US military, technology, arms, tactics

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Mort Walker
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by Mort Walker »

brar_w wrote:Of course there is always a possibility that they have something in the works to put a giant radar on an airliner and calling it a day and that the very top of the USAF leadership commenting about moving away from such an approach is just a lie or a bluff. I suppose one believes what one wants to believe.
It's not a matter of believing, but a matter of physics. The E-2D Advanced Hawkeye platform AN/APY-9 with its digital receiver proves that capability. If a complete distributive approach were to be taken, then the E-2 program would have been slowly phased out instead of acquiring nearly 80 of the E-2D after FY2014. A similar approach will most likely be taken by USAF.

When the service chiefs submit their POMs to the SECDEF, and during the FYDP PPBE process, you can't discount influence by the big defense contractors. This happens everywhere, and in the US it is probably lower percentage, but again we're talking about a $740 billion annual budget.

Federal Contractor Misconduct in the Last 25 Years
That is not the limitation because ABMS is not concerned with that.
I've heard this before multiple times, not from you, but from others outside of this forum. Just because you have integrated data links, comms, and situation displays with all the icons displaying all sorts of information, with all formal operational testing, means all of it is accurate. This is especially true when you're remote sensing small distant objects.
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by brar_w »

Mort Walker wrote: If a complete distributive approach were to be taken, then the E-2 program would have been slowly phased out instead of acquiring nearly 80 of the E-2D after FY2014.
The US Navy has its own limitations and priorities not to mention timelines. The E-2D was required because the E-2C needed replacement within a particular specific time period. The SDD phase for the E-2D was green lighted in 2003. They also needed to roll out NIFC-CA (which they US Navy spent nearly 2 decades to develop) and other naval integrated fires connectivity for which they needed a more modern platform. Deferring modernization till the mid 2030's or beyond was and is not an option for the US Navy and they needed to get something in development by 2005 (nearly 3 decades prior to when the USAF expects to retire the E-3).

And they don't have the "air-power" budgets of the US Air Force. There are stark differences between what they prioritize as far as investments, and what the USAF prioritizes. Differences owing their unique mission (surface fleet and carrier protection), their budget profile (hence the very stark contrast b/w the Navy's investment in stealth and unmanned vs the US Air Force) and their need and their shorter recap cycles owning to unique carrier aviation needs and challenges. There are also mission and roles and responsibility differences which will lead one service to prioritize one thing and the other focus on other areas.
When the service chiefs submit their POMs to the SECDEF, and during the FYDP PPBE process, you can't discount influence by the big defense contractors. This happens everywhere, and in the US it is probably lower percentage, but again we're talking about a $740 billion annual budget.
Of course. Because your preference doesn't find itself in the budget, it must be because some contractor somewhere bribed someone somewhere to something differently. It must not be about the USAF having a unique ability to assess LO/CLO and understand its own capabilities and limitations when it comes to protecting non survivable platforms in the post 2035 timeframe.
I've heard this before multiple times
To recap what I had written - ABMS is not just focusing on historic, present and known sensor integration and developing advanced tracking and targeting capabilities. It is also going to do the same for future sensors. In fact, there are sensor programs that are part of the ABMS efforts with ABMS itself being the capability and greater than the sum of its parts. So again, new generation of sensors are being developed for this program or are expected to be developed. Just because someone doesn't take a 777 and mounts a large chappati on it to satisfy folks who thinks that is the only workable solution, doesn't mean that they don't plan on introducing new sensors into their ISR and AEW capabilities. It is very much in the DNA of ABMS as it is currently known to exist. One has to use one's own imagination in trying to decipher what elements of this critical capability are not yet known.
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by Mort Walker »

^^^My preference has nothing to do with it. I thought you understood the problem of target detection and identification.
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by brar_w »

Yes I do. But I also understand that a dead AWACS isn't going to do anything like that. And a very loud, large, and non-survivable aircraft isn't going to be very effective in supporting a VLO optimized penetrating family of systems at the tactical edge. And as I tried to explain earlier, this isn't a predominantly 3 and 4th gen fleet with a few F117's sprinkled in between (like in Gulf War). This is now a 1000+ VLO fleet (by 2024) and with a large chunk of the next generation penetrating FOS having been fielded (RQ-180 is already operational, B-21 is currently being fabricated, NGAD demonstrator is flying etc etc) or under development by the time the E-3's need replacement. So the problem isn't a niche but mainstream. So what replaces that role (for that large of a VLO fleet) in the 2030s? This is likely to be the area of much classified investment so the definitive solution remains to be seen. They've in the past looked into setting up bi-static sensors at the forward edge much farther from an emitting source. But that's just probably one of many areas they've looked at. Of course, if they've also developed ways like MHTK and directed-energy to make these non-survivable platforms more survivable then that may lead to a different calculus. But it still won't sufficiently solve all their needs and problems. Something new needs to be developed to help out with those.

The question is (what we can't tell now because we don't know the level of classified activity and its results) how much of the E-3 will be transitioned to this and how much will be retained for a more traditional "E-3 like" system. As I've been saying since my very first post on this topic, there is room for a traditional 1970s style AWACS approach (large radar + airliner). It is a viable path to take for the homeland defense and CCM mission. Same with using it in COCOMs where there is vast technological mismatch which is expected to remain (like CENTCOM etc). But something besides this is the critical need of the hour when it comes to supporting the penetrating fleet in the pacific. So a balance would need to be struck and this is why not all the $$ can go towards creating the Next Gen. E-3. It is foolish to think that they aren't hard at work on this. I mean the RQ-180 is supposed to integrate with the B-21, NGAD and F-35 and help them to find hard to find targets. The NGAD is supposed to create air-superiority within a highly protected airspace. The F-35 is the counter IAD and SEAD tactical platform. So as a Family of Systems they aren't going to be dumb enough to leave out the one critical piece of that puzzle - How to provide high quality SA and long range targeting to this family of system.
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by NRao »

Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2)
What Is JADC2?

Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) is the
Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) concept to connect
sensors from all of the military services—Air Force, Army,
Marine Corps, Navy, and Space Force—into a single
network. Traditionally, each of the military services
developed its own tactical network that was incompatible
with those of other services (i.e., Army networks were
unable to interface with Navy or Air Force networks). DOD
officials have argued that future conflicts may require
decisions to be made within hours, minutes, or potentially
seconds compared with the current multiday process
to
analyze the operating environment and issue commands.
They have also stated that the Department’s existing
command and control architecture is insufficient to meet the
demands of the National Defense Strategy (NDS). Congress
may be interested in the concept because it is being used to
develop many high-profile procurement programs for all of
the military services.

