Indian Nuclear Submarines -3

[Singha]

you have been ranting on the issue for quite some posts now, everyone has heard your pov. not everyone is in agreement. that also is known.

I dont think people will get anywhere by attempting to convince others here. just present your pov and move on, there is no prize for harvesting souls here

[Philip]

Vivek,after WW2,all the allies stole sub secrets and subs in toto from Germany.Germany was producing over 36 subs at the end of the war! Read sub history. There are enough books,sources available. Though the allies had their own sub designs,they borrowed heavily from the Germans in particular. Each country then developed subs to suit their own needs,but this took decades during the Cold War.In addition there were several sub design bureaus in the USSR .Vast sums of money was spent on sub tech esp. when N-subs arrived in full thanks to Adm.Rickover and the Nautilus.

India and the IN does not have the vast sums of money required to leapfrog decades of sub R&D as the major navies have done. We also did not put down enough investment in sub manufacturing post the HDW sub constructioin at MDL,where we built just two, and thanks to "Weepy Singh" and later the Cong. govts.squandered the tech acquired and sold the infrastructure and machinery for scrap. The jingoism that we can design and build almost anything at home needs a stiff dose of reality if an audit is made of the various programmes under the DRDO. The various programmes and their delays and cost overruns is in the public domain.The new dispensation has made it v.clear that accountability has to go along with leadership of DRDO clusters and a monthly report directly to the PMO has been demanded.

Yes,we do not want to be forever indebted to others ,but even in the West,close allies and friends lean upon each other.Britain's SSBN deterrent is Trident,from the US.Several Europeans combined to produce the EF,Typhoon,missiles,etc. Seeking partners in JVs,as we're doing with Russia,Israel,etc., helps cut down development time,avoids "reinventing the wheel",and if you take BMos as a prime example,gives the 3 services a global lead in a critical weapon system. There's no need to rant and rave at a friend who has been loyal for decades and helped us kick Pak's backside in '71 and warned off the US from its plans to militarily intervene in that conflict.

Today our ATV programme has matured to the extent that we are building a series of SSBNs and we all know who has helped us. The next step is building a series of SSN/SSGNs at home where we will similarly need some help. The goal is what should be kept in mind, commissioning the subs on time and within budget to equip the IN which needs to counter around 80 PLAN subs plus a dozen or so Paki ones.Tech demonstrators do not a war win.Numbers ,quality and excellent training and manpower do.

[pushkar.bhat]

Thanks Singha and Phillips for bringing some sanity to this thread.

Comment self deleted.

[Singha]

once the americans put radar onto the PBY catalina flying boats (high loiter time) and maybe even the B24 liberator, they could pickup the snorkels of U-boats from upto 20km away iirc. they became very vulnerable. secondly convoy tactics also changed to make it harder and better escort screens were arranged.

towards the end they were experimenting with "AIP" (walther closed cycle?) but not in numbers as their docks and factories were being bombed. someone must have conveniently stolen that tech in the end.

the only consistently successful sub campaign in ww2 was the american one in pacific. they built big sub classes called gato and balao for long transits from hawaii and generally had a easy time as inexplicably the IJN totally ignored ASW assets .... so they were able to bag a lot of supply ships for the japanese held islands upto new guinea. one wolfpack of such subs even entered the sea of japan from the south, caused mayhem for a couple weeks and escaped from the north...despite strong patrols.

so in popular imagination the Uboats have a big place,but the american sub campaign only enthusiasts know of.
http://histclo.com/essay/war/ww2/sea/pac/sub/sc-us.html

American submariners often do not get the appreciation due. As Admiral Nimitz explained, it was the submarine force that held the line while America rebuilt its fleet. American submarines, however, were hampered by poor strategic and tactical concepts and ineffective torpedoes in 1942. The American submarines by 1943, however, began to significantly affect the delivery of raw materials to Japan. The American submarines targeted the Japanese merchant marine (maru) fleet. While the big fleet carriers got the headlines. The American submarines sunk over 50 percent of all Jpanee vessels destroyed during the War. The Japanese merchant marine was almost completely destroyed, cutting the country's war industries off from supplies and bringing the country close to starvation by 1945. The American submarines did to Japan what the German u-boats tried to do to Britain. Surprisingly the Japanese submarine fleet had little impact on the Pacific campaign. Unlike the Americans, the Japanese began the War with the effective Type 93 Long-Lance Torpedo. The Japanese Navy never used their submarines to interdict American supply vessels. Rather they were used to target fighting ships with only limited success because of their tactical deployment. The Japanese used theor submarines as scouts and to targer warships. As the American offensive moved toward the Home Islands, the Japanese used their submarines to supply bypassed island garisons, some of which were near starvation. They were also used to supply bypassed islasnd bases where garrisons were close to starvation. They also managed to get some secret German military technology to Japan late in the war (1944).

American submarine commanders, once the topedo problem was fixed, proved to be very effective. While they get little publicity compared to the German U-boat commanders, they efficiently conducted the only major successful submarine campaign in history. Perhaps the most famed American commander was Dudley 'Mush' Morton who commanded the fabeled Wahoo. He relentlessly sought out the Japanese and helped forge the way the Pacific Fleet subnmarine force waged the campaign. He was the first U.S. submariner to single-handely destroy an entire Japanese convoy. [Keith] We know very little at this time about Japanese commanders. They from the beginning of the War had an effective torpedo. They did not have the advantage of code breaking and radar that Americam commanders had. And the failure to wage an effective commerce war was in part due to decesions made by the Japanese High-Command as well as American ASW operations.

Submarines could strike without surfacing with torpedoes. Once the initial problems with American torpedoes were corrected, the submarines rapidly destroyed the Maru fleet. Torpedo attackse the safest way of sinking an enemy ship because it could be done without surfacing and exposing the submarine. This of course is why the Germans insisted in pursuing unrestricted submarine warfare in World War I. The American submariners by 1944, significantly reduced the number of large targets justifying a torpedo. And as operations shifted closer to the Home Islands, the targets increasingly became small ships. This required the submariners to surface abnd use the deck guns or even explosive charges. These targets wre sanpans, fushing boats, and other small craft. One author describes the attacks, ":For a submarine crew there was no maneuver more exhilerating, or more fear-inducing, than a surface gun action. Relying on surprise and speed, the submarine could suddenly punch through to the surface, while half-drenched sailors scrambled through the hatches to reach their guns and amunition lockers. A crack team aimed to get off the first shots within 20 seconds of surfacing. Men who were usually kept cramped beneath the sea were at last unleashed to encounter the enemy face tio face."


---
the brits and russians and italians had a few subs...but no game changing plays there.

[Philip]

Singha,very true.US sub achievements in the Pacific played a vital role in defeating the IJN,the game despite Midway,the key battle and carrier aircraft.The carrier came into its own in the Pacific,right from the attack on Pearl,Midway,etc.,but subs tilted the balance.
When Japan sent its two task forces to counter the US landings in the Phillipines at Leyte Gulf,two US subs,Darter and Dace sank Adm.Kurita's flagship the Atago and other warships in the Palawan Passage which had a major influence on the out come of the battle.

