NAL Saras Project demise:Root Cause discussion.

[ramana]

A sad day for me.

After 16 Years and Rs 300 Crore, Civil Aircraft Dream Crashlands

By Ramu Patil Published: 20th January 2016 04:45 AM

BENGALURU: India’s most ambitious civilian aircraft project has been given a quiet burial. Rs 300 crore (50 million dollars) was spent on the project, started way back in 1999 to build an indigenous 14-seater aircraft that was expected to put India in the big league and pave the way for the development of bigger passenger airplanes in future.


Bengaluru-headquartered National Aeronautics Limited (NAL) has stopped all work on Saras, the mutli-role aircraft that was named after the Indian crane. The planes already built have remained grounded and those working on the project have been redeployed.

NAL is part of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) headed by the prime minister.

Confirming that work on the project has been completely stopped, NAL director Shyam Chetty told Express: “Funding for the project stopped from December 31, 2013, but the work went on much beyond. Eventually, we had to stop the work when we ran out of lab funds. It was a Rs 300 crore project.”

“People who were working on the Saras project were redeployed for other projects where skills sets required are similar as NAL takes up lots of work in the strategic sector,” he said.

The aircraft made its maiden flight in 2004, but the project has always been plagued with glitches. Weight was a major concern as the aircraft was overweight by 1,000 kg. In fact, during the maiden flight, all seats except three — for two pilots and a flight test engineer — were removed to bring down the weight.

A turning point for the project was when a Saras aircraft on test flight crashed in 2009, killing two pilots and a flight test engineer from the Indian Air Force. IAF’s Aircraft and Systems Testing Establishment located close to the HAL airport in Bengaluru was conducting tests and the aircraft was carrying out an ‘engine relight’ procedure when it crashed. The project never fully recovered from that crash.

The Director General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) came out with a report 18 months after the crash. “The DGCA report made it clear that there were no problems with the aircraft or its design. However, those heading CSIR at that point were not too keen on the project, so it never received the kind of encouragement it should have got,” a former NAL officer who was associated with the project told Express. “The flight testing resumed in 2012. But, we had only one aircraft.”

The IAF had evinced keen interest in the aircraft as it could have been used to train its transport pilots. NAL was also hoping to find other buyers as the aircraft was being built for multiple roles. There was even a plan to develop a 80-seater plane based on Saras’ success.

“This was India’s first project to design and develop a civilian aircraft. At one point, around 600 people, including those from NAL, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) and private sector were working on it,” the former NAL officer said.

“Now, all that work seems to have gone for a waste as the aircraft and the infrastructure created for the purpose are rendered useless.” Currently, two aircraft - one fully built and the other nearly complete - are parked at NAL’s Belur campus in the city.

NAL had built two aircraft and was in the process of making a third one using composite materials to reduce the weight. Saras also flew at air shows in the city. In fact, NAL was able to address the weight issue to some extent in the third aircraft that never took to the skies. In the second one, they used a more powerful engine. Saras aircraft were powered by Pratt and Whitney engines.


The NAL director still seemed hopeful that the project may be revived in future. “Even now we are maintaining the aircraft and we hope that the project will be revived,” he added. Those in the know of the developments, however, are not that optimistic. According to them, the message from the government is very clear - it is not willing to invest in a project that is taking far too much time.

Sources said NAL officials recently gave a detailed presentation to Science and Technology Minister Harsh Vardhan, who is also vice-president of CSIR. “The minister did not give any assurance,” a source said.

Seriously, we could only afford 50 million dollars for a national dream over 14 years, and no more! The curse of an Indian scientist. It hurts me to think of their plight. Why would anybody spoil one's career being that. Just learn screwdrivergiri. Or work in a Bollywood movie. A movie project makes more money these days!

[ramana]

Facts:
- Project started in 1999.
-First flight in 2004. ie five years.
- Plane was overweight by 1000kg or 1 tonne.
- Plane flew with minimal seats; instead of 14 seats had only 3 seats.
- Plane crashed in 2009 while engine relight procedure was being tested. So it was engine failure. What engine did it have? Pratt and Whitney turbo-prop
- From pictures it has twin engines. Was the test to shut all engines down and then try to relight them?
- Second plane was re-engined with Pratt and Whitney engines and completed.
- Third plane was made with composites. Means lot of funds expended for tooling.
- Third plane is incomplete.
- Funds spent so far Rs. 300 crores over 16 years.
The designers could not convince completion of the third plane and fly it.

---From wiki
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NAL_Saras

The plane was really started in 1991 with Russian collaboration and was discontinued.

The project began in 1991 as a collaboration with Russia (Myasishchev had a similar project called the Duet), but financial trouble led the Russians to drop out early in the project. The project almost came to a halt when it was hit by US-imposed sanctions in 1998, after India's nuclear tests in Pokhran. The Saras project was sanctioned on 24 September 1999 with initial schedule of its maiden flight by March 2001.

