Indian Military Aviation - 21 Sept 2015

Rakesh · Post by **Rakesh** » 02 Nov 2017 04:57

I am sure wise and smart as Indranil onlee

And hopefully Indranil will let him join the Indian Air Force flying AMCA!

Too bad though, many of us oldies will have dementia at that time to remember anything!

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 02 Nov 2017 08:34

The "stork"has brought Indy a Bonnie baby.Gratters old man!

SBajwa · Post by **SBajwa** » 03 Nov 2017 03:31

Armed drones are useful during peacetime to keep an eye on a terrorist training camp and hit it when there are high targets visible. Get the GPS from satellites and keep drone up for surveillance. Drones could be used to take out bridges, radar installations and other known targets during war time. Drones in wartime could provide info to theatre commanders.

Khalsa · Post by **Khalsa** » 03 Nov 2017 06:13

Indranil wrote:I can't type much (just had a son).

Congratulations!!

and yes be prepared to use that sentence and lot more in your life

chola · Post by **chola** » 03 Nov 2017 06:42

Congrats on the little Bahubali, Indranil!

Cain Marko · Post by **Cain Marko** » 03 Nov 2017 07:04

Congratulations Indranil - and may you and the Mrs. be blessed with all thee joys of parentrhood. May HQ also go easy on you for being such a stalwart forumer and may BRF see mithai the weight of the little one distributed for good measure since we have all but given up on the Admiral to give us the Akula variety.

atma · Post by **atma** » 03 Nov 2017 07:42

Badhai Ho, Indranil! Just distributed leftover Halloween candy to family, citing a new arrival in the family!! Hope you are able to type just as I can with my grand niece in my lap. Regards.

Gagan · Post by **Gagan** » 03 Nov 2017 20:00

Congratulations Indranil !

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 13 Dec 2017 01:02

Another older post, please see correlation between IAF/USAF tactics.

Karan M wrote:As to the human factor, in 1991.
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/arc ... ce/307291/

Today, of course, electronic systems extend a fighter’s vision well beyond the range of the most acute eyeball. Aerial combat is no longer a matter of fixing your sights on a dodging enemy. Most of the maneuvering in air-to-air combat today takes place BVR, or beyond visual range. The modern fighter pilot flies strapped into the center of a moving electronic cocoon. His speeding jet emits a field of photons* that can find, identify, and target an enemy long before he will ever see it. At the same time, his electromagnetic aura defends him by thwarting the enemy’s radar.
Why BVR

American pilots strive to find and shoot down enemy aircraft from outside what they call the WEZ, or “weapons engagement zone,” which means safely beyond range of the enemy’s missiles. Traveling faster than sound, the fighter pilot is part of a network that can spot an enemy over the horizon, sometimes before he even leaves the ground; that can attack multiple targets simultaneously; and that in an emergency can react to an incoming threat before the pilot is even aware of it. Today’s jet is a machine so powerful, so smart, and so fast that the fighter jock’s biggest challenge is to safely fly and land it.
The same gentleman who went overboard on the Red Flag briefing but explains why war isn't meant to be fair.

“When cavemen fought they had their fists, first of all,” F‑15 pilot Colonel Terrence “Skins” Fornof explained to me last year in Alaska. “Then someone came up with the sling, which meant he could attack his enemy before he could get close enough to take a swing. The history of warfare technology has all boiled down to increasing the distance between you and your enemy’s fist. Distance means time, and you gain the advantage by extending that timeline. Our goal is the same as it ever was: to kill the enemy before he even has a chance to employ his weapon. War is not fair. You don’t want him to even get close enough to fight.”
The modern day system

Being the best means learning to fully inhabit that screaming node, high above the slow curve of the Earth, strapped down in a bubble where the only real things are the sound of your own breathing and the feel of sweat rolling down the center of your back. You are alone but not alone. You cope with constant, multiple streams of data, everything from basic flight information—airspeed, altitude, attitude, fuel levels—to incoming radar images displayed on small, glowing green screens stacked in rows before you and to both sides. In your helmet are three or four radio links, with the AWACS, with the ground, with your wingman, and with your flight leader. It is a little bit like trying to navigate at high speed with four or five different people talking to you at once, each with a slightly different set of directions. It is not for amateurs. By the time Rodriguez flew into combat for the first time, he had hundreds of hours of training behind him, and being in the jet was second nature. With him were his wingman, his formation, and the superhuman reach of America’s technological eyes and ears.

Hurling a few dozen jets into the sky against this, as Saddam did in 1991, was most unwise.
Yet

But given all the other advantages enjoyed by the allied pilots, the brave, outnumbered Iraqi pilots launching themselves at the approaching juggernaut might as well have been committing suicide.

