Army strikes terror camps in PoK

[Karan M]

In fact, if Indian troops are captured or assaulted by TSP, it will only strengthen the resolve of Indians to see TSP for what it is. Which is why the WKK scumbags and NGO groups are so anti-any nationalist or BJP govt because they fear the actions taken by the GOI will set india on an irrevocable part to destroy their bechara Mughal wannabes, whom they cherish so much. Who doesn't remember the IE headline blaring "they killed him" when a parliament attack murderer was sentenced and hung.

[Akshay Kapoor]

Re military political relationship, success begets support. But if a raid goes awry and Indian soldiers are captured on PoK soil, causing a diplomatic and political fallout that will be a truer test of political support. I will be happy to ve proven wrong.

Anoop, that is the kind of thinking that has led to Indian troops hunkered in their bunkers all because of the "what if".
That scenario too should be considered by the Indian authorities and the IA will likely respond, yes it can happen & we signed up for this because we are dealing with complete turds who don't value life, so let us keep attacking them. The kulbhushan yadav case has not prevented us from attacking TSP soldiers. We cannot afford to let another IC-814 make us into a weeping group of crybabies either.
For this, the media should be effectively handled and any deliberate attempts to paralyze national will should be dealt with severely.

Karan Indian troops are NOT HUNKERED IN THEIR BUNKERS. They aggressively patrol the LC which is why these incidents happen. If they were hunkered these incidents wouldn’t happen. Perhaps you mean that senior commanders haven’t been offensive enough to go deep into enemy territory proactively. If so that is correct because there was no political order to do so. After 26/11 ACM Fali Major was pleading and raging with MMS to go in and presented several options but he was not given the go ahead.

So the govt has to give yhe services the confidence that they will back them 100 pct and that the nation has a proper strategy of offensive and clear goals in sight. And that any gains will not be frittered away by returning territory to them. Pls amend your post if that’s what you meant.

I fully agree with your other statements. If soldiers are captured we should up the ante a 100 times and throw everything at Pak including air attacks to get them back. It should be used as an opportunity to up the ante. Strong will should be articulated and nothing should be allowed to weaken it.

[Anoop]

Karan, Sir,

My point is that any political party will have to handle fallout of things that dont go well. How much fortitude they have to do so remains to be seen. To date, they have not had to do so, since we have been reactive i.e. the popular mood has generally been one of grevious rage because of Pakistani provocations. What we need now is a change in narrative where we are prepared for losses even as we adopt a proactive strategy. For that, the govt, media and population must be prepared.

[Akshay Kapoor]

Karan, Sir,

My point is that any political party will have to handle fallout of things that dont go well. How much fortitude they have to do so remains to be seen. To date, they have not had to do so, since we have been reactive i.e. the popular mood has generally been one of grevious rage because of Pakistani provocations. What we need now is a change in narrative where we are prepared for losses even as we adopt a proactive strategy. For that, the govt, media and population must be prepared.

You are focusing (inadvertently I think ) on the wrong thing. There is no fear of losses and the Pakis have no great ability to inflict them. So take this out of the equation. We have taken huge losses as a nation with over 80000 citizens killed by Pak terror. If we become offensive and hit them this will reduce drastically. So equation is not - offensive = losses. Equation is thousand cuts = losses.

Your concern with the tactical aspects will be used by media to paint a wrong picture and portray Pak as some great power and that we should be scared of them because of losses. Our media and chattering classes can be very insidious so nothing but complete resolve should be shown by us. On BR of course we can discuss al aspects of the operations but word it carefully because traitors will pick up on anything and twist words.

The real fear in these people’s mind is not the losses that Pak can inflict but the losses we will inflict on them. Remember the statement Anil Kapoor makes in one movie (he is portraying a SF major) ‘ Samne aake lado. Ghar ghar me ghus ke maarenge’.

