NRao wrote:Nothing new or unknown there. Which is why they should have made a LOT more progress by now. They have known about this for a long time
The US Army's integrated fire control network was and still continues to be in development. It has a direct bridge into the US Navy's CEC. So as far back as a decade plus ago, they added this to the list of things to develop and field. Which they are on the cusp of doing. The system will now begin to get fielded starting 2021 and will be operational around 2022. So they have been doing something about it for a long time. Of course technology development (that allows all this) has been proven to be more complex then initially anticipated. But even before the whole concept of JADC2 and ABMS was born they were already hard at work in connecting the two Navy and Army fire control networks with one other.
On the Navy side, NIFC-CA only began to come into force with the AEGIS baseline 9.0 suite around 2015 IIRC. Not all ships were AEGIS BL9 enabled but their number is growing. They needed a long range interceptor, a platform with a decent loiter time and much better computing power for this concept to work. They got both of these with the SM-6 and the E-2D. But they were limited at the induction rates of both these systems. Once they fielded this capability, they expanded this to other platforms. Again, this required computing and networking upgrades which they introduced on the EA-18G and will do so with the Block III Super Hornet. Likewise, the USMC does it with their CTN and the AN/TPS-80 radar system which can tie into NIFC-CA as the ground based sensor element. And the US navy didn't stop at that. It continued (and continues) to expand this capability roll-out to other platforms. The newest is the F-35 NIFC-CA capability which comes aboard using a dedicates MADL-antenna terminal on navy platforms so that the F-35 can use its LPI/LPD data-links to pass on tracks for the SM-6. It is a slow and expensive process because A) platform upgrades take time, and B ) The service has to balance it with other platform and capability upgrade priorities. It is one thing to say that technology X can get you the sort of OTH intercept capability leveraging network advances. But those with the purse strings are going to ask you tough questions like, "what is going to use that system and where are the CONOPS". So until you have capacity that can leverage this and then have a concept of operations allowing you to efficiently make use of it then no one is going to take money away from one side of the budget and give it to you for this.
So on a bi-lateral basis this is happening. But as I said, left to this arrangement the services will continue to prioritize differently (which is often dubbed as inter-service rivalry even though most of the time it is a logical prioritization of tasks and investments) because they can't get integration ahead of the actual capability (you are only as fast as your slowest process).
What JADC2 has the potential of doing is completely upending the process. Instead of chasing capability, the integration itself will be the capability around which newer systems will be developed. This requires the selection of the right approach, supremacy of the architecture in decision making, and loads of money to develop and field the technologies. Neither the navy nor the Army has that sort of money lying around. And the Congress generally doesn't take too well to OSD led efforts.
This is where ABMS comes in. The USAF seems to think it has the right set of technologies, and capabilities and is uniquely placed (given they spend time in air and space) to run this effort. It also has the money in its R&D accounts to finish something of this proportion. It has a rapid capabilities office that has expereince in very large system development and acquisition (it is leading an $80 Billion project in the B-21) while Navy and Army RCO's in comparison are relatively small shops. But the Congress and the other services are not yet totally convinced. Over time (like in the next 2-3 years) if they convince enough combatant command commanders then they can proceed at an accelerated pace. But they have to convince them first through experimentation and demonstration. This was exactly how capabilities that went into Assault breaker were fielded. If you are going to pull money from bombs, ships, tanks and aircraft and put them into a mythical ABMS you have to convince all the stakeholders of its effectiveness. That is exactly what the USAF under Roper and Dunlap are attempting to do. As is seen by this year's budget fight, they have some ways to go before everyone is completely sold.
And people like Roper know this. He had to break the same barriers at the MDA and demonstrate the capabilities and potential in a limited fashion before COCOMs forced the services to field this capability. Today, an Army BMD radar can cue a Navy vessel thousands of kms away to launch a ballistic missile defense interceptor on remote and even engage on remote. This wasn't done overnight and neither would ABMS or its more broader parent in JADC2.
BUT, the Services just do not want a joint effort - pretty much for anything.
This is a common narrative. But in practice, the record of joint integrated approaches have been much more mixed than some of this commentary that's around would lead one to believe. There are a lot of successes around MIDS, GPS, resilient PNT and many other efforts and capabilities shared across all services and all domains. The ubiquitous Link-16 continues to be around and is even headed to space (which is something not talked about as much as it should as it really can revolutionize how L-16 is employed). One can circle back with HR McMaster to see how an Air Force supplied capability, jointly experimented with, demonstrated, and jointly fielded, was pivotal in his success at the battle of 73 Easting. Or one can look at the joint technology that is inside US Navy's Tomahawk missile, and aboard its fighters. These are large successes experimented with, demonstrated and fielded decades ahead of when others had similar level of capability. And yet in other areas there has been less cooperation and it has been completely lacking in many others. But even if one completely eliminates JADC2 and ABMS from the discussion, the services have been moving to integrating their fire-control loops and kill chains for a long time. US Army and Navy NIFC-CA/CES and IBCS collaboration, and US Army and Air Force IBCS collaborations are just two examples. It hasn't happened fast enough because each service is on a different timeline in fielding its capability. The Navy fielded NIFC-CA about 5 years ago. The Army will field IBCS in 2022. So some of it is because of different capabilities being at different maturity levels.
But coming to the success of JADC2 and ABMS - It will depend upon what they demonstrate. Effectively, what the USAF is asking is to become the lead technical provider for JADC2. What usually follows this is a "tax" that is imposed on each service and platform (not literally) because something has to give way to funding this rather large (measured in tens of billions of dollars) effort. So Congress, service chiefs and most importantly COCOM commanders need to be first convinced (through experimentation) on this being the RMA that they should bankroll before all this begins to happen. Some thought 2020 would be the year that this happens. Not so. Maybe 2021 and 2022 would be the years the capability pivots and really gets a boost in funding.