1965 India Pakistan War: History

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby vsunder » 17 Oct 2019 07:18

ramana wrote:Rohit thanks.

I have a question for you.

In Chapter VI of the 1965 Official War history, there is short description of Maj Gen Niranjan Prasad's plan for 15 Division operations which was different than the Corps plan.
I know he asks for air cover etc but looking at the events turned out what do you think?

I would ask Ravi Rikhye too if I could.

I am getting the feeling that the Lahore was Western Command attack to relieve the pressure on Chamb while the I Corps attack in Sialkot was a Army HQ attack.
So these are two different campaigns.


Ramana: Interestingly a few weeks ago I met a relative of Maj-Gen. Niranjan Prasad. The family seems very upset with how he is remembered since Lt.-Gen Harbaksh Singh had only very negative things to say. It is a fact that Prasad requested he begin his attack a few hours before sunrise to take advantage of the darkness, permission was not given and instead he was asked to attack in the daylight with only a part of his division. The attack not only failed but the attacking force degenerated into chaos and panic. Prasad's jeep with its two stars was captured and is on display in some Paki war museum, there are pictures of it on the Internet. Several of the officers under Prasad were taken prisoner. Harbaksh Singh went to meet Prasad and according to Harbaksh Singh, Prasad himself turned out unshaven and in a state of panic to meet him. Harbaksh relieved him of his command and said something like "shape up man, you look worse than a coolie". Prasad's replacement Maj.-Gen. Mohinder Singh seems to have been awarded a MVC for his subsequent actions leading 15 ID. Mohinder Singh took over command on 9th September.

Perhaps one account of the action around Lahore is Battle of Dograi and Batapore by Brig. Desmond Hayde MVC. who with his 3 Jat was in the thick of it at the Bata Shoe Factory at Batapore(Lahore). I still remember the picture of Hayde towering over a small LBS when LBS went to meet Hayde on the field.

https://www.amazon.com/Battle-Dograi-Ba ... 8181580486

Hayde went on to pen a personal memoir Blood and Steel that was published by Anglo-Ink a small Anglo Indian publishing house based in Chennai. They also specialize in Indian Railway memoirs.

http://www.angloink.com/index.php?route ... duct_id=50

For younger folks this will suffice:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Desmond_Hayde

https://www.thebetterindia.com/163707/a ... ayde-news/

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby rohitvats » 18 Oct 2019 17:13

VSunder, Sir - I had not seen your post before I posted mine. Later I read through your post and realized the mistake!

Coming to the equations themselves, to put it mildly, I'm mathematically challenged to fully comprehend and use these equations. Even though, I really want to.

For sometime now, I've been trying to do a ground-up comparison of own army with Pakistan and China. One of the things I'm trying to study is the organizational structure and its impact.

For example, comparison between a 10 man squad/section in terms of fire-power.

- US Army I think has 09 man section with 2 x fire teams of 4 men each and 9th in Squad Leader. Each fire team has 3 x riflemen (1 rifleman has UBGL) and 1 x GPMG. So, 2 x GPMG, 2 x UBGL and 05 x riflemen.

- Within the Stryker Brigade Combat Team, the above is modified as in 1 x Rifleman has either Javelin ATGM or is a Designated Marksman.

You can see a clear difference in the capability of the two. Using the equations you've mentioned, I assume there's method to arrive at firepower weight of the two and the difference between them.

Using some broad guidelines like above, I hope we can assess the firepower differential between opposing armies.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby vsunder » 18 Oct 2019 18:55

rohitvats wrote:VSunder, Sir - I had not seen your post before I posted mine. Later I read through your post and realized the mistake!

Coming to the equations themselves, to put it mildly, I'm mathematically challenged to fully comprehend and use these equations. Even though, I really want to.

For sometime now, I've been trying to do a ground-up comparison of own army with Pakistan and China. One of the things I'm trying to study is the organizational structure and its impact.

For example, comparison between a 10 man squad/section in terms of fire-power.

