Indian Strategic Long Range Bomber

[Philip]

X-posted from the Ru mil td.

Leave the rhetoric aside,the emphasis on LRCMs and LR tactical strike capability is sorely missing in the IAF/IN's arsenal. I've been saying this for aeons,that it is mystifying why the IAF especially,which once operated Canberra bombers,has such myopia.Even the Syrian War and Gulf Wars,where LRCMs have been the most widely used force multipliers, appears to have gone unnoticed by the service.With the retiremnt of the TU-142 Bears, we have nothing left to undertake a mission sev. thousand kms. away. The solution for the next decade,acquire a decent no. of Backfires of which Russia has dozens mothballed.Upgraded Backfires armed with LRCMs would provide us with the lost capability.

http://russia-insider.com/en/politics/r ... ia/ri21072

Russian Missiles Have 2X the Range of US's - It's a Big Deal in Syria
"An 800 pound gorilla ... in the room is Russia’s stand-off capability (ability to fire from longer ranges than your oponent) —it is simply much better than the American one ... (Russian) ranges ... are simply beyond the reach of any stand-off weapon in the US arsenal."
Andrei Martyanov

Russian cruise missiles being fired recently from the Mediterranean to Syria
Size does matter and so does range and speed whenever anyone talks about weapons. It seems that there is a great deal of confusion which perpetuates itself in regards to a relatively small Russian military contingent in Syria.

The most popular indicator of this confusion is a never ending discussion of a possible American attack on the Russian forces in Syria, primarily on the air base Khmeimim. Can such an attack, once one considers the size of forces US can deploy against Russians, succeed in “defeating” them?

An excellent Russian news report going onboard Russian subs and ships involved in firing these cruise missiles - fascinating

This is both a legitimate but also a highly unprofessional question. In fact, there are many people of prominence in the US who apart from considering such a terrifying scenario are actually pushing for it. Lieutenant-Colonel Ralph Peters doesn’t mince words when it comes to attacking Russians; in fact, he is a very straight to the point guy when giving prescriptions on how to fight those Russians: This could spin out of control very, very fast. If it does, we have to win rapidly and decisively — and keep it within Syria.

There is no doubt that Peters and the bunch of US military and political people he represents did partake in the strategic wisdom of the past, from Clausewitz to Moltke to Guderian, but it is here where a seemingly legitimate question on the probability of American success in bombing those nasty Russkies into the stone age at Khmeimim and elsewhere in Syria stops being, well, serious.

Of course, US can unleash whatever it has at its conventional disposal at Khmeimim and it will eventually overwhelm whatever the Russians have there, from several SU-35s to S-300s and S-400s and, possibly, make Peters’ wet dream of keeping the whole ordeal confined to Syria very real. This would work, say against anyone’s military contingent - except Russia's.

At issue here is not the fact that Russia is a nuclear superpower—everyone knows that. Even the most rabid American Russophobes know this and can grasp, however slightly, the concept of their poor dears turning into radioactive ash pretty fast if they do the unthinkable, such as attacking Russia proper with nuclear weapons. Syria, however, is a bit different—the escalation to a nuclear threshold could, indeed, be controlled by those who hold a decisive advantage conventionally.

At issue here is the fact of conventional war—a precise type of a conflict US military prided itself on for the last 30+ years, boasting of being able to handle any kind of adversary.

In the foundation of this, rather overly assertive approach, the self-assurance was the real and not so real advantage of the US in stand-off weapons. Aggression against Yugoslavia showed the US military could overwhelm the air-defense of a nation such as Serbia fairly fast and from distances far beyond the reach of its obsolete air defenses. There were Tomahawk cruise missiles, which were launched at Serbia in thousands and which rendered her air defense almost useless after the first couple of weeks of incessant bombing.

But here is the problem for the US: Russia can take this hypothetical conventional conflict well beyond Syria any time it wants and I am not talking about other strategic theaters, such as Ukraine, where Russia can “compensate” for a hypothetical “defeat” in Syria. The reason for this is purely technological—Russia can go tit-for-tat conventionally in Syria and anywhere in the Middle East.

In fact, the Russian military has in its possession the most advanced arsenal of High Precision stand-off weapons which have been demonstrated in action for the whole world to see.

This is what makes the whole talk about “defeating” the Russian contingent in Syria very amateurish.

