Indian Navy News & Discussion - 15 Dec 2016

Viv S · Post by **Viv S** » 18 Sep 2017 05:32

brar_w wrote:The Russian pods would have ...

Indian Air Force News & Discussion - 15 Dec 2016

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NRao · Post by **NRao** » 18 Sep 2017 07:27

Cosmo_R wrote:^^^ Also, the whole Vishal thing was to make India spend on being a 'complementary' naval power and take the pressure off the pakis by starving the IAF/IA

Since I do not visit, is that the latest on BR?

Cost/funds for the IAC has always been a topic of concern - Austin has been saying so for eons.

However, it is too late for India to disregard the threat from China. How India decides to face it is TBD. IF a 65,000 ton boat is not feasible, then the challenge will have to be faced by collaborating with "allies". In recent events this has been reflected in two ways: 1) Dual ministry meetings with the US and Japan, where the FM + DM of the two nations meet at the same time. This is a huge development, where a foreign + military policies are forged at the same time (i cannot recall this being done before????). And 2) trilateral FM meeting between India + US + Japan, as it is happening at the NYC during the UN get together. Bet Vishal will surface in such talks.

Another dimension of the Vishal will be the naval AMCA. That is a natural.

Rishi_Tri wrote: Rao, Carter, Trump aside; it is the bureaucracy in Washington, ~~Pentagon~~ *CIA (and the other 16 intel agencies)* which decides the course.

There, corrected it for you.

Rakesh · Post by **Rakesh** » 18 Sep 2017 08:23

sudeepj: You cannot look at a super carrier as a stand alone vessel. This ship comes with a ridiculous amount of support platfroms in the sub-surface, surface and aerial spheres. A single US Carrier Strike Group (CSG) consists of the following;

- A super carrier with a carrier air wing consisting of Rhinos, Growlers, E-2D Hawkeyes, ASW helicopters, etc.
- Guided missile cruisers consisting of Ticenderoga Class cruisers armed with Tomahawk cruise missiles and ASW helicopters.
- A destroyer squadron consisting of Arleigh Burke Class destroyers armed with Tomahawk cruise missiles and ASW helicopters.
- Attack submarines - Los Angeles or Virginia Class (the latter arguably being the premier attack SSN ever fielded by any Navy).
- Supply vessels providing ammunition, fuel and logistics.

The fire power from a single American CSG is greater than the firepower of many nations' entire armed forces. But that capability comes with a significant cost. But I will talk about cost more a bit later. The point I am trying to make is before an American CSG even enters a theatre of operations, it is fully aware of all threats in the area and has the capability to effectively neutralize those threats. Moral of the story, a single CSG can royally ruin your parade. You will not recover. And America has nine of them.

Take a look at the Indian Navy now. How much of the above capability do we have? Our Kolkata Class destroyers were comissioned without the Barak 8 SAM, the ASW capability in the form of the Sea King Mk.42B is a lot left to be desired. The first Scorpene is being comissioned now, after signing the deal in September 2005 I believe. A bloody 12 long years to commission one SSK. Let us not get into SSN territory. Until recently, many of our front line destroyers and frigates had no towed array sonars. See below.

Sonar contract provides major boost to navy
http://www.business-standard.com/articl ... 024_1.html

So get the building blocks in place first for the Navy. Below is a list of capabilites the Navy needs IMVHO for an effective CSG and a blue water navy as a whole;

- Start the construction of SSNs with BrahMos land attack capability.
- Start acquiring more SSKs, preferably the Soryu. A minimum of 12...double the Project 75 order.
- Buy a minimum of a 100 Sikorsky S-70 helictopters in various roles. The S-70B variant to replace the Sea King Mk.42B in the ASW role and to be stationed on every aircraft carrier, every destroyer and every frigate; another S-70 variant to replace the Sea King Mk.42C in the commando insertion role and another S-70 variant (preferably the MH-60 Jayhawk) in the search and rescue role. A fantastic and proven helicopter...she is a beast.
- Increase the current order of four additional Boeing P-8Is to a minimum of another four more. I personally would like to see 24+ P-8Is in total. Eight on the western seaboard, eight on the eastern seaboard, eight in the A&N area.
- In flight refuellers dedicated for naval air ops....preferably the Boeing KC-767
- Northrop Grumman E-2D Advanced Hawkeyes for airborne surveillance or a similar platform.
- Growlers (brar, I know Boeing cleared the Rhino for carrier ops aboard the Vikramaditya and the Vikrant). Can the Growler be cleared for the same?

The problem is the Navy is doing this ass backwards. Invest and start construction of a nuke powered EMALS carrier and then buy the rest in piece meal blocks, depending on who is willing to sell and how much the MoD is willing to loosen the purse strings. One cannot expect to mirror American style supercarrier diplomacy, if the foundation on what an Indian CSG sits on is hollow. Secondly, without the above building blocks you can expect to see the Vishal at the bottom of an ocean somewhere. I am all for a supercarrier, but you need the back up.

Which brings me to the issue of cost and influencing other (maritime) nations. Sudeep, I am going to use your own Djibouti example. But first let me talk about cost. Because all of the above is nice to have, but if you do not have the money...you ain't even buying a single paper clip. There is no synergy between what the Armed Forces want and what India is willing to spend. At $20 billion for the Vishal, I am sure some babu at the North Block must have got an asthma attack and thus rejected the navy's five year acquisiton plan and thus called it unrealistic. So first, both need to be in harmony with each other. I have said this before and I say again, Democrats and Republicans in the US are at opposite ends of the political spectrum, but they both lie in the same bed when it comes to American exceptionalism and supremacy. The same is not true in India. So either we increase defense spending in relation to GDP or what we are discussing will remain as theory onlee. And that is a fact.

Now assuming (and that is a big assumption) there is a synergy of views between the Armed Forces needs and India's aspirations (which is what controls the purse strings), a supercarrier along the lines of the Vishal arrives on the scene. Can you not achieve the same with a Vikrant Class aircraft carrier as well? Will Djibouti really be influenced ONLY by a nuclear powered, EMALS equipped, 65,000 ton behemoth? I guess a F-18 Rhino flying off the deck of a Vikrant does not provide the same punch as a flying off the Vishal. Boss, I agree with you...influence all those African nations I say. But if you achieve the same goal with the Vikrant, why do you need the Vishal? Now yes, EMALS gives the F-18 the ability to carry a larger payload. But explain to me what exactly is there in Djibouti that we have an itch so bad, that we need to bomb back into the stone age?