- US Army I think has 09 man section with 2 x fire teams of 4 men each and 9th in Squad Leader. Each fire team has 3 x riflemen (1 rifleman has UBGL) and 1 x GPMG. So, 2 x GPMG, 2 x UBGL and 05 x riflemen.

- Within the Stryker Brigade Combat Team, the above is modified as in 1 x Rifleman has either Javelin ATGM or is a Designated Marksman.

You can see a clear difference in the capability of the two. Using the equations you've mentioned, I assume there's method to arrive at firepower weight of the two and the difference between them.

Using some broad guidelines like above, I hope we can assess the firepower differential between opposing armies.


Rohit I suggest we take this offline. I can write up notes that explain things in greater detail than a post and attach MAPLE plots with phase plane pictures, this will help in your understanding. By changing parameters you can see how the plots change on the same picture.
The key point in using mathematical models is yes there is an equation, but the choice of parameters is entirely ours, should I choose the parameter as 7 or 0.9 etc. The choice of the parameter depends on combat effectiveness, tactics, etc etc. There are people at least in the US military establishment who have been thinking about it and surely they have modeled it for the units you refer to. For example a declassified report here apparently shows how to choose parameters that go into the Lanchester equations:

https://apps.dtic.mil/docs/citations/AD0704744

Regarding Dupuy and his collaborators, indeed their models are based on the Lanchester equations( so my hunch was entirely correct) and so I would say the main work is collating the data from various battles D-Day, Salerno etc Indo-Pak war/s and choosing the parameters. Here is an article by someone in the Dupuy institute and using a Lanchester model

http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/blog/2018 ... l-warfare/

Again please give me time, as I am buried in two projects. But I will write up the notes in layman's language and explain what the issue is to address your problem. Data like what you are asking killing rates or what we have been referring in a genteel fashion as parameters that go into the Lanchester equations or combat effectiveness parameters etc are probably well-known to the US military establishment like the works ^^^.
It would be important as a first step for you to get the declassified document above and see what methods they use to evaluate the combat effectiveness of units. Then next come the equations which we know everything about. Last comes the actual "solving" the equation and plotting the course of the battle till the end, which we also know how to do, by hand or easier using the appropriate mathematical software MAPLE. So in the three steps to answer your question it is the first step that is key. We can of course put in various values of the parameters and produce all sorts of plots. For example in a theoretical battle between an Indian force and a Pakistani force we can assume the kill rate of the Indian Force is 6 while that of the Pakistani force is 4 and we can analyse the model. Or we can take a kill rate of 10 for India and 3 for Pakistan and analyse the model and each model has to be analysed with different initial force concentrations, say the last one 10:3 with Indian forces numbering 3,000 at the start and Pakistani 1000 etc. so you see we have at least 4 parameters to choose from. The two kill parameters and the two initial strengths of the opposing forces. Out of these the kill parameter choice is the most important and for that we need data to obtain the kill parameters. Ok here is an email id you can send a mail to and I will get in touch with you

yadav.mark@yahoo.com

rgds/-

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Karan M » 18 Oct 2019 19:54

VSunder, please put up the notes here in public so all can learn.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ramana » 23 Oct 2019 05:36

I suggest we put that in a different thread.
i believe rudradev long ago created a simulations thread.
We can re name it and post these there.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby nachiket » 23 Oct 2019 05:43

ramana wrote:I suggest we put that in a different thread.
i believe rudradev long ago created a simulations thread.
We can re name it and post these there.

Is it this one: viewtopic.php?f=16&t=6877 ?

I can move it back from the Trash Can if needed.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ramana » 23 Oct 2019 10:41

Yes please and rename it Military Simulations and we can move these posts there.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Rohit_K » 24 Oct 2019 09:01

Relevant to 1965 - x-posting from TSPA thread:

Was looking at Google Reviews of Lahore Cantt's structures and saw the local Officers Mess is named "Fateh Khem Karan" :rotfl:

Pic:
https://www.google.com/maps/place/Corps ... 74.3697415

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ramana » 02 Nov 2019 11:52

ramana wrote:I am posting that picture for it tells us a tale!!!

