1965 India Pakistan War: History

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Gerard
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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Gerard » 15 Nov 2019 09:11

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XXV, SOUTH ASIA

199. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson - Washington, September 10, 1965, 6:45 p.m.
Pak/Indian Roundup. Still no clear picture of the situation on the only really active front in the Punjab below Kashmir. Pak counter-attacks in the Lahore area have taken them well into India, and Delhi seems quite worried.

The SYG doesn’t seem to have gotten very far in his talks with the Paks, who are still insisting on a Kashmir settlement as part of any cease-fire agreement. Nor does McConaughy’s latest talk with Bhutto (Karachi 4282 attached) show much give.

The much more guarded tone of Indian statements suggests that Delhi is getting worried over Pak counterattacks. Chavan’s denial India was attacking East Pakistan is the first bright move they’ve made so far. But Delhi’s 5643 from an excellent source shows little give as yet either.

The consensus here is that neither side will begin to negotiate seriously until more blood has been let. Many of us feel that the Paks will do quite well militarily in the next week or so in the key Punjab sector. But this would only humiliate the Indians and probably make them less likely to stop shooting. The Paks are already beginning to worry about running out of ammo, etc. at which time Indian weight would begin to tell.

[Page 384]
Our Muslim friends (Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia especially) are eager to show their sympathy to the Paks.4 We don’t think we ought to growl at them too much because they won’t provide significant support and it helps for the Paks to think they have at least a few anchors left to Westward.

PM Wilson told the Paks he saw a solution emerging in four stages: (a) cease fire; (b) return to status quo; (c) neutralize and quiet Kashmir; and (d) a Kashmir settlement. U Thant too says the UN would probably have to take on the Kashmir issue again. The Brits apparently envisage some Commonwealth initiative if U Thant fails, and are probing Moscow’s view.

Nothing from the Chicoms so far except more noise. But Delhi fears the Paks may try to incite India to attack East Pakistan, because this would trigger the Chicoms.

https://history.state.gov/historicaldoc ... 68v25/d199

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Gerard » 15 Nov 2019 09:13

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XXV, SOUTH ASIA

203. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) - Washington, September 13, 1965.
Pak/India Food. You wanted a reminder before meeting with President.

I’m solid with State/AID and embassies in believing that if Pak and Indian public came to believe we were using food as an instrument of pressure, it would be a real setback to our influence.

We can tell roughly when an actual pinch might occur—but the real problem is psychological. At what point, in their current emotional state, will the Paks and Indians start accusing us of using food as a weapon? Bowles thinks this could “blow sky high in another week or so,” and I’d stick with the judgment of the man in the field in this case.2

The trick is to keep on using food as leverage by only dribbling it out slowly, but to do so in time to forestall public reactions. Thus we keep the GOI and GOP worried (as they already are by our stalling), yet don’t give them or anyone else a handle to accuse us of using starvation as a weapon. It could also help trigger communal riots.

State/AID recommend a million ton (two month) extension for India and 350,000 tons (under existing agreement) for Paks, which would carry them till about December—mostly for East Pakistan. I’d favor just cutting both in half—but doing it now!

https://history.state.gov/historicaldoc ... 68v25/d203

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Gerard » 15 Nov 2019 09:14

Office of the Historian

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XXV, SOUTH ASIA

205. Special National Intelligence Estimate - SNIE 13–10–65 - Washington, September 16, 1965.
PROSPECTS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST INVOLVEMENT IN THE INDO-PAKISTAN WAR
We believe that China will avoid direct, large-scale, military involvement in the Indo-Pakistan war. An impending Pakistani defeat would, however, substantially increase the pressures for Chinese entry. Even in this circumstance we believe the chances are better than even that the logistic problems involved and the primacy of Vietnam in China’s interests would keep China from undertaking a major military venture against India. In addition to propaganda, political support, and military gestures, China will probably offer material aid, but it probably cannot deliver more than token amounts. It will make threats and there is an even chance it will make small-scale military probes across the Indian frontier; the odds that it might launch a limited-objective attack similar to that of 1962 are somewhat lower. In either case it would expect to produce political and psychological effects far greater than the military importance would justify.

[Here follows the 11-page Discussion portion of the Estimate.]


https://history.state.gov/historicaldoc ... 68v25/d205

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Gerard » 15 Nov 2019 09:16

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XXV, SOUTH ASIA

222. Memorandum From the White House Situation Room to President Johnson - Washington, September 22, 1965, 7 a.m.
Pakistan announced acceptance of the UN cease-fire proposal at a dramatic last-minute Security Council meeting last night.2 Pakistan Foreign Minister Bhutto announced Pakistani acceptance as the 3:00 AM UN deadline was reached. India had already accepted the UN proposal, but the Indian delegate to the UN asked that a new time be set for the cease-fire to become effective in the light of Pakistan’s delay in announcing its position. The Security Council later announced that the deadline was extended 15 hours until 6:00 PM today.

