may be a great suspect in Bhabha's assassination.

To rule that theory out as outlandish is just plain outlandish.

And while you are about IIT AmberG., why do not you let us know who set up IIT? And also the "famine scare" of 1960s which was to ensure that US exports its surplus wheat to India and also the US funded female infanticide from AIIMS?

Or you can probably explain Madam Halfbrights stated goal of Cap, Rollback and Eliminate India's nuclear program or Convicted Fmr. Assistant Secy of State Robin Raphael's statement of not recognizing cashmeres ascension to India.

Bhabha having good reputation with US scientists is totally orthogonal to US's political goals.

---

AmberG., I do not think you are so naive that given the history of CIA you will call speculation of its involvement outlandish but actually bring in outlandish and unsubstantiated astrological theory!

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby disha » 13 Aug 2017 05:31

Dear AmberG' - can you go through this article and call it outlandish?

https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/may/05/cia-long-history-kill-leaders-around-the-world-north-korea

In spite of this, the US never totally abandoned the strategy, simply changing the terminology from assassination to targeted killings, from aerial bombing of presidents to drone attacks on alleged terrorist leaders. Aerial bomb attempts on leaders included Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi in 1986, Serbia’s Slobodan Milosevic in 1999 and Iraqi president Saddam Hussein in 2003.

Earlier well-documented episodes include Congo’s first prime minister, Patrice Lumumba of Congo, judged by the US to be too close to close to Russia. In 1960, the CIA sent a scientist to kill him with a lethal virus, though this became unnecessary when he was removed from office in 1960 by other means. Other leaders targeted for assassination in the 1960s included the Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo, president Sukarno of Indonesia and president Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam.

In 1973, the CIA helped organise the overthrow of Chile’s president, Salvador Allende, deemed to be too left wing: he died on the day of the coup.


And here is the CIA's targeted assassinations never disputed:

1945 Korea Kim Koo
1951 Iran Mossadegh
1961 Congo Patrice Lumamba
1963 Iraq Qassim government (targeted killings)
1960s-70s Cuba Fidel Castro
1970 Chile Salvadore Allende

Given the above., I will NOT be surprised if CIA is implicated in both Bhabha and Shastriji's assassination.

It is churlish to call the above "outlandish". The history is there for all to see - as long as they keep their eyes open and even more their minds.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby disha » 13 Aug 2017 05:41

So dear Amber'G., are you going to call this outlandish as well:

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/05/opinion/rasenberger.html

The peak of outrage against government-sponsored assassination was the mid-1970s, when the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations — better known as the Church committee — spent more than 60 days questioning 75 witnesses about C.I.A. plots of the late 1950s and early 1960s. Back in the darkest days of the cold war, the agency had devoted significant resources and creativity to devising unhappy ends for unsavory or inconvenient foreign leaders. Among those listed for assassination were Patrice Lumumba of the Congo, Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam, Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic and, most famously, Fidel Castro of Cuba, who survived no fewer than eight C.I.A. assassination plots. ...

At the C.I.A., where many top officials were highly cultivated products of elite boarding schools and Ivy League colleges, assassination may have been in vogue at the time, but it was not a subject for polite discussion. When one C.I.A. official turned in a memo urging the “elimination” not just of Fidel Castro, but of Raul Castro and Che Guevara, too — a sort of assassination triple play — Allen Dulles, the agency’s director, did not balk. But he did cross out “elimination” and pencil in a softer word: “removal.”

Such squeamishness seems almost quaint by today’s standards. “Targeted killing” is the latest euphemism for assassination. Employed with some regularity since the 1980s, targeted killing has been an especially valued tool of the C.I.A. and Pentagon since 9/11. Several executive orders prohibiting government-sponsored assassination were issued in the aftermath of the Church committee, including one signed by Ronald Reagan in 1981. Reagan himself challenged the order in 1986, when he approved an air attack on Libya — and the implicit attempt on the life of Colonel Qaddafi — as retribution for the bombing of a Berlin discotheque.



It is definitely churlish to call the speculation that Dr. Bhabha and Late PM Shastriji were in the cross hairs of CIA and marked for "removal" as outlandish.

In fact as recently as 2012., american dog Karan Thapar called for "sudden removal" of Modiji and Modi ji himself alluded as recently as 2015 & 2016 that he may be targeted in his speeches publicly.

