I dont think people will get anywhere by attempting to convince others here. just present your pov and move on, there is no prize for harvesting souls here

tsarkar wrote:You start with a personal attack, that I will respond later once I’ve posted completely. Rest assured, and as readers can themselves decide, most posts of mine are well substantiated with logic and facts.
I’m responding to your multiple posts in a single post, and structuring them contextually for the sake of clarity.
tsarkar wrote:Yes, golly gawsh! The purpose of ATV project was to use any means – buy, beg, borrow, steal, develop – to build a nuclear submarine that is essential for assured second strike given our no first use commitment. Hence the Material Department was established, which is one of India’s best sourcing organizations. And it very successfully managed sourcing.
No Karan, you are wrong here. Despite Pokhran, there were no sub systems denial from Germany for Type 209/1500 submarines. We did a Thomson CSF Eldone sonar upgrade on Type 209/1500 in early 2000s. Despite Pokhran, There were no sub systems denial for Project 877 submarines. If you read Admiral Hiranandani’s 5th book, which is the Official History of the Indian Navy, it was in the same timeframe 1999-2000 that Russia agree to integrate Klub Land Attack Missile to Indian Type 877 submarines. Those were the first time Russia integrated cruise missiles to conventional submarines.
There was absolutely no need to ATV project to make things on their own when subsystems were available through sourcing.So ATV Project never had to jump through hoops.
How does a nuclear submarine differ from a conventional submarine? Hull design, Reactor, Heat Exchanger, Turbines, Gears. Let’s call it powerplant. If it carries ballistic missiles, then missiles, launch systems and communication systems for targeting. Rest of the systems are exactly same as DE submarines
As explained earlier, all the rest of the subsystems systems were available.
In 1998/99 a decision was taken to use the rest of the sub-systems as in Type 877 instead of Type 671. Reason being Type 877 was newer and more in number than Type 671, and in widespread service, so supplier chain was well established.
Example being the torpedo system of INS Arihant, which is the same as Type 877 Sindhu class. Also the USHUS sonar was chosen, which was developed to fit the Type 877 Sindhu class. Using existing & proven design features cuts down on project risk.
So to conclude, ATV Project had all “internals” subsystems available for sourcing and did not have to jump through hoops like you are.
Karan M wrote:As regards internals, with the amount of data available, am I supposed to waste my time telling you about all the parts that go into a submarine, which you clearly know about but are just trying to engage in rhetoric?
No, you’re making a [b]very poor attempt to wriggle out when I asked you to specify which internals other than hull & powerplant held up ATV project from 1976 to 1999 by giving a pathetic lame excuse of wasting time. As explained very simply and clearly above, all other sub systems were available from Russia. You refer to some mysterious exotic subsystem that delayed the program from 1976-2009 but are unable to specify which subsystem[/b]
The project was dead in 1998 because we had issues with the powerplant & hull.
Karan, you are attempting to confuse readers by stating that ATV project faced the same challenges as Scorpene project.
No, MDL is not trying to locate other manufacturers, because the Scorpene design is proprietary to DCN and Navantia. There are no other manufacturers
And we didn’t get ToT for Scorpene subsystems because of a poorly drafted contract.
In the original contract, to show fake Indigenization, certain subsystems were allocated to be procured by MDL. These systems were called Mazgaon Procured Materials (MPL). There was no ToT asked in the contract. MPL procurement was delayed by MDL, and DCN & Navantia jacked up prices. In the world of business, something available at a point of time when rupee was 45 to a dollar is not available at a later point of time when rupee is 66 to a dollar.
MPL was just white labelled parts. There was a vague hope that ToT will be done for MPL but nothing specific in the contract.
Karan, the Scorpene challenges were artificially created by vested interests. ATV project faced no such challenges.
ATV project had no ToT requirements for internal sub-systems for which good sourcing arrangements were in place. So please do not attempt to confuse by stating ATV project faced same challenges as Scorpene
The blog is wrong.