War is much more than some shoot-out between belligerents, the war starts in the operational rooms and political offices well before any shot is fired. If the Russian contingent in Syria had been deployed there say in 2005, there would have been no problem in imagining Ralph Peters’ scenario.
But it is not 2005 and an 800 pound gorilla, which many continue to ignore, in the room is Russia’s stand-off capability—it is simply much better than the American one and it opens an operational door, in case of a hypothetical conventional attack on Kheimim, for a massive retaliation against any US asset in the region.

Yesterday, in the wake of the death of Lieutenant General Asapov in Syria, allegedly with some “help” from the so called Coalition in the vicinity of the liberated Deir-ez-Zor, Russia’s strategic aviation launched long-range stealthy X-101 cruise missiles at ISIS targets in Syria. There is nothing new now in Russia’s using 5,500+ kilometer range cruise missile, nor is there news any more for the Russian Navy being able to launch 2,500+ kilometer range 3M14 of Kalibr family from anywhere in the Eastern Mediterranean or the Caspian Sea.

These are ranges which are simply beyond the reach of any stand-off weapon in US arsenal with Tomahawk TLAM-A Block II having the maximum range of around 2,500 kilometers while TLAM Block IV, currently being most produced variety, having the range of 1,600 kilometers.

Raytheon says that these missiles are capable of loitering and that Tomahawk would be able to hit moving targets. It is all fine and dandy but the key is range and precision and here the US is not in the leading position to put it mildly. Range gives an unprecedented operational flexibility and yesterday’s launch from Russian Tu-95 Bears strategic bombers had a very serious message—not in terms of X-101′s range, even longer range cruise missiles are getting ready for procurement, with ranges in 10,000 kilometers vicinity. The message was in the fact that missiles were launched from Iranian and Iraqi aerospace. They didn’t have to do so, this could have been easily done from the area of the Caspian Sea. But Bears launched while being escorted in Iranian aerospace by Su-30s and Su-35s of Russian Air Space Forces and that, apart from obvious hint at Russian full capability to reach any US ground asset in the area, provided some ominous signs.

Iran knows for sure that should the unthinkable but not improbable happen, such as an American attack on the Russian forces in Syria, Iran will not be left standing on the side—she gets immediately “involved” whether she wants it or not. So, the logic goes, why not make the best of it when all bets, other than nuclear, will be off. Iran may as well have Russian forces on her side and in her airspace, which, obviously helps significantly. But that also opens another serious operational possibility in case of a real conventional conflict in the area between Russia and the US—a scenario Neocons, due to their military illiteracy and overall detachment from the strategic reality, are dreaming about.
Putting inevitable emotions aside and looking at the factual side of things, Russia’s Military Doctrine since 2010, reaffirmed in 2014 Edition, views the use of stand-off High Precision as a key in strategic force containment, as Article 26 of a doctrine clearly states. Russia doesn’t want war with the US, but if push comes to shove Russia is totally capable of not only reaching US ground assets, such as CENTCOM’s Qatar forward installation but, what is even more significant, also the naval ones in the Persian Gulf.

Apart from 66 long-range strategic bombers, the Tu-160s and Tu-95s, Russia has at her disposal more than 100 TU-22M3 bombers many of which are capable of both inflight refueling and of carrying a rather intimidating weapon—the X-32 (Kh-32) cruise missile whose range is 1000 kilometers and the speed is in excess of Mach 4.2. This missile, apart from being able to attack anything on the ground, is capable in fact was designed primarily for the purpose, of hitting anything moving on the surface of the sea.

The missile, let alone a salvo of those, is incredibly difficult if possible at all to intercept and as yesterday’s demonstration showed, Iran, most likely would have no problem with allowing these very TU-22M3s to operate from her airspace in case of the worst case scenario. Launched anywhere from Darab area the salvo will not only cover all of a Persian Gulf but will reliably close off Gulf of Oman for any naval force. No ship, no Carrier Battle Group will be able to enter this area in case of a conventional conflict with Russia in Syria—the strategic ramifications of this are enormous. Even the salvo of 3M14s from Caspian Sea on October 7, 2015 made such an impression that USS Theodore Roosevelt and her CBG almost immediately left the Gulf.

Moreover, this simple, single operational fact shows precisely why for two years a relatively small Russian military contingent has been able to operate so effectively in Syria and, in fact, dictate conditions on the ground and in the area of its operations. The answer is simple—many adrenaline junkies are lowered in a cage into the water to face sharks, with only metal rods separating them and sharks’ deadly jaws. Yet, up there, in the boat one can always put a man with a gun which can be used in case of emergency to a deadly effect should the cage give.

