MoD: Defence Procurement Policies Issues and Discussions

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bharathp
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Re: MoD: Defence Procurement Policies Issues and Discussions

Post by bharathp »

YashG, what you described above is the classic startup vs behemoth conundrum.
a startup type company can take high risks, high value ROI works because it can pivot quickly and fail without much draw back
an established behemoth cannot fail without major consequences. this is in part the reason why the bigger a company gets, the slower the innovation.

one way to break that cycle was to separate the "behemothized" part and bring chunks of "startup" size parts into the same company - but NEED to keep them separate. management, hiring, payments - all of it.
the target being any new breakthrough achived by the multitude of the "startup size" groups will be used to retrain the behemoth - to increase the size of the said breakthrough.

instead of shoving the swadeshi mandate, I propose, have a swadeshi mandate for only afew parts - gun systems, of small arms, or ballistics etc - let them be the "nimble ones". when you see a breakthrough tech/innovation from them - you can then retain the behemoth to absorb from the splinter groups.
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Re: MoD: Defence Procurement Policies Issues and Discussions

Post by Rakesh »

https://twitter.com/delhidefence/status ... ZU2FOggdGA ---> #Budget2022. Defence Capital Allocation upped to Rs 1.52 lac (~ $20.32 billion) crores from Rs 1.38 lac crores (~$18.5 billion).

https://twitter.com/delhidefence/status ... ZU2FOggdGA ---> Capital outlay increase is a jump of nearly 10%. And 68% of capital procurement will be allocated towards the domestic industry this year, up from 58% last year.

https://twitter.com/SJha1618/status/148 ... ZU2FOggdGA ---> So, the total projected spending on India's three armed services is $51.55 billion at current exchange rates. The total allocation for the Ministry of Defence (including pensions) during 2022-23 is $70.25 billion.
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Re: MoD: Defence Procurement Policies Issues and Discussions

Post by Rakesh »

https://twitter.com/Amitraaz/status/148 ... ZU2FOggdGA ---> Defense R&D will be opened up for industry, startups and academia with 25% of defense R&D budget. Private industry will be encouraged to take up the design and development of military platforms and equipment in collaboration with DRDO and other orgs through SPV model: FM

https://twitter.com/Amitraaz/status/148 ... ZU2FOggdGA ---> 68% of R&D budget in Defence earmarked for Make In India: FM
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Re: MoD: Defence Procurement Policies Issues and Discussions

Post by Rakesh »

https://twitter.com/AnirudhGB/status/14 ... ZU2FOggdGA --->

Defence Budget 2022-23 Capital Outlay Breakdown: Total CAPEX: ₹ 1,52,369.61 crore ($20.38 billion)

1) Army: ₹ 32,015.26 crore ($4.28 billion)
[12.24% decrease over 2021-22]

2) Navy: ₹ 47,590.99 crore ($6.36 billion)
[43.11% increase over 2021-22]

3) Air Force: ₹ 55,586.65 crore ($7.43 billion)
[4.45% increase over 2021-22]
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Re: MoD: Defence Procurement Policies Issues and Discussions

Post by Rakesh »

https://twitter.com/DefenceMinIndia/sta ... ZU2FOggdGA ---> Additionally, to boost the Coastal Security, the Capital budget of the Indian Coast Guard has been enhanced by 60.24% to Rs 4,246 crore in FY 2022-23 vis-à-vis Rs 2,650 crore in FY 2021-22.

https://twitter.com/DefenceMinIndia/sta ... ZU2FOggdGA ---> This enhancement is aimed at building up of assets such as acquisition of ships & aircraft, augmentation of infrastructure, establishment of coastal security network and building up technical & administrative support structures.

https://twitter.com/AnirudhGB/status/14 ... ZU2FOggdGA ---> ICG gets a capital outlay hike of 60.24% to take it to Rs. 4246 crore. They are already the 4th largest coast guard in the world, just imagine their fleet size with such a massive hike.
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Re: MoD: Defence Procurement Policies Issues and Discussions

Post by YashG »

Rakesh wrote: https://twitter.com/AnirudhGB/status/14 ... ZU2FOggdGA --->

Defence Budget 2022-23 Capital Outlay Breakdown: Total CAPEX: ₹ 1,52,369.61 crore ($20.38 billion)

1) Army: ₹ 32,015.26 crore ($4.28 billion)
[12.24% decrease over 2021-22]

2) Navy: ₹ 47,590.99 crore ($6.36 billion)
[43.11% increase over 2021-22]

3) Air Force: ₹ 55,586.65 crore ($7.43 billion)
[4.45% increase over 2021-22]
Well actually this is amazing. Given one of the chinese defence research papers proposed that china curtail indian expansion in IOR. Indeed some quarters guessed that one reason of chinese himalayan aggression was to push india to divert investments away from navy to army. Good we just went ahead and disproportionately did the otherwise.
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Re: MoD: Defence Procurement Policies Issues and Discussions

Post by k prasad »

Question is, what is that 47k crores for FY22-23 going to cover by way of CAPEX projects? It suggests some big ideas at work... Does this mean that Submarines + IAC2 are both on the cards, or is it going to go towards a larger number of capital ships - destroyers and frigates, that is?

I wonder what led to the decrease for IA... maybe the emergency procurements post-Galwan covered most of the possible near-term CAPEX needs?
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Re: MoD: Defence Procurement Policies Issues and Discussions

Post by ks_sachin »

k prasad wrote:Question is, what is that 47k crores for FY22-23 going to cover by way of CAPEX projects? It suggests some big ideas at work... Does this mean that Submarines + IAC2 are both on the cards, or is it going to go towards a larger number of capital ships - destroyers and frigates, that is?