[nam]

If the Indian army processes the initiative and is the proactive party, then by default the onus to seal the border becomes a puki problem. Again, no retaliation should be expected from India as we need to be the aggressor in these matters. Leave the issues of retaliation and reaction to the pukis. Seize the initiative. Systematically destroy them and their posts. Border must be hot and expensive, both in numbers of casualties and the money they expend in defence.

Ofcourse, what you say is very logical, however the reality is we are in defensive mode across LoC. The objective seem to prevent infiltration, rather than punish.

If you ask me, I will move all our civilians up to 40KM from LOC, to hinterland. And convert the LoC up to 40KM in POK in to no-man's land for Pakis. Fire assaults on anything and everything. Shoot anything that moves. Choice for PoK residents to move away or get killed. Hell should look more peaceful.

Unfortunately we are not ruthless. A little of croc tears, Paki reminding us of "similar cultural" and briyani and we set up a 2003 ceasefire.

The Neelam valley road was under constant fire assault for 12 years. One reason the Paki asked for 2003 ceasefire.

We don't hate Pakis, as much they hate us. As simple as that.

[Karan M]

Karan Indian troops are NOT HUNKERED IN THEIR BUNKERS. They aggressively patrol the LC which is why these incidents happen. They aggressively patrol the LC which is why these incidents happen. If they were hunkered these incidents wouldn’t happen. Perhaps you mean that senior commanders haven’t been offensive enough to go deep into enemy territory proactively. If so that is correct because there was no political order to do so. After 26/11 ACM Fali Major was pleading and raging with MMS to go in and presented several options but he was not given the go ahead.

Akshay, yes, the second point exactly. I get the point of fixing our open holes in internal security but by just letting TSP do whatever it wants, previous GOIs utterly failed the nation. Just deploying tens of thousands of BSF/CRPF guys we have in bunkers in COIN deployments, the tens of thousands of IA/CRPF etc guys in front of public installations.. so exactly, what I am saying is the fact we stay on our own side of the border, is the "bunker mentality".. its like trying to create a fortress India, which will never ever be perfect. All TSP has to do is come across and constantly attack us.

We should have been doing 10x to them.

In short, its a figure of speech, regarding our mentality. The inability to prosecute the fight on TSP side of the border but our side, wherein we basically wait for these attacks to keep occurring, which has been GOI policy since independence. While singing the hosannas of peaceful nation and what not as if the rest of the world really gives a darn (apart from their investments in our country).

[Karan M]

Karan, Sir,

My point is that any political party will have to handle fallout of things that dont go well. How much fortitude they have to do so remains to be seen. To date, they have not had to do so, since we have been reactive i.e. the popular mood has generally been one of grevious rage because of Pakistani provocations. What we need now is a change in narrative where we are prepared for losses even as we adopt a proactive strategy. For that, the govt, media and population must be prepared.

Anoop, an old timer like you - no sir for me. My point is the fallback should be planned for & the services have to take the lead in educating the political establishment of what the risks are, and what the fall back options are in each case.

My take is the rubicon has been crossed to a degree because no doubt, before the surgical strikes, the IA told Modi & co of the risks and how it was entirely probable casualty figures could be high on our side too. Yet, the decision was made & I suspect will only increase going forward.

[Karan M]

The real fear in these people’s mind is not the losses that Pak can inflict but the losses we will inflict on them. Remember the statement Anil Kapoor makes in one movie (he is portraying a SF major) ‘ Samne aake lado. Ghar ghar me ghus ke maarenge’.

DITTO. This is the real fear of the oiseaules like the Couptas, the Butts, the assorted barking mutts of the p-sec establishment, they think of the TSP types as wayward brothers, as children who need to be sheltered from the nasty Indians in the services and those in the GOI who want retaliation. Any nationalist organization that wants retribution is "communal" and "war mongering".

Remember the caterwauling by assorted morons in the media about the surgical strikes being "limited", "not really signalling a change in policy".. well, their worst fears are coming true.