The Russian military contingent in Syria is not just some military base—it is the force tightly integrated with Russian Armed Forces that have enough reach and capability to make anyone face some extremely unpleasant choices, including the fact that it is Russia, not the US, who controls escalation to a threshold and that can explain a non-stop anti-Russian hysteria in US media since the outcome of the war in Syria became clear. Let us only hope that all described above remains merely speculation and has no basis in real life—if those scenarios do not become reality, it is all for the better.
Source: The Unz Review

[Philip]

6 RussianTU-22 Backfire bombets just obliterated a huge ISIS arms dump in Syria. When will we ever acquire such a capability?

[Philip]

Once offered to India.Russia has dozens of Backfires in mothballs which the IN and IAF could prove very useful to.The lack of a dedicated strat./tact/ LR bomber is a gaping hole in our strat. deterrent triad as well as dominating the maritime sphere in the IOR+.
Xcpts:
http://russia-insider.com/en/russias-su ... es/ri21635

Russia's Supersonic Bombers: Now Locked and Loaded With New Supersonic Missiles
Russia's Tu-22M3 bombers from the 1980s are in for the most comprehensive revamp since their introduction into service

Dave Majumdar Subscribe to 2828Mon, Nov 20, 2017|
Russia is planning to upgrade its fleet of Tupolev Tu-22M3 Backfire intermediate range bombers with new engines and avionics. The first of 30 modernized supersonic bombers will make its first flight next year if all goes as planned.

"The first heavily upgraded Tu-22M3 will take to the skies in 2018,” Tupolev chief executive officer Alexander Konyukhov told the Moscow-based TASS news agency on November 17. “Also in that year, the modernization of operational aircraft will begin in compliance with the new state armament program. The upgrade will be carried out within the timeframe defined by this program."

“The Tu-22M3M will feature an absolutely new avionics system standardized with the Tu-160M2," a Russian defense industry source told TASS. "This refers to the entire avionics, including the navigation and sighting complex.”
Michael Kofman, a research scientist specializing in Russian military affair at the Center for Naval Analysis, is skeptical about some aspects of the upgrade program. Kofman correctly noted that refitting an existing airframe with new engines can require complex engineering work. “I'm quite skeptical on NK-32-02 engine refit for Tu-22M3,” Kofman said.

Moreover, the TASS report notes that the Tu-22M3M will be armed with upgraded X-32 supersonic anti-ship missile, a modernized version of the X-22 (NATO AS-4 Kitchen). The massive 13,000lbs weapon has a speed of about Mach 4.5 while flying at altitudes of 130,000ft over a range of about 620 miles. It can be armed with a 1,102lbs conventional warhead or a nuclear warhead if needed. The Tu-22M3M will be able to carry three such weapons.

*(Apart from this missile,the Backfire could carry even more numbers of BMos-A just tested.)

[Rakesh]

Yes please. All these B1Bs etc make it useful to have.
Thanks, ramana

Ramana-ji, thread has been moved to Military Forum. Thank you.

[ramana]

Up. The recent Cope India 2023 exercise showcasing US B1B bombers brings focus on this subject again.

[konaseema]

Unless the IAF presses the panic button, I am not sure if there will be enough justification or funds to lease a US B1B. With the Russian - Ukraine war, the chances of buying / leasing a few Tu-95 or Tu-22M can be ruled out. My guess is that this might be restricted to forum discussions. Priority for IAF ideally should be to shore up its fighter squadrons. The other choice would be to make some desi jugad and convert a few of the fleet of 17 IL-76 to bombers, if that is a possibility.

[Pratyush]

We need to be clear about what we want our strategic bombers to accomplish.

If the objective is to penetrate deep into PRC and drop bombs. Then the b1 or any non stealth bomber is a waste of money. As it's not surviable in PRC airspace.

If the objective is ot use it as a cruise missile carrier. Then a Desi rapid dragon implementation with air launched LRCM. On the IAF airlift fleet will be a cheaper option.

So what is the objective of the IAF.

Additionally, the IAF needs to grow in size from the current approved strength. But we don't even know by when the IAF will attain the currently approved strength.

[Cain Marko]

^Pratyushji, this is what I wrote when the topic first came up. I still stand by it.

