India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby Rakesh » 16 Jan 2017 21:23


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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby Rakesh » 18 Jan 2017 21:57

India's surgical strike was a calibrate and responsible move: US Assistant Secretary of State
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/nisha-biswal-india-surgical-strike-us-assistant-secretary-of-state-china-jem/1/857292.html

A key member of Barack Obama's diplomatic team, Nisha Biswal said that India should act when it is needed to defend its people but also prevent escalation. The US Assistant Secretary of State spoke exclusively to India Today.

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby Karthik S » 18 Jan 2017 22:05

A lot has happened since that SS. It has almost become irrelevant in that it didn't stop further attacks and nor did we retaliate similarly again.

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby Aditya G » 06 Mar 2017 02:48

http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/ ... outh-asia/

NO PEACE AND NO WAR IN SOUTH ASIA?

by Michael Krepon | January 29, 2017 | 8 Comments

George Perkovich and Toby Dalton have assessed the possibilities of conflict between India and Pakistan in a timely book, Not War, Not Peace? Motivating Pakistan to Prevent Cross-Border Terrorism (Oxford, 2016). Their bottom line is reflected in the title: India’s confrontation with Pakistan “is neither war nor peace, but rather a chronic contest of wills occasionally punctuated by bursts of violence.” Will the violence remain contained? Yes, if rational actors act on the basis of rational analysis. But there would have been no wars in 1965, 1971, and 1999, and no crises in 2001 and 2008, if rational actors and rational analysis had prevailed.

George and Toby’s book was not well received in Pakistan, where there is great sensitivity about being typecast as the instigator of tensions and conflict, without due regard for Indian misdeeds. Another complaint is that the authors have laid before India a menu of retaliatory choices against Pakistan – as if these options would not have occurred to New Delhi. This book was also not warmly welcomed in India, where advice from U.S. analysts can be viewed as condescending. Such are the hazards of Washington-based NGOs focusing on nuclear dangers on the subcontinent. George and Toby deal with this situation by not making final recommendations, but their inferences can be easily drawn.

India shares blame with Pakistan for the mess created since Partition. New Delhi has not been generous in its dealings with Pakistan, especially over the disputed and divided territory of Kashmir. Pakistan’s military and intelligence services will not let this issue rest. Since the late 1980s, payback usually has taken the form of strikes against Indian targets by extremist groups that have taken up residency in Pakistan. Consequently, war scares on the subcontinent begin with actions emanating from Pakistan; wars depend on how New Delhi reacts.

While George and Toby’s book has been caricatured as being anti-Pakistan, it is actually addressed to Indian decision makers. At the book’s core is a deeply cautionary assessment about the dangers of Indian military retaliation. In the event of another significant attack, this book’s message may well be drowned out by vitriolic social and television media. Strident voices in India carried out a practice run after the September attack on a military outpost at Uri by the usual suspects, to which Prime Minister Narendra Modi responded – to much national jubilation – with publicized commando raids across the Kashmir divide.

One of the book’s conclusions is that “the two states’ possession of survivable nuclear arsenals makes conventional war mutually suicidal.” Short of victory, what would constitute an advantageous outcome for India? One that, in George and Toby’s estimation, would “leave Pakistan’s civilian and military leaders and institutions with the motivation and sufficient capabilities necessary to control anti-Indian terror organizations.” (Italics in the original.)

Successful retaliation, would, in the authors’ view, accomplish the following objectives:

Satisfy a “domestic political-psychological need for punishment”;
Motivate Pakistani authorities to act against extremist anti-India groups;
Deter Pakistani authorities from escalating conflict in reaction to India’s punitive moves; and
Bring the conflict to a close in ways that do not leave India worse off than before it began.
For purposes of analysis, George and Toby posit five “ideal-type” options that Indian leaders might contemplate to achieve these objectives. (In reality, they understand that hybrid choices are available.) Option one is army-centric “Cold Start” operations. Option two is limited air strikes. Option three is a symmetrical response utilizing sub-conventional warfare and covert operations to foment insurgency in Pakistan. Option four is enhancing India’s nuclear capabilities and revising its nuclear doctrine to complement conventional options, thereby dissuading Pakistan from escalating across the nuclear threshold. The fifth option is a combination of Indian strategic restraint, as was the case after the 2001 Parliament attack and the 2008 Mumbai attack, combined with a strategy of “non-violent compellence” via diplomatic means to “isolate and punish Pakistan economically, politically, and morally.”

George and Toby pour cold water on Cold Start, a doctrine to which the new Indian Army Chief has expressed fealty. In their view, army-centric warfare is a poor way to engineer the objective of giving civilian leaders in Pakistan a leg up in policy making over the Pakistan Army. (This objective would require a decisive win on the battlefield, which would, in turn, invite mushroom clouds.) Another limited conventional war – this time initiated by India – could well end in stalemate, which would be deemed a victory by Pakistan. It would also strengthen links between Pakistan’s military and intelligence services and extremist groups. Moreover, this option is conducive to escalation, leaving India worse off than before resorting to a clash of arms.

The authors are also skeptical about the net effects of the air-power option. Air power alone rarely accomplishes strategic gains, let alone the more modest tactical objectives against which success might be measured on the subcontinent. The air-power option also invites escalation. The authors’ bottom line is that, “the surface attraction of limited, precise airborne strikes is offset significantly, if not equally, by risks and [Indian Air Force] inadequacies.”

As for covert operations directed against Pakistan, the authors reason that they are “the most proportionate and least escalatory policy for India to pursue.” Employing this option would, however, forfeit India’s high ground as being the victim and not the perpetrator of terrorist acts – once plausible deniability has been lost. Moreover, Pakistan may have stronger cards to play than India in this domain. As with other options, applying significant pain would invite significant responses. And this option, like those before it, would bind Pakistani authorities even closer to extremist groups.

The authors also have their doubts about the utility of beefing up India’s capability for nuclear war-fighting options to complement conventional military operations, dissuade Pakistan from crossing the nuclear threshold, and to control escalation in the event this threshold is crossed. This option would require nothing less than a significant change in Indian strategic culture, followed by a far more effective and coherent strategy of military planning, procurement, and operational follow through than India has demonstrated to date. And if all of this could be overcome, the dilemma of escalation control would remain.

The fifth option, “non-violent compellence,” built upon UN Security Council Resolution 1373, also faces difficulties. UNSC 1373 was a Chapter VII initiative after 9/11, obligating all states to prevent their territory from being used by extremist groups to recruit, organize, train, fundraise, and carry out attacks. Pakistan is clearly in violation of this Resolution, but retains the protection of China to deflect penalties. Pakistani authorities are quite sensitive about being isolated, and creative ways are available to apply pressure, as noted in this book. To succeed, however, a campaign of non-violent compellence requires Washington’s support and New Delhi’s willingness to negotiate on Kashmir. The authors assess that the risks of non-violent compellence are low compared to other options, but their probable benefits are comparatively limited, as well. Nonetheless, there is untapped potential for New Delhi in this space.