Rakesh · Post by **Rakesh** » 18 Sep 2017 08:45

KrishnaK wrote:
Rakesh wrote:And as for China, they will be bringing the battle to the Indian Ocean. Having an effective sub fleet consisting of Indian designed SSNs and Soryu Class SSKs will render Chinese aircraft carrier operations redundant.
The idea that subs can render carrier operations redundant is far from definite. From what I understand, the way subs track carriers is by picking them up at chokepoints. Once CBGs make their way into vast ocean expanses, need MPAs to find, track and fix them. Difficult.

There are a number of studies for and against the effectiveness of submarines against aircraft carriers and vice versa. I found one that drives the point home for the submariner. And I am sure you will find studies that are for a CSG. Since the handwriting is hard to read, I reproduce the writing below the photo.

(Text over a periscope targeting photo)

For RADM [Rear Admiral] J. P. Moorer (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_P._Moorer)

I enjoyed your "parochial" speech about carriers, and agreed with your points. Let me counter with a parochial submarine aphorism: "There are two kinds of ships in the world: submarines and targets." Sorry not to have you aboard.

Very respectfully,

Thomas F. Wiener
CDR, USN
C.O., USS Jack (SSN-605) - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Jack_(SSN-605)

KrishnaK wrote:
Rakesh wrote:Station the Growler at naval land air stations, as they have longer legs than the F-35B. No Growler ops capable off an LHD, as far as I know. Do an in-flight refuelling of the Growler with buddy F-18s or Su-30MKIs and you have some serious reach in the IOR.
The advantage of a carrier is an air force base that can move ~55mph. Naval land air stations stay put and will come under attack.

And ask the United States AF, the Royal AF, the Indian AF, the Armée de l'air and they will list all the negatives that come with aircraft carriers. This is an age old argument which has no winner. But point noted

KrishnaK wrote:All this angus beef burger, wada pav comparisons are facile.

That hurts, cause I enjoy both

Viv S · Post by **Viv S** » 18 Sep 2017 09:15

Rakesh wrote:Take a look at the Indian Navy now. How much of the above capability do we have? Our Kolkata Class destroyers were comissioned without the Barak 8 SAM, the ASW capability in the form of the Sea King Mk.42B is a lot left to be desired. The first Scorpene is being comissioned now, after signing the deal in September 2005 I believe. A bloody 12 long years to commission one SSK. Let us not get into SSN territory. Until recently, many of our front line destroyers and frigates had no towed array sonars.

I agree with your basic premise - India of 2017 cannot afford a supercarrier but keep in mind, we're looking at a development + build cycle of around 15 years for the ship. So the real question is - can the India of 2027 afford to fund the construction a supercarrier and can the India of 2037 afford to operate a CBG built around it?

If the project is sanctioned next year, the design will probably be completed by 2021-22, with construction can commencing after a review from the following fiscal. The ship will likely be laid down around 2024-25, and if all goes well, can be launched by 2029-30, delivered to the Navy around 2033-34 and be operational by 2035 (roughly coinciding with the retirement of the Vikramaditya & MiG-29Ks). Its escort force will likely include P-15C destroyers, P-17Bs frigates, screened by P-28A corvettes and a pair of indigenous SSNs (there's a happy thought eh?).

So, I say, focus on a building a STOVL carrier force around our LHDs for now to complement the Vik-based MiGs (because 17 years is a long time), but let the CV program run in parallel as a long term strategic project - like the AURA & AMCA.

Aditya_V · Post by **Aditya_V** » 18 Sep 2017 09:19

I think best choice will be 1 more Vikrant class with bigger lifts to be built quickly and build Visual to make it ready by 2035

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 18 Sep 2017 13:58

Gents,sinc ewe're acquiring a 3rd Chakra/Akula,perhaps a 4th too,plus 6 SSNs ,there is no need for a large conv. AIP boat like the Soryu,the "poor man's N-sub".I just posted that SoKo wants to follow our example after building a series of German U-boats.N-boats have a much greater all-round blue-water capability and SoKo now have enough conv./AIP boats to deal with NoKo and littoral threats.

IN and budgetary blues:
We need a 3rd carrier,no Q about it,but when can we afford it and there are huge unknowns as to what its design should be,what aircraft it should carry,UCAVs too,etc.,etc. In any case whatever carrier we choose,it will be not less than 7-10 yrs. for even a sistership of the new Vikrant to arrive if we took the decision today.2030 is therefore the earliest that we can expect carrier no.3.
However,the 30,000t+ multi-role amphib programme is afoot,with two pvt. yards identified as well who could do the biz. If these vessels are designed to also operate STOVL fighters,we have the bird (in hand) the JSF (if the US will sell it to us) or the Yak-141 (in the bush).Going a step even further,the design/deck layout could also incorporate an angled deck + ski-jump to allow the NLCA (or even a Sea Gripen) to be carried should either of these two poss. developments fructify. This would however require some out-of-the-box thinking by the IN's acquisition/plg. team,to plan for such extra possibilities.I give two options,whose overall cost should be the same approx.

1. I would think that at this moment in time,given the 3 massive demands from each service on their own,that even a sister ship of the IACV-1 with mods,will not be approved.This leaves the IN with no alt. but to leverage the design/capabilities of the amphibs planned,reducing the no. to even 3 if they come with STOVL fighters/fxd. wing future possibilities.The STOVL option is with us if we can get the US to sell them to us,further cementing Indo-US defence ties,that is IF the US wants to do so! JSFs will not come cheap,around at least $100M a pop,why I've included the option for NLCAs/Sea Gripes,but which will require designing a proper angled flight deck and ski-jump.NLCAs would be not more than $25-30M a pop.Gripes about double to 2/3rds the cost of a JSF.Development of either SE naval fighter would also allow them to be used aboard the two exg. CVs,VikA and Vikrant,a plus point for an angled deck option.

2.Alternatively,we build the sister ship of IAC-1 ,equip it with 29Ks (rectified or MIG-35 std. improved variants,or another twin-engined type-but would be suitable only for this vessel), or an outside thought even JSFs ,which could also operate deck only from the other CVs,but these would have to have deck coatings which could survive the extreme heat of a VL by a JSF to avoid melting decks. The IN could then build 3-4 smaller less capable amphibs like the new Ru Lavinia class,only 17,000t,armed with KA-52 attack helos for supporting amphib assault.The cost of this alt. should not be more than the above option.

Option 2 would certainly give the IN more carrier borne air capability at sea,but reduce the amphib capability significantly. The big Q is what is the priority of the IN reg. these two requirements,enhanced air capability for anti-ship,land attack,anti-air and ASW in blue waters,or greater amphib capability for intervention /expeditionary ops in the IOR littorals.GIven that the main threat in the next decade is going to be PLAN/PN subs,whatever option is chosen we'll have an additional 3-4 platforms that can operate multi-role ASW helos. PLAN carriers and task forces can also be dealt with by LRMP/strike ACs like backfires from "INS India".