The advantages of an imported fast bomber

1. Would cover IOR and sea lanes from SCS to hormuz comfortably.
2. Potent cover against plan flotillas
3. Relatively cheap vs say, a CV
4. Excellent fire power
5. Quick time to target
6. More survivable as compared to an Mpa type... High speed and low level flight profiles.
7. Escalation and power projection, show of force type asset. imagine Indian Navy bomber patrol over Malacca. Something missile cannot do.
8. Quick induction, you can bring this asset into play in 2 to 5 years.
9. High speed, high altitude recon

Yes, it has its advantages.

Not the best asset for lands attack against PRC although it may still serve a purpose in such missions.

[Pratyush]

Cain, it's not that I don't understand your argument for the need for a strategic bomber. I do. But within the current Indian strategic context, i am not sure that such an investment is best for India or best use of Indian resources. I will try to present seperate argument against each one of the points you have presented above in the next few posts.

I hope that you are able to see what I am trying to say and together we improve our rational even if we don't agree entirely with the points.

[Pratyush]

1/n

The advantages of an imported fast bomber

1. Would cover IOR and sea lanes from SCS to hormuz comfortably.
2. Potent cover against plan flotillas
3. Relatively cheap vs say, a CV
4. Excellent fire power
5. Quick time to target

Sinp.....

1) comfortably yes, economically no, because, if the objective is to fight a two front war, then leased or imported machines will not be present in sufficient numbers to be utilised for the efforts you have in mind.

They will be committed to deep strikes against industrial hubs. They will require overfly permission along with massive inflight refueling in order to evade PRC defences. It's not a given that countries in Indo China will permit overflight or tanking will be available.

2) no more than a 3000 ton missile vessel with 32 to 48 cell Brahmos missile launchers.

3) Not exactly. The lease of the bombers will be billions of dollars for 6 to 12 machines. Such a force is too small to effectively deal with a PLAN CVBG.

The surveillance and support assets required to make such strikes effective are going to run into CVBG resources territory. Resources that will be needed in Tibetan theatre of operations.

But without the flexibility and presence and diplomatic options provided by CVBG during peace time.

4) only in areas where the enemy no longer has the ability to contest Indian bombers. In areas where the enemy can contest Indian bombers, with IADS and fighters. These bombers are dead, if they are being used a anything other than cruise missile carrier's.

But, if the objective is to sling cruise missiles. A truck based system will be substantially cheaper and equally effective conducting fire missions against the enemy.

5) true, but can that Target not be serviced by a Su 30 or a Brahmos.

[Pratyush]

2/n

The advantages of an imported fast bomber

Snip....

6. More survivable as compared to an Mpa type... High speed and low level flight profiles.
7. Escalation and power projection, show of force type asset. imagine Indian Navy bomber patrol over Malacca. Something missile cannot do.
8. Quick induction, you can bring this asset into play in 2 to 5 years.
9. High speed, high altitude recon

Yes, it has its advantages.

6) of it's being used as a surrogate for an MPA, it's not going to be more surviable than the MPA. A low observable autonomous air vehicle is the answer to the problem.

7) the bombers might appear to be formidable. But it lacks the presence and persistence of a CV.

Bomber will show up and leave. A CV when deployed, will be present and able to effect outcomes through its persistence either in war or during peace time.

yes, but it's not going make any difference to a determined PRC. Unless the IAF is organically growing as well. The IAF needs to be a 200 hundred squadron force.

2 or 3 squadrons of such bombers is not going to make any difference our current or future strategic situation.

9) a bomber flying recon during a standoff is going to be a trigger initiating a conflict.

A UAV is cheaper and safer option.

[Pratyush]

I am not saying that India doesn't need to have a strategic bomber. But in the absence of comprehensive national security policy. Without a clear identification what are the threats being faced.

What would be the threat scenario in 2030, 2035, 2040, 2045, and 2050.

We need to think seriously about it and then decide what place any strategic bomber will have in the IAF.

[TVenky]

What if 6 ( of Tu-142MK-E could be resurrected with new avionics, weapons, and upgraded/uprated engines ?.. Wouldnt this be a moderate if not a good solution from cost and time to onboard perspective. ?

Something tells me, when these Albatross were flying Chinkies were not loafing in IOR freely.. but after these were retired PLAN is having real freedom of passage.

[TVenky]

1/n

The advantages of an imported fast bomber

1. Would cover IOR and sea lanes from SCS to hormuz comfortably.
2. Potent cover against plan flotillas
3. Relatively cheap vs say, a CV
4. Excellent fire power
5. Quick time to target

Sinp.....