..............................
They have a budget of their own IIRC. $5.5 billion over 5 years?
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by Rakesh »

Saw this on twitter

Image
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by brar_w »

Rakesh wrote:Saw this on twitter
See this: viewtopic.php?f=3&t=7088&start=1960#p2474717
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by NRao »

Rakesh
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by Rakesh »

brar_w wrote:
Rakesh wrote:Saw this on twitter
See this: viewtopic.php?f=3&t=7088&start=1960#p2474717
That is awesome. The future of air power.
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by brar_w »

NRao wrote:
They have a budget of their own IIRC. $5.5 billion over 5 years?
JADC2 is an overall fire-control level connectivity concept with individual efforts rolling up to it. The USAF brings in its ABMS which is the broader technical solution towards it, the Army brings in its IBCS, and the Navy its naval integrated fires capability.

The Army, Navy and Air Force systems can all talk to each other and see what the other see. They have been able to do this for years. This is done through J series and other protocols and other operational communication and data exchange nodes. For example, the US Army Air Defense and other offensive forces have MIDS ground terminals via which they can get tactical pictures being generated by non-Army assets such as the AF's AWACS or the Navy's E-2. However there are not integrated and thus there is no fire control level connectivity. For example, if a PATRIOT battery is getting a sensor feed from a USMC surveillance or fire control radar, it can only see what those radars see. Operators have to manage that and there is nothing in the command and control doing track correlation and establishing a fire-control level composite track which can be ingested by the organic C2 system.

With JADC2 and more specifically, with IBCS (which rolls up to it) the US Army now has a broad "global" command and control layer that can supersede individual legacy and future platform's C2 systems and provide direct sensor to shooter connectivity and act as bridge. Operationally, this allows a US Army's launcher to just be by itself and not linked to a PATRIOT or other AD system unit. As long as it is connected via Army's IBCS, IBCS can make it launch a weapon towards a target that is detected, tracked, and identified by a different sensor without any organic PATRIOT command and control system having computed the fire control solution with a non PATRIOT radar, or a PATRIOT radar able to provide missile communication cues utilizing the composite track developed by IBCS using those or completely different sensors.

Likewise, even when full PATRIOT units are deployed (such as a battery or a battalion) IBCS can command then and launch weapons from them without the need for the organic C2 to develop a FC solution - with IBCS doing that for it. So its an over-layer for Army systems which is system agnostic and is always going to be bringing into its fold legacy sensors, AD systems and provides standards to use to develop future sensors (for example, USMC and USAF new radars are going to be IBCS compliant from the start). The US Navy likewise has its naval integrated fires and fire-control level connectivity and JADC2 possibly via ABMS will be able to talk to and through it and extend it beyond just the small group of US Navy platforms that are currently linked into it. All of these roll up to JADC2 which is the ultimate connectivity framework which combines the various fire-control loops and technologies fielded across air, naval and land warfare. USAF's ABMS is the leading technical solution for that highest level global sensor to shooter connectivity which doesn't do away with individual service led kill chains but just connects them with one another and provides a standard so that future integrated kill chains are developed to be compliant with it.

So while many media and even non technical official publications describe this as a means to connect the services so that their systems talk to one another, this isn't what the system and its enabling technologies are doing. That is already happening and has been in place for a long time. What JADC2 and its underlying elements are trying to do is connect kill chains across different services and disparate systems that may have multiple generation of technologies (like a legacy C2 system) all trying to share a common fire control loop. With ABMS they are going beyond and introducing AI drive battle management, and both a cloud based and tactical edge library that will be used for CID and other discrimination and decision making.
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by NRao »

JADC2 is, currently, a concept and one that is disjointed. Mainly because of internal politics.

In Sept 2020, USAF and Army signed a deal:
.......

According to an Air Force news release, the services agreed to establish the “most basic” levels of what they are calling Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control, or CJADC2, adding a "C" to the usual JADC2, the services’ effort to connect sensors to shooters.

The services agreed to develop mutual data-sharing standards and service interfacing by the end of fiscal 2022.

The effort will be led by Army Futures Command and the Air Force’s office of strategy, integration and requirements known as A5. The agreement was signed during a daylong meeting at the Pentagon on Sept. 29 between Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Charles “CQ” Brown and Army Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville.

........
The technologies exist, the will is very diluted. Imagine, in 2020, these two Services had to modify JADC2 to CJADC2 for their own purposes!! And, one wonders what ever happened to the USN. Hopefully there are plans to include the USN - even at "most basic" levels.
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by brar_w »

It is disjointed at the moment because the technology is not quite mature for them to all fall into one single technology enabler. They probably need 2-3 years of solid experimentation with ABMS to determine whether it is the right approach and architecture for everyone else to get behind. Meanwhile, outside of JADC2 the services already have plans to integrate each other's fire-control networks into their fold. For example, the upcoming USAF and USMC radars will be Army-IBCS compliant from the very start. It is right there in there SDD mandates and program budget docs. In fact it was in those docs even before any of these programs and efforts (ABMS or JADC2) were stood up.

Similarly, the Army's IBCS has funding to create a bridge so that it can do the same with US Navy's CEC. US navy also has the same plans to do that exchange with the Army system. What a potential adoption of an ABMS solution to execute JADC2 could allow is to really push this in very rapidly and make it both forward and backwards compatible. It's like a steroid injection both in terms of connecting disparate legacy fire control loops, and in creating hardware, software, and cyber resiliency standards and actual equipment (like radar, IR sensors, Software defined radios and other data links) for future equipment.

Left to their own devices, the individual services will prioritize a MVP and then move on. That is the most prudent and cost effective path for them. A-CJADC2 with an ABMS technology enabler allows them to control this effort at the joint forces level with one technology solution handling all domain integration of fire control nodes and kill-chains without raiding other service priorities. This is exactly how MIDS etc proliferated. Even GPS proliferation was done this way i.e. by offloading the major technical ownership to one service (the USAF as well in that case) which maintained that capability for all others.

Will Roper's approach of getting an architect to manage all the technology R&D streams and orchestrate the demonstrations is a solid one. He would know, because he himself was once the lead architect of the missile defense capability when those efforts were getting set up. But there is a long road ahead. They need to continue with their experimentation and employ more and more complex warlike scenarios. Then they need to move some of the more mature elements of the ABMS roadmap into acquisition and show that these hardware and software can be be fielded and perform as expected (i.e. pass an official OT&E). So right now it is a cool little concept with lots of promise (based just on unclassified demonstrations and material). Next step would be to further increase the pace and complexity of these experiments, and then field initial capability and have it prove itself in real world conditions outside of the experimentation and demonstration environment. That is begining to happen now with the USAF RCO being given the authority to move initial hardware into acquisition and give it to COCOMs. Once all this is done, they will have more support and Congress will be less prone to cut funding or ask them for further demonstrations before funding levels are increased.

ABMS and JADC2 are now what Assault Breaker was back during the Cold War. And much like the latter's technology, it too will have to be put through its paces before it gets widespread support with those who control funding and those who will employ it (like sister services).
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by NRao »

Technologies are not that disparate for anyone to be concerned about. Given that it is DoD, everything needs a long testing period - that is natural and expected.

