It is an occupational hazard.Singha wrote:the talwar helideck looks like it could be awash in heavy seas...
Thanks John, short concise and to the point like your any other post at BRF!John wrote:Sure.Katare wrote:John, can you please do a comparison of Shivaliks and Talwars. Strengths, weaknesses, pro and cons ?
Design: Shivalik. While both vessels incorporate radar cross section reduction. Shivalik incorporates far more of these features and super structure is fully enclosed and weapon systems like torpedo tubes are tucked away inside the structure. Talwar in other hand doesn't even have enclosed mast which makes the mast rather cluttered and should give much higher radar cross section. Also Shivalik incorporates great deal of IR and noise reduction.
Hanger: Shivalik. Shivalik can operate 2 medium helos or one large helicopter, where as Talwar's landing pad and hanger are quite limited in space.
Propulsion: Shivalik. CODOG is superior to COGAG (Talwar) in terms of ASW operations (lower noise) and range when operating on just Pielstick.
Radar suite: Shivalik. The EL\M-2238 is superior to Fregat where as former is phased array radar the latter is planar array radar with design dating back to cold war. While 2238 serves as secondary radar it can potentially replace Fregat and be used as primary radar and used to guide Barak-8 SAM.
Weapon Suite: Shivalik. Both vessels are fairly comparable but Shivalik has the advantage with its twin Rbu-6000 weapon system where as Talwar only single Rbu-6000. Both vessels can be fitted with Kashtan or two Ak-630 + Barak-1 combination. Russians seem to have already fitted Ak-630 on later Grigorovich vessels so i suspect IN will not get Kashtan-M but rather Ak-630 and will fit Barak-1 or SR-SAM during refit.
Main Gun: Toss up. Oto 76 mm is license built locally and is proven weapon system with ability to fire DART and Vulcano rounds. But A-190 is 100 mm at a rate of fire of 80 rate of fire. While on paper A190 looks to be superior, Oto is far easier to maintain and offers more versatility.
EW/ECM/Sonar: Even, Any locally built talwar is likely to get domestic suite similar to what is fitted on P-15A/B/Shivalik.
Cost: Talwar? This deserve question mark since the deal is currently 750 million (another 30 million for turbines?) each where as Shivalik cost around 500-600 million in 2010, i suspect if Shivalik are built now will cost around 800-850 million.
Also current cost figures for Talwar doesn't include any potential cost overruns which are likely to happen while Talwar are built in GSL.
Sorry wasn't too clear El\M-2238 is the secondary air\surface search radar in Shivalik. I suspect it serves as target acquisition radar for Barak-1 since it's superior to Fregat however we are stuck with Fregat because of Shtil.Katare wrote:
Thanks John, short concise and to the point like your any other post at BRF!
In respect of the bolded/underline section above - You mean EL2238 is secondary Radar on Shivalik? Or did you mean that EL2238 is a secondary Radar on Talwars (to guide Barak-1, I assume) but they can be used as primary to like on Shivaliks?
Navy researches ways to build stealth submarines
TNN | Updated: Mar 6, 2018,
Pune: A group of 30 officers from Indian Navy will engage in an elaborate research at the Defence Institute of Advanced Technology (DIAT) here with a view
to reduce vulnerability of military submarines and ships to detection by the enemy from noise and vibrations generated by propulsions that run them.
Commodore A K Sinha (retd), DIAT registrar, who also specialises in submarines, told TOI on Tuesday, “The naval headquarters recently communicated to us the need for a collaborative research project on this aspect. As of now, 30 naval officers are pursuing advanced postgraduate studies at DIAT and these officers, along with the institute’s professors, will work on the project.”
Sinha said, “The project, to be directly monitored by naval headquarters, is at a primary stage and we are working on various aspects related to it. Our laboratories will play a key role as they have modern equipment essential for carrying out such research. The practical aspect of the project will be carried out by the navy on its ships and submarines.”
Element of stealth is critical to military submarines which are designed to move around undetected under the sea and surface only in situations where they need to establish radio contact or perform data communication with their respective headquarters.
A senior navy officer, who did not wish to be named, told TOI over phone, “Every ship and submarine is equipped with different types of propulsion system and each of these systems generate a particular type of noise or vibration underwater. Using sound navigation and ranging, better known as sonars, the enemy can identify the type of ship or submarine, distance and its speed. Reducing or tweaking propulsion sound of ship and submarine will give a big operational advantage.”
