India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

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SwamyG
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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby SwamyG » 05 Oct 2016 08:49

ramana wrote:TSP miscalculated very badly. They thought by pulling off another attack on an Army camp instead of a civilian target like Mumbai they can get away. As I said in the Pakistan: managing Failure thread, all their redlines are erased and they are in state of shcock. even their supporters abandoned them after realizing this. Only China is still with them and for how long we have to see. Right now TSPA is like that Prince in Bhaubali walking with head cut off. Its matter of time for it to fall and break up.

Pakistan did not expect these many casualties. For thousand cuts to work, the damage has to be smaller each time. My guess is they must have expected Indian casualties to be between 5 and 10; and that would have been a small victory for them. The tent catching fire was bad for the Indian soldiers, and is proving to be very bad for Pakistanis.

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby GShankar » 05 Oct 2016 19:49

GShankar wrote:Not sure but heard there is movement on both sides. Rambha's make up crew are being asked to go with her for the photo op and the crew is shopping some woolen jackets. And heard Rambha has been officially permitted to take some new diwali presents for her audience.


I posted the above a few days ago. Seems truer now with ACM saying that there is going to be ops for 6 months. Also heard the make up crew are waiting for security clearance.

Combine that with news reports that India is also building quite a few small underground rooms for photo and op. Seems like we are getting ready to shoot a mega serial.

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby pankajs » 05 Oct 2016 20:01

SwamyG wrote:
ramana wrote:TSP miscalculated very badly. They thought by pulling off another attack on an Army camp instead of a civilian target like Mumbai they can get away. As I said in the Pakistan: managing Failure thread, all their redlines are erased and they are in state of shcock. even their supporters abandoned them after realizing this. Only China is still with them and for how long we have to see. Right now TSPA is like that Prince in Bhaubali walking with head cut off. Its matter of time for it to fall and break up.

Pakistan did not expect these many casualties. For thousand cuts to work, the damage has to be smaller each time. My guess is they must have expected Indian casualties to be between 5 and 10; and that would have been a small victory for them. The tent catching fire was bad for the Indian soldiers, and is proving to be very bad for Pakistanis.

I think Modi was waiting for the right time. Last 2-3 years he was busy with his other agenda items i,e international and commercial diplomacy, babudom, policy paralysis, etc. Also, time was needed to fix some deficiencies in RAW and IA capacities wrt Bakis. And then the latest flareup in Kashmir with Bakis going all out to corner him.

Considering all the above, my take is that Modi was just about ready to teach the Bakis a lesson even before the Uri attack. This heinous attack was just the trigger for what was coming anyways.

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby UlanBatori » 08 Oct 2016 02:14

We all know that the Coyote is going to try the next level against the RoadRunner. The only question is, what is an appropriate 'response'? I think the response should be Moderately Enlightened, thinking about the Big Picture, Long-Term. IOW, hit the infrastructure of the PA very hard, ignore the terrorists' own infrastructure. Take a heavy toll on HQ Command and Control etc. plus roads, bridges, rail lines. This will REALLY call the bluff on the New Clear blackmail and start the spiral to disintegration. Also, really push the LOC back by a kilometer or two in each attack and hold the territory. Concentrate artillery-spotting missiles. I don't know how much of this possible, but it may be time to escalate them to oblivion using sheer conventional superiority. Some good "diplomacy" with Baloch types and Swat/ Pakhtoon types wouldn't hurt either - a good flow of captured weapons down the Passes to Quetta etc. Will be interesting to watch PA trying to deal with simultanaeous rebellions in Balochistan and Pakhtoonistan while India smashes their infrastructure in POK and takes territory west of the yellow sea. Some experts maintain that TSP will unite in hate of India, but today the reality may be different: a once in a century chance to break free of the TSPA may really appeal to forward-thinking Baluchis and Pakhtoons.

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby Prem » 08 Oct 2016 02:22

If PA cannot protect Jihadi in Kashmir then good chance Jihadi will like to negotiate domestic market for their dream creating huge fissure hastening Paki Piecing Process.

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby Rudradev » 08 Oct 2016 03:41

UBji, I think the ante will be upped using various proxies. When that stupid bald Pakjabi poseur was given a mouthful by Senge Sering of Gilgit-Baltistan and Ahmar Mustikhan of Baluchistan while trying to pitch Cash-mere for the n^nth time at the Stimson Center, it gave an indication of where Indian intentions lie (and with the full blessing of the DupleeCity establishment, at least for now).

Much as I'd like to see different, I think the TSPA chaddi-removal by regular Indian Army and SF has gone as far as it will go for now. The point has been made, the message received by all concerned audiences, and Modi wants to get back to improving governance and economic growth. What will ensue will be a combination of isolating and blocking Pakistan via diplomatic and economic means (such as SAARC/BIMSTEC), and raising temperatures through moral and diplomatic support to non-state Baluchis, Pathans, Balwaris etc. just enough that China decides its mock goose is cooked and CPEC isn't worth sinking another yuan into. Hopefully we will significantly enhance our military assistance to the Afghans as well. Most LoC violations or attacks on Indian Security Forces installations will be retaliated against by massed artillery fire (this actually worked superbly well for us throughout the '90s and all the way up to '03).

The Pakis would have to pull off something really stupid, like a high-casualty terrorist attack on a soft target in the hinterland, before we upped the ante further than this. Personally, I think the 28/9 strike unnerved them sufficiently that they won't try it until they feel as if they have some other "ace" up their sleeve... significant internal security issues in Punjab, for example, or a major ISI-pasand Taliban victory in Afghanistan that takes the pressure off PA deployment on the Durand line.

When that comes I don't think our response will be incremental (as in salami-slicing little bits of POK and pushing the LoC westward). I think it will be Cold Start for real, and we'll come away with all of POK/NA for keeps.

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby Ramu » 08 Oct 2016 03:48

Cotton is the oil of India. This export needs to be banned.