[Karan M]

you know amongst all the SIZE 150 screaming , I could not find any actual evidence to prove the original claims.

You start with a personal attack, that I will respond later once I’ve posted completely. Rest assured, and as readers can themselves decide, most posts of mine are well substantiated with logic and facts.

What personal attack, where dear sir? Folks have repeatedly disagreed with your claims, using facts & logic, and if need be we retain the right to do so. Indeed, let the readers decide, as to who is using personal vitriol to mask the lack of hard facts.

I’m responding to your multiple posts in a single post, and structuring them contextually for the sake of clarity.

I didn't see any clarity in the below post. Only size 150 yelling which I edited.

Yes, golly gawsh! The purpose of ATV project was to use any means – buy, beg, borrow, steal, develop – to build a nuclear submarine that is essential for assured second strike given our no first use commitment. Hence the Material Department was established, which is one of India’s best sourcing organizations. And it very successfully managed sourcing.

Where is the proof that it managed sourcing in the manner in which you describe. Your claims that success was achieved via "any means - beg, borrow, steal" etc are contrary to all known facts regarding India's existing weapons programs. As matter of fact, they have repeatedly been delayed by the need to develop every other component inhouse or by sanctions.

In short, your claims are contradicted by how far we are behind indigenization on our other programs such as the Scorpene. Yet to see any of your evidence regarding our Kilos or HDWs either.

No Karan, you are wrong here. Despite Pokhran, there were no sub systems denial from Germany for Type 209/1500 submarines. We did a Thomson CSF Eldone sonar upgrade on Type 209/1500 in early 2000s. Despite Pokhran, There were no sub systems denial for Project 877 submarines. If you read Admiral Hiranandani’s 5th book, which is the Official History of the Indian Navy, it was in the same timeframe 1999-2000 that Russia agree to integrate Klub Land Attack Missile to Indian Type 877 submarines. Those were the first time Russia integrated cruise missiles to conventional submarines.

Above statements are apples to oranges because I clearly mentioned that Arihant is a strategic program and hence its even harder compared to other programs like the HDW. I note you snipped that part of my post. Why?

As matter of fact, India exploded nuclear bombs during the NDA. It came under further sanctions, which would affect our strategic programs in particular. The Tejas despite being a conventional system suffered. BTW, so did the Arjun. We had to seek French assistance to supplant the US sourced TI in the original Dutch system. India even had issues with Kaveri since Belgian firms part of Safran refused to supply systems to India.

So in short, there is no hard and fast rule to state that all supplier nations would behave the same or that even the aforesaid conventional system suppliers to existing programs would cooperate on the ATV to the level we required.

There was absolutely no need to ATV project to make things on their own when subsystems were available through sourcing.So ATV Project never had to jump through hoops.

No evidence to support these statements. And there are ample grounds to be skeptical of the claims that an Indian ballistic missile submarine will have subsystems available easily through sourcing.

BTW, are you aware that these "subsystems" will have to be purpose designed for the specific submarine in question? So India will share these details with the west & they in turn will cooperate.

I am afraid your pronouncements are not substantial. I'll wait for someone associated with the program to speak out, for its equally a fact based on my own interactions that this is where the Russians came through.

You are free to disagree and retain your opinion.

How does a nuclear submarine differ from a conventional submarine? Hull design, Reactor, Heat Exchanger, Turbines, Gears. Let’s call it powerplant. If it carries ballistic missiles, then missiles, launch systems and communication systems for targeting. Rest of the systems are exactly same as DE submarines

Errrr... So are these systems available OTS for any submarine? So just because a conventional military aircraft is the same as a commercial aircraft - hey it has wings, FBW, actuators, ailerons, etc, the technology for the former won't come under further restrictions? Or the technology and subsystems for one can be happily ported onto the other?

Guys, lets take a CFM56 and put it in the LCA, everything will work.

But it won't.

There is a huge degree of customization and system to system optimization required which is why a handful of OEMs exist in the world able to take your needs and make a design out of it. Never mind laws like ITAR et al.

And add to this the clear evidence its being done for a strategic program & the issues ramp up many times over

As explained earlier, all the rest of the subsystems systems were available.

Not explained at all. Please provide specifics. Not generalities which are based on a completely flawed premise (available off the shelf, without custom design for a strategic program).

In 1998/99 a decision was taken to use the rest of the sub-systems as in Type 877 instead of Type 671. Reason being Type 877 was newer and more in number than Type 671, and in widespread service, so supplier chain was well established.
Example being the torpedo system of INS Arihant, which is the same as Type 877 Sindhu class. Also the USHUS sonar was chosen, which was developed to fit the Type 877 Sindhu class. Using existing & proven design features cuts down on project risk.

Again, zero evidence provided.

As regards the rest of the statements, obviously NPOL/DRDO would use an USHUS sonar derivative on the Arihant. Straightforward deduction & I already stated the very same Russian firm which worked on the Kilos was tapped by India to work on the Arihant. In short, there is nothing new in your statements and if anything, they support my point that Russian firms provided critical ancillary support which is where we are weakest.

So to conclude, ATV Project had all “internals” subsystems available for sourcing and did not have to jump through hoops like you are.

I am afraid you are stating your own opinions as fact.

As regards internals, with the amount of data available, am I supposed to waste my time telling you about all the parts that go into a submarine, which you clearly know about but are just trying to engage in rhetoric?

No, you’re making a [b]very poor attempt to wriggle out when I asked you to specify which internals other than hull & powerplant held up ATV project from 1976 to 1999 by giving a pathetic lame excuse of wasting time. As explained very simply and clearly above, all other sub systems were available from Russia. You refer to some mysterious exotic subsystem that delayed the program from 1976-2009 but are unable to specify which subsystem[/b]

I think people here can judge exactly how quickly you resort to personal attacks when you are asked to provide data.

Using your own words, that's rather equivalent to one making "pathetic lame excuses" and "wriggling out" in lieu of a fact based civil discussion.

Lets recap. I have shown the exact systems that go into Naval ships including the Navy's perspective plan.
I have also shown the Navy at present cannot even locally source many of the high tech systems for its conventional platforms.
I have shown the percentages by the Navy's own statements.
I have provided evidence of Russian firms advertising the same assemblies for the Arihant.

In contrast, all you have done, dear sir is note: "I TSarkar, claim that everything on the Arihant was like this, like that, and hence forth and so forth, and if you disagree with me, I will engage in vitriolic abuse, lame this, lame that, and scream in extra large fonts.

That does not constitute evidence.

The project was dead in 1998 because we had issues with the powerplant & hull.

Which you claim and provide zero evidence for.

Karan, you are attempting to confuse readers by stating that ATV project faced the same challenges as Scorpene project.

No dear sir, here i am pointing out to discerning readers that your statements about making/sourcing parts for strategic submarines are so easy, fail the logic test of not being able to do the same for even something like the Scorpene.

Above, you were stating that making a conventional submarine is the same as Boomer, but now since it can't hold up (no details)... we have the poorly drafted argument statement.

No, MDL is not trying to locate other manufacturers, because the Scorpene design is proprietary to DCN and Navantia. There are no other manufacturers

Ah, so in other words, you admit that India's contribution to the Scorpene is poor.. but wait, why is that??