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 18 Sep 2017 14:08

PS: With respect to the above post,the RN during the Falklands War,used STUFT (Ships Taken Up From Trade) to augment its massive logistic requirement for taking back the Falklands,thousands of NMs away. The 14,000t Ro-Ro container ship,Atlantic Conveyor (lost while being towed) ,was used to transport sev. air assets:

The ships were used to carry supplies for the Royal Navy Task Force sent by the British government to retake the Falkland Islands from Argentine occupation. Sailing for Ascension Island on 25 April 1982, Atlantic Conveyor carried a cargo of six Wessex helicopters from 848 Naval Air Squadron and five RAF Chinook HC.1s from No. 18 Squadron RAF. At Ascension, she picked up eight Fleet Air Arm Sea Harriers (809 Squadron) and six RAF Harrier GR.3 jump jets.

The IN can similarly requisition sev. merchant ships for any amphib op in the IOR.We've done so before in A&N amphib exercises.However,we do not possess any worthwhile Ro-Ro capability at all in our merchant shipping list,if at all.This is essential if we are to transport MBTs,l;arge radars,AVs,transports ,missile carriers,,etc.,abso essential for any major amphib op. Should we augment our merchant fleet thus,it would take some slack off the req. for nos. of dedicated amphib vessels, STUFT is something that the IN needs to study very closely as it would be an excellent method by which to have the assets req. in any crisis. With so many car carriers/Ro-Ros operating out of Indian ports,such vessels would be excellent for our coastal/IOR shipping flying the Indian flag. The money saved could go towards the IN's priority list.

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 18 Sep 2017 17:13

First Scorpene ready, Modi to commission INS Kalvari next month

http://ajaishukla.blogspot.in/2017/09/f ... ssion.html

Aditya_V · Post by **Aditya_V** » 18 Sep 2017 17:19

Goods news, looks like the Arabian sea continental shelf is shaloow in many sections requiring us to have subs with lesser than 2000 ton displacement while the Bay of Bengal the Shelf is pretty deep.

Rakesh · Post by **Rakesh** » 18 Sep 2017 17:43

Viv S wrote:
Rakesh wrote:Take a look at the Indian Navy now. How much of the above capability do we have? Our Kolkata Class destroyers were comissioned without the Barak 8 SAM, the ASW capability in the form of the Sea King Mk.42B is a lot left to be desired. The first Scorpene is being comissioned now, after signing the deal in September 2005 I believe. A bloody 12 long years to commission one SSK. Let us not get into SSN territory. Until recently, many of our front line destroyers and frigates had no towed array sonars.
I agree with your basic premise - India of 2017 cannot afford a supercarrier...

Boss, I agree with your post 100% but I would like to endorse what Aditya_V said right after your post. I reproduce, "I think best choice will be 1 more Vikrant class with bigger lifts to be built quickly and build Vishal to make it ready by 2035."

This is a better common sense approach. Get the building blocks first (helos, SSNs, SSKs, airborne surveillance, in-flight refullers, etc) and then go for the Vishal. And at that stage, why stop at 65,000 ton? Go big or go home, as the saying goes. This gives the navy valuable time to incorporate the building blocks and see how they operate in an Indian naval doctrine. Figuratively speaking, lay the keel first (the building blocks) and then build the rest (nuclear powered, EMALS equipped, etc).

tsarkar · Post by **tsarkar** » 18 Sep 2017 17:57

One basic problem of the discussion on "sea control" here is that it uses WW2/1950s definition of sea control.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 18 Sep 2017 19:44

It will not be a bad idea to build our next aircraft carrier as a nuclear powered vessel to 65K ton, with some Russian/UK/french design help - if the reports on availability of a higher powered reactor are true. Even if it is a ski jump version, it is fine. The important part is to keep the technology evolution in house. Just like the LCA is an entire eco-system around aeronautics a nuclear power carrier/sub is equally valuable as an eco-system to invest into locally. If the US can come through with EMALS to be fitted on an Indian designed, built and powered carrier then the costs for such a system will dictate its feasibility. If not let it be a ski jump version and build our own steam catapult at least as an R&D project for future carriers. Import only and only if there is NO other option and the option to not do so does not exist.

Added: It is important the we retain the freedom to launch non-US origin aircrafts on ANY US supplied technology. So, let us not presume that just because we get EMALS the fighter and other AEW/tanker assets have to be US supplied. If we do not have this freedom, then it is not worth it.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 18 Sep 2017 19:55

Rakesh wrote: For RADM [Rear Admiral] J. P. Moorer (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_P._Moorer)

I enjoyed your "parochial" speech about carriers, and agreed with your points. Let me counter with a parochial submarine aphorism: "There are two kinds of ships in the world: submarines and targets." Sorry not to have you aboard.

Very respectfully,

Thomas F. Wiener
CDR, USN
C.O., USS Jack (SSN-605) - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Jack_(SSN-605)

A real quote from an Indian retired VADM with life long experience on the matter. "Submarine hunting is still an enigma and between the ASW asset and the Sub, the sub has a definite edge"

Cain Marko · Post by **Cain Marko** » 18 Sep 2017 23:42

If India could haggle and get the POW from the Royal Navy at friendship prices, it might be worth a dekko. Load it up with jsf. Get another 36 silver bullets for the IAF and end this fiasco of single engine fighter.
Cost would more or less be same... Around 15-20 billion is my guess.

93 jsf...15 billion
1 CV...5 billion

Either this or add another vikrant, and work with mig to make the birds more dependable. Use the money saved for SSN, BN, GN, backfires, more MPAA and uavs from US.

let the sef program end. But of course this is quite unlikely.

Rakesh · Post by **Rakesh** » 19 Sep 2017 03:48

ShauryaT wrote:Added: It is important the we retain the freedom to launch non-US origin aircrafts on ANY US supplied technology. So, let us not presume that just because we get EMALS the fighter and other AEW/tanker assets have to be US supplied. If we do not have this freedom, then it is not worth it.

Boss, I do not see any reason why the US would deny India the freedom to do the above. I do not see why a naval Tejas or a future naval AMCA cannot use EMALS. But that having being said, there are platforms that the Khan operates that have no equal elsewhere. The E-2D Hawkeye is one. The S-70 is another. The Growler is a third. The capabilities these platforms offer are unrivalled. There is a reason why American Presidents love their Carrier Strike Groups. They are just that damn effective. The point I am trying to make is select the best platform that we can get our hands on. If you want effective carrier ops, get the best that you can afford and can acquire.

Cain Marko wrote:If India could haggle and get the POW from the Royal Navy at friendship prices, it might be worth a dekko. Load it up with jsf. Get another 36 silver bullets for the IAF and end this fiasco of single engine fighter.
Cost would more or less be same... Around 15-20 billion is my guess.