He said, “Modern generation stealth submarines are difficult to track. The submarines of Class A212 of German Federal Navy or Saab A26 of Swedish Navy have been designed in such a way that they hardly make any noise, emit almost no heat and minutely reflect radar or sonar signals. To develop such systems, researchers need to carry out studies so that we can develop such systems indigenously.”
Another senior navy officer said, “Propulsions generate maximum noise and vibrations under water. If you equip ship or submarine with silent propulsion, you will have to compromise on speed and longevity of the vehicle. Therefore, having a new propulsion system which will generate less noise and vibration and at the same time have no effect on other functioning of ships and submarines is critical.”
India belatedly boosts naval competition with China
March12, 2018
Sreeram Chaulia
New Delhi needs partnerships to make up for lost opportunities
Indian warships on parade off the coast of Mumbai © Reuters
The signing of a military agreement between India and France granting mutual access to naval bases is a clear indication that India is ramping up its defense diplomacy in response to China's growing presence in the Indian Ocean.
The March 10 deal was hailed by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi as "a golden step" and the visiting French President Emmanuel Macron as a milestone to prevent the Pacific and Indian Oceans from "becoming zones for hegemonic power."
It paves the way for Indian armed forces to use France's defense installations in Djibouti, Abu Dhabi and Reunion Island, all pivotal locations in the western Indian Ocean.
After years of Indian policy restraint allowed China to steal a march and establish a strong maritime presence in what New Delhi sees as India's strategic zone, Modi is bolstering the country's claims in a vast watery expanse where 80% of the world's oil flows via coveted sea lanes and chokepoints.
But with access to prime ports lost to Beijing, and a much smaller defense budget than China, New Delhi must rely heavily on partnerships to try to make up the difference.
Related stories
With China in mind, India and France deepen military cooperation
India and Vietnam to strengthen defense ties against assertive China
Just weeks before securing access for his warships to France's possessions, Modi gained entry to the port of Duqm through a military agreement with Oman in February that will allow Indian military vessels to dock for maintenance.
Duqm will help India to buttress its most valuable asset in the Arabian Sea, the Iranian port of Chabahar, which is New Delhi's gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia.
Further south off the east African coast, India is working to improve surveillance and defense infrastructure by developing Assumption Island with the Seychelles and Agalega Island with Mauritius. Taken together, the French footholds and the naval arrangements with Middle Eastern and African countries help advance India's claims to be a "net security provider" in the Indian Ocean.
The proactive defense diplomatic initiatives under Modi since 2014 are a marked departure from the doubts that historically have cost India heavily as it conceded geopolitical space to adversaries, notably China.
As an independent developing country with a sense of post-colonial grievance, India once abhorred power politics and rejected the quest for overseas military bases as imperialist. During the height of the Cold War, India vehemently opposed American, British and French militarization of the Indian Ocean and sought to exclude these "extra-regional powers" from its maritime neighborhood.
deological objections to engage in geopolitics and use the Indian military to establish a sphere of influence continued to restrain New Delhi even after the Cold War. The port of Hambantota at the southern end of Sri Lanka, which was handed over to China on a 99-year lease in 2017, was first offered to India in 2003.
Despite repeated invitations from the Sri Lankan government, Indian leaders hemmed and hawed, losing a chance to shape the central sector of the Indian Ocean region.
(The greatest foreign policy disaster by our MEA since Independence.I had repeatedly warned our jokers what was going to happen but they did ziltch.The prophet is not honoured in his own country)
The huge Chinese presence at Hambantota, close to the tip of southern India, has now become a strategic nightmare for New Delhi. In 2017, Modi extracted a commitment from Colombo for India to develop the Trincomalee port on Sri Lanka's east coast to counter the Chinese. Still, Hambantota poses a risk to India that echoes the threat the U.S once faced from the Soviet Union's presence in Cuba, just 90 miles from Florida's beaches.
In 2011, Vietnam offered New Delhi exclusive naval access to the port of Nha Trang, overlooking China's key naval and cyberwarfare center on Hainan Island. But India failed to move this proposition forward. New Delhi has since struggled to find a permanent base in the South China Sea region due to its relatively limited naval might and worries among Southeast Asian countries about upsetting China.
The aggressive inroads that China has made in the Indian Ocean over the last decade and Beijing's assertion that it does not accept these seas as India's "backyard" pose an unprecedented challenge to New Delhi. Regular Chinese naval activity in Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Djibouti is worrying India and has increased pressure for a firm response.
Modi's government, which desires to make India a "leading power," believes vacillation and the failure to pursue opportunities in defense diplomacy have increased New Delhi's vulnerability to Beijing, which has put in place a "string of pearls" strategy to contain India with ports from Djibouti in the west to Myanmar in the east.