“From Western eyes, it’s a suicide mission,” Rodriguez told me. “From the eyes of the guy being invaded, he’s protecting the homeland.”
The human factor

Even greatly disadvantaged, the Iraqi fighters were dangerous, and as it happened the large American force made a potentially fatal mistake that Saturday morning. The incoming MiGs were spotted, of course, but in the confusion of the moment either tactical errors were made by the strikers, or the Iraqi pilots exploited a seam in the American defenses. The AWACS command had spotted the MiGs immediately when they took off, and had handed them off to a Navy formation of F‑14s, which failed to intercept them. When Rodriguez and Underhill were alerted to the approaching threat, it came as a jolting surprise. The MiGs were just 13 miles out and closing at a speed of more than 1,000 nautical mph. Both pilots immediately began evasive maneuvers.
Trying to go by mission briefing, that there was a chance that clutter could reduce the Missile/Radar performance

Rodriguez dove steeply, getting below the lead MiG, where he would be harder to find on its radar—pointing down, the radar’s signal can get confused by all the signals* bouncing back up from the ground. Then Rodriguez began flying in a low arc, keeping the MiG on his wing line, making himself “skinny,” presenting as small a radar target as possible. Within minutes the two fighters would be in a visual turning fight, a situation familiar to many experienced pilots from earlier wars, but one that is not supposed to happen in modern air warfare.
Matter of seconds. Now think of how more lethal missiles & systems have become.

A cockpit alarm warned him when the MiG’s radar locked on him. The threat was still just a blip on his screen; he hadn’t actually seen it yet. He was frightened and thinking furiously when in his headset he heard Underhill shout, “Fox!”—the code word for I have just fired a missile.

Rodriguez looked back over his shoulder, following the smoke trail of Underhill’s missile, and then, looking out ahead of it, caught his first and only glimpse of the MiG. This is the precise instant captured from the Iraqi pilot’s perspective in the photo on Rodriguez’s wall. It turns out that the picture does not preserve a moment of personal triumph for him, as I had originally supposed, but one of intense fear and vulnerability. Rodriguez’s little F‑15 in the distance was not predator but prey, trapped and awaiting a kill shot that would never come, because in the next instant the MiG became a huge fireball in the sky. The whole encounter lasted a little more than 10 seconds.

“Mole saves my bacon because he kills this guy before he can take a shot at me,” Rodriguez said as we sat in his office.
Next set of tactics.

The second of his aerial kills was what he called “more routine,” more typical of modern aerial combat. A week after the first episode, he was flying in what the Air Force calls a “wall of Eagles,” a formation of four F‑15s spread out in the sky over roughly five to eight miles at 33,000 feet to maximize their visibility and radar range.

At that point, the remaining Iraqi air force was so vulnerable that the AWACS plane assisting the F‑15s picked up the enemy jets the minute they started their engines, while they were still on the ground. Rodriguez and the other pilots watched three radar blips form on their screens as the MiGs took off and climbed. Rodriguez assumed that the planes were, like the rest of Saddam’s air force, escaping into Iran.

“They were basically running scared,” he says. “Extremely scared.”

It took a few moments to identify the jets as MiG‑23s, and then the wall of Eagles began preparing to launch missiles at them.

“We think we’re going to have to stay above the clouds and we’re never going to see the missiles do their job, and all of a sudden there’s a big sucker hole, an opening in the clouds below,” he says. “The F‑15s dove to about 13,000 feet. The fleeing MiGs were hugging the terrain, flying just 300 to 400 feet above the ground, when we started launching AIM-7 missiles at them.

“And, sure enough, the missiles did their job.”

The Iraqi flight leader took the first hit. An American missile sliced through his plane, taking out the engine but leaving the shell of the plane intact. Trailing a thick cloud of smoke, the pilot began turning to the north, apparently trying to return to his base. Rodriguez’s flight leader fired a Sidewinder, a heat-seeking missile that lit up the sky when it hit, turning the unfortunate Iraqi pilot and his plane into an enormous fireball.

Rodriguez’s missile ripped straight through his target. The MiG apparently flew right into it. There was no large explosion. The missile just tore the jet to pieces, turning it into what Rodriguez called “a ground-level sparkler,” scattering debris across a wide swath of desert.
Sound familiar?

Cope India 2004.

AWST on Cope India wrote:The U.S. pilots used no active missiles, and the AIM-120 Amraam capability was limited to a 20-naut.-mi. range while keeping the target illuminated when attacking and 18 naut. mi. when defending, as were all the missiles in the exercise.

"When we saw that they were a more professional air force, we realized that within the constraints of the exercise we were going to have a very difficult time," Snowden says. "In general, it looked like they ran a broad spectrum of tactics and they were adaptive. They would analyze what we were doing and then try something else. They weren't afraid to bring the strikers in high or low. They would move them around so that we could never anticipate from day to day what we were going to see."