It is internal politics (which is reflected in the Sept 2020 signing of a deal - that too for basic services), compounded by - of course - vendors like NG. Have they even decide who is the host for their cloud for their final product?

They all have an allergy for "Joint"ness
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by brar_w »

NRao wrote:Technologies are not that disparate for anyone to be concerned about. Given that it is DoD, everything needs a long testing period - that is natural and expected.
There is a gap between something being experimented with vs that to be ready to actually move into operational employment. Of course technologies are disparate. There are generational limitations (legacy hardware) and other more subtle nuances of how each service has adopted its kill chain (for example, the US Navy uses a different part of the spectrum than the US Army).

Pre-prototype level of technologies are great for early risk reduction, proof of concept and experimentation but there is a fairly significant engineering and development that needs to happen before they move through the maturity hoops. If it were easy, the USAF wouldn't have been seeking $1 billion for R&D on these just next year.
It is internal politics (which is reflected in the Sept 2020 signing of a deal - that too for basic services), compounded by - of course - vendors like NG. Have they even decide who is the host for their cloud for their final product?
Internal politics isn't about one service always being right. But if a monopoly and programmatic ownership needs to be handed to one service (like USAF owning ABMS, and ABMS being the tech base for JADC2) then they need to prove their metal in actual demonstration of capability. If they do that they'll convince enough stakeholders to crush those barriers. But that needs to be done. There is a reason that Will Roper took this mix of technology straight to the COCOM's with the initial experiments happening with NORTHCOM, then PACOM and they have one planned with EUCOM as well. So he went straight to the customer. The idea being to develop a momentum that leads to adoption. Meanwhile, how well they do in their next 2-3 year of experimentation will determine whether this same success will transfer over to the force providers. After all, the Navy has a legitimate claim to owning JADC2 given they are the only service that has actually been integrating air and ground forces in one multi-domain integrated fight (CEC, NIFC-CA, and USMC's CTN). This is why the approach chosen by ABMS was to do onramp experiments spaced a few months out so that the USAF can convince its customers that they have A) The right architecture, B ) Are placing the right technology bets, and C ) have the right investments and funding lined up in their budgets to support what they are attempting to do (which will be vast and very expensive). They are far far away from convincing everyone of this but its very much still a work in progress.
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by NRao »

brar_w wrote:
NRao wrote:Technologies are not that disparate for anyone to be concerned about. Given that it is DoD, everything needs a long testing period - that is natural and expected.
There is a gap between something being experimented with vs that to be ready to actually move into operational employment. Of course technologies are disparate. There are generational limitations (legacy hardware) and other more subtle nuances of how each service has adopted its kill chain (for example, the US Navy uses a different part of the spectrum than the US Army).

Pre-prototype level of technologies are great for early risk reduction, proof of concept and experimentation but there is a fairly significant engineering and development that needs to happen before they move through the maturity hoops. If it were easy, the USAF wouldn't have been seeking $1 billion for R&D on these just next year.
Nothing new or unknown there. Which is why they should have made a LOT more progress by now. They have known about this for a long time
It is internal politics (which is reflected in the Sept 2020 signing of a deal - that too for basic services), compounded by - of course - vendors like NG. Have they even decide who is the host for their cloud for their final product?
Internal politics isn't about one service always being right. But if a monopoly and programmatic ownership needs to be handed to one service (like USAF owning ABMS, and ABMS being the tech base for JADC2) then they need to prove their metal in actual demonstration of capability. If they do that they'll convince enough stakeholders to crush those barriers. But that needs to be done. There is a reason that Will Roper took this mix of technology straight to the COCOM's with the initial experiments happening with NORTHCOM, then PACOM and they have one planned with EUCOM as well. So he went straight to the customer. The idea being to develop a momentum that leads to adoption. Meanwhile, how well they do in their next 2-3 year of experimentation will determine whether this same success will transfer over to the force providers. After all, the Navy has a legitimate claim to owning JADC2 given they are the only service that has actually been integrating air and ground forces in one multi-domain integrated fight (CEC, NIFC-CA, and USMC's CTN). This is why the approach chosen by ABMS was to do onramp experiments spaced a few months out so that the USAF can convince its customers that they have A) The right architecture, B ) Are placing the right technology bets, and C ) have the right investments and funding lined up in their budgets to support what they are attempting to do (which will be vast and very expensive). They are far far away from convincing everyone of this but its very much still a work in progress.
I agree 110%.

BUT, the Services just do not want a joint effort - pretty much for anything.



What is forcing the issue is the progress made in data integration, AI, etc. Each Service love these techs - only as long as it is within their own Service. But, when data has to be shared ................. they literally do not show up to talk about it. Evidenced by the Sept 2020 signing between USAF+ USA for a set of basic service. When will they even talk about granular details?
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by brar_w »

NRao wrote:Nothing new or unknown there. Which is why they should have made a LOT more progress by now. They have known about this for a long time
The US Army's integrated fire control network was and still continues to be in development. It has a direct bridge into the US Navy's CEC. So as far back as a decade plus ago, they added this to the list of things to develop and field. Which they are on the cusp of doing. The system will now begin to get fielded starting 2021 and will be operational around 2022. So they have been doing something about it for a long time. Of course technology development (that allows all this) has been proven to be more complex then initially anticipated. But even before the whole concept of JADC2 and ABMS was born they were already hard at work in connecting the two Navy and Army fire control networks with one other.

On the Navy side, NIFC-CA only began to come into force with the AEGIS baseline 9.0 suite around 2015 IIRC. Not all ships were AEGIS BL9 enabled but their number is growing. They needed a long range interceptor, a platform with a decent loiter time and much better computing power for this concept to work. They got both of these with the SM-6 and the E-2D. But they were limited at the induction rates of both these systems. Once they fielded this capability, they expanded this to other platforms. Again, this required computing and networking upgrades which they introduced on the EA-18G and will do so with the Block III Super Hornet. Likewise, the USMC does it with their CTN and the AN/TPS-80 radar system which can tie into NIFC-CA as the ground based sensor element. And the US navy didn't stop at that. It continued (and continues) to expand this capability roll-out to other platforms. The newest is the F-35 NIFC-CA capability which comes aboard using a dedicates MADL-antenna terminal on navy platforms so that the F-35 can use its LPI/LPD data-links to pass on tracks for the SM-6. It is a slow and expensive process because A) platform upgrades take time, and B ) The service has to balance it with other platform and capability upgrade priorities. It is one thing to say that technology X can get you the sort of OTH intercept capability leveraging network advances. But those with the purse strings are going to ask you tough questions like, "what is going to use that system and where are the CONOPS". So until you have capacity that can leverage this and then have a concept of operations allowing you to efficiently make use of it then no one is going to take money away from one side of the budget and give it to you for this.