One value of this important book lies in its interviews with experienced sources in both countries. Another is the high quality of the authors’ analysis. They note that, “Pakistan finds itself falling further behind India in all measures of well-being, security, and reputation.” But Pakistan’s military and intelligence services have measured national security in different ways, and pride themselves in being ahead of India in nuclear and sub-conventional warfare capabilities. Consequently, it will be hard to alter the prospects for an intensified nuclear arms competition and an unstable equilibrium on the subcontinent.

The authors anticipate that Modi would adopt a “Chinese menu” approach to the next significant provocation emanating from Pakistan, drawing from options two, three and five. That Modi retaliated to the Uri attack in a lesser fashion with commando raids suggests that he is mindful of escalatory pressures. But escalation will be hard to avoid, depending on the extent of future injuries incurred. The way out of the current mess therefore begins with demonstrable steps by Rawalpindi to prevent sparks that can lead to escalation and war. These steps will not be sustainable unless New Delhi responds with sustained and meaningful diplomatic engagement.


from comments:

Tariq Osman Hyder (History)
January 30, 2017 at 12:51 pm
In the original book by George Perkovich andToby Dalton , which I read with interest, the Authors, whom I know and like as family friends that we value although we have differences on policy ,had not given much credence to Pakistan’s firm belief that India was mounting a destabilisation campaign through Afghanistan ( and in concert with it allay the Afghan Intelligence Service) in Pakistan’s border regions.UNSC 1373 cuts both ways. This destabilisation has been a longstanding Indian policy dating back to 1947 and support for Afghan irredentist claims against Pakistan. In the first round of the Joint Anti Terrorism talks with India in 2006, I gave the Indian side chapter and verse of some of these then recent attempts and actions including the recruitment by an identified Indian official in Afghanistan of a Pakistani tribesman to mount a bomb attack on the USA Ambassador on Kabul or failing that the Defence Attache to provoke a USA reaction against Pakistan. One would have though that when the authors returned to the fray recently in updating their thesis, they would have mentioned as it probably occurred after they wrote the book of the uncovering in Pakistan of a senior Indian Intellegence operative from India, a serving Naval Officer based under cover in Iran in Charbehar whose task it was to further this destabalisation campaign by supporting certain insurgents and terrorist elements in Baluchistan.It is the prerogative of the authors to write a book on 101 ways to pressure Pakistan ostendibly for its own good and that of India but its relevance, credibility and acceptability would require a modicum of balance and recognition empirical evidence across both borders.Ambassador Tariq Osman Hyder

George Perkovich (History)
February 1, 2017 at 11:17 am
Tariq, my dear friend, in the past, evidence presented by Pakistan regarding suspected Indian operatives/terrorists was difficult to substantiate. But let us accept that the Indian naval officer arrested for spying was in fact facilitating various misdeeds in Balochistan. Our analysis in the book indicates that this is/would be a natural tactic for India to pursue, and indeed one we expected. We also analyze how the tactic could be relatively less risky than other responses to Pakistan-based terrorism. At the same time, we suggest that the conduct of covert operations, especially violent ones that harm civilians, could have negative effects on Indian interests. The book also recounts what we could learn about the history of Indian conduct of covert operations in Pakistan. We recognize any empirical evidence we see, and have no qualms about saying that India would increase covert operations. It’s an obvious thing to do in response to subconventional campaigns by Pakistan. If Pakistan gets some satisfaction from saying, “see, the Indians do it too,” this also is to be expected. Yet, it doesn’t solve anything. That’s sort of our point, as you know. Take care!

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby Aditya G » 07 May 2017 00:33

Superb piece suggesting India expand retaliatory measures - say retake Haji Pir pass/

http://www.orfonline.org/expert-speaks/ ... stan-army/

Escalate to deter the Pakistan army

RAJESH RAJAGOPALAN

As the Indian government considers how to respond to Pakistan army’s latest provocations, it should keep in mind that proportional retaliation will prove to be no more than a temporary slave. The key is to convince the Pakistan army that India will not hesitate to escalate, and that the Pakistan army will not win the escalation race. Though military escalation will be painful to both sides, and there are always uncertainties in any military venture, Pakistan army’s leadership has repeatedly demonstrated that its threats to escalate are not matched by its actual behaviour, which has been far more cautious. The Pakistan army leadership, rightly, fears escalation more than its rhetoric lets on, and this provides India a deterrence leverage that it needs to take advantage of.

Escalation is the only real option that India has to deter the Pakistan army. Diplomacy is useful to an extent, and it is important for India to make its case to the rest of the world. But diplomacy will not solve the terrorism problem. It is foolish for India to expect that one more bilateral statement with some visiting foreign leader will change the Pakistan army’s calculations. Even states that agree with India about the Pakistan problem will not do much because this is not their problem. In this, they are no different than India: it is not as if New Delhi is going to help any other country with their terrorism problem either

The other aspect of diplomacy, bilateral diplomacy with Pakistan, also offers no solution. Most importantly, though India should always be open to negotiations, expecting that bilateral diplomacy with the civilian leadership in Pakistan will solve the Kashmir problem is foolish because Pakistan’s civilian leadership have little control over the Pakistan army, especially when it comes to India or Kashmir. This is well-known, and has been demonstrated clearly and often.

In addition, there are no magical solutions that some back-channels can come up with, that will solve either the Kashmir problem or the India-Pakistan problem. And of course, these problems are not the same. The India-Pakistan problem, rooted in the imbalance of power in the region, will persist even if the Kashmir problem is resolved, though that is not to suggest that no effort must be made to solve at least the Kashmir problem. It is also silly to cut off talks or sports or other interactions with Pakistan every time there is some transgression because all this does is illustrate Indian helplessness, not strength or confidence. India should always be open to talks and negotiations with Pakistan, even as it responds forcefully to every assault from the Pakistan army.

Because it is the Pakistan army that controls the levers of terrorism against India, India’s deterrence policy should focus on the Pakistan army. The aim should be to deter the Pakistan army from seeing terrorism as a no-cost option by threatening — and when needed, imposing — a very high cost on the Pakistan army for such behaviour.

So far, India’s military response has failed to put the Pakistan army, the only arbiter of its India policy, under adequate pressure. India’s exaggerated fear of escalation has been a serious constraint. Until the “surgical strikes” last year, New Delhi’s fear of escalation was so great that it did not acknowledge military retaliation even when it took them. So openly owning to such retaliatory strikes was a significant breakthrough. But it is also necessary to acknowledge that, outside of publicising it, these strikes were not very different from the other border actions that the Indian forces had carried out before {I disagree with the author here. The surgical strikes were a command level operations with multiple simultaneus strikes involving multiple battalions, including 2 SF units themselves.}. More importantly, the retaliatory attacks in September 2016 were carefully calibrated, and also appears to have been designed to signal that India did not want to escalate further, as I pointed out then. The India attack was shallow, targeted mostly terrorists rather than the Pakistan army and it did not attempt to seize territory, characteristics similar to previous Indian retaliatory strikes. The strikes were escalatory only in relation to previous Indian behaviour, not in relation to Pakistan’s actions itself. Considering that Pakistan had ordered a direct attack on an Indian army camp, resulting in the death of seventeen Indian soldiers, an escalatory response should have been much more severe. But the limited aim of the surgical strike was understandable because India was already making a significant change in policy and signaling resolve by publicising the strikes. But such a limited response will not suffice this time; escalation would need to be in relation to Pakistan’s behaviour rather than to standard expectations of Indian behaviour.