The IAF did not fly its top-end Su-30MKI aircrafts, instead the older un-upgraded Su-30MKs and Su-30Ks of the 24 Sqn, such as these. Compare the relative size of the aircraft!

By comparison, the U.S. pilots don't think they offered the Indians any surprises. The initial tactic is to run a wall with all four F-15s up front. That plays well when the long-range missiles and AESA radar are in play.

"You know we're there and we're not hiding," Snowden says. "But we didn't have the beyond-visual-range shot or the numerical advantage. Eventually we were just worn down by the numbers. They were very smart about it. Their goal was to get to a target area, engage the target and then withdraw without prolonging the fight. If there were a couple of Eagles still alive away from the target area, they would keep them pinned in, get done with the target and then egress with all their forces.
Now, back to the USAF & BVR.

The American planes began to conduct the standard series of checks to identify the plane. The F‑15 is equipped with a full range of instruments to, in effect, interrogate an unidentified plane in the air. They were coordinating with an AWACS, working through some language difficulties (the controllers spoke accented English). A process that would normally take 20 seconds took three times as long, which is a huge difference when you’re traveling hundreds of miles per hour. Rodriguez and his wingman were rapidly approaching the weapons engagement zone, where they would lose the advantage of their longer-range missiles.

They were on the edge of the WEZ as the ID was completed, and Rodriguez launched an AMRAAM, or “advanced medium-range air-to-air missile,” a new element of his arsenal added after the Gulf War. In the Air Force, they call it the Slammer. One advantage it affords is a “fire and forget” feature; because the missile has its own homing and guidance system, the pilot need not stay pointed at the target. He is free to turn and evade the incoming jet in case his shot for some reason misses. Rodriguez stayed with his missile for as long as he could.

“It all went into slow motion, and I felt like the missile and I were kind of flying in formation for a while,” he recalls. “It just seemed to stay there for a couple of seconds and then, whoosh! It disappears. You see that glow [the missile’s exhaust], and that becomes just a little ember, and then it’s gone. And of course at night you can’t follow it anymore. The smoke trail goes away. But I could see it start to curve, and I go, ‘Okay, it looks like it’s doing the right lead-pursuit tracking.’ And the missile did everything it was advertised to do. We have a little counter display inside the cockpit that ticks down the time to intercept, and when the counter said zero, I looked outside through my canopy to the general vicinity of where I knew the target was going to be. I mean, that fireball was huge.”
He shot down a MiG-29 without a SPJ & malfunctioning systems BTW as it later emerged.

But the above should show how tactics, systems all evolve.

And how the IAF was practising as well. Larger number of mixed formation type aircraft against fewer opponents.

All in all, the IAF is constantly evolving and improving its BVR tactics.

Range and its importance. Speed and its importance. Why supercruise etc etc.

Why AESA & more modern radars.

“If the enemy has radar-guided missiles, now we’re shooting at each other,” Lieutenant Colonel Chuck “Corky” Corcoran told me last year at Elmendorf. Corcoran is a former F‑15 pilot who now commands the 525th Fighter Squadron, the Bulldogs, one of the three F‑22 squadrons just now getting planes. “If those enemy weapons have similar capabilities to ours, I’ve got to employ some sort of tactic to gain an advantage, whether it’s getting higher and faster so I can shoot first, or checking away [shifting slightly off course] to increase his missile’s time of flight.”

Drawing out that time, even by a split second, can mean everything, because it allows your missile to strike first. Once the enemy’s plane is destroyed, its radar can no longer steer his missile.

“His missile is looking for reflected radar energy that he’s pointing at you, so if your missile gets to him and blows him up and kills his radar before his missile gets to you, then you are going to live,” Corcoran explained.

An AMRAAM missile like the one Rodriguez used over Kosovo was a major step forward because it frees the attacking plane from having to keep its radar pointed at the target. The American plane can launch a missile from outside the WEZ, turn, and kick on its afterburners before the target has a chance to even shoot.

These tools rely, of course, on radar, which can be jammed.

“If you can’t match your enemy’s technology, you can always subtract from it,” says Wayne Waller, a Virginia contractor who designs radar systems for the F‑15. “You may invent something that gives you an advantage, but you can’t hang on to it for very long. Our radar used to be difficult to jam, but the capability to do that has improved geometrically. That knowledge is out there. And the jamming advances cost a lot less than improving the radar.”