Myanmar's Kyaukphyu port, 70% of which is owned by China, is on the Bay of Bengal and serves as a potential barrier to the Indian navy expanding operations in East Asia. Although Kyaukphyu is a commercial venture designed as part of China's Belt and Road Initiative, India is apprehensive of the dual-use nature of most Chinese port projects.
India is responding by attempting to overcome delays with its promised development of Myanmar's Sittwe port, which is New Delhi's answer to the Chinese presence at Kyaukphyu. India is rightly capitalizing on Myanmar's fear of overdependence on China. The idea is to reinforce India's eastern flank, just as, on its western side, India is planning to use Duqm and Chabahar in the Arabian Sea to counter China's showpiece project at Gwadar port in Pakistan.
While Modi is demonstrating a clear will to forge ahead and end strategic uncertainty, there are questions about whether India can bear the costs of its expanded naval strategy. India's defense spending, including advanced weapon systems, fell to a historic low in 2018 amounting to a mere 1.58% of GDP (the lowest since 1962). Domestic welfare and development needs rank high in India's democratic electoral dynamics and trump foreign policy priorities.
The economic benefits China dangles to poor nations throughout the Indian Ocean region surpass whatever grants or loans India can afford to muster. Yet, paucity of funds has not dulled India's eagerness. Aware that India cannot win a one-to-one contest with a richer China, Modi is relying on partnerships with friendly countries.
Economic links and naval interoperability programs are emerging under the "quadrilateral" defense cooperation involving India, Japan, Australia and the U.S. -- a grouping with the implicit aim of containing China's expansionism.
Bilateral arrangements such as those with France are belated but essential for New Delhi to avoid losing its strategic competition with Beijing. Gone are the days when India was indecisive in foreign defense policies and was being left behind. But sustaining the robust approach it is now pursuing demands better long-term planning and execution.
Sreeram Chaulia is a professor and dean at the Jindal School of International Affairs in Sonipat, India. His most recent book is "Modi Doctrine: The Foreign Policy of India's Prime Minister."
“The second and third of the six Scorpene-class submarines are undergoing sea trials while the fourth, fifth and the sixth are under construction. We want to focus on first getting all these submarines commissioned, before going in for more submarines,” Vice Admiral Srikant said.
Most modern ASMs are top attack, no?Philip wrote:The Chins are planning a large arsenal ship concept that we've discussed over a decade ago a semi-submersible vessel that submerges to avoid missile attack.They have two concepts apparently, one an arsenal sub and the other as above which has wave riding capabilities.One concept has a twin sail.
Rakesh wrote:Second in the Godavari Class series of vessels. The first (Godavari) was decommissioned in 2015. Only one left now - INS Gomati.
https://twitter.com/IndianDefenceRA/sta ... 5880156160 ---> INS Ganga - the oldest ship of the Western Fleet, is scheduled for decommissioning on 22 March 2018 at Mumbai.
Don't forget El\m-2238 radar wonder if these will get salvaged and used to replace lw-08.Prem wrote:
Elta describes 2238 as follows:John wrote:Sorry wasn't too clear El\M-2238 is the secondary air\surface search radar in Shivalik. I suspect it serves as target acquisition radar for Barak-1 since it's superior to Fregat however we are stuck with Fregat because of Shtil.Katare wrote:
Thanks John, short concise and to the point like your any other post at BRF!
In respect of the bolded/underline section above - You mean EL2238 is secondary Radar on Shivalik? Or did you mean that EL2238 is a secondary Radar on Talwars (to guide Barak-1, I assume) but they can be used as primary to like on Shivaliks?
In Talwar frigate we have Pozitiv radar as the secondary radar not sure what variant is used in Admiral Grigorivich FFG. Talwar doesn't look like it can support beefier secondary radar like El\M-2238 or even 3d-CAR.
I was proposing if we build another batch of Shivalik FFG we can switch over to using 2238 radar in place of Fregat ( Perhaps fit 3d-CAR as the secondary radar) and fit Barak-8 SAM.
That doesn't look like Godavari, but I think is INS Ranvijay. I think there is a few years left in that ship.John wrote:Don't forget El\m-2238 radar wonder if these will get salvaged and used to replace lw-08.Prem wrote:
Vips Ji :Vips wrote:
India's first indigenously built floating dock FDN-2 is all set to join the navy.
