Operational Art or War Doctrine

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brar_w
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Re: Operational Art or War Doctrine

Post by brar_w »

With France it is also as much about maintaining the design and development comptencies across the A&D strategic areas that is very costly. To maintain those that have had to take a step back and pursue their own path which becomes very costly and requires other capabilities to be traded off to pay for it. The Rafale is a good recent example but many other smaller ones exist across its military programs. If it has a good strategic side it also has a negative economic one.
ramana
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Re: Operational Art or War Doctrine

Post by ramana »

Shiv, Thanks for posting as even UK got constrained by American art of war.

Something for India to ponder with all those four and five letter agreements US wants to push.


This is a problem because, Desportes insists, numbers matter and most conflicts require controlling space rather than simply locating and attacking the enemy. Controlling space requires “volume.” The result is a French military that can prevail in a battle but cannot win a war.
very insightful profound statement.

Operation Riddle in 1965 was not effective as there was not enough volume for Indian forces. I analyzed this in the 1965 war thread.

Same with Western front on 1971 war.
ramana
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Re: Operational Art or War Doctrine

Post by ramana »

Up.
ramana
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Re: Operational Art or War Doctrine

Post by ramana »

A very good assessment of the 1965 war by the commander Lt. Gen. Harbaksh Singh

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spot ... ns-learnt/

The Strategic Concept

Although we did succeed in whittling down PAK’s fighting potential, especially armour, and occupied chunks of her territory, most of our offensive actions, however, fizzled out into a series of stalemates without achieving any decisive results. With the exception of the HAJIPIR offensive, none of the remaining thrusts were pushed to a successful conclusion ..
Read more at:
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spot ... ns-learnt/
ramana
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Re: Operational Art or War Doctrine

Post by ramana »

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_War


I would like people to read about readiness of US troops in Korean War and compare to IA in 1962.


Looks like same peace dividend mindset.

Just like Nehru let Krishna Menon take the fall, Trueman let Johnson take the rap for US troops under equipment disaster.
RoyG
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Re: Operational Art or War Doctrine

Post by RoyG »

ramana wrote:Shiv, Thanks for posting as even UK got constrained by American art of war.

Something for India to ponder with all those four and five letter agreements US wants to push.


This is a problem because, Desportes insists, numbers matter and most conflicts require controlling space rather than simply locating and attacking the enemy. Controlling space requires “volume.” The result is a French military that can prevail in a battle but cannot win a war.
very insightful profound statement.

Operation Riddle in 1965 was not effective as there was not enough volume for Indian forces. I analyzed this in the 1965 war thread.

Same with Western front on 1971 war.
This is a transient phenomena. Unmanned weapons will fill the gap. Their security situation is also very diff from ours. France is among the best.
nam
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Re: Operational Art or War Doctrine

Post by nam »

Posters,

World World 1 on a week by week basis. Phenomenal series,I promise, you will be hooked.The series started in 2014, every week telling story about the progress of the war in that week! You need to see this to understand the scale of a conflict.



Full List: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6FgaL0x ... w3KxuKsMvT




Trivia's: WW1 started on death of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. He was not the cause,because he was the stumbling block for the war. He was dead against starting the war!

Ottoman empire forces were routinely defeated by one force in the Middle East. British Indian Army! In case you are wondering on what problem Turkey may have with us..

French lost close to 27,000 troops on a SINGLE DAY at their first major engagement with the Germans. They were riding their horses in bright uniform towards German machine guns!
manjgu
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Re: Operational Art or War Doctrine

Post by manjgu »

ok...so what i learnt on the 1962 war from the briefing... PLA was a well drilled, competent force..not a rag tag militia.. all aspects of military operations was well thought out..intelligence, logistics, training etc. they concentrated their forces in few areas .. the indians were strung out in penny packets along the border often manning posts which did not make military sense ( in terms of their definsibility, visibility, access etc). The most famous of all posts Dhola was sited poorly at the bottom of a valley... The chinese attacked in force with accompnying artillery to soften up targets before attack and the attacks were carried thru with vigour/force. The logistics of IA was v poor and all was done in haste... IAF tried to help with logistics but was a very poor effort.. overall poor planning at all levels and only the bravery of men and junior officers saved some pride. the officer giving the briefing showed the movement of chineses on a bigggg map pinned on the wall ... as i said in my previous mails the chinese was said to be 7 feet tall ... they did not shy away from attacking what they considered of importance. the enemy numbers were grossly exaggerated often to hide our own shortcomings... attacking uphill requires lot of manpower and the chinese understood the numbers required. IA was mostly engaged in defensive action with individual acts of courage/bravery...but overall total loss of command and control.
ramana
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Re: Operational Art or War Doctrine

Post by ramana »

A dated article but useful to understand unfolding events:

OODA and You
ramana
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Re: Operational Art or War Doctrine

Post by ramana »

I found an interesting article about force ratios, technology, and asymmetry and application of Lanchester equations:
You can get a link if you do some keyword search.
Asymmetric Warfare: A Primer
The armed forces of United States are the most capable military ever assembled. Are they designed, however, to handle a determined insurgency?
By Charles A. "Bert" Fowler