India’s exaggerated fear of escalation has been a serious constraint. Until the “surgical strikes” last year, New Delhi’s fear of escalation was so great that it did not acknowledge military retaliation even when it took them.


India’s reluctance to escalate so far is surprising for two reasons. One is that, logically, it is the stronger state that has the option to escalate. India’s conventional military superiority may not be as great as it should be given that India’s GDP is almost eight times as large as Pakistan’s and India’s military budget is about seven times larger but it is clearly the stronger side in the equation. And in a short offensive with specific territorial targets (such as the Haji Pir pass, for example), {Good one - it is time we try occupy area i.e. reverse kargil} India’s current superiority should be sufficient, especially since India should be able to gain tactical surprise. The Pakistan army may know that India is gearing up for an attack along the LoC, but it will not know where that attack might come. In short, the stronger side has more options, and a bigger margin for error, and India needs to recognise it.

The second is that despite all the rhetoric about Pakistan’s propensity to escalate, Rawalpindi has repeatedly chosen not to escalate. In Kargil, when India employed its air force, Pakistan complained and warned of escalation dangers but chose not to escalate. And the Pakistan army simply abandoned its Northern Light Infantry (NLI) troops. Similarly, in 2016, India’s surgical strike did not lead to any escalation by the Pakistan army, despite almost two decades of constant threats to escalate. In between, there have been repeated artillery duels and cross-LoC raids, not one of which the Pakistan army escalated. If the Pakistan army was really so trigger-happy to escalate, it has had plenty of opportunity. That it has not so far escalated suggests that Pakistan army leadership knows that it will face significant and disproportionate cost if it escalated. Indian military superiority might not be great enough to give it an easy win over Pakistan, but it is difficult to imagine Pakistan winning either.

This is the key issue. To the extent that Pakistan cannot win, there is little incentive for the Pakistan army to escalate. Much of the argument about escalation between India and Pakistan is based on the assumption that the Pakistan army will climb all these steps on the ladder, doubling-down on a losing bet until escalation reaches the nuclear level. But each of these steps represent an expensive and irrational gamble, and the Pakistani army leadership is not irrational. They have made bad bets — Operation Grand Slam and Kargil definitely were — but they have shown no propensity to double down when their initial gamble failed. Rather, they have usually chosen to walk away and find another game to play. {Tactic known as downhill skiing in BRF}

Pakistan army’s behaviour is perfectly rational: as is well-recognised, its domestic legitimacy is built on its role as defender of the Islamic Republic against India. If it cannot perform this basic duty, its domestic legitimacy will suffer, as will its outsized role in national politics, economy and society. It is not without reason that Pakistan disowned the NLI troops in the Kargil war or refused to acknowledge that India had conducted a retaliatory strike last year. More than anything else, the Pakistan army fears defeat at Indian hands. Despite its rhetoric, it fears escalation because escalation carries with it the very real possibility of a just such serious defeat. Much like a Haka war dance, Pakistan’s threats are designed to intimidate but are not actual predictors of behaviour.

It is this fear of escalation, which the Pakistan army has masked behind bombastic threats, that India needs to exploit. It gives India a clear deterrence leverage. But it also requires India to look to the actual behaviour of the Pakistan army leadership rather than assume that Rawalpindi’s rhetoric is an indicator of how they will behave.

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby Aditya G » 07 May 2017 00:38

x-post.

Several thinkers have proposed options to GOI. Perplexing as to why we are not exercising any? Why hasnt GOI use recent BAT action as a trigger to retaliate? It is good to have Army the free hand, but that doesnt mean the GOI is relieved of its job

Deans wrote:I wrote a paper on Pakistan policy last June, identifying various non military and military measures we might take. This was summarised in this article. https://swarajyamag.com/world/a-new-non-diplomatic-approach-for-pakistan
The paper has been read by some of our policy makers.
One measure that is relevant to the LOC but not mentioned in the summary, is that we complete the Tulbul water project (which we stopped
as a goodwill gesture to Pak) and will allow us to flood the Neelam valley at will, in some parts of the year (while making the Jhelum navigable
on our side).

On the LOC there is no reason why we cannot have a battle of attrition (for e.g. in the form of cross border shelling) where Pakistan,
being the smaller player, will lose disproportionately, even if both sides suffer similar military casualties.
If we move 1 of our 2 artillery divisions into the valley and all our Pinaka and Smersh regiments, we would outnumber Pak 3:1 in artillery
and would have a huge deterrent in our ability to hit places like Murzaffarabad or Mangla/Mirpur with long range rocket artillery. If we restrict
action to the LOC only, the number of villages in POK within artillery range is more than the number which are vulnerable on the Indian side.
Besides, most of ours are Kashmiri muslim villages, so targetting them is bad optics for Pak and, to put it cynically, not such a bad thing for us. Villages in Jammu are vulnerable to firing across the IB and that is where we have to take a position that an attack across the IB
will result in all out war - whereas POK is disputed territory. My sense is that Pak, for all its bluster, is in even worse shape than we are, in terms of equipment, stock levels of ammo etc and would be reluctant for any fighting to spill beyond the LOC.

Given that POK is disputed territory, I believe doing a `Kargil in reverse', as a previous poster advocated, is doable. Its a question of seizing a
relatively unimportant feature on the LOC, which we will have the ability to reinforce, if Pak wants to try and take it back. Yet, unimportant
enough for Pak to decide it can ignore it and slink away tail between legs, if it decides it does not want to risk serious casualties (and unimportant enough for the world to ignore). Doing this would force Pak to spread its forces thinner and consume greater resources guarding features it
never did earlier and send the message that we can hit them in new and unexpected ways.

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby Prasad » 07 May 2017 11:56

How does one escalate without preparation. Something like retaking Haji Pir will need extensive preparations all across the border. Preparation will be picked up and we'll be gently suggested to not go ahead and usual suspects will warn the porkis too.

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby Deans » 07 May 2017 11:56

Aditya ji, The Pakistan paper (a fairly detailed one which talks about the specifics of military action etc) has been read by some of our decision makers. The names I can mention include Gen VK Singh and the RSS think tank on foreign policy. The sense I get is that GOI knows what has to be done and some baby steps are being taken - though I too am frustrated at the pace. However, I believe GOI is up against a lot of inertia in the system (if not outright negativism from the WKK types) and a resource crunch which it is trying to correct.

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby Aditya G » 07 Jun 2017 21:57

Nice piece by Lt gen panag

http://m.hindustantimes.com/opinion/why ... paFlJ.html

(Ignore the presstitute headline)

....