[Karan M]

It will take time.

Services are now showing their mettle to the politicos beyond just what was dismissed by the babucracy as "regular COIN". I still remember how DDM ran down NSG ops in 26/11 based on leaks from the then insiders in the GOI.

The strong arm of the establishment, folks like Doval, Service chiefs, SF groups - all were likely pushing for this day for ages and were held back by chai biscoot fear mongering by the WKK/p-sec groups in the establishment.

Now ones star is on the rise. The other, will finally, get eclipsed.

If the Indian army processes the initiative and is the proactive party, then by default the onus to seal the border becomes a puki problem. Again, no retaliation should be expected from India as we need to be the aggressor in these matters. Leave the issues of retaliation and reaction to the pukis. Seize the initiative. Systematically destroy them and their posts. Border must be hot and expensive, both in numbers of casualties and the money they expend in defence.

Ofcourse, what you say is very logical, however the reality is we are in defensive mode across LoC. The objective seem to prevent infiltration, rather than punish.

If you ask me, I will move all our civilians up to 40KM from LOC, to hinterland. And convert the LoC up to 40KM in POK in to no-man's land for Pakis. Fire assaults on anything and everything. Shoot anything that moves. Choice for PoK residents to move away or get killed. Hell should look more peaceful.

Unfortunately we are not ruthless. A little of croc tears, Paki reminding us of "similar cultural" and briyani and we set up a 2003 ceasefire.

The Neelam valley road was under constant fire assault for 12 years. One reason the Paki asked for 2003 ceasefire.

We don't hate Pakis, as much they hate us. As simple as that.

[Aditya G]

.....
2. The tactics were quite innovative - ied was the best part.
...

I am guessing they would have employed Claymore mines. Just like in Op Ginger.

[Thakur_B]

One big change. Brig sahab will probably become Major Gen for this. In the past it could have been a career limiting move.

I hope proactive/retaliatory action does not become a defining criteria in performance evaluation / annual targets. While I do not question the ethics of the organisation, the pressure of performance may lead to a few poorly planned ops or risky ops conducted just for the sake of glory hunting. We've seen this in the past where pressure to increase tango headcount led to a few fake encounters.

[abhijitm]

One big change. Brig sahab will probably become Major Gen for this. In the past it could have been a career limiting move.

I hope proactive/retaliatory action does not become a defining criteria in performance evaluation / annual targets. While I do not question the ethics of the organisation, the pressure of performance may lead to a few poorly planned ops or risky ops conducted just for the sake of glory hunting. We've seen this in the past where pressure to increase tango headcount led to a few fake encounters.

Thats the job of army to investigate. Army is trained to fight and defend country. There must be reward for their action.

Discourage good action because someone might take disadvantage - is not correct.

[ArjunPandit]

One big change. Brig sahab will probably become Major Gen for this. In the past it could have been a career limiting move.

[/quote]
Maj Gen GD Bakshi's career too was limited because of his proactive action.

[Akshay Kapoor]

One big change. Brig sahab will probably become Major Gen for this. In the past it could have been a career limiting move.

I hope proactive/retaliatory action does not become a defining criteria in performance evaluation / annual targets. While I do not question the ethics of the organisation, the pressure of performance may lead to a few poorly planned ops or risky ops conducted just for the sake of glory hunting. We've seen this in the past where pressure to increase tango headcount led to a few fake encounters.

Fake encounters - Bullshit. Sounds like Dawn or the Nation. Don’t make comments on ‘glory hunting’ etc without knowing the ABC of tactics and operations. There is a tactics thread for people to educate themselves before shooting off emails. No more general comments without knowledge of the situation.

[Thakur_B]

I hope proactive/retaliatory action does not become a defining criteria in performance evaluation / annual targets. While I do not question the ethics of the organisation, the pressure of performance may lead to a few poorly planned ops or risky ops conducted just for the sake of glory hunting. We've seen this in the past where pressure to increase tango headcount led to a few fake encounters.