1) comfortably yes, economically no, because, if the objective is to fight a two front war, then leased or imported machines will not be present in sufficient numbers to be utilised for the efforts you have in mind.

They will be committed to deep strikes against industrial hubs. They will require overfly permission along with massive inflight refueling in order to evade PRC defences. It's not a given that countries in Indo China will permit overflight or tanking will be available.

2) no more than a 3000 ton missile vessel with 32 to 48 cell Brahmos missile launchers.

3) Not exactly. The lease of the bombers will be billions of dollars for 6 to 12 machines. Such a force is too small to effectively deal with a PLAN CVBG.

The surveillance and support assets required to make such strikes effective are going to run into CVBG resources territory. Resources that will be needed in Tibetan theatre of operations.

But without the flexibility and presence and diplomatic options provided by CVBG during peace time.

4) only in areas where the enemy no longer has the ability to contest Indian bombers. In areas where the enemy can contest Indian bombers, with IADS and fighters. These bombers are dead, if they are being used a anything other than cruise missile carrier's.

But, if the objective is to sling cruise missiles. A truck based system will be substantially cheaper and equally effective conducting fire missions against the enemy.

5) true, but can that Target not be serviced by a Su 30 or a Brahmos.

1... In a 2-front war, we don't need a strategic bomber per se for Pakis. All we need a lovingly configured and loaded Su-30 or Rafale or even Jags should be fine.. isnt it ?..

[Pratyush]

What if 6 ( of Tu-142MK-E could be resurrected with new avionics, weapons, and upgraded/uprated engines ?.. Wouldnt this be a moderate if not a good solution from cost and time to onboard perspective. ?

Something tells me, when these Albatross were flying Chinkies were not loafing in IOR.. but after were retired PLAN is having real freedom of passage.

PLAN did not have the ability to operate in the Indian Ocean as late as 2010. They are developing that ability as they are building their fleet.

The availability and types of MPA is not going to act as a deterrence against the PLAN as the size of the fleet grows.

[Pratyush]

1... In a 2-front war, we don't need a strategic bomber per se for Pakis. All we need a lovingly configured and loaded Su-30 or Rafale or even Jags should be fine.. isnt it ?..

A handful of non stealth bombers are going to be insufficient against the PRC itself. TSP doses not come to the picture for any strategic bomber.

[Pratyush]

India needs to re evaluate the size of the airforce required and build industrial and human resource capacity needed to accomplish this.

This fantasy that 50 squadron force can hold the line against the PRC and TSP combined, needs to be gotten rid off.

[ShauryaT]

I am not saying that India doesn't need to have a strategic bomber. But in the absence of comprehensive national security policy. Without a clear identification what are the threats being faced.

What would be the threat scenario in 2030, 2035, 2040, 2045, and 2050.

We need to think seriously about it and then decide what place any strategic bomber will have in the IAF.

The PRIMARY purpose of a strategic long range bomber is its nuclear delivery role. A highly visible, recallable and the only type of aircraft capable of legs and payloads to rightfully fulfill the stated declared capability of a triad. Secondary roles are for the anti shipping and conventional long range missile carrier/bombing roles. Tertiary role could be CAS.

War is not a video game to push buttons, where missiles and drones do all the delivery. The IAF brass and ALL great powers are committed to wield, sustain and evolve this asset type.

The likely "threat" scenarios for the foreseeable future is only one. China.

[Cain Marko]

1/n

The advantages of an imported fast bomber

1. Would cover IOR and sea lanes from SCS to hormuz comfortably.
2. Potent cover against plan flotillas
3. Relatively cheap vs say, a CV
4. Excellent fire power
5. Quick time to target

Sinp.....

1) comfortably yes, economically no, because, if the objective is to fight a two front war, then leased or imported machines will not be present in sufficient numbers to be utilised for the efforts you have in mind.
Very economical compared to a cbg probably by an order of magnitude.

They will be committed to deep strikes against industrial hubs. They will require overfly permission along with massive inflight refueling in order to evade PRC defences. It's not a given that countries in Indo China will permit overflight or tanking will be available.
I don't see much of a deep land strike role for an upgraded tu22 unless dead/dead had already sufficiently happened. It could then be used to devastating effect. Could also use it otherwise as a missile carrier.