Image

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ramana » 07 Nov 2019 11:56

Ok. MAF Arjan Singh regretted sending Vampires



https://www.theweek.in/theweek/cover/IN ... Singh.html


In hindsight, I regret that we used the Vampires—they were slow and I realise that it was a mistake. The Pakistanis, on the other hand, had the Sabres, Starfighters and the advanced Miracle radar.


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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Aditya_V » 07 Nov 2019 13:58

ramana wrote:Ok. MAF Arjan Singh regretted sending Vampires



https://www.theweek.in/theweek/cover/IN ... Singh.html


In hindsight, I regret that we used the Vampires—they were slow and I realise that it was a mistake. The Pakistanis, on the other hand, had the Sabres, Starfighters and the advanced Miracle radar.



The problem is I dont think IAF had a say in the acquisition , these were decisions made at the top in 1950's heady days of NAM, when the Indian leadership was debating why not fire the entire Armed forces. When war came in 1962 Politically the leadership funked from using the Air force.

Kudos to the leadership in 1965 who took a firm decision in response to Operation Gibralter and Grand Slam, in 1965 Oragauns and Vampires were obsolete and many of Pilots including some GNat pilots were afraid of the F-104, the only radar equip fighter in the Sub continent, A million salutes to people like Squadron leader Devayya who took on F-104 in hostile territory with a Mystere.

PAF in 1965 had clear superiority thats why people like Rafiqui came and fought dogfights over FAS Adampur. In Feb 2019, May-Jun 1999, Dec 1971 the PAF mainly kept itself well within Paki teritory.

What a difference in those 6 years additional upgraded hunters, 100 odd Mig 21 M's and 100 odd Su-7B's made.

I hope through LCA and MWF can have rapid acquisition like 65-71 alogn with much better weapons to completely outclass the PAF to fight a no contest war.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby nachiket » 08 Nov 2019 03:49

Aditya_V wrote:
ramana wrote:Ok. MAF Arjan Singh regretted sending Vampires


The problem is I dont think IAF had a say in the acquisition , these were decisions made at the top in 1950's heady days of NAM, when the Indian leadership was debating why not fire the entire Armed forces. When war came in 1962 Politically the leadership funked from using the Air force.

He isn't saying he regrets India buying them (they were bought much before the war, IIRC before the pakis got Sabres), he regrets using them over Chhamb where three got shot down by the Sabres.

The real problem for the IAF was after that. They could not to use the Vampires again after that because they were hopelessly outclassed. So several squadrons of aircraft became basically unusable on the first day of the war in which the AF was already at a qualitative disadvantage.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby nam » 08 Nov 2019 04:29

Do we have any details on what happened to all the US TFTA kit on the Patton tanks, that we captured intact?

Did the Soviet's get some for reverse engineering? or we meekly gave them back to the US?

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby nachiket » 08 Nov 2019 04:48

Both the Soviets and the Americans already had better tanks than the M-47/48 Patton by the time of the 1965 war.

The Soviet T-54 was used in the Hungarian revolution in 1956. The Brits got a lucky chance to examine one of them when someone drove one onto the British embassy grounds in Budapest. The Americans saw their detailed report and decided they needed to upgrade the M-48 Patton because it was inferior to the T-54. Thus the M-60 Patton was born.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Aditya_V » 08 Nov 2019 10:45

nam wrote:Do we have any details on what happened to all the US TFTA kit on the Patton tanks, that we captured intact?

Did the Soviet's get some for reverse engineering? or we meekly gave them back to the US?


Some were displayed at Patton Nagar and the Finance Ministry wanted to levy Customs duty on the Defense Ministry for illegally imported Battle Tanks- Babdom at its best.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby nam » 08 Nov 2019 15:28

Aditya_V wrote:Some were displayed at Patton Nagar and the Finance Ministry wanted to levy Customs duty on the Defense Ministry for illegally imported Battle Tanks- Babdom at its best.