I wonder what led to the decrease for IA... maybe the emergency procurements post-Galwan covered most of the possible near-term CAPEX needs?
Or maybe they have decided to put proper money into developing a jet engine and proper equipment for our infantry - uniforms / bpj's / rifles etc
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Re: MoD: Defence Procurement Policies Issues and Discussions

Post by k prasad »

ks_sachin wrote:
k prasad wrote:Question is, what is that 47k crores for FY22-23 going to cover by way of CAPEX projects? It suggests some big ideas at work... Does this mean that Submarines + IAC2 are both on the cards, or is it going to go towards a larger number of capital ships - destroyers and frigates, that is?

I wonder what led to the decrease for IA... maybe the emergency procurements post-Galwan covered most of the possible near-term CAPEX needs?
Or maybe they have decided to put proper money into developing a jet engine and proper equipment for our infantry - uniforms / bpj's / rifles etc
I meant the 47k for the Navy, Sachin. The IA and IAF have their own Capex outlays with significantly smaller increases (or in the army's case, a decrease). None of the things you mentioned are related to the Navy.
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Re: MoD: Defence Procurement Policies Issues and Discussions

Post by ks_sachin »

k prasad wrote:
ks_sachin wrote:
Or maybe they have decided to put proper money into developing a jet engine and proper equipment for our infantry - uniforms / bpj's / rifles etc
I meant the 47k for the Navy, Sachin. The IA and IAF have their own Capex outlays with significantly smaller increases (or in the army's case, a decrease). None of the things you mentioned are related to the Navy.
Thanks K Parsad for correcting me.
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Re: MoD: Defence Procurement Policies Issues and Discussions

Post by stephen »

k prasad wrote:Question is, what is that 47k crores for FY22-23 going to cover by way of CAPEX projects? It suggests some big ideas at work... Does this mean that Submarines + IAC2 are both on the cards, or is it going to go towards a larger number of capital ships - destroyers and frigates, that is?

I wonder what led to the decrease for IA... maybe the emergency procurements post-Galwan covered most of the possible near-term CAPEX needs?
Most probably for the buy/lease of F-18 or Rafale for Vikrant and purchase of MQ-9 drones would be the next big ticket purchase for the navy. Apart from these the construction of the 6 SSNs would begin.
The IA did not utilize its allocated funds last year, also with a heavy emphasis on Atmanirbharta, the Govt. must have put its foot down on any plans of importing ATHOS arty. This could also have been a message to them that whatever purchases they want to make it should be Indian and no more big bucks for imports. The target of 68% amount to be spent only on desi products should further push in the message.
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Re: MoD: Defence Procurement Policies Issues and Discussions

Post by asbchakri »

So a question, it says here the IA only spent only 40% of its capital budget this year and it may have to return it if it does not place orders. So what happens to this funds. Has this affected in the decrease of its budget?.

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Re: MoD: Defence Procurement Policies Issues and Discussions

Post by vera_k »

bharathp wrote:a startup type company can take high risks, high value ROI works because it can pivot quickly and fail without much draw back
an established behemoth cannot fail without major consequences. this is in part the reason why the bigger a company gets, the slower the innovation.
Everyone wants to be successful and is doing their best. However,

a) An established company is used to listening to and fulfilling the needs of its largest customers. These bring in the most money, so it makes sense to cater to them.
b) Smaller companies usually have no hope of selling to the largest customers. And their products are not as capable either. So they end up catering to customers with smaller budgets themselves. Eventually the smaller customers become larger, and cause the smaller companies to grow larger themselves.

In this context, it would mean that the research organizations focus on selling to and cultivating the smaller Indian armed services or to the export market. The larger ones have enough money to get whatever product is necessary from the established vendors worldwide. Perhaps this is what is being attempted this year.
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Re: MoD: Defence Procurement Policies Issues and Discussions

Post by Prem Kumar »

asbchakri: its "use it or lose it". There was a proposal to allow carry-forward of unutilized Defense budgets but I don't think it came into effect.

Quite a sorry state of affairs, with China barking at our gates. The IA seems worst off: having spent only 40% of their capital budget allocated.

https://www.news18.com/news/india/army- ... 07575.html
Multiple sources in the three services told News18.com that the primary reason for poor expenditure was the Covid-19 pandemic, because of which many contracts could not materialise and deliveries got delayed.

“This was particularly true of indigenous equipment manufactured by the defence PSUs,” a second defence source said.

“The delayed deliveries and contracts had a cascading effect on the payments. Thus the payment milestones got shifted and the spending got postponed,” the source said, adding that some of the planned procurements also got delayed as they were awaiting final approvals at various levels.

A third defence source said that another reason for the delay in capital spending was the capping of capital budgets for domestic procurements. “Spending on ongoing foreign procurements would have been faster. But a cap for indigenous procurements, conclusion of certain domestic contracts and deliveries getting delayed together led to delayed spending,” the source added.
A couple of factors:

1) Covid delays in contract finalization, delivery delays & hence payment delays
2) The usual shilling for foreign maal

Yet somehow, the IAF spent 70% of its Capex & the Navy spent 90%! The IA, as usual, makes excuses. Welcome to the new regime. Its mostly going to be domestic maal, whether they like it or not. Either get on-board or keep moping.

It becomes harder for the RM to ask for more money from the FM if the services cannot spend the money that they've been allocated!
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Re: MoD: Defence Procurement Policies Issues and Discussions

Post by Vidur »

Capital contracts are progressed and signed by DG Acquisitions in Dept of Defence within Raksha Mantralya. Service HQs have almost no say in this. They can liason with DGA and request expiditing at best. The reason why IN spent its budget is because all of it was already earmarked for ships under construction as per contract. Please check the public record - no new contracts were signed. Same with IAF.

RM may call DGA and AS Army to his office and impress upon them the utmost need for alacrity in concluding and signing contracts. If any contract has to be signed with HAL then CMD HAL must also be impressed upon by RM that this must be expedited.