Please do not be churlish AmberG.

Added later:

I think AmberG., you need to take back your outlandish comment (and with due apologies)., otherwise you need to prove each point in the article below as outlandish.

http://www.theweek.co.uk/politics/21051/cia-and-long-history-assassinations

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby KrishnaK » 13 Aug 2017 09:08

disha wrote:And while you are about IIT AmberG., why do not you let us know who set up IIT? And also the "famine scare" of 1960s which was to ensure that US exports its surplus wheat to India and also the US funded female infanticide from AIIMS?


I'm shocked you left out vasectomies and polio out of the CIA conspiracy list. That said here's some alternative facts about famines in the 1960s Swallowing the humiliation - Inder Malhotra.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby Najunamar » 13 Aug 2017 09:57

CIA involvement in Shastri and/or Bhabha's death(s) does not sound too outlandish given the prevailing mood in the US at that time (we all know the crazed utterings of Nixon and Kissinger which was not an aberration but perhaps a bit more extreme). The US of 60s-70s was extremely arrogant and hostile toward India and I am seeing them headed in the same direction in this and the coming decade. All talks of a "Hyperpower" gives one a sen se of deja vu. Only this time, India is very well prepared and there's a huge diaspora which I doubt will go without a fight :evil:

Disclaimer: For those who say I am totally wrong - I could be, but it is not for want of interaction with the American public (lived and worked here for the last 25 years).

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby disha » 14 Aug 2017 10:08

KrishnaK wrote:
I'm shocked you left out vasectomies and polio out of the CIA conspiracy list. That said here's some alternative facts about famines in the 1960s Swallowing the humiliation - Inder Malhotra.


That is a good record of the wheat "export" by US - ipso-facto. And are you expressing shock as in cynicism and indicating that I am indulging in CT when I am pointing out that CIA was involved in regime change or assassination? You need to be clear.

Polio & CIA are not related in India. And CONgoons are more famous for vasectomies., but that is a discussion for other thread. How the US created a wheat crises needs to be studied in another thread. The reason is simple., India's staple along with rice, wheat were millets like bajri, jowar etc. But the focus was purposely on wheat. In retrospect., was a wheat crises engineered so that America can influence India's foreign policy? As stated., that is a topic for a separate thread.

---

My point is clear., CIA was actively involved in assassination of influential figures across the globe in pursuit of the then american foreign policy and it is not outlandish to suspect them for the untimely deaths of Dr. Bhabha and late PM Shri Shastriji.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby KrishnaK » 18 Aug 2017 04:22

disha wrote:That is a good record of the wheat "export" by US - ipso-facto. And are you expressing shock as in cynicism and indicating that I am indulging in CT when I am pointing out that CIA was involved in regime change or assassination? You need to be clear.
Your claim that the US manufactured a famine scare is clearly nonsense. Clearly making fun of you.

My point is clear., CIA was actively involved in assassination of influential figures across the globe in pursuit of the then american foreign policy and it is not outlandish to suspect them for the untimely deaths of Dr. Bhabha and late PM Shri Shastriji.
It isn't just outlandish, it's garbage. Much of the information about attempts on Castro come from USG sources.

Decades earlier in 1975, the US Senate Church Commission revealed details of at least eight plots on Castro's life, using devices which, the commission report said, "strain the imagination".


From The CIA's Family Jewels - The National Security Archive

6) Plan to poison Congo leader Patrice Lumumba (p. 464)


Why is there no such information about Indias leaders ? Similar to the other forum conspiracy - containing India which is an article of faith for some here.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby Kashi » 18 Aug 2017 05:58

KrishnaK wrote:an article of faith for some here.


Just like your faith in everything USA isn't it?

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby ramana » 18 Aug 2017 20:58

Guys Get back to topic.