Indian cotton exports to Pakistan slump amid tensions: Traders http://m.moneycontrol.com/news/business ... 95361.html

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby UlanBatori » 08 Oct 2016 04:13

Rudradev: Prem makes a good point. The jehadi production line from the madarssas is like a nuclear reaction. If they don't draw the product out to get killed on the yellow sea, the product accumulates inside TSP looking for other targets - they have no skills other than AK47-RPG-IEDMubarak. The only other relief valves are (a) terrorize Balochis and Balwaris, and Swatis (b) inflate Shia mosques in Karachi or (c) inflate shias or Americans in Afghanistan. DupleeCity has a problem - if you note, recently Kunduz has seen large Pakiban victories. BO is close to achieving a complete rollback of Dubya's campaign of 2001-2002 in Afghanistan, by January Kabul may be surrounded. IMO this can bring the US military as close to a mutiny as they have been since Vietnam, given the spectacular defeat in Iraq as well.

So it is very much in DupleeCity/ NATO interest to see the Afghan border sealed. I don't know how they can do that, but for sure, if DT wins that is going to happen with the military being given a free hand, and if HC wins, see above re: mutiny. I think she will be forced to act as well.

What happens then? The jehad can go into thermal runaway, and India's interest will be in seeing the Mujaheddin corralled to direct their kind attentions on urban Pakjab. Think ISIS/Yezidi type relationship between Mujaheddin/Pakjabi wimmens. :mrgreen: (sorry, human sympathy is kind of short when it comes to Pakjabi elites). This IMO is the Amplifier situation that India/ RAA Agints are/should be moving towards. This will take care of the PA, and force them to leave Balochistan, Swat, Pakhtoonistan, Balwaristan and eventually Sindh to become free. My big problem is that I don't see what stops PeeAllSee from moving into the power vacuum in the Northern Areas, and there is not much that IA can do about that.

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby hanumadu » 08 Oct 2016 04:23

^^Rajnath Singh is talking about completely sealing the border by 2018. Make the terrorist relief valve into India (and Afghanistan) completely sealed. If not the Pakjabis, the balochis and sindhis will face the full brunt of the jihadis. If nothing else, it should at least hasten their separation from Pakistan.

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby Philip » 08 Oct 2016 13:44

No border can be made 100% secure.Plus the cost would be unaffordable.Offence is the best defence. Use some of the money to increase offensive capability. We need to invest more in surveillance using sats,aircraft,UAVs,and advanced communications intercept systems.UCAVs with stand-off missiles will give us the ability to strike from within our airspace as well as over Pak.The scope and scale of spl forces should be increased in this covert proxy war situ. to take advantage of the increased intel info.More surgical and pin-point strikes against both jihadis and Paki mil installations will teach them a lesson.It is only when their backsides are b*ggered and burnt do they squeal for "Uncle"!

Accompanied by arty fire at will,seizing the opportunity,heavy Paki mil casualties will result in a backlash from the populace at home. Remember how denying and concealing the extent of their the Kargil casualties were recd. Sabotage of specific targets by Afghan,Sindh and Baluchi agents to complicate the nternal mayhem.

The hints that the Baluchi leadership will be given sanctuary in India,and the HQ of a Baluch govt-in-exile set up here ,esp if in the capital,where it can meet other international entities,is going to be a huge setback for the Pakis.Their pathetic talk to take Maoist/Naxal issues to the UN will fall on deaf ears. The West hates Commies! Neither are our CPM "pinkos" giving them anything more than a few dregs of immoral support.They've run govts in Bengal and Kerala for decades and have abandoned "revolution" to enjoy the creature comforts of office! :rotfl:

If the Pakis do not relent,then surgical ops must give way to selected mil ops. Let's not give the pigsty any clues in our thinking.

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby ShauryaT » 08 Oct 2016 22:42

Philip: +1. The proof of the pudding will be in the eating. Let us see, what the budget for military is like for next year and if MoD is actually able to streamline and get thing done. The new DPP is in place. They have pulled back from investments into the 17th Corps, let us see, if these investments actually happen!!

Added: What the Pakis are counting on is to claim that poor Kashmiris are being suppressed. They will latch on to the bugle of human rights and freedom. We have to counter, the counter has to be the dangers of Islamism. Will the government do it? After all the two nation theory was rooted in Islamist theory. The world never understood or cared enough for this pre-9/11, now they do. We better strike or loose this advantage.

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby UlanBatori » 08 Oct 2016 23:59

And the window is not infinite. Oirope is becoming increasingly dhimmified. Bilayat already is, and America is going that way.

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby Guddu » 09 Oct 2016 01:53

Will Rawheel strike or not, is the question ?. His window to respond shuts close in nov, when he is scheduled to retire. So he is debating whether he wants to go out in a blaze of glory....or will have to slink into retirement with the cloud of vasectomy hovering over his head. So lets see what might be the thinking....in Rawheels pea brain.

One advantage of acting before nov is that he may get an extension, I cannot see NS, not granting the future field marshall an extension in a time of national crisis. For that to happen, the pakis have to respond with a major strike, such that India is forced to respond. If India does not respond Rawheel gets no extension...and his dreams of becoming a field marshall die.

If Rawheel goes quietly into the night, that will be admitting defeat for him...and his post retirement izzat will suffer.

So does he act or not act. If he does, what will he do and how will India respond...I think this thread will go on for some time, perhaps 6 months, based on what the IA is saying.

UlanBatori
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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby UlanBatori » 09 Oct 2016 02:11

I mean window to solve Pakistan Problem (PeePee). RawHeel etc small fry.


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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby deejay » 09 Oct 2016 22:11



You are not going to get dissenting voices I think. :)

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby Karthik S » 09 Oct 2016 22:42

Guddu wrote:Will Rawheel strike or not, is the question ?. His window to respond shuts close in nov, when he is scheduled to retire. So he is debating whether he wants to go out in a blaze of glory....or will have to slink into retirement with the cloud of vasectomy hovering over his head. So lets see what might be the thinking....in Rawheels pea brain.