2) no more than a 3000 ton missile vessel with 32 to 48 cell Brahmos missile launchers.
Such a vessel can't cover vast distances quickly. And what kind of 3000 ton vessel carries that many brahmos? It would take a 20000 ton cruiser sized ship to carry 48 brahmos, the p15b only carries 16! Moreover, Time to target is what makes supersonic bombers in the naval role so attractive.

3) Not exactly. The lease of the bombers will be billions of dollars for 6 to 12 machines. Such a force is too small to effectively deal with a PLAN CVBG.
Not correct. I don't see a sqd of backfire costing more than sqd of Rafales tbh. Last i checked unit cost of latest backfire variany was $160 million. The chinese were offered an entire production line at 1.5 billion./color]

The surveillance and support assets required to make such strikes effective are going to run into CVBG resources territory.
? How? A 45 ton cv itself costs 5 billion. Add air wing of 50 Rafales and see what happens. A cvbg will have large number of escort assets each costing in the billion level. The whole thing will be $25 billion. Try maintaining that.
ISR assets are assumed to be the same. Can't imagine why more are needed. In any case this area needs more assets to begin with.

But without the flexibility and presence and diplomatic options provided by CVBG during peace time.
Not sure if diplomatic options is the primary role of a $20 billion asset. In any case blinders and blackjacks do notoriously good diplomacy... That's why the big 3 use them in various flight paths. No better flag waving than showing the loaded belly of a nuke capable bomber.

4) only in areas where the enemy no longer has the ability to contest Indian bombers. In areas where the enemy can contest Indian bombers, with IADS and fighters. These bombers are dead, if they are being used a anything other than cruise missile carrier's.

But, if the objective is to sling cruise missiles. A truck based system will be substantially cheaper and equally effective conducting fire missions against the enemy.
Again, i see a primarily naval role for such assets. Btw the Ukraine ads despite s300s didn't down a single backfire afaik. These are not your old soviet variety

5) true, but can that Target not be serviced by a Su 30 or a Brahmos.
No, it simply can't. Not even a su34 could do this. You'll need to dedicate a full sqd with multiple ifr assets to come close to what 6 backfires could do. The range and payload difference is too much. Let alone a blackjack. The carrier killer and naval hva targeting role is the silver bullet niche for a backfire. The only alternative would probably be to station a large ssgn/SSN force, which will take a long time. And lots of money.

[Cain Marko]

IMHO, a lease of blackjacks is the best for forward. Followed by some backfires.
These are doubtless the cheapest and fastest way to grant the Indian Navy real teeth against the possibility of probing plan assets and large cbgs in IOR and Indo Pacific in the next 10 years.
Range, payload and speed/time to target make this niche role possible. Nothing else can match these criteria. Not stealth drones, not mkis, not ffgs or ddgs, nothing. Vs a plan cbg this is the perfect asymmetrical response at a fraction of the cost and at an acquisition pace that would make a difference.

Even a backfire with 6 internal rampage and 3 external bmos will be such force multiplier. 6 of these and a plan cvbg is in trouble.

[Pratyush]

Cain, your focus is purely on naval application of such an aircraft. I OTOH was focusing on all areas of operations.

Even so, in the face of a modern or any projected PLAN CVBG. PLAN is not going to send a single CV against India in the Indian Ocean. Whenever they decide to come inside the Indian Ocean. By the time they are confident in long range deployment of CV. They will have 4 to 5 CV for operations.

In such a scenario they will not be sending a single CV. They will be sending 2 to 4 CV, with a full strength of escorts 4 to 6 escorts each.

If the task force has two sky jump shipa and 2 CATOBAR ships. They are likely to be present in Indian Ocean with 6*2 helicopter AEW for sky jump ships. Along with 6 *2 fixed wing AEW's. ( If the fixed wing AEW's cannot operate from sky jump ships) That is 24 AEW present with the air group. Along with 24*2 = 48 J15 on the sky jump ships and upto 48*2 on the CATOBAR ships. For a total of 144 combat aircraft in the task force.

So let's examine the example that you have quoted. A force of 6 Backfires with a total of 54 (6*9=54) rampage missiles with an operational ranges of 150 to 250 kms. Or 3*6= 18 Brahmos (300 km to 900) will be well within the ad bubbles of PLAN escorts.

Such a force approaching PLAN task force is going to intercepted long before they reach lauch positions. Even if they succeed in launching missiles, those will be intercepted by AA tasked destroyers.