The tanks themselves being displayed, which I am aware. What happened to the sights, radio, ammo, or even the engine? Did we ever reverse engineer anything?

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Kashi » 08 Nov 2019 16:32

nam wrote:Did we ever reverse engineer anything?


:lol: :lol: :lol: :lol:

Did you think for one moment that it is likely?

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Rsatchi » 08 Nov 2019 16:40

Kashi wrote:
nam wrote:Did we ever reverse engineer anything?


:lol: :lol: :lol: :lol:

Did you think for one moment that it is likely?[/quote]

Are Sir
'Hum usooolu ke pakke hain'
Pretty sure the baboos would have made adequate arrangements for all the said things to be removed neatly packaged and sent back to US of A using 'Goberment' funds onleeee :rotfl: :rotfl:

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby dinesh_kimar » 08 Nov 2019 17:17

^ why reverse engineer the losing tank in battle, hain ji ?

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ramana » 10 Nov 2019 00:05

I read many books to understand how and why the Patton got defeated in 1965.

To understand Patton you need to go to M4 Sherman and WWII tank battles. M4 had an inadequate 75mm gun. Only good at close range. So need a longer range gun for Patton. Th 90mm was good at 2000 yards. To take advantage, they put a fire control system from U.S. Navy. Great in trials. First round kill etc. But in battlefield the range advantage was lost. The fire control was complex. Centurion could shoot 3 rounds before Patton got one out.
As to why Centurion 20 pdr was good the answer is in Patton armor.

M4 casualties were due to spalling of armor after a hit. So to reduce crew casualties, the Patton cast turret was of softer steel with high fracture toughness so it doesn't shatter easily. Centurion had flat plate armor with rolled grain in load direction and was better.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ramana » 11 Nov 2019 08:06

We need to find out
1) the background of decisions on Centurion procurement in the 1950s. How and why it was limited to 186 tanks?

2) Next how many M4 Sherman's got up-gunned with the 75 mm CVN 75?

3) And when was the Vijayanta deal signed to make in Avadi?

The gap in 1965 was not enough medium tanks nor enough anti-tank weapons in artillery or infantry.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Sanju » 11 Nov 2019 20:15

Aditya_V wrote:
nam wrote:Do we have any details on what happened to all the US TFTA kit on the Patton tanks, that we captured intact?

Did the Soviet's get some for reverse engineering? or we meekly gave them back to the US?


Some were displayed at Patton Nagar and the Finance Ministry wanted to levy Customs duty on the Defense Ministry for illegally imported Battle Tanks- Babdom at its best.


Aditya_V ji, any source for the highlighted part? Not questioning your assertion, just for my own records. TIA

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ramana » 12 Nov 2019 22:52

Chapter 4 of the 1965 War Report gives details of the Gibraltar Force that was trained and infiltrated. The key move happened in August 1962 with formation of Razakar force in POK. These formed bulk (70%) of the infiltrators. The Mujahid force was formed later. These were armed porters.

The companies were armed with
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RL-83_Blindicide

The whole force organization to me reminds me of Wingate's Chindit columns in Burma but on a much larger scale.

The columns, the command and control, the porters, the mule convoys, and the air drops.
Were any Pak Army officers part of the Chindits during WWII?

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ramana » 13 Nov 2019 01:47

I keep shouting about lack of volume in the Indian army in this war.
The Gibraltar forces tied up 4 divisions of Indian Army in J&K for mopping up and thus saved Lahore and Sialkot.

The fate would have been different.

Do read Chapter 4 to get a picture of the gallant actions in repelling Gibraltar and how it forced Pakistan to launch Grand Slam.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Sanju » 13 Nov 2019 02:18

ramana wrote:I keep shouting about lack of volume in the Indian army in this war.
The Gibraltar forces tied up 4 divisions of Indian Army in J&K for mopping up and thus saved Lahore and Sialkot.