We did not get reactors off the shelf. While BARC could design reactors, it did not have experience in designing reactors suitable for submarine operations. Where the Russians helped is give design inputs to BARC for designing the reactor in a manner that it was suitable for submarine operations, give design inputs for integrating the complete powerplant, and finally design inputs for building a hull around the powerplant and the missiles.
This is where we failed before 1998 and this is where the Russians helped.
Karan M wrote:Here is the hard reality as versus fanciful claims of this magic, that magic for our non strategic segment http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/new ... 148467.cms
According to a study conducted by Navy, India has achieved an indigenisation of 90 per cent in the float segment. In the move segment, India has achieved 60 per cent of indigenisation and just 30-40 per cent in the fight segment.
This is another attempt by you to confuse readers by implying that lack of indigenization of submarine internal sub-systems help up ATV project.
Because ATV Project DID NOT have any indigenization requirements for internal sub-systems that were reliably sourced by the Material Department.
Indian Navy’s indigenization plan is much after INS Arihant was launched in 1999. There was absolutely no bearing of this indigenization plan on ATV project timelines.
Karan M wrote:PS: There are no "peripherals" in something like the Arihant or a submarine. Everything will go together & has to be customized. Any delay on one side will delay everything.
More nonsense logic from you. How much delay did customizing 533 mm TT of Project 877 Sindhu for ATV take? From 1976 to 2009?
How much delay did customizing USHUS sonar of Project 877 for ATV take? From 1999 to 2009? USHUS was available since early 2000s and if not, MGK-400 Rubikon sonar was available in plenty.
Karan M wrote:Facts are that the reactor & hull are Indian. The peripherals not so much (please show us the evidence otherwise since it contradicts all data for even the non strategic segment).
Karan, if YOU hypothesize that mythical peripheral components held up ATV project in 1998, then onus is on YOU to give evidence to support your hypothesis. Not me.
Its like you saying there are rose gardens in Pluto and asking others to give facts to prove otherwise.
That kind of twisted nonsensical logic used by you & a couple of other internet champions here does not work with me or in the real world outside internet forums.
You are as naked as the Emperor’s new clothes when it comes to providing evidence as to which peripheral subsystem or component held up ATV development from 1976 to 2009.
And I have written how the supply chain for sub-components was freely available, there was no ask for indigenization for those sub-components, and none of those sub-components were something mysterious or exotic as speculated by you.
Karan M wrote:My view is that with or without Russian assistance BARC had the capability to do what it did , was well on its way
If it was well on its way, why did Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat asked for a technology audit in December 1998?
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/indi ... 25929.html
By the late 1990s, it had spent over Rs 2,000 crore on its classified ATV programme without results. The failure to produce a submarine had in 1998[/size] piqued then navy chief Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat to call for a technical audit.
Can you explain, Karan, that if ATV “was well on its way”, when why was there no submarine in 1998?[/size]
Can you explain, Karan, that if ATV “was well on its way”, why was there no construction program in 1998 with not even one steel plate cut in 1998?[/size]
Your logic of other internal subcomponents being unavailable is wrong & incorrect. The ATV project could easily source other internal subcomponents before 1998.[/size]
Read here how IN Captain Dr Buddhi Kota Subba Rao was victimized by DAE and his life destroyed because he said DAE reactor wont work. How DAE refusal to admit the reactor worked delayed the program.
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2006/20060228/edit.htm#6
Since the early 1970s, the DAE and the Navy have been involved in a project which would lead to the development of a nuclear reactor suitable for powering submarines.
These, for obvious reasons, have to be much smaller than land-based power plants.This project, named 932, functioned under the DAE with some naval officers thrown in. Progress was slow when, in 1979, the naval officer assigned to the project, one Capt Subba Rao, reported to the Navy that the design being developed by the DAE was flawed and wholly unsuited for the purpose.