The original design target parameters included a maximum take-off weight of 6,100 kg and a maximum payload of 1,232 kg, a high cruise speed of over 600 km/h, an endurance of six hours, a maximum flight altitude of 12 km (cruise altitude 10.5 km), short take-off and landing distances of about 600 m, a maximum rate of climb of 12 m/s, a low cabin noise of 78 dB, a range of 600 km with 19 passengers, 1,200 km with 14 passengers and 2,000 km with eight passengers, a high specific range of 2.5 km/kg and a low cost of operation of ₹ 5/km.

The first Saras (PT1) completed its maiden flight at the HAL airport in Bangalore on 29 May 2004.[1]

While the designed empty weight of the aircraft is around 4,125 kg, the first prototype weighed in around 5,118 kg. This issue is sought to be addressed by including composite wings and tail by the third prototype. The airframe of Saras-PT2 was built with lighter composites to reduce its overall weight by about 400 kg from its first prototype, which was overweight by about 900 kg. The aircraft is powered by two Canadian Pratt & Whitney turbo-prop engines.[2]

And about the crash. It was the second plane not the overweight plane.

Incidents and accidents[edit]

On 6 March 2009, 2 Indian Air Force test pilots, Wing Commander Praveen Kotekoppa and Wing Commander Dipesh Shah along with a Flight Test Engineer Squadron Leader Ilayaraja, were killed when the second prototype Saras aircraft crashed and caught fire in an open field near Bidadi, about 30 km from Bangalore.[7] A court of inquiry found that wrong engine relight drills given to the pilots contributed to the crash,[8] concluding that an "Incorrect relight procedure devised by the designer and adopted by the crew at insufficient height leading to rapid loss of altitude and abnormal behaviour of aircraft resulted into accident."[9]

http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp ... 234847.ece

BANGALORE: The board of inquiry constituted by the Directorate-General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) has completed its investigation into the March 6 crash of the Light Transport Aircraft Saras near Bidadi in Karnataka.

Two pilots and an engineer, all from the Indian Air Force’s Aircraft and Systems Testing Establishment, were killed in the crash of the Prototype Two (PT2).

An official of the National Aerospace Laboratories (NAL), designers of the Saras, said the DGCA had promised to make the report available before month-end.

The Hindu has learnt from officials connected with the board of inquiry that the engine relight (engine restart) drills given by the designers and followed by the pilots were wrong.

The two test pilots were for the first time on the Saras, attempting to switch off and relight in midair one of the two Pratt and Whitney (PT6A-67) engines. The test is a mandatory requirement of the flight development programme. The aircraft had reached its designated height of 9,000 feet and the left engine switched off. After one minute, the crew attempted to relight the engine, and this was communicated to the ground crew. But soon after radio communication was lost, the aircraft started losing height and crashed. “Prior to the flight, the pilots were briefed by the designers about the drills to be followed during relight, and they followed it. But the relight drills were incorrect. With each aero engine having its own unique set of procedures to be adhered to during relight (like at what speed, airflow, where the propellers stop, etc), the pilots just followed the designer’s briefings. Errors occurred; the aircraft went out of control and crashed,” an official explained.

Did the designers show any remorse for giving wrong briefings that killed three IAF officers and grounded the plane for ever?



About IAF orders and commitment...

The IAF has signed up with National Aerospace Laboratories, Bangalore for the purchase of 15 Saras aircraft. “NAL signed a memorandum of understanding with IAF to sell 15 Saras aircraft. The Kanpur unit of Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd will manufacture these planes,” The 14-seater twin-engine aircraft would be used for coastal surveillance as well as training young cadets on transport flying.[4]The second prototype of the aircraft is overweight by 500kg against the specified design weight of 4125kg. The third prototype has yet to take flight. [5]

So why was the lab unable to convince the CSIR to release the funds to complete the third plane?
So its not the accident that spooked the CSIR. It wasn't the aircraft.
Fact they had to make presentation to Minister means he thought it important to look into it and made time for it.

[ramana]

Also isn't the point of twin engines that one can land the plane safely if one of the engines fails? So what happened here?
Was the plane aerodynamically imbalanced that it needs both engines?

Vivek_Ahuja can you comment on this Saras plane aerodynamics?

[DexterM]

DGCA Report: http://dgca.nic.in/accident/reports/VT-XRM.pdf
Root Cause is likely BPA. Which means Pratt & Whitney contributed in good measure to the deaths. Not sure how engine relight test are performed so cannot comment. The report is comprehensive, as expected. Blame is spread wide and far.

Why wasn't a more powerful engine pursued instead of quixotic pursuits of shaving off weight at the expense of massive delays?
Basic decision analysis would have lead them to the path that would involve minimal schedule delays if that was indeed a focal point. Apparently, it was not the major concern. Cost must have been one focal point. Meeting the requirements was paramount as is evident.