Countries that cannot afford to build fleets of the most advanced supersonic fighters can afford to build pods with clever software to mount on older airframes. This was brought home dramatically in Cope India 2004, a large aerial-combat training exercise that pitted F‑15 pilots from Elmendorf against India’s air force, which is made up of the MiG‑21 and MiG‑29, and the newer Mirage 2000 and Russian-built Su‑30. The exercises were conducted high over north-central India, near the city of Gwalior.

“We came rolling in, like, ‘Beep-beep, superpower coming through,’” Colonel Fornof told me. “And we had our eyes opened. We learned a lot. By the third week, we were facing a threat that we weren’t prepared to face, because we had underestimated them. They had figured out how to take Russian-built equipment and improve upon it.”
Why sensor fusion. We have that on the Phalcon, AEW&C and planned for LCA Mk2. Rafale has it.

“It is really two big steps ahead of anything else out there,” Corcoran told me. “All of the data from all the different sensors in the aircraft are fused. The F‑22 has one big display in the middle of the cockpit, so you are kind of sitting in the middle of that display, and all of the sensors run on their own. And tracks show up all around you, 360 degrees, and all of it in color. So the red guys are bad, the green guys are good, and the yellow guys—we don’t know who the yellow guys are yet. So without the pilot doing anything, you have this 360-degree picture of the battle space around you. With the F‑15, after a couple of years of training, you might be able to achieve that level of awareness.”
Why IAF is insisting that the engines on the FGFA be better to allow true supercruise. Why it wants 360 degree avionics, maximum stealth etc.

“The F‑22 avionics allow me to be a better battle-space manager and efficient killer,” Tinsley explained. “I have stealth, so I have the surprise piece. And then on top of all that, I can do it at supercruise. I can climb higher than other fighters, I can go faster with lower fuel consumption, so I can cover a larger space. And no one can see me. Now we’re getting that 8-to-1 kill ratio I need to maintain superiority.”
How IAF can use its PAK-FAs to help its Su-30s or how Rafales with Meteor can help LCAs

“When the F‑15s are up doing their tactics, we’re kind of back behind them a little bit and helping them out if they have trouble,” Colonel Jim Hecker, the operations-group commander at Elmendorf, told me. “If an F‑15 is having some trouble dealing with electronic countermeasures where he can’t shoot, that’s when we’ll go in and get rid of that guy for him. I think the synergistic effect of having a couple of F‑22s in with those fourth-generation fighters is great. Based on the buy, I think we’re going to have to do that if we stay at the same number of F‑22s. We simply don’t have enough, so we have to find ways to integrate like this to optimize our capability.”

JTull · Post by **JTull** » 13 Dec 2017 01:40

Karan M, great effort!

Key differences between USAF and IAF:
1. In all the conflicts in last few decades, USAF (and allies) always had numerical superiority against a single, small adversary. IAF could potentially be facing a twin coordinated threat with fewer aircraft than it ever had. We need a third assembly line on LCA asap.

2. The aircraft that USAF bring to a conflict are not only better networked and armed than an adversary, they're all heavy fighters capable of longer time on station. Qualitatively a different beast to the enemy. We simply can't afford top of line heavy fighters in huge numbers. Few squadrons of Rafale and potentially FGFA can be embedded, but we may get overwhelmed numerically. I don't think Russia can deliver the sensor fusion that a 5G aircraft should have. A domestic sensor package on Russian platform is the best bet.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 14 Dec 2017 19:37

I could have linked these articles in the history thread - but they indicate what the air force does even today and has plenty of stuff about how people and aircraft behave at high altitude - with no jargon

Fantastic articles
http://jpjopenpage.blogspot.in/2009/07/ ... rt-ii.html
http://jpjopenpage.blogspot.in/2009/08/ ... t-iii.html

Cain Marko · Post by **Cain Marko** » 15 Dec 2017 23:22

Question to gurulog.... I've always wondered:
Can a a2g missile be used as long ranged aam against lumbering targets like awacs, fuellers?
Vice versa, can aams be used against ground targets?

Fwiw..I found this interesting little tid bit about rmaf use of kh31s...
https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-GKYNhYRCy5A/ ... 0/kh31.jpg

Note the use vs the aew aircraft

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 16 Dec 2017 06:50

Cain Marko wrote:Question to gurulog.... I've always wondered:
Can a a2g missile be used as long ranged aam against lumbering targets like awacs, fuellers?
Vice versa, can aams be used against ground targets?

Fwiw..I found this interesting little tid bit about rmaf use of kh31s...
https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-GKYNhYRCy5A/ ... 0/kh31.jpg

Note the use vs the aew aircraft

This is lesss about lumbering and more about radar emitting. It homes in on a radar emitting AWACS

Manish_P · Post by **Manish_P** » 16 Dec 2017 09:50

shiv wrote:I could have linked these articles in the history thread - but they indicate what the air force does even today and has plenty of stuff about how people and aircraft behave at high altitude - with no jargon

Fantastic articles
http://jpjopenpage.blogspot.in/2009/07/ ... rt-ii.html
http://jpjopenpage.blogspot.in/2009/08/ ... t-iii.html

Note to self - Do not partake in refreshments when reading articles posted by Shiv saar

Almost sprayed out the sip of coffee i was taking in, when i came to this part..

