Key Military Strategic Issues List 2017-2018

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ramana
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Key Military Strategic Issues List 2017-2018

Postby ramana » 28 Oct 2016 05:02

As the new year approaches, I would like to start this thread to list the key strategic issues facing each of the services individually and jointly.

I would like our members Akshay Kapoor (Army), Deejay (Air Force) and tsarkar (Navy) to lead the discussion on this subject.

I also would like Sachin to discuss the Internal Security and Police issues for a comprehensive look.

Please be expansive (five year outlook) and then narrow(one year) it down to what can be solved in a year.
Thanks in advance

ramana
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Re: Key Military Strategic Issues List 2017-2018

Postby ramana » 10 Jan 2017 04:59

Here is Commodore C. Uday Bhaskar with two experts on challenges in 2017



ramana
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Re: Key Military Strategic Issues List 2017-2018

Postby ramana » 10 Jan 2017 05:02

On suggested template:


Unlikely Event


Background


Events and Triggers


Pathways to Unlikely Outcome

Indicators to Watch For

Factors to Encourage Positive Outcome


Probability of this Event High Medium Low

ramana
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Re: Key Military Strategic Issues List 2017-2018

Postby ramana » 28 Apr 2017 05:38

UP!!!!

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Re: Key Military Strategic Issues List 2017-2018

Postby ramana » 01 Jun 2017 19:10

Singha wrote:my reading of the scene. import substitution needed marked
helina/nag - sofradir seeker
astra - agat seeker
brahmos - russi engine and seeker

ngarm - 100% desi ARM seeker now ?
akash - fully desi (?)
barak8 - seeker
SAAW/garudamma/garuda - fully indigenized?
nirbhay - turbofan engine

^^ all the above would replace the R77, KH31, KH59, Armat, durandel, AS30L, popeye, kornet, konkurs, SA6/3 currently in service.

R60 would likely get replaced by python5

we need a family of "aesa" seekers in X and mmw band starting from atgm size to brahmos size. perhaps using common components and back end processors. this problem I am confident will be beaten once and for all within 10 years.

the other crown jewel will be the desi turbofan engine for nirbhay.

we can then play around like lockheed and boeing do, mating a variety of seekers, warheads, chassis and engine to come up with new weapons quickly.

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Re: Key Military Strategic Issues List 2017-2018

Postby ramana » 01 Jun 2017 19:14

Philip wrote:Multi-use Astra should be actively pursued,as it would eliminate the need for a similar firang system,also is smaller than Akash and should be cheaper too.However,this re[port needs to be evaluated for accuracy. One int. point is that Akash weighs 700KG+ while Astra weighs only 150KG+ Even Astra MK-1 should serve the SRAAM requirement easily. Being this light,its use aboard naval vessels would be preferable too.

http://www.defensenews.com/articles/hom ... us-efforts
Indian Astra Missile Still Needs Russian Tech To Find Targets
By: Vivek Raghuvanshi, December 19, 2016 (Photo Credit: Alexander Nemenov/AFP via Getty Images)

NEW DELHI — In conflict with claims that India's 40-kilometer-range Astra Mark-1 beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile (BVRAAM) is indigenous, the Indian Air Force (IAF) says it will forever be dependent on Russia for the missile's critical technologies.

The IAF says the missile's developer, state-owned Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO), simply cannot produce it fully in-house.

"The missile seeker (main part for guidance) is based on Russian R-77 radar seeker in Astra Mark-1, and the homemade seeker has not been developed," according to a senior IAF official, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

The seeker helps in firing the missile from beyond visual range, tracking and then locking onto the target, the IAF official explained. It also provides the capability to follow its target despite complicated maneuvers, the official added.

"Astra missile is unlikely to be fully indigenous, as critical components like active sensor and proximity fuses would have to be imported as of now," said Daljit Singh, a retired IAF air marshal and defense analyst.

However, a DRDO scientist said the "radio frequency seeker is a transfer of technology from Russia, but the other subassembly is indigenous."

"After the latest tests (Dec.11-13), Astra Mark-1 missile will get into induction stage in another six to eight months," according to the DRDO scientist.