If one were to dispassionately triage this, it would lead to the lack of product ownership or worse, a focused aero strategy at the top levels. The teams that execute the projects are therefore lackadaisical and not likely to achieve success despite their own best efforts.

/2c - please discard as opinion since I have a (fish)bone to contend with here.

[Austin]

May be the didnt had the height and single engine didnt have the power to keep it flying as it was falling perhaps entered spin or entered into stall.

giving the wrong procedure to reignite the engine leading to crash is gross negligence on part of design should have been court martial

[DexterM]

May be the didnt had the height and single engine didnt have the power to keep it flying as it was falling perhaps entered spin or entered into stall.

giving the wrong procedure to reignite the engine leading to crash is gross negligence on part of design should have been court martial

Read the report Austin. Propeller manufacturer and engine supplier are not in sync. Who will you court martial? No issues with the height or engine in reality. Clearly outlined. Spend the time to read it instead of denouncing various parties.

[Indranil]

Ramana,

IIRC, single engine failure and relight had been already verified. They went on to simulate both engine failure and relight. However, they used the wrong procedure. They did not feather the propellers, making them spin freely. This amounted to a great increase in the drag and quickly bled off the planes energy. It was a case of communication breakdown for a "non-intuitive" procedure and pilot error as well.

Dexter, they reduced the weight and used a more powerful engine in the second prototype.

Saras is not an ideal plane. We cannot build an ideal plane in our first go. There is a huge learning curve, which we don't have the tenacity to master. Trying to build a NCAD without learning the lessons on Saras is fool hardy in my opinion.

LCA is not a state-of-art plane. LCA Mk2 and AMCA are. But they are possible only because we laboured through LCA.

ULV from ISRO will be state-of-art. But that is because we laboured through SLV, PSLV, GSLV, GSLV MkIII.

Agni IV/V/VI are state-of-art. But that is because we laboured through Prithvi, Agni I/II/III.

NCAD cannot state-of-art. If we don't learn our lessons from Saras.

Ramana sir,
There are possibly many reasons for failure of Saras. But 50 million for a civilian plane spread over 15 years. That is laughable! My university department used to have more research funding for each academic year.

[ramana]

I would like to know the Rs 50 million disbursal? What were the tranches?

Indranil, Something sticks in my gut on this project. Am not able to put the finger on it.


I will read the report.

Any CAG reports on this plane?

Reason why I am looking in detail is need to compare DRDO/CSIR with international institutes for effectiveness had come up.

Want to chose
UK/Aus/Canada CSIRs, Max Planck Institutes with CSIR
ARPA with DRDO

[vishvak]

One reason, not related: more prototypes not sanctioned or planned to begin with. It takes time for RnD efforts anyways, rather have more prototypes just as well . More prototypes can not be any big burden on ForEx to begin with.

[ramana]

Three proto-types for a first design is good. LCA was 2 TDs.
So that's not where the issue lies.

[member_29268]

Some important excerpts from the DGCA report.

No Review for 26 test flights?



Non-availability of effective and current SOPs



Non-Availability of monitoring records.



Who is ADES?. It has no website and no working email registered.




Based on whatever i could glance through it is clear that this is not a very professional conduct on part of NAL whatever may be the reasons. It had a free hand on the project without any effective oversight. Lack of experience in managing the project is clearly evident. Even local DGCA has been reprimanded in the report for being silent spectator.

[member_29268]

Some more snaps.







This one is interesting..

[Indranil]

There is no questioning that work ethics in the public sector need to be revisited. The notion that a govt. job is a "secure job for life" has to be erased. There is no place for that in today's world.

But, I still feel that a lot of people must have worked really hard to make Saras possible. This group of people should be identified, weed out the rest (offer them VRS, if it is political problematic to fire them). Empower the remaining people based on their feedback on what is required to make this project a success. Watch the magic!

[ManjaM]

Three proto-types for a first design is good. LCA was 2 TDs.
So that's not where the issue lies.

For a first attempt, 3 flying prototypes is aggressive. I am surprised that there was no Static article that was loaded to ultimate loads. No Fatigue test article either. One can conclude that
1)Structure was waaay overdesigned, this conclusion is backed up by the 1000kg overweight.
2) NAL had confidence in they analysis methods. I doubt anyone can be confident in their methods without a full scale test.
I suppose the static and fatigue tests were done away with in order to save money and prove the structure good by analysis alone. I dont know if DGCA would have accepted this. I know for a fact that the FAA would not have accepted analysis alone for structural substantiation.

Additonally I am confused about this line -
"NAL had built two aircraft and was in the process of making a third one using composite materials to reduce the weight."
NAL has certainly erred here. Composite material is not a drop-in-place solution for weight reduction. Design, analysis, fabrication, inspection, quality assurance, maintenance, painting, repair.. almost every aspect of composites is more expensive and needs more skilled mechanics than Aluminum. I am surprised that NAL adopted composites as the solution to being 1000kg overweight. There is substantial performance that can be extracted out of metals by "sharpening the pencil" without going the composite route. The design cycle for composites is longer, material qualification is long drawn out with coupon tests for coming up with material strength and stiffeness numbers. It is likely that this decision to drop in composites as a solution to weight might have taken so much time and money out of the meager budget that it left no legroom to actually complete the program.