So on a bi-lateral basis this is happening. But as I said, left to this arrangement the services will continue to prioritize differently (which is often dubbed as inter-service rivalry even though most of the time it is a logical prioritization of tasks and investments) because they can't get integration ahead of the actual capability (you are only as fast as your slowest process).

What JADC2 has the potential of doing is completely upending the process. Instead of chasing capability, the integration itself will be the capability around which newer systems will be developed. This requires the selection of the right approach, supremacy of the architecture in decision making, and loads of money to develop and field the technologies. Neither the navy nor the Army has that sort of money lying around. And the Congress generally doesn't take too well to OSD led efforts.

This is where ABMS comes in. The USAF seems to think it has the right set of technologies, and capabilities and is uniquely placed (given they spend time in air and space) to run this effort. It also has the money in its R&D accounts to finish something of this proportion. It has a rapid capabilities office that has expereince in very large system development and acquisition (it is leading an $80 Billion project in the B-21) while Navy and Army RCO's in comparison are relatively small shops. But the Congress and the other services are not yet totally convinced. Over time (like in the next 2-3 years) if they convince enough combatant command commanders then they can proceed at an accelerated pace. But they have to convince them first through experimentation and demonstration. This was exactly how capabilities that went into Assault breaker were fielded. If you are going to pull money from bombs, ships, tanks and aircraft and put them into a mythical ABMS you have to convince all the stakeholders of its effectiveness. That is exactly what the USAF under Roper and Dunlap are attempting to do. As is seen by this year's budget fight, they have some ways to go before everyone is completely sold.

And people like Roper know this. He had to break the same barriers at the MDA and demonstrate the capabilities and potential in a limited fashion before COCOMs forced the services to field this capability. Today, an Army BMD radar can cue a Navy vessel thousands of kms away to launch a ballistic missile defense interceptor on remote and even engage on remote. This wasn't done overnight and neither would ABMS or its more broader parent in JADC2.
BUT, the Services just do not want a joint effort - pretty much for anything.
This is a common narrative. But in practice, the record of joint integrated approaches have been much more mixed than some of this commentary that's around would lead one to believe. There are a lot of successes around MIDS, GPS, resilient PNT and many other efforts and capabilities shared across all services and all domains. The ubiquitous Link-16 continues to be around and is even headed to space (which is something not talked about as much as it should as it really can revolutionize how L-16 is employed). One can circle back with HR McMaster to see how an Air Force supplied capability, jointly experimented with, demonstrated, and jointly fielded, was pivotal in his success at the battle of 73 Easting. Or one can look at the joint technology that is inside US Navy's Tomahawk missile, and aboard its fighters. These are large successes experimented with, demonstrated and fielded decades ahead of when others had similar level of capability. And yet in other areas there has been less cooperation and it has been completely lacking in many others. But even if one completely eliminates JADC2 and ABMS from the discussion, the services have been moving to integrating their fire-control loops and kill chains for a long time. US Army and Navy NIFC-CA/CES and IBCS collaboration, and US Army and Air Force IBCS collaborations are just two examples. It hasn't happened fast enough because each service is on a different timeline in fielding its capability. The Navy fielded NIFC-CA about 5 years ago. The Army will field IBCS in 2022. So some of it is because of different capabilities being at different maturity levels.

But coming to the success of JADC2 and ABMS - It will depend upon what they demonstrate. Effectively, what the USAF is asking is to become the lead technical provider for JADC2. What usually follows this is a "tax" that is imposed on each service and platform (not literally) because something has to give way to funding this rather large (measured in tens of billions of dollars) effort. So Congress, service chiefs and most importantly COCOM commanders need to be first convinced (through experimentation) on this being the RMA that they should bankroll before all this begins to happen. Some thought 2020 would be the year that this happens. Not so. Maybe 2021 and 2022 would be the years the capability pivots and really gets a boost in funding.
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by brar_w »

Final Count: 75% of the House, and 80% of the Senate voted to override Trump's veto and enact the NDAA 21 into law. Not a single senator voted against the override who hadn't objected to (voted against) the original bill itself (no senate pickups).

Senate hands Trump his first veto override

The Senate handed President Donald Trump the first veto override of his presidency, passing the National Defense Authorization Act with a wide bipartisan majority over his objections.

Trump vetoed the defense legislation last week after lawmakers didn't include an unrelated repeal of legal protections for social media companies. He also objected to a provision that would remove Confederate leaders names from military bases and limit troop withdrawals for Afghanistan and Europe.

The House voted to override the veto of the landmark defense bill by a wide vote on Monday.

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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by Mort Walker »

^^^That’s too bad. A very short sighted decision.
Without the repeal of Section 230, no Republican will ever be elected as president and there shall never be a Republican majority in either house. Expect O&S and RDT&E budgets to be slashed dramatically in the next 3-5 years.
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by brar_w »

The results were known from the beginning. There was no way that the Congress wasn't going to override a veto before the session ended formally on the 3rd. They spent a good part of half a year negotiating this and everyone (that needs to be for a 2/3+ majority) was aligned on the final bill. Not a comma was changed from the bill that passed overwhelmingly just a couple of weeks ago. There is a reason why the NDAA has been enacted within a session for 6 straight decades. No tweetstorm was going to change that. It is a good lesson for future administrations. If they value a legislation strong enough, they should seek it separately and not in the form of a rider. And definitely not as a rider to the NDAA. Half-assery won't work there and there is more than half a century of precedent to prove that.
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by Mort Walker »

^^^Just about every congressional district has a military base, contractor, subcontractor or supplier. That is the main incentive. With $740 billion, there is enough pie to go around for everyone. When it became abundantly clear that social media wanted the election to go one particular way, there was no choice but to push for Section 230 repeal. The only way something that important would happen is to attach it to the NDAA.
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by brar_w »

Mort Walker wrote: The only way something that important would happen is to attach it to the NDAA..
I'm glad attaching it to the NDAA worked out in the end and Congress caved.

In reality, 78 house members voted against the original NDAA and 87 (just 9 more) voted against the override. In the senate 13 voted against the NDAA and 13 voted against the override (no additional vote against was added).

Of course this was as expected and known from the very start. And as I had mentioned a couple of pages back, the bill and the aviation component in the spreadsheet still stands and is now law.

But if someone wants to draw a lesson that they can continue to introduce non defense related and non bi-partisan riders into the NDAA, then they can continue to have at it and see what happens.
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by brar_w »

More structural changes to the USMC with the Pacific focus:

New in 2021: Why the Corps may see fewer M777s next year

In 2020 the Marine Corps released its Force Design 2030 plan in hopes of transforming the Marine Corps for a future fight against China.

Part of the plan calls for a massive reduction in the number of M777 tube artillery batteries in favor of more High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, or HIMARS.

The Corps currently has 21 active duty M777 batteries and plans to reduce that number to five, essentially a reinforced battalion worth of artillery by 2030.