Cain-ji, you are living with ji. You cannot escape it

If India is looking at the POW, then we might as well acquire the QE as well. Nothing worse than buying individual carriers...logistical nightmare to maintain one Vikrant, one Vikramaditya, one Prince of Wales. That is why the best solution in the short term is build a second, but larger Vikrant. Make her STOBAR capable, wider lifts, Lightning Bs with Growlers and the whole support package. Lay the keel now and it will be qualified for carrier ops by 2029 or 2030. This gives the Indian naval design bureau time to figure out what they want on the Vishal and how much the govt is willing to spend. Build up capability incrementally. And since none of this is being pushed on us, as we are led to believe on BRF, we have the choice to defer on EMALS no?

Or the other option is buy both the QE and POW and say goodbye to Vishal or a follow on Vikrant. I would rather go with the former option, because it will be our design, built at home and can customize it with whatever we want.

Rakesh · Post by **Rakesh** » 19 Sep 2017 05:32

Rakesh wrote:...the ASW capability in the form of the Sea King Mk.42B is a lot left to be desired.

India's MRH saga – A blue water navy without multirole helictopers
http://kaypius.com/2017/06/17/indias-mrh-saga/

And there are folks arguing for a 65,000 ton, nuclear powered, EMALS equipped super carrier

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 19 Sep 2017 11:27

I'm posting this here as this is from a former RN First Sea Lord. It is worth reading to see how we must first have our basic requirements met . Britain is now sinking dangerously low inthe water in being a first rate mil. stae says the former RN chief.This is also a timely reminder to our naval/strat. planners in the IN ,MOD,PMO,wherever,that a balanced fleet that "functions" as expected is what is reqd. The IN has huge gaps in sev. areas esp. ASSW/MR helos,subs,etc. These fundamentals must be set right before we dream to be the US's "B" team! An interesting obervation,in that he thinks that 3 SSNs/SSBN is reqd. WE are building just 6 SSNs,and plan to have at least 5 SSBNs,There will be none left for offensive duties in the ICS,etc. We therefore have to possess at least 4 SSGNs (modified Akulas) for that purpose and increase the SSN no. to 9.

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/ho ... [b]Britain will soon have a 'third world' military, former First Sea Lord warns
Former head of navy says there are not enough ships, staff, submarines or missiles[/b]

Rachael Revesz
Equipment and staff of UK navy have depleted over three decades Jeff J Mitchell/Getty Images
Britain will end up with a “third world military” unless ministers spend more, a former head of the Royal Navy has warned.

Admiral Sir George Zambellas, who retired as First Sea Lord last year, told The Sunday Times that the Navy was “hollowed out” in terms of resources, and he questioned how much more the “post-Brexit Navy” could be stretched in global waters.

Adm. Zambellas, who won a Distinguished Service Cross in 2001 for his command of a warship during Britain’s intervention in Sierra Leone, said that after the UK’s 2015 defence review the country had a “choice” to make regarding the future of the Navy.

READ MORE
Future warships will have a 'mind' of their own, says Royal Navy chief

“You either put more money in or you stop doing serious things and disappear into a Third World nation, security-wise, even though we are spending billions on defence.”

He added that after 37 years of cuts the Navy is “at the bottom of the efficiency barrel and we all know that, because the Navy is so hollowed out.”
Adm. Zambellas said the Navy did not have enough missiles, combat surface ships or “integrated support”. He recommended 12 hunter-killer submarines to protect the four submarines carrying the UK’s nuclear deterrent, but only three of the promised seven have been built.

He also questioned the delayed response from the UK after Hurricane Irma ripped through the Caribbean islands, leaving hundreds of UK citizens stranded.
A first ship was stationed nearby and could help but a second ship, HMS Ocean, is not expected to arrive until the end of next week.

During the early 1980s, the UK had 26 submarines – now 10, and 55 frigates and destroyers – now 19, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies. The UK only has one aircraft carrier, which will be operational in 2020 as it undergoes sea trials.

A Ministry of Defence spokesperson said: “Our budget is growing and, for the first time since the Second World War, so is our Royal Navy.
"Our Navy can already carry out all its operational requirements, but with two types of brand new frigates and two huge aircraft carriers in the pipeline, the UK is fulfilling its global maritime role.”[/quote]

Manish_Sharma · Post by **Manish_Sharma** » 19 Sep 2017 14:50

After 12 year long saga of mmrca we failed to buy 126 Rafale jets for IAF the sole protector of our skies.

From where money is coming to buy this Ego Symbol carrier and 57 rafales? That will just spend time running away hiding from agosta subs. Just like our carrier didn't take part in Karachi bombing alongside osa boats, due to pns ghazi.

Super carrier will just be a big juicy target for aip subs and modern missiles.

Have 9 ssgn + 9 ssbn alongwith 30 ssk instead

Cosmo_R · Post by **Cosmo_R** » 19 Sep 2017 15:16

Viv S wrote:
Cosmo_R wrote:Interesting point. If range is a factor, why not put Growler capabilities on P-8 I or a more specialized version of 737s?

Longer legs, loiter time, MRO compatibility with P8-I
For a tactical role (i.e. escort jamming), the ideal platform is the Su-30MKI. Its has great persistence, a second seat for the EWO, enough grunt to power the jammers and a design has been adequately localized such that HAL can do the conversion in-house with a set of EL/L-8251s. Should offer capabilities comparable to the Growler (at least until the NGJ replaces the latter's ALQ-99s).

The MKI makes sense. It's an opportunity for HAL to show that they can leverage the 'deep license'. The MKI has the legs and speed. Good idea.

chola · Post by **chola** » 19 Sep 2017 16:50

Cosmo_R wrote:
Viv S wrote: For a tactical role (i.e. escort jamming), the ideal platform is the Su-30MKI. Its has great persistence, a second seat for the EWO, enough grunt to power the jammers and a design has been adequately localized such that HAL can do the conversion in-house with a set of EL/L-8251s. Should offer capabilities comparable to the Growler (at least until the NGJ replaces the latter's ALQ-99s).
The MKI makes sense. It's an opportunity for HAL to show that they can leverage the 'deep license'. The MKI has the legs and speed. Good idea.

Yes! My greatest wish for HAL is for it (and GOI) to man up and say to Russkies, "You've made your money and this entire eco-system we've built up to supply 70% of the MKI isn't going away. We're going to make a whole shitload of Indian Flankers and variants. You can help us if you want."

And you know what? They'll agree. Because they'll still supply us with the AL-31. They have that kind of agreement with Cheen and their endless Flanker variants.