Subba Rao was no nuclear scientist and his knowledge of reactors was self acquired and, in the beginning, no one took him seriously. However, his arguments became persuasive and Adm Ronnie Pereira, the Naval Chief, took him to Dr Raja Ramanna, the Scientific Adviser to the Raksha Mantri, and, himself, a former head of the DAE. Dr Ramanna promised to have Subba Rao’s views examined by the DAE but the department made no change in its approach.[/size]
The CNS remained convinced that the objections raised by Captain Rao were valid and, thereafter, took little interest in Project 932.
[size150]The DAE man controlling the project was one Dr Anil Kakodkar. Time was to show that the development of the reactor was, indeed, flawed. It had to be abandoned with great loss of money and time and a new approach had to be adopted.
For his efforts, Subba Rao was arrested by the Mumbai policy when leaving the country with some documents on nuclear reactors earlier published in a foreign magazine. The DAE certified that these documents could be ‘harmful’ to national security. The poor man languished in prison for over a year. [u]He learnt law, argued his own case and was acquitted honourably with severe strictures being passed on the authorities
Today, when we talk of the ATV project and its delays, it is easy to overlook that more than a decade was lost because the DAE, smitten by its we-know-all philosophy, failed, possibly refused, to objectively analyse the deficiencies highlighted to them by somebody outside the establishment.
The inability to shed the ‘I can do it cocoon’ at some time when it becomes clear that capability just does not exist, is the greatest bane and weakness of our scientific community. It has done India proud many times and in different fields, space being a prime example, but has left the country staggering at other times. The DAE falls in this latter category.
Russia’s proven system suppliers were available from 1976-1999 and availability of sub systems providers never held up ATV Project. [/size]It was hull & powerplant issues where Russians gave design assistance. On resolution of those issues from 1999 onwards, did INS Arihant start taking shape
’ll respond on Anil Kakodkar and Srikumar Banerjee’s quotes later since I’m out of time for today.
BTW Srikumar Banerjee is a family friend, though we’ve never discuss work. And a coursemate is heading SBC, again, we never discuss work.
In 1987. the Indian Navy had leased a Soviet nuclear submarine. The purpose of the lease was to train the Indian navy in the use of such a technically advanced naval vessel. The reactor unit was sealed and the spent fuel was to be returned to the Soviet Union. Mr. Gandhi had assured President Reagan that "this specific submarine on lease from the Soviet Union would not be used in any manner in the event of any hostilities." Prime Minister Gandhi had assured President Reagan in writing that there was "no ground for any apprehension".
Naturally, our navy wanted to know more about the submarine leased from the Soviet Union to India, and this led to a covert operation to obtain detailed plans and drawings of this vessel. The incident occurred when an Indian Navy Captain was arrested at Bombay International Airport before boarding a flight for the United States in possession of detailed technical data on the Soviet nuclear submarine. Apparently, Indian Intelligence had tracked the Indian naval officer - or was he a double agent - and, in any case, I was asked to meet with the Prime Minister who confronted me with the facts. I did my best to smooth ruffled feathers, and fortunately Mr. Gandhi was sufficiently experienced in international relations to know that information on the Soviet vessel was a legitimate target for our Intelligence agencies. I urged that the apprehension of the Indian officer before leaving India with the drawings should not adversely impact on over-all U.S.-Indian relations. At the same time, I protected vis-a-vis Washington the American official who had been in charge of this case at the Embassy. He left the post quite rapidly, but has enjoyed an interesting career after his service in India.
tsarkar wrote:@ Admin - Karan increased the font size of what he selectively wanted to highlight. I just followed his precedent.
In addition, Karan has a habit of insulting & deriding others posters, Admirals & institutions, when facts provided went against his pet personal speculations. Examples of this are underlined below -Karan M wrote:So subsystems are somehow going to be magically available because, wait for it, Admiral Ranked Officers (oh golly gawsh!) are available to head 3 centers and "globally source" or "indigenously build" all components required for a submarine. A nuclear submarine, when we have international pressure on India to not even launch ballistic missiles and have to jump through hoops to make things on our own.![]()
He has no logic or facts to prove his pet speculations, so he goes on deriding the personnel & institution.