One advantage of acting before nov is that he may get an extension, I cannot see NS, not granting the future field marshall an extension in a time of national crisis. For that to happen, the pakis have to respond with a major strike, such that India is forced to respond. If India does not respond Rawheel gets no extension...and his dreams of becoming a field marshall die.

If Rawheel goes quietly into the night, that will be admitting defeat for him...and his post retirement izzat will suffer.

So does he act or not act. If he does, what will he do and how will India respond...I think this thread will go on for some time, perhaps 6 months, based on what the IA is saying.


As Maroof Raza said in a TN episode, if they react they are doomed, if they don't they are damned. It applies to the good general.

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby Lilo » 11 Oct 2016 09:53

Today being Vijayadashami - security forces must brace for a terror attack from pakistan.
And remain on a hairtrigger to strike back simultaneously.

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby Bibhas » 11 Oct 2016 14:41

Shopian grenade attack on CRPF. 3 CRPF Jawans and 5 civilians injured. Few hours back.

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby Gyan » 11 Oct 2016 16:09

Anyone who has seen Himalayan Mountain Range even as a tourist knows that there is no chance of the border being ever sealed. Not to mention terrorists use night time, forest cover, bad weather, cover fire etc to infiltrate.

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby Austin » 11 Oct 2016 23:31

Russian flamethrower ‘Shmel’ spearheaded surgical strikes

http://in.rbth.com/blogs/stranger_than_ ... kes_637715

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby anishns » 12 Oct 2016 04:52

^^^ What an awesome system to send those Jihadis to meet their 72



Check out around 1:00 minute to see how the RPO-A does it's job! :twisted: :twisted: :twisted:

ramana
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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby ramana » 12 Oct 2016 05:27

Our jawans could have used this in Kargil heights.

Does DRDO have plans to make a T/B warhead for the 84 mm Carl Gustav?

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby jamwal » 12 Oct 2016 13:42

Gyan wrote:Anyone who has seen Himalayan Mountain Range even as a tourist knows that there is no chance of the border being ever sealed. Not to mention terrorists use night time, forest cover, bad weather, cover fire etc to infiltrate.

Mountainous terrain in all sectors is not identical. It can be done in some sectors, but not possible in others.

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby Philip » 12 Oct 2016 14:48

As I warned over a week ago,Goa is now on high alert as our intel warns of terror strikes.Spl sec. teams being rushed ahead of the BRICS summit.Pak will do anything to sabotage the summit.

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby rsingh » 12 Oct 2016 17:22

^^^
Instead it will be our media we should worry about. Live broadcast of Chinese shit, giving us lecture about good neighbourhood. Wish you were here (Bakistan) rona dhona for the d-sidelins summit with real SAARC sans bakistan .

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby VishalJ » 12 Oct 2016 19:30


SSridhar
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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby SSridhar » 13 Oct 2016 14:29

Uri, Surgical Strikes and International Reactions - Vivek Chadha, Rumel Dahiya, Neha Kohli and Shruti Pandalai, IDSA
The Uri Terrorist Attack

On September 18, 2016, four terrorists belonging to the Pakistani jihadi group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) struck at an Indian Army camp in Uri. The camp housed more than the usual number of troops, given the changeover between two infantry battalions. This had resulted in the creation of additional temporary accommodation in the form of tents. Unlike in the past, this was seen as an obvious vulnerability by the Pakistani terrorist handlers who decided to exploit this fleeting opportunity.

It can be argued that the terrorists were lucky and came across troops housed in tents when they struck the camp at Uri. This is, however, unlikely for three main reasons. First, terrorists are not known to carry incendiary ammunition as part of their regular arsenal, as is evident from terror strikes in the past. Further, the use of such specialised incendiary ammunition requires terrorists to carry under barrel grenade launchers. In the Uri attack, these launchers were carried by each of the four terrorists, which further reinforces the fact that it was indeed a carefully orchestrated attack. Second, terrorist groups do not have the intelligence and logistics wherewithal to detect, monitor and plan such a carefully calibrated strike, with a definitive focus on exploiting a fleeting opportunity. The terrorists who struck at the Uri camp did just that. Third, beyond the specific details related to the incident, it has been established over a period of time that the JeM has been funded, guided, trained and controlled by the Pakistan Army. Therefore, the circumstantial evidence presented by the attack only reinforces this premise.

Backdrop to the Surgical Strikes

The resultant impact of the Uri incident, which led to the death of 19 army soldiers, was not the only provocation that hardened the government’s resolve to move beyond standard reactions. The Army’s action against terrorist launch pads was also linked to the cumulative build-up of terrorist attacks that had been emanating from across the Line of Control (LoC). This was reinforced by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who indicated that those responsible for the Uri attack would not go unpunished. Therefore, a robust and determined response was expected sooner rather than later. It was a matter of time before a strong message was delivered, through surgical, yet demonstrative, means.

The military options available for counter terror strikes has been analysed threadbare over the years. When viewed along the escalatory ladder, these included shallow strikes across the LoC against terrorist launch pads, precision long range missile strikes against terror camps, deep Special Forces strikes against terrorist camps, surgical strikes to eliminate terrorist leaders, and neutralisation of Pakistan Army positions along the LoC directly involved in the launch of terrorists into India. The innovation in executing the counter punch was, therefore, more likely to come in terms of the time and place of its delivery.

India’s reaction to the Uri terrorist attack is a distinct departure from the strategic and tactical approaches it had adopted in the past. The government decided to undertake a shallow surgical strike along the LoC.
This clearly implied that the Army intended to target terrorist launch pads, which are typically located between 500 metres and a couple of kilometres along the LoC inside Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK). The decision reinforced the government’s restraint and mature response, which had characterised past Indian responses as well. Second, by limiting the strike to terrorist launch pads, India maintained the requisite balance between resolve to punish the perpetrators of terrorism and keeping a low military threshold as would be expected from a reasonable state. Third, on completion of the strike, the Director General Military Operations of the Indian Army informed his counterpart in Pakistan of the same and simultaneously indicated termination of the mission, thereby, ensuring that no ambiguity existed regarding the scope and scale of the operation. Fourth, a large number of friendly foreign countries as well as the media were informed about the operation. This saw the government and the army take ownership of the operation and its intended consequences. Fifth, the government called for cooperation from the Pakistan to fulfil its international obligations to fight terrorism, as has been promised by Islamabad on more than one occasion.