India has decided to adopt a strategy of “compellence” against Pakistan through a proactive limited war. The political aim is to compel Pakistan to peace on own terms. Essentials of likely politico military strategy: the war will be initiated as a pre-emptive strategic offensive; maximum territory will be captured in POK for permanent retention; a belt of 20 kilometre relative to tactical objectives will be captured across the IB for post war negotiations; maximum damage will be caused to Pakistan’s war waging potential particularly its Air Force, Navy and mechanised forces; maximum damage will be caused to Pakistan’s economic potential; all objectives will be achieved in 10 days, however, prolonged operations may be undertaken in POK; Armed Forces must be prepared for use of Tactical Nuclear Weapons by the enemy.
....

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby Prem » 07 Jun 2017 23:08

Aditya G wrote:Nice piece by Lt gen panag

http://m.hindustantimes.com/opinion/why ... paFlJ.html

(Ignore the presstitute headline)quote]....

India has decided to adopt a strategy of “compellence” against Pakistan through a proactive limited war. The political aim is to compel Pakistan to peace on own terms. Essentials of likely politico military strategy: the war will be initiated as a pre-emptive strategic offensive; maximum territory will be captured in POK for permanent retention; a belt of 20 kilometre relative to tactical objectives will be captured across the IB for post war negotiations; maximum damage will be caused to Pakistan’s war waging potential particularly its Air Force, Navy and mechanised forces; maximum damage will be caused to Pakistan’s economic potential; all objectives will be achieved in 10 days, however, prolonged operations may be undertaken in POK; Armed Forces must be prepared for use of Tactical Nuclear Weapons by the enemy.
....
[/quote]

General is saying what we have discussed here 10 years ago.

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby Aditya G » 08 Jun 2017 02:25

Well, at this point there are 30 pages of BRF options ready and laid out! 8)

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby Aditya G » 22 Jun 2017 03:13

http://indianexpress.com/article/india/ ... e-4710860/

...

Asked whether the IAF had given options to the government about some kind of an “aerial surgical strike” inside Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK), the Air Chief said: “The use of air power in response to heinous acts or terrorist attacks is an option that is to be taken by the government. IAF is prepared for any eventuality.”

The situation on the Line of Control (LoC) has been tense over the past several weeks, particularly after two Indian soldiers were killed and beheaded last month by a Pakistan Army Border Action Team. Last year, special forces of the Army had launched surgical strikes in PoK after 19 soldiers were killed in a terror attack at Uri. The IAF was not used in that operation.

On the possible use of air power against the Maoists, Air Chief Marshal Dhanoa said: “Our roles are restricted to providing intelligence and surveillance to the forces on ground. We use the RPAs [remotely piloted aircraft] extensively in these operations for intelligence collection, as well as helicopters, mainly for speedy movement of forces between area of operations, and casualty evacuation. As far as terrorist threats are concerned, we do not envisage carrying out air attacks on our territory, to prevent any sliver of possibility for collateral damage. But we have the capability, and are in a position to strike as and when we are cleared to do so by the government.”

...

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby Bala Vignesh » 23 Jun 2017 16:56

I don't know if somebody has suggested this but why not start emulating the Pakis by employing BAT team ourselves??? Increase the composition of the the Ghatak teams in a battalion and let them go out and take out these BAT teams and capture paki officers for Interrogation​ on possible insurgencies planned.

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby Gagan » 23 Jun 2017 17:35

The Pakistanis tried a BAT team action against the Americans in the Salala Checkpost incident, and then tried to run away back to the safety of the two (terrorism support) outposts there.

The US responded by sending an AC-130, and an Apache gunship and killed everyone around - 36 officially admitted casualties by Pakistan. That put an end to all Pakistani BAT haramigiri in Kunar and Nangarhar provinces.

The US special forces did a lot more, which is never revealed. The US forces have done several surgical strikes it seems

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby nam » 23 Jun 2017 18:26

Bala Vignesh wrote:I don't know if somebody has suggested this but why not start emulating the Pakis by employing BAT team ourselves??? Increase the composition of the the Ghatak teams in a battalion and let them go out and take out these BAT teams and capture paki officers for Interrogation​ on possible insurgencies planned.


That would be waste of time and effort.

There is a much simple solution. Air strikes on the company/ brigade posts and hq.

We think of "ideas" because we dont have the b**lls to blow the Paki Company to bits.

Announce to the world, there was intruders in large numbers and we used airpower like Kargil.

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby nam » 23 Jun 2017 18:34

There will more of such incidents to the run up to Modi US visits...

Pakis know Modi cannot carry a sudden crisis on his meet with Trump, so will not respond to such provocations.

So there will no visible retaliation for such provocations.

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby Bala Vignesh » 23 Jun 2017 19:01

May be i am wrong but Wouldn't an aerial bombing of a legitimate​ pak army unit HQ(company/battalion/brigade) construe as an act of war??
In any case use of a manned fighter for this purpose is a costly​ proposition as the operational​ cost of the equipment plus munition, let alone the capital cost of the equipment which would be at risk of getting intercepted, would be high. If we can develop cheap loitering/remotely piloted munitions then it makes sense, to me.

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby ArjunPandit » 23 Jun 2017 19:22

Bala Vignesh wrote:May be i am wrong but Wouldn't an aerial bombing of a legitimate​ pak army unit HQ(company/battalion/brigade) construe as an act of war??
In any case use of a manned fighter for this purpose is a costly​ proposition as the operational​ cost of the equipment plus munition, let alone the capital cost of the equipment which would be at risk of getting intercepted, would be high. If we can develop cheap loitering/remotely piloted munitions then it makes sense, to me.

SO ARE WE DISCUSSING THE COST OF EQUIPMENT OVER OUR BRAVE MEN? :evil:

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby Bala Vignesh » 23 Jun 2017 20:36

ArjunPandit wrote:SO ARE WE DISCUSSING THE COST OF EQUIPMENT OVER OUR BRAVE MEN? :evil:

Like it or not, ArjunPanditji, we have the army and RR deployed along the LoC and IB and would continue​ to do so for the foreseeable future. In light of the above, the deployment of a BAT is less risky than that of a Fighter over PoK to bomb enemy locations.
There is no way that an equipment is more costly than the life of a person.

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby srin » 23 Jun 2017 20:44

Aditya G wrote:Superb piece suggesting India expand retaliatory measures - say retake Haji Pir pass/

http://www.orfonline.org/expert-speaks/ ... stan-army/

Escalate to deter the Pakistan army

RAJESH RAJAGOPALAN

As the Indian government considers how to respond to Pakistan army’s latest provocations, it should keep in mind that proportional retaliation will prove to be no more than a temporary slave. The key is to convince the Pakistan army that India will not hesitate to escalate, and that the Pakistan army will not win the escalation race. Though military escalation will be painful to both sides, and there are always uncertainties in any military venture, Pakistan army’s leadership has repeatedly demonstrated that its threats to escalate are not matched by its actual behaviour, which has been far more cautious. The Pakistan army leadership, rightly, fears escalation more than its rhetoric lets on, and this provides India a deterrence leverage that it needs to take advantage of.

Escalation is the only real option that India has to deter the Pakistan army.
[...]

