1965 India Pakistan War: History

The Military Issues & History Forum is a venue to discuss issues relating to the military aspects of the Indian Armed Forces, whether the past, present or future. We request members to kindly stay within the mandate of this forum and keep their exchanges of views, on a civilised level, however vehemently any disagreement may be felt. All feedback regarding forum usage may be sent to the moderators using the Feedback Form or by clicking the Report Post Icon in any objectionable post for proper action. Please note that the views expressed by the Members and Moderators on these discussion boards are that of the individuals only and do not reflect the official policy or view of the Bharat-Rakshak.com Website. Copyright Violation is strictly prohibited and may result in revocation of your posting rights - please read the FAQ for full details. Users must also abide by the Forum Guidelines at all times.
BRF Oldie
Posts: 2116
Joined: 29 Mar 2017 06:37

Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ArjunPandit » 02 Sep 2018 11:58

ramana wrote:https://twitter.com/adgpi/status/1035933550166663169?s=19

Mussharraf, who later became President of Pakistan was amongst the ones who were bogged down and ran away. He never forgot the humiliation of having run from that battle with his pants on fire literally.

I wish all these were captured through videos(Shiv style) or Gifs, capturing the flow of actions with audio. Very difficult for layman like to understand the action on maps

Posts: 797
Joined: 26 Aug 2004 19:13
Location: Moscow

Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Deans » 02 Sep 2018 12:55

Quite often, success in battle is a matter of which side makes fewer mistakes - rather than successful execution of a grand operational plan.
The tank battles of 1965 are a case in point (Chawinda and Khem Karan). I believe there is more to be learnt from mistakes than from success.

Our mistakes:
- We did not realise that Pakistan had 2 armored divisions (we assumed they had one, as we did). When the its second armored division turned up at Khem Karan (we expected at most a armored brigade, which is why we had one) we did panic and only the cool head of Gen Harbaksh Singh prevented a retreat East of the Beas, which would have lost us prime territory in Punjab.
Ironically, the very slow advance of 4th Mountain Div (albeit with only 2 brigades) into Pakistan, prevented it from being completely outflanked by Pakistan's 1st armored division.
-Our own 1st armored division had just 1 tank brigade, the 2nd was little more than a lorried infantry brigade. They had to advance towards Sialkot with inferior tanks and a 1:2 numerical disadvantage in tanks.
- Close air support by the IAF was largely absent (particularly when Pak tanks were stuck in the mud at Assal Uttar).

Pak mistakes (Khem Karan):
- Advancing with no reece, on the assumption that the Hindoos will just flee when they hear a tank.
- Tanks not advancing with infantry support.
- The advantage of the Patton was negated by fighting in sugarcane fields with low visibility and its weight was a liability, when the ground was
- Pak armor was over ambitious at Khem Karan and not bold enough at Chawinda.

Ravi Karumanchiri
Posts: 664
Joined: 19 Oct 2009 06:40
Location: www.ravikarumanchiri.com

Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Ravi Karumanchiri » 07 Sep 2018 09:29

Dear Pakistanis, this Defence Day, please stop celebrating hate

The Pakistani military has propagated a false narrative about the 1965 war with justifies its oversized role in society.
by Taha Siddiqui

BRF Oldie
Posts: 8279
Joined: 12 Nov 2006 04:16
Location: New York

Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby anupmisra » 09 Sep 2018 19:14

Musharraf buys all copies of sensitive ‘65 war book
Old article when mushy was in power.

ISLAMABAD: The Pakistan Army general headquarters has purchased all 22,000 copies of a sensitive book by a former Inter Services Intelligence(ISI) chief on the myth of the victory claimed by the Pakistan Army in the 1965 war against India.
The army felt The Myth of 1965 Victory by Lieutenant General Mahmood Ahmed would malign the armed forces’ image.
The sources said Mahmood had submitted the manuscript to the GHQ as per rules. However, after going through the manuscript, the GHQ referred it to Musharraf, who noted on the file that Mahmood should review sensitive parts of the book and the title, especially the use of the word ‘myth’ in relation to the 1965 war.
Mahmood refused to make suggested major deletions, claiming the book was in print.
The sources said Mahmood joined the Tableeghi Jamaat after being relieved of his post-retirement assignment to head the Fauji Fertilizer Corporation.
He is one of seven generals who carried out the coup against Nawaz Sharif in 1999. He was Corps Commander, Rawalpindi, at that time, but was rewarded for his loyalty to Musharraf and made director general, ISI.

https://www.dnaindia.com/world/report-m ... ok-1056075

Posts: 1599
Joined: 09 Feb 2009 16:58

Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby wig » 16 Sep 2018 16:44

https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/sunda ... 53654.html

16 Squadron & Badin radar raid
No. 16 Squadron of the IAF entered the war on September 7, 1965, which marked the beginning of a new phase of war with Pakistan. As I joined the squadron on June 30, 1966, in Gorakhpur, I heard many stories of its successes, experiences and travails. The Badin raid has remained with me since then.