The Special Forces Operation

These decisions formed the strategic backdrop to the tactical strike that was undertaken by the Army. On receipt of a go ahead from the highest level within the government, a large number of central resources were made available to the Army and were seamlessly integrated to achieve cohesion in orchestration. From receiving satellite imagery to corroboration of inputs through human intelligence and a drone feed of events, the sequence of events followed clockwork precision in execution. Despite such support, the operation was a challenge given the decision to strike simultaneously at multiple targets spread across different divisional and corps boundaries. This implied that the loss of surprise or a premature launch at one location could well have led to serious life threatening consequences at the others. However, the plan went ahead as envisaged and unfolded over the early hours of darkness of September 28, 2016.

The Special Forces contingent involved in the operation was sub-divided into smaller sub-groups and brought to the vicinity of the LoC where the holding units of the Indian Army are positioned. They were launched after last light through gaps in own minefields, which dot the area ahead of Indian defences. Having crossed the minefields, which remain a constant threat to life given their being washed laterally due to heavy rains and slides over a period of time, the sub-groups continued to close in on the targets along the LoC. The target areas were being monitored for any dramatic build up in contrast to intelligence that had earlier been fed. At the designated hour, the strikes were launched on the unsuspecting terrorists who were preparing to infiltrate across the LoC for the next strike, supported by fire to pin them down. The strike succeeded completely in eliminating the terrorists, achieving the intended impact within a short timeframe as planned. Having succeeded in their mission, the sub-groups extricated as swiftly as they had closed in with the target area and returned to their base locations just before day break.

The operation left in its wake a trail of terrorists and their support elements who had clinically been eliminated. This was announced the same day during a joint press conference of the spokespersons of the Ministry of External Affairs and the Indian Army. The element of surprise that the operation witnessed was also seen in the follow up sequence of events. The strategic plan executed through a tactical strike achieved many firsts and substantial gains that need to be reinforced.

Impact and Implications of the Surgical Strikes

This was the first operation conducted by the Army across a wide frontage of well over 100 kilometres at multiple terrorist targets along the LoC. Second, by taking ownership of the strike, India snatched the initiative from Pakistan, which had continued its provocations through terrorist attacks at regular intervals. Third, the Army raised the cost of using terrorism as an instrument of state policy by a couple of notches. Fourth, the Pakistani narrative about the absence of India-targeting terrorists on its soil stood exposed for the world to see. Fifth, the strikes proved to be an important element for maintaining the morale of the people of India and the armed forces. Sixth, the strike reinforced the credibility of the government and displayed its resolve, even as justified restraint and maturity was on display. Finally, India called into question the Pakistani belief that it would not react to terrorist provocations because of the fear of escalation. Along with this, the army also crossed the laxman rekha that had for long constrained its ability to hit terrorists in their own backyard.

Pakistan’s Response to the Surgical Strikes

Following the surgical strikes carried out by the Indian Army across the Line of Control (LoC) on the night of 28/29 September 2016, the Pakistan establishment was in denial mode once again. It has accused India of “fabrication of truth” and explained the death of two soldiers and injury to nine others as resulting from cross-border firing between troops deployed on either side of the LoC. However, in a move unusual for cross-border firing, which is fairly routine, the Indian High Commissioner was summoned to the Pakistan Foreign Office and issued a demarche. In the initial statement carried by The Nation on behalf of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, it was stated that the PM “condemned the military action undertaken by the Indian Army along the Line of Control.” However, the Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) categorically stated that no surgical strikes were carried out across the LoC.

When looking at the clear articulation of the event by the Director General Military Operations (DGMO) of the Indian Army, the political leadership, and briefing of envoys of 25 countries by Foreign Secretary in New Delhi on 29 September, it becomes clear that an operation was indeed carried out. Subsequent press reports also suggested that two members of the strike force from the Special Forces units of the Indian Army have also received injuries during the operation. The question that arises is the reason for Pakistan’s denial of the operation ever having taken place. The benign explanation is that Pakistan does not wish to escalate tensions at this particular moment when regional and global opinion is against the promotion of terrorism by states anywhere in the world. The other explanations could be:

  • Pakistan wants to deny the existence of terrorist launch pads in the territory presently under its control and wants to avoid accountability on this account.
  • Pakistan wants to avoid a linkage between India’s targeting of terrorists and the casualties its troops suffered in the vicinity of the terrorist launch pads.
  • The Pakistan Army does not want to be seen in a poor light vis-à-vis India, particularly after its loss of face in not being able to detect the US strike at Abbottabad (Operation Neptune Spear) in which Osama bin Laden was killed.
  • Denial also becomes necessary to prevent questions about the Pakistan Army’s level of alertness and preparedness and consequently greater public pressure to undertake retaliatory action at the earliest even if that turns out to be a misadventure.

World opinion has definitely turned against Pakistan and there is more than enough evidence to link the Pakistan Army with terrorist groups. The Pakistan Army, therefore, has a difficult choice of either denying the presence of terrorist launch pads in the portion of Jammu and Kashmir under its occupation close to the LoC or having to undertake a retaliatory action for which it may not be prepared presently.

All told the Pakistan government and Army obviously know the facts. Therefore, two main reasons to downplay the operations are: (a) avoid admitting association with terrorists, and (b) avoid public pressure to retaliate.

But soon enough the Pakistan public would know the facts when jihadi tanzeems start holding functions to honour the jihadis who have been killed in the Indian surgical strike. It is then that Pakistani public will hold the Army responsible for such incidents.