The fate would have been different.

Do read Chapter 4 to get a picture of the gallant actions in repelling Gibraltar and how it forced Pakistan to launch Grand Slam.


Prior to '62, there was constant degradation in numbers for IA, after '62, we went on an Emergency basis literally offering EC (Emergency Commission) to increase volume. By the time '65 came around we were slowly ramping up our numbers, however, most were greenhorns. My Father's battalion was a newly raised one with the most experienced officer having 11 years of service, the next experienced officer was barely 2 years and counting. Part of 42 div that got plastered in Chamb-Jaurian.

To top that, there were those who were fast tracked to Command ranks (Col & above). Many of them lived up to the responsibilities placed on their relatively inexperienced shoulders. There were some who were plain incompetent, as they had met with the Peter Principle.

This resulted in some horrendous decisions, one of them being inadequate forces required for defence at particular points. In addition, there was the Chinese threat, as the weather was still conducive to their interference ( the wounds of '62 were still raw), that had divided our forces, we also had part of our forces facing East Pakistan.

One cannot build up an army overnight, '65 was an invaluable lesson to our Armed Forces as well as our Strategists.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ramana » 13 Nov 2019 05:06

Sanju, Even GB during WWI had similar issues. No general in that Great War had commanded more than a division in the Second Boer War.

In Chapter 4 we see how Chamb was lost due to inadequate anti-tank assets.

One thing that I want to know is the Centurions were in 4 regiments (186) versus the 9 regiments of Pattons. And they knew there were two Pak armored Divisions 1st and 6th.

This low numbers were much before Gen JNC.
So what was going on>

In 1962 the refrain was the forces were trained and equipped for the Pak front.
Yet we see very inadequate strength and numbers.

I would expect more anti-tank assets like the RCL.
Maybe as these were US made and got only after 1962 war.

The Brigadier in charge of Chamb had a very large front of 83 km and most of his troops were taken away from his command.
And no anti-tank mines.


My pranams to your dad and his cohort that they fought so well.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby nachiket » 13 Nov 2019 05:31

ramana wrote:One thing that I want to know is the Centurions were in 4 regiments (186) versus the 9 regiments of Pattons. And they knew there were two Pak armored Divisions 1st and 6th.

Isn't the story from 65 that the Army HQ did not believe the intelligence assessment that pakis had raised a second armored division? And the paki 6th Armored was a nasty surprise to us after the war began?

Basically 62 was a wake up call because of which 65 did not end in defeat. And 65 was the wake up call because of which 71 ended in a decisive victory. Unfortunately our leaders did not learn the lesson as well as they should have. Because we again had deficiencies in several areas when 99 came around (artillery, aerial PGMs, BPJ's, helmets, night vision etc.) which could have saved a lot of lives.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ramana » 13 Nov 2019 05:50

If you read the Official War Report (OWR) chapter 6 and 7 they knew about the two armored divisions. Only the location was not sure. The unbelief story is psy-ops.

BTW Lt.Gen. Dhillon who is a civil engineer was shown the full details of the Icchogil Canal and he understood the significance but did not convey it to his juniors.


In chapter 13 from page 33 to 45 is touching recollection of the role of CAPF and civilians in the 1965 war.

I was un-familiar about the gallantry awards for the CAPF.

Can Some one create a wiki page on Role of Paramilitary and Civilians in 1965 War.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ramana » 13 Nov 2019 07:16

And Sanju Please read Chapter XII Review and Reflections.

Very nice summation and critique.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Sanju » 13 Nov 2019 07:40

ramana wrote:Sanju, Even GB during WWI had similar issues. No general in that Great War had commanded more than a division in the Second Boer War.

In Chapter 4 we see how Chamb was lost due to inadequate anti-tank assets.

One thing that I want to know is the Centurions were in 4 regiments (186) versus the 9 regiments of Pattons. And they knew there were two Pak armored Divisions 1st and 6th.