It can be done. We have done this before.
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Re: MoD: Defence Procurement Policies Issues and Discussions

Post by ramana »

Why they need to be impressed to spend already budgetted funds which are allocated to weapon systems approved by CCS?
And the Chinese breathing down the LAC.
Who are these two folks?
Thanks.
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Re: MoD: Defence Procurement Policies Issues and Discussions

Post by Vidur »

DGA is Director General Acquisition a AS rank officer in DOD. AS is Additional Secretary to Govt of India eq to a Lt Gen. AS (Army) is the IAS officer in DOD responsible for progressing army matters including progressing capital acquisition with DGA. Together DGA and AS (Army) have to get this done. Service HQ role is over at a much earlier stage. Their role is - putting up case, getting AON, drafting QRs and helping in draft of RPF with DGA and finally testing. Once they submit their test report, their role is much reduced.

Why do DGA and AS (Army) need to be impressed ? They have no incentive to push these contracts. Service HQs have a big incentive obviously as its their war fighting being impacted. Vast majority of IAS officers don't care about that ! Hence RM has to tell them its a priority for him and will impact their future postings. Else why would they do anything ?

Budgeting is not equal to contract signing. We have to sign the contract and once contract is signed we have to release funds per the milestones in the contract. So there are 02 tracks that we have to pursue before March 31st to ensure capital budget is utilised.

1. Signing new contracts - Even if final CCS approval for contract has come (CCS approval is first at budgeting and then at contract stage and there can be years, even decades between the two) it still takes time to sign a contract. Each stage has to be diligently followed up and pushed.

2. Speaking to DPSUs to expedite production and thereby achieve milestones per contracts and trigger payment. Many projects running behind schedule. Mazgaon Docks has done a good job I must say

Out of the box solutions

You have only two months left. Progressing cases for new equipment is very unlikely. Best option is to order more of existing orders with DPSUs and Indian pvt sector. This will need RM clearance and perhaps CCS too but if PM and RM wish they can approve. Projects that will qualify in my view :

a) Brahmos - more regiments and more missiles
b) Pinaka
c ) T 90s, BMPs, Arjun
d) LCH and LUH

Reading Gen PR Shankar a) and b) are great and much needed options for detterence by denial

https://www.gunnersshot.com/2019/12/pin ... ntact.html
Last edited by Vidur on 05 Feb 2022 14:57, edited 5 times in total.
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Re: MoD: Defence Procurement Policies Issues and Discussions

Post by Vidur »

I think its well worth COAS effort to go to RM and say I want to order more Brahmos, Pinaka, LCH and LUH before 31st March. RM can approve it in my view. He doesn't need CCS approval. CCS can be intimated on progress in next meeting. These are all Aatmanirbhar Bharat projects with orders already given. CAG will certainly comment that AON was not taken. But 5 yr defence plan and LTIPP can be shown which may have larger numbers of these equipment. If it doesn't army can in parrallel or restrospectively make a case, record COAS decision and keep the records to show CAG.

We do such things all the time during audit !
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Re: MoD: Defence Procurement Policies Issues and Discussions

Post by kit »

As regards procurement, is there a plan b when it comes to orders ?.. if item A is priority but can't be delivered in a year, but item B , desirable in a longer term but available now, be ordered right away ?? I know this is over simplification
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Re: MoD: Defence Procurement Policies Issues and Discussions

Post by YashG »

Vidur wrote:
Out of the box solutions

...
d) LCH and LUH
Please LCH & LUH!
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Re: MoD: Defence Procurement Policies Issues and Discussions

Post by ramana »

Does RM have a Military aide? Brigadier level.
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Re: MoD: Defence Procurement Policies Issues and Discussions

Post by ramana »

Apples and Pineapples

Pinaka is one shot rocket and a missile in guided version.
World over rockets cost less than guns.
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Re: MoD: Defence Procurement Policies Issues and Discussions

Post by fanne »

Can they not pay for LCH, LUH, K-9 this year for future deliveries?
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Re: MoD: Defence Procurement Policies Issues and Discussions

Post by Anujan »


Tube artillery reaches immense pressure during firing and the shell travels through it creating friction and vibration. Making this type of a gun barrel is the main challenge, look up autofrettage and chrome lining of artillery. On top of that, it also has an APU, a sighting system for direct fire, a computer for gun laying, and a hydraulic ( :roll: ) system for traverse and elevation to aim the gun.


Towing vehicle, ammo trucks for tube artillery is your mango military vehicle (picture)

Image
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Re: MoD: Defence Procurement Policies Issues and Discussions

Post by nachiket »

Vidur wrote:DGA is Director General Acquisition a AS rank officer in DOD. AS is Additional Secretary to Govt of India eq to a Lt Gen. AS (Army) is the IAS officer in DOD responsible for progressing army matters including progressing capital acquisition with DGA. Together DGA and AS (Army) have to get this done. Service HQ role is over at a much earlier stage. Their role is - putting up case, getting AON, drafting QRs and helping in draft of RPF with DGA and finally testing. Once they submit their test report, their role is much reduced.