The next anniversary is coming up in a matter of weeks and we are still arguing extraneous things.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby jayasimha » 06 Sep 2017 13:19

The Indian Air Force Under
Air Marshal Arjan Singh

https://www.indianarmy.nic.in/writeread ... 230915.pdf

Image

AVM Upkarjit Singh, ACAS Ops (Space) with Air Marshal (Retd) VK Bhatia

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby jayasimha » 06 Sep 2017 13:24

https://www.indianarmy.nic.in/writeread ... 230915.pdf

Operations in the Chhamb
and Sialkot Sectors

By Lt Gen Satish Nambiar

Image

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby ramana » 06 Sep 2017 20:24

10 September is anniversary of martyrdom of Abdul Hamid PVC.

Please use his image as DP

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby ramana » 10 Sep 2017 05:10


ramana
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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby ramana » 10 Oct 2017 04:33

Google Books:

Cold War Jet Combat: 1950 to 1972 Michael Bowman

Pages 63 onwards have description of India-Pakistan wars. And very nice pictures from page 66.

Page 81 and 82 have a very detailed description of the IAF Hunters flown by Menon, Bishnoi, Kullar, and Nagi attack on the goods train to Khemkaran that restricted the Patton tanks at Asal Uttar to 30 rounds per tank and limited fuel.


The It has many pictures but looks like PAF gave them more access and hence its their pictures that are printed.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby ramana » 16 Oct 2017 09:19

Old Pakistani reappraisal of the war:

https://web.archive.org/web/20130119073 ... 2005_pg3_1

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby Aditya_V » 16 Oct 2017 10:59

ramana wrote:Old Pakistani reappraisal of the war:

https://web.archive.org/web/20130119073 ... 2005_pg3_1


Again same OLD BS that the PAF won all wars and it was only the PA which lost it. But I hope this propoganda is kept rammed down by the PAF on the PA continously, can't bee good for inter force relations.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby ramana » 16 Oct 2017 22:26

Nice no?

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby ramana » 29 Nov 2017 06:59


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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby ramana » 30 Nov 2017 03:50

krishna_krishna wrote:......
Also the porkies beefed up the numbers via propoganda to show that their were planes were intact showing borrowed planes from fellow birader nations, case in point one of the planes been shot was when a shot aircraft was found by IAF with camo pattern not used by any airforces in the indian subcontinent. One insane porki jearnail went about to write the actual truth about the conflict, which was cleared by Army book club to be printed and sold. All the copies of that book that was produced by Oxford university Press were bought by porki army with a condition that it will not provide this for general distribution. Looks like may be the book had broken invincibility of proky forces on their face, I will try to google the name of the book on the internet and Jernails name.

I will add later Massa help to parkis via MAAG and their help in planning their entire AF operations in details.


Am still waiting.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby krishna_krishna » 30 Nov 2017 05:36

ramana wrote:
Am still waiting.


Guru will try to finish this by next weekend, its really crzy

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby ramana » 30 Nov 2017 20:39

Thanks.

BTW Rohitvats is also working like crazy to tie up all we know about 1965 war.
Its much more important then we think.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: Forty Years Since

Postby ramana » 01 Dec 2017 02:09

Two great blog articles from higher direction of war by Lt. Gen Hasnian courtesy Rohitvats:


1) India Pakistan Conflict 1965 Focused Recall Part I


India-Pakistan conflict 1965 : Focused recall (Part 1)



Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain
Updated: September 13, 2015, 1:10 PM IST

.

Fifty years to the date and India was into the 14th day of what is commonly called the 22 Day War. I have been attending functions related to the events, speaking at most of them and writing a great deal too. However, at the beginning and even well before, I concentrated on the sequence of the war of which most people in India were blissfully ignorant. Thereafter, I fell into the temptation of justifying how exactly India was the true and only winner. That too was necessary. As we progress into September find that many people all over the nation are much better informed about the War and are increasingly asking searching questions which should inevitably have been asked many years ago. This is the awakening about military affairs that I always dreamt of and I am extremely thrilled to witness it. The next few essays are all about a few of those questions and some attempted answers. But to set the record right is also important. This was no 22 day war; that comes from the presumption that transgression of the LoC on 01 September 1965 was the commencement of the war. Actually we were at war all of August 1965, in J&K and the most stupendous success of the entire war came our way at Hajipir in end August 1965.