Vivek K wrote:tsarkar, if Russian help was available, then why did the ATV come on line after more than 30 years? And if the tech is Russian and India has already used it in the Chakra-I and the Akula, then why is it taking so long for trials to be completed? If this was Russian know how and they are already operating several types, then why isn't the Arihant in service already?
Singha wrote:true - its a long way from having a gearset, chain and wheels in hand to knowing how to cobble it all together flawlessly into a quality road bike.
[/quote]Karan M wrote:http://www.frontline.in/the-nation/critical-feat/article5038061.eceMultidisciplinary effort
Building Arihant’s reactor was essentially a multidisciplinary effort that involved fuel development, thermal and mechanical engineering to manufacture the reactor pressure vessel, steam generators and high pressure components, control rod mechanism, control and instrumentation, electromechanical systems, drive mechanisms, and so on. “It is a marriage of all these systems to make the reactor work efficiently,” Banerjee said in August 2009. “It is not desktop research at all,” he emphasised.
BARC’s engineers and scientists were involved in all this, from engineering the concept to the final product development. For everything had to be developed from scratch and there was absolutely no technology available to India on the PWR.
While V.K. Mehra gave leadership to the reactor development programme and H.S. Kamat was in charge of fuel development, B.K. Bera, A.K. Suri and R.P. Singh played important roles on the fuel side. The contribution of G.P. Srivastava, M. Mahapatra and R.K. Patil was formidable in control and instrumentation. R.S. Yadav dealt with the design and manufacture of one of the most important components, the reactor pressure vessel. C.G. Utge was responsible for the development of high-pressure, high-temperature equipment.
Why was PWR, not Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor (PHWR) technology which India had mastered and used to build several commercial reactors, chosen to propel the submarine? PWRs use enriched uranium as fuel and light water as coolant and moderator. In contrast, PHWRs use natural uranium as fuel and heavy water as both coolant and moderator. “PHWR is not something which you can make into a compact form,” said Banerjee, who later became AEC Chairman. Besides, nuclear energy generation depends on the quantity of fissile material available in the reactor and the PWR lent itself admirably for this with a high availability of fissile material (uranium-235) in enriched uranium. While plutonium also can be used as fuel, enriched uranium-driven fuel is generally adopted for reactors that propel submarines.
The question now arose whether India had the capability to enrich uranium. (If the non-fissile U-238 is removed from natural uranium, then the U-235 concentration will go up. This is called enrichment of uranium. This is done by a series of chemical and physical processes. If one uses enriched uranium as fuel, the availability of neutrons is high enough to generate electricity and one can use light water as coolant and moderator.)
So a small plant was set up at Ratnahalli near Mysore in 1990 for enriching uranium, and work on designing the enriched uranium fuel for the submarine’s nuclear power pack also began. BARC made a technological breakthrough in developing all the centrifuges needed for enriching uranium without any external help. The centrifuges were needed to separate U-238 from U-235 so that the concentration of U-235 went up, but the separation technology itself was very complex. To sustain the centrifugal forces, centrifuges were to have a high strength-to-weight ratio. Yet, they had to be thin. So maraging steel was used in the manufacture of centrifuges.
The next step was to process the enriched uranium into fuel. Banerjee said: “This is also crucial because unlike in the case of fuel for the land-based reactor, here the fuel had to be monolithic. This required special fabrication techniques that allow you to make the fuel withstand the rolling, pitching and other movements of the submarine…. In Trombay, we developed the right kind of fuel.”
Reactor development
The reactor development itself was a big and tough task. At the heart of the reactor is its pressure vessel, which houses the fuel. Developing the pressure vessel entailed the use of a special technology and a special steel. The material had to have high fracture toughness and the toughness had to be retained even if the steel got exposed to radiation. So a special type of steel was developed to withstand the radiation environment.
The design of the vessel was another major challenge. The issue of the reactor’s compactness came in. The entire PWR had to fit into the cramped space of the submarine’s hull. Steam generators, tall structures consisting of a maze of pipes, posed another big problem. They produced steam to drive the turbine which generated electricity. So the steam generator and the pressure vessel were designed in such a way that every small space in the hull was made use of. This was a very important mechanical engineering design, which BARC engineers, after many trials and efforts, evolved.