Why do DGA and AS (Army) need to be impressed ? They have no incentive to push these contracts. Service HQs have a big incentive obviously as its their war fighting being impacted. Vast majority of IAS officers don't care about that ! Hence RM has to tell them its a priority for him and will impact their future postings. Else why would they do anything ?
Thanks for bringing out this point. This has been the bane of our bureaucracy for a long time and not just in the MoD. IAS officers have no incentive to do their effing jobs. Apparently they consider the enormous salary and benefits that our poor taxpayers pay them as their entitlement not as an incentive to do what they are supposed to. At least in the case of the MoD, George Fernandes style "incentives" of being threatened with a posting to Siachen (or perhaps the LAC to face Chinese spiked clubs) need to be brought back post haste.
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Re: MoD: Defence Procurement Policies Issues and Discussions

Post by asbchakri »

If that is the case why not the PM or RM do anything about it. Is it beyond their sphere of influence. I do not understand this, I've been hearing a lot about this bureaucracy issues, is it that difficult to keep them in line.
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Re: MoD: Defence Procurement Policies Issues and Discussions

Post by A Deshmukh »

year 2022 capex budget == 2021 and prior year orders.

on new orders there is only a smaller %age (15%?) of advance.

need to look at breakdown of navy budget. most likely large amounts earmarked for delivery of IAC-1 and scorpenes.
there will very few surprises in the budget.
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Re: MoD: Defence Procurement Policies Issues and Discussions

Post by souravB »

asbchakri wrote:If that is the case why not the PM or RM do anything about it. Is it beyond their sphere of influence. I do not understand this, I've been hearing a lot about this bureaucracy issues, is it that difficult to keep them in line.
As per my understanding, Ministers depend heavily on bureaucracy during their time in office. So they usually defer to the expertise of bureaucracy. That brings 'the problem' since the worker then is in a position to dictate what should be worked on & how.
In a perfect system, Policy formulation should reside with the elected & only execution should be done by the salaried. Elected bring SME with them to help formulate policy & executives are hands-off during that time.
But that doesn't happen in defense(at least) to my knowledge. Politicians keep SME in defense at an arms length due to legacy issues. There is no formal body like NITI AAYOG for defense or an industrial body which is in a position to lobby &/or guide yet.
Also there are certain tricks that executives have learned over time to keep the elected in line like selective leaking of documents, delaying passion projects of elected etc.

This is my limited understanding and would love to be fact checked by the gurus :lol:
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Re: MoD: Defence Procurement Policies Issues and Discussions

Post by nachiket »

asbchakri wrote:If that is the case why not the PM or RM do anything about it. Is it beyond their sphere of influence. I do not understand this, I've been hearing a lot about this bureaucracy issues, is it that difficult to keep them in line.
A wise man once said that the political opposition is only the opposition in exile. The Bureaucracy is the opposition in residence. Think of it as running a company where you are nominally the CEO but you have no say in the hiring of any of your employees and you have no authority to fire any of them for incompetence or non-performance. The most you can do is have someone transferred but their career will still be protected once they are out of your clutches. Listen to Nitin Gadkari's very revealing rant about his problems with NHAI and ministry officials. He straight up told people to their faces to avoid coming to the office because things work much faster and more smoothly when they are not "working". But he still couldn't fire them. And this is one of our more successful ministers who has actually managed to perform quite well.

That's not to say there aren't any good bureaucrats who work hard and take their job seriously. There certainly are. Problem is when you can't get rid of the bad apples and they tend to rise to the top the effect is disastrous. As an example of bad-apples rising to the top, here is a piece written by our former Defence Secretary: Link where he actually argues that we should go ahead with the Kamov deal despite the availability of the LUH because "India needs expertise in the manufacture of twin-engines helicopters". This after HAL has delivered hundreds of twin-engined Dhruvs to the armed forces. People like this head our MoD.
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Re: MoD: Defence Procurement Policies Issues and Discussions

Post by asbchakri »

I understand you cannot fire them, but guess the only thing they can do is transfer them them to a ministry other than one with national security at risk. But I agree with you that is not as easy :( .
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Re: MoD: Defence Procurement Policies Issues and Discussions

Post by jaysimha »

Ministry of Defence and SIDM jointly hosted a Budget Webinar on February 26, 2022 to discuss implementation of Budget announcements 2022-23 relating to Defence with stakeholders including industry, startups, academia, Public Sector undertakings, DRDO and the 3 Services. The Webinar was launched by Hon'ble Prime Minister with his inspirational words exhorted all stakeholders to work towards AtmaNirbhar Bharat in defence

1000 industry leaders and startup champions joined. Very valuable and thought through suggestions were made.

Hon'ble Raksha Mantri responded to some of the suggestions and made important announcements in his Valedictory address. These announcements addressed some of the issues raised by industry instantaneously.
A new era of Defence industry growth and opportunities!!
Image
As posted by Dr. Ajay Kumar, Def. Sec. MoD. GoI
on LinkedIN
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Re: MoD: Defence Procurement Policies Issues and Discussions

Post by Rakesh »

Indigenous weapons must to surprise adversaries: PM Modi
https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-ne ... 83033.html
25 Feb 2022
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Re: MoD: Defence Procurement Policies Issues and Discussions

Post by jaysimha »

Centre exceeds procurement target on indigenous defence products
Dalip Singh |Updated On: Apr 20, 2022
https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/ec ... 338606.ece
The preliminary expenditure report of March 2022 pointed out that it the ministry has been able to utilise 99.50 percent of the defence services budget in 2021-22
----------
https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1818229
----------------------
https://newsonair.com/2022/04/20/make-i ... nce-firms/
Image
which is this vehicle???????
What is the system on it????
is it inducted ???
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Re: MoD: Defence Procurement Policies Issues and Discussions

Post by ks_sachin »

jaysimha wrote:Centre exceeds procurement target on indigenous defence products
Dalip Singh |Updated On: Apr 20, 2022
https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/ec ... 338606.ece
The preliminary expenditure report of March 2022 pointed out that it the ministry has been able to utilise 99.50 percent of the defence services budget in 2021-22
which is this vehicle???????
What is the system on it????
is it inducted ???
Kalyani LSV mounted anti drone system

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Re: MoD: Defence Procurement Policies Issues and Discussions

Post by mody »

Having Successful Military Industrial Complex (MIC)
I have been meaning to write this for a long time, but never really got around to it.
I have been thinking for a while, as to why has India not been able to develop a robust and world class MIC, in over 70 years, even though we inherited some weapons manufacturing capability from the British and even though we setup so many OFB factories and defence PSUs.
I will break this down into two parts. Part 1 will be the enabling factors that are present in other countries that have developed a good MIC and Part II will try to look at current situation in India and the problems thereof.
First up a disclaimer, that I have no military experience nor belong to a military family. In fact belong to a typically gujju business class family and as far as I know, no one in my known family history has ever come close to wielding any kind of weapons.