It is this fear of escalation, which the Pakistan army has masked behind bombastic threats, that India needs to exploit. It gives India a clear deterrence leverage. But it also requires India to look to the actual behaviour of the Pakistan army leadership rather than assume that Rawalpindi’s rhetoric is an indicator of how they will behave.


I find this article extremely ironical. The article points out Pak army fears, but also wants to deter it - which means we're also fearful. Otherwise, why deter ?
So - why deter indeed ? No, we don't need deterrence. We need confrontation. We need a suitable causus belli to finish off Pak as it stands now.

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby ArjunPandit » 23 Jun 2017 21:57

Bala Vignesh wrote:
ArjunPandit wrote:SO ARE WE DISCUSSING THE COST OF EQUIPMENT OVER OUR BRAVE MEN? :evil:

Like it or not, ArjunPanditji, we have the army and RR deployed along the LoC and IB and would continue​ to do so for the foreseeable future. In light of the above, the deployment of a BAT is less risky than that of a Fighter over PoK to bomb enemy locations.
There is no way that an equipment is more costly than the life of a person.

Then why is bombing the posts or using arti is more expensive??

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby nam » 23 Jun 2017 22:47

Bala Vignesh wrote:May be i am wrong but Wouldn't an aerial bombing of a legitimate​ pak army unit HQ(company/battalion/brigade) construe as an act of war??


Infiltration in India and killing it's soldiers & people is also a act of war. 26/11 was a act of war.

I have to give it to the PA. They realize they are at war and everything is fair.

We don't.

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby Aditya G » 24 Jun 2017 22:11

nam wrote:
Bala Vignesh wrote:May be i am wrong but Wouldn't an aerial bombing of a legitimate​ pak army unit HQ(company/battalion/brigade) construe as an act of war??


Infiltration in India and killing it's soldiers & people is also a act of war. 26/11 was a act of war.

I have to give it to the PA. They realize they are at war and everything is fair.

We don't.


What construes as an act of war and what doesnt certainly seems like a grey area.

Pak BAT actions aside, IA blows up PA posts and posts video on twitter. That did not lead to war.

IA SF routinely cross LoC and extract revenge (ref Op Ginger, Surgical Strikes) and that was not seen as an act of war.

IA opened up 155mm guns on PA post 2 km inside LoC killing 7 men instantly and that was not act of war either.

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby Guddu » 24 Jun 2017 23:25

It would be great if India starts some heavy duty response while Modi is having chai-biskoot with Trump, just like Trump did to XI.

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby vasu raya » 25 Jun 2017 00:08

we need coverage of entire PoK, maybe COTS quadcopters and a whole lot of explosives be air dropped (ala Purulia) close to the targets, the drone (like a humming bird) is programmed/camera driven to place the explosives much like special forces

while we wait for the C-295 be modded to the likes of AC-130 gunship

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby pankajs » 25 Jun 2017 00:45

Let me also add my two bits.

We need to get COTS Dog robot from japan modded to look like Pigs. Let these pigs be provided with suicide vests and let loose across LOC on suicide missions against bakis and their posts.

Time permitting, I will work on a more elaborate dream sequence.

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby ParGha » 25 Jun 2017 02:07

nam wrote:There is a much simple solution. Air strikes on the company/ brigade posts and hq. We think of "ideas" because we dont have the b**lls to blow the Paki Company to bits.


A field HQ is 15-20 men, a few radios, maps, tables and chairs... often dug in and hard to spot. If you want to blow up a company in one go, your best bet is to hit them when they are rotating in or out of the sector, especially when the convoy of trucks are passing through a mountain road. Or get Mother Nature to help with an assisted avalanche or flash-flood.

As far as air-strikes go, there are reports that ISI and R&AW chiefs have an agreement dating back to early 1990s -- IAF won't launch air-strikes as long as the ISI doesn't arm the tangos with MANPADS. If this is true, then the cost of breach of this agreement is too high for both sides: it will cost India hundreds of millions (if not billions) of dollars to secure its civilian air traffic, and all of Pakistan becomes open hunting-grounds for the IAF. So forget about limited "surgical" air-strikes... it is an all-out-war or nothing proposition. For LICs, plenty of other options exist on land and at sea.

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby nam » 25 Jun 2017 02:35

We had carried out air strikes in 2002, at the peak of Op Parakram. What was Paki response? Nothing. We hammered the Neelam valley and blocked the road to Northern areas for 12 years! The Pakis could nothing. Read somewhere we shelled a brigade HQ in response to Kalachuk killings. Again, nothing happened.

If Manpads & airstrike story is true, then as usual Pakis got the better of us on the negotiating table. They get to infiltrate as much they want, while we spend huge men and resources defending against it. All Pakis loose is some drugged junkie. They don't even have to maintain the strength on LOC, like we do.

Anza Manpads were captured in Kashmir as well. So looks like Pakis did not keep their part of bargain.

May be it is time for the RAW chief to send a updated note. "No airstrike until no infiltration".

And Pakis have announced 832 civilians causalities due to our retaliation. If Pakis want a proper fight, well this reason is good enough.

Edit: Just read a An32 was targeted with a Anza manpad in 2002 in Kashmir. As usual Pakis acted like Pakis.

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby ParGha » 25 Jun 2017 03:00

-duplicate-
Last edited by ParGha on 25 Jun 2017 16:18, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby vasu raya » 25 Jun 2017 03:55

pankajs wrote:Let me also add my two bits.

We need to get COTS Dog robot from japan modded to look like Pigs. Let these pigs be provided with suicide vests and let loose across LOC on suicide missions against bakis and their posts.

Time permitting, I will work on a more elaborate dream sequence.


saabji, pakis have coverage of the valley with all the plausible deniability, we are limited to the narrow band along LoC, any longer range means employed other than artillery seems to be counted as escalatory, whoever is counting

anyways its shouldn't be incredulous that where a small camera can be attached to a quadcopter, one can attach a C4 brick...

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby Austin » 02 Jul 2017 13:06

The Swathi Weapon Locating Radar, developed by the DRDO, was used first in September 2016 to locate "firing units" of Pakistani Army, though the system was inducted officially three months later, Parrikar said.

PaK surgical strike was in planning for 15 months: Parrikar


"The starting of September 29 (2016) surgical strike on the western border was 9th of June, 2015....We planned 15 months in advance. Additional troops were trained. Equipment was procured on priority basis," he said.

The Swathi Weapon Locating Radar, developed by the DRDO, was used first in September 2016 to locate "firing units" of Pakistani Army, though the system was inducted officially three months later, Parrikar said.

It was thanks to the Swathi Radar that 40 firing units of Pakistani Army were destroyed, he added


Disclosing that the surgical strikes against PaK militants were planned 15 months in advance after the Manipur killings, he said, "I felt insulted....A small terrorist organisation of 200 people killing 18 Dogra soldiers was an insult to the Indian Army and we sat in the afternoon and sat in the evening and worked out the (plan of) first surgical strike which was conducted on 8th June morning in which about 70-80 terrorists were killed (along the India-Myanmar border)."