Two weeks ago, Shekhar Gupta wrote a short post on Facebook on Late Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh, the iconic Army Commander Western Command, who single handedly, commanded the entire war front in 1965. He implored everyone to read the General’s book ‘War Despatches’ which is perhaps the most brilliant and brutally frank account of the entire build up, the war itself and the post conflict aspects. A television show featured his family too. I am glad that the right attention is being given to one of India’s greatest soldiers. I was fortunate that my family enjoyed a personal relationship with the great General as my father was Gen Harbaksh’s Brigade Major (BM) in Damana (Jammu) when the General was a Brigadier in mid 1950s. Military personnel are usually aware of the intimacy in such relationships between commanders and principal staff. From my parents I only heard deep praise for the Harbaksh family and for the General’s military prowess; his insistence on being given information and advice in very few words was his forte. This last quality must surely have helped him tremendously in directing and leading the war effort. He had a responsibility on his shoulders far in excess of what should have been placed and in many ways this was one of the reasons why the Indian pick up of intelligence and response may have been less than what it could and should have been. Let me justify this statement.

In 1965, neither was the state of telecommunication reliable nor were there enough air transportation resources to allow senior commanders the liberty of frequent and easy visits to lower headquarters and to battle zones. HQ Western Command was initially located at Shimla, its peacetime station and later moved to the plains to control the operations. From Ladakh to Bikaner is a vast distance and to be responsible for the entire front which included the Chinese threat from Aksai Chin, was downright impractical. It took another war in 1971 to realize this resulting in the creation of HQ Northern Command, the move of HQ 15 Corps from Udhampur to Srinagar and the raising of HQ 16 Corps at Nagrota for the command and control of formations from the PirPanjal till Pathankot.

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Further, it took yet another war in 1999 to detach responsibility of HQ16 Corps from the broad area of the Chenab-Ravi Corridor, merge that area with Western Command and raise HQ South Western Command to take charge of Southern Punjab and Northern Rajasthan.

So, effectively Gen Harbaksh Singh had the command of an area of responsibility (AOR) which is today looked after by three Field Armies (Commands). This too was in an era when technical intelligence sources were extremely limited. Perhaps India just could not afford to have more HQ or there were insufficient troops to be placed under smaller Field Armies or most importantly the Government just did not care nor listened to military advice. Whatever be the reasons it is clear that sitting in Shimla, Ambala, Chandigarh or Jalandhar it was not possible for an Army Commander or his HQ staff to get a feel of the situation in Jammu & Kashmir before Operation Gibraltar was launched on 05 August 1965. Gen Harbaksh, in his excellent book, does mention that operational plans for an offensive into Pakistan Punjab were prepared as early as Apr 1965 after receiving directions from the Chief.

Yet, through August 1965 even as Op Gibraltar was in full swing he was visiting Kashmir very frequently, especially during the early part of the Battle of Hajipir, 26-31 August 1965. It is more than likely that there was insufficient attention paid to the reports of activities across Akhnoor in the Chenab-Jhelum Corridor (CJC) and even in the Shakargarh Bulge (Northern part of the Chenab-Ravi Corridor CRC) ). Even one glance at a map can give a surmise that it is these sub sectors which were and are most vulnerable to possible Pakistani incursions to sever the road communications between Pathankot and J&K or between Jammu and Poonch/Rajouri sector. That Akhnoor sector was defended by a weak squadron of tanks of 20 Lancers and effectively three of the five battalions of 191 Infantry Brigade with nothing in depth, was taking of risk beyond any sense of prudence. On the part of Pakistan it cannot be denied that Operation Grand Slam, the operation planned and executed in the Akhnoor sector was designed to cement a victory which it thought it would achieve in J&K. Two brigades of Pakistan 7 Division were specifically earmarked for the task and two regiments (11 Cavalry and 13 Lancers) from the newly raised 6 Armoured Division were part of the force. The area selected for the attack afforded a short distance for concentration from Kharian. Although the Samba-Kathua area could easily have been accessed the distance for concentration meant a move parallel to the border through Sialkot; the pickup of intelligence by India would have been much quicker. Pakistan’s early planning and prudent selection of Akhnoor sector for attack after the setback at Hajipir ensured that it caught India by surprise.