In fact even in programs where the engineers and managers went in fully intending to design a composite airplane, significant delays and budget overshoots have happened because of the choice of materials. Examples are the Lear85, B787. The newest Gulfstream 500 and G600 have only a few parts, mostly secondary structure, made out of composites. The G650 with its class leading performance and M0.99(in a dive) is an all metal airplane. It is wholly possible that this choice of composites sealed the fate of the Saras. Other factors are also likely, poor initial weight estimate, lack of attentive Program Management and understandably a lack of experience. The Saras is not the first significantly overweight airplane that NAL has designed, the Hansa is in the list as well. This additionally points to a much larger problem with the External loads models. Were the Saras and Hansa good outcomes of a grand vision, one of the industrial powerhouses would have picked up the design. As no one has, it is clear that the program was late, heavy and over budget. To borrow an americanism, thats 3 strikes.

Finally, development of Civil Aviation is a burden that is too great for NAL. They need to focus on materials, methods and systems. There is enough room to shine as an R&D outfit in this space without getting into high risk aircraft development.

[ramana]

ManjaM, Please read the 75 page report.
- The second plane which already had composites is the one that crashed.
- The overweight first plane is the hange queen.
- Incomplete third plane is sitting around.
- The reason that second plane crashed was two:
- Insufficient height margin for recovery by the test pilots for mishaps. Tests were done at 10,000 feet but actual relight was at lower. Still the engine did relight but did not have height margin and crashed.
-There was persistent rudder control issues on the plane which were never addressed.
- Minor design defects all along which contributed to the major accident.

There was absolute passive oversight of the management by NAL, Test Director and staff.
I still see some of issues in the Director's statement.

When the funds were stopped in 2013 what does he mean they were still working on it till now?
Which budget it came from? if staff did it on own who authorized it?

[ManjaM]

Sir, I hve read it when it came out and skimmed through again a year ago. The report does point out the reasons for the crash as it should. But is the crash the reason for the program getting canned? Are teh reasons for the failure of the program same as the reasons for the crash? I have listed the reasons in my assessment that led to the program not succeeding. The report also pointed out the reckless attitude of the test pilots, which was probably a function of lack of effective Program Management by NAL.

CSIR does make available some slush funds to its labs. It is likely that NAL used some of these monies to continue working the Saras under different heads. There are umpteen ways to do it. That is no big mystery there. For example "Landing gear design for 20 seater civil aircraft" or "Optimization studies of Composite wing spars " or "Bird strike studies of composite Wing to body fairing" etc etc, you get the idea.

That there was poor Program Management by NAL is evident.

[ramana]

NAL: SARAS from concept to first flight

http://www.nal.res.in/pdf/nalfdl04.pdf

[ManjaM]

DGCA Report: http://dgca.nic.in/accident/reports/VT-XRM.pdf
Root Cause is likely BPA. Which means Pratt & Whitney contributed in good measure to the deaths. Not sure how engine relight test are performed so cannot comment. The report is comprehensive, as expected. Blame is spread wide and far.

Why wasn't a more powerful engine pursued instead of quixotic pursuits of shaving off weight at the expense of massive delays?
Basic decision analysis would have lead them to the path that would involve minimal schedule delays if that was indeed a focal point. Apparently, it was not the major concern. Cost must have been one focal point. Meeting the requirements was paramount as is evident.

If one were to dispassionately triage this, it would lead to the lack of product ownership or worse, a focused aero strategy at the top levels. The teams that execute the projects are therefore lackadaisical and not likely to achieve success despite their own best efforts.

/2c - please discard as opinion since I have a (fish)bone to contend with here.

Succintly stated.
Between different product teams, it is difficult to get engineers to cede and make compromises. However, these compromises are essential to the success of teh program. This is where a strong program office comes in to make command decisions and ram it down the throats of product teams. However chasing a 1000kg weight saving by changing materials is an exercise that is not likely to yield desired results in a reasonable time frame or budget. I wonder if time and budget were a concern to everyone involved.

Anyhow, not all is lost. It is only a total loss if we dont followup with another program. Wing looks conventional, we can probably reuse it. For example the Beechcraft Queen air wing was reused on the Fairchild Merlin(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swearingen_Merlin). Assuming the wing is good and that is the only thing that comes out of this program, it will be 50 crores well spent.

[ramana]

Why was the more powerful engine not chosen, Could be "Bridge on River Kwai" syndrome.

They already committed to current engine and bash on regardless.

This is where technical management comes in.
As the DGCA report says passive oversight was the guiding principle.