Fake encounters - Bullshit. Sounds like Dawn or the Nation.

Machil case? court martials?

[Akshay Kapoor]

That’s IS ops not across the LC actions. And the truth is not clear by any means. Your army and security forces operate in the toughest environment with huge casualties taken to prevent ‘civilian’ casualties. No other force in the word show this kind of restraint and you are using one incident (the details of which are shrouded in controversy) to imply that we should be defensive on the LC !!

[Thakur_B]

^^ Where did my post implied that the army be on the defensive ? Rather go back a few posts of mine that suggests wholesale adoption of policy of razing all Pakistani posts. I do Kadi Ninda of such interpretations

[deejay]

One big change. Brig sahab will probably become Major Gen for this. In the past it could have been a career limiting move.

I hope proactive/retaliatory action does not become a defining criteria in performance evaluation / annual targets. While I do not question the ethics of the organisation, the pressure of performance may lead to a few poorly planned ops or risky ops conducted just for the sake of glory hunting. We've seen this in the past where pressure to increase tango headcount led to a few fake encounters.

Thakur Saáb Are you seriously suggesting that Army leadership not be evaluated for the work they supposed to do?

Also, where did Akshay Kapoor say that this has become a criteria for performance evaluation? All he says is under present dispensation he will not lose out on promotion like in the past Cdrs would. Under the present dispensation an act like this will get the recognition and promotion that is due. It is a comment on the dispensation.

Instead of taking the point you go hunting for the one odd incidents (which were then rightly punished by IA). What it in turn does is build up ammo for non action by IA.

So now we have built up two such points - a) Own casualty and hurt we will suffer b)" I hope proactive/retaliatory action does not become a defining criteria in performance evaluation / annual targets. " - meaning army should not do performance evaluation for military leadership that is pro active or retaliatory.

Point (b) IMHO is a must have criteria for performance evaluation. Only a stupid, unfit leadership will shy away from this. One odd incorrect examples cannot define or be made to define how IA officers should be.

Sad, that you think this way. Anyways, you can ask for an army where people are judged on PPTs rather than military leadership. I think a lot of MoD would love that. They have always tried to side step pro active military leadership. Gen Thimmaiya, Gen Thorat, Gen Sagat Singh, Gen Hanaut - a few names which come to mind where I wish they had been evaluated for their pro active military leadership. Unfortunately you remember Machil but not these.

[deejay]

^^ Where did my post implied that the army be on the defensive ? Rather go back a few posts of mine that suggests wholesale adoption of policy of razing all Pakistani posts. I do Kadi Ninda of such interpretations

But you don't want this to be part of the defining criteria for the leadership which does this??? Then why the eff should any one bother -

[Aditya G]

Lt Gen Hooda, former Northern Army commander believes that LoC retaliation is the only alternative

http://www.news18.com/news/india/opinio ... 16393.html

The martyrdom of Major Moharkar and three soldiers while on a routine patrol in the Keri sector of Jammu and Kashmir was followed, after 48 hours, by an Indian Army cross-border strike which killed at least three Pakistani soldiers. This tit-for-tat action is now seen as something that has become the new normal along the Line of Control (LoC) separating India and Pakistan. There is a similar pattern with ceasefire violations (CFV) — one side initiating and the other responding immediately.

Questions are often asked whether these eye for an eye tactics serve any larger purpose. After all, we are not only losing our soldiers but also civilians living in border areas. The civil population is most impacted due to displacement from their homes and the debilitating impact on their daily lives.

Violent incidents close to the border, like the Pathankot attack, also hold India-Pakistan relations hostage as they are seen as being more directly linked to the Pakistani state, as opposed to terrorist actions which take place in the villages of Kashmir valley.