MKI Growler. MKI naval for STOBAR (for our 2nd Vikrant class with large lifts.) MKI naval catapult (for Vishal.) MKI twin engine testbed. Oh yeah!

Prasad · Post by **Prasad** » 19 Sep 2017 19:32

http://www.delhidefencereview.com/2017/ ... ships/amp/

Indian Navy Looks To Bolster Blue Water Operational Capabilities With Fleet Support Ships

A piece on HSL building fleet support ships in partnership with Hyundai heavy industries.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 19 Sep 2017 19:53

Rakesh wrote:I do not see why a naval Tejas or a future naval AMCA cannot use EMALS.

I had the Mig and a future N-FGFA in mind, so essentially Russian craft. You may be referring to a technical capability to do so, I am referring to a geo-political denial framed into contractual law or a firm understanding resulting in an effectual denial.

The point I am trying to make is select the best platform that we can get our hands on. If you want effective carrier ops, get the best that you can afford and can acquire.

I would rather take a different approach for India. The forces have to first live within the capabilities and means the nation can provide them with. Capabilities acquired through imports have to be "essential" to protect the core "minimum" security interests of the nation. So in this process between an EMALS carrier and an ADS, where the EMALS can potentially allow us more capabilities by way of AEW, Growler, Tankers and a large fighter fleet and an ADS only good enough to stay between Malacca and Hormuz, I would choose the latter - until such time we have our own indigenous capabilities to exert power in near waters. Would not want to use imports to display India's powers in far shores. Makes no sense. Also, would not want to be in "alliance" with other major powers and loose our strategic independence. If someone can make the case that EMALS is essential to protect core minimum interests, then yes worth considering. Get foreign EMALS, foreign fighters only, foreign tankers, foreign AEW to show India's power is oxymoronic. (The adjective not targeted at you but at our higher defense management).

At this time, what we need most as you have pointed out too is numbers for the sub surface fleet - needed yesterday to protect core security interests.

Rakesh · Post by **Rakesh** » 20 Sep 2017 00:21

ShauryaT wrote:
Rakesh wrote:I do not see why a naval Tejas or a future naval AMCA cannot use EMALS.
I had the Mig and a future N-FGFA in mind, so essentially Russian craft. You may be referring to a technical capability to do so, I am referring to a geo-political denial framed into contractual law or a firm understanding resulting in an effectual denial.

I was referring to both, but I am intrigued as to the "geo-political denial" angle. Could you kindly elaborate a bit more on such a scenario? What perceived threat would the US face if we did indeed have a N-FGFA take off from EMALS whose IP is owned wholly by the US?

ShauryaT wrote:
Rakesh wrote:The point I am trying to make is select the best platform that we can get our hands on. If you want effective carrier ops, get the best that you can afford and can acquire.
I would rather take a different approach for India. The forces have to first live within the capabilities and means the nation can provide them with.

I believe that is the attitude of the Babus in the MoD. Right or wrong, that is the approach they have taken. The govt takes a different view and sees a closer alliance with the United States. And there is nothing wrong in that premise. My concern lies (on EMALS) in the fact that India is absorbing that level of technology while ignoring the rest of the package. As I said earlier, one cannot look at an American aircraft carrier as a stand alone vessel. Crude example, but it is akin to attaching the three pointed star (of a Mercedes Benz) on to the hood of a Hyundai. You will not get that level of performance, if that is what you desire.

ShauryaT wrote:
Rakesh wrote:Capabilities acquired through imports have to be "essential" to protect the core "minimum" security interests of the nation.

Not directed at you, but to the larger populace. What defines the core "minimum" security interests of the nation? No one has a clear answer and thus we keep importing equipment and platforms as Band-Aid solutions.

ShauryaT wrote:So in this process between an EMALS carrier and an ADS, where the EMALS can potentially allow us more capabilities by way of AEW, Growler, Tankers and a large fighter fleet and an ADS only good enough to stay between Malacca and Hormuz, I would choose the latter - until such time we have our own indigenous capabilities to exert power in near waters. Would not want to use imports to display India's powers in far shores. Makes no sense. Also, would not want to be in "alliance" with other major powers and loose our strategic independence. If someone can make the case that EMALS is essential to protect core minimum interests, then yes worth considering. Get foreign EMALS, foreign fighters only, foreign tankers, foreign AEW to show India's power is oxymoronic. (The adjective not targeted at you but at our higher defense management). At this time, what we need most as you have pointed out too is numbers for the sub surface fleet - needed yesterday to protect core security interests.

Agree 100%. 108+ to you Boss.

My ideal situation would be - as I indicated in an earlier post - would be to lay the keel for a second Vikrant Class vessel now. Make her bigger and better, be STOBAR capable, have lifts wide enough to accommodate every naval fighter out there...but should have a logistical footprint similar to that of her older sister. Ease of maintenance which should translate to greater availability at sea. Acquire all the support platforms that is best suited for it. Buying a cheaper vessel now will free up funds to acquire the support platforms - SSNs, SSKs, land-based tankers, fighters, airborne surveillance platforms, helicopters, etc. That is key, IMO, to transitioning to a nuclear powered, EMALs equipped carrier.

Then plan (if that is what the nation's aspirations are at that point) for a two-ship Vishal Class, nuclear powered, EMALS equipped, super carrier. Lay the keel for the first vessel in the mid-2020s and it should be ready for carrier ops by the late 2030s or 2040. By the Navy's own calculation, the Vishal is supposed to arrive on the scene only by the mid 2030s anyway.

In this way, by 2030, the Navy should have three aircraft carriers. Two Vikrant Class + One Vikramaditya. By the late 2030s, the Vikramaditya can be retired and the first of the Vishal Class can take over. And so on and so forth. Crawl, Then Walk & Then Run.

Cosmo_R · Post by **Cosmo_R** » 20 Sep 2017 05:17

^^^..What defines the core "minimum" security interests of the nation? No one has a clear answer and thus we keep importing equipment and platforms as Band-Aid solutions."

Bulls-eye!

We are trying arm for every eventuality without even understanding fully what the scenarios might be. Classic case of "if you don't know where you want to go, any road will get you there."

Only the Great Khan has the resources and the desire for 'full spectrum dominance'.

What is our 'strategic doctrine'? what military and diplomatic tools do we need to enforce it? So far it has all been 'ad hoc' .