Deal is dead: Seychelles oppn says no to India's military base in country
AFP
Published Mar 21, 2018,
Seychelles' oppn coalition, which holds majority in parliament, said it would not ratify deal with India to build military base.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi with Seychelles President Danny Faure. (Photo: File | PTI)
Prime Minister Narendra Modi with Seychelles President Danny Faure. (Photo: File | PTI)
New Delhi/Victoria: Seychelles' opposition coalition, which holds a majority in parliament, said on Tuesday that it would not ratify a deal signed with India to build a military base on one of the archipelago's outlying islands.
The deal would see India invest USD 550 million dollars in building the base on Assumption island to help it ensure the safety of its vessels in the southern Indian Ocean.
Indian soldiers would be deployed on the island which lies 1,135 kilometres southwest from the capital Victoria, and help train Seychelles' troops.
Also Read: India's plan to build military base in Seychelles spurs controversy
However, the deal has faced some resistance from locals, and Wavel Ramkalawan, head of the opposition Linyon Demokratik Seselwa (Seychelles Democratic Union in Creole) said the coalition "will not ratify the Assumption deal. This deal is dead".
The LDS had held a majority in parliament since its victory in 2016 legislative elections.
On Monday, President Danny Faure said he would meet with Ramkalawan on March 26 to discuss the deal, which was agreed in principle in 2015 and then finalised in January this year.
The government says the base will help coastguards to patrol its 1.3 million square kilometre exclusive economic zone for illegal fishing, drug trafficking and piracy.
Currently, the remote coral island has a tin shack post office, an air strip and almost no people. Less than seven kilometres long the island has a high point just 30 metres above sea level and is covered in bird excrement.
But its location lends it strategic importance for monitoring shipping in the Mozambique Channel.
However, Indian presence in the Seychelles is a sensitive matter. Some fear an influx of Indian workers who, they say, might come to dominate the economy, while others consider a foreign power building a military base an affront to sovereignty and national pride.
Opponents of the plan also cite Assumption's relative proximity to Aldabra atoll, a UNESCO World Heritage Site that is home to the world's largest population of giant tortoises.
Yes OP was using that picture to show what is in Godavari but yes D55 INS Ranvijay will be in service till atleast for another decade.sohamn wrote:That doesn't look like Godavari, but I think is INS Ranvijay. I think there is a few years left in that ship.John wrote: Don't forget El\m-2238 radar wonder if these will get salvaged and used to replace lw-08.
I was under the impression EL\M-2238 on Shivalik is the large variant (4.0mx2.0m) which has a range of 350 km (i believe Godavari is fitted with Medium variant if you compare the sizes). Fregat-M2EM i believe is around 300 km and take that with grain of salt from what i have heard Fregat radar performance has been bit disappointing. One of reasons Shivalik sports EL\M-2238 even though Barak has been integrated with Fregat.SNaik wrote:Elta describes 2238 as follows:
The antenna in the Doppler sensor has a planar array for 3D multi-beam operations and a vertical array of strip radiators.
Fregat-M2M is definitely a post-cold war development and uses passive phased array.
The larger two-faced STAR-Extended Range definitely can replace Fregat, but the smaller single-face version installed on Shivalik seriously lacks in range for that.
The Andaman and Nicobar Islands: India’s Eastern Anchor in a Changing Indo-Pacific
Darshana M. Baruah
As India continues to develop the islands, it must prioritize strengthening its air, surface, and sub-surface surveillance capabilities. The islands need to be capable of basing and deploying surveillance resources and require stronger anti-submarine warfare and early warning capabilities. India should also upgrade the islands’ communications infrastructure and integrate it with maritime domain awareness facilities on the mainland. The current infrastructure is poor and cannot sustain a coherent surveillance strategy. There is an urgent need to enhance the islands’ intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance cover to fully utilize their potential.
However, transforming the islands from a strategic outpost to a key forward operating base will require significant development of the islands and procurement of new assets. The islands are currently home to modest military assets and infrastructure with tremendous, though underutilized, potential. Surveillance assets such as the P-8i’s are deployed to the Andamans from the mainland. The islands will require considerable military and civilian infrastructure to support the required force structure of a full-fledged forward operating military base.
However, developing these islands will carry massive environmental, sustainability, and tribal welfare challenges. There is an island-wide restriction on clearing land for development, and 94.68 percent of the islands is under forest cover. The presence of indigenous tribes on the islands has also restricted commercial activities and development near tribal areas. While the current government is taking initiatives to transform the islands into a maritime hub, the pace of progress is not fast enough to match maritime developments in the region.
Are you referring to Mark 8 used by Royal navy?ramana wrote:Anyone know if OFB was making 4.5" guns for ships?