In fairness they lost 400 kg by proto-type 2 which is the crash plane.

Overweight was 900 kg.
They should have asked for funds to complete third plane.

But before that someone needs to convince the rudder I good.

[Indranil]

Not a moderator for this thread. REquest moderation as it is going to get dirty.

Strike 1:

For a first attempt, 3 flying prototypes is aggressive.

How many programs do you know that have less than 3 prototypes for the entire flight testing program.

Strike 2:

I am surprised that there was no Static article that was loaded to ultimate loads.

No Fatigue test article either. One can conclude that
1)Structure was waaay overdesigned, this conclusion is backed up by the 1000kg overweight.
2) NAL had confidence in they analysis methods. I doubt anyone can be confident in their methods without a full scale test.
I suppose the static and fatigue tests were done away with in order to save money and prove the structure good by analysis alone. I dont know if DGCA would have accepted this. I know for a fact that the FAA would not have accepted analysis alone for structural substantiation.

You are surprised because you can't type the following three words on Google "SAras structural testing".
The first link: http://www.nal.res.in/pdf/saga-main.pdf. It has pages and pages on structural testing.

Strike 3:

Additonally I am confused about this line -
"NAL had built two aircraft and was in the process of making a third one using composite materials to reduce the weight."
NAL has certainly erred here. Composite material is not a drop-in-place solution for weight reduction. Design, analysis, fabrication, inspection, quality assurance, maintenance, painting, repair.. almost every aspect of composites is more expensive and needs more skilled mechanics than Aluminum. I am surprised that NAL adopted composites as the solution to being 1000kg overweight. There is substantial performance that can be extracted out of metals by "sharpening the pencil" without going the composite route. The design cycle for composites is longer, material qualification is long drawn out with coupon tests for coming up with material strength and stiffeness numbers. It is likely that this decision to drop in composites as a solution to weight might have taken so much time and money out of the meager budget that it left no legroom to actually complete the program.

In fact even in programs where the engineers and managers went in fully intending to design a composite airplane, significant delays and budget overshoots have happened because of the choice of materials. Examples are the Lear85, B787. The newest Gulfstream 500 and G600 have only a few parts, mostly secondary structure, made out of composites. The G650 with its class leading performance and M0.99(in a dive) is an all metal airplane. It is wholly possible that this choice of composites sealed the fate of the Saras.

NAL is the absolute authority in India for manufacture of composites for aeronautical applications. And Saras PT1 had considerable amounts of composites too. In PT2, the count of composite materials were increased. IIRC, the major composite components added in PT2 were the pressure bulkhead, flooring, and the some fuselage skins. And they know the cost and infrastructure required. And that's why they came up with a process called VERITy which significantly decreases costs and infrastructural needs. Can you show one evidence of a structural component failing leading to the crash?

Other factors are also likely, poor initial weight estimate, lack of attentive Program Management and understandably a lack of experience. The Saras is not the first significantly overweight airplane that NAL has designed, the Hansa is in the list as well. This additionally points to a much larger problem with the External loads models. Were the Saras and Hansa good outcomes of a grand vision, one of the industrial powerhouses would have picked up the design. As no one has, it is clear that the program was late, heavy and over budget.

Structural refinement is the holy grail of manufacturing an aircraft. Nobody will give you that data. It can only be generated by building, flying, refining. Building, flying, refining. Building, flying,refining... Refinement cannot come without building.

To borrow an americanism, thats 3 strikes.

For you as well.

[Indranil]

DGCA Report: http://dgca.nic.in/accident/reports/VT-XRM.pdf
Root Cause is likely BPA. Which means Pratt & Whitney contributed in good measure to the deaths. Not sure how engine relight test are performed so cannot comment. The report is comprehensive, as expected. Blame is spread wide and far.

Why wasn't a more powerful engine pursued instead of quixotic pursuits of shaving off weight at the expense of massive delays?
Basic decision analysis would have lead them to the path that would involve minimal schedule delays if that was indeed a focal point. Apparently, it was not the major concern. Cost must have been one focal point. Meeting the requirements was paramount as is evident.

If one were to dispassionately triage this, it would lead to the lack of product ownership or worse, a focused aero strategy at the top levels. The teams that execute the projects are therefore lackadaisical and not likely to achieve success despite their own best efforts.

/2c - please discard as opinion since I have a (fish)bone to contend with here.

Succintly stated.
Between different product teams, it is difficult to get engineers to cede and make compromises. However, these compromises are essential to the success of teh program. This is where a strong program office comes in to make command decisions and ram it down the throats of product teams. However chasing a 1000kg weight saving by changing materials is an exercise that is not likely to yield desired results in a reasonable time frame or budget. I wonder if time and budget were a concern to everyone involved.

Wrongly stated.

PT1 had a 850 hp engine, and PT2 had a 1200 hp engine. Simple Google searches!

[chetak]

Some important excerpts from the DGCA report.