"It was a very successful strike," he said. On the Army's side, the only injury was a leech attaching itself to a soldier's leg.
:lol:

Contrary to some reports, no helicopters were used. "I had placed helicopters (on stand-by) only in case of emergency evacuation,
" he

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby Aditya G » 17 Sep 2017 02:19

This article from last year did not attract sufficient attention:

http://www.theweek.in/theweek/cover/cov ... ions.html#

At the height of the Kargil war in 1999, prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee summoned the director-general (security) at the cabinet secretariat for a one-to-one, hush-hush meeting. He had one question for the officer: Did he have men who could carry out an operation near Pakistan’s nuclear facility in Kahuta, located in the Himalayan foothills in their part of Punjab?

Soon after the meeting, a band of 40 bearded men in plainclothes left their base at Sarsawa in Saharanpur district in Uttar Pradesh for a remote location in Jammu and Kashmir, the terrain of which was similar to that of Kahuta. The men were part of the Special Group, India’s most elite special forces unit that was so discreet that it was considered nonexistent. Their objective: train for a suicide mission. “For almost 45 days, the men were made to run up and down the hills for the mission, which did not happen ultimately,” an intelligence officer who monitored them from Delhi told THE WEEK.

Months later, in December, the same men were placed on standby again. Terrorists had hijacked the Indian Airlines flight 814 and forced it to land in Kandahar in Afghanistan. Thanks to the efforts of officers of the Research and Analysis Wing, Iran had agreed to provide five helicopters for a planned strike on the hijackers. :eek:

Ajit Doval, the current national security adviser, was then in the Intelligence Bureau and was involved in coordinating the mission. The operatives were told to kill the Taliban members surrounding the plane, and make way for a crack team of the National Security Guard to storm the aircraft. “However, the mounting pressure from the families [of hostages] and television channels forced Vajpayee to take a call against the strike,” said the intelligence officer, who, at that time, was working closely with the Prime Minister’s Office. “Unlike today, we had the capability to strike back. The political leadership had the option of using a fully capable and proven strike force.”

The situation that India finds itself in, after the attack on the 12 Brigade headquarters in Uri in Jammu and Kashmir on September 18 this year, is very different from the crises in 1999. Perhaps, a parallel can be drawn between now and the situation after the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai. On the midnight of December 24 that year, the men, women and children in the border villages near Jodhpur in Rajasthan began packing their belongings to leave their homes for good. The reason: They had just witnessed fireworks like never before, and it wasn’t Diwali.

In New Delhi, a phone call woke up M.L. Kumawat, then director-general of the Border Security Force. On the other end of the line was an intelligence officer of the specialised G-branch of the BSF. “The villagers are leaving,” said the officer. “They say there has been a build-up of force on the Pakistani side and that the government is asking them to vacate their homes.”

Kumawat realised that the fear of war had gripped the villagers. He called officials at All India Radio and asked them to put out an announcement. “No communication has been received either by the BSF or the Rajasthan government for vacating any village along the border,” he said. “Such reports are designed to create panic where there is none.”

38-The-shadow-warriors
The following morning, the Union home ministry swung into action. Officers in forward posts were told to stamp out rumours of war, as the government knew the cost of escalating the border tension. “Once it starts, it is difficult to stop the firing,” Kumawat told THE WEEK. “One small incident can trigger a warlike situation. We can’t go by public outcry. I am glad that the Narendra Modi government has opted for a mature response.”

India’s response to the Uri attack has certainly been mature, with the government focusing on strategic and diplomatic offensives to isolate Pakistan. An all-out war has been ruled out, but plans of a more subtle kind are afoot. Intelligence officers are exploring the possibilities of carrying out covert, precision strikes on terrorist camps in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Maps have been pulled out to mark coordinates of locations like 26/11 mastermind Hafiz Saeed’s proposed gathering in Karachi and the Jamat-ud-Dawa headquarters in Muridke near Lahore. The JuD is believed to be the parent organisation of Lashkar-e-Taiba, which carried out the Mumbai attacks.

India certainly has the resources, at least on paper, to carry out covert strikes in PoK (see graphics). But the question is which of the special forces should go in, and whether they are prepared enough. Given the circumstances and the terrain involved, the Special Group appears to be the obvious choice. The SG personnel are well trained and well equipped, and have proved their mettle both on foreign soil and within India. SG, based in Sarsawa in UP, was used extensively by prime ministers Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi and Vajpayee for special operations in Kashmir and Punjab.

Staffed mostly by Para (Special Forces) officers of the Army, SG is directly under the command of the prime minister. “We were the first ones in the country to use AK-47 rifles, which were imported clandestinely from a European nation,” a former SG operative told THE WEEK.

SG’s list of successful ops is long. In the late 1980s, after Gen Hussain Muhammed Ershad captured power in Bangladesh, he held a political opponent in captivity. Even her life in prison was under threat. “The political personality was brought out from there by the Special Group under direct orders from the [Indian] prime minister,” said a source.

SG has also been used for black ops abroad. During the Indian Peacekeeping Force’s operations in Sri Lanka’s Tamil stronghold of Jaffna, SG provided training to members of the militant Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam :roll: . The force was also involved in Operation Blue Star to flush out terrorists from the Golden Temple in Amritsar. Former SG operatives say that even though the 1 Para (SF) of the Army claimed that it had killed militant leaders J.S. Bhindranwale and his military chief, Maj Gen (retd) Shabeg Singh, their bodies were riddled with AK-47 bullets. Only SG used AK-47 then.

As home minister, L.K. Advani used SG to eliminate militants in Kashmir. “Both he and defence minister George Fernandes would visit the headquarters in Sarsawa to personally congratulate and encourage the men who were carrying out successful operations at short notice, away from public glare, and sometimes even beyond the boundaries of our country,” said the senior officer.

SG, however, has lost some of its bite in recent years. A senior Army officer who served in SG said the curtailing of funds for intelligence gathering and deep operations had affected the force. Apparently, the feud between Gen V.K. Singh, when he was Army chief, and his junior colleagues, had severely constrained the intelligence gathering capabilities of the Army. In 2012, post Singh’s retirement, the top-secret Technical Support Division led by Colonel Hunny Bakshi was disbanded.

Covert ops, such as the ones that India is considering in PoK, require the right mix of technology, equipment and actionable intelligence to succeed. But, with intelligence gathering in disarray, it remains doubtful whether India has it.

To dismantle the terror infrastructure across the border, the special forces would first need to pin-point the location of terrorists. “We know these terror camps are not in pucca buildings,” said a former R&AW officer. “Often the satellite images give locations that are actually school buildings. How do we target them in such a case? Unless someone tells us where and when, it is very difficult to think of an aerial strike. If we send special forces to a pin-pointed location, we need to have deniability…. In case our man is caught, we lose all our credibility.”

Here is where moles and sources across the border become important. Till a few years ago, not even half a dozen cross-border sources or assets were available to Indian intelligence agencies. “We need to run our sources in the enemy territory and they should be able to carry out these operations by themselves,” said an officer of a border guarding force.

There is also the argument that the option of covert strikes within Indian territory is not well explored. “Covert operation does not necessarily mean that you have to cross the border,” said K. Srinivasan, former inspector-general who had worked in the intelligence wings of the BSF and the Central Reserve Police Force. “Along the border, there are a lot of elements who act as the support base for terrorists…. If we stamp out these elements, we can cut the oxygen supply of the terrorists.”