International Responses to Uri and India’s Surgical Strikes

India’s diplomatic offensive launched post the Uri-attacks provided the broader context in which its decision to carry out the surgical strike needs to be seen. The thrust to ‘name and shame’ Pakistan as a sponsor of terrorism emanating from its soil was carried out systematically, at the national, regional and global level across all fora. Indian diplomatic representations in the 71st session of the United Nations General Assembly in response to Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s efforts to internationalise the Kashmir issue called out Pakistan on its “long-standing policy of sponsoring terrorism, the consequences of which have spread well beyond our region.”1 In a statement intended to provoke, the Indian response also stated that “The land of Taxila, one of the greatest learning centres of ancient times is now host to the Ivy League of terrorism. It attracts aspirants and apprentices from all over the world.”2 This was followed up by External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj who, in an evocative speech at the UN General Assembly, called for the isolation of Pakistan and added that “in our midst, there are nations that still speak the language of terrorism, that nurture it, peddle it, and export it. To shelter terrorists has become their calling card. We must identify these nations and hold them to account. These nations, in which UN declared terrorists roam freely, lead processions and deliver their poisonous sermons of hate with impunity, are as culpable as the very terrorists they harbour. Such countries should have no place in the comity of nations.”3

India was then quick to rally international support from the US, UK, and France, which condemned the Uri attack, and also highlighted Pakistan’s atrocities in Balochistan, which led the European Union to respond with a threat of punitive economic sanctions if Islamabad did not come clean on human rights violations.4 In conversations with her Indian counterpart Ajit Doval after the ‘cross-border attacks’, US National Security Advisor Susan Rice reportedly said that, “the US expects that Pakistan take effective action to combat and delegitimise United Nations-designated terrorist individuals and entities, including Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Muhammad, and their affiliates”.5 Media reports suggested that the US and UK even tried to prod Pakistani Prime Minister Sharif to condemn the Uri attack during his meeting with US Secretary of State John Kerry and British Prime Minister Theresa May at the side-lines of the UN General Assembly. 6

Countries such as Germany, Japan, and South Korea also issued statements condemning the incident and expressed support for India’s stand on countering terrorism globally.7 Japan, in a statement condoning the incident, said: “The government of Japan strongly condemns the terrorist attack on the Indian base in Uri, Jammu and Kashmir, and extends its sincere condolences…Japan condemns terrorism in all forms regardless of its purposes and strongly reiterates that no act of terrorism can be justified.”8 Germany also stands “firmly on the side of India in the fight against terrorism,” according to an official statement. 9

Key West Asian countries and members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) also issued statements condemning the Uri terrorist attack. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Qatar all issued statements on the attack. Post Uri, the Saudi Arabian Foreign Ministry stated: “The foreign ministry expressed the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's strong condemnation and denunciation of the terrorist attack that targeted an Indian military base in the Uri area of north Kashmir, killing and wounding dozens.” 10 The UAE’s “Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation renewed the country’s firm stand against terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and expressed… solidarity with the Republic of India and support to all actions it may take to confront and eradicate terrorism.” 11 News media also reported that the “UAE and Bahrain have, in their statements, even supported any action by India to confront, eradicate and fight terrorism — at a time when Delhi is discussing a range of military, diplomatic, political and economic options to retaliate against Pakistan.” 12 Statements from these OIC members are significant since they have traditionally supported Pakistan’s stand on Kashmir and the OIC itself was doing so with respect to the recent unrest in the Valley. The “OIC Secretary General Iyad Ameen Madani [had] expressed concern over the situation in Kashmir and called for an immediate cessation of atrocities by India, urging the Indian government for peaceful settlement of the dispute ‘in accordance with wishes of Kashmiri people and the UNSC resolutions’.” 13

In the immediate aftermath of the surgical strike, the US reiterated its support for India’s fight in combating terrorism and sought to clarify the need for de-escalation of hostilities by both sides. 14 Meanwhile, media reports suggested that China’s reaction to the strikes came two days after Pakistan dispatched two special envoys on Kashmir to Beijing to drum up support for its position. “As shared neighbour and friend to both India and Pakistan, we are concerned about continuous confrontation and tensions between India and Pakistan,” foreign ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang was quoted as saying. He added, “we call on all relevant parties to exercise restraint and refrain from actions that would escalate tension.” 15 However, on the side-lines, the news of China blocking a tributary of the Brahmaputra river in Tibet at a time when India's reported decision to suspend talks with Pakistan under the Indus Water Treaty in response to the Uri attacks did not go unnoticed.16 Co-incidentally, China also continued with its decision to extend its technical "hold" on a UN resolution to ban the Jaish-e-Mohammed leader Masood Azhar. The resolution to ban him was co-sponsored by the US, UK, France and India, with 14 other countries acquiescing. China was the only one to block it with a technical hold.17

Russia came out strongly in support of Indian action saying Moscow stood for “decisive struggle against terrorism in all its manifestations.” The Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson added, in a statement, that “we expect that the Government of Pakistan should take effective steps in order to stop the activities of terrorist groups in the territory of the country.”18 In another explicit statement of support, given to a news network, the Russian Ambassador in New Delhi, Alexander Kadakin, said, “the greatest human rights violations take place when terrorists attack military installations and attack peaceful civilians in India. We welcome the surgical strike. Every country has right to defend itself.”19,” Russian Ambassador Alexander M Kadakin’s interview to CNN-News18, 03 October 2016, accessed on October 4, 2016.