Let me begin by clarifying the Indian Army's tactical thought process. The Army believes that a calm LoC is a preferable operational environment. Indian soldiers deployed on the border in Jammu and Kashmir have two main tasks. The first is to maintain the sanctity of the LoC (which is not marked out on ground) by ensuring that there is no intrusion by Pakistan to grab our territory. The second is to maintain a strong counter-infiltration grid to prevent terrorists from sneaking into our territory.

In the forested and mountainous terrain along the border, these are extremely challenging tasks even under normal conditions, and best performed when the LoC is calm. If hundreds of mortar bombs are raining down you, it is difficult to carry out patrolling and spot a small group of infiltrators who may be attempting to sneak into the area. The fact that our patrols are still carrying out their duty despite the Pakistani firing is reflective of the bravery and dedication of our officers and men. But it comes with a huge risk.

Pakistan Army’s view is just the opposite. A calm LoC not only makes the pushing in of terrorists more difficult but is also reflective of an improving situation in Jammu and Kashmir. The latter goes against the Pakistani narrative of a state embroiled in violence.

We have seen this playing out since 2013, particularly in the Jammu region. 2012 was the most peaceful year in the history of Jammu and Kashmir insurgency. The total casualties of terrorists, security forces and civilians were only 117. Terrorism had been almost completely wiped out from areas South of Pir Panjal. In sharp contrast to this improvement, the LoC heated up.

CFVs by Pakistan army increased from 114 in 2012 to 347 in 2013, 583 in 2014 and 720 in 2017. Over 90% of these were in Jammu region. The LoC turned violent with many soldiers martyred in firing, ambushes and BAT actions, and bodies being mutilated, the latest incident being on 1 May this year in the Poonch sector.

How should the Indian soldiers on the LoC react to such provocation? The reality is that the LoC is a brutal place. Any misstep is fatal. It is impossible for any military leader to salute his comrade's coffin without promising retribution. Deaths which remain unavenged will lead to a disastrous loss of morale. Troops are already under tremendous pressure and they need the highs of tactical victories.

This game is playing out daily on the LoC. Some incidents get highlighted in the media but most don't. However, successful actions contribute to a sense of ‘moral ascendancy’ over your enemy. In warlike situations, as Napolean said, “Moral is to the physical as three to one.” But is there a war on at the LoC? For a soldier whose post is being bombarded by artillery, mortars, rocket launchers and machine guns, it is as close to war as he can get.

Is it possible to break out of this seemingly endless cycle of violence? The ball is clearly in Pakistan army's court. The Indian Army has made it known to them in border meetings and through the DGMO level talks that calm will only return to the LoC if their army takes actions to check the movement of terrorists from their side and stop cross-border violations. If infiltration, ambushes, CFVs and IED attacks continue, there can be no peace.

Is there any strategic sense to the Indian Army's actions along and across the LoC? In the short term, the answer may appear to be in the negative because Pakistan appears undeterred and continues its support to anti-India terrorists. However, we do not have many options. Diplomacy between the two countries is perhaps at its lowest level. There are no economic linkages that can be exploited.

Dependency on a third country to force a change in Pakistani attitude have not been successful.

Under these circumstances, military pressure seems to be the only path. Pakistan Army cannot be permitted to plan terrorist actions in comfort and without fear of retribution. They must feel the pain of lost comrades. It will be a long and somewhat bloody haul but today there appears to be no other alternative to compel Pakistan to change its ways.

(The author is former Northern Commander, Indian Army, under whose leadership India carried out surgical strikes against Pakistan in 2016. Views are personal.)

[Akshay Kapoor]

This is exactly why just one to one retaliation is not enough. Their whole goal is to push through infiltrators and ours cannot be just to stop that. It has to be to hurt them deep so that they are reacting to us. Current hot LC is good for them so we need to make it much much hotter and in depth - their ops areas. We need to have a really offensive strategy sign very clear goals in mind :

1. Impose severe costs on their officers
2. Destroy as much of their defences and operational infrastructure as possible using all means at our disposal including arty.
3. Give them a disproportionate cost in casualties to their regular troops and to civilians. Something that really deters them or if not degrades their capacity significantly.