Bhutto said Pakistan was giving the UN a “last chance” to settle the Kashmir question and stated that Pakistan would withdraw from the organization if it does not do so.

[Page 425]
Prior to Bhutto’s announcement, the US Embassy in Karachi reported that Ayub would have trouble with Pakistani public opinion if a cease-fire was announced. The Embassy noted that to some extent Ayub is a prisoner of the propaganda carried in the controlled Pakistani press in the past several days, but added that public opinion in Pakistan is subject to rapid shifts in sentiment. President Ayub will address his nation sometime this morning.

Replying to Peking’s broadcast last night claiming that the Indians had attempted to destroy their old military works along the Sikkim border, the Indians have stated that none of their forces have crossed the Sikkim-Tibet border and that if the installations were destroyed, the demolition must have been done by the Chinese themselves.

Peking has as yet made no comment on the Pakistani acceptance of the UN cease-fire proposal.


https://history.state.gov/historicaldoc ... 68v25/d222

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Gerard » 15 Nov 2019 09:18

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XXV, SOUTH ASIA

228. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson - Washington, September 29, 1965.
Pressure on Peshawar. Several days ago the Paks closed a small [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] installation [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. On 22 September they forcibly closed a minor [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] acoustic installation [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. [1 line of source text not declassified] This morning they closed two more small installations near Karachi.

Later today Pak guards barred our people from the airfield in Peshawar [1 line of source text not declassified]. No notice or explanation was given in any of these cases.

[Page 435]
McConaughy raised the earlier incidents with Ayub this morning. Ayub professed total ignorance (cables on meeting attached)2 but the Foreign Secretary knew all about it and indicated these installations were being used against Pak security. Since the installations closed have nothing to do with Pak/Indian matters, however, the pattern seems rather to point to a deliberate Pak effort to show us they have cards too, and as pressure to get us to resume aid.

If we can’t get Kashmir for Ayub, our only lever to keep Ayub on the reservation is aid. If so, then we must keep convincing Ayub that unless he plays ball with us (e.g. on our installations), there won’t be any. This suggests that we should quietly respond to the Pak squeeze on our installations by suspending at least some of the aid now in the pipeline. We have the following options:

A.
Of the $264 million odd in FY’65 and prior aid now in the pipeline, about half is not yet covered by letters of commitment authorizing disbursements. AID could simply hold these up. It would take about a week for the Paks to catch on.
B.
Once letters of commitment are issued, about six big US banks then issue letters of credit. A simple AID query as to how much credit remained to be drawn under these letters would get back to the Paks very quickly, and worry them.
C.
We could go further and ask the banks not to issue any new letters of credit, and even to suspend any remaining disbursements under existing ones. This would get Pak wind up immediately.
D.
This would leave only the aid goods already bought and perhaps in transit. Repossessing and/or diverting this entails many complications.
E.
We could also hold up administratively the 175,000 tons of grain on which PA’s were just issued.
Since the Paks are in a highly agitated frame of mind, it seems best we move carefully. Steps A and B above would put us in a good position, would worry the Paks, yet wouldn’t entail early publicity. We also wouldn’t want to trigger Pak closing of Peshawar before they had had a chance to digest the likely cost.

State probably will not have a recommendation before tomorrow. Among other things, we are worried over the possibility that Ayub is not fully master in his own house. Thus this memo is only to bring you up to date on the state of play.


https://history.state.gov/historicaldoc ... 68v25/d228

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Gerard » 15 Nov 2019 09:23

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XXV, SOUTH ASIA

237. Special National Intelligence Estimate - Washington, October 21, 1965.
INDIA’S NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY

The Problem

To estimate India’s nuclear weapons policy over the next few years.

Conclusions

A.
India has the capability to develop nuclear weapons. It probably already has sufficient plutonium for a first device, and could explode it about a year after a decision to develop one. (Paras. 1–3)
B.
The proponents of a nuclear weapons program have been strengthened by the Indo-Pakistani war, but the main political result has been a strengthening of Prime Minister Shastri’s position. We believe that he does not now wish to start a program and that he is capable of making this decision stick for the time being. (Paras. 4–14)
C.
However, we do not believe that India will hold to this policy indefinitely. All things considered, we believe that within the next few years India probably will detonate a nuclear device and proceed to develop nuclear weapons. (Paras. 15–20)
[Here follows the 5-page Discussion section of the Estimate.]

https://history.state.gov/historicaldoc ... 68v25/d237

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Gerard » 15 Nov 2019 09:24

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XXV, SOUTH ASIA

239. Memorandum for the Record- Washington, October 27, 1965.

239. Memorandum for the Record1
Washington, October 27, 1965.
The President approved extension of the present food shipments to India for an additional 30 days. In doing so, however, he emphasized very strongly that we should make it clear to the Indians that we are not satisfied with their performance on their own agricultural program on their previous and existing commitments. He referred to a report he had received from Under Secretary Schnittker of the Department of Agriculture2 which emphasized that (a) India has failed to live up to a commitment to this Government and to her own people in failing to reach her food production goals (b) India is not giving fertilizer and food production nor the investment promised in her plans and required by her people (c) India’s key failures have been in fertilizer, pesticides, producer incentives, credit and seed varieties (d) fertilizer production is the crucial factor and (e) that the U.S. must use all possible leverage to improve India’s performance.