But the IAF official said the service may not induct the Astra Mark-1 missile because it's unsure if it will even be proven in the field. :rotfl:

Defense News
India, Russia Sign Defense Inter-government Agreements

The IAF is currently pushing for a longer-range BVRAAM. "IAF has already told Ministry of Defence that it will mount only an upgraded version of Astra missiles on Light Combat Aircraft-series fighters," the IAF official noted.


DRDO has already begun work on the Mark-2 version of the Astra missile with a range of up to 100 kilometers, similar to the French Meteor BVRAAM, the DRDO scientist said.

Defense News
India Seeks Global Ties for Its Light Combat Aircraft Mark-1A Program

"With China having tested a very-long-range air-to-air missile early this year and Astra Mark-2 missile remaining the main requirement of IAF, which is still in initial stages of development, India will need to import advanced BVRAAM soon," another IAF official said.

Astra Mark-1 missile is a single-stage, solid-propellant missile that is 3.57 meters long and flies at more than four times the speed of sound at Mach 4.5.


"The technology used in Astra missile is more sophisticated than indigenous Agni (ballistic medium-range nuclear-able missile), as it works on a terminal active radar seeker and an updated mid-course internal guidance system that helps the missile in locating the target," according to the DRDO scientist.


Indian fighter aircraft are currently armed with Russian, French and Israeli BVR missiles.

"Astra missile, however, is not likely to be cheaper than other fully developed BVR missiles, considering the extent of research and development funding and other development costs," defense analyst Singh added.


*(But even if equally expensive, the money will mostly stay at home. If a multi-use Astra is developed, it will bring down costs even further.)

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Re: Key Military Strategic Issues List 2017-2018

Postby ramana » 10 Nov 2017 21:58

USI Journal has a number of research topics

http://usiofindia.org/Projects/CS3/

and areas of interests:

http://usiofindia.org/CS3/ResearchAreas/

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Re: Key Military Strategic Issues List 2017-2018

Postby ramana » 10 Nov 2017 22:01

I would like members to take time during coming holidays and work on a short essay on this subject.

http://usiofindia.org/Events/GMEC/

Role of the Indian Armed Forces in Strategic Decision Making - Reclaiming the Strategic Space

1. In strategic level decision making especially those related to the nations security, the stakes are extremely high and have long-term implications; but tend to be based on human perceptions and judgements as these have to be taken in an unpredictable environment. Therefore, it is important that all stakeholders are a part of the decision making process. Sadly, one of the SIPRI reports stated that "Indian security for the past 50 years has been marked by defence policy making sans strategic logic, long term planning and a sense of urgency characterised by opacity, ad hoc decisions and general muddle-headedness. The decades old debate on reorganisation of the higher defence organisations and the national security apparatus has made little progress." This is definitely is not desirable.

2. In the present arrangement, the Armed Forces are of out of the government mechanism on strategic decision making. Ignorance of the political leadership coupled with bureaucratic reluctance has ensured the military leaders are left out of the loop and the political leadership are denied strategically sound advice particularly those related to the threats, armed forces transformation, capability development and employment and institutional issues.

3. There is a view that while the military input is essential for and invaluable in deliberations on matters of security; the concept of security today is much wider and hence, the civilian leadership with inputs from the Ministry of Defence can holistically handle it. But the perception is that there is an imbalance in India's civil-military relations brought about by an intervening bureaucratic layer in the Ministry of Defence between the military and the political head. The question to be asked is - Is the "lack of trust" between the civil-military officials affecting strategic policies? Whatever be the case, it is important that the Armed Forces make themselves heard, have greater space in relevant decision-making and seek partnership in national security and defence policy-making, lest we suffer the same fate as was the case in 1962.

4. There is an urgent need for an integrated approach to 'national security' with the political, military, economic and diplomatic aspects meshed together cogently. A democratic nation which is aspiring to be a regional power requires effective and sound advice to be rendered to the civilian authorities who are representative of, and answerable to the Parliament. Integrated approach to strategic decision making helps to build trust, avoids costly delay, avoidable duplication and wasteful expense, and improves operational efficiency. Therefore, there is no doubt that the Indian Armed Forces have an important role to play in strategic decision making related to national security especially on issues that directly affect them such as intelligence assessments, force structures, resource allocation, defence processes and procedures.