[Manish_P]

^ Countering them will not be the job of only the strategic LRBs. There will be surface & sub-surface (of the IN) and aerial components (of the IN/IAF) brought to bear.

The PLAN CV group/s in turn will also have sub-surface elements loitering in the area, sent in advance beforehand to screen for our units.

In the end it will probably come down to qty or tonnage being brought to bear - and how much risk/damage either party is willing to absorb.

[Pratyush]

That is the point.

Just 6 non stealth bombers are not going to cut it against a full strength CVBG.

Increase the size of the attacking bomber force to between 64 to 72. Approaching from multiple vectors and supported by just two Indian Navy CV groups. The PLAN task force cought between the two threat axis is dead.

[Manish_P]

Correct, saar. But what is the cost of a bomber force of 64-72.

To get 60 odd LRBs the IN will have to ask for 180

I can just imagine the face of the Hon. RM when the cost of those is put in front of him.

I know Rajnath Singh ji has an awesome poker face, i mean not even goris wanting to play holi faze him in the slightest.. but still

[Pratyush]

For me the bomber fleet will be a part of the larger IAF buildup. I have for the past year or so asking for a 200 combat squadron force by 2050.

If the IAF presents a plan to achieve success a force. 25 to 30 squadrons could be strategic bombers.

Shri RNS should be able to approve such a force.

[ShauryaT]

Big three push ahead with stealth bombers: What it means for strategic deterrence and India

Under the current circumstances, acquiring bombers is not a priority for India for at least one decade

The Boeing B-52 Stratofortress is the American long-range, subsonic, strategic bomber operated by the USAF since the 1950s. The bomber can carry up to 32,000 kg of weapons and has a combat range of around 14,200 km without aerial refuelling. Around 75 aircraft are still in inventory. It has superior performance at high subsonic speeds and relatively low operating costs. After being upgraded between 2013 and 2015, the fleet is expected to serve till the 2050s.

There were unconfirmed reports that India was keen to buy at least six Tu-160.

Bomber aircraft: Deterrence and military outcomes

Deterrence theory refers to how threats or even limited use of force by one party can convince another party to refrain from responding. It applied more prominently during the Cold War with regard to the use of nuclear weapons and the concept of mutually assured destruction, in short, unacceptable punishment. Strategic bombers of the Cold War were primarily armed with nuclear weapons.

The high cost of bombers does not fit into the current defence Capital budget allotments of the IAF. Typically a stealth bomber is nearly 6-8 times costlier than a stealth fighter. Just acquiring 6-8 bombers would be too expensive to maintain, and add huge infrastructure, and spare parts costs and complications. A formation of just three IAF fighters can deliver equal to, or more ordnance than the H-6 bomber. The higher agility of fighters and numbers would also increase survivability and give employment flexibility in multiple roles. The current fighters are also capable of the air vector role of nuclear deterrence.

The defence of India’s homeland remains the nation’s first priority. IAF fighters can already cover all likely targets in the northern Indian Ocean from well past Malacca Strait to the Gulf of Hormuz. Similarly, IAF fighters can take on all relevant land-based targets against their immediate adversaries. IAF air defences will prevent incursions by the H-6K class of bombers, and in fact, should force it to remain at some distance from the border to reduce the cruise missile ranges. Under the current circumstances, acquiring bombers is not a priority for India for at least one decade.

The writer is Director General, Centre for Air Power Studies. Views expressed are personal.

[bharathp]

for the chini threat - is there a possibility of collaborating with the Japanese and have a shared half sqdn of strategic bombers?
I would think this will create a good grid around cheen and our financial burden shared and specific to cheen?

I understand no one wants to have a shared sqdn - It would be more of shared maintenance/readiness kind of deal so we each have half the fighters required but shared buden of MROs

[Manish_P]

...

The Boeing B-52 Stratofortress is the American long-range, subsonic, strategic bomber operated by the USAF since the 1950s. The bomber can carry up to 32,000 kg of weapons and has a combat range of around 14,200 km without aerial refuelling. ...It has superior performance at high subsonic speeds and relatively low operating costs. ...

..

Important point. Almost all supersonic fighters/bombers value high subsonic (just under mach 1) speeds on cruise power settings (no afterburners) more than supersonic dash.

It's more important for fighters due to lower fuel capacity. IIRC there was a declassified report a year ago which revealed the Mach 2+ rated F-15s spent less than 5% flight time over mach 1+ flight over their entire flying cycle.