This low numbers were much before Gen JNC.
So what was going on>

In 1962 the refrain was the forces were trained and equipped for the Pak front.
Yet we see very inadequate strength and numbers.

I would expect more anti-tank assets like the RCL.
Maybe as these were US made and got only after 1962 war.

The Brigadier in charge of Chamb had a very large front of 83 km and most of his troops were taken away from his command.
And no anti-tank mines.


My pranams to your dad and his cohort that they fought so well.


Ramana ji, Thank you for your kind words.

Regarding the lack of full strength, yes 41 Mountain Brigade had 2 Battalions as compared to the standard 3. This is only one instance among others.

Regarding 186 Centurions and the lack of additional Centurions, I recall reading that post 1962, the Powers that be, decided to buy light tanks to fight in the mountains (this was post '62), as that would be where our future wars would be fought. Therefore the British Centurion with a weight of 45 tons being the MBT, supported by the newly purchased French AMX-13/75 at 13 tonnes were fielded with the US built Medium Weight 33 ton Sherman tanks.

The "blame" for the Light tanks are placed at the feet of Gen. JNC, which I used to believe earlier, but on rereading his career, I no longer believe that may be the case. The General was initially assigned to the Infantry and then was retrained as a Tank officer. The Centurion was considered as arguably, the "best" Cold War tank of its time and any Cavalry trooper worth his Black beret, would go for the best tank available. The AMX-13 was probably purchased based on cost considerations and if our experience with Babudom especially related to arms purchase tells us anything, the decision to go with the Light Tanks can be placed in that corner. It cost us much.

Reading the WAR DISPATCHES - Indo-Pak Conflict 1965 by Lt. Gen Harbaksh Singh, the lack of experience in certain situations are sadly apparent. The instance of 161 Fld. Rgmt. being an example.

The Gibraltar forces tied up 4 divisions of Indian Army in J&K for mopping up and thus saved Lahore and Sialkot.


In your earlier post, you refer to the tying-up of the 4 divisions of IA, there is a top-secret letter printed in the War Dispatches that is from Maj. Gen Akhtar Hussain Malik (the architect of Op. Gibraltar) giving operational instructions to Brig. Fazle Rahim, MC commander of KHILJI force on 29-Aug-1965. ( A copy of the letter was sent to one Brig. AAK Niazi, sk, MC)

In "The Monsoon War, Young Officers Reminisce 1965 India-Pakistan War" by Capt. Amarinder Singh & Lt. Gen. Tajindar Shergill, PVSM, another point is made about the distributed assets of the Indian Army in COIN operations in the then NEFA (Chinese armed and trained Naga insurgents).

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Sanju » 13 Nov 2019 07:41

ramana wrote:And Sanju Please read Chapter XII Review and Reflections.

Very nice summation and critique.


Will do.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ramana » 13 Nov 2019 07:58

On my part, if we look back there was a bigger plan that was thwarted in hindsight.

Pakistan trained 30,000 irregulars (70:30) for Gibraltar. In the event, it sent approximately 8000 of them in two waves by the third week of August and had another 5,500 as a third wave which did not happen. These forces were defeated by XV corps(4 Divisions) by 29 August and Haji Pir pass captured. This is a diversion

Then Pakistan launched Grand Slam its second phase to cut off Kashmir from India by capturing Akhnur and Jammu. The sector was Chamb-Jaurian. The attacking force was 7th Infantry Division with 2 tank regiments, 5 regiments of field, medium and heavy artillery. And opposing was 191 Inf Brigade and supporting arms. And these were depleted to reinforce Poonch where an attack as expected. This resulted in the capture of Chamb. Even this is a diversion

India retaliated with Operation Riddle. This was a two-prong attack in Sialkot and Lahore sectors. Waiting in that area were the two Pak armored divisions with infantry divisions. The bulk of these would have been launched into Punjab eventually. The Indian two corps (XI corps and I corps) attack took the war into Pakistan or else it would be inside India. Even here the XI corps attack towards Lahore got repulsed and withdrew to Khem Karan and led to Battle of Assal Uttar. And the I corps attack got bogged down in Chawinda.
It doesn't make sense that TSP had two large formations in Punjab theater for just defensive purposes. This is the main attack force.