'Band-aid' doesn't rock

Rakesh · Post by **Rakesh** » 20 Sep 2017 10:30

Well the logic (twisted) is buy EMALS, put a nuke reactor in and you can control everything from Alaska to India. That is a Palin-esque (as in the former Governor of Alaska, Sarah Palin) and retarted statement. I am sure Governor Palin will see INS Vishal from her house in Alaska, just like she claims to see Russia from Alaska

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 20 Sep 2017 11:44

At a cost of approx. $1.5+B EACH,we can build a series of SSNs,say 6,for the price of just one large CV.No prizes for guessing who would come off best in a shooting match! Now even if the CV costs around the same,with its accompanying aircraft and helos,the cost of the erst of the task force must be taken into acct.,including at least one of the planned FSS of 40,000t mentioned in an above post.On that topic,these ships are terribly underarmed. Anti-torpedo decoy system OK,but only 20mm guns for air defence for such a costly vessel carrying hugely expensive fuel,etc.? These large auxiliaries must have their own integral air defence capability and should have at least 2 BPDMS systems like Pantsir,the Kashtan gun/missile successor which gives an air defence "dome" of 20KM using SAMs and 30mm gatlings.
Alternatively,30mm gatlings and Barak-1(upgraded) systems could be installed as we've already done on some of our surface combatants.

Back to the carrier Q.Money is going to be v.scarce.If we cannot even afford a sister ship to the IAC-1,then the 4 amphibs must be designed with a ski-jump and angled deck to operate either STOVL fighters like the JSF/Yak-successor or NLCA/Sea Gripen.The latter two aircraft would also be able to operate from the two exg. carriers,a plus point.

N-powered EMALS carriers are a wet dream.Simply unaffordable and v. questionable as we are NOT Uncle Sam's deputy-unless we want to oust Pak and become the Yanqui's rent boy of Asia! We have no major expeditionary ambitions apart from defending those island nations in the IOR with whom we have def.agreements and securing the A&N islands from Chin invasion/attack. I've said it umpteen times,"INS India" is our most precious unsinkable carrier in the IOR,from which we can operate any kind of aircraft.LR bombers,LRMP aircraft,stealth fighters,AWACS/AEW/SIGINT/ELINT/tankers-such specialised aircraft,the "full Modi"! If we also seal the deal for operating the Matalla airport at H'tota,then we would've prevented the Chinese from using it for their naval aircraft,giving us the ability to monitor anything untoward that might take place at HT. In addition,the planned upgrades of the airstrips in the A&N islands should make it possible for any large type of aircraft (incl. tankers) able to operate from these bases.Using the A&N theatre as a launching pad,we could foray into the ICS/pacific waters at will.

In any crisis,the PLAN is going to throw at us a large number of subs,at least a dozen,perhaps even upto 20 subs,including some of their SSNs,in the hope that saturation of the Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea will checkmate any IN wish to interdict and destroy Chinese tanker shipping transiting the IOR,by attacking and sinking our major naval assets like carriers in the IOR itself. Remember that China will possess between 80-100 subs,mostly modern,by 2020+,with Pak operating another 8+ Yuan subs.It will be v.difficult for us to distinguish between a PLAN Yuan and a PN Yuan,since both PLAN and PN subs will be operating out of Gwadar,Karachi,etc. This will further complicate matters for the IN. Please remember how the Germans in both WW1 and WW2 sent in alrge numbers of subs ,the fearsome "wolfpacks",which claimed millions of tons of sunk shipping.It was mainly the breaking of the German code,new radar dev. and large nos. of ASW aircraft that allowed the British and its allies,the US had not then entered the war,to know the locations of German U-boats and send their warships,subs and ASW aircraft to sink them.

The outcome of the battle was a strategic victory for the Allies—the German blockade failed—but at great cost: 3,500 merchant ships and 175 warships were sunk for the loss of 783 U-boats.
The success of pack tactics against these convoys encouraged Admiral Dönitz to adopt the wolf pack as his primary tactic.

Unless we possess a large sub fleet and with permanent stationing of our subs in the ICS and at the chokepoints,from where advance warning,tracking and including prosecution of the same is possible,allowing Chin subs to infiltrate into the IOR without our ability to tail them would be a potential disaster even for our own merchant shipping/tankers from the Gulf!

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 20 Sep 2017 12:58

PS:Some info.The collisions between US warships in recent times may have a more sinister explanation that poor shiphandling,trg.,etc. There have been other reports of ships suddenly finding that their GPS systems showed them to be sev. KMs away from their actual position/Some of these have been experienced when transiting Chinese waters,near the shoals occupied by the Chins.Hackers have also allegedly confessed to interfering with merchant shipping navigation/GPS. The Chins warned the US DDG which had sailed past the islands in Q only a few days before.While the jury is still out reg. possible cyerwarfare being responsible, the IN must take adequate precautions so that fail-safe navigational eqpt./stand-by eqpt. is aboard all our naval assets. China is reported to have a million strong cyberwarfare army engaged 24 X 7 testing the defences of its enemies and also engaged in stealing whatever intel,mil and industrial secrets it can through its cyber-army.

JTull · Post by **JTull** » 20 Sep 2017 15:03

I request BRFites to consider what part of cost of a SSN and it's armaments is spent in sourcing within India. And compare that to a A/C with videshi engines, EMALS, aircraft, missiles, etc.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 20 Sep 2017 22:43

tsarkar and Philip, Coming back to the Sindhurakshak accident, the Naval COI stated that it occurred during the arming of a torpedo.
What type of torpedo was it? Type 53-65 or the TEST 71/76 torpedoes?

Also will some kind soul post the CAG report and the Naval COI on Sindhurakshak?
It was supposed to be released.
I would like to read it in detail.

Bala Vignesh · Post by **Bala Vignesh** » 21 Sep 2017 00:32

ramana wrote:tsarkar and Philip, Coming back to the Sindhurakshak accident, the Naval COI stated that it occurred during the arming of a torpedo.
What type of torpedo was it? Type 53-65 or the TEST 71/76 torpedoes?

Also will some kind soul post the CAG report and the Naval COI on Sindhurakshak?
It was supposed to be released.
I would like to read it in detail.

Ramana garu,
This is what i found in the CAG site in a quick google search. Will keep searching for more.