Development of hundreds of subsystems and high-pressure valves and pumps posed various challenges, which were met by BARC engineers. Indian industry rose to the occasion by manufacturing them. The entire reactor structure had to be designed in such a way that it is stable when the submarine accelerates. What had to be taken into account here was that the reactor was housed in a submarine that sped under water. The thrust generated by the submarine’s propulsion required a design for the reactor that was different from that of a nuclear power reactor on terra firma.
“In designing the propulsion of the submarine, we had to take into account the various sea conditions, including rough sea, the submarine’s pitching and rolling, the effect of saline water, enemy action which includes underwater explosions/depth charges and internal conditions,” explained Basu. “Yet another factor is that the propulsion plant had to be compact and so weight and volume had to be minimised. Thirdly, the plant had to be very reliable. It is moving under water, hundreds of kilometres away from the shore. In case of an accident, no help will be available from outside. So back-up safety systems should function perfectly.”
So, the design of the safety system was crucial. BARC went for passive safety systems, which would not need an external source of electricity, to come into action. The passive thermo-siphoning system will come into play in abnormal conditions. Since a submarine’s reactor has no exclusion zone, unlike its counterpart on land where no human settlement is allowed a few kilometres around it, gamma shielding, and partly neutron shielding, by water was done.
In land-based reactors, control rods fall by gravity and bring the reactors to a halt in case of an accident. But the rolling and pitching of the boat demands that the control-rod mechanism is designed suitably to take care of the submarine’s various movements. “Since power has to be generated in a regulated manner, it puts a lot of restrictions on the design of the control mechanisms. Diverse techniques were used to design them. We had to take into consideration the possibility of the boat going upside down. So special sensors and drives were made for ensuring a safe and reliable operation of the control-rod mechanisms,” said Srivastava in August 2009. Indeed, 13 control mechanisms were accommodated within a diameter of 0.8 metre.
[BARC also built a simulator at Visakhapatnam to train navy personnel in operating the reactor. When the Russians were shown this simulator, they were amazed at its sophistication.
In the Arihant project, which went under the name of ATV programme, DRDO laboratories contributed sonars, sensors, sound absorption materials, communication equipment, electronics and weapons. While the Naval Physical and Oceanographic Laboratory (NPOL), Kochi, contributed sensors to Arihant, special acoustics were done by the Naval Science and Technology Laboratory (NSTL), Visakhapatnam.[/b]
In the end, as Banerjee emphasised, it boiled down to teamwork in a multidisciplinary project and he called the platform “a very complex combination of various technologies”. As Kakodkar said, “This PWR technology is very complex. You have to make it extremely compact and pack it in the cramped space of the submarine’s hull. It was a big challenge.”
Today, India can assert that it has mastered the technology of developing and manufacturing nuclear propulsion for driving submarines. The proof of it lies in three more nuclear-powered submarines being built at Visakhapatnam. When the four submarines, including Arihant, patrol the seas, India will have achieved the status of a blue-water navy.
Singha wrote:I dont think there is any "shame" in admitting we took lot of Rus help on this one. the key thing now is do we pair up this reactor or design/license a bigger more efficient design for the SSBN family and whether a new powerful design is needed for the dedicated SSNs which will need 35 knot speed . how quickly we solve these questions will decide timeline of our global power ambitions (and alongwith funding 12 blackjacks when production resumes)
Singha wrote: (and alongwith funding 12 blackjacks when production resumes)
Karan M wrote:There you go. And in our case, the facts show that even the gears & transmissions for many of our frontline, non strategic warships are actually licensed designs from abroad. Let alone submarines. Here, there are only 4 countries with the in depth across the board experience for nuclear subs - US, France, Russia, China. Last, UK depends a lot on the US and multinational sourcing (eg Thales for sonars) given its a NATO Munna and in P-5.