No Review for 26 test flights?



Non-availability of effective and current SOPs



Non-Availability of monitoring records.



Who is ADES?. It has no website and no working email registered.




Based on whatever i could glance through it is clear that this is not a very professional conduct on part of NAL whatever may be the reasons. It had a free hand on the project without any effective oversight. Lack of experience in managing the project is clearly evident. Even local DGCA has been reprimanded in the report for being silent spectator.

Who is ADES?. It has no website and no working email registered

this looks very much like a body shopping operation, usually run by ex employees of the parent organisations, supplying cheap labor to the NAL guys. such arrangements are rampant in DRDOs too.

Its's a money sucking scam with active participation and connivance of senior staff to bypass the so called "manpower shortage".

[chetak]

{quote="DexterM"}DGCA Report: http://dgca.nic.in/accident/reports/VT-XRM.pdf
Root Cause is likely BPA. Which means Pratt & Whitney contributed in good measure to the deaths. Not sure how engine relight test are performed so cannot comment. The report is comprehensive, as expected. Blame is spread wide and far.

Why wasn't a more powerful engine pursued instead of quixotic pursuits of shaving off weight at the expense of massive delays?
Basic decision analysis would have lead them to the path that would involve minimal schedule delays if that was indeed a focal point. Apparently, it was not the major concern. Cost must have been one focal point. Meeting the requirements was paramount as is evident.

If one were to dispassionately triage this, it would lead to the lack of product ownership or worse, a focused aero strategy at the top levels. The teams that execute the projects are therefore lackadaisical and not likely to achieve success despite their own best efforts.

/2c - please discard as opinion since I have a (fish)bone to contend with here.{/quote}

Succintly stated.
Between different product teams, it is difficult to get engineers to cede and make compromises. However, these compromises are essential to the success of teh program. This is where a strong program office comes in to make command decisions and ram it down the throats of product teams. However chasing a 1000kg weight saving by changing materials is an exercise that is not likely to yield desired results in a reasonable time frame or budget. I wonder if time and budget were a concern to everyone involved.

Wrongly stated.

PT1 had a 850 hp engine, and PT2 had a 1200 hp engine. Simple Google searches!

search in the old posts following the saras crash. There is a wealth of information there

It looks like the rudder may have had insufficient authority following the change in engine. This was clearly stated in some foreign consultant's report well before the crash.

The relight procedures that were followed were for the old engines and not for the up rated ones.

Maybe overconfidence of the crew who did not check the paperwork before the fatal test flight, especially in not verifying/validating crucial data like relight procedure. Also NAL ground personnel may have been lax in updating the vital procedures.

The crews flying the saras mostly different for many different flights so the much required continuity was missing, also the final crew may not have been completely up to speed on the previous test reports

[Singha]

some of it is done to rehire retired employees as contractors who are essential to projects.

[chetak]

some of it is done to rehire retired employees as contractors who are essential to projects.

How come "essential people" for the very same projects change when the director changes??

the chain of hire and kickback is common talk in any of these places.

If there is a loophole, there will naturally be born a skillful exploiter. Works every time

[member_29268]

They should have asked for funds to complete third plane.

There are two sides of it:
1. Designer asked for funds and

Remember Saras is a very old project (started in early 1990s) and no national pride was associated by GoI to it as is in the case of Kaveri, Tejas et al. In this context it is quiet possible that the original backers of the program in the design team might have retired in the late 2000s and hence after the crash hence have no taker. You need designer confidence in the program to really passionately ask for funds. Just my opinion.

2. Designer was not allocated sufficient funds: Cost of the two prototype itself would have been ~300 crores (going by the wiki figures). So there is no question NAL,ASTE,HAL might have allocated some of the internal resources under diff budget head.

There is no questioning that work ethics in the public sector need to be revisited. The notion that a govt. job is a "secure job for life" has to be erased. There is no place for that in today's world.

But, I still feel that a lot of people must have worked really hard to make Saras possible. This group of people should be identified, weed out the rest (offer them VRS, if it is political problematic to fire them). Empower the remaining people based on their feedback on what is required to make this project a success. Watch the magic!

indranil, there are three types of people in a govt organisation:
1. Smart: They will work only 9-5 but will always stress on efficiency and will be the ~5% of the organisation. They will be the only ones in review committees of 10s or 20 odd so called technical experts who will speak something sensible. My boss was one of them.
2. Hard working: ~10-15% They are simply do what is being told to them and if PM asks them to complete the work by 22:00, they will start doing w/o if the work can actually be done. They are the ones who will be doing most of the overtimes because they are unable to comprehend that most of the time proper planning can indeed avoid overtimes. These people will be mum in any kind of reviews.
3. Lazy: They will always postpone the work for tomorrow or until PM asks to get it done ASAP. These are the backbenchers and will gossip with each other and crack jocks occasionally.