And note the instructions to I (Pak) armoured Division that were captured.

Now I understand Rohitvats disbelief.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby nachiket » 13 Nov 2019 10:04

ramana wrote:Now I understand Rohitvats disbelief.

What was his disbelief?

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ramana » 13 Nov 2019 10:29

About 1965 being about Kashmir only.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ramana » 13 Nov 2019 10:32

One nugget in Official War Record (OWR) is 75% of Indian casualties were due to shell fragments!

This is in the Notes section of Chapter 12. I had seen this somewhere else.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Aditya_V » 13 Nov 2019 13:15

In Some ways then was 1962 a good wake cup call since as per the above posts the Pakis were aldready preparing by 1962 and it served us a good reminder and hence we were better prepared in 1965?

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby rohitvats » 13 Nov 2019 16:01

ramana wrote:One nugget in OWR is 75% of Indian casualties were due to shell fragments!
This is in Notes section of Chapter 12. I had seen this somewhere else.


The finest artillery to emerge from WW2 was the US Army. And Pakistan Army's artillery regiment was trained to very high standards by US Army. They absorbed the lessons well. In the words of Ravi Rikhye, PA Artillery was adept in breaking-up Indian infantry charges - which can explain high casualties due to artillery.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby LakshmanPST » 13 Nov 2019 16:47

Was reading the articles posted on first page (Many of the links are no longer working. Good that entire content is quoted in the post). Noticed this interesting paragraph in the article titled, "A crucial assessment of Kashmir Valley mood"

Sheikh Showkat Hussain, who teaches law at Central University of Kashmir, believes that Pakistan contemplated a rebellion in Kashmir after India had started claiming Kashmir as an “integral part” of the country, which was contrary to the UN resolutions. India’s defeat at the hands of the Chinese in the 1962 war also emboldened Pakistan in undertaking the cross-border adventure. “India had taken a host of measures to integrate Kashmir with it, brazenly eroding Article 370 in the process. These measures included changing the nomenclature of J&K’s PM to CM and ‘sadr-e- riyasat’ to governor. Kashmiris were watching the situation helplessly and anger was brewing,” says Hussain.


The situation in Kashmir right now is actually worse (for Pakistan) than 1965 after India abolished Article 370 altogether... I guess Pakistan would have definitely declared a war on India by now, if they believed they could win a conventional war (and had Western backing) like in 1965...
We have moved miles ahead in terms of quantity & quality of our equipment and manpower...
-
And looks like Pakistani tactics haven't changed much... Sending 'irregulars' across LoC to fight India...
While we have come a long way since 1965, when Pakistan could simply send thousands of irregulars across Ceasefire line within 1 or 2 years to start a rebellion... Today they are getting their asses kicked and finding it really difficult to get in... Very few of them are able to cross over today...

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ArjunPandit » 13 Nov 2019 18:34

Ramana guru & RV why dont you two write an article to be printed in 2020. should we look 1962 and 65 in isolation? didnt china act in 1965? werent threats made for A&N islands.
I am not as factual as Ramana guru and RV, but something deep inside tells me 62-65 were to finish the unfinished business of partition including Kashmir. We stood and survived is a testimony to some good our ancestors had done...

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby rohitvats » 13 Nov 2019 18:36

As one reads more about 1965, one thing becomes clear:

- the decision to attack into Pakistan in the Lahore sector (even before the Sialkot Sector on 8th September), had a much wide ranging implication than simply taking the pressure off the Chhamb sector.

- It most probably prevented the proverbial 4th Battle of Panipat!