Lastly in addition to the above all levers is national power have to be used - Baloxhistan, economics , trade, Indus waters.

We really have to hit them hard. Gen Hoodas article makes the strategic issues very clear.

[Aditya G]

Lt Gen Hasnain;

https://swarajyamag.com/defence/in-tran ... lan-is-key

In 1983, I was deployed at a forward defended locality (FDL) in the Poonch sector as a company commander. It was a remote post surrounded on all sides by Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, where the Pakistan Army had an upper hand due to their deployment at a higher ground, and yet we kept them subdued due to intense engagement from well-concealed positions.

We kept the morale high through some sub-tactical-level psychological actions. Across the Betar Nala, I had a grandstand view of both Indian and Pakistani positions, rising up to the Raja Rani, which features the highest peaks on that part of the offshoot of the Pir Panjal; the area had seen intense fighting in both the 1965 and 1971 wars with Pakistan. The Line of Control (LOC) ran between two trees standing like twins and visible from far away; they were called “Bhai Bhai” in typical cryptic army humour. Close to Raja Rani was a forested feature where a Pakistani helipad existed, obviously the battalion headquarters of the Pakistani unit; it was called Rakh Chikri (“Rakh” means forest). The entire area had a thick forest cover.

On 25 December 2017, I was forced to mentally recall the lay of the ground again as this was the exact area of the 59 Baluch against whom an Indian unit of the famous Poonch Brigade carried out a local tactical action across the LOC, killing an officer and three jawans of the Pakistan Army. It was an act of retribution for the action carried out by the Pakistan Army at Keri against our troops, in which an officer and three bravehearts of 2 Sikh (Royal) were martyred.

The Indian action at Rakh Chikri was a tactical trans-LoC operation and not a surgical strike. The difference is essentially in the realm of objectives. In a surgical strike, specific objectives are chosen relating to the adversary’s infrastructure and locations, including terror camps, launch pads and training facilities, and the focus remains there; the distance could be deeper into the adversary’s ground. Any other operations conducted in adversary-held territory are incidental to the main operations.

In a local tactical operation, the penetration is comparatively shallow, but the number of troops could be comparable, operating as a number of small teams. They could be a mix of Special Forces and ghataks (commandos of the infantry units who are trained to a much higher degree of proficiency). The nature of operation is more akin to ambush, as routes of adversary patrols and logistics elements are well-known over the years. The Indian Army units are quite adept at these operations and can execute them without hiccups.

Pakistan chose to launch its operation against an Indian Army unit, 2 Sikh (Royal), in the Keri-defended area of the Rajouri sector, on 22 December 2017. A strike on the Kashmir LOC would have been much more difficult with the heavy snow conditions and missing foliage, which makes movement easier to discover. The Rajouri and Mendhar sectors are comparatively lower in altitude and in winter have the cover still reasonably intact. There are hundreds of such locations along the lower areas of the LOC south of the Pir Panjal, where there is enough broken ground through which infiltration is possible, and the LOC anti-infiltration fence runs close to the LOC. All these locations are patrolled by our troops for domination. The inevitable question should be why the strength of such patrols is small, making them vulnerable. The answer is that with the hundreds of responsibilities of troops at the LOC and the large number of such locations, there can only be a certain strength of troops available for patrolling the many gaps.

It also needs to be remembered that it is the Pakistan Army which has the initiative because it aids and abets in the infiltration of terrorists across the LOC. It also assists and in fact organises and leads Border Action Team (BAT) actions against our troops. The Indian Army has greater deployment, but it is more in responsive mode so as to counter infiltration and ensure the security of its posts. Much of the troop strength at our posts goes into these arduous tasks. Yet it cannot be denied that faster response systems and drills can assist in ensuring that the BAT cannot get away after having executed a task.