And we didn’t get ToT for Scorpene subsystems because of a poorly drafted contract.

Ok so, the contract was poorly drafted. And pray, why does India need TOT if its so good at ancillary systems via the Arihant program??

It couldn't be, possibly, that this is an area of industrial weakness & the contract merely acknowledges the reality. That when it comes to submarines we are behind.

So, what about the Kilo then. Please show us the indigenization % for the Kilo?

In the original contract, to show fake Indigenization, certain subsystems were allocated to be procured by MDL. These systems were called Mazgaon Procured Materials (MPL). There was no ToT asked in the contract. MPL procurement was delayed by MDL, and DCN & Navantia jacked up prices. In the world of business, something available at a point of time when rupee was 45 to a dollar is not available at a later point of time when rupee is 66 to a dollar.
MPL was just white labelled parts. There was a vague hope that ToT will be done for MPL but nothing specific in the contract.

Which we do know given the multiple reports on the subject. The part in bold exactly points to how weak India is in submarine ancillaries let alone "sourcing" and how complex these things can get. That we need TOT, to make these parts for a conventional system, let alone a strategic one which then comes under all sorts of Govt to Govt pressure & needs diplomatic work to assist.

In short, I am glad you finally acknowledge how complex it is to build a submarine as versus dismissing anyone's points to the effect with abuse.

Karan, the Scorpene challenges were artificially created by vested interests. ATV project faced no such challenges.

I see, so artificial challenges can affect everything from batteries for our Kilo class subs, to ammunition for our strike corps, to every program. But somehow the ATV program was immune and could import off the shelf systems for a custom build strategic program.

As I said, I disagree with your claims.

ATV project had no ToT requirements for internal sub-systems for which good sourcing arrangements were in place. So please do not attempt to confuse by stating ATV project faced same challenges as Scorpene

Actually, the only one confusing folks and attempting to do so would be you, dear sir. Because everyone should know the amount of technological effort it takes to purpose design systems for any program whether it be a Naval ship or a fighter aircraft.

To claim that "internal sub-systems were available via good sourcing arrangements" without ANY evidence bar your own words - just to win the argument, sorry - not enough.

As a matter of fact, all the available evidence shows that post 1998, the Indian Govt worked with the Russians on a Govt to Govt deal to get their manufacturers involved in the program and provide custom designed subsystems above and beyond what local industry could/agreed to do (given limited volume requirements).

All this stuff is not available off the shelf from some shop one can walk into and order either. Each & every system impacts the other. Each and every component requires detailed design input from the Indian side.

The blog is wrong.

I am glad you agree. If you had noted this to begin with, perhaps you may not have reacted with all the abuse you initially did for my pointing out it was so.

We did not get reactors off the shelf. While BARC could design reactors, it did not have experience in designing reactors suitable for submarine operations. Where the Russians helped is give design inputs to BARC for designing the reactor in a manner that it was suitable for submarine operations, give design inputs for integrating the complete powerplant, and finally design inputs for building a hull around the powerplant and the missiles.

These "design inputs", the term you use above, sound delightfully vague. What were they exactly? Please provide specifics.

From the BARC links posted before.

Russians were consulted about the Indian design. The BARC team made the PWR design for which there was no transfer of technology.

As regards BARC not having the experience, BARC acknowledges that. As it also acknowledges the Russian help to speed things up, but it insists that the reactor design is completely Indian & no transfer of technology took place.

In short, the Russian assistance was about the same kind we engage in with our other programs wherein a technical audit of the overall process is done, so that all the x and y's are taken care of, and we don't waste time on tests and items which we don't need to progress and our core design appears to shape up well.

This is where we failed before 1998 and this is where the Russians helped.

I have to disagree. I maintain, based on available evidence that the project was trundling along with a lot of delay baked in, and the Russian assistance accelerated the program. If you disagree, please provide facts to counter the same and please do so in a civil manner.

Here is the hard reality as versus fanciful claims of this magic, that magic for our non strategic segment http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/new ... 148467.cms
According to a study conducted by Navy, India has achieved an indigenisation of 90 per cent in the float segment. In the move segment, India has achieved 60 per cent of indigenisation and just 30-40 per cent in the fight segment.

This is another attempt by you to confuse readers by implying that lack of indigenization of submarine internal sub-systems help up ATV project.

No, this is another attempt by me to tell readers about the exact state of indigenization in the Indian Navy & not rely on claims that state otherwise, without any factual information to the contrary.

Because ATV Project DID NOT have any indigenization requirements for internal sub-systems that were reliably sourced by the Material Department.

Oh, I see. Perhaps this is why DRDO & NPOL plus L&T/TATA SED go to such great lengths to state their contribution to the program. And the Material Dept was so great at sourcing that it could involve hitherto unknown shipbuilders to custom design components and systems for the ATV, all this in a manner which the rest of the Navy is yet to achieve.

Indian Navy’s indigenization plan is much after INS Arihant was launched in 1999. There was absolutely no bearing of this indigenization plan on ATV project timelines.

I cannot but wonder at the manner in which you make these sort of claims. The Navy's indigenization push has been there for ages now. The latest plan is but a reiteration of that commitment & the most current plan.

Of course, the current status has a bearing on ATV.

Its akin to stating "guys, the fact that India did not make any fighter plane apart from the Marut has no bearing on the LCA. The LCA is handled by ADA. LCA came much after the Marut. It has absolutely no bearing on the LCA".

Whereas in reality anyone can correlate the industrial capability issues between the two topics, the fact that India did not have sufficient capability to draw on for the LCA and draw logical inferences.

And your obvious dismissal of such plain data & logic, is why I don't think your statements are factual. Feel free to disagree in a civil manner.

PS: There are no "peripherals" in something like the Arihant or a submarine. Everything will go together & has to be customized. Any delay on one side will delay everything.

More nonsense logic from you. How much delay did customizing 533 mm TT of Project 877 Sindhu for ATV take? From 1976 to 2009?

I think the only "nonsense logic" is from your side. I do wish though that you could learn to debate in a more civil manner.

A submarine has far more than torpedos, we have already covered that.

How much delay did customizing USHUS sonar of Project 877 for ATV take? From 1999 to 2009? USHUS was available since early 2000s and if not, MGK-400 Rubikon sonar was available in plenty.

And all you have to claim for "indigenization" are the handful of items which Indian industry managed & which are known publicly. BTW, USHUS sonar was developed off of the Panchendriya system. So it wasn't available just like that either.

Facts are that the reactor & hull are Indian. The peripherals not so much (please show us the evidence otherwise since it contradicts all data for even the non strategic segment).

Karan, if YOU hypothesize that mythical peripheral components held up ATV project in 1998, then onus is on YOU to give evidence to support your hypothesis. Not me.

No dear sir, you are the one claiming ONLY the hull & reactor had issues (which, you can't specify) and insist everything else was available easily off the shelf.

I have provided evidence that:

Landbased reactor received fuel late based on raw material from Russia processed by BARC
Subsystems have been sourced from Russia
Our conventional submarines continue to be reliant on imported subsystems which prove that India is "not there yet" for submarine fitments.