Part – I The Enabling factors for establishing a robust MIC
If we look at all the countries that have been successful in establishing a robust MIC, there are a few common threads that emerge. The first is that the country should see the military as a means of enforcing its national will and as an integral part of its foreign policy. The military is a part of national government setup and an extension of its foreign policy. This is true in the case of all the countries that have a successful MIC.
Even in democratic countries like the US, the military is consulted and is in the loop in many foreign policy initiatives and retired military officials are part of fairly influential think tanks, which guide US policy.
Unfortunately in India, it is not so. The military has always been kept at an arm’s length by the government and forget foreign policy, the military has not always been consulted even in military matters by the government. I shall cite examples for the same below.
IFS officer’s opinions would probably count for more, than that of service chiefs as things stand in the Indian government.

Even export of weapons systems forms as integral part of foreign policy of all countries that have a good MIC. Even the testimony to the senate arms services and foreign relations committee in the US to justify any kind of arms sales under FMS route, routinely mentions that it will further America’s foreign policy objectives and improve foreign relations!!

While it’s true that for a lot of the western countries this came about due to colonialism, where the colonies were always governed by Politico-Military leaders rather than civilians.
The other factor is that even the political leadership in most countries with a strong MIC has much better understanding of military matters and many have served in the military in the past. While many countries have had the government/countries led by ex-military leaders (from Eisenhower, to Charles De Gaul and many more), others have had military leaders take up fairly important roles in the government, post retirement. In India, this has been completely missing. Few retired military officers, have joined politics and have joined the government, but almost none have been given roles in the core decision making of the government. Nor do think tanks etc., have the same kind of influence on government policy in India, as we see in some other countries.
The few times that India used its military to fulfil national objective and enforce the nations will were the police actions in Hyderabad and the liberation of Goa. However, both of these were internal actions.

As I said above, the military has hardly been consulted in foreign policy matters and many times have not been fully consulted even in Military matters.
In 1948, Nehru did not consult the military while declaring a ceasefire and referring the matter to the UN. After capturing Zo-ji la pass, the offensive wasn’t pursued into Baltistan, as Nehru was told by Sheikh Abdulla, that he did not have influence in that region and could not guarantee loyalty to India.
The case of 1962 is too well known and apart from the military not being consulted, it was systematically hampered.
In 1965 also, the military was not part of the ceasefire negotiations in Tashkent otherwise, we would not have agreed to give back the Haji Pir pass, which links Poonch and Uri and offers an alternative to the Banihal pass to connect Jammu and Kashmir. Even the military itself failed in this case, as Gen Choudhary was reportedly consulted by LBS before declaring ceasefire, however, the good general had no idea about the inventory situation of our ammunition and possible situation of Pakistan regarding the same. For an army chief in war time, this is down right shameful.
In 1999, the government declared that India would fight only in its own controlled territory and would not cross the LoC. I doubt the military was consulted before making this announcement and if it was consulted, its objections were set aside, even though this should have been a purely military issue.
We celebrate Kargil as a victory, but I am not so sure. What exactly did we win? We did not gain anything in the conflict. At least post mid June, the self imposed moratorium on not crossing the LoC should have been dropped and we should have captured territory as the pakis were retreating. An area at least 50 Kms due west of the Saltoro ridge and 10-15 Kms west/north west of Turtuk should have been captured. This would have solved the Siachen issue for us, something which Musharaf was trying to do and also ensure that Pakistan would not be able to do a repeat of Kargil in the future. Except as the consequence of our victory, all we got was that we now have to patrol and man the Kargil heights throughout the year and as a consolation Pakistan lost face internationally and a few hundred of its uniformed cannon fodder were killed. The pakis don’t care about either and Mush recovered from the international loss of face pretty quickly.

Even the Indian military leadership perhaps doesn’t understand this aspect of their role, as the Indian military officers under the British were simply supposed to follow orders and only be concerned with the military operations. Whereas the top British officers were always Politico-Military leaders, who were also supposed to be involved with the administration and governing of the colonies. Indian civilian leadership has had absolutely no idea about military matters.

In countries like the UK, where the role of the military in shaping the national foreign policy and its role in the government has declined, it has also coincided with the decline of its MIC.

The other major enabling factor is the importance of strategic autonomy and appreciation of the military and war in the national psyche. Unfortunately in India, in spite of our over 6,000 year history, the country has never really experienced war. I mean Total War, where the entire country is involved in the national war effort. The only instance in Indian history that I can think of, when the whole country was involved in the war effort, was perhaps during Ashoka’s Kalinga campaign.
Even during the supposed 17 invasions of Ghazni, scorched earth type tactics were never employed. The enemy did not have to bother about trying to maintain their supply chains from Afghanistan or central Asia all to way to India’s heart land.
Even during the Delhi massacres carried out by Timur, Ghori and Nadir Shah, when supposedly hundred thousand civilians were butchered in Delhi, shouldn’t we have been able to kill close to 10,000 of their soldiers at the same time? A 1:10 ratio, but for an invading army, it would have still been significant.
Even for our independence, we have only been told that it was our non-violence that won us the independence. The INA, the threat of mutiny by the Royal Indian Navy, if the surrendered INA soldiers were punished, played no part. For the British the supposed threat posed by the retired or released Indian soldiers posed an even bigger risk. At the end of the 2nd world war, the British Indian Army, numbered almost 2.5 million. A vast majority of these were then relieved from service, as the British could not afford to keep them on the payroll, nor was there a need for such a large army.
These soldiers were trained to fight with modern weapons and fight a modern war. Many of them even managed to retain their weapons. Some of these retired soldiers and ex-INA soldiers, played a significant part in the first Kashmir War, from the Pakistani side.
The British were apprehensive, that eventually these large number of retired soldiers, with not a whole lot of income, would blame the British for any future financial woes and may turn against them. A military mutiny post the 2nd world war, was something that Britain most certainly would not have been able to deal with. But, none of these factors are ever taught in our history.
We are simply told, that we kept turning the other cheek and our tormentor, finally just got tired of slapping us and left!!