Within South Asia, India found support from all its other neighbours. After its decision to boycott the SAARC summit which was due to be held in Pakistan in November, Bhutan, Afghanistan, Maldives and Sri Lanka all pulled out citing “concerns on terrorism” and the lack of a “conducive atmosphere” for the forum.20 In fact, Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s government came out in explicit support of India’s operations saying in a statement that “India has got all legal, internationally accepted right to make a response to any attack on her sovereignty and her soil.”21 The Afghan Ambassador to India, Shaida Mohammed Abdali, supported India’s response, saying that “it is time to take bold action.”22 While official statements from the Maldives government condemned international terrorism in generic terms, the Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) led by former President Mohamed Nasheed lauded India’s mature response and demanded that “Pakistan (must) combat and delegitimise terror groups in the region.” 23

Keeping up the momentum on the diplomatic offensive, India’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Syed Akbaruddin, said that while Pakistan had reached out to the UN Chief and the 15-nation Council over the issues of the surgical strike and Kashmir, its call for intervention by the world body has not found any resonance as there was no further discussion on the matter. 24 India had seized the initiative first, by briefing top envoys of 25 countries including the US, China, Russia, the UK and France on the ‘context of the strike’ after the Indian Army had concluded its operations.25
Successful Strategic Communication and Unity of Response

The operation stood out particularly for the clarity with which information about the surgical strike was presented in the public domain. The narrative was precise, had clarity of purpose, and showed the unity of response in the military, political and diplomatic wings of the government. The messaging was clear: this was a limited strike to pre-empt terrorists from entering India, the target were terrorists and not the Pakistan Army, India had acted within its rights and the Indian Army was in constant touch with its Pakistani counterpart to ensure that there was no ratcheting up of tensions. The combined press briefing conducted by the Director General of Military Operations and the Spokesperson of the Ministry of External Affairs left no ambiguity about the limited scope of the operation and its demonstrative nature, and built upon the official narrative that had shored in international diplomatic capital post the Uri attacks. The Indian establishment had clearly taken lessons post the Myanmar operation and projected a unity of response across the various wings of the government.

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby Gyan » 13 Oct 2016 18:06

jamwal wrote:
Gyan wrote:Anyone who has seen Himalayan Mountain Range even as a tourist knows that there is no chance of the border being ever sealed. Not to mention terrorists use night time, forest cover, bad weather, cover fire etc to infiltrate.

Mountainous terrain in all sectors is not identical. It can be done in some sectors, but not possible in others.


I meant to say the mountain range "as a whole" cannot be "fully sealed" at "all times".

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby Aditya G » 13 Oct 2016 21:49

Question to analysts: have public admission of punitive loc strikes (like op ginger) provided legitimacy to the same? Parrikar said that these are on initiative of local commander and GoI is only informed of same post facto. So are these strikes considered acceptable? There is not a squeak of protest against op ginger unlike surgical strikes (oh India the eternal irony)

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby Aditya G » 24 Nov 2016 01:16

Shivshankar Menon's take on options post 26/11. His justifications to not pursue kinetic options don't make sense to me.

He must have written this before Surgical Strike. We have seen the strategic results from it, which tells me how detached from reality was complete UPA gorment including Mr. Menon.

http://www.livemint.com/Leisure/29lXP57 ... tacks.html

I am often asked, “Why did India not attack Pakistan after the 26/11 attack on Mumbai?” Why did India not use overt force against Pakistan for its support of terrorism? I myself pressed at that time for immediate visible retaliation of some sort, either against the LeT in Muridke, in Pakistan’s Punjab province, or their camps in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, or against the ISI, which was clearly complicit. To have done so would have been emotionally satisfying and gone some way toward erasing the shame of the incompetence that India’s police and security agencies displayed in the glare of the world’s television lights for three full days.

During and after the attack, a series of informal discussions and meetings in government took place that considered our responses. The then national security adviser, M.K. Narayanan, organized the review of our military and other kinetic options with the political leadership, and the military chiefs outlined their views to the prime minister. As foreign secretary, I saw my task as one of assessing the external and other implications and urged both external affairs minister Pranab Mukherjee and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that we should retaliate, and be seen to retaliate, to deter further attacks, for reasons of international credibility and to assuage public sentiment.

For me, Pakistan had crossed a line, and that action demanded more than a standard response. My preference was for overt action against LeT headquarters in Muridke or the LeT camps in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and covert action against their sponsors, the ISI. Mukherjee seemed to agree with me and spoke publicly of all our options being open. In these discussions we considered our options, the likely Pakistani response, and the escalation that could occur.

But on sober reflection and in hindsight, I now believe that the decision not to retaliate militarily and to concentrate on diplomatic, covert, and other means was the right one for that time and place...

The simple answer to why India did not immediately attack Pakistan is that after examining the options at the highest levels of government, the decision makers concluded that more was to be gained from not attacking Pakistan than from attacking it. :roll:

Let’s consider what might have happened had India attacked Pakistan. Most immediately, the fact of a terrorist attack from Pakistan on India with official involvement on the Pakistan side would have been obscured. Instead, as far as the world was concerned, the incident would have become just another India-Pakistan dispute. India had some experience with this ho-hum reaction when it took Pakistani aggression by so-called tribal raiders in Kashmir in 1947 to the UN Security Council. The evidence clearly showed the involvement of the Pakistan Army in the invasion, but the UN Security Council chose to play politics and to treat aggressor and victim similarly, and imposed a cease-fire. Ultimately the UN Security Council’s intervention only made finding a solution, and eliminating aggression, more complicated. Faced with a dispute between two traditional rivals, the world’s default response is to call for peace and to split the blame and credit 50:50 in the name of fairness or even-handedness. This was just what the Pakistan Army wanted. Its first reaction during the attack itself was to approach the United States and the United Kingdom asking that India be restrained from launching a war between two nuclear weapon states (NWS).

An Indian attack on Pakistan would have united Pakistan behind the Pakistan Army, which was in increasing domestic disrepute, disagreed on India policy with the civilian elected government under President Asif Zardari, and was half-heartedly acting against only those terrorist groups in Pakistan that attacked it. An attack on Pakistan would also have weakened the civilian government in Pakistan, which had just been elected to power and which sought a much better relationship with India than the Pakistan Army was willing to consider. Zardari’s foreign minister, Shah Mehmood Qureshi, was actually visiting Delhi on the night the attack began. The Pakistan minister of information, Sherry Rehman, who admitted publicly that Kasab was a Pakistani, soon lost her job under pressure from the army. In fact, the Pakistan Army mobilized troops and moved them to the India-Pakistan border immediately before the attack began, then cried wolf about an Indian mobilization. Once again, a war scare, and maybe even a war itself, was exactly what the Pakistan Army wanted to buttress its internal position, which had been weakened after Gen. Pervez Musharraf’s last few disastrous years as president.