But it all depends on what the mission profile would be - intercepting mobile targets like CVBGs/Armour columns or static targets like bases/infrastructure.

In our case, given our limitations as an importer (with meager budgets) they will have to play a multiple role.

A good point therefore when the retd. AM says that in our case, the heavy hitting, fast flying, long-legged SU-30MKIs can also take up part of the LRB duties. They need to be given even better teeth and more support at distance (refuelers).

[drnayar]

Why not have a Heavy New Generation Fighter bomber to fill in the role of "Strategic Long Range Bomber" ., when we get to the stage of AMCA we could well think a stealthy heavy multirole fighter bomber ., more survivability better agility and deploying options with deep strike capabilities

[Pratyush]

The Su 30 will have to be replaced by the mid 2040s. There is definitely space for a 6th generation replacement for it.

When the first time it had emerged, that, one of the former COAS had spoken about strategic bombers for the IAF. Then everyone assumed that he was talking about the Tu160.

I had proposed a clean sheet design to be built arround either 4 dry Kaveri with a payload of 20000 pounds and an un-refuled combat radius of 3000 kms.

Or with 2 Russian PD 90s with similar performance. A start today can leverage the technology developed for the AURA/ SWIFT program with flying prototype by the mid to late 30s. Production tooling can be created concurrently.

So that the first aircraft can be in service by 2042 or there abouts.

[drnayar]

The Su 30 will have to be replaced by the mid 2040s. There is definitely space for a 6th generation replacement for it.

When the first time it had emerged, that, one of the former COAS had spoken about strategic bombers for the IAF. Then everyone assumed that he was talking about the Tu160.

I had proposed a clean sheet design to be built arround either 4 dry Kaveri with a payload of 20000 pounds and an un-refuled combat radius of 3000 kms.

Or with 2 Russian PD 90s with similar performance. A start today can leverage the technology developed for the AURA/ SWIFT program with flying prototype by the mid to late 30s. Production tooling can be created concurrently.

So that the first aircraft can be in service by 2042 or there abouts.

Maybe a good discussion on pros and cons of a scaled up AURA bomber design [ manned / unmanned ] or a clean sheet "conventional" stealthy design

But its not the concept of dedicated bomber but rather how the airforce would tackle that role matters. It could very well be a mix of unmanned armed UCAV gate busters with a head on force mix of stealthy fighter bombers, electronic warfare support fighters and AEWs. Cleanups once the airspace has been sanitised can be done by 4+ gen fighter bombers.

Having said all that , pakis are sure not to need that much of heavy hitters., and the borders with china are a different matter.

Long range munitions are key to any fight with China and hypersonic missiles and Pralay regiments are the right step.

We are also building up our sensor capabilities including space [ Geo ] , all in the right direction. Navic would soon have global coverage.

[Pratyush]

Pralay lacks the range to threaten PRC industrial heart land.

I am also interested in long ranges cruise missiles. These can be launched from trucks or long range bombers.

[ramana]

Any news reports of Cope India-23?

[Cain Marko]

That is the point.

Just 6 non stealth bombers are not going to cut it against a full strength CVBG.

Increase the size of the attacking bomber force to between 64 to 72. Approaching from multiple vectors and supported by just two Indian Navy CV groups. The PLAN task force cought between the two threat axis is dead.

^ Countering them will not be the job of only the strategic LRBs. There will be surface & sub-surface (of the IN) and aerial components (of the IN/IAF) brought to bear.

The PLAN CV group/s in turn will also have sub-surface elements loitering in the area, sent in advance beforehand to screen for our units.

In the end it will probably come down to qty or tonnage being brought to bear - and how much risk/damage either party is willing to absorb.

Think in terms of:
1. How many bombers that carry 6-12 brahmos would be needed to counter a single cvbg. Scale it up from there. I was thinking of single current/near term plan CV. A tu160 can carry upto 12 brahmos.
2. What other asset can we bring to bear in the short term (3-5, maybe 10 years) to counter plan cvbgs?
3. What would be the cost of bombers vs other alternatives?

These are the primary criteria for suggesting a fast bomber force for the Navy. They are more potent than a single MKI at long distances by far. Ads and fighter patrols can be countered with MKI/rafale escorts, which will have better range when equipped with a2a load outs.

And it doesn't necessarily have to be Russian birds, a few b1b slightly repurposed to carry brahmos, leased for 12 years will do nicely.