(v) Loss of INS Sindhurakshak
INS Sindhurakshak costing `404.54 crore was a Russian made EKM submarine14 commissioned in December 1999. The submarine met with an accident of explosion and subsequent sinking with loss of lives in August 2013. The BoI which investigated (August 2013) the circumstances leading to the accident initially appreciated various vulnerabilities/causes for likelihood of the accident. The reconvened Board, in February 2014 after scientific analysis and careful consideration, inferred leakage of oxygen from a torpedo as a primary initiator of the incident. The oxygen leak was attributed to material failure of oxygen flask or its associated pipelines. The BoI proceedings also brought out that the operational deployment of the submarine in August 2013 by Indian Navy was not justified due to the following:
· The laid down Ships Operating Standards (SHOPS) for the submarine had not achieved the requisite Harbour and operational evolutions. · Complete ‘Work Up’ of the submarine was not conducted when the submarine was prepared for operational deployment as the ‘Work Up’ was completed within one week instead of prescribed two weeks.
· The trials and calibration of Navigational aids and sensors should be completed prior to deployment of a submarine for ‘Work Up’ with any consorts. However, in the case INS Sindhurakshak, the Sea Acceptance Trials of two critical equipment were not completed even at the time of its preparation for operational deployment.
· Submarine authorities concerned did not properly assess the crew fatigue, besides, the submarine was holding ammunition nearing life expiry. Indian Navy appraised Audit (July 2016) that as the acceptance trials are extremely stringent, the Sonar performance was improved by the combined efforts of the Sonar OEM, yard and ships staff in order to clear the acceptance trials. However, due to advent of monsoon the acceptance trials were not attempted as the sea state was appreciated to be beyond the limits laid down in the protocol. For inadequacies in completion of SHOPS, Indian Navy stated that with the submarine’s sound material state, satisfactorily completing Task-II and accomplishing a torpedo firing, the inadequacy of not having completed SHOPS was not overwhelmingly weighing against embark on a deployment.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 21 Sep 2017 01:54

Bala Vignesh, Thanks for the link. I too found while browsing the CAG site.
Report 20 of 2017 is the relevant one as you posted above.
The CAG methodology was efficient. The reviewed the numerous BOI reports and then categorized them to draw general conclusions.

The true root cause was the following:

The BoI which investigated (August 2013) the circumstances leading to the accident initially appreciated various vulnerabilities/causes for likelihood of the accident. The reconvened Board, in February 2014 after scientific analysis and careful consideration, inferred leakage of oxygen from a torpedo as a primary initiator of the incident. The oxygen leak was attributed to material failure of oxygen flask or its associated pipelines.

So essentially they looked at all factors that could have caused the accident and narrowed the true root cause down to the leakage of oxygen from the torpedo. The other things you note while conducting an investigation of this importance and take corrective action.
Some of the language of the CAG ignores realties of running a naval fleet where you have to balance between operating a vessel or have it sit on a dock. There is schedule pressure on the boat crew which is hinted at. The boat was back form refit in Russia and had undergone trials. There was a need to send her off on patrol. We don't know why but the Work Up time was reduced by a week as the crew was proficient. This is a command decision. However the oxygen leak could not have occurred due to this schedule pressure.

Now coming to the leaking oxygen, the torpedoes were either Type 53-65 or Test 71/76. Both have Hydrogen Peroxide and fuel for the thermal engine. All these owe to the granddaddy of them all German Walther H2O2 oxidizer and kerosene fuel.

Type 53-65 is vintage 1965 torpedo. I don't know about Test 71/76 torpedo.

What was the pedigree of the Type 53-65? When was it made? What was its acceptance test report when it was accepted by IN from the supplier? Who was the supplier? The Bishkek factory? What were the weld inspection reports like? How many out loads did it go through? Did it age out? Did it get bumped in its service life? How long the Type 53-65 was used in IN service?

Reason why I ask is first of all there is no oxygen but high test hydrogen peroxide in the torpedo.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High-test_peroxide

This high test or high concentration H2O2 has a tendency to expand its volume to a very large value and any fuel burns violently as rate of reaction is exponential. Any one recall that blue flash of the H2O2 combining with the fuel that late night.

Kursk sank when the H2O2 powered torpedo caught fire and exploded leading to secondary explosions.

New Scientist Link

On Friday, Russian Prosecutor General Vladimir Ustinov confirmed that conclusion. Ustinov said hydrogen peroxide fuel leaking from an unarmed torpedo apparently caused the first explosion inside the submarine’s torpedo chamber.

“The initial impulse which triggered an explosion of the torpedo was the result of an unusual process of events inside the oxidising agent reserve of the torpedo,” Ustinov said at a press conference. He said no one could be blamed for the accident.

Most likely the welds didn't hold together and caused the leak.
I don't know if its weld or a braze.

Braze is by nature porous.
But is used for non-ferrous metals.

After the Kursk, Russia Navy stopped using these thermal torpedoes as a safety measure.

Russia decommissioned torpedoes using the propellant shortly after the Kursk sank.

So the best option is to bring the Varunastra (VA) torpedo to submarine service ASAP.

The accident happened in 2013 and by now DRDO should have adapted VA for sub service.

That would be effective corrective action to prevent loss of submarine.

Meanwhile a big salute to the IN submarine sailors who deal with this explosive everyday. Hats off to them.

Viv S · Post by **Viv S** » 21 Sep 2017 02:53

Philip wrote:At a cost of approx. $1.5+B EACH,we can build a series of SSNs,say 6,for the price of just one large CV.No prizes for guessing who would come off best in a shooting match!

Can an SSN provide air cover to the IN's surface fleet? A CV and an SSN each have their role to play. They cannot replace each other.

Now even if the CV costs around the same,with its accompanying aircraft and helos,the cost of the erst of the task force must be taken into acct.,including at least one of the planned FSS of 40,000t mentioned in an above post.

The task force already exists. An IN fleet consisting of 10 destroyers & 12 frigates has already been sanctioned, with more likely to be added in the 2020s. That's about enough to constitute 4 CBGs.

Back to the carrier Q.Money is going to be v.scarce.If we cannot even afford a sister ship to the IAC-1,then the 4 amphibs must be designed with a ski-jump and angled deck to operate either STOVL fighters like the JSF/Yak-successor or NLCA/Sea Gripen.The latter two aircraft would also be able to operate from the two exg. carriers,a plus point.

It'll be cheaper and faster to acquire a sister ship to the IAC-I than it would to design a new amphibious carrier with a ski-jump & angled-deck. One of the two LHDs vying for the Indian MRSV contract, is designed ONLY for STOVL operation, while the other is a pure helicopter carrier.

N-powered EMALS carriers are a wet dream.Simply unaffordable and v. questionable as we are NOT Uncle Sam's deputy-unless we want to oust Pak and become the Yanqui's rent boy of Asia! We have no major expeditionary ambitions apart from defending those island nations in the IOR with whom we have def.agreements and securing the A&N islands from Chin invasion/attack. I've said it umpteen times, "INS India" is our most precious unsinkable carrier in the IOR,from which we can operate any kind of aircraft.

Balderdash. In the time-frame in which its likely to be developed & delivered (i.e. ~2035), a nuclear-powered EMALS-equipped carrier is perfectly affordable. With a sister ship, no less. And you can say it umpteen+1 times, but the basic premise of your argument (nuclear CV = expeditionary ops) will still be flat out wrong. the same applies to your prescription for a green-water navy.