The answer lies in ensuring that the Indian Army sheds all qualms about conducting trans-LoC operations and any hesitation about the choice of objectives. If gloves have to be off, the ethics of LOC conflict may need to change. Already the Indian Army is dominating the exchanges of fire assault across the LOC. It only has to move up a few notches to shed inhibitions and prove that it can do one better than the Pakistan Army, a fact that it has proven in battle many a time.

I have conducted trans-LoC operations in my time when we were absolutely pressed to respond and can vouch that one strike would put the Pakistan Army into a shell and force it to become completely defensive. I have seen Pakistani FDLs lighting fires all night to illuminate areas around them because of the scare we imposed and psychological domination we achieved. To that extent, the swift decision of the government to give the Army’s Northern Command the green light to proceed and carry out retaliation for the criminal act that the Pakistan Army indulged in at Keri was most appropriate.

The choice of Rakh Chikri for the retribution did not surprise me. It is far removed from Keri (almost 120km away), in a higher part of an offshoot of the Pir Panjal range where the separation is reasonably large, offering scope for movement. The adversary would least have expected a response in an area higher up in the mountains due to snow conditions (December was usually a month during which Rakh Chikri was white-shod; not known whether the same is true today).

It is well-known that the LOC has become for Pakistan a convenient location for strategic messaging. When it is unable to achieve anything substantial in other domains, such as operations in the Valley or Jammu, it resorts to an odd BAT action. Due to infrequency in execution, the predictability factor remains low while surprise is high. Maintaining a high level of vigil 24 x 7 x 365 is virtually impossible for the best of forces; there will be chinks in the armour and human failings at some point. What the Indian Army needs as part of a transformation of conflict with Pakistan is greater proactivity and freedom to operate optimally to place its adversary under intense pressure.

The government does not appear to have placed shackles in the Army’s way, so it is up to its hierarchy to draw up a more offensive game plan. Ethics and qualms do not work here. There have been times the Indian Army has actually deliberately held back its offensive designs to allow the Pakistan Army to continue its counter-insurgency operations, for which troops from the LOC had also been withdrawn. We need to do the reverse so that a larger strength of the Pakistan Army is forced to return to the LOC and be on 24 x 7 vigil, awaiting Indian Army ghataks and Special Forces who could be behind it or on its flanks.

Lastly, Pakistan is adept at choreographing events and executing its tactical actions in sync with them. The visit of Kulbhushan Jadhav’s family and their humiliation comes in close coordination with the trans-LoC operation at Keri. It is this which needs to be defeated more substantially with greater predictability and better war-gaming.

Trans-LC ops entered common man's jargon now .... ofcourse very old concept in the army :

[Lisa]

Lt Gen Hasnain;

https://swarajyamag.com/defence/in-tran ... lan-is-key

The government does not appear to have placed shackles in the Army’s way, so it is up to its hierarchy to draw up a more offensive game plan. Ethics and qualms do not work here. There have been times the Indian Army has actually deliberately held back its offensive designs to allow the Pakistan Army to continue its counter-insurgency operations, for which troops from the LOC had also been withdrawn. We need to do the reverse so that a larger strength of the Pakistan Army is forced to return to the LOC and be on 24 x 7 vigil, awaiting Indian Army ghataks and Special Forces who could be behind it or on its flanks.

100% Correct.

[SBajwa]

I would put snipers at strategic places to look for officers and hit them only. That would teach the Nawabs or RAPE class a lesson.

[SBajwa]

I would put snipers at strategic places to look for officers and hit them only. That would teach the Nawabs or RAPE class a lesson.

[Trikaal]

Pakistan seems to have dedicated SF snipers attached with each unit whose sole job is to pick out indian soldiers. Dunno if we hv something similar. If not, this needs to be rectified, with our snipers picking off their sepoys and officers. I often hear about indians getting sniped but not the other way around.