In contrast, India has substantial experience with reactor design.

I don't think your statements around "hull & reactor" were an issue, "dead design was resuscitated by Russia" etc are based on facts. As I said, you are free to disagree & maintain your opinion. I will maintain mine!

Its like you saying there are rose gardens in Pluto and asking others to give facts to prove otherwise.

Actually in this case, it was you who went to Pluto insisting on some items which remain to be verified.

That kind of twisted nonsensical logic used by you & a couple of other internet champions here does not work with me or in the real world outside internet forums.

Actually, you are the one using "twisted nonsensical logic" & as regards internet champions, please spare me your claims.

It just speaks volumes that you have to resort to any & every ad hominem attack since you can't prove any of your claims via facts and figures.

You are as naked as the Emperor’s new clothes when it comes to providing evidence as to which peripheral subsystem or component held up ATV development from 1976 to 2009.

And here we go again, with the over the top abuse - thankfully, for the forums sake i edited the silly font sizes.

By those standards, you are the one naked when it comes to providing evidence (fair play, in using your own words for your own statements dear sir, or we can keep this civil), because you can't provide any evidence of India making submarine systems in depth for its Scorpenes or Kilos let alone the ATV and apart from using the fancy term "design input" there are no details in your posts, with clear sourcing, of what BARC did or did not do for the Arihant either.

Sum total of your arguments:

India cannot make systems in depth for any other submarine but its ok lets ignore that because otherwise this argument would sink & because, I. TSarkar, say so. Very compelling, I am sure.

You can't quote your own claims as a source for your own claims.

And I have written how the supply chain for sub-components was freely available, there was no ask for indigenization for those sub-components, and none of those sub-components were something mysterious or exotic as speculated by you.

Actually you have done nothing of the sort.

Heres what you did. "I claim the supply chain for sub-components was freely available"... err.. for a strategic program, ignoring even the level of joint design that goes into a conventional ship & theres evidence that where possible, Indian industry made subsystems (so much for the "no ask for indigenization") but is still way behind that required.

In short, since you can't prove that the subsystems are available in India, now you claim they were never required to begin with.

My view is that with or without Russian assistance BARC had the capability to do what it did , was well on its way

If it was well on its way, why did Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat asked for a technology audit in December 1998?

http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/indi ... 25929.html

Has it struck you that gentlemen like Shri Matheswaran asked for an audit of the entire LCA program in recent years since he felt that the LCA itself was unsuitable as a category?

In short, Mr Bhagwat could have been upset with many things (choice of subsystems, weaponry - limited BM fit as envisaged, this, that). What you have done is build up an entire edifice on merely one throw away line. That's not evidence but conjecture.

By the late 1990s, it had spent over Rs 2,000 crore on its classified ATV programme without results. The failure to produce a submarine had in 1998[/size] piqued then navy chief Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat to call for a technical audit.

Can you explain, Karan, that if ATV “was well on its way”, when why was there no submarine in 1998?[/size]

Again, more SIZE 150 SCREAMING, which in order to carry on a civil conversation, I removed. That aside, Mr Bhagwat had every right to be upset at the pace of progress for instance & the manner in which the program was run.

And Mr Bhagwats frequent run ins with his Govt were also an issue so I would hesitate to take any media interpretation of events as a fact.

Can you explain, Karan, that if ATV “was well on its way”, why was there no construction program in 1998 with not even one steel plate cut in 1998?[/size]

More SIZE 150 SCREAMING, removed for the folks here...

Can you please provide factual evidence that in 1998 there was not even a single steel plate cut?

BTW, has it struck you that the land based reactor went operational many years later & hence the actual submarine reactor was still in development (as versus your claims that the Russian helped with some brand new design).

Your logic of other internal subcomponents being unavailable is wrong & incorrect. The ATV project could easily source other internal subcomponents before 1998.[/size]

Actually sir, only you are your own source for claiming that internal subsystems are easily available & were easily available before 1998. Based on a multitude of reasons, I disagree.

Read here how IN Captain Dr Buddhi Kota Subba Rao was victimized by DAE and his life destroyed because he said DAE reactor wont work. How DAE refusal to admit the reactor worked delayed the program.

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2006/20060228/edit.htm#6

Since the early 1970s, the DAE and the Navy have been involved in a project which would lead to the development of a nuclear reactor suitable for powering submarines.

These, for obvious reasons, have to be much smaller than land-based power plants.This project, named 932, functioned under the DAE with some naval officers thrown in. Progress was slow when, in 1979, the naval officer assigned to the project, one Capt Subba Rao, reported to the Navy that the design being developed by the DAE was flawed and wholly unsuited for the purpose.

Subba Rao was no nuclear scientist and his knowledge of reactors was self acquired and, in the beginning, no one took him seriously. However, his arguments became persuasive and Adm Ronnie Pereira, the Naval Chief, took him to Dr Raja Ramanna, the Scientific Adviser to the Raksha Mantri, and, himself, a former head of the DAE. Dr Ramanna promised to have Subba Rao’s views examined by the DAE but the department made no change in its approach.[/size]
The CNS remained convinced that the objections raised by Captain Rao were valid and, thereafter, took little interest in Project 932.

[size150]The DAE man controlling the project was one Dr Anil Kakodkar. Time was to show that the development of the reactor was, indeed, flawed. It had to be abandoned with great loss of money and time and a new approach had to be adopted.

For his efforts, Subba Rao was arrested by the Mumbai policy when leaving the country with some documents on nuclear reactors earlier published in a foreign magazine. The DAE certified that these documents could be ‘harmful’ to national security. The poor man languished in prison for over a year. [u]He learnt law, argued his own case and was acquitted honourably with severe strictures being passed on the authorities

Today, when we talk of the ATV project and its delays, it is easy to overlook that more than a decade was lost because the DAE, smitten by its we-know-all philosophy, failed, possibly refused, to objectively analyse the deficiencies highlighted to them by somebody outside the establishment.

The inability to shed the ‘I can do it cocoon’ at some time when it becomes clear that capability just does not exist, is the greatest bane and weakness of our scientific community. It has done India proud many times and in different fields, space being a prime example, but has left the country staggering at other times. The DAE falls in this latter category.

More SIZE 150 screaming, removed.

BTW In recent years, the then US Ambassador has admitted that they tapped Mr Subba Rao to leave India with critical documentation for the Russian supplied submarine & it lead to a diplomatic issue.

In short, it was an espionage mission gone awry.

The rest of the claims regarding Anil Kakodkar & reactor designs, less said the better.

Russia’s proven system suppliers were available from 1976-1999 and availability of sub systems providers never held up ATV Project. [/size]It was hull & powerplant issues where Russians gave design assistance. On resolution of those issues from 1999 onwards, did INS Arihant start taking shape

So "Russia's proven system suppliers were available from 1976-1999" but no explanation why hull and reactor assistance was not available.

Not that it could be the program had several issues, which are classified & which were taking far too long, and the Vajpayee Govt decided to give the entire nuke triad a strategic impetus & put in extra resources to get the issue tackled.

Nope.. not that.

’ll respond on Anil Kakodkar and Srikumar Banerjee’s quotes later since I’m out of time for today.