The President noted the fact that the U.S. has been sending to India 20% of our wheat production and that India’s relative position has been slipping back. These are matters which he will want to have some answers for and on which he believes the Indians should make some commitments with respect to actual performance.

https://history.state.gov/historicaldoc ... 68v25/d239

245. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) - Washington, November 11, 1965.
To add to our problems we may have a major Indian food crisis on our hands. Poor rains are apparently resulting in a very bad fall/winter crop. Last year’s record production of 88 million tons was estimated earlier to be only 85 this year; new estimates are that it might be even less. Freeman’s man, Brown, now in Delhi, has sent in Delhi 12442 attached, estimating that 10–15 million tons more grain imports from all sources may be needed to sustain India’s millions to the next harvest. (I believe this figure includes our present shipments, which if continued at present rate would make up six million tons of this.)

The Baltimore Sun has been running a good series. Latest article attached.3

Am running this down and will be ready shortly to advise a course.

https://history.state.gov/historicaldoc ... 68v25/d245

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Gerard » 15 Nov 2019 09:30

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XXV, SOUTH ASIA

263. Memorandum of Conversation - Washington, December 14, 1965, 1:16–1:30 p.m.
President Ayub said that he and President Johnson talked about problems between Pakistan and the United States. They had recognized that there has been a certain amount of drift in the last few years. Pakistan’s basic concern was its national security. United States policy had begun to change in 1959 when we had started reassessing the value of our pacts and alliances with various countries. It was during this period, with our changing views of the importance of pacts, that we had decided that we could do business with neutrals and that this had special application to United States relations with India. This was further stepped up when Communist China and India began to have border difficulties. The Indian military budget had been increased 300%. An army of a million had been established. It was difficult for him to understand how an army of this size could be used against China since there was no room for it given the difficulty of the terrain. He felt that this Indian buildup was directed principally against Pakistan. He stated that India had increased its divisions from 9 to 21. India was now raising 10 more divisions. Within the past four or five years the Indian military budget had increased from $600 million annually to $2.6 billion. He saw absolutely no requirement for such a large military establishment. If it were not for United States generosity India would be starving. On the other hand, if peace were possible, India and Pakistan could divert large sums to economic development. Pakistan intended to be reasonable about Kashmir with the hope that some kind of solution could be reached. After that, a reduction of forces could take place and then there would be freedom of fear from each other. If peace were to come United States interests would be promoted as would those of India and Pakistan. The question, of course, is how to bring this about. There was the United Nations. There was the possibility of a plebiscite or of arbitration where two or three eminent people might be asked to make the decision. With binding arbitration neither side would lose face. There was a precedent for this in the Radcliffe [Page 503]Commission as well as the arbitration provision worked out for settlement of the Rann of Kutch border dispute.

https://history.state.gov/historicaldoc ... 68v25/d263

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby Gerard » 15 Nov 2019 09:33

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XXV, SOUTH ASIA

271. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson - Washington, December 20, 1965, 5:30 p.m.
We have a fascinating up-to-the minute report2 [1 line of source text not declassified] that: (a) Bhutto seems to regard Ayub as having sold out on his US trip; (b) Bhutto may be planning to use some papers relating to a secret Pak/Chicom deal against Ayub; (c) Bhutto thinks he’d better quit—he actually dictated a letter of resignation to Ayub; (d) Bhutto believes that Aziz Ahmed has been won over to the American side, and that G. Ahmed is also on that side. The only mention of you is that Bhutto says you “back-patted Aziz Ahmed” a great deal (and apparently to good effect).

This report suggests that the visit (plus our hard line posture leading up to it) have really shaken the Paks, that changes in Pak policy are in the offing, and that Bhutto may be on the way out3 (we don’t know, of course, whether he actually did send his resignation to Ayub). This report also tends to confirm some older reports from the same source on a secret Pak/Chicom understanding.

https://history.state.gov/historicaldoc ... 68v25/d271

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby VickyAvinash » 15 Nov 2019 12:22

rohitvats wrote:As one reads more about 1965, one thing becomes clear:

- the decision to attack into Pakistan in the Lahore sector (even before the Sialkot Sector on 8th September), had a much wide ranging implication than simply taking the pressure off the Chhamb sector.


As I said earlier, 1965 was much bigger than Kashmir!


Very well written Rohit sir. These details need to reach to much wider audience. If possible, request to consider writing an article may be on DDR as Indranil and JayS did on LCA. New generation needs to know.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ramana » 21 Nov 2019 03:15

I was reading a book on Allied armored operations in WWII in Europe.
The key to M-4 availability versus Panther tanks, was agile repair units and special Tank Delivery Units (TDU) to deliver repaired and new tanks to the fighting formations.

