Raja Ram wrote:Cross posting from STFUP thread in other forum at the request of ramana
Based on the above there are a few things that can be inferred
1. The installations were informed and were in a state of alert. That is why the response was well coordinated once the initial contact was made.
2. The initial losses are very high, especially when you take into account that this was a pattern starting from attack on parliament to attacks on Army Camps in J&K, Kabul Embassy Attack, Gurdaspur attack etc. The initial contact claimed maximum casualty on perimeter guard duty. Given the alert, and the report of missing car of the police SP near the border in a case of carjacking; the perimeter guards should have been adequately protected with full body armor; reinforcing of approach defenses must have been in place way ahead of entry and a clear vantage view and surveillance should have been in place in all approaches. Indications are that these were not there or it was not adequate enough
You have not taken into consideration two very important points:-
In earlier examples given by you the initial contact came as surprise, but here we were fully prepared and waiting in our own re-enforced (?) positions.
Second as their phones were being actively tapped, we knew well in advance, the exact position of terrorists before they launched the initial attack. This should have been like Pig shoot.