A limited strike on selected terrorist targets—say, the LeT headquarters in Muridke or the LeT camps in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir—would have had limited practical utility and hardly any effect on the organization, as U.S. missile strikes on al Qaeda in Khost, Afghanistan, in August 1998 in retaliation for the bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania had shown. The LeT camps were tin sheds and huts, which could be rebuilt easily. Collateral civilian damage was almost certain since the camps, and particularly the LeT buildings in Muridke, had deliberately been sited near or beside hospitals and schools. Even if there were no civilian casualties from Indian actions, casualties could nonetheless be alleged and produced by the ISI. The real problem was the official and social support that terrorist groups in Pakistan such as the LeT were receiving, and that was not likely to stop because of such a limited strike.

Official support also meant that the prospect of bringing the perpetrators of the attack in Pakistan to justice were near zero, and would be even lower once an Indian attack took place. So this consideration was really irrelevant to the decision.

And a war, even a successful war, would have imposed costs and set back the progress of the Indian economy just when the world economy in November 2008 was in an unprecedented financial crisis that seemed likely to lead to another Great Depression.

Now let’s consider what did occur when India chose not to attack Pakistan. By not attacking Pakistan, India was free to pursue all legal and covert means to achieve its goals of bringing the perpetrators to justice, uniting the international community to force consequences on Pakistan for its behaviour and to strengthen the likelihood that such an attack would not take place again. The international community could not ignore the attack and fail to respond, however half-heartedly, in the name of keeping the peace between two NWS. The UN Security Council put senior LeT members involved in the attack on sanctions lists as terrorists.

Pakistan itself did as little as it could against the perpetrators. The terrorists had been motivated and briefed personally by Hafiz Saeed, the head of LeT (which had renamed itself Jamaat-ud-Dawa) and were trained by Pakistan Army officers. The immediate Pakistani reaction to international and Indian pressure was to show Pakistani police officers locking Jamaat-ud-Dawa offices and to briefly place Hafiz Saeed under house arrest. But he was released in early June 2009 and is now treated by the Pakistani authorities and media as a respected social and political leader. David Coleman Headley, the U.S. national of Pakistani origin who, by his own account, undertook seven reconnaissance visits to Mumbai for the ISI and LeT, has given testimony to an Indian court about two previous failed attempts by the LeT that same year to attack Mumbai, and of the direct involvement of the ISI in planning the reconnaissance, choosing the targets, and training and equipping the attackers. In May 2009, we were given a report by the Pakistan Federal Investigation Agency that acknowledged that the Mumbai attack was mounted from inside Pakistan by the “defunct LeT.” Despite this, after India presented Pakistan with undeniable evidence, evidence that the Indian Supreme Court found sufficiently credible to sentence Kasab to death, the Pakistanis still prevaricated, raised questions, sought clarifications, and finally arrested only seven lower-level members of the LeT. The seniormost detainee was Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, the military operations head of the LeT, but he was allowed to carry on his business from inside the jail, using a cell phone and receiving visitors. On January 9, 2015, he was even granted bail of U.S. $3,100 by a High Court. The other masterminds remain at large in Pakistan. Lists of 37 people in Pakistan involved in the attack have been given to Pakistan. The LeT simply carries on its deadly business under its changed name of Jamaat-ud-Dawa. The perpetrators of the Mumbai attack have yet to face justice in Pakistan, despite serial promises, including some made by National Security Adviser Sartaj Aziz to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in 2014, that they would be sentenced in two to three months.

We have had much greater success dealing with those connected with the attacks when they traveled outside Pakistan, and with those in Spain, Italy, and elsewhere who helped equip them with communications and other equipment. According to media reports, Sheikh Abdul Khwaja, handler of the 26/11 attack and Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami (HuJI) chief of operations for India, was subsequently picked up in Colombo, Sri Lanka, and brought to Hyderabad and formally arrested in January 2010. Zaibuddin Ansari (aka Abu Hamza, aka Abu Jundal) was arrested at the Delhi airport on June 25, 2012, after he was deported from Saudi Arabia. But the list of those responsible is long. India originally named 37 suspects, including two Pakistan Army officers in the case, to which the names of David Headley and Rana were subsequently added.

The real success was in organizing the international community, in isolating Pakistan, and in making counterterrorism cooperation against the LeT effective. India began to get unprecedented cooperation from Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf countries, and China, too, began to respond to requests for information on these groups. Equally, success could be measured in dogs that did not bark in the night, in avoiding the outcomes that would have resulted from a decision to attack Pakistani targets and the high probability of war ensuing from such a decision.

Internally, there was clearly a need to tighten laws and build institutions against terrorism. The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act was passed unanimously in December 2008, the National Investigation Agency was established, and a national counterterrorism center was proposed, which is still to be created. Other steps to ensure coordinated use of intelligence and counterterrorism actions were also taken.

Interestingly, the attack united India as no other event except a war had done. Sensing this, the political parties did not make the attack and India’s response an issue in the general election campaign that followed within a few months, and the center-left United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government was voted back into power in May 2009.

All the same, should another such attack be mounted from Pakistan, with or without visible support from the ISI or the Pakistan Army, it would be virtually impossible for any government of India to make the same choice again. Pakistan’s prevarications in bringing the perpetrators to justice and its continued use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy after 26/11 have ensured this. In fact, I personally consider some public retribution and a military response inevitable. The circumstances of November 2008 no longer exist and are unlikely to be replicated in the future.

Excerpted from Choices: Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy (256 pages, Rs 599) by Shivshankar Menon, with permission from Penguin Random House.