I think TSP armor was organized on that plan and converted the Tank Delivery Units into armored regiments to raise the second armored division (6th Armored).
This was a fundamental mistake as it reduced the armor availability of the 1st Armored division.


They basically used up their battle spare tanks to create a new division and lost both.

Something to think about.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ramana » 19 Dec 2019 05:45

I keep coming back to 1965 war and its ramifications....
viewtopic.php?p=2401525#p2401525
LB Johnson had double loss Vietnam and US.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ramana » 19 Dec 2019 05:45

How I wish KS garu had lived a few more years to see this.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ramana » 03 Jan 2020 00:37

Knowing what we know about 1965 war, what were the indicators and warnings that were missed and by whom?
Whom includes : Person, Service etc.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby nam » 03 Jan 2020 01:22

The biggest obvious we seem to have missed is Chinese nuke test in 64.

We should have known that Pak would conclude, we will go nuclear after Chinese. Along with this India was making it's army larger.

So Pak will attack before our conventional forces became too large to handle and training caught up with the numbers.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ramana » 03 Jan 2020 02:47

In fact in 1964 Ayub Khan wrote in Foreign Affairs (article sent to me by a BRF member) that Pak arms margin over India was eroding due to the re-armament program after 1962 debacle.
I do not know if any body in MEA even read that article and if it raised red flags.

The Chinese nuke test of 16 October 1964, was a known factor since Mao told Nehru after 1955 Bandung conference.
Conjecture is that Nehru changed the emphasis of the Second Five Year plan from Agriculture to Science and Industry to have an industrial base.

So I don't think in GOI quarters the Chinese nuke test was a surprise.

In fact Bhabha and later on Sethna told how their monitoring of the debris gave them valuable information as to the nature of the Chinese tests.

Besides the Pak decision was based on US factors and not China at all.
And if you look at timeline Chinese test in October 1964 does not give adequate time to launch Operation Gibraltar in August 1965.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ramana » 03 Jan 2020 02:56

So first was Rann of Kutch
Then Gibraltar
Then Grand Slam

In counter to Rann of Kutch, India developed Operation Riddle.
Which was operationalized after Operation Grand Slam.

The cognitive dissonance was that all these were land based operations despite both countries having up to date air forces.

The Indian Navy was out of the loop and even the chief was stranded on East Coast.

Air force was surprised by the PAF attacks but recovered.

The standard response is they were not included in planning by Army.

That begs the question no one read the news papers of what was happening in Kutch?
And Gibraltar was a month long war starting in early August to month end.
And this was being covered in news papers almost daily basis.

It could be the intelligence and the force commanders were too involved in tactical to see the big picture.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby rohitvats » 03 Jan 2020 13:45

- ramana, you need to add one more aspect to operation in Kutch.

- Pakistan wanted to use it to draw down Indian reserves into this sector. Indian military leaders resisted this temptation.

- Imagine, Indian reserves drawn down from Punjab or hinterland to Kutch? What is Indian reserves from Southern Punjab were sent?

- After all, PA 1st Armored Division was supposed to be used against southern Indian Punjab in Fazilka sector!

What is the events had unfolded like this:

- India takes the bait and sends reserves into Kutch.
- We manage to repel Pakistan and in the process, enter into Pakistan proper in the sector. This would've been inevitable/unavoidable.
- In the meanwhile, Pakistan Army has already moved its powerful 1st Armored Division opposite Indian central Punjab. This was most likely a holding area
- As tensions mount and as Indian reserves move to Kutch, PA 1st Armored Division moves further south opposite Suleimanke/Fazilka Sector.
- Then, using the excuse of Indian Army moving into Pakistan in Kutch Sector, it launches attack against Indian southern Punjab!

- As an unbalanced Indian Army is trying to come with terms with this assault, Pakistan launches Op Gibraltar. How many troops can be spare for countering these guerrillas?

- And along with it, Operational Grand Slam is put into place!

The whole sequence of events proceeds in a manner in which we could've been imbalanced and not able to address all issues with satisfaction.

Compare this with the near linear nature of escalation as it actually happened - Gibraltar -- > Grand Slam --> Our attack --> PA attack and counter attack.

Food for thought.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ramana » 03 Jan 2020 21:31

Fascinating line of thought.
So by not being drawn into Kutch, India made the later war a linear engagement where the numbers are on India side.
I have not read JNC memoirs or those of the leaders of that time if Kutch de-escalation was planned or due to lack of capability.
Lt. Gen Sinha writes in his memoirs that the much lamented Lt Gen BK Kaul had come up with the logistic plan to move First Armored from its base to the front in a timely manner and that was implemented in 1965.
Off course no credit to him expect in Sinha's memoirs.