BTW Srikumar Banerjee is a family friend, though we’ve never discuss work. And a coursemate is heading SBC, again, we never discuss work.

In a similar vein, many folks here could bring in all the people they interact with on a non classified manner.

PS: Please get used to folks having opinions which are different than yours & if you seek to convince them, try not to yell and shout. It makes the whole discussion a bit of a farce and portrays your opinions in the worst possible light.

That they are not factual and hence you feel the need to resort to abuse to force them across.

[Karan M]

And some inconvenient facts as versus claims in mass media.

From the notes of Amb. John Dean - Khan Amb. to India at the time.

Oh BTW on the Subba Rao case:
http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/libra ... /India.pdf

In 1987. the Indian Navy had leased a Soviet nuclear submarine. The purpose of the lease was to train the Indian navy in the use of such a technically advanced naval vessel. The reactor unit was sealed and the spent fuel was to be returned to the Soviet Union. Mr. Gandhi had assured President Reagan that "this specific submarine on lease from the Soviet Union would not be used in any manner in the event of any hostilities." Prime Minister Gandhi had assured President Reagan in writing that there was "no ground for any apprehension".

Naturally, our navy wanted to know more about the submarine leased from the Soviet Union to India, and this led to a covert operation to obtain detailed plans and drawings of this vessel. The incident occurred when an Indian Navy Captain was arrested at Bombay International Airport before boarding a flight for the United States in possession of detailed technical data on the Soviet nuclear submarine. Apparently, Indian Intelligence had tracked the Indian naval officer - or was he a double agent - and, in any case, I was asked to meet with the Prime Minister who confronted me with the facts. I did my best to smooth ruffled feathers, and fortunately Mr. Gandhi was sufficiently experienced in international relations to know that information on the Soviet vessel was a legitimate target for our Intelligence agencies. I urged that the apprehension of the Indian officer before leaving India with the drawings should not adversely impact on over-all U.S.-Indian relations. At the same time, I protected vis-a-vis Washington the American official who had been in charge of this case at the Embassy. He left the post quite rapidly, but has enjoyed an interesting career after his service in India.

[Karan M]

@ Admin - Karan increased the font size of what he selectively wanted to highlight. I just followed his precedent.

In addition, Karan has a habit of insulting & deriding others posters, Admirals & institutions, when facts provided went against his pet personal speculations. Examples of this are underlined below -

So subsystems are somehow going to be magically available because, wait for it, Admiral Ranked Officers (oh golly gawsh!) are available to head 3 centers and "globally source" or "indigenously build" all components required for a submarine. A nuclear submarine, when we have international pressure on India to not even launch ballistic missiles and have to jump through hoops to make things on our own.

He has no logic or facts to prove his pet speculations, so he goes on deriding the personnel & institution.

What a complete and total fabrication & an attempt to defend the indefensible (over the top yelling at size 150 in a personal response as versus quoting news articles), never mind the liberal use of epithets/pointlessly vituperative terms.

You made the claim "Admiral Ranked Officers" were deputed to the ATV program so everything would be sorted out.

By those very same standards, Admiral Ranked Officers were deputed to many organizations and guess what, India STILL IMPORTS many key subsystems. Admiral Ranked Officers run shipyards. Yet problems remain with productivity, delayed deliveries, missed timelines.

Senior officers from the SFC attend to Agni & provide inputs. Yet missile development takes time.

But somehow, magically, the ATV is exempt, merely because some senior folks are deputed, when that same strategy can only do so much & the ATV program requires in depth custom design & not just "sourcing".

In short, you made a completely illogical equivalence between Admiral Ranked Officers being deputed = technology sourcing & availability which I countered.

In response, you screamed & attempted to parlay the above into some attack on the institution. What a try!! Anything and everything to win the argument. No method too low, no antic beyond the pale.

You dear sir have your own "personal speculations" about reactors, hulls, this that and what not. You are welcome to your opinions but equally other folks here can hold their own ones as well.

When asked for facts, you have quoted "Praveen Swamy" as a source (who inspires skepticism with "Grandmother crossed the LOC " and similar stories) & responded with abuse.

That doesn't evidence make.

[Karan M]

tsarkar, if Russian help was available, then why did the ATV come on line after more than 30 years? And if the tech is Russian and India has already used it in the Chakra-I and the Akula, then why is it taking so long for trials to be completed? If this was Russian know how and they are already operating several types, then why isn't the Arihant in service already?

Fair questions. Here is my answer - the ATV program & in fact our entire nuclear weapons program or even strategic triad was not adequately supported or focused on before the actual Pokhran tests & the overt declaration of intent.

There were multiple walls separating the most trivial of things & the ATV program was mismanaged.

Once the GOI took a closer look, they decided to accelerate the program & BARC & private/public industry resourcing was stepped up by a quantum (how can one know this? Ask anyone working in the sector during the period how many RFI/RFP and actions took place. It was an open secret where these orders & resources were being directed, and not classified).

This also meant Russian assistance for all items throughout the design & development process, not just "hull & reactor" which were areas where at least Indian industry had some experience & existing programs could be accelerated, but many Russian subsystem and other designers were roped in to contribute systems.

Why Russia? Because post western sanctions, Russia was the the only country with the across the board experience India needed & which would supply systems & customize in depth.

This is why the Russian ambassador said on the lines of "we have helped you with a ship with Akula technology" etc. Many of the systems providers for the Arihant were involved in its Russian peers.

However, the assistance had certain conditions, it was not outright TOT or transfer of design technology. This is the reason BARC is so proud of its PWR since its a completely local design with Russians for oversight & consultancy. India obviously would not share everything with them either. In the same manner while the origin of the LCA FBW was a JV with BAe/Martin Marietta's flight controls division, post sanctions it became completely a NAL CLAW and ADE baby. On the other hand, the Russians helped with fuel which BARC processed for its land based reactor.

If they hadn't, the program would have to depend entirely on the Rare Materials Plant & associated ones, we would have got there but more delays.

On the cons side, India does not have a ready "huge ready reactor" from Russia's boomers which it can deploy everywhere. On the plus side, it has something far more valuable, a design team at BARC with their own reactor. L&T with the fabrication tech.

What it is yet to (or is developing) are the myriad other systems that go into a submarine. We will get there.

[Karan M]

true - its a long way from having a gearset, chain and wheels in hand to knowing how to cobble it all together flawlessly into a quality road bike.

There you go. And in our case, the facts show that even the gears & transmissions for many of our frontline, non strategic warships are actually licensed designs from abroad. Let alone submarines. Here, there are only 4 countries with the in depth across the board experience for nuclear subs - US, France, Russia, China. Last, UK depends a lot on the US and multinational sourcing (eg Thales for sonars) given its a NATO Munna and in P-5. And China's subs are not at the same level as those of the others. In fact, the most critical parts of the Arihant which are truly Indian are its reactor & hull. Many other systems not so much. The usual method for indigenization will be to indigenize spares and consumables, but many critical items will come from the "partner", which in part is the reason why we are always offering boondoggles like the MTA and what not.