Most other countries that have a successful MIC, have seen numerous wars, where the entire population is involved in the war effort and there is a much better understanding of and appreciation for strategic autonomy in these countries.
Even simple 1 line slogans like “Sevastopol Stand Strong” of “Keep Calm” still have resonance with the local populations even after so many years.
In countries like France, they do not mind spending large sums of money on defence R&D, just so that they can maintain their strategic and military autonomy. No politician or even the public will ever argue in France, that why not just buy similar or in some cases better weapons and in most cases perhaps at a cheaper price from allies like the US, rather than spending large amounts on their own MIC. It will simply not happen. Even if some politician were to come up with such an idea, the people simply would not support, even it means lower taxes or more government dole outs etc.

The case of Japan is even stronger. Notwithstanding their post war pacifist constitution and a formal military alliance with the US with guarantee of nuclear safety, they never stopped investing in their own MIC. Often times the weapon systems developed were never deployed or similar foreign systems were bought instead, yet, the R&D in critical technologies and weapons systems has never stopped. No politician will ever cut down this spending and let their MIC wither away. Even the people will stand fully behind this strategy. In fact I would not be surprised if Japan secretly even has an active R&D program on nuclear weapons and fully developed technology for the same. Strategic insurance.

During the 20th century cold war, every military breakthrough was celebrated in all of the respective countries. No caveats or disparaging comments would be made as how the system was still inferior to those developed by others or deliberate running down of the systems with references to length of time taken to develop the same or the amount spent on it etc.
In India even the media doesn’t know how to report on defence matters.

Without the above enabling factors it’s difficult to develop a truly world class MIC.
mody
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Re: MoD: Defence Procurement Policies Issues and Discussions

Post by mody »

PART – II Problems in the current MIC setup in India.
1). Separate R&D and production agencies. DRDO is the main R&D organization in India, whereas the actual production of the weapons systems is handled by different entities. This is a unique setup, not existing in any other country. Even in the old Soviet Union, which is the closest to our OFB-DPSU based MIC, the same design bureaus were responsible for the design, development and production of the systems. DRDO has often complained that they want to have the final say about which company will produce the system that has been developed. Upto now that has not been the case. Two projects though stand out in the current system. The ATAGS gun and the Shivalik multi-mode grenade. ATAGS is being developed with private partnership, where companies involved in the development, will also be producing the system. Shivalik on the other hand, was given to the private company Solar systems, in a competitive bidding. This is a huge breakthrough, as in the past, the system would have been passed on to an OFB, without any other options being available.
These two are the examples to follow and the production agency, be it private of PSU, should be involved in the development cycle right from the prototype stage for major weapon systems and for small systems, the model followed for the Shivalik grenade should be followed. In the later model, the quality control and quality and performance guarantees should also be considered and not just the price offered by the production company.

2). No ownership of the programs being taken by the defence services. Everywhere else in the world, it’s the military that is the real driver of weapons development. In India, it doesn’t seem to be the case. In most cases, the military has employed a hands off approach to weapons development and have not taken over the ownership of the programs.
There should be a formal position of Weapons Development Officer or a branch dedicated to weapons development in all the three services. A senior level officer should head this, with a tenure of at least 3 years. Dedicated officers should be assigned to be part of this branch and every major weapons program should have a dedicated officer assigned to it. Similar programs or programs of weapons systems all designed for similar purpose, could have a single officer, assigned to all of them. For example, all tactical air to ground weapons programs like NGARM, SAAW, PGHSLD, PG-Glide bombs etc. all could have a single officer monitoring the progress.
Likewise, for every other type weapons development from ship based armaments, ship and land based radars and sensors. Air based radars and sensors, EW and sensors, etc.

3). Long term planning, capability based requirement
Weapons development is a long term affair. Rome wasn’t built in a day and nor was any successful MIC, or individual weapons system. The country has to formulate a 10 year strategic plan, about the strategic challenges envisioned and capability that the military and the nation wants to acquire, to counter those challenges, as well as meet the objectives that the country wants to achieve.
The budget should also specify the amount being allocated for some of the major weapons development programs, if not in public document, then at least in the internal documents.
This would be similar to the system in the US, where a bi-partisan defence committee approves the budget for long running development programs. This way, even the politicians would not be able to kill the projects by slowing down the funding etc., without putting it on record.

All weapons development should be based on the capability that the country wants to have.
For example, Israel developed the Iron Dome system. No other country in the world, would use precision guided ammunition, to knock down cheap unguided short range rockets and mortar rounds. However, for Israel, these rockets are the most abundant weapons used by its adversary in the Gaza strip. If it can negate the effectiveness of these rockets, then it can sustain its operations against the militants in Gaza, for a much longer time. If the rockets would be taking a steady toll, on life and economy in Israel, then the military would always be under pressure to halt its actions. Hence, for them, even if the system is expensive, the development of the same made sense for the capability that it gives them.
For us the cross border firing on the LoC, has posed a challenge for a long time. However, there are no programs that specifically lay out the weapons and sensors that we want to develop, which will allow us to dominate any kind of exchange on the LoC. The aim should be that any local CO on the paki side would be shitting bricks, when he gets the order to violate the ceasefire and fire at Indian positions or try and provide cover fire for terrorists trying to infiltrate, because he would know the kind of retaliation that would come as a response.
The capability required and periodic strategic reviews, would also help us rationalize our inventory of older weapons systems and the approved holdings of the same.
An example would be the anti-personnel and anti-tank mines that we hold. The army has a sanctioned holding of literally hundreds of thousands of mines. Perhaps upto a million, all taken together. Do we really need so many? Storing all of these is regular expense and it takes a lot of effort to deploy and remove the mines in large numbers. Do we really need over 2,00,000 anti-tank mines anymore? Having a long term defence policy and periodic strategic reviews, will allow us to answer these types of questions.