Another is the death of LBS robbed India of a moment of victory.
Having defeated the Paki attack in 1965, India should have been able to gather stature and respite as all victors of wars do.
Instead the death of LBS and soon after Homi Bhabha both robbed India.
Then the Syndicate-indicate wars sapped country till the final 1971 victory.
And here again the political leaders (same Syndicate gang in a different form) worked to rob India of the peace of the victory.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby nam » 03 Jan 2020 21:53

Attacking Lahore was probably planned as our first step. We were prepared for it, that is why within days of Grand Slam, we were able to launch across.

It might also explain, why we did not move troops towards Kutch. If things escalated on Kutch in to attacks towards Lahore, we would need troops to cover any blow backs.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby manjgu » 03 Jan 2020 22:00

nobody in indian army was so dumb as to move reserves into Kutch which was of limited strategic value... even a jackass knows the CG of pakiland is punjab from the time it was created.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ArjunPandit » 03 Jan 2020 22:09

^^wasnt there an agreement after kutch skirmishes which saw india losing 100s of sq km of territory???this happened between jan and april. The war began on august.
Another complication/unknown was the chinese

Air Marshal Asghar Khan, the then Pakistan Air Force chief, wrote that Operation Gibraltar was based on three assumptions: the raiders would receive the support of the local population, India would limit its retaliation to 'Azad Kashmir' and finally and most importantly, that the Indian troops would in no circumstance cross the international border.


meanwhile pakis being pakis used the period between ceasefire to the tashkent declaration to capture land in fazilka sector...

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ArjunPandit » 03 Jan 2020 22:13

ramana wrote:Another is the death of LBS robbed India of a moment of victory.
Having defeated the Paki attack in 1965, India should have been able to gather stature and respite as all victors of wars do.
Instead the death of LBS and soon after Homi Bhabha both robbed India.
Then the Syndicate-indicate wars sapped country till the final 1971 victory.
And here again the political leaders (same Syndicate gang in a different form) worked to rob India of the peace of the victory.

i think it was the unassuming personality of LBS, the popular nehru/gandhian peaceful values that robbed india of its well deserved place after this victory. Not to forget the humiliation of fasting due to stoppage of PL480 was another cause. The leaders realized this situation and focussed energies on solving the real problems. Perhaps they should have learnt from their experiences in 65 for deciding in 71, but they didnt.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ramana » 04 Jan 2020 01:23

manjgu wrote:nobody in indian army was so dumb as to move reserves into Kutch which was of limited strategic value... even a jackass knows the CG of pakiland is punjab from the time it was created.


The Pak attack on Rann of kutch (Operation Desert Hawk) was a surprise and after achieving that they got the British to intercede and and propose a ceasefire, It happened before any movement of reserves.
And Gen. JN Chaudhri did advise that only an attack on Punjab would reduce the pressure. Hence Operation Riddle was drawn up and forces moved there. In meantime the Kutch Ceasefire happened.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby nam » 04 Jan 2020 01:53

India would limit its retaliation to 'Azad Kashmir' and finally and most importantly, that the Indian troops would in no circumstance cross the international border.


This is clear BS by the Paks. They had their armor units ready to invade across our Punjab with grand plans of go up to Delhi.

They even para dropped on our air bases!

Did they think we will not react?

They DID expect us to cross the IB. The only thing they did NOT expect, was us to cross IB within 2 days of Grand Slam.
Last edited by nam on 04 Jan 2020 02:20, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ArjunPandit » 04 Jan 2020 02:00

nam wrote:
India would limit its retaliation to 'Azad Kashmir' and finally and most importantly, that the Indian troops would in no circumstance cross the international border.


This is clear BS by the Paks. They had their armor units ready to invade across our Punjab with grand plans of go up to Delhi.

They even para dropped on our air bases!

Did they think we will not react?

They DID expect us to cross the IB. Only thing was they did NOT expect, was to cross IB within 2 days of Grand Slam.

Knowing that they're pakis, I would say yes :rotfl: :rotfl: :P ... Have you forgotten, that they didn't expect us to do anything when they say in kargill

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ramana » 12 Jan 2020 14:03


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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ramana » 29 Jan 2020 05:16

I was reading "Air Power and Maneuver Warfare" by Martin van Creveld with Steven Canby and Kenneth Brower.

While at first glance it looks not germane to this thread but it describes attrition warfare vs maneuver warfare.

Its very clear that Gen. J.N. Chaudhri fought in the Attrition warfare model even when he was attacking in Punjab.

While TSPA was fighting in Maneuver warfare model.

Unfortunately the press did not understand what he meant and nor did he bother to explain what attrition warfare was all about.
The press and his detractors latched on to 'attrition' and compared wins and losses by the numbers.
JNC expected a longer war and chose this model. And its short comings made him agree to ceasefire prematurely.

If we study 1971 war, FM Manekshaw chose attrition warfare in West Pakistan and maneuver warfare in East Pakistan. It was a hybrid war to suit the objectives.

Attrition Warfare attributes:
Attrition warfare represents an attempt to grind down an opponent and its superior numbers.