As we come out, we hear a helicopter coming in to land. Out comes a 3-star General who tells us that don't worry... in case you eject over the glacier, I will have my ski troops pick you up in 15 minutes....we are all flabbergasted...what glacier?

Indranil · Post by **Indranil** » 16 Dec 2017 09:56

shiv wrote:
Cain Marko wrote:Question to gurulog.... I've always wondered:
Can a a2g missile be used as long ranged aam against lumbering targets like awacs, fuellers?
Vice versa, can aams be used against ground targets?

Fwiw..I found this interesting little tid bit about rmaf use of kh31s...
https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-GKYNhYRCy5A/ ... 0/kh31.jpg

Note the use vs the aew aircraft
This is lesss about lumbering and more about radar emitting. It homes in on a radar emitting AWACS

I think can develop a version of this too modifying NGARM.

Manish_P · Post by **Manish_P** » 16 Dec 2017 13:56

For the viewing pleasure of Aditya_V

Aditya_V · Post by **Aditya_V** » 16 Dec 2017 14:13

Nice would like Tejas and AMCA there one day.

fanne · Post by **fanne** » 16 Dec 2017 20:34

this means we do nt have inadequate number of refullers. SU30MKI can act as refullers!! great!!

Manish_P · Post by **Manish_P** » 16 Dec 2017 22:04

To a limit yes. A relay is also doable if at all required, with the dedicated re-fuellers staying well inside our air space.

Incidentally the Su-34 Strike aircraft has an internal fuel capacity of about 12 tons compared to the 5 tons of the Su-30 MKI

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 16 Dec 2017 22:09

http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-10dDWT7xkIU/V ... 8912_n.jpg

This is so wrong. Caste discrimination. Why can't Il 78 directly give fuel to Mirage? Untouchable or what? Why it is giving to Sukhoi and asking Sukhoi to give to Mirage. Or maybe Il 78 not speaking French?

Ask me. I have all the explanations

Manish_P · Post by **Manish_P** » 16 Dec 2017 22:18

Please do Shiv ji. Just a minute, let me just keep my glass down..

Cain Marko · Post by **Cain Marko** » 17 Dec 2017 02:04

Manish_P wrote:To a limit yes. A relay is also doable if at all required, with the dedicated re-fuellers staying well inside our air space.

Incidentally the Su-34 Strike aircraft has an internal fuel capacity of about 12 tons compared to the 5 tons of the Su-30 MKI

Not 5 but 10 tons on the mki. Which should go up considerably once it is plumbed like the su 35 or mig 29k for efts.

Cain Marko · Post by **Cain Marko** » 17 Dec 2017 02:06

Indranil wrote:
shiv wrote: This is lesss about lumbering and more about radar emitting. It homes in on a radar emitting AWACS
I think can develop a version of this too modifying NGARM.

True on both accounts. Indranil guru, I was just wondering if IAF would already have the capability since it operates a kh31 version that has about 200km range iirc.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 17 Dec 2017 05:49

Cain Marko wrote:Question to gurulog.... I've always wondered:
Can a a2g missile be used as long ranged aam against lumbering targets like awacs, fuellers?
Vice versa, can aams be used against ground targets?

Fwiw..I found this interesting little tid bit about rmaf use of kh31s...
https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-GKYNhYRCy5A/ ... 0/kh31.jpg

Note the use vs the aew aircraft

That is some blog speculation to be honest.

Aircraft move fast. So you need mid course guidance.

We can do that with our missiles we have the building blocks.

Manish_P · Post by **Manish_P** » 17 Dec 2017 08:06

Cain Marko wrote:
Manish_P wrote:To a limit yes. A relay is also doable if at all required, with the dedicated re-fuellers staying well inside our air space.

Incidentally the Su-34 Strike aircraft has an internal fuel capacity of about 12 tons compared to the 5 tons of the Su-30 MKI
Not 5 but 10 tons on the mki. Which should go up considerably once it is plumbed like the su 35 or mig 29k for efts.

Oops. My mistake

Cain Marko · Post by **Cain Marko** » 17 Dec 2017 11:01

Karan M wrote:
Cain Marko wrote:Question to gurulog.... I've always wondered:
Can a a2g missile be used as long ranged aam against lumbering targets like awacs, fuellers?
Vice versa, can aams be used against ground targets?