[Karan M]

Requoting.

http://www.frontline.in/the-nation/critical-feat/article5038061.ece

Multidisciplinary effort

Building Arihant’s reactor was essentially a multidisciplinary effort that involved fuel development, thermal and mechanical engineering to manufacture the reactor pressure vessel, steam generators and high pressure components, control rod mechanism, control and instrumentation, electromechanical systems, drive mechanisms, and so on. “It is a marriage of all these systems to make the reactor work efficiently,” Banerjee said in August 2009. “It is not desktop research at all,” he emphasised.

BARC’s engineers and scientists were involved in all this, from engineering the concept to the final product development. For everything had to be developed from scratch and there was absolutely no technology available to India on the PWR.

While V.K. Mehra gave leadership to the reactor development programme and H.S. Kamat was in charge of fuel development, B.K. Bera, A.K. Suri and R.P. Singh played important roles on the fuel side. The contribution of G.P. Srivastava, M. Mahapatra and R.K. Patil was formidable in control and instrumentation. R.S. Yadav dealt with the design and manufacture of one of the most important components, the reactor pressure vessel. C.G. Utge was responsible for the development of high-pressure, high-temperature equipment.

Why was PWR, not Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor (PHWR) technology which India had mastered and used to build several commercial reactors, chosen to propel the submarine? PWRs use enriched uranium as fuel and light water as coolant and moderator. In contrast, PHWRs use natural uranium as fuel and heavy water as both coolant and moderator. “PHWR is not something which you can make into a compact form,” said Banerjee, who later became AEC Chairman. Besides, nuclear energy generation depends on the quantity of fissile material available in the reactor and the PWR lent itself admirably for this with a high availability of fissile material (uranium-235) in enriched uranium. While plutonium also can be used as fuel, enriched uranium-driven fuel is generally adopted for reactors that propel submarines.

The question now arose whether India had the capability to enrich uranium. (If the non-fissile U-238 is removed from natural uranium, then the U-235 concentration will go up. This is called enrichment of uranium. This is done by a series of chemical and physical processes. If one uses enriched uranium as fuel, the availability of neutrons is high enough to generate electricity and one can use light water as coolant and moderator.)

So a small plant was set up at Ratnahalli near Mysore in 1990 for enriching uranium, and work on designing the enriched uranium fuel for the submarine’s nuclear power pack also began. BARC made a technological breakthrough in developing all the centrifuges needed for enriching uranium without any external help. The centrifuges were needed to separate U-238 from U-235 so that the concentration of U-235 went up, but the separation technology itself was very complex. To sustain the centrifugal forces, centrifuges were to have a high strength-to-weight ratio. Yet, they had to be thin. So maraging steel was used in the manufacture of centrifuges.

The next step was to process the enriched uranium into fuel. Banerjee said: “This is also crucial because unlike in the case of fuel for the land-based reactor, here the fuel had to be monolithic. This required special fabrication techniques that allow you to make the fuel withstand the rolling, pitching and other movements of the submarine…. In Trombay, we developed the right kind of fuel.”

Reactor development

The reactor development itself was a big and tough task. At the heart of the reactor is its pressure vessel, which houses the fuel. Developing the pressure vessel entailed the use of a special technology and a special steel. The material had to have high fracture toughness and the toughness had to be retained even if the steel got exposed to radiation. So a special type of steel was developed to withstand the radiation environment.

The design of the vessel was another major challenge. The issue of the reactor’s compactness came in. The entire PWR had to fit into the cramped space of the submarine’s hull. Steam generators, tall structures consisting of a maze of pipes, posed another big problem. They produced steam to drive the turbine which generated electricity. So the steam generator and the pressure vessel were designed in such a way that every small space in the hull was made use of. This was a very important mechanical engineering design, which BARC engineers, after many trials and efforts, evolved.

Development of hundreds of subsystems and high-pressure valves and pumps posed various challenges, which were met by BARC engineers. Indian industry rose to the occasion by manufacturing them. The entire reactor structure had to be designed in such a way that it is stable when the submarine accelerates. What had to be taken into account here was that the reactor was housed in a submarine that sped under water. The thrust generated by the submarine’s propulsion required a design for the reactor that was different from that of a nuclear power reactor on terra firma.

“In designing the propulsion of the submarine, we had to take into account the various sea conditions, including rough sea, the submarine’s pitching and rolling, the effect of saline water, enemy action which includes underwater explosions/depth charges and internal conditions,” explained Basu. “Yet another factor is that the propulsion plant had to be compact and so weight and volume had to be minimised. Thirdly, the plant had to be very reliable. It is moving under water, hundreds of kilometres away from the shore. In case of an accident, no help will be available from outside. So back-up safety systems should function perfectly.”

So, the design of the safety system was crucial. BARC went for passive safety systems, which would not need an external source of electricity, to come into action. The passive thermo-siphoning system will come into play in abnormal conditions. Since a submarine’s reactor has no exclusion zone, unlike its counterpart on land where no human settlement is allowed a few kilometres around it, gamma shielding, and partly neutron shielding, by water was done.


In land-based reactors, control rods fall by gravity and bring the reactors to a halt in case of an accident. But the rolling and pitching of the boat demands that the control-rod mechanism is designed suitably to take care of the submarine’s various movements. “Since power has to be generated in a regulated manner, it puts a lot of restrictions on the design of the control mechanisms. Diverse techniques were used to design them. We had to take into consideration the possibility of the boat going upside down. So special sensors and drives were made for ensuring a safe and reliable operation of the control-rod mechanisms,” said Srivastava in August 2009. Indeed, 13 control mechanisms were accommodated within a diameter of 0.8 metre.

[BARC also built a simulator at Visakhapatnam to train navy personnel in operating the reactor. When the Russians were shown this simulator, they were amazed at its sophistication.

In the Arihant project, which went under the name of ATV programme, DRDO laboratories contributed sonars, sensors, sound absorption materials, communication equipment, electronics and weapons. While the Naval Physical and Oceanographic Laboratory (NPOL), Kochi, contributed sensors to Arihant, special acoustics were done by the Naval Science and Technology Laboratory (NSTL), Visakhapatnam.[/b]

In the end, as Banerjee emphasised, it boiled down to teamwork in a multidisciplinary project and he called the platform “a very complex combination of various technologies”. As Kakodkar said, “This PWR technology is very complex. You have to make it extremely compact and pack it in the cramped space of the submarine’s hull. It was a big challenge.”

Today, India can assert that it has mastered the technology of developing and manufacturing nuclear propulsion for driving submarines. The proof of it lies in three more nuclear-powered submarines being built at Visakhapatnam. When the four submarines, including Arihant, patrol the seas, India will have achieved the status of a blue-water navy.

[/quote]

In short, the entire reactor and ancillaries were a BARC design. Note the reference to multiple design efforts for the steam generator and pressure vessel. All the myriad components Indian industry made, including control systems. Not some easy TOT or design input from Russia which paved the way for success.
At best, the consultancy we avail in our programs speeds things up, but the heavy lifting has to be done by us. This also maintains compliance with all sorts of international laws and regulations which we follow to the T perforce as our partners hold us to them.

[Indranil]

The personal attacks and finger pointing is a blotch on this otherwise wonderful and illuminating discussion. Let the points flow!