In its place the Corps will see a “300 percent increase in rocket artillery capacity,” a brief about the force design changes said.


The Corps hopes to eventually have a rocket system capable of sinking ships. The increased firepower is meant to force enemy ships to stay in port, while allowing the U.S. Navy to operate freely in any future battlefield.

The Corps hopes to have 36 Joint Light Tactical Vehicles capable of firing a Naval Strike Missile by 2022.

The Marine Corps is currently in the experimental phase of force design and is still unsure exactly which batteries will be switched over to rockets, Teresa Ovalle, a spokeswoman for Marine Corps Combat Development and Integration told Marine Corps Times.

“A decision of the future composition of Marine artillery is pending the outcome of ongoing Phase III force design planning,” she said.
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by Mort Walker »

So what happens to the 16 remaining M777 batteries? Do they go into USN logistics storage or go up for FMS or both?

It is a rather odd development since USMC is an expeditionary force designed for rapid deployment without very heavy armor like the Army.

Unless guided rocket shells similar to the Excalibur are available for rocket artillery system, this would be either a regression in capability or an expensive deployment.
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by brar_w »

Mort Walker wrote:So what happens to the 16 remaining M777 batteries? Do they go into USN logistics storage or go up for FMS or both?
The units will be taken out of the active force and some may go into reserve, long term storage, passed to the Army, or may be divested (scrapped or sold/offered for FMS) all together. Likely a combination of all these things at some level.
Mort Walker wrote:It is a rather odd development since USMC is an expeditionary force designed for rapid deployment without very heavy armor like the Army.
This is being done with an expeditionary force requirement in mind. They are divesting armor. Also, the type of tubed artillery and fires they are expanding or bringing in as new systems is consistent with their expeditionary abilities and does not wed them to the USAF. So the same movers and airlift that currently supports the "outgoing" elements will support the "incoming" elements. In fact, because of the heavier stuff leaving it does give them surplus lift capacity which is also why they want to re-baseline medium and heavy lift to align with the new force structure.

The US Army and USMC have only bought precision tubed artillery since the last many years (as opposed to the non guided versions of the same) so an increase of HIMARS will naturally also mean more GMLRS rounds and other longer ranged fires which are going to be required given the cross range distances in the Pacific and China's own long range fires reach.

The USMC had built up a significant COIN force structure and posture given the demands in Afghanistan and Iraq and is now moving towards its traditional maritime and littoral force roots with a focus on fitting its unique role in the Pacific which will naturally require different capabilities and competencies (and strategy) than the CENTCOM AOR. Multiple system development and force structure changes have been in the works to support that pivot. Although they won't say it as such (they tried but got rebuffed) this is very much a pivot from an Air-Land like battle construct to an Air-Sea battle construct with more focus on ambhious operations and the littorals which is a unique USMC comptency (as opposed to duplicating something that the Army already does like deep inland battle).
‘What are the big challenges facing the United States and threatening U.S. security interests?’”

The service has spent nearly the past two decades fighting land wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Now, it needs to be able to operate from within China’s weapons engagement zone and examine issues such as how to get a carrier battle group close enough to attack its targets, Wood noted.

“Without that capability, the U.S. Navy is operating from the outside,” he said. “Up to this point, a country like China can operate almost unmolested, unchallenged, within the range of its weapons, and so it has dramatic freedom of movement.”

Because of the service’s recent focus on the Middle East, many Marines have not been exposed to amphibious operations, Wood noted.

“This focus on the Indo-Pacific distributed operations and littoral environment is going to really change the mindset of the Corps,” he said. “It’s going to introduce a lot of Marines who really don’t have amphibious experiences to draw from ... into that world.”

This will require a change in how it trains and organizes, according to the force structure plan.

“Such a profound shift in missions, from inland to littoral, and from non-state actor to peer competitor, necessarily requires substantial adjustments in how we organize, train and equip our Corps,” Berger said in the document.

The service hopes to invest in expeditionary long-range precision fires; medium- to long-range air-defense systems; short-range air-defense systems; high-endurance, long-range unmanned systems; electronic warfare; and lethal strike capabilities, the report said.

“We must acknowledge the impacts of proliferated precision long-range fires, mines, and other smart weapons, and seek innovative ways to overcome these threat capabilities,” Berger said in the document.

The Marine Corps has “over invested in” capabilities such as tanks, towed cannon artillery, and short-range, low-endurance drones incapable of employing lethal effects, the report said. The service wants to eliminate at least two light attack helicopter squadrons, three law enforcement battalions and reduce its reliance on amphibious combat vehicles.
https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org ... ve-changes

Here's a table describing what they want to shed, and what they want to add as part of the new force design:

Image

Changes will be gradual and adjusted based on how they do their analysis, wargame, and do the sort of broader large force exercises to test these operational concepts. The Commandant is championing this and they've already done a fair bit of wargaming to develop portions of this strategy and find the optimal force structure for their unique role in the Indo-Pacific. They aren't the Army, and they aren't the Air-Force so instead of duplicating a lot of capability, which they were sort of forced to do due to the demands of CENTCOM, they are probably better off focusing in things that they do best (as that amphibious force) and responding to the challenges of the region ('tyranny of distance' and China's long range fires).

Specifically, the Commandant writes:
Similarly – and understandably, in a force that was
designed with different assumptions regarding threat
and environment – there are some capabilities that I
assess we are over-invested in.
A partial list includes
heavily armored ground combat systems (tanks), towed
cannon artillery, and short-range, low endurance
unmanned aerial systems (UAS) incapable of employing
lethal effects.
Finally, as an element of the integrated
naval force, we have capability and capacity excesses
and shortfalls in areas not organic to the Marine Corps,
but which are essential to our ability to contribute
to sea control and sea denial in a contested littoral
environment.

These include a requirement for smaller, lower signature,
and more affordable amphibious ships and a shortfall
in affordable, distributable platforms that will enable
littoral maneuver and provide logistical support in a
very challenging theater for the kind of operations
envisioned in our current concepts.
The full document is HERE
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by Mort Walker »

I don't quite understand the reasoning here. Unlike the former USSR where US and Soviet troops were adjacent to each other across a large European border, the same can not be said with China. The only place where there would be contiguous land mass is the Korean peninsula. Reducing helo squadrons and light weight artillery such as M777 just makes it harder logistically to bring forces quickly to conflicts in and around the Indo-Pacific. Aside from that, any US-China conflict would first start as an Air-Sea battle, then progress to an Air-Land battle. Perhaps the assumption is that the USMC may be fighting Chinese proxies, such as the DPRK, or even Iran.
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

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It is actually quite easy to understand the reasoning behind it. And it makes a lot of sense. The primary challenge in the Pacific as far as the DON is concerned is around the Air-Sea battle. In fact this is the case for all US forces. Even the former Army chief who is now the CJCS agrees with this and has basically told the Army to be prepared to pave the way for the budget to provide more $$ to the Navy. So no one really in position of influence as far as a uniform wearing leader is concerned has any doubt about where the capability edge needs to reside (it isn't inland battle). Even the US Army knows this and this is why they've structured their big-6 the way they have.

