Carriers, when combined with surface combatants and aviation are extremely effective sea control instruments in addition to force projection. It is a mobile air-wing (PLUS) that can be anywhere you want it to be. It is any day more survivable than a fixed air-base that has nowhere to hide. Any long range UCAV, or even long range bomber (like B-2, B-1, B-21 etc.) are at best sea denial capabilities with limited payload, and limited flexibility when it comes to the type of payload. So while they have a role in a maritime context, their role is very specific and not comprehensive. Once you move away from control to purely being a denial force you've already ceded what you are trying to preserve in terms of the capability to maneuver within a region which is what the carrier force, the amphibious force, and the other joint forces capabilities provide you. USN and USMC's carrier aviation provides that (this is precisely what China is also, interestingly trying to replicate). They aren't merely the Navy's Air Force as are often dubbed. They serve a different role and have clearly defined missions that they lead and others where the USAF's Tac Air fleet leads.V_Raman wrote:the main rationale for these super carriers is the massive pacific ocean. if they have long range UCAVs - then even carriers might come down in number
ACC also never really had confidence that the $80 million URF number would be met either. But the program not only met it but beat it (JPO wanted it $80 by Lot 14, the program delivered $80 Million by Lot 13) a full year ahead of the contract year that was the target. It took some muscle from the negotiators and one unilateral award that the contractors had to legally accept. Left to traditional channels they'll probably get it close but may miss the $25 K mark. But they can get it lower than $25 K per hour if they are smart about it. Ditch the skinny PBL and go all in (this will need congressional waivers), and contract GE for an adaptive engine upgrade program and get some competition to P&W.
Much of that "accounting" CPFH is attributed to the mix of contractor and organic depot support (both mil and civilians). So it is directly tied to CAPEX to build up depot capacity and modernize existing capacity. Much of that is something the USAF has been putting off during the sequestered budgets. If they don't put that work upfront, then they will keep paying more and when that OPEX is tallied it will manifest in a higher per hour "accounting" number. Foreign partners and FMS customers are already using much higher PBL's than what the DOD is negotiating at the moment. So it isn't like a comprehensive PBL is not being offered. It is that the current DOD laws and regulations don't permit them to go for those type of contracting until M-C and also that the contractor would also want a minimum of CAPEX investment in the AF's own depot capacity. On the F-35, 52% of the O&S cost is through the channels provided by the OEMs (LM, BAE, Northrop Grumman operating via LM and P&W operating independently). 48% of the cost is operations and the USAF investments in creating and operating their facilities that support their operations. So no single partner can unilaterally ensure a CPFH reduction of X amount by a certain date (unlike unit cost). It isn't magic but a science and good business and operational practices in investing upfront.