The Western Air Command was aware that the PAF had received sophisticated radars from the US. One of these radars was located at Badin near Karachi. This radar, apart from assisting PAF fighters in intercepting intruders, was also tending towards strategic interference in the Indian air space. With a view to neutralise it, a Canberra on photo recce photographed this target on September 18, 1965.

The decision to disable the Badin radar was hastened when a PAF Sabre jet on September 19, 1965, shot down an aircraft well within the Indian air space and killed the then Chief Minister of Gujarat, his wife, three members of his staff, a journalist and two crews. Clearly, the directions had come from the radar controller at Badin.

the mission
The mission to hit the Badin radar was assigned to 16 Squadron CO Wing Commander Peter Wilson (Pete), who wanted a surprise raid by four Canberra bombers on the target between 7.45 am and 8 am when staff changed shifts at the radar station. A fifth Canberra interdictor was to act as a decoy and make an overt approach at about 20,000 ft and invite attention. It was also to act as an alternate to the main and sixth Canberra interdictor to be flown by Wilson with Sqn Ldr O Shankaran as the navigator. This main interdictor was to approach the target last to strike at the domes. They were separated by about 120 yards.

The mission team arrived in Agra, the launching base, on September 20, 1965. On September 21, the first bomber crew comprised Sqn Ldr HB Singh and Flt-Lt GN Bhaskar. Their aircraft was armed with two 4,000 lbs bombs each. The second bomber crew was Sqn Ldr PPS Madan with Flt-Lt S Karkare and their aircraft was also armed like the first one. The third was Sqn Ldr RS Rajput (Kaddu) and Flt-Lt BV Pathak with six 1,000 lbs bombs and the fourth was Flt Lt RG Khot with Flt-Lt GS Negi with a bomber armed like the third. They were to take off in this order with a two to three minutes separation and proceed about 20,000 ft initially and then pull up to the bombing height of 10,000 ft above ground and release bombs. The fifth aircraft was flown by Sqn Ldr SP Khanna with Fg Offr KM Joy who was to act as decoy. Flt-Lt Ashok Bakshi (Joe) and Fg Offr BS Sidhu were on stand by.
The anatomy of the raid, however, differed in its occurrence. While the first two groups dropped their bombs as per plan, the third bomber went on to release bombs later. The third crew had forgotten to increase their bomber's speed and as a result they not only saw the fourth one overtaking but also could not see the targets. Kaddu then manoeuvred the aircraft and dropped the bombs from 7,500 ft as it passed between the two domes. It was at that time he noticed Pete and Shankaran’s Canberra turning right. Pete delivered the crucial rocket “coup de grace”. As per Shankaran’s own clarification to me, in the middle of their planned turn from the IP towards their targets, Pete levelled out early, noticing smoke in the distance, and thus arrived at 30 feet above the ground with the targets on the right and was, therefore, able to hit only one dome successfully. This first-hand admission from Shankaran, on logical reconstruction, negates several hearsay statements being ascribed to Pete, before he passed away, of having missed the targets on their first run. Also, the other rocket pod did not fire.

Revelations of the Badin success kept emerging as the times passed. A PAF report went on to report the fatality of one of their men. We later learnt that not only the radar had to be replaced and relocated but the domes were also gone.

Forum Moderator
Posts: 51383
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ramana » 11 Dec 2018 07:06

There was a session on IAF lessons learned in 1965 war at the Military fest in Chandigarh.
If there are any reports please post here.

Forum Moderator
Posts: 51383
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ramana » 18 Dec 2018 11:47

In the Badin raid the 4000 lbs bombs dropped by first aircraft turned to be duds based on Wilson's writeup.

I am interested in the causes of such high dud rate for the 4000 lbs bombs used in 1965 war.

IAF had two types of bombs: 1000 lbs MC and 4000 lbs MC . Both had ~50% filling of RDX/TNT.

Normally it's the fuzes that are suspect as many things can go wrong with mechanical devices.

However we note both bombs had the same set of fuzes for nose and tail fuze:
NP27/42 or NP 44 and TP 28/30 or 37.

First three type are contact or instantaneous. The last is time delay based on chemical action. Only for very long delay. So not used.

And we know the 1000 lbs ones usually worked.

So less probability of faulty fuzes.

Then attention goes to the explosive filling. RDX/TNT is stable with long life.
OFB certifies them up-to 30 years age.
Also storage temperature has bad effect of reducing the effective life of chemicals.
Arrhenius law.
So most likely these 4K bombs were WWII stock sold off by UK.
Then add storage temperature.
Both effects could have led to the high dud rate.
I wish they had tried them in flight demos or Pokhran firepower demos to see if the worked.
Also could they have used both nose and tail fuzes to ensure redundancy?

Return to “Military Issues & History Forum”

Who is online

Users browsing this forum: Ambar, Apurva, jandash00, jpremnath, Karthik S, ks_sachin, Lisa, nam, Shivaji, sudhan, Thakur_B, TKiran and 138 guests