In 1999 during the Kargil War, over stretch of AOR for a single HQ resulted once again in our inability to keep the focus on terrain vulnerabilities. 15 Corps (Chinar Corps) was handling Kashmir and Ladakh, from Demchok in East to Gulmarg in the West. It was responsible for Eastern Ladakh, Siachen, Kargil, the Kashmir LoC in Kupwara and Baramula sectors and the raging militancy at its height aided by foreign terrorists. It had staff as much as any other Corps HQ but with a minor increment. It failed to read the indicators about the potential Kargil intrusion because its focus was elsewhere and rightfully so. No HQ can be focused with equal priority to each sub sector for which it is responsible unless it has a compact area well within its capability of focus. The Kargil experience led to the splitting of 15 Corps AOR with HQ 14 Corps being raised for Ladakh. Each time splitting of AOR has happened after a negative event which essentially reflects that military appreciation in matching resources to an AOR has never really been our forte.


{Why? This would be third time after 1965, 1971 and 1999. Was it because of the old British Indian Army formations that Kitchener created?

In one of the ongoing seminars of the 1965 Indo-Pak war a seasoned veteran who writes on strategic issues raised a very pertinent question. It alluded to the reasons why in the Akhnoor sector we have twice been surprised (1971 too) and whether our posture today caters for surprise factor in the future. Even the thinking public, which is reading and listening about military affairs with much greater interest than ever before, deserves to be given an answer to this. Three things the reader must know about this sector. First, the Chenab Jhelum Corridor (CJC) where it hugs the LoC is a short distance from the debouching areas from where an offensive force can be launched by Pakistan. Concentration can be done by the Pakistan Army in a very quick time frame which means the chances of being surprised are very high. Secondly, the River Tawi and the artificial obstacle of the ditch cum bund (DCB)can effectively check the initial offensive. Thirdly the distance being short from the LoC to Akhnoor there is always a need to have defences in depth and sufficient armour to respond with. Both in 1965 and 1971 these criteria were not there but today Akhnoor has all this and more. The CJC is excellent territory for us to commence a pre-emptive offensive so that the battle is fought in Pakistan territory with enough threat to his nearby cantonments.


The major tank battles of the 1965 War were fought once the Indian Army launched its offensive on 06 Sep 1965 taking the Pakistan Lahore sector completely by surprise; so we weren’t the only ones to be surprised through the war. The Lahore and the Sialkot sectors where the credentials of India’s tankmen were tested will be the focus of Part II of this essay.



2)1965 India- Pak War How the armed forces fought in the plains


1965 India-Pakistan War: How the Armed Forces fought in the plains



Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain
Updated: September 21, 2015, 11:31 AM IST

By now readers all over India must be having the 1965 Indo-Pak war coming out of their ears, so much has been the splurge by the media and the efforts of the armed forces themselves have been appreciable. The Forgotten War has just about become the most Remembered War and we have made good much of the neglect, the reasons for which were never very clear. However, I do subscribe the prime reason as the lack of a strategic culture in India. It seems to be making a dent somewhere now and that is a very positive sign. Common people are discussing and evincing interest and the generation born in the 1970s and thereafter in particular appears to be realizing the value of military heritage and sacrifice.

Last week I promised to continue the analysis of the War by addressing the events which took place from 06 Sep 65 onwards. Gen Harbaksh Singh wrote of his dilemma in deciding the date of the launch across the IB in Punjab. The plans were broadly in place in Apr 65 itself and deliberations about the contingency of having to open the Punjab front had taken place well before; it was not a spur of the moment decision as has been made out in some analyses but a well-planned and thought out military action.

The dilemma was the need for simultaneity in launch of 11 Corps with its three formations – 15, 7 and 4 Infantry Divisions, through what is broadly called the Amritsar sector and of the newly raised 1 Corps (the HQ was effective on 3 Apr 65) hastily orbatted with 26 Inf Div (holding formation), 6 Mountain Division (raised for the Central Sector on the Sino Indian border and equipped for mountain warfare), the recently raised 14 Infantry Division and finally the pride of India’s Armoured Corps, the 1st Armoured Division (Black Elephant). To today’s observers this would seem a perfectly formed order of battle for a Strike Corps; a holding/pivot formation deployed at the firm base, two division sized forces for two thrust lines and a sizeable armored component.

{So Lt Gen. Harbaksh Singh was launching a two corps simultaneous attack. This is a major deep battle strike formation. Let us see what happened?}


Image

Yet, the situation wasn’t what meets the eye and appears on paper. 6 Mountain Division had never trained with armor or even exercised in the plains. 14 Infantry Division had just about completed its raising and had not fetched up into the battle zone even by the launch date, 6 Sep 65. 1 Armored Division had just the 1st Armored Brigade and 43rd Lorried Brigade with just four armored regiments; it had to borrow an armored regiment to have matching capability with Pakistan’s known armored formation.