The Navy has a program for 4 Landing Platform Docks (LPDs). These are supposed to be large, between 20K-30K ton vessels. What is the capability that we wish to have by procuring or building these. Keep in mind that the building and operating cost of such ships would be very high. Apart from the upfront construction cost, each of the ships is also envisioned to have 10-12 helicopters. This would mean also procuring upto 50 helicopters for the 4 ships. Such large ships would also require escort, just like CBGs. Hence we would need to dedicate some frigates and destroyers as escorts for these ships. 4 LPDs, along with the 4 LSTL ships that we have, would give us the capability to land a force of almost 2 brigades or 2 IBGs on a foreign shore. If we really want to have this capability, even the army would need to set aside two brigades, which would be tasked for this kind of role. We would have to carry out regular exercises of this force, for beach landing, capturing beachheads, setting up an air defence perimeter and then going further to capture whatever other objectives are envisioned. All of this would mean a large operational expense as well.
Now, unless we really envision capturing some island territories or landing our forces on the Makran cost to open a second front against the pakis or cutoff Baluchistan from Sindh or have the capacity to land 5-10 thousand troops somewhere in Africa or the Middle east, planning to acquire 4 LPDs does not really make any sense. Especially at a time, when we have many more pressing needs.

The capability required, can also be dictated by price considerations. Air to ground weapons like the JDAM, have been developed, keeping in the mind the cost factor. Cost can be a driver for weapons development. We have the Griffin-III and Paveway-2 kits with us. However, how many can be afford. Same with the Excalibur round. If the Army and Air force want to have the capability to hit a large number of targets using precision guided weapons or the Air force can have a vision, that over 10 years, between 50-80% of all its ammunition will be precision guided. This will obviously require lowering the cost of the system. A mandate can be given to say develop a replacement for Griffin-III kit, that will be almost just as effective, but cost about 50-60% of the imported system. For the same budget, the military would be able to afford twice the number of weapons.

4). Project planning, project management and understanding of critical technologies
The project planning and project management, are currently our weak points.
Most projects do not have any kind of set timelines. For some projects DRDO has given completely unrealistic timelines. For every major project, a definite project management team should be set up, comprising of the main development lead, the higher ups of the DRDO lab, under which the product is being developed, the military representative, the manager responsible for the eventual manufacture of the product, from the production company/agency and any other MoD official if required.
The critical technologies that are needed to develop the weapon system should first be identified as the successful development of these technologies would determine the success or failure of the system. Besides, identifying the technologies required and the roadmap to develop the same, will keep all the stake holders on the same page. Many a times it has happened that we have heard of tests carried out by DRDO, declared a success, but the military is far from convinced. Maybe the tests conducted were for developing some underlying critical technology. The system tested, would not look anywhere close to a deployable weapon system, but for the scientist involved, it would signal a critical breakthrough, whereas for the military, it would seem like just another science experiment.
Identifying the critical technologies that need to be developed and cannot be purchased by ToT, license manufacture or by any other means, also gives a better appreciation of the progress being made.
As an example, for a main battle tank, the armour, the main gun and associated ballistic computer, fire control software and ammunition and the mobility, are the three most crucial building blocks required. For modern composite armour, the technology is closely guarded and not shared even amongst allies. Likewise for the main gun. Russia did not part with the metallurgy of the T90 main gun, even though we had paid for the full ToT. We were already having the technology for the T72 main gun and had also developed our own for the Arjun!! Same with the source codes for the ballistic computer and the fire control software. Having developed these two most critical building blocks, required for any MBT, the country has to realize, that it has crossed the threshold required for fielding its own MBTs and there is no need for any more imports. Developing better ammunition for the gun and developing the mobility part of the equation are the only things required. Even for the mobility, a world class suspension system has been developed.
No amount of ToT or Strategic Partnership (SP, just new fancier name for ToT), is ever going to teach us how to design and develop or give us the critical technologies, which are required for any weapon system.
Another example would be the Ka-226T helicopters, as LUH. They are being planned under a SP model, with almost 200 to be procured. But, even for a such a large quantity, more than what Russia itself, will ever build, we will not get the coaxial main rotor tech, which is the most crucial piece of technology that Kamov can offer, as part of the technology transfer. Even for the ALH, even though we funded the development of the Shakti engine, we donot hold the IP for it, nor do we have the technology for the same. To develop another variant of the same for the LUH, we again had to pay a large amount.
So when the Navy argues that the NLUH project should be pursued through the SP model and it will somehow help develop the infrastructure for Helicopter development and production in India, it will not be the case. Building a 100 helicopters will not get us any new technologies. For helicopters, the main engine, the rotor design and the main gearbox are the critical building block technologies. Apart from the flight control software etc, offcourse. We have mastered all of these, except for the engine part. For any new program, we will still have to put in the hardwork, but atleast, we have the understanding and capability to develop the building blocks required and that the most crucial part.

The HTT-40 programs will do a whole lot more for the Aviation development in India, then any kind of ToT or SP project can ever do!!

Even the ATAGS program is an example. The gun being developed is world class and future proof and will give us one of the best guns in its class. Yet, we have hardly heard any good words about the program from any of the serving or retired military personnel. They say good things about the Dhanush project, even though only 114 have been ordered and they rave about the robustness and the low price of the Sharang, but now one talks about the successful development of a 25 litre chamber and very good other parts as well. The military has to understand and appreciate the critical technologies developed in the country.