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby ranjan.rao » 24 Nov 2016 02:13

^^the problem with such logical and coherent analyses is that they ignore a thing called H&D. If Americans and Britishers had done such flawless cost benefit analysis and not pursued their belief in "Free and Fair world" in WW1/WW2 then for all we know, "The Man on High Castle" would have been a reality.

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby Karan M » 25 Nov 2016 01:27

that entire article is an exercise in denial

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby Prem » 25 Nov 2016 01:58

Not mere pinpricks
Shireen M Mazari
I
ndia’s new strategy is a dangerous adventurism but it has been fuelled by the diplomatic support it has received from Washington and other capitals (with even Japan now signing a civil-nuclear agreement with India) and Pakistan’s inability to show an assertive diplomatic-political response.So India’s new strategy is to keep giving Pakistan nosebleeds along the LoC and WB, gradually upping the ante through the use of naval power before a final push through a rapid land attack – confronting Pakistan on multiple fronts in rapid succession. Cold Start was focused on a rapid land move but the new strategy encompasses a multiple level rapid attack after a gradual build up – thereby having a built-in element of surprise.Unfortunately, Pakistan has misread the signals and failed to formulate a holistic strategic response encompassing military and politico-diplomatic options. India is playing a dangerous chicken game with Pakistan but it needs to realise that nuclear antagonists cannot be locked in a zero sum game environment. Their survival is linked together now. :rotfl: Pakistan needs to send this message clearly to both India and its allies by formulating strong, unambiguous policies and response


https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/167250 ... -pinpricks

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby Aditya G » 25 Nov 2016 02:23

^ death thru a thousand nose bleeds?

I like this phrase

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby srin » 26 Nov 2016 02:01

Aditya G wrote:Shivshankar Menon's take on options post 26/11. His justifications to not pursue kinetic options don't make sense to me.

He must have written this before Surgical Strike. We have seen the strategic results from it, which tells me how detached from reality was complete UPA gorment including Mr. Menon.

http://www.livemint.com/Leisure/29lXP57 ... tacks.html

To have done so would have been emotionally satisfying and gone some way toward erasing the shame of the incompetence that India’s police and security agencies displayed in the glare of the world’s television lights for three full days.

:shock: And this guy was our NSA ? The incompetence was with Govt, first holding up NSG at Manesar and then arranging BEST buses at Mumbai airport. And I hope he can talk about this incompetence with a straight face while looking Tukaram Ombale's family in the eye.

[...]
An Indian attack on Pakistan would have united Pakistan behind the Pakistan Army, which was in increasing domestic disrepute, disagreed on India policy with the civilian elected government under President Asif Zardari, and was half-heartedly acting against only those terrorist groups in Pakistan that attacked it. An attack on Pakistan would also have weakened the civilian government in Pakistan, which had just been elected to power and which sought a much better relationship with India than the Pakistan Army was willing to consider.
Why is rescuing Pakistan's civilian govt even a foreign policy objective for us. We don't have any bones in that game. We want to both of them gone

A limited strike on selected terrorist targets—say, the LeT headquarters in Muridke or the LeT camps in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir—would have had limited practical utility and hardly any effect on the organization, as U.S. missile strikes on al Qaeda in Khost, Afghanistan, in August 1998 in retaliation for the bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania had shown. The LeT camps were tin sheds and huts, which could be rebuilt easily. Collateral civilian damage was almost certain since the camps, and particularly the LeT buildings in Muridke, had deliberately been sited near or beside hospitals and schools. Even if there were no civilian casualties from Indian actions, casualties could nonetheless be alleged and produced by the ISI. The real problem was the official and social support that terrorist groups in Pakistan such as the LeT were receiving, and that was not likely to stop because of such a limited strike.

He doesn't say why we couldn't hit the official supporters of LeT too

Interestingly, the attack united India as no other event except a war had done. Sensing this, the political parties did not make the attack and India’s response an issue in the general election campaign that followed within a few months, and the center-left United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government was voted back into power in May 2009.
And that's a mistake we shouldn't ever repeat


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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby Aditya G » 26 Nov 2016 04:57

UPA was a dark dark time for India. The damage caused to our national security during the time was tremendous.

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby Rakesh » 26 Nov 2016 07:00

Aditya: The UPA was the final nail in the coffin for India's security. The Congress has been building that coffin for six decades now. Starting with Nehru's foolhardiness which was continued with Indira's nearsightedness and Rajiv's stupidity, India got the shaft each and every time. I come from a family of Congress-only supporters, but the proof is in the pudding. It would be challenging to vote for them again. I have never voted in India though. If only Sardar Patel was PM, all of Kashmir would be with India today. Somebody cursed us with Nehru.

P.S. Can you imagine if Rahul was P.M. today? Send me to Siberia somebody!

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby Aditya G » 26 Nov 2016 15:33

Praveen Swami with his latest. I would ignore most of the article because it is mostly conjecture, but there is an interesting possibility of a limited war in Neelum Valley.

We should examine retaking of PoK in terms of slices, peaks or even Posts as a Retaliation Option.

http://indianexpress.com/article/explai ... m-4392082/

....

This means Pakistan’s forces wouldn’t be able to defend the LoC should India choose to wage a limited war along the Neelum valley. With over 2,00,000 troops committed to counter-insurgency in the country’s north-west, Pakistan’s generals are also hard pressed for troops.

Like Vajpayee, Modi is hoping the threat of war will compel Pakistan to leash the terrorists it has let out of their pens. Both sides, though, seem determined not to blink first. It is a dangerous game. Force is a useful instrument, but it also seduces. Even small missteps or miscalculations could, only too easily, lead to war.

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby Rakesh » 26 Nov 2016 19:24

India’s response was so strong that Pakistan pleaded with us to stop: Parrikar
http://m.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-s-response-was-so-strong-that-pakistan-pleaded-with-us-to-stop-manohar-parrikar/story-atS3xnkkPnytssMxZyJyzM.html

Coming from the RM, this is huge. The pigs felt pain. Thank You!!!


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