Fwiw..I found this interesting little tid bit about rmaf use of kh31s...
https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-GKYNhYRCy5A/ ... 0/kh31.jpg

Note the use vs the aew aircraft
That is some blog speculation to be honest.

Aircraft move fast. So you need mid course guidance.

We can do that with our missiles we have the building blocks.

Say the arm is fired at 120-150km distance, how far can awacs run during the 2-3 odd minutes available to it? Iirc, the kh31 is supposed to have radar guided mcu capability. Here is what good ole kopp had to say about it...

During the 1990s there were persistent claims that the airframe was being adapted for use as a long range AAM with a Counter-ISR role, as an “AWACS-killer”, with the designation R-31P. The reality is that both the anti-radiation and anti-shipping variants of the extended range configurations of this missile have compatible 135 NMI plus range on high altitude trajectories, and suitable basic seeker technology, and both have a suitable laser proximity fuse. Adaptation for an air - air role of this kind would involve primarily changes to the control laws in the guidance and proximity fusing timing parameters. It is entirely conceivable that such a Counter-ISR capability already exists embedded in newer variants of the missile's guidance system.

So that poster might not altogether be a hawa mein teer, no pun intended.

srai · Post by **srai** » 18 Dec 2017 10:48

Cain Marko wrote:Question to gurulog.... I've always wondered:
Can a a2g missile be used as long ranged aam against lumbering targets like awacs, fuellers?
Vice versa, can aams be used against ground targets?

Fwiw..I found this interesting little tid bit about rmaf use of kh31s...
https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-GKYNhYRCy5A/ ... 0/kh31.jpg

Note the use vs the aew aircraft

If you look at the * note at the bottom of the image you attached, you will see it says "However in 2004 Tactical Missiles Corporation emphatically denied that it had ever worked on an air-to-air version of the Kh-31".

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 19 Dec 2017 11:40

Are they hiding the 172?

Kersi · Post by **Kersi** » 20 Dec 2017 15:01

shiv wrote:http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-10dDWT7xkIU/V ... 8912_n.jpg

This is so wrong. Caste discrimination. Why can't Il 78 directly give fuel to Mirage? Untouchable or what? Why it is giving to Sukhoi and asking Sukhoi to give to Mirage. Or maybe Il 78 not speaking French?

Ask me. I have all the explanations

Any Dalits / Brahmin issues ????

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 20 Dec 2017 15:23

I think its a +ve sign, showing mixture and bodily fluid exchange among all castes.

Aditya_V · Post by **Aditya_V** » 20 Dec 2017 16:54

shiv wrote:http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-10dDWT7xkIU/V ... 8912_n.jpg

This is so wrong. Caste discrimination. Why can't Il 78 directly give fuel to Mirage? Untouchable or what? Why it is giving to Sukhoi and asking Sukhoi to give to Mirage. Or maybe Il 78 not speaking French?

Ask me. I have all the explanations

French cannot wait their turn they want their fuel immediately?

chola · Post by **chola** » 20 Dec 2017 18:54

I want to discuss how we divide up the air assets in Bharat compare to other nations and whether it affects the efficiency of our armed forces, especially the Army.

The IA Aviation Corps fly around just 150 helos versus over 400 for the Air Force. The Army has no fixed wings.

We’re rather like the Russian military which has the Air Force controlling all of the 1200 helos while the Army have nothing but UAVs.

The US Army OTOH flies around 3000 helicopters and 150 fixed wings, up to the size of the C-27. The USAF flies only around 150 helos for light utily and communication roles.

PLA ground forces have 1000 helicopters and they also have fixed wings with An-34 sized Y-7 and the larger Y-8 and Y-9. The PLAAF have only 100 helos.
http://www.china.org.cn/china/2017-12/2 ... 113178.htm

So does having the Air Force control the vast majority of rotorcraft like the Russians weaken the Army and limits its options especially regarding airborne tactics? Or is the American way of allowing the Army a massive helo wing weakening the Air Force by confusing jurisdiction?

IMHO the split between rotor and fixed wing for Army and Air Force respectively is a natural division that gives the Army flexibility but not impinges on the Air Force’s mission. What got me investigating this is the IAF’s insistence on the Apache which is an US Army mainstay.