[Viv S]

I dont think there is any "shame" in admitting we took lot of Rus help on this one. the key thing now is do we pair up this reactor or design/license a bigger more efficient design for the SSBN family and whether a new powerful design is needed for the dedicated SSNs which will need 35 knot speed . how quickly we solve these questions will decide timeline of our global power ambitions (and alongwith funding 12 blackjacks when production resumes)

^+1

I don't think there's any dispute about the fact that we received design consultancy from the Russians on the ATV project. Shouldn't be any shame either. After all, we received it from Krauss Maffei on the Arjun, Dassault & LM on the Tejas, EADS on the N-Tejas, Fincantieri on the IAC, MBB & Avio on the Dhruv, SPKB on the Delhi-class and so on. All perfectly kosher.

However, when one interprets that, as Philip did, to mean that Arihant is powered by a Russian reactor (with the suggestion that we ought to buy more Russian SSNs to retain logistical compatibility), it's bound to rile folks up.

[Karthik S]

(and alongwith funding 12 blackjacks when production resumes)

Is there a proposal to buy these?

[Viv S]

There you go. And in our case, the facts show that even the gears & transmissions for many of our frontline, non strategic warships are actually licensed designs from abroad. Let alone submarines. Here, there are only 4 countries with the in depth across the board experience for nuclear subs - US, France, Russia, China. Last, UK depends a lot on the US and multinational sourcing (eg Thales for sonars) given its a NATO Munna and in P-5.

Nope. Sonars and ancillary equipment marketed by TUS Ltd have been developed and manufactured in the UK. The company is owned by Thales Group but the technology belongs to the UK govt. When the French were considering integrating the Brimstone on the Rafale, they had to approach the UK MoD despite the weapon being a Thales product. Similarly, while BAE Systems Inc. (USA) is a subsidiary of BAE Systems plc (UK) its technology is tightly regulated by the US DoD and it is for all means and purposes an American company.

[krishna_krishna]

(and alongwith funding 12 blackjacks when production resumes)

Is there a proposal to buy these?

I am not sure about 160 although I remember deal was for two tu22m3 for IN and if paanwala are to be believed, they are currently in use by IN for strategic purposes to make sure no cbg can think of threatening desh like massa and frenchies did during parakaram.

[Singha]

2 tu22m3 does not make any sense at all. 12 would be a reasonably sized bomber squadron. ideally we need some 30 bombers - 24 on active duty with 50% availability rate, 2 for training, 4 in reserve.

a backfire can deliver a whole lot more of brahmos/zircon than a su30 labouring with a single item on the centerline - farther and more.

[krishna_krishna]

^^^ Agree but I am not sure about the numbers , there are atleast two Backfires according to paanwala. Take it for what it is worth. Also per him 160's were asked at first but they won't share that with anyone hence desh settled for what was available although they were upgraded. Regarding 24 hour patrol even to fire a rpg MMS clown won't given permission, do you think something like this would even fly. They were bought aftermath of parakram during ABV days.

[Cain Marko]

just present your pov and move on, there is no prize for harvesting souls here

OT, but amidst all the heavy posting, this piece made me truly lol...ridiculously phunny saar

[Viv S]

^^^ Agree but I am not sure about the numbers , there are atleast two Backfires according to paanwala. Take it for what it is worth. Also per him 160's were asked at first but they won't share that with anyone hence desh settled for what was available although they were upgraded. Regarding 24 hour patrol even to fire a rpg MMS clown won't given permission, do you think something like this would even fly. They were bought aftermath of parakram during ABV days.

Your paanwala is wrong. The T-22M is too large and too loud for it to operate out of any Indian base without anybody noticing it for a decade.

[Karthik S]

The Foxbats did.

[Karan M]

^^^ Agree but I am not sure about the numbers , there are atleast two Backfires according to paanwala. Take it for what it is worth. Also per him 160's were asked at first but they won't share that with anyone hence desh settled for what was available although they were upgraded. Regarding 24 hour patrol even to fire a rpg MMS clown won't given permission, do you think something like this would even fly. They were bought aftermath of parakram during ABV days.

Sir, whoever said this is very badly mistaken. Two backfires won't do anything for any sort of deterrence and their combat capability will be zilch as versus (say) larger numbers of even airliner derivatives with AShMs.

[Viv S]

a backfire can deliver a whole lot more of brahmos/zircon than a su30 labouring with a single item on the centerline - farther and more.

Just two more, making it a total of three BrahMos missiles for every Tu-22M (the BrahMos is too large for the internal bay). The BrahMos-M could possibly be accommodated in the internal bay for a grand total of 10 missiles (6 internal + 4 external), but then again you could equip the Su-30MKI with five of them. Also factor in the Su-30s likely superior serviceability/availability, so in practice you'd wouldn't even need twice as many Su-30s to deliver the same missile load.

The range argument only applies to a PLAN fleet operating well south (or west) of Diego Garcia. Any range where it can be a threat to us, is a range where we can credibly threaten it (even without a dedicated bomber).

All the same, if we were able to track the distant enemy taskforce and opted to hit it at that range, it would still be a one-off mission that could be performed by Su-30s with tanker support. Which unlike the Tu-22M would be able to self escort. Or the job could be done by carrier-based fighters if we dispatch a CBG to hunt it. Ideally, of course we'd have taken the PLAN force down when it transitioned the Malacca/Sunda strait itself.

On the northern borders (i.e IB/LAC) its a completely waste of space being exceptionally vulnerable to dense PLAAF air and ground based defences. And would achieve nothing that a barrage of LACMs fired from TELs couldn't.

Bottom-line, if force projection is a concern/priority we really need to be looking at getting more refuelers ASAP rather than chasing after big bombers.

[Viv S]

The Foxbats did.

The Foxbats operated before the internet era. Not in today's world where everyone's packing a camera in their pocket. And while the squadron's operations were secretive, we most certainly knew about its existence.

[deejay]

^^^ Agree but I am not sure about the numbers , there are atleast two Backfires according to paanwala. Take it for what it is worth. Also per him 160's were asked at first but they won't share that with anyone hence desh settled for what was available although they were upgraded. Regarding 24 hour patrol even to fire a rpg MMS clown won't given permission, do you think something like this would even fly. They were bought aftermath of parakram during ABV days.

Your paanwala is wrong. The T-22M is too large and too loud for it to operate out of any Indian base without anybody noticing it for a decade.

I wouldn't bet on it.

[Cain Marko]

I am not sure about 160 although I remember deal was for two tu22m3 for IN and if paanwala are to be believed, they are currently in use by IN for strategic purposes to make sure no cbg can think of threatening desh like massa and frenchies did during parakaram.

If true, aap ke aur paanwala mahashay ke muh mein ghee tatha shakkar sadaiiva raho..

While two is perhaps too few, I had heard of four, they can still be very useful for delivering surprise mithai to would be bullies. Makes some sense given that IN has really low power projection assets with a rather humble cbg.

One thing backfires can do that no bomber can do is fly fast, and far with a massive load. Whilst slow transports could carry the load, they could never make it on time, and while mkis could make it there fast enough, they have neither the range not the load carrying capacity. A couple of backfires with a two bmos each and about 6 kh 31 types could cripple a cbg or 6 klub and four kh 31.