Now my point in the previous post was not that you remove the lazy 80% from the organisation(will be real good for the nation though!) but even if People of type 3 are at the helm of saras project, the project could have handled more professionally. the very fact that it was not shows the inexperience of NAL in designing a project (nothing new) and that this is to be expected and only when something bad happens people start to look at whether SOPs were followed or not.

[Zynda]

Indranil,
I went through the Saras Saga document not in great detail but enough. Firstly, the amount of work done by NAL employees is absolutely fantastic given the funding shortcomings and not to mention, less compensation compared to Private sector.

Some of the points I could observe:

1. A lot of individual structural articles were subjected to Limit Load and some of them to Ultimate load static tests. There was no mention of a full-scale test of the entire aircraft either at Limit Load or Ultimate Load. We have to remember that it was first attempt by India at designing a modern commercial airborne platform. It is important to test major subsystems articles & full-scale i.e. complete aircraft, to static DLL & DUL tests as well as fatigue (both sub systems wise and full-scale).

2. No mention of Fatigue testing although I am aware that some component level fatigue testing was done.

3. I was going to do a detail post on this point (along with others over the weekend), but majority of the sub-systems in Saras were way over designed that I would be surprised that if they fail even at Design Ultimate Load. Even in the report, it mentions of a subsystem which successfully withstood DUL without failure. Actually, the Federal Aviation Regulations state that at DUL, the structure should withstand load for 3 seconds without breaking. They don't state explicitly what needs to happen after 3 seconds. Interpretation: That 3 seconds rule is approximately the time it takes for load to have an "effect" on the structure. The structure is supposed to break at DUL or may be <1% load exceeding DUL. I know for certain Saras subsystems, the load at failure exceeded 30% beyond DUL which is ridiculous.

4. DGCA defines DUL as 1.98 times DLL? Thats about 50% higher than what leading commercial regulations (EASA/FAR) defines DUL. I wonder how a product defined wrt DGCA rules can be competitive internationally?

5. I agree with Manja saar that composites doesn't necessarily mean that it is drop in place solution for weight reduction. Actually at least in commercial aviation, structures even metallic are highly optimized. Switching over to composites might yield in some weight savings but right from manf to maintenance, composites consume more resources compared to metallic ones. Sure composites can be used for secondary structures like interiors monuments etc., which are not critical. Some of the Indian aviation design stalwarts are of the opinion that if Saras is properly designed, even with a metallic structure, it will end up being competitive and VFM product.

Structural refinement is the holy grail of manufacturing an aircraft. Nobody will give you that data. It can only be generated by building, flying, refining. Building, flying, refining. Building, flying,refining... Refinement cannot come without building.

You are spot on Sir about the above. It is a shame that the program is being cancelled.

I can probably get some more info on the nature of tests but it won't be possible before next week Thursday. Travelling early part of next week...

[Indranil]

1. A lot of individual structural articles were subjected to Limit Load and some of them to Ultimate load static tests. There was no mention of a full-scale test of the entire aircraft either at Limit Load or Ultimate Load. We have to remember that it was first attempt by India at designing a modern commercial airborne platform. It is important to test major subsystems articles & full-scale i.e. complete aircraft, to static DLL & DUL tests as well as fatigue (both sub systems wise and full-scale).

2. No mention of Fatigue testing although I am aware that some component level fatigue testing was done.

Please look at the link I provided: http://www.nal.res.in/pdf/saga-main.pdf. Turn to page 22. That the structural tests for the entire complete fuselage. Page 33 and53, for complete stub wings. Page 35, 49 69, for complete rudder, aeliron, flap. Page 84 and 93 for the complete wing. You might want to read on Page 107 and 108 for a some more details about the full scale tests and set up

3. I was going to do a detail post on this point (along with others over the weekend), but majority of the sub-systems in Saras were way over designed that I would be surprised that if they fail even at Design Ultimate Load. Even in the report, it mentions of a subsystem which successfully withstood DUL without failure. Actually, the Federal Aviation Regulations state that at DUL, the structure should withstand load for 3 seconds without breaking. They don't state explicitly what needs to happen after 3 seconds. Interpretation: That 3 seconds rule is approximately the time it takes for load to have an "effect" on the structure. The structure is supposed to break at DUL or may be <1% load exceeding DUL. I know for certain Saras subsystems, the load at failure exceeded 30% beyond DUL which is ridiculous.

4. DGCA defines DUL as 1.98 times DLL? Thats about 50% higher than what leading commercial regulations (EASA/FAR) defines DUL. I wonder how a product defined wrt DGCA rules can be competitive internationally?

Ideally, an optimized structure breaks after a few seconds of DUL. But designing such pieces requires data. Where will Indian scientists get this data. I don't know why DGCA specifies DUL as 1.98 times DLL. That is really high.