- IMO, 1965 war had two objective - one was in Kashmir and second one was in southern Punjab (Indian). And basis what Lt General Mehmud Ahmed, ex-DG ISI, wrote/mentioned in his book on 1965 war, Pakistan Army's 1st Armored Division had never practiced or trained or war-gamed attacking into India along the Kasur - Khem Karan axis.

- It was supposed to undertake much grander plans, south of where it fought.

- He alludes that the Division was supposed to attack along southern Indian Punjab and attack deep into India.

- Shortest route towards Delhi is the Fazilka, Malout, Sirsa, Hisar, Rohtak and then, Delhi.

- Though, one can argue about an armored division traveling 400 km deep into Indian territory but then again, very few troops were available south of Punjab. And any deep penetration into India (even 100 kilometers) could've panicked and unhinged the political leadership. And possibly many within the army as well.

- The bombast about having tea at Red Fort had some basis to it, even if it was quite outlandish.

- It is my considered opinion that 1965 had two prongs - one was in Kashmir and second one was in Southern Punjab. And it quite likely that Indian attack opposite Lahore forced the Pakistan Army to launch 1st Armored Division opposite Kasur rather than move it further south for a punch deep into India.

- Just look at the timelines: 1st Sep is when Grand Slam was launched, 6th September is when we attack opposite Lahore and 8th September is when 1st Armored Division attacks Khem Karan.

- Does it look like 1st Armored Division 'just' appeared opposite Kasur? And that PA wanted to restrict the battle to only Kashmir?

- The 1st Armored Division was actually located in a forested area known as 'Changa-Manga'. You can look it up on Google Maps; its about 44 km west of Kasur.

- So, Pakistan Army's premier reserve formation, 'The Mailed Fist' was not in its peacetime location but hiding in a forest. And why? Does it look like PA was not ready for actions south of Kashmir?

- Also, as per Pakistan Army write-ups, it was launched prematurely into Khem Karan. It was asked to move out on 6th September towards Kasur because given Indian attack in Lahore sector, it was told to 'DO SOMETHING'. And Kasur was the nearest target.

- But what was the actual target for which it had trained?

- In the words of its GOC in 1965 war (in an interview he gave to some officers in PA Staff College) - '....a much bigger hook and a much deeper objective'.

- An indication about this objective can be drawn from the fact that when leading elements of 1st Armored Division, its 4th Armored Brigade, arrive in Changa-Manga area, its Brigade Commander did a recce of Suleimanke Sector.

- Now, where is Suleimanke? Opposite India's Fazilka.

- Look it up on the map of India and see what possibilities a combined force of 1st Armored Division and 7th Infantry Division could exploit? And what could be a deeper hook and bigger objective.

- BTW, 1st Armored Division had moved out from its peace station in Kharian to general area of Chiniot and Changa-Manga by mid-May 1965. And then whole of it was concentrated in general area of Changa-Manga. This movement happened when Rann-of-Kutch was active and then it stayed-put.

- So, their most powerful strike formation was moved 230 km from its peace station. If Kashmir was the sole objective of 1965 war, this insanely powerful armored division could've been applied opposite Chamb and wound-up the whole matter before even India could react.

- So, why did it go so south?

- In an another interview, the Brigade Commander of 3rd Armored Brigade (which was under 1st Armored Division) had said and I quote:

"No information was provided to us regarding the projected operations of 1 Armored Division in the Khem Karan sector prior to the outbreak of the hostilities in September 1965. We were training for operations down south in the Suleimanke Sector. The operations in the Khem Karan sector were not even considered a possibility. We never heard of it. All was kept too secret. If we had known about this operation, we would've certainly prepared for it. We came to know about employment of 1st Armored Division in this sector , for the first time on 6th September, 1965, in the order group by the commander of 1 Armored Division'.


Even the maps of the Khem-Karan area were given to them on 6th September!!!

- So, what happened which forced the Pakistanis to deploy 1 Armored opposite Khem Karan?

- The attack on Lahore front happened!

As I said earlier, 1965 was much bigger than Kashmir!


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