Today’s Strike Corps are well oiled war machines, the pride of the Army, trained and fully aware of their tasks. They go into battle as they arrive, completely confident that the pivot formations are there to assist even before they launch. In 1965, 1 Corps was just a loosely hinged strike force not even aware of the opposition it would face. The possibility of meeting Pakistan’s 1st Armored Division in battle was live but the delay in launch occurred due to the inability of 14 Infantry Division fetching up to its concentration area.


{however plans were in place since April 1965, yet 14 Div was not raised nor in its launch point nor trained for plains warfare. 1st Armored was not equipped at all. So Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh didn't have the resources for such a major attack./}

Pakistan’s key formation had already shown its hand at Khem Karan on 6/7 Sep 65. [b]The task of 1 Corps (Sialkot sector – through Samba-Vijaypur) was supposedly made easy but little was known about the existence of a second armor formation in the form of Pakistan’s 6th Armored Division in the Sialkot sector. Whether the staggered launch of 11 and 1 Corps on 6 Sep and 9 Sep respectively was beneficial or would a simultaneous launch have achieved more is difficult to say but there can be no doubt that the dilemma for the man in charge of it all, Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh, was real.


With his typical offensive spirit and facing two crumbling fronts in Akhnur (North) and Khem Karan (South) one would not have liked to be in his shoes. He chose the ideal solution copy book style, borrowing from the age old saying – attack is the best form of defence. He chose to open Western Command’s third front, in the Sialkot sector. I admit that if I was in command I may have chickened at this stage of the war and may have employed elements of 1 Corps to reinforce the emerging failure in 11 Corps southern flank; those kinds of decisions give temporary solace to senior commanders.

Two things stand out from 11 Corps operations in the Amritsar sector. The inability to exploit the initial success which brought it to the doorstep of Lahore with the Bata shoe factory in its lap, may be rationally explained by saying that there was never an intent to get into Lahore’s labyrinth lanes and roads. However, the maintenance of a credible threat across the obstacle would have caused more caution in the Pakistan Army and perhaps prevented the launch of full weight operations in the south against Khem Karan. In after thought this is easy to surmise but the grave danger of keeping an unprotected bridgehead on the west of the Ichogil canal may have worked against prudence. There was a general shortage of armor and the quality of tanks left few options to play with.[/u]

[b]{This was the danger that Nehruvian cutting down the Army weapons procurement led to.}


Many have criticized the Indian Army’s reluctance to go for Lahore. Besides the reasons already brought out, it is forgotten that by the evening of 6 Sep 65, the very day that the Punjab front was activated, Gen Harbaksh had a crisis situation on his hands in the south. 4 Mountain Division’s advance had been halted by the unrevealed Pakistan 11 Infantry Division and the Pakistan 1st Armored Division was raring to get into Indian territory. The latter had been well camouflaged in the Changa Manga forest further south and its exact position was not known when the Punjab front was activated. That was a blunder of sorts. In my discussion with Pakistani Army officers I learnt that Pakistan 1st Armored Division’s emphasis on camouflage and concealment has always been intense and the same is treated as a mantra even today. The reason why the Indian Army could not pick its location in Sep 65 was also because no air recce was permitted and the IAF remained restricted to the Chamb-Akhnur sector to defeat Op Grand Slam launched by Pakistan.

Quite obviously if your southern thrust has crumbled a senior commander will look at restoration before strengthening the northern arm heading into a built up area. But the question is why the southern thrust should have crumbled so quickly. When you have long stand offs between India and Pakistan, of the Op Parakaram kind in 2002, there is enough time to lay mines and reinforce obstacles. Here the offensive went in without commensurate defensive preparations. When Pakistan 1st Armored Division revealed its hand and launched the offensive it sliced through Indian defences; infantry units were revealed naked and unprotected without obstacles, without mines and with very little armor in support.