Apart from this, as mentioned previously, the production company or the production agency, should be identified once the final prototype has been made and should be made an integral part of the development project. This will ease the eventual manufacturing process and help speed up the project.
Also, the numbers required have to be specified and should be known to all, once the project enters the LSP stage. This way it will not require 1 year or more for the price negotiations etc.
As an example, 2 squadrons of Akash missile were ordered, once it became ready. This at a time, when 28 squadrons of Pechora SAMS were in service and Akash had been in development for a long time. This is just unacceptable. The services should have specified the numbers required a long time back, once the developmental trials were almost over. Once the developmental trails are almost over the quantity required should be specified, so that by the time the user trails are over, the production company is ready with the entire cost calculation, along with the plan for any kind of capital expenditure required to start producing these systems.
The NAG missile project is another example of this. After 2 decades of development and even though the system is ready for production and deployment, the Army still does not know how many of these systems they require. Saying that the Army never had an analogous system in their inventory is a poor example. Also, everyone realized that the NAMICA wasn’t ready, only once the missile itself was almost ready for deployment. A completely unacceptable state of affairs.


5). Responsibility
Currently no one in the entire defence establishment in India, is held responsible for anything. Right down from the Raksha Mantri, to the MoD babus to service personnel to OFBs and DPSUs or DRDO.
This is just unheard off in any other country.
Even in the old Soviet Union, which had the closest structure to our OFB-DPSU-DRDO heavy structure, if a weapon system failed or proved to be a dud, the design bureau associated with it, would be held responsible and would loose political patronage, funding and worst still some of the main scientists involved might get demoted or transferred to some far off God forsaken place.
In India, no one from the OFB or DPSU has ever been held responsible for anything. The RM is also not held responsible for failure of any development project or failure of any procurement program or for anything else. Babus and other government officials are generally always insulated, except for some corruption charges.
Even the services are never held responsible for formulating unachievable requirements, due to brochuritis or simply pining for imports. DRDO officials and scientists are also not held to account for failures to deliver on promises and no technical audit is ever carried out over what was promised and what was achieved and if anyone was being dishonest in promising what they did. Accounts audit is carried out by CAG etc., but these do not paint the complete picture and even in this, no one is really punished or held accountable.
There are many examples. The 120 mm mortar is one example, where the services formulated requirements which were impossible meet, the DRDO yet decided to take it up and the MoD sanctioned the project. It was only after the Israeli’s said that the specs required were impossible to meet, that everyone realized their folly.
The case of Multi Caliber Rifle is another example. The project is perhaps no longer required, yet the research and the work on the same continues. The services that formulated the requirement do not want to admit that they made a mistake and that it is no longer required and that the project should be closed. The MoD babus that sanctioned the project, do not want to admit that it was a mistake and hence get castigated later for having been a part of wastage of tax payer money and the DRDO personnel working on the project, perhaps know it too, that it is not going to go anywhere, yet they are happy to continue with the project, as long as the allocated funds are flowing.
Everyone involved probably knows that the project is not going to go anywhere and that it will never be inducted.

6. An active and dedicated industrial espionage program.
All countries with a good MIC, also have a very active and dedicated espionage program, that tries to steal the best available defence technologies from around the world, even from friends and allies.
Even Israel spies on the US to try and steal technology. Unfortunately, we seem to be lacking in this. We have not been able to steal any significant breakthrough military technology (at least there is nothing known publically on this).

There are perhaps many more issues that I might have left out. Others can help and contribute.
S_Madhukar
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Re: MoD: Defence Procurement Policies Issues and Discussions

Post by S_Madhukar »

Great post modyji. Only thing I would add is at no point in our lives does defence or any martial activities come up. There is also this issue with us thinking defence and governance being delegated so our job as citizens is done.

Feels like in all our civil military interactions whether with US, UK, Soviet almost never have we learnt anything about institutional and societal approach from them.
It just boggles my mind.

We almost never learnt high science education and men and women equality from Soviets and professionalism from US. I sometimes feel all our civil and military brass needs to spend time in a professional services modern company be it IT services to actually learn these skills.

Also I think UK system is a bad influence at least in recent times, the bureaucracy and military leadership had been failing since WW2 if not WW1. We probably should have US style practical and academic rigour in training and that includes the whole MIC.

I am aware some our officers are trained at Sandhurst, Cranfield (supply chain and logistics) in UK. UK is terrible at procurement massive wastages and the education at these institutions seems to have not improved the big ticket wastages, I wonder what education we are getting at our end? These days UK imports a lot more hardware as part of NATO, not sure how self sufficient are they?
When our PM says Atmanirbhar it seems like an anachronism to our brass when globalisation seems to encourage imports and trade even in defence.

So either we are poor students or we are too clever and a half and end up screwing up big time. And like you said that big A of Accountability and not Accounts seems to lie no where and that’s a country political problem as well.
ramana
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Re: MoD: Defence Procurement Policies Issues and Discussions

Post by ramana »

Mody please write it as an article and can get it published!
Prem Kumar
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Re: MoD: Defence Procurement Policies Issues and Discussions

Post by Prem Kumar »

Well, some good news!

AoN for 28K Crores worth carbines, bullet-proof jackets, drones, Guided Pinaka, new area denial ammo, ICV Command vehicle, marine gas turbine for Navy and 14 fast attack craft!

Many of these are IDDM (ICV, Guided Pinaka, drones, area denial ammo, fast attack craft, BPJs etc). But some are license-production (under the Make-in-India garb) - I think the carbines are going to fall into that category & so will the marine gas turbine.

AoN is the first step - hope these will translate to orders in the near future

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ind ... 142590.cms
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