A side that perceives itself to be at a marked disadvantage in maneuver warfare or unit tactics may deliberately seek out attrition warfare to neutralize its opponent's advantages.

The attritionalists' view of warfare involves moving masses of men and material against enemy strongpoints, with the emphasis on the destruction of the enemy's physical assets, success as measured by enemy combatants killed, equipment and infrastructure destroyed, and territory taken and/or occupied. Attrition warfare tends to use rigidly centralized command structures that require little or no creativity or initiative from lower-level leadership (also called top-down or "command push" tactics).



Maneuver Warfare Attributes:
Achieve decisive victories by using minimal necessary resources and in minimal amount of time, through manoeuvre, concentration of force, surprise, and related tactics.
Maneuver warfare advocates that strategic movement can bring about the defeat of an opposing force more efficiently than by simply contacting and destroying enemy forces until they can no longer fight. Instead, in maneuver warfare, the destruction of certain enemy targets (command and control centers, logistical bases, fire support assets, etc.) is combined with isolation of enemy forces and the exploitation by movement of enemy weaknesses.



You can see by the TOE of Indian Army being rebuilt after 1962 vs Pak Army TOE after the US MAAP largesse.

Indian Army was at marked disadvantage in maneuver warfare wrt Pak Army.

But the way Pak Army fought at Asal Uttar shows they lapsed into attrition warfare out of old habit.


So this puts JNC generalship in context of military theory.


He did what he could with what he had.
Could he have done better in hind sight may be.
But put yourself in his shoes.
He fended off Fourth Battle of Panipat.
And gave Independent India its first draw if not a victory.
Historically for India, a draw with Muslim forces is a victory

He set in place the re-organization on Indian military that led to 1971 victory.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ArjunPandit » 29 Jan 2020 08:03

Have you published this outside here? Why don't you put it on swarajya and op India

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ramana » 08 May 2020 07:14

Napoleon's dictutm that,
‘in war, the moral is to the material as three is to one!'

applied in this war in Punjab.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ramana » 08 May 2020 07:18

I will x-post the text too.

viewtopic.php?p=2242834#p2242834

The first IAF jet fighters were the DeHavilland Vampires. These were paid from Sterling balances.
Armament was 20mm HS cannon and rockets.
Soon IAF realized they are not so good.
The Vampires were augmented with Dassault Ouragans.

Ouragans were first jet fighters from Dassault and were comparable to the Mig-15s used in North Korea. They also had the high-velocity rockets which were way better than the rockets on Vampire.

Meantime PAF was getting Sabres already.

So the next-gen Dassault plane Mystere and the Hawker Hunter were purchased.

Both were great fighter and ground attack planes.

Soon after the 1965 war, the Mysteres were retired and Su-7s were bought for that role.

In big-picture terms, Inda had to keep up with matching technology that was being introduced into the sub-continent.*
Unfortunately, the British technology was marginal with a dash of the stiff upper lip and the French was a lot of croissants. Meaning high priced bakwas.

Into this mix came the Soviets with inexpensive planes and offer to mfg them in India.


The uphill battle that Indian military services had to fight was the technology being introduced.

If you study combat system analysis methodology if opposing forces had marginal force ratios, the technology ratio factor had to be inverse of the attackers.
Eg. If PAF to IAF locally was 2:1 and could happen as IAF had three front war (West Pakistan, East Pakistan, and China) then to survive IAF had to have a technology advantage of 2:1 over PAF.
Yet all they had was 1:0.8 (Eg Starfighter and Sabres were much better than Gnats and Mysteres) in their favor. IOW with inferior planes, they fought against better.

That was the greatness of the 1965 war and all those great pilots warriors.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ramana » 11 May 2020 08:24

Pre-Release statements by Capt Amarinder Singh on Monsoon War

A review of Monsoon War by Lt Gen Tejinder Singh Gill and Capt Amarinder Singh



"Not all regiments perform well in a war. But the accounts of the Indian Army on the 1965 war glorify them all.

The army has culled the details from war dispatches and narratives sent by different regiments and some have padded them by cooking up stories. The war accounts do not say where we did badly," says Congress deputy leader in the Lok Sabha, Captain Amarinder Singh ahead of the launch of his new book, The Monsoon War, in New Delhi on September 20.


"History cannot be distorted. We have to tell the truth. My book tries to put the record straight," the scion of the erstwhile Patiala royal family told Hindustan Times on Friday.

Amarinder, who was in the Sikh Regiment and aide-de-camp (ADC) to the general officer commanding-in-chief (GOC-in-C), Western Command, Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh, during the 1965 war, says his own regiment's details are "glorified". "I have penned down a no-holds-barred book on the war as a lot many stories haven't emerged, some of those which have emerged are not true to facts," he said. An avid military historian, Amarinder has previously authored books on the Anglo-Sikh wars, World War 1 and the Kargil war of 1999.