{So Maj. Gen Niranjan Prasad was only one cause. The root cause was inadequate armor. And thus structural. I think the mountain division structure was not for the plains.}

Lesser men than General Harbaksh would have wilted. And this is where we await Captain Amrinder’s forthcoming book. I am convinced that senior leadership at Delhi would have been worried sick when news of the Pakistani breakthrough at Khem Karan was revealed. Another disaster in the making so soon after 1962; it would have been the end of a nation. Harike and Beas Bridge lay open although our 2 (I) Armored Brigade and 3 Cavalry would have contested in the rolling plain of Valtoha to Taran Taran, the Pakistani armor’s push towards the River Beas would have meant the forced retraction of both 7 and 15 Infantry Division. Not to forget that 1 Corps had yet to be launched. The dilemma for Gen Harbaksh was real and intense. If it was the desert with no built up areas the obvious thing would have been to push 15 and 7 Infantry Division further west to reach Pakistan’s innards, into its centre of gravity, the food belt of the Chenab-Ravi corridor.

But this was no desert and further advance of these divisions would have only embroiled them into the built up areas. General Harbaksh did what really was the only option to execute – create a pivot at Asal Uttar and contest. Although credit has been given to the rear guard action of 4 Mountain Division at Asal Uttar, details of the decision to lay thousands of mines and blast the canal bunds to create a quagmire of boggy ground in such a quick time frame have been less spoken of. In the melee of tank versus tank battles and the virtually merging fronts at Asal Uttar the integrated effort of Indian armor, infantry, artillery and engineers, not to forget the stupendous staff work involved with logistics of movement was nothing short of a miracle. It was truly professionalism of the highest order.



{And extreme valor to face down the Pattons and destroy them.}

1965war_tank

Just a word on terrain which we must not forgot. Punjab’s battles are restricted by the river corridors. Pakistan had the option to swing south from Khem Karan or go east into uncontested territory but the presence of the River Sutlej forced it to advance along the grain towards the Beas Bridge.


As far as 1 Corps operations are concerned, some of the big landmarks with battles attached to them emerged on the Sialkot front. Chawinda, Philora, Buttur Dograndi etc require reams to write about. While armored formations as entities may not have achieved the desired degree of domination or achieved the larger aim of cutting off Sialkot, the performance of armored units was outstanding. The spirit and professionalism of units such as Poona Horse (Lt Col Tarapore, PVC), Hodson’s Horse, 7 Cavalry and 16 Cavalry was admirable. Just as almost six Pakistani armored regiments contested India’s 3 Cavalry, 8 Cavalry and Deccan Horse at Asal Uttar and failed to make a breakthrough a larger Indian armored component fought in the Sialkot sector but against a progressively enhancing strength of Pakistan’s 6 Armored Division. The details of armored battles make interesting stories of individual valor but what is more important is that by launching 1 Corps even in its weaker form a potential desperate attempt by Pakistan to try and address the Pathankot-Jammu highway was offset and real estate captured for the eventual tradeoff. It is in this sector that the potential for a deeper thrust existed even after 22 Sep 65. The ceasefire based on erroneous data of ammunition holding if avoided for another three or four days, may have resulted in the isolation of Sialkot and forced withdrawal of Pakistan from Akhnur. That was not to be.

This piece cannot be complete without the mention of two units of my own Regiment. 8 Garhwal Rifles under the command of Late Lt Col Jerry Jirad fought alongside Poona Horse at Buttur Dograndi, winning a battle honor of the same name. It is one of the rare units of the Indian Army in which both the CO and the Second in Command (2IC) were killed in a single battle. Late Maj Abdul Rafey Khan, VrC (P) of the Rampur family was the 2IC. Ist Garhwal Rifles fought in an unsung theatre in the desert but achieved tremendous results at Gadra Road near Barmer, capturing the redoubtable Pakistani defences, under the leadership of Late Lt Col (later Brig) Krish Lahiri, VrC. The unit received the battle honor – Gadra Road. Brig Lahiri passed away a few weeks before the golden jubilee of the battle.

It has been a pleasure recounting and analyzing the events of the 1965 Indo Pak Conflict. It has left me richer in my faculties. I hope you, the reader can say the same.



Rohitvats has sent me screenshots of Capt's book which I plan to purchase. It recounts the big plan was to create 4th battle of Panipat. I think the 1 Corps attack which stymied the 6th Armoured Div saved it.


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