Karthik S wrote:Singha wrote: (and alongwith funding 12 blackjacks when production resumes)
Is there a proposal to buy these?
Singha wrote:just present your pov and move on, there is no prize for harvesting souls here
krishna_krishna wrote:^^^ Agree but I am not sure about the numbers , there are atleast two Backfires according to paanwala. Take it for what it is worth. Also per him 160's were asked at first but they won't share that with anyone hence desh settled for what was available although they were upgraded. Regarding 24 hour patrol even to fire a rpg MMS clown won't given permission, do you think something like this would even fly. They were bought aftermath of parakram during ABV days.
krishna_krishna wrote:^^^ Agree but I am not sure about the numbers , there are atleast two Backfires according to paanwala. Take it for what it is worth. Also per him 160's were asked at first but they won't share that with anyone hence desh settled for what was available although they were upgraded. Regarding 24 hour patrol even to fire a rpg MMS clown won't given permission, do you think something like this would even fly. They were bought aftermath of parakram during ABV days.
Singha wrote:a backfire can deliver a whole lot more of brahmos/zircon than a su30 labouring with a single item on the centerline - farther and more.
Karthik S wrote:The Foxbats did.
Viv S wrote:krishna_krishna wrote:^^^ Agree but I am not sure about the numbers , there are atleast two Backfires according to paanwala. Take it for what it is worth. Also per him 160's were asked at first but they won't share that with anyone hence desh settled for what was available although they were upgraded. Regarding 24 hour patrol even to fire a rpg MMS clown won't given permission, do you think something like this would even fly. They were bought aftermath of parakram during ABV days.
Your paanwala is wrong. The T-22M is too large and too loud for it to operate out of any Indian base without anybody noticing it for a decade.
krishna_krishna wrote:I am not sure about 160 although I remember deal was for two tu22m3 for IN and if paanwala are to be believed, they are currently in use by IN for strategic purposes to make sure no cbg can think of threatening desh like massa and frenchies did during parakaram.
deejay wrote:Your paanwala is wrong. The T-22M is too large and too loud for it to operate out of any Indian base without anybody noticing it for a decade.
I wouldn't bet on it.
Cain Marko wrote:One thing backfires can do that no bomber can do is fly fast, and far with a massive load. Whilst slow transports could carry the load, they could never make it on time, and while mkis could make it there fast enough, they have neither the range not the load carrying capacity. A couple of backfires with a two bmos each and about 6 kh 31 types could cripple a cbg or 6 klub and four kh 31.
Mihir wrote:Hiding a Backfire from prying eyes on the ground and within Indian airspace is one thing. A unit of this sort would need to be well-drilled -- that means fairly frequent long-range patrols over international waters. How do you hide it from the Americans and the Chinese and the Burundians if you're doing that? Unless they're all in on the secret, that is...
deejay wrote:Mihir wrote:Hiding a Backfire from prying eyes on the ground and within Indian airspace is one thing. A unit of this sort would need to be well-drilled -- that means fairly frequent long-range patrols over international waters. How do you hide it from the Americans and the Chinese and the Burundians if you're doing that? Unless they're all in on the secret, that is...
I agree there are no Backfires.
Mihir wrote:You have no idea what sort of pickle you've gotten yourself into. Just wait until you attend your first BR meet
krishna_krishna wrote:
I am not sure about 160 although I remember deal was for two tu22m3 for IN and if paanwala are to be believed, they are currently in use by IN for strategic purposes to make sure no cbg can think of threatening desh like massa and frenchies did during parakaram.
Vivek K wrote:Only from Indians could you expect self derision! Some posters here are disgusting and should ask for Russian/French/American citizenship. It is acceptable that certain obstacles received foreign design inputs. It still took a long time and is still being tested out because this is a Indian design. Why is that so difficult to digest for the pimps of foreign suppliers?
India must build on this research and development and look at ways to develop an indigenous sub line based on experience gained from Arihant/Aridhaman and follow on subs and the Scorpenes.
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