Akshay Kapoor · Post by **Akshay Kapoor** » 20 Dec 2017 21:16

cross posting from LCA thread

From Manjgu

The Jag fulfill a certain role in IAF and the crew train for that.. if there are threats in the lo lo lo..arent there threats in hi hi hi or any mix of lo's and hi's? the crew train to minimise the risks associated with their role.. and survive with tactics, electronics and a prayer ! in a fluid battle situation, its not that all assets move under a cover of MANPADS or AD 24*7... the lo lo lo has still many + s to it. b) the kargil example was not too good..the COAS in a specific situation said that not good to bring in hepters... with fellas sitting on high peaks..looking down ..hepter not optimised for high altitude combat... But probably something was to be done and under Army presure, persistence hepters were brought in ( in that sense it was un necessary sacrifice much against IAF's professional opinion). From what i have read the hepter which went down was not equipped with protection suite unlike the other 3 or 4 who had such a protection suite. it was not like PA fired only 1 stinger which shot the hepter down. c) in the mountains during kargil IAF had very fixed lines of attack given the constraints of not crossing LOC....in a war in the plains of punjab, rajasthan this predicitability will be much less more in a fluid battle situation

Akshay Kapoor · Post by **Akshay Kapoor** » 20 Dec 2017 21:20

Deejay brought out that a huge number of stingers were fire, almost one every 2 seconds or something like that. Only one hit and that too on Nubra 3 which did not have CMDS. His opinion was that given this stingers were not that effective.

Akshay Kapoor · Post by **Akshay Kapoor** » 20 Dec 2017 21:25

From T Sarkar on LCA thread

Warfare is an evolving science, and one cant stay hung up because of the way things were done in the past.

What is wrong in quoting what factually happened in Kargil & what ACM Tipnis said on multiple occasions?

What happened earlier at Kargil was corroborated earlier in Gulf War 1, where the British lost six Tornadoes in low level runs.

https://www.raf.mod.uk/history/RAFTorna ... Losses.cfm

The investigating team concluded that the aircraft was hit by a surface-to-air missile while leaving the target area.

The investigating team concluded that the aircraft was shot down by a surface-to-air missile during the run-in for a loft attack.

investigating team were able to conclude that the aircraft was lost as a result of an enemy SAM attack

It was subsequently concluded that their aircraft had been seen to hit the ground while leaving the target area.

I've posted data and ACM Tipnis's statements for readers to derive their own conclusion. Standoff weapons like SAAW, Glide & PG kits are the way things will go in future. The sooner we adapt, the better. This is my last post on this subject.

deejay · Post by **deejay** » 20 Dec 2017 21:34

chola wrote:I want to discuss how we divide up the air assets in Bharat compare to other nations and whether it affects the efficiency of our armed forces, especially the Army.

The IA Aviation Corps fly around just 150 helos versus over 400 for the Air Force. The Army has no fixed wings.

We’re rather like the Russian military which has the Air Force controlling all of the 1200 helos while the Army have nothing but UAVs.

The US Army OTOH flies around 3000 helicopters and 150 fixed wings, up to the size of the C-27. The USAF flies only around 150 helos for light utily and communication roles.

PLA ground forces have 1000 helicopters and they also have fixed wings with An-34 sized Y-7 and the larger Y-8 and Y-9. The PLAAF have only 100 helos.
http://www.china.org.cn/china/2017-12/2 ... 113178.htm

So does having the Air Force control the vast majority of rotorcraft like the Russians weaken the Army and limits its options especially regarding airborne tactics? Or is the American way of allowing the Army a massive helo wing weakening the Air Force by confusing jurisdiction?

IMHO the split between rotor and fixed wing for Army and Air Force respectively is a natural division that gives the Army flexibility but not impinges on the Air Force’s mission. What got me investigating this is the IAF’s insistence on the Apache which is an US Army mainstay.

There is a simple solution. We can start calling the Air Force as Indian Army. (Sorry could not resist)

Akshay Kapoor · Post by **Akshay Kapoor** » 20 Dec 2017 21:35

T Sarkar sir,

Fair point that warfare is evolving and we have to adapt but rates of adoption and adaption depend upon economic capacity & nation's willingness to spend. It is obvious that the latter is certainly not there so it must never be forgotten that the vast majority of our forces - certainly army and perhaps the IAF (and I wont speak for the Navy as T Sarkar sir is best suited to do that) go into harm's way much more than other forces. And this will continue for decades yet for sure. When 30% of your fleet is Jags surely you will use them. And bayonets are still used - very much used sir.

Shivji's response was to a post saying words to the effect 'the US is a might power. X doesn't work for them so why will it work for (implied second rate or third rate power) for India'. Personally I feel he made valid points.

deejay · Post by **deejay** » 20 Dec 2017 21:51

TSarkar Sir, I will disagree with you politely.

ACM Tipnis hesitation for using helicopters in the role was two fold: 1) The Gunships could not be used at Kargil 2) IAF had never practiced firing at point targets on hills with Mi 17s. In fact, in the shoot down of Nubra 3, you will recollect it did not have a functioning CMDS. There weren't 04 Mi 17s with functional CMDS.