For the USMC and DON the main concern would be how to maneuver naval forces around the various roadblocks and challenges that Chinese rocket artillery and other anti-access area denial capability brings. And against a navy that will out number them 2 or 3 to one in theater. That is, the role of the USMC will be to act as a rapid response ambhip force that come in and contain, and counter the anti-access capability of the Chinese. It isn't to come ashore and then fight a deep inland battle like they have done in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last couple of decades. That is why the Army exists and why it is supported by the USAF for its expeditionary needs.

Cannon artillery loses favor (for USMC) because its strength was boosted to account for Iraq/Afgan and also because it does not deliver the sort of long range cross domain fires require to execute the joint Navy-USMC strategy. It is short range ( low to mid "tens of km") and not very flexible as far as cross domain ability is concerned. The threat also gets a vote. So longer range artillery (measure 100+ km range) that is flexible (cross-domain) wins over shorter ranged artillery that is not as flexible.

The rest (reduction in airlift and smaller fighter squadrons) is simply a re-baselining to the new normal and force structure. Airlift is reduced because there is a different force structure with different demands. The previous airlift footprint existed to support the then existing force structure. These things are supporting and their footprint is adjusted based on the fighting force. Out go 3 infantry battalions, the entire tank force, and a decent chunk of the gun inventory so that has an impact on how much airlift you need, and how much CAS and other fixed winged support assets you need to support that force.

The USMC has had a few years since Mattis delivered the NDS to wargame this and try out some of these concepts in live exercises and then align on a construct. They continue to do this and refine this further. Also, quite smartly, the commandant presented a budget-neutral force structure in that he is reconfiguring to aligning with the NDS's Pacific (near peer) mandate without assuming any budget increase. So if any COCOM thinks that he, as the force provider, is taking too much risk somewhere then they can lobby and ask for higher funding. This is a great strategy but one that will continue to evolve as they wargame and execute it in exercises and as the threat evolves.

From the horse's mouth itself (regarding the DPRK and Iran stuff):
Part of the answer to that question is, and you have to embrace — which I do — is the premise of the National Defense Strategy, which the foundation of this strategy is deterrence. So we have to build a maritime force that can as effectively as possible, within the resources we have, deter Russia, deter China, and be ready to respond to a crisis anywhere. So what does the Marine Corps look like in the future compared to what it does today? Today, we are built for a large scale amphibious forcible entry. We’re built for sustained land operations — in other words, the force ashore. We are heavy. We are built for force protection to protect our force. It was the force that we evolved over the past 15 years to match up for what we had to do in the Middle East.

To do what we need to do in the future, we have to become lighter. We absolutely have to become more naval and operate as a single maritime force. We have to be able to operate while distributed. We have to be able to operate in very austere environments where there is no [inaudible 00:00:11:19], there is no bottled water flown in, and where we have to be able to move ourselves around in smaller units so that if we’re in a situation where we’re inside an adversary’s collection, weapons engagement, weapons’ ranges. If you’re going to operate in there all the time, which we think we must do as a stand-in force, then you’ve got to be able to move or else if they can find you and they can kill you. So the mobility aspect of it is pretty important.

So I think in some aspects, we’ll retain some parts of what we have right now and that we’re fielding right now. In other ways we will shed some capabilities that were useful in Korea, useful in World War II, useful in the past, but not what we need going forward.


We’re building a force that, in terms of capability, is matched up against a high-end capability. The premise is that if you do that, if you build that kind of a force, then you can use that force anywhere in the world, in any scenario; you can adapt it. But the inverse is not true. If you build a low-end force, or a medium (however you want to characterize it), if you build that capability of a force, you cannot ramp up against a higher end adversary.

So in our charge to support the National Defense Strategy and execute the defense planning guidance, we are pacing ourselves in terms of capability against China

LINK
It is a very well articulated message that leaves little to imagination. The USMC wants to divest the heavier force, and as far as its precision fires portfolio it wants to focus on long range and cross domain capability and divest a sizable chunk of its current short range towed cannon artillery that is really designed to support an inland deployed force (see the last Syrian deployment) which saw the USMC behave more like the US Army and field overlapping and duplicate capability. It also wants to get into the air-defense business rather than relying on a sister service (which was ok in Iraq/Syria etc but is no longer viable in the Pacific).

The rest is just about moving, and supporting that force and the changes reflect that. They are not reducing airlift because they don't see themselves needing airlift. The airlift numbers are changing because of changes elsewhere. Airlift capacity is defined by the rest of your force and the needs of the MAGTF, not the other way around.

And most notably, the commandant does not want this rather significant change to happen overnight. He wants this to happen over a decade alongside some rigorous wargaming and exercising with the US Navy. A decade also gets them some of the new platforms that they are developing which will be vital to the success of this strategy.
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by brar_w »

Ford Reflects on 2020 Milestones, Accomplishments

As the new year begins, USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) and her crew reflect on the achievements, milestones, unexpected events, and the ways they conquered them during 2020 before looking to the year ahead.

During eight independent steaming events Ford steamed (and fast cruised) for nearly 200 days, completed 5,652 catapult launches and arrested landings (traps), sailed 35,959 miles, and broke records for number of traps in one day (170), consecutive days steaming (33) and miles steamed in one underway (10,069).

Ford and her crew started these successes by achieving a major milestone in January 2020. First, Aircraft Compatibility Test (ACT), in which more than 200 launches and recoveries were completed with multiple aircraft, to include the first arrestment and launching of E-2D Hawkeye, C-2A Greyhound, E/A-18G Growler, and the T-45 Goshawk on Ford’s Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System and Advanced Arresting Gear systems.

Capt. J.J “Yank” Cummings, Ford’s commanding officer, explained that when the ship completed the first of its Post-Delivery Test and Trials (PDT&T) milestones, such as ACT, this major accomplishment played a crucial role in Ford’s continued success throughout 2020.

“In January, we all had wicked huge smiles on our faces as we headed to sea for ACT. We hadn’t conducted flight operations in 18 months and completing EMALS and AAG compatibility testing for all fleet aircraft and the T-45 was a giant confidence boost which set us up for an extremely successful 2020,” said Cummings. “Ford’s technology and innovative design are nothing without confident, well-trained Sailors maintaining and operating them. And with each underway last year our team and systems got better and better. 2020 ended on high note with successful carrier strike group integrated operations in November and the smoothest carrier qualification underway in the ship’s history during the December underway.”

Building on ACT, Ford and her crew continued to succeed throughout the spring. Ford was awarded the Carrier Maintenance Efficiency Award (The Purple E) March 9. Earned her Flight Deck and Carrier Air Traffic Control Center certifications on March 22, and just two days later completed her first vertical replenishment. Marking a huge PDT&T milestone for Ford’s Advanced Weapons Elevators (AWE), in April, she certified Lower Stage Weapons Elevator (LSWE) 5, the first of her lower stage weapons elevators.

Pushing forward into the summer, Ford showed just what it means to be first-in-class. After completing her first carrier air wing embarkation for cyclic operations with Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 8, June 8, she went on to receive certification of LSWE 1 in July, and now has just five remaining elevators to certify. The crew wrapped up the summer by completing a consolidated operability test of AWEs on Aug. 22.

“I am proud of the hard work, grit and enthusiasm our Sailors showed last year to complete these milestones,” said Cummings. “We got underway and returned to homeport on time, every time, but more importantly, we accomplished the mission every underway. The crew is very proud of this given the number of curve balls world events have been throwing at us. Our determination and flexibility allowed us to spend over half the year at sea taking care of business.”

While underway, as the only aircraft carrier regularly available on the East Coast last year, Ford singlehandedly contributed to pilot production, completing carrier qualifications for 170 pilots assigned to the “Gladiators” of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 106 and “Greyhawks” of Airborne Command and Control Squadron (VAW) 120 and 114 student naval aviators assigned to Chief of Naval Air Training Command.

With the New Year here, Ford’s commanding officer is looking ahead to the next steps on Ford’s path to PDT&T completion.

“We accomplished a lot last year, but the best is yet to come for Ford,” said Cummings. “We have three more independent steaming events before full ship shock trials, and I know that we’re going to continue to test and perfect our systems, and continue our strike group integration. I am confident the crew understands just how crucial 2021 will be, because they know we’re making history on a first-in-class warship, and our efforts will have lasting impacts for generations to come.”

Ford is in port Naval Station Norfolk for a scheduled window of opportunity for maintenance as part of her Post-Delivery Test and Trials phase of operations.
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by brar_w »

BAE Systems To Demo Pod-Mounted Towed Decoy For U.S. Navy P-8A Poseidon


Image
BAE Systems receives rapid response contract from U.S. Navy to demonstrate leading-edge RFCM system. The pod-mounted RFCM system is a leading-edge, lightweight, high-power system that will add a new self-protection capability to this next-generation U.S. Navy aircraft.

The rapid response is the result of collaboration among small focus teams who developed an innovative approach to the design and fabrication of the system’s mechanical parts. As a result, BAE Systems will design, build, integrate, and ship the RFCM system in approximately five months, followed by two months of flight testing on the P-8A Poseidon platform. Testing will begin early in 2021.

The RFCM system consists of a small form factor jammer, a high-powered amplifier and the AN/ALE-55 Fiber-Optic Towed Decoy.

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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by Mort Walker »

Is that $4 million per P-8A for each RFCM or total for the 100+ P-8A the USN operates? Seems more like per aircraft cost.
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by brar_w »

$4 million is the cost to put the solution together (whatever BAE proposed) and deliver a prototype (s) for ground and flight testing and to go through the solution demonstration after being cleared on the P-8 platform. If the Navy likes what it sees it will set up an integration program and then buy the systems separately for additional testing and eventually fleet induction which will come later and naturally will be dependent upon whether the demonstration met what the Navy expected from it.
Last edited by brar_w on 06 Jan 2021 09:54, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by Mort Walker »

^^^OK. The SIR states anticipated delivery order of 18 months, but BAE systems is claiming 5-6 months, which means they've done the development already and the contract covers some of their NRE costs.
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

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What they are saying is that they have been able to accelerate the program and are in a position to deliver a demonstration within 5-6 months instead of much longer if a more traditional approach was followed. That doesn't mean the Navy will just snap a finger and buy the solution that is demonstrated to it (which could also happen but that will depend upon what exactly they demonstrate and how many objectives they meet). It also doesn't mean that the solution is already fully integrated with the P-8. The demonstration will inform them whether A) it is the right solution, B ) What further mission-system integration is required to field this capability to the fleet, and all of this will inform the program going forward. So yes, one possible outcome could be that they are happy with the demonstration and then move to buy BAE's solution. In which case they could field it relatively quickly given that most of these systems are in Navy's acquisition already. Another could be that they like parts of it and spend more time and money in developing something that works to meet the full requirements whether that is the self-defense capability itself or the platform integration portion. Yet other could be that the demonstrations don't meet the Navy's expectations and then they go back and develop something that will.

So the 4 million is just the amount BAE needs to furnish what it proposed, to integrate it for a demonstration and to conduct the demonstration. That's about it. Whatever follows will be funded afterwards.
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by Mort Walker »

^^^It also means that a solution is readily available and contract award using FY21 funds. With a new administration and OMB priorities, there could be some changes to FYDP. So no reason to wait for later FYs.
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

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Mort Walker wrote:^^^It also means that a solution is readily available and contract award using FY21 funds. With a new administration and OMB priorities, there could be some changes to FYDP. So no reason to wait for later FYs.
The contract award for this was scheduled in the original budget request. It occurred within the range for the program. Nothing to do with OMB, FYDP or any other theory. The navy programmed this and is executing on what it programmed.

The simplest explanation is the one that the company released itself as part of its press release in that it is being contracted by the US Navy to conduct a 2-month demonstration of its proposed countermeasure solution for the P-8. It lays it out quite clearly and this is consistent with official program materials. The Navy expected this demonstration to occur in Q3 FY21 and it seems that, based on the the press-release, it is going to be at or near that. So everything is going as was planned and laid out in February/March of last year. BAE's PR claims that they accelerated this through smart contracting and working closely with the program office. This could mean anything but if I was to guess, I'd say they took the RFCM that they had prepared for another service that paid them to take a system through a few design reviews and repurposed it for the Navy application. But we don't know for sure. Certainly it is using components that are already operational with the Navy.

What follows, will be based on the success (or not) of that demonstration. I don't know more than anything that is given in their official release and other materials from the Navy. The US Navy never specified if and when they planned on a fleet release. But that is understandable because doing that even before contracting for a prototype, and conducting the demonstration would have been highly speculative.