5. Effective civilian control over security forces and structures is one critical component. Civilian control not only helps ensure transparency and policy oversight; it can help restore the legitimacy of security institutions among the public. However, it is also important that military viewpoints be effectively represented in decision-making structures.

6. With the above as the background, carry out an analysis of the existing national security decision-making processes and structures and suggest ways and means on how the Indian Armed Forces can play a greater role in the strategic decision making and reclaim the strategic space. The essay should also address the following issues:-
a. Current strategic environment is too vital a subject to be dealt with in watertight compartments. In what all aspects, do the armed forces need to play a significant role in the strategic decision-making?
b. Do our civilian authorities-executive and legislative-adequately demonstrate critical understanding of the larger strategic issues and implications of military employment and institutional conduct? Are they adequately conversant with military purposes, capabilities, constraints and effects?
c. Do the Indian Armed Forces demonstrate critical, creative understanding of the strategic purposes? Does it contribute in strategic level discussions, and explain the consequences of military employment and institutional conduct?
d. There is a wide range of national security decision-making models available in developing and developed countries. There are similar and dissimilar challenges faced by other armed forces in the world. Analyse these models and highlight those issues that are of relevance to us.
e. Keeping in view the fast changing strategic environment and trends in warfare, there is an urgent requirement to review our higher defence control system. Do we need changes in the structures, processes, and procedures that create a space for the Indian Armed Force to meaningfully contribute towards efficient and effective decision making at the strategic level?



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Re: Key Military Strategic Issues List 2017-2018

Postby ramana » 03 Aug 2018 21:09

In the CDS thread I posted a link to an essay about revamping the staff training in US military and suggested approach. I am posting key excerpts here

To Produce Strategists focus on Staffing Senior Leaders


Once curricula are rebalanced, specific assignments could be redesigned as well. Rather than assigning students long research papers, more course assignments could be structured around writing short analytical memos (one to two pages), the ubiquitous 5” by 8” issue cards found throughout the Pentagon, speeches, and congressional statements. Done correctly, these could be substantive, well-argued pieces, not collections of clichéd phrases. Feedback on student assignments could be almost daily and direct. If a writing assignment misses the mark, the student could be required to rewrite it until it meets executive writing standards. Several of the assignments could be unannounced and with short timelines to mimic the intensity and disruptiveness experienced by a staff. Brief, analytical presentations could be assigned frequently to hone speaking skills. Some small percentage of students should be expected to fail, but with the understanding that a professional military education failure does not reflect on students’ technical expertise.

Role-playing has a place in graduate-level professional military education as well. In addition to learning how to staff a senior leader, students could assume the role of principal in mock congressional testimonies or briefings to secretary of defense where they are reliant on “staff” (also role-played by students) to succeed. Faculty could provide immediate, direct feedback about their performance. Experiences like these should reinforce the importance of good preparation and the unfortunate outcomes of poor staff work. They could also drive home the strategic dimensions of serving on senior staffs, to include when to take a decision rather than elevate it. In sum, faculty could reshape curricula to graduate thoughtful, quick-acting staff officers immediately ready to assist their senior leaders.



...

Students should be pushed to analyze, integrate, and recommend options quickly and effectively to senior leaders for a wide variety of issues under demanding circumstances. Graduates assigned to a headquarters should be striving from the day they arrive to be value-added to their senior service commander, service chief, joint leader, or civilian principal. If they don’t arrive on a staff wondering each day how to support their principal better, command and staff, and war colleges have failed in their missions — and missed a golden opportunity to develop the next generation of military strategists and senior leaders in the process.



I think BRF is losing its rigor and analytical thinking with myriad postings and sniping comments.
I would like members to think critically and how all these threads advance Indian interests and learn to write short four para essays to communicate this.
This will make better all round persons of all of us.


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