[Aditya G]

Pakistan seems to have dedicated SF snipers attached with each unit whose sole job is to pick out indian soldiers. Dunno if we hv something similar. If not, this needs to be rectified, with our snipers picking off their sepoys and officers. I often hear about indians getting sniped but not the other way around.

Please see this thread:

https://twitter.com/strategic_front/sta ... 7618802688

[Aditya G]

I would put snipers at strategic places to look for officers and hit them only. That would teach the Nawabs or RAPE class a lesson.

Pakistanis are doing exactly that. Aside from reports in our media, we have seen videos from Pakistan such as Wajahat Khan's documentaries showing off deployment of snipers with fairly modern bolt action sniper rifles.

How effective are Pakistani snipers? Yes we have lost men to sniping - but the Major was the sole officer casualty this year, and as far as known it was not to sniping. My point is sniping is done by both sides, and has some utility but is not a be all end all solution to either side. IMHO fire assaults as employed by IA are much more effective.

[Trikaal]

I am glad that we are giving back just as good or even better when it comes to sniping. Thanks for clearing my misconception.LOC is very hot atm and the temperature will only rise in the coming days.

[darshhan]

Found the caption below at Shatrujeet FB page

#2018
दिन बदलेगा साल बदलेगा
शिकारी वही हैं सिर्फ शिकार बदलेगा


(Translation: Day will change, the year will change. Hunted will also change, only the hunter will remain same)

Let us hope and pray that gallons of Pakistani blood gets spilled in this year. Let us wish that our warriors have tremendous success in snatching, maiming, and murdering Pakis.

[Akshay Kapoor]

Inshiah allah !

Also let’s never forget that though these are tactical actions you suggest , because it’s a pivot to offence with clear goals will have important strategic implications.

[Akshay Kapoor]

I would put snipers at strategic places to look for officers and hit them only. That would teach the Nawabs or RAPE class a lesson.

Pakistanis are doing exactly that. Aside from reports in our media, we have seen videos from Pakistan such as Wajahat Khan's documentaries showing off deployment of snipers with fairly modern bolt action sniper rifles.

How effective are Pakistani snipers? Yes we have lost men to sniping - but the Major was the sole officer casualty this year, and as far as known it was not to sniping. My point is sniping is done by both sides, and has some utility but is not a be all end all solution to either side. IMHO fire assaults as employed by IA are much more effective.

Guys this was a BAT action not sniping. Officer was checking his posts and taking stock, motivating , debriefing , briefing going from post to post. They have to do that to patrol the LC. And BAT attacked them. Sniping may have been part of the action though. I had posted about sniper tactics in another thread some months ago.

The above article by Gen Hasnain is a good summary of what happened.

[Thakur_B]

^^An SSG sniper and his spotter were reported to be BTFO a couple of days later. Sniping may have been involved.

[Aditya G]

The History Channel docu may be based on Nitin Gokhale's work, but we do learn new facts. Most importantly, is the number of targets. So far we knew 5 targets were hit. I had combed through all open source info and come up with this:



However, History TV mentioned 6 targets:





I thought it was an error typical of DDM. I inquired with Gokhale ji and he came back:

Actually 7 but one was empty so 6

This was never revealed earlier! If there were 7 targets then there at least equal number of teams involved. Which unit? Why to hide it so far?

We also learn that at least 1 SF team was delivered via chopper to a location - presumably within own territory but who the hell knows what all they have kept hidden.

[ramana]

How do T-1 thru T-6 correspond to your locations?

[Aditya G]

How do T-1 thru T-6 correspond to your locations?

As per History TV Docu Strike Team 1 hit Leepa Valley target T-1. But we know this team split and hit two adjacent but distinct targets.

So it doesnt tally 1:1

[Manish Jain]

Here's Youtube link for History Channel's documentary on surgical strikes -

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aXQj6-K ... e=youtu.be

[IndraD]

entire programme is available now

[JTull]

Is there a better video? For long periods the voices are muted and we can only hear music.

[Aditya G]

Recce footage: