undoubtedly.Rakesh wrote:I agree with the Navy's decision on this. This sailor knew the rules and still flouted them. She needs to go.
She must have known the tendencies even before recruitment.
undoubtedly.Rakesh wrote:I agree with the Navy's decision on this. This sailor knew the rules and still flouted them. She needs to go.
No. Minesweeper hulls need a lot of shock & vibration resistance. Different design philosophy. The US uses wooden hulls because it believes it offers best shock resistance.Pratyush wrote:Will the ability to shape the top works of the kiltan help in building hulls of minesweepers.
also much reduced sensitivity to magnetic mines.tsarkar wrote:No. Minesweeper hulls need a lot of shock & vibration resistance. Different design philosophy. The US uses wooden hulls because it believes it offers best shock resistance.Pratyush wrote:Will the ability to shape the top works of the kiltan help in building hulls of minesweepers.
Looks same to me ....Aditya_V wrote:The P-30 seems to have a lot less clutter than the P-28, seems to be much more stealthier design.
Make in India: Government shipyards win Rs 12,000 crore deal to supply 16 ASW craft to Navy
Leaving private sector competitors behind, government shipyards -- Cochin Shipyard Limited and Garden Reach Shipyard Limited -- bagged the order to supply 16 anti-submarine warfare (ASW) craft to the Indian Navy.
Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi's 'Make in India' programme, government shipyards are moving ahead of their private sector rivals in warship building as they have emerged winners in a Rs 12,000-crore deal to supply 16 anti-submarine warfare (ASW) craft to the Navy.
"As tenders for the Rs 12,000-crore deal were opened, the shipping ministry's Cochin Shipyard Limited and defence ministry's Garden Reach Shipyard Limited (GRSE) emerged as the two lowest bidders," a defence ministry source told Mail Today.
This is the third open tender deal involving competitive bids in the recent past which has gone to public sector firms. Recently, the Hindustan Shipyard Limited (HSL) won the contract for building two diving support vessels (DSVs) worth Rs 2,020 crore after it emerged as the lowest bidder.
Under the ASW shallow water craft deal, CSL emerged as the lowest bidder and GRSE the second lowest. The second lowest bidder will have to build the eight crafts at the price offered by the lowest bidder as per the tender issued by the Navy.
As per the defence procurement procedure, the company offering the lowest price for a particular weapon system is given the contract among the firms which meet technical requirements specified in the tender document.
When the private sector firms were allowed to bid for defence contracts, it was felt that they would be quoting lower prices than government firms, but this has proved to be otherwise.
In the recent past, there have been cases where Navy and Coast Guard projects have been delayed by private shipyards and in some of the cases, the delay has been by many years.
In one such case, a Gujarat-based shipyard has been able to supply only one out of six survey vessels ordered by the Navy even 10 years after signing the deal. In another case, a major private shipyard has not supplied even a single patrol vessel out of the contract for five signed more than six years ago.
Some of the major private sector shipyards are facing serious financial constraints and were cleared by the government for receiving tenders only after conditional clearances were granted to them by the defence ministry's finance wing.
Due to the improved performance of defence shipyards, the Goa Shipyard Limited was nominated by the government for partnering with the Russians for manufacturing four Talwar-Class follow-on warships worth more than Rs 20,000 crore.
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/...t ... 69446.html
The commissioning on Monday of India’s third and newest anti-submarine corvette, INS Kiltan, by Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman is good news. But it also underlines the ills that plague warship building in India. The Kiltan was commissioned five years later than originally scheduled and without anti-submarine capabilities that are fundamental to such a corvette. Three and a half years after the National Democratic Alliance came to power promising to quickly make up the military’s arms shortfalls, it is evident that, in warship building like in the procurement of other weaponry, this government has performed no better than the United Progressive Alliance before it.
In April, the navy’s warships acquisition chief told defence industrialists in New Delhi that the navy would increase its strength from 140 vessels currently to 170-180 ships by 2027. This requires increasing warship numbers by three or four every year, as well as inducting four or five new vessels annually to replace warships that complete their service lives of 25-30 years. Against this requirement for seven to nine new warships every year, the navy is barely able to induct three or four. This lackadaisical production rate in domestic defence shipyards has forced the navy to look overseas at offers like the Russian one to build four follow-on frigates of the Talwar-class.
A key reason for building delays is the navy’s penchant for the latest, with admirals demanding that each warship incorporates newer and more sophisticated technology. This is a recipe for delay. In contrast, fast builders like China finalise a particular design and then churn out a large number of those warships, benefiting from economies of scale, the certainty of supply orders and worker experience in building a particular “type”. The People’s Liberation Army (Navy) has already commissioned 25 Type 054A Jiangkai-II class frigates and is building three more. It has already inducted six Type 052D Luying-III class destroyers and work is under way on at least eight more.
In contrast, the Indian navy builds barely three or four warships of one type before going back to the drawing board and reworking specifications. It built just three Delhi-class destroyers under Project 15 and then took years to rework the design into what it called a “follow-on” class – Project 15A – but which was actually a substantively different warship. Even before three destroyers were built under Project 15A, the navy reworked the design into Project 15B, to build four new destroyers. Frigate orders have been similarly broken up. After Project 17 (three ships), there is now a follow order under Project 17A for seven frigates but, inexplicably, this is distributed between two different shipyards. A different kind of disjointedness characterises the four-corvette Project 28 order. The ship commissioned on Monday, INS Kiltan, has an all-composite superstructure in place of the steel superstructures on the first two Project 28 corvettes.
Besides design and planning confusion, warship building is also dogged by capacity limitations. All four public sector warship yards – Mazagon Dock (Mumbai); Garden Reach (Kolkata); Goa Shipyard (Goa) and Hindustan Shipyard (Visakhapatnam) – are located in metropolitan areas with little scope for expanding facilities. To add capacity, the defence ministry created the “strategic partner” policy to bring in private sector shipbuilders like Larsen & Toubro and Reliance Defence Industries. But the poorly conceived policy faces opposition, not least from within the defence ministry itself. Consequently, projects earmarked for strategic partners languish, such as Project 75-I to build six new submarines, even as Mazagon Dock’s submarine building facilities increasingly lie idle. Without policy clarity within the ministry, the navy’s strength and numbers are set to fall further.
- Ajai Shukla says that splitting orders between multiple yards cuts advantages in numbers. However, this is necessary given the tardy pace of construction by Indian shipyards. A much smaller, and simpler order for 8 LCUs was placed on Sep-2011 - 6 years ago - and yet only 2 stand commissioned today.Broadsword said...
@ Anonymous 23:33 ...that the seven ships of 17A have been split up between two shipyards, losing the advantage of building in numbers.
On examination I don't find this point to be true at all. IN has standardized and ensured many basic equipment is shared across the fleet and also ensured indigestion of same;A key reason for building delays is the navy’s penchant for the latest, with admirals demanding that each warship incorporates newer and more sophisticated technology. This is a recipe for delay
That was true in 1980s and 90s; Projects 15, 16, and 25. Truth being we lacked the capital to order more. Compared to the 1980s (when our naval power was at peak), the Navy is in fact moving to fewer classes of ships with higher units;In contrast, the Indian navy builds barely three or four warships of one type before going back to the drawing board and reworking specifications.
The P-15B is a virtual repeat of the P-15A with minor changes to superstructure. Which is why those ships are coming (relatively) fast.Even before three destroyers were built under Project 15A, the navy reworked the design into Project 15B, to build four new destroyers.
For a very specific reason - that is to establish a second manufacturing line of frigate/destroyer on another seaboard. The Godavari/Brahmaputra class was supposed to accomplish exactly the same thing at MDL/GRSE but labor problems forced the navy to restrict frigate/destroyer construction to MDL only. Only in recent years has GRSE been brought back on track and is graduating from frigate sized P-28 to destroyer sized P-17A. Likewise P-17A will be the vehicle for establishing modular construction techniques on both manufacturing lines.Frigate orders have been similarly broken up. After Project 17 (three ships), there is now a follow order under Project 17A for seven frigates but, inexplicably, this is distributed between two different shipyards.
Again for a very good reason. The first 2 corvettes had stability problems due to higher topweight. The composite structure was expected to alleviate some of that. But there may be a penalty in battle damage resistance...we shall see if composites hold up as well as steel.A different kind of disjointedness characterises the four-corvette Project 28 order. The ship commissioned on Monday, INS Kiltan, has an all-composite superstructure in place of the steel superstructures on the first two Project 28 corvettes.
Lots of gaps in production.Katare wrote:I think Shukla has hit the nail in the head! That is exactly the problem with that said there other major issues as pointed by post above which cause IN to do it.
In general we like to buy weapons in small chunks. Su30s were bought in 4-5 different orders. What a deal we could have received if we had put an order for 300 flankers in one go. For everything we have follow on orders obsession. We need ot order frigates in set of 10 with upgrades to design allowed at midway.Corvets should be ordered in set of 12 to 16 in one go and destroyers in a set of at least six to 8. Subs should be ordered in set of a dozen at a time. We'll get much better prices and faster delivery schedules, much happier and much more profitable yards
Some data points even however fuzzy they maybe.INS Aridhaman is already undergoing finals checks and it is likely to be launched for sea trials in late November or December. The nuclear reactor which will power INS Aridhaman will go critical only after sea trials. The submarine will be formally commissioned into the Navy only by 2019. INS Arihant is powered by an 83 MW pressurised light water nuclear reactor.
Two more SSBN submarines under ATV project are already in the pipeline. With four nuclear submarines, Indian Navy will be able to truly project its blue-water operational capabilities.
The third submarine, which is likely to be launched in 2018, will have much more advanced weapons, systems and equipment than Arihant and Aridhaman, but will be of the same size as its predecesso
Aridhaman is also much faster than Arihant. Powered by a pressurised water reactor, Aridhaman boasts of a seven-blade propeller with a maximum surface speed of 15 knots and 24 knots underwater.
negi wrote:Admiral is mixing up things ; his retirement happened primarily in the backdrop of Sindhurakshak accident in 2013 August and then later Sindhuratna in 2014 both submarine accidents were due to "operational errors" that IN has confirmed it has nothing to do with vested interests ; the battery issue with Sindhurakshak happened in 2010. However the video again shows what is exactly wrong in the system people from one 'department' claim that the other 'department' is not doing their job this is the root cause of all issues in any system all that talk notwithstanding now the good Adm has now joined the dark side (he is now LG of A&N islands so part of the same neta-babu group that accepted his resignation within 2 hours).
You are missing the point , issue is accidents that lead to Admiral stepping down have nothing to do with sanction of upgrades His comments are no different from laments from common joe on the street about government's apathy towards roads or other administrative issues . As for his point let me tell you no armed force will get financial autonomy not even within the USA everywhere the purse strings are controlled centrally . As for your last observation that is clutching at the straws point I made was it is easy to criticize the system when it doesn't work for you , at the time when this interview was recorded things did not work for him ; now he is having to work within the same system and with same people . LG/Governor/MLA are all the same for they are part of the "legislative" you wish to make that distinction for your convenience specifically for this topic go ahead.Aditya G wrote:The admiral is referencing MMSs scalding remarks about national resources.in this context he is critical about the lack of powers to sanction upgrades and repairs even though he is responsible to operate the boats.
The governer is not a babu, he is a political appointee, but definitely not a neta either.
Fenders would have been deployed anyway. Hopefully, that would have taken the main impact and cushioned it as well.Rakesh wrote:Those hulls have definitely made contact in the pictures above. There will be damage.