Co-authored by Lt Gen Tajindar Shergill (retd)who, as troop leader with Deccan Horse was taken prisoner of war after a forlorn tank attack, the latest book has taken into account versions from Pakistani sources for giving a more "factually correct" picture.

"For instance, in the Sialkot sector, Pakistan claimed that only 62 tanks were destroyed by India's 1 Armoured Division, which puts it at 162 tanks. Only two regiments, 10 and 11 Cavalry of Pakistan, accounted for 88 tanks. Likewise, Pakistani sources have admitted to losing over 50 tanks in Khemkaran, however, 97 were counted gathered in Patton Nagar after the war in army accounts. Unlike in India, where secrecy issues prevented regiments from writing on the war, they were free to do so in Pakistan," Shergill said.

While some regiments were "glorified", the book says some real victories did not get their due. "Following the defeat of Pakistani 1 Armoured Division at Khemkaran on September 10, it was a strategic blunder not to shift additional armoured forces to the Rachna Doab, where a major victory had been won at Phillora on September 11 by India's 1 Armoured Division, in the heartland of Pakistani northern Punjab. But this victory was not reinforced," the book says.

TESTAMENT TO LEADERSHIP OF LT GEN HARBAKHSH SINGH


The book is also a testament to the leadership of Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh. It claims that over the course of the war, Harbakhsh had even implemented an effective solution to the Kashmir territorial dispute. "However, over the course of peace talks between then Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and President Ayub Khan of Pakistan, many of Harbakhsh Singh's tactical solutions were waylaid - which is perhaps one of the many reasons why the Kashmir dispute still has the potential to sour the relationship between the two great nations," it adds.

Chronicling the war as two young officers who saw it from the line of fire, Amarinder and Shergill say they have relied on their own notes and personal diaries, seminars and interviews with colleagues in different regiments at that time.

Though most war historians say the 1965 war was indecisive while conceding some strategic gains to India, the book says in terms of war objectives set out by Shastri at a meeting with the three chiefs of defence forces at that time, India certainly won the war.

"A curious war objective of India was to occupy minimum territory that would be returned to Pakistan after hostilities. The other two were to give a fitting reply to make Pakistan realise that Jammu and Kashmir could never be taken by force and destruction of the offensive power of Pakistan. And India did achieve these three," Shergill says.

All royalties from the sales of this book will go to the war widows and orphans of Deccan Horse and 2 Sikh.

IN THE BOOK:

"Learning on 10 September evening that Pakistan 1 Armoured Division was attacking Khemkaran to cut the GT Road at Beas Bridge, the army chief called army commander Harbakhsh Singh at 0300 hours on 11 September and asked him to withdraw forces to the line of the Beas River. Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh refused, saying that either a written order be given, or that the Army Chief - Gen JN Chaudhuri - come to the field and give an executive order. This was unusual and an example of the General's firm resolve."


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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ramana » 14 May 2020 22:29

One gruesome statistic of 1965 war from the book Monsoon War is:

11,479 Officers, JCOs, and ORs became casualties in the war.
Killed in Action 2862: 168 Officers, 116 JCOs, 2565 ORs, and 13 NCsE

Wounded 8617: 436 Officers, 347 JCOs, 7768 ORs, and 66 NCsE.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ArjunPandit » 15 May 2020 03:23

I think 1965 war might assume importance in near future. We may not have the choice to plan our timing like we did for in 1971 for an offensive in PoK. Also, that time may not be the easiest time to conduct operations in mountaineous regions. Winter war could work in the situation when we are going for the sledge hammer. Only additional time I would think (based on history) be around the same time as we fought kargil war (May -July) or Op Parakram pretty much the same time...

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ArjunPandit » 15 May 2020 03:36

nam wrote:The biggest obvious we seem to have missed is Chinese nuke test in 64.

We should have known that Pak would conclude, we will go nuclear after Chinese. Along with this India was making it's army larger.

So Pak will attack before our conventional forces became too large to handle and training caught up with the numbers.


my sense is that was a time of lot of political confusion and infighting..with post nehru gandhi era ending and unlike nehru the leadership was inward looking more so after nehruvian era ended with many fiascos...
Brig Dalwi in the himalayan blunder mentions very clearly that the nation should clearly have thought about sorting our own problems before offering solutions to the world and had a good reading of its own neighbourhood and prioritized military priorities for aircraft carrier v/s basic mountain eqpment for army esp after the takeover of tibet by chinese

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ArjunPandit » 15 Jun 2020 15:00

Last edited by nachiket on 15 Jun 2020 23:00, edited 1 time in total.
Reason: Fixing YT link

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ramana » 03 Aug 2020 21:45

Two articles by Samir Joshi:

Mig 21 in 1965 war

Something to reflect on. Why was the Type 74 not deployed once the Type 75 gun deficiency was noted?


and

1965 IAF attack on Sargodha

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby ramana » 16 Aug 2020 21:44

Shwetabh Singh Rajput on Twitter posted this chart of Soviet Arms supplies from 1960 t0 1974

https://twitter.com/singhshwetabh71/sta ... 68001?s=20

Image

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby abhik » 17 Aug 2020 01:31

^^^
I hadn’t realised we bought and operated so many A-12's (wiki says 65 in total!), quite formidable, even compared to todays transport fleet.