The fighters were used initially in non precision mode. Nachiketa went down due Engine Failure. S/L Ahuja was shot down but in his 2nd pass, not first. Both passes were in the valley, slow speed and in full visual range of enemy ground troops. They had time to sight, prepare, aim, acquire and shoot by the time of second pass and not the first pass.

The luxury of limited battle let IAF choose its platforms and attack modes thereafter. The IA also saw the impact of losing fighters and the media space / psychological victories it gave to the enemy, hence, I think they eased off on the pressure of using Air Assets in brute force mode. What must not be forgotten is that helicopters continued to operate in the conflict zone for CASEVAC, Communication and Logistics. Though, they were not used in direct line of fire by either IAF or AAC.

In a full scale war or where our backs are against the wall, I do not see why we will not push all are assets to gain advantage however risk prone they may be. If we have a military and weapons, we might as well use them. Also, let us not foll ourselves that fighting forces can stay out of harms way and fight wars from stand off ranges. Even the mighty US has lost Chinooks, Apaches, F 117, etc, etc because the man and the platform were in the range of effective enemy fire to achieve objectives.

Wrt Jags in lo-lo mode, the aircraft is under threat all through the enemy territory. The main objective in flying low is to avoid detection enroute to target from enemy radars and airborne interception. Hence, flying low and using terrain comes handy. The fast speed enroute also helps in largely avoiding enemy anti aircraft fire (ack-ack/ flak) or MANPADS etc. The idea is to finally reach the target with surprise and minimum reaction time to enemy AD at target. At target, the speed of the attacker will always be slow irrespective of the type of mission profile or aircraft and in most cases the aircraft will also be low. Jaguars over target are therefore not necessarily disadvantaged to any greater degree over target when compared to other aircraft.

I will defer to Abhibhushan Sir or any person with better understanding of fighter combat but the above is my understanding.

Can LCA do the same as Jags in lo-lo profile within its combat radius? Partly Yes. But as someone elsewhere pointed out to me today, lo -lo sustained operations causes greater fatigue on both machine and man. I understand that the Jaguar was specifically engineered (strengthened) for greater stresses of lo-lo missions.

Akshay Kapoor · Post by **Akshay Kapoor** » 20 Dec 2017 21:57

viewtopic.php?f=3&t=7616&start=40#p2237676

Cross posting from tactics thread where the op was discussed and certain very interesting things pointed out. Deejay has made some very interesting observations. Do read all the posts re the operation in the thread and see the video as well. Very informative.

chola · Post by **chola** » 20 Dec 2017 22:06

deejay wrote:
chola wrote:I want to discuss how we divide up the air assets in Bharat compare to other nations and whether it affects the efficiency of our armed forces, especially the Army.

The IA Aviation Corps fly around just 150 helos versus over 400 for the Air Force. The Army has no fixed wings.

We’re rather like the Russian military which has the Air Force controlling all of the 1200 helos while the Army have nothing but UAVs.

The US Army OTOH flies around 3000 helicopters and 150 fixed wings, up to the size of the C-27. The USAF flies only around 150 helos for light utily and communication roles.

PLA ground forces have 1000 helicopters and they also have fixed wings with An-34 sized Y-7 and the larger Y-8 and Y-9. The PLAAF have only 100 helos.
http://www.china.org.cn/china/2017-12/2 ... 113178.htm

So does having the Air Force control the vast majority of rotorcraft like the Russians weaken the Army and limits its options especially regarding airborne tactics? Or is the American way of allowing the Army a massive helo wing weakening the Air Force by confusing jurisdiction?

IMHO the split between rotor and fixed wing for Army and Air Force respectively is a natural division that gives the Army flexibility but not impinges on the Air Force’s mission. What got me investigating this is the IAF’s insistence on the Apache which is an US Army mainstay.
There is a simple solution. We can start calling the Air Force as Indian Army. (Sorry could not resist)

Ha ha. But seriously can the IAF truly understand the jawans on the ground? The Apache was developed as a tool for the US Army with a mission that is first and foremost support of the grunts slugging away on ground.

This has always been an issue in the US with the Army holding very hard and fast to aviation assets like copters and light aircraft for artillery forward control. There can’t help but be cultural divergence between Air Force who fight from 10000 feet up and those fighting at ground level. That is not even going into chain of command issues that can arise in the battle field with ground forces depending on air support from a sister service.

With the US Marines this issue is out in the open where the USMC not only fly helos but also fixed wing, including frontline fighters with stated mission that they are for its foot soldiers. They say that every Marine including the pilots of F-18s operating from carriers is a Marine grunt first and foremost. If a Marine airman feels this way then his mission is much clearer to him. And his commanders are also more likely to send him and his expensive aircraft into the “mud” to support his fellow grunts.