Wanting to influence over the maritime economy of the IOR requires a sea-control doctrine. A sea-control doctrine requires a surface fleet. A surface fleet operating in blue waters needs organic air cover. Organic air cover can only be generated by an aircraft carrier.

Unless the IN is to start relying on USN cover like the JMSDF, an aircraft carrier will always be an intrinsic part of its force plan.

The threat from the PLAN/PN subs will be handled the way it always has been - with mix of SSKs, MPAs, frigates, corvettes & ASW helos. Also, attack subs, while ideal ambush predators, lack the speed and sensor range required to sanitize large stretches of the ocean. The RN, RCN & USN didn't beat the U-boat threat with subs of their own.

And unlike the Soviet assets in the Norwegian & Barents seas, the PLAN isn't hemmed into the SCS for the IN to easily 'tag' its subs transiting the Malacca. It'll have access to PN bases at Karachi & Ormara, a base of its own at Gwadar and an ample stretch of coastline to sortie out from.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 21 Sep 2017 03:36

Viv S: Please go through the IN budget and please compute the costs for the EMALS and let us know under what scenario a $20+ billion carrier is affordable. The reported articles says $20 billion for the carrier only not including its aircrafts.

Also, in terms of sea control there ARE alternatives to super-duper carriers. Alternatives by way of bases in Seychelles, Nha Trang and Mozambique with LRMP and Long range bombers, which can supplement 3 ADS and its flotilla with Tanker support, AEW and if need be long range fighters such as the Sukhoi from say Car Nicobar? India has the capacity to establish this sea control of the IOR on Indian terms, without mortgaging ourselves further financially or in geo-political terms. Establishing such bases will go a long way towards projection of power than any foreign designed toy can.

Added: If I have to stretch slightly, maybe even Chabahar and an Australian base can be had.

Rakesh · Post by **Rakesh** » 21 Sep 2017 05:04

Friendship of the Seas...aka influencing

When the non-nuke powered and non-EMALS equipped Vikrant arrives with F-18 Rhinos or Rafale Ms on the deck, expect the influencing to hit home.

Great shots just of submarine INS Shishumar pulling into a port at Duqb Port, Oman
https://twitter.com/livefist/status/910227967430856704

Love this shot of INS Mumbai & INS Shishumar at Duqb Port, Oman
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/DKJgqkDWsAAWfUu.jpg

Rakesh · Post by **Rakesh** » 21 Sep 2017 05:12

Viv_S: Demonitization has hit the economy pretty bad. I believe growth is now at 5.7% when it was around 7- 8% YOY in the past.

http://money.cnn.com/2017/08/31/news/ec ... index.html

And when the economy tanks, the government and the bureaucracy look at the first ministry to cut funds to and you guessed it....it is the Ministry of Defence. The military feels the crunch the most, the babus at the MoD not so much. The economy was bound to take a nosedive with demonitization, but it will bounce back. I have no doubt in that. But to lay the keel for a nuclear powered, EMALS equipped Vishal Class aircraft carrier requires planning and resource allocation and it needs to happen now. Obviously that is not happening. At this rate, I do not expect to see the vessel qualified for carrier ops before 2040.

Everything is going to suffer because of the state of the economy...single engine deal, order for 57 naval fighters, Project 75I, etc. I do not expect significant traction (beyond the usual noises) on any of these post the election in 2019. I still believe the Modi Govt will win a second term. At that time, everything will see a renewed push and the economy should have bounced back as well.

KrishnaK · Post by **KrishnaK** » 21 Sep 2017 05:35

ShauryaT wrote:Also, in terms of sea control there ARE alternatives to super-duper carriers. Alternatives by way of bases in Seychelles, Nha Trang and Mozambique with LRMP and Long range bombers, which can supplement 3 ADS and its flotilla with Tanker support, AEW and if need be long range fighters such as the Sukhoi from say Car Nicobar?

And the US has bases in the South China Sea, Indian ocean and that doesn't seem to be enough.

Added: If I have to stretch slightly, maybe even Chabahar and an Australian base can be had.

I think if you stretch it further, we can have Japan as well.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 21 Sep 2017 06:05

During naval maneuvers, India's still relatively new MiG-29Ks made low approaches to the USS Nimitz—likely a first for the type

Indian and US Naval air crafts over INS Vikramaditya

Rakesh · Post by **Rakesh** » 21 Sep 2017 06:23

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 21 Sep 2017 10:49

Viv pl don't impute false propositions from my posts.I've never been against carriers or a strong carrier navy.Circumstances however make it simply ludicrous for the IN to operate a 65K t N-powered EMALS carrier at this moment in time without beggaring the rest of the navy and affecting budgets of the two other services too. We can leverage the situ by adopting a multi-role design for the amphibs with an angled deck plus ski-jump if there is a will.I've shown from the post-WW2 Essex carrier mods that this isn't such a dificult task even before the CVs are built! If they simply come with a ski-jump then we have only one aircraft at the moment,subject to sanctions,etc.,which is the JSF and the US hasn't as yet offered it to us,hence the proposal that the amphibs have what I've said above. You may disagree on this but that's your privilege.

Secondly,what if there aren't even funds for a second sister ship to the IAC-1? We will have no alternative but to redesign the amphibs,that is if the IN thinks imaginatively. An angled deck plus ski-jump will offer more aircraft options which could also use the 2 exg. carriers if the NLCA/Sea Gripen are available. I've asked the Q,"what is the priority for the IN? Greater available air power at sea vs an enhanced amphib capability? The sub fleet enhancement both N-subs and conv. AIP subs in any case will take top priority. I would prefer the former,as explained,using the STUFT method,we can enhance assets for amphib ops taken from the merchant fleet which should have sev. ro-ro ships available.

Our greatest threat in the present and future is from Chinese and Paki subs and our sub fleet at the moment is barely 15% of their combined strength.We will be outnumbered and unable to sufficiently defend ourselves from this UW threat in a future crisis unless the sub fleet is augmented on a war footing. Neither do we have enough surface combatants ,though the number is much healthier than the subs,.and ASW escorts in the inventory to sanitise the key critical areas of the IOR from a concentrated PLAN ingress into the IOR,from where it will already be operating out of Gwadar,Karachi and Djibouti on a permanent basis.

There's no need to elaborate upon multi-asset prosecution of subs,its well known ,however,if we do not leverage the land mass of India for operating LRMP,maritime bombers,which will have great range,endurance and strike capability,it will make the job of the PLAN achieving its objectives much easier. While Blackjacks are indeed superior to Backfires,they're far more expensive and Russian requirements will have to be first met with the new prod.There are a few doz. Backfires readily available for modernisation. Armed with stand-off LRCMs and super/hyper BMos,they could attack targets even in the ICS/Pacific waters when operating out of the A&N islands.