Englishman Frederick W. Lanchester (1868-1946) was a major contributor to the foundation of automotive and aeronautical engineering. He also published works on radio, acoustics, warfare, and even relativity. His equations of combat form the basis of the science of operations research. (These equations have been used to formulate business strategy in recent times.) He was the first to describe the aeronautics of lift and drag. His automobile inventions include the gas engine starter, rack-and-pinion steering, disk brakes, four-wheel drive, and fuel injection.
In his historic 1916 paper "Mathematics in Warfare," Lanchester presents two simple differential equations relating force attrition to the number of forces or weapons in opposition and to their effectiveness (see sidebar "Lanchester's Equations"). The equations' solutions show that the effectiveness of a force is directly proportional to the effectiveness of its weapons and to the square of its numbers. The following table illustrates how Lanchester's equations would apply in a classic artillery duel:

The Lanchester Exchange: Artillery Duel

The table shows 200 weapons arrayed against 100 weapons with equal kill probabilities (Pk) of 10 percent. In the first round, Orange kills 20 Blues, and Blue kills 10 Oranges--leaving 190 Oranges to kill 19 of the remaining 80 Blues, while the Blues kill 8 Oranges in the second round. At the end of the sixth round, all the Blues are gone and 168 Oranges (84 percent) remain.

Note that each side engages only the remaining live targets. If neither side can tell when it has killed a target, as in some artillery duels, both sides must continue to shoot at all the targets, thereby wasting part of their efforts. Lanchester analyzed this problem also and showed that the impact of numbers is a linear not square law.

Bob Everett, former president of The MITRE Corp., noted that that was reasonable, because in the square-law example, "you get one power from the number of weapons shooting at the other side and the other power from the reduced number of targets you have to shoot at."

The advantage of telling dead from live targets is one of the reasons that artillery forces use spotters and counter-battery radar and that air forces use bomb-damage assessment after air attacks.


(Please see, " " for a graphic representation of the difference in attrition.)

Of course, wars aren't fought in accordance with mathematical equations, and there are many other important factors, including leadership, discipline, morale, training, and health. Nevertheless, analysis of battles between conventional forces over the years has supported the thrust of Lanchester's Law: numbers do make a huge difference.

In the 1985 book Race to the Swift, British military analyst Richard E. Simpkin notes that "for a conflict between two large, sophisticated mechanized forces, one did not go far wrong with a '1.5 law'--a halfway house between Lanchester's two cases."

Lanchester's paper appears in Volume 4 of mathematician James Newman's delightful The World of Mathematics collection. (Incidentally, to give you some feeling of what Newman thinks of our profession, he writes in his commentary on Lanchester, "His writings on these matters, apart from high professional competence, exhibit such striking independence of judgment and boldness of conception that it is surprising to learn he was an engineer." Oh, well.)

Lanchester and the Cold War

During the Cold War, in the strategic nuclear area, the United States wisely opted for parity in numbers and, generally, some superiority in weapons capability. However, in the tactical arena, the United States took a different approach. The Warsaw Pact nations had overwhelming numerical superiority in almost all categories of conventional forces--infantry, tanks, artillery, tactical aircraft, and so on--ranging from 2:1 to 5:1. NATO based its counter to such numbers on a substantial conventional force plus tactical nuclear weapons. The plan called for 15 000 nuclear weapons: artillery shells, warheads for surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles (SSMs and SAMs), and nuclear bombs for tactical aircraft. Although most of the weapons were fabricated--deployment to Europe was limited to about 7000--the threat of their use effectively countered any Warsaw Pact offensive capability for more than two decades.

Overall, one ruefully concludes that it is unlikely there is a military or a military-technical solution to the low-tech asymmetric warfare in Iraq.

However, over time, similar advances by the Soviets overtook that "solution," and there were concerns about crossing the nuclear threshold and triggering strategic exchanges. Therefore, NATO began considering a conventional solution to the numerical disparity.

In the mid-1970s, as the United States started to rebound from the Vietnam War, key analyses by BDM International (a defense consulting and research firm) and Martin Marietta prompted the U.S. Department of Defense to readdress the conventional-force imbalance. One effort was a Defense Science Board (DSB) study in 1976 titled "Conventional Counters to a Pact Attack." The charge was to see what technology could do to help counter the numerical discrepancy.

Early in the study, one of the board members, MITRE's Ed Key, pointed out the relevance of Lanchester's Law, and it became a major theme of the study. The first conclusion of the DSB study noted the importance of a surveillance system that could provide NATO forces an accurate and timely picture of enemy force distribution with an appropriate command, control, and communications (C3) structure, which together would allow commanders to achieve, in some cases, local numerical superiority and, in others, to avoid local numerical inferiority.

A second thrust was to seek systems for asymmetrical engagements whose effectiveness would be sufficiently great to overcome numerical square-law advantages. Because, for example, it would be nearly impossible to make NATO tanks nine times as good as Warsaw Pact tanks to overcome the 3:1 numerical advantage, other means of effectively attacking tanks, whereby the tank had essentially zero capability against the attacker, were sought. Several promising approaches were identified and many more were conceived by the Defense Department and vigorously pursued.

The thrust of asymmetrical engagements is to avoid force against a numerically superior similar force until the enemy force has been substantially weakened. The combination of those capabilities led to the term "force multiplier," which rapidly became a buzzword in the military community.

The third finding of the DSB study was: if good surveillance and C3 were good for NATO, then countering or disrupting Warsaw Pact surveillance and C3 would be bad for the enemy. The Defense Department launched a substantial C3 countermeasures (C3CM) effort, and the term "force divider" was born. C3CM is yet another form of asymmetric engagement.

By the late 1970s, Defense Department speeches were awash with Lanchester. To rephrase an old maxim: You couldn't throw an empty beer bottle through a window without hitting some major giving a talk on Lanchester's equations