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Re: 1965 India Pakistan War: History

Postby wig » 28 Aug 2020 17:18

https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comme ... 965-132361

The glorious victory at Hajipir in 1965
The capture of the Pass validated the importance of the element of surprise by taking calculated risks and making bold manoeuvres. Brigadier Bakshi’s relentless offensive and the daunting courage displayed by young officers were among the reasons for this historic success.

worth reading in full


extracted
The attacks were launched during the night of August 25-26, but in spite of the determined attack, 1 Para fell back, and 19 Punjab could not proceed beyond the Bedori base. The first light of August 26 was the defining moment for the commander of 68 Infantry Brigade as both thrust lines got stalled.

In the afternoon of August 26, the commander was informed that Bedori had been captured by a flanking formation and the news was broadcast to the nation on All India Radio. Brigadier Bakshi reluctantly believed in the news about the capture of Bedori and tasked 4 Rajput to skirt around it. While bypassing Bedori, 4 Rajput came under heavy fire from Bedori. It was realised the next day that the information was wrong and that Bedori was still with the enemy.

On the night of August 26-27, 1 Para attacked again and captured Lediwali Gali by midday on August 27. With Bedori, a formidable feature, still with the enemy, the commander of 68 Infantry Brigade planned to contain it through 4 Rajput and pull out 19 Punjab to task it to capture the Hajipir Pass by moving through 1 Para on the Lediwali axis.

It was turned down by the ‘powers that be’ and, instead, the commander was directed to capture Bedori on priority and Hajipir subsequently since Bedori had been announced to have been captured. However, the commander remained committed to capturing Hajipir without loss of time. Speed was the most essential factor for capturing Hajipir since any delay would give time to the enemy to reinforce defences.

Brigadier Bakshi decided upon an unorthodox plan: to send a self-contained company plus a column from 1 Para under Maj Ranjit Singh Dayal from Lediwali Gali during the night of August 27-28 (i.e. from Lediwali Gali height of 3,140 metres, descend to Hyderabad Nullah below, cross it and then ascend to Hajipir Pass at 2,637 metres — all in one night). The weather was at its worst, with rain and slush coming down the craggy slopes. Brigadier Bakshi spoke to Major Dayal in chaste Punjabi: “Agar te jit leya Hajipir te tu hero ban jayenga, nahi te mainu command ton remove kar den ge” (If you capture Hajipir, you shall be a hero, and if you don’t, I’ll be sacked) or words to that effect.

Major Dayal carried out the arduous mission in the treacherous terrain and weather prevailing that night. He appeared at the Pass by the first light of August 28. Pakistan had moved a company of 20 Punjab during the night to reinforce defences at Hajipir. Pakistan troops were so surprised that they retreated from the shoulders of the Pass with little fight, leaving behind weapons, radio sets, charging engines, meter maps and desi ghee!

The capture of the Pass validated the importance of the element of surprise by taking calculated risks and making bold manoeuvres.

Meanwhile, 19 Punjab remained held up near the Bedori base because the ridge was narrow and it was not feasible to capture Pt 12330 (Bedori) from the north-west. Brigadier Bakshi now decided to launch 19 Punjab from a completely different direction. The 3.7-inch Howitzer artillery gun was used to decimate the bunkers and Pt 12330 was captured on August 29.

However, a complex of high mountain features, Gitian, and Pt 8777 dominated the road from Hajipir to Poonch. 6 Dogra, with an additional company from 19 Punjab, was tasked to capture the Gitian complex.

It was captured by September 21, albeit after a fierce battle. It was probably the toughest battle in the entire Hajipir operations where Pakistanis resorted to repeated counter-attacks, both during the night and day. Our three officers, one junior commissioned officer (JCO), and 32 jawans were killed in action; five officers, three JCOs, and 80 jawans were wounded. The enemy had 90 dead, while an estimated 200 were wounded. For this valiant effort, 6 Dogra was bestowed with the battle honour ‘Hajipir’. Hours prior to this battle, the vital communication line between the tactical headquarters at Hajipir and 6 Dogra broke down due to heavy shelling, leading to a precarious communication gap which was vital at this critical juncture. The restoration of the line by the author, then a young Captain, under intense enemy fire was recounted by Lt Gen Zoru Bakshi 20 years later in a New Year’s card to the author.

In the meantime, 68 Infantry Brigade continued its advance from Hajipir Pass along the Eastern Ridge with 6 Dogra and 19 Punjab to link up with Poonch. 93 Infantry Brigade captured Raja and Rani by September 7. The Meghdoot Force (commando force under Maj Megh Singh), advancing from Poonch, linked up with 19 Punjab on September 10.


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