5. I agree with Manja saar that composites doesn't necessarily mean that it is drop in place solution for weight reduction. Actually at least in commercial aviation, structures even metallic are highly optimized. Switching over to composites might yield in some weight savings but right from manf to maintenance, composites consume more resources compared to metallic ones. Sure composites can be used for secondary structures like interiors monuments etc., which are not critical. Some of the Indian aviation design stalwarts are of the opinion that if Saras is properly designed, even with a metallic structure, it will end up being competitive and VFM product.

The manufacturing and maintenance of composites have reached a stage were most new aircraft have very high percentage of composites. In some cases they decrease the maintenance costs as they don't degrade in the same way as metallic parts due to environmental conditions. They are not going for composites for vanity. They were always going to use it for the wings, tail and control surfaces. They included the floor board, fuselage front top skin and pressure bulkhead to reduce weight on the PT2. Besides the composites had nothing to do with the accident, time required, or the project cancellation! They just did not have the funds. They kept asking from the 1980s, got the money in 1999. Was paid peanuts up till project completion in 2013. And ofcourse they had never done a project management of this scale, and made errors.

[Zynda]

Please look at the link I provided: http://www.nal.res.in/pdf/saga-main.pdf. Turn to page 22. That the structural tests for the entire complete fuselage. Page 33 and53, for complete stub wings. Page 35, 49 69, for complete rudder, aeliron, flap. Page 84 and 93 for the complete wing. You might want to read on Page 107 and 108 for a some more details about the full scale tests and set up.

Sir, I was aware that full sub-systems tests were performed individually in isolation. Not a full-scale test of the entire aircraft where some of the components interact with each other. Please see this image to get an idea of what I am referring to. The image is wrt Damage Tolerance but per my understanding applies equally well to static testing as well.



Here is an image of 787 undergoing full-scale static testing



Actually, let me get back to you next week on why exactly a full-scale testing is essential. I think I have an idea but I need further clarity.

Edit: When I used the word sub-systems, I meant "component" level. Apologize if it caused any confusion. Also I've gone through the content on page 107 & 108. I was told that no full-scale testing of the entire aircraft (static & fatigue) was undertaken for Saras program circa 2013. If you find any info which is otherwise, please post it. I would love to update my knowledge.

Ideally, an optimized structure breaks after a few seconds of DUL. But designing such pieces requires data. Where will Indian scientists get this data.

That is a beautiful question Sir. The best practice is to design the system in such a way that it fails just below DUL. Via FEM, one would know the location & mode of failure before hand. That particular part of the plane can be redesigned or beefed up locally. The iteration is continued until the latest config meets certification requirements (and validated by testing...these activities can be done at component levels...no full-scale testing is required).

Of course I am simplifying and the actual process is much more complicate and time consuming but I think you get the overall idea.

Indranil, no arguments about funding part. It is really pathetic & lamentable that NAL scientists got the short end of the stick cause I know some people who were really passionate about their work at NAL. I think largely due to funding issues, the above process could not be followed in spirit wrt Saras, Hasna and in fact many desi programs (including Tejas). And I am sure this translates in to other aspects like aerodynamics as well.

[Indranil]

Zynda,

I know what you are referring to. Please turn to 107 and 108 of that link. You will see the full-scale of the entire aircraft.

[DexterM]

Indranil, apologies for the misleading comment about the engine selection. The belief was that the third prototype was being equipped with the newer engine while they refinished PT1. My bad. All other comments related to Program Management stand true though.

I'm sure the stalwarts here understand RCA methods well. Why not build the Ishikawa diagram to understand all the factors that would contribute to the failure or closure of the program? Or the Five Why method if folks find that more meaningful. We're still only discussing the failure of a specific prototype (or two).

[ramana]

DexterM, First need to get crash out of the way. We can do Fishbone for the crash first as its well documented.
For Saras Program cancellation need flow chart as 5 Whys? and Fishbone will not uncover underlying circumstances.

Zynda,
DUL of 2.0 * DLL is chosen for suddenly applied load (impact loading) but margin for that is equal to or greater than 1.0.

Structures its always about margin.

Margin is what saves you.

So 1200 hp engines were drop in replacement without re-look of control laws?

[ramana]

NAL

Saga of SaRas -2

takes you to lessons learned from first prototype Pt-1

Says Pt-2 was close to production standard.

A pity it crashed due to a series of mis steps.

[Indranil]

So 1200 hp engines were drop in replacement without re-look of control laws?

No, they had to change the control laws slightly, along with the nacelles.

[ramana]

I am reading the 2 part Saga of Saras.

First part shows they went by the book.
Did all testing as required by FAR and some more.
Used modern design techniques.
And validation.
Maybe the choice of P&W engine was not right and 1200 hp should have been from beginning.

Project funded in 1999 and first flight in 2004. Along the way US sanctions on test rigs etc.

Now reading part 2.

[ashish raval]

All the knowledge has to be transferred to IIT and NIT's for future generations. Indian defenseman companies should be given technology for free and if they're able to make it fly there should pay x percent of profit from each sale to government.