If the agencies know this formula, why do they fail to implement it? The answer takes us back to the basics. The demand of the intelligence wings for surveillance and interception capabilities has been pending for years. Currently, only law enforcement agencies and the Intelligence Bureau are allowed to intercept calls. The intelligence units of the forces deployed in Kashmir depend on other agencies for it. “As a result, there is a huge time lag, which is a big handicap for the troops on the ground. Any kind of covert operations cannot be carried out if real-time information is not available,” said an intelligence officer.

According to former home secretary G.K. Pillai, combining goodwill gestures with covert operations in conflict zones will increase manifold the chances of success. “Pakistan is carrying out aerial strikes in Balochistan. We have always enjoyed local support there but did not build on it. It is important to build on that goodwill today,” he said.

Kumawat cautions that while carrying out covert operations against Pakistan, New Delhi must keep in mind that it is in conflict with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence and its military, and not its people. “If the people of Pakistan start feeling that the army and the non-state actors are not working in their interest, that will be our biggest victory,” he said.

Covert ops, however, do not offer a permanent solution to a problem that has festered over many decades, said Pillai. “Kashmir is the key,” he said. An officer who was part of many successful covert operations in the valley said if tourism is brought back, sports take place and development embraces Kashmir, India can even think of holding a plebiscite in the state. Will Pakistan hold a similar plebiscite in PoK? That day the war will be won

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist str

Postby Aditya G » 28 Nov 2017 01:58

ACM Fali Major (retd) has spoken about the options post-26/11 in a more direct manner today.

What he said previously:

Aditya G wrote:Our establishment has evaluated kinetic options in the past. One hopes that these are again evaluated:

Agencies : New Delhi, Wed May 27 2009, 18:20 hrs:

India had various options vis-a-vis Pakistan following the 26/11 Mumbai attacks and the force had "enough" intelligence to do what it wanted, Air Chief Fali Homi Major said on Wednesday.

"There were certain options, which were certainly discussed. Depending on the objective and the task given, IAF had enough intelligence to do what it wanted to do then," Major told reporters
here during a joint press conference with his successor and chief-designate Air Marshal P V Naik.

....

He refused to reveal what the government had discussed with the armed forces immediately after the Mumbai terror attacks that claimed nearly 200 lives, including NSG commandos and senior Maharastra police officers.

....


Today;

http://www.timesnownews.com/india/video ... jor/133825

(Open link for the video - do watch)

New Delhi: In a shocking disclosure, Air Chief Marshal (Retd) Fali Homi Major has revealed that the Indian Air Force was ready to take revenge for the devastating 2008 Mumbai terror attacks but the then United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government 'blocked' any further action on the surgical strike option that was meant to teach terror-sponsor Pakistan a lesson.

Nine years after the 26/11, the ex-IAF chief dropped a bombshell when he revealed that they had the plan as well as capability to hit the terror-training camps in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir in 2008, but the then UPA government never gave the necessary nod.

Talking to Times Now, the former IAF chief said that two days after the strike, the heads of the three services of Indian Armed Forces were called at the then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's residence along with the then defence minister AK Antony and the defence secretary.

Before the meeting, the three chiefs had discussed amongst themselves what could be done and considered the possible options the government could ask them to take, said Air Chief Marshal (Retd) Fali Homi Major.

During the meeting, the IAF chief apprised the then PM that from logistics to weapons and planes, everything was ready to strike terror-training camps in PoK. But he never received a go-ahead from the government.


In the wake of an attack like 26/11, the window of opportunity to strike is 24 hours, said Air Chief Marshal (Retd) Fali Homi Major, adding that even a small tactical action by the Air Force has a strategic effect.

In a nutshell, here are the claims made by the former IAF chief:

The revelation tears apart the Congress' claims that the UPA has also conducted surgical strike during its tenure but never publicised it to gain the electoral advantage, 'unlike PM Narendra Modi'.

The sensational revelation raises the following questions:
Why did the UPA let go of an opportunity to teach Pakistan a lesson in the aftermath of 26/11 attack?
Why did the UPA not take up IAF’s proposal of surgical strike despite the IAF Chief's assurances of being prepared?
Was the Congress misleading India when it claimed to have carried out successful surgical strikes during its tenure?
The disclosure has sent political shockwaves. The Bharatiya Janata Party has slammed the then UPA government, saying the Congress lacked the courage to take on Pakistan.


It seems of all options that were examined by the 3 services, the air strikes option progressed to highest maturity. I will have to check whether this meeting happened after the one where Mike Narayanan presented his options to GOI.

ACM believes that the reaction should have been within the first 24, at most 48 hours. It would have ensured surprise.

Interestingly, in 2016 NaMo came in with a bias in favour of air strikes but the professional advice was in favour of Special Forces. Were the defence forces wiser in this instant? Are air strikes even an option to hit terror pads/camps? The SF interviews in surgical strikes clearly mentioned that the targets were under direct recce & observation by the assault party for at least a day. Could they have simply designated the target and lased a LGB on to it? A Heron was in the air as well, could the target be lighted up by the UAV?

Rambling on; comparing with ABV's tenure. Aside from Kargil and Parakram, he authorized at least 2 more significant actions;

1. Revenge SF raid for Kaluchak massacre. Executed successfully by 9SF deep into PoK

2. Precision attack by Mirage-2000s on LC directly on Pak Army.

One must credit ABV for taking these bold decisions - however the obsessive secrecy robbed their strategic effect.

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby Aditya G » 28 Nov 2017 02:38

http://www.timesnownews.com/india/artic ... ess/134157

New Delhi: A UPA insider on Monday corroborated Air Chief Marshal (Retd) Fali Homi Major's version that the Indian Air Force was ready to take revenge for the devastating 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, but was held back due to UPA's reluctance to permit the same.

Nine years after the 26/11, the ex-IAF chief dropped a bombshell when he revealed that they had the plan as well as capability to hit the terror-training camps in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir in 2008, but the then UPA government never gave the necessary nod.

Talking to Times Now, the former IAF chief on Monday said: "Surgical strike was an opportunity lost and we didn't make use of it."

The 'insider' confirmed to Times Now that the Cabinet Committee on Security met in PMO on November 28, 2008, two days after the horrendous 26/11 attacks.

The chiefs of Navy, Air Force, Army, Intelligence Bureau, Research and Analyses Wing were present at the meeting chaired by the then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.

During the meeting, the military option came up for discussion. The former IAF chief says he had put forward two-three absolute actionable points. However, the intelligence machinery during the UPA regime was clearly falling back on its tasks as there was no intel on coordinates on terror camps. Perhaps, due to this inefficiency, the IAF did not know the precise position of intended targets, that is the terror camps across the LoC, into Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir (PoK). There was always a fear of collateral damage. So, a decision was taken to gather more accurate intel.