We also know that the US Navy doesn't expect the development of the RFCM system for the P-8 to be completed till at least the fourth quarter of 2021. So they are developing and buying a prototype to conduct a demonstration and the program will continue to fund its development through this entire fiscal year. Whether they choose to buy it will be dependent on this demonstration. It is part of the P-8 improvements roadmap so whenever they are satisfied with a solution and it is ready to jump a milestone hoop they'll field the capability. Or they could really love what they see later this year and just choose to rapidly field an interim capability much faster. Both options are available and it isn't like this is something new on the horizon as its been part of the capability spiral for some time now.
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by uskumar »

Trade, Russian deal among ‘friction’ points in US-India relations: Outgoing ambassador’s comments, decoded
With reference to the Russian S-400 air defence system that India is acquiring, Juster sought to remind his audience at the event organised by the Observer Research Foundation and US Embassy that “there are trade-offs India has to decide how much it matters to get the most sophisticated technology, to be as interoperable as it can be within its technology and potentially with other friendly forces, and to diversify its sources of procurement”
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

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U.S. Air Force F-16 Released Collaborative Small Diameter Bombs During First-Ever Collaborative Weapons Demo


Image
Last month, a team from the Air Force Test Center carried out the first-ever Air Force flight demonstration of collaborative weapons, using an F-16 carrying Collaborative Small Diameter Bombs (CSDBs). The CSDBs are Small Diameter Bombs (SDBs) that have been modified with a collaborative autonomy payload.

According to an Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) release, two CSDBs released by the F-16 quickly established communication with each other and their seekers detected a GPS jammer. However, the jammer was not the highest priority target of the weapons, based on the pre-defined ROEs (Rules of Engagement) preloaded by a mission planner, so the two CSDBs collaborated to identify two highest priority targets. But something went wrong: “due to an improper weapon software load, the collaboration guidance commands were not sent to the weapon navigation system. Without the updated target locations, the weapons impacted a fail-safe target location,” the AFRL release says.

Still, the demo represented a first step for the Air Force Golden Horde Vanguard program, an initiative focused on advancing networked, collaborative and autonomous – or NCA – weapon capabilities through live and virtual testing.

The final goal of the program is to develop Networked Collaborative Weapon systems, that is to say weapons that are able to share data, interact, develop and execute coordinated actions or behaviors. The key feature of these weapons is the ability to shared data to improve information across an entire group of weapons (a “swarm”) thereby improving the effectiveness of the entire swarm. In other words, NCA weapons can “observe” a dynamic battlespace and react in real time so that they can properly attack their targets. More or less a scenario similar to the one of the “drone swarms” we have discussed in detail in the near past.

When each NCA weapon shares measurements of a target’s location, combining this information reduces errors since it creates a more accurate “picture” for all to reference. Current weapons usually follow a pre-designed profile (for instance, Joint Direct Attack Munitions – JDAMs – fly towards the target GPS position). If the enemy does something unexpected, preprogrammed weapons are ineffective, and additional weapons (either preprogrammed with the new GPS position or Laser Guided) may be required to complete the mission. NCA weapons are advantageous since they observe and react to the enemy in real time, helping weapons overcome adversary defenses before the enemy can respond with effective countermeasures.

“The technologies enabling this new capability include a home-on-GPS-jam seeker that gathers information about the battlespace, a software defined radio for communication between weapons and a processor preloaded with collaborative algorithms. The collaborative algorithms use a dynamic approach called play calling, similar to a quarterback calling a play in football. A “play” is an established behavior that groups of collaborative weapons, or swarms, can enable (or disable) when they meet certain predefined conditions. Weapons that use this technology are semi-autonomous since they abide by pre-defined Rules of Engagement and only execute based on an approved list of plays.”

NCA weapons do not use artificial intelligence or machine learning to make determinations independently regarding which targets to strike. The system only selects from set plays and cannot violate defined RoE.

Still, much testing still has to be done before this technology lands on frontline weapons.

“This successful Golden Horde demonstration builds the foundation for integrating this technology into a variety of other weapon systems, which will help the U.S. maintain a technological advantage over our adversaries,” Col. Garry Haase, Director of the AFRL Munitions Directorate explained.

“I’m very pleased with results of this first test,” stated Steven Stockbridge, the Golden Horde Principal Investigator. “The team saw good performance from the networked collaborative sub-systems and understand the root cause of the weapons not impacting the desired targets. We anticipate readiness for the next flight test.”

Two more CSDB flight tests are planned for early 2021, increasing the number of collaborative weapons in each demonstration to four.

Interestingly, collaborative testing should also involve MALDs (Miniature Air-Launched Decoys). MALD is an expendable air-launched flight vehicle that looks like a U.S. or allied aircraft to enemy integrated air defense systems (IADS). Its goal is to deceive enemy radars: launched by a host platform, a swarm of these lightweight decoys (300 pounds) with a range of 500 NM (Nautical Miles) would appear as formations of conventional aircraft to the enemy IADS and radar sites. The MALD-J (Jammer) variant of the decoy is a “stand-in” jammer that can operate much closer than conventional EW to the target radar, operating in pairs and working with “traditional” EW platforms.

Ultimately, the testing should also include collaboration between CSDB and CMALD in a scenario where collaborative decoys are released in swarm to deceive/jam enemy radars while CDSBs are used to attack them in accordance with the pre-defined RoE.
Prithwiraj
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by Prithwiraj »

Bloomberg has an article out today(behind paid wall)which says US Carrier (Ford -13.2 billion dollar) EMLS Catapult and arresting system (3.2 billion dollar) is still prone to frequent outages 3 years after commissioning. And we believe China will get it right first time?
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by NRao »

brar_w
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by brar_w »

Prithwiraj wrote:Bloomberg has an article out today(behind paid wall)which says US Carrier (Ford -13.2 billion dollar) EMLS Catapult and arresting system (3.2 billion dollar) is still prone to frequent outages 3 years after commissioning. And we believe China will get it right first time?
Yes this is what I have been saying in the China and Aircraft Carrier thread as well. System maturity is going to be require before your targets are met. There is no way you are even going to get close to meeting your design goals before for performance and reliability until you've done 50-100K real-world test cycles and have used those learnings to make improvements in hardware, software, and processes. That's just the military high end technological learning curve and there is nothing that China has demonstrated till date that would warrant one to consider that they have somehow found a way to by-pass that altogether. There is no "prototype" of a naval integrated system. Your fist live operational example is also your prototype.

This also applies to their 5GFA programs by the way. The USAF F-22, and F-35 challenges are open book and very well documented in open source official reports. This despite having stealth research going back half a century, and operational stealth going back more than 3 decades (even the B-2 is 25+ years old). Yet we are to believe that China can simply snap a finger and field comparable 5GFA (without actually having a comparable fighter engine) aircraft in terms of stealth, mission system fusion, propulsion efficiency/performance just like that. These are strategic advantages in technology acquired through decades of long-lead time research and development and operationally, by employing this capability in an operational context and learning lessons on what work and what doesn't. And they never really stopped post cold war demise. F-35, RQ-180 and B-21 are just three examples of post cold war funding of this research and development (but probably not the only programs that kept on building this capability) so while the pace may have slowed they were continuing to move the needle forward.
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Re: US military, technology, arms, tactics

Post by Mort Walker »

The Bloomberg article quotes the head of ODT&E, but I couldn’t find specifics. It seems they’re quoting a selected release report not publicly available. Until there is GAO report, progress on EMALS may be slow but continues.
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