[Karan M]

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ... tu-22m.htm

4 were planned ..

[Viv S]

Your paanwala is wrong. The T-22M is too large and too loud for it to operate out of any Indian base without anybody noticing it for a decade.

I wouldn't bet on it.

If they've locked it away in a hangar somewhere that's one thing. But if they wish to be effective in wartime, they've got to train and you can't do that on the ground. And any time that it takes to the air there's a persistent likelihood of someone snapping a picture. And once that happens (and it will happen at some point) within an hour a hundred people will know about it on Whatsapp. And within a day it'll be on blogs.

All that effort to conceal what... three or four Tu-22Ms? Waste of effort by any yardstick.

[Karan M]

The original plan was for Gorshkov, Akulas and Tu-22Ms per reports at that time..2/3 were done. If Tu22Ms were acquired, they'd be the greatest secret acquisition by India (or most countries).. having been hidden from spysats and what not...

[Viv S]

One thing backfires can do that no bomber can do is fly fast, and far with a massive load. Whilst slow transports could carry the load, they could never make it on time, and while mkis could make it there fast enough, they have neither the range not the load carrying capacity. A couple of backfires with a two bmos each and about 6 kh 31 types could cripple a cbg or 6 klub and four kh 31.

If they're operating at range within the IOR (as opposed to transiting the Malacca), they'll have the plenty of room to stiffen their surrounding airspace. Enemy CBG means enemy fighters. If the Ka-31 is operating ahead on the likely ingress paths, just a pair of J-15s on CAP would be enough to scatter if not shatter the flight of inbound bombers.

[Singha]

one advantage of bigger range even in maritime strike mission is the ability to take a longer route to avoid hostile emitters and to loiter around more, plus the luxury of disappearing to some base deep in the rear away from any counter salvo.

how far and fast the su30 can fly with 5 brahmos-A is unknown....even if the missile is "only" 1.5 tons.... will be much less than A2A loadout for sure.

we need take a leaf from seen playbook here and pair up high endurance flankers in A2A mode with bombers , just as irani F-14 and Rus foxhounds are seen up north.

[Karan M]

with 5 brahmos-A, a flanker wont even take off..i'd be very surprised if a flanker can carry more than one brahmos-A. perhaps you meant brahmos-m?

[Mihir]

Hiding a Backfire from prying eyes on the ground and within Indian airspace is one thing. A unit of this sort would need to be well-drilled -- that means fairly frequent long-range patrols over international waters. How do you hide it from the Americans and the Chinese and the Burundians if you're doing that? Unless they're all in on the secret, that is...

[Austin]

Back Fire has a decent range of 2000 km Radius with full 24T Payload with lesser payload the range is much higher and variable wings affords her speed at different altitude, Russia cannot exploit Refueling for Backfire due to limitations of INF treaty but that should not be an issue for other users.

I have not seen any IAF official talk about having Strategic Bomber not even in general discussion or writeup , So all the talk of having any kind of Strategic Bomber is just BRF wishlist

[deejay]

Hiding a Backfire from prying eyes on the ground and within Indian airspace is one thing. A unit of this sort would need to be well-drilled -- that means fairly frequent long-range patrols over international waters. How do you hide it from the Americans and the Chinese and the Burundians if you're doing that? Unless they're all in on the secret, that is...

I agree there are no Backfires.

[Philip]

Where have I said as alleged that the reactor on the ATV is a "Russian" one,in toto,as if it was fabricated in Russia and dumped into the hull?! That considerable help was provided by Russia in the totality of the ATV project can't be denied,neither does the GOI deny it. That BARC built the reactor has been never denied either,it's always been known.No one outside the team that designed the sub and built the reactor will have full details of the extent of the cooperation. Whatever specialist help was obtained from Russia or anywhere else will be heavily classified.But one can read between the lines and draw general conclusions as to the magnitude of help. As mentioned in an above post,we've been getting considerable help from various nations on several projects.Why is there little criticism about those projects? Why the angst solely against Russia? Is it because there isn't any comparable US assistance anywhere barring supply of engines for the LCA,not tech transfer mind you. So let's stop splitting hairs and move on please.

Russia,Israel and France ,in that order,have been the most forthcoming of nations that have assisted us in critical projects. As far as nuclear subs and N-sub tech is concerned,there is only one nation that is assisting us,Russia. Even France has openly declared to Oz,that it "will not" provide sophisticated sub tech to India as it tries to win the Oz sub contest! It will be interesting to see the outcome of the visit of Mr.M to Moscow next month,esp. where N-subs are concerned.

Since this td is about the ATV and BMos has crept in,what would be the ideal load of BMos on our N-subs? Remember that MTCR regs. technically cripple BMos's full range and Nirbhay will have to be the weapon of choice for LR strike,our version of Tomahawk or Kalibir.What about the K-5 with a conventional payload? I don't think that more than 3 BMos-Ms on an MKI and 1 on a 29K will be poss. or practical.Perhaps a 29K could carry two under the wings,but until the contours of BMos-M are seen one will not know.

PS:Hiding a Backfire would be ridiculous,but not imposs. The best place for hiding our Backfires would be..... in Russia! All training ,etc. could be done there without detection and the birds flown in when required. As Aust. has said,the myopic IAF have a mindset that hasn't understood the importance of possessing strat. bombers,but yet wants to develop its space assets. Therefore,we must hand over the strat bombing role immediately to the IN which already operates TU-142 Bears,which can easily carry an N-payload instead of anti-sub,anti-ship weaponry.The IN could acquire any strat. bombers like Backfires from Russia later on.

[Mihir]

Hiding a Backfire from prying eyes on the ground and within Indian airspace is one thing. A unit of this sort would need to be well-drilled -- that means fairly frequent long-range patrols over international waters. How do you hide it from the Americans and the Chinese and the Burundians if you're doing that? Unless they're all in on the secret, that is...

I agree there are no Backfires.

You have no idea what sort of pickle you've gotten yourself into. Just wait until you attend your first BR meet

[deejay]

You have no idea what sort of pickle you've gotten yourself into. Just wait until you attend your first BR meet

Yes, look forward to it.

[John]

I am not sure about 160 although I remember deal was for two tu22m3 for IN and if paanwala are to be believed, they are currently in use by IN for strategic purposes to make sure no cbg can think of threatening desh like massa and frenchies did during parakaram.

Tu-160 production isn't starting up till 2020+ and even then it is as credible as Russia fielding a new carrier. Tu-22m3 is a cold war relic and doesn't stand a chance against any decent air defense system. Heck even Georgians brought one down that was used for recon and it was fitted with most sophisticated EW system. Not to mention they are nightmare to maintain no sense in procuring them.

[member_20292]

Only from Indians could you expect self derision! Some posters here are disgusting and should ask for Russian/French/American citizenship. It is acceptable that certain obstacles received foreign design inputs. It still took a long time and is still being tested out because this is a Indian design. Why is that so difficult to digest for the pimps of foreign suppliers?

India must build on this research and development and look at ways to develop an indigenous sub line based on experience gained from Arihant/Aridhaman and follow on subs and the Scorpenes.

language man!