Another CCS meeting was held on December 02, six days after 26/11. During that meeting, military options for a counter strike in PoK were discussed at length ad nauseam. However, it seemed the UPA lacked the will to carry out what the Army, Air Force, and perhaps even the Navy wanted. The 'insider' was present at the meetings. He told Times Now that PM Singh and other UPA Cabinet ministers were not keen on allowing the military options as they feared retribution from Pakistan

...


http://www.timesnownews.com/india/video ... han/134148

...

“The strike was supposed to be 100% successful and then after that, we were supposed to put such a defence that Pakistan would not find us on their radar. We had the upper hand on the whole issue. We had to choose a target system which would pass a message to the whole of Pakistan, that don't mess with us. Unfortunately, we did not get a go ahead,” Air vice marshal Barbora (Retd) stated.

The former vice marshal added that the IAF had given the government many options but they got nothing.

“We don't take action without the clearance from the government. We gave the government many options that we could have easily carried out, but we wanted hard intelligence. Gathering information is the job of the intelligence agency of the country, but we got nothing. What we got was mix bag. We wanted correct information,” Air vice marshal Barbora (Retd) added.

.....

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby ArjunPandit » 28 Nov 2017 05:00

nam wrote:We had carried out air strikes in 2002, at the peak of Op Parakram. What was Paki response? Nothing. We hammered the Neelam valley and blocked the road to Northern areas for 12 years! The Pakis could nothing. Read somewhere we shelled a brigade HQ in response to Kalachuk killings. Again, nothing happened.

If Manpads & airstrike story is true, then as usual Pakis got the better of us on the negotiating table. They get to infiltrate as much they want, while we spend huge men and resources defending against it. All Pakis loose is some drugged junkie. They don't even have to maintain the strength on LOC, like we do.

Anza Manpads were captured in Kashmir as well. So looks like Pakis did not keep their part of bargain.

May be it is time for the RAW chief to send a updated note. "No airstrike until no infiltration".

And Pakis have announced 832 civilians causalities due to our retaliation. If Pakis want a proper fight, well this reason is good enough.

Edit: Just read a An32 was targeted with a Anza manpad in 2002 in Kashmir. As usual Pakis acted like Pakis.

This seems very fraud to me, after 2000s IAF has significant superiority over paf, and can bluntly say the moment after any indian air assets drop, you can assume nothing will fly in pakistan and nothing will sail from karachi

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby Aditya G » 28 Nov 2017 13:21

^ Post SS era, the enemy will be fearful of our capabilities as previously they had a free run. Now at the minimum there is a calculation required at their end "if namo van risk sending in his SFs then what else is he prepared for?'

We were not retaliating earlier - we are doing so now. We are willing to look at all options and execute them even if they carry risk.

Retaliation creates deterrence.

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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist str

Postby Amoghvarsha » 29 Nov 2017 05:00

Aditya G wrote:ACM Fali Major (retd) has spoken about the options post-26/11 in a more direct manner today.

What he said previously:

Aditya G wrote:Our establishment has evaluated kinetic options in the past. One hopes that these are again evaluated:

Agencies : New Delhi, Wed May 27 2009, 18:20 hrs:



Today;

http://www.timesnownews.com/india/video ... jor/133825

(Open link for the video - do watch)

New Delhi: In a shocking disclosure, Air Chief Marshal (Retd) Fali Homi Major has revealed that the Indian Air Force was ready to take revenge for the devastating 2008 Mumbai terror attacks but the then United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government 'blocked' any further action on the surgical strike option that was meant to teach terror-sponsor Pakistan a lesson.

Nine years after the 26/11, the ex-IAF chief dropped a bombshell when he revealed that they had the plan as well as capability to hit the terror-training camps in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir in 2008, but the then UPA government never gave the necessary nod.

Talking to Times Now, the former IAF chief said that two days after the strike, the heads of the three services of Indian Armed Forces were called at the then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's residence along with the then defence minister AK Antony and the defence secretary.

Before the meeting, the three chiefs had discussed amongst themselves what could be done and considered the possible options the government could ask them to take, said Air Chief Marshal (Retd) Fali Homi Major.

During the meeting, the IAF chief apprised the then PM that from logistics to weapons and planes, everything was ready to strike terror-training camps in PoK. But he never received a go-ahead from the government.


In the wake of an attack like 26/11, the window of opportunity to strike is 24 hours, said Air Chief Marshal (Retd) Fali Homi Major, adding that even a small tactical action by the Air Force has a strategic effect.

In a nutshell, here are the claims made by the former IAF chief:

The revelation tears apart the Congress' claims that the UPA has also conducted surgical strike during its tenure but never publicised it to gain the electoral advantage, 'unlike PM Narendra Modi'.

The sensational revelation raises the following questions:
Why did the UPA let go of an opportunity to teach Pakistan a lesson in the aftermath of 26/11 attack?
Why did the UPA not take up IAF’s proposal of surgical strike despite the IAF Chief's assurances of being prepared?
Was the Congress misleading India when it claimed to have carried out successful surgical strikes during its tenure?
The disclosure has sent political shockwaves. The Bharatiya Janata Party has slammed the then UPA government, saying the Congress lacked the courage to take on Pakistan.


It seems of all options that were examined by the 3 services, the air strikes option progressed to highest maturity. I will have to check whether this meeting happened after the one where Mike Narayanan presented his options to GOI.

ACM believes that the reaction should have been within the first 24, at most 48 hours. It would have ensured surprise.

Interestingly, in 2016 NaMo came in with a bias in favour of air strikes but the professional advice was in favour of Special Forces. Were the defence forces wiser in this instant? Are air strikes even an option to hit terror pads/camps? The SF interviews in surgical strikes clearly mentioned that the targets were under direct recce & observation by the assault party for at least a day. Could they have simply designated the target and lased a LGB on to it? A Heron was in the air as well, could the target be lighted up by the UAV?

Rambling on; comparing with ABV's tenure. Aside from Kargil and Parakram, he authorized at least 2 more significant actions;

1. Revenge SF raid for Kaluchak massacre. Executed successfully by 9SF deep into PoK

2. Precision attack by Mirage-2000s on LC directly on Pak Army.

One must credit ABV for taking these bold decisions - however the obsessive secrecy robbed their strategic effect.


Saar

Anything i can read about both 1 and 2.

Aditya G
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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby Aditya G » 29 Nov 2017 13:27

For #1: there is very little info available on record. Mr. shourie told an audience in a session with shekhar coupta. Let me find the video.

For #2: this is a famous strike .... Done via ground based laser designation.

http://m.huffingtonpost.in/2017/01/26/e ... _21701344/

http://vayu-sena.tripod.com/other-loonda-kargil-ii.html


manjgu
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Re: India's Retaliation Options to significant terrorist strikes

Postby manjgu » 29 Nov 2017 22:22

i dont know why ACM Fali Major was fretting over intelligence... if India has to send a message are there not many targets like PA Hq or ISI Hq or even a significant military target which can be bombed by IAF. I am asking a question .... will the bombing of muridke vs bombing of PA HQ elicit a different response from Pakistan?? why is Hafeez Saeed so important in scheme of things if we know he is just a pawn of PA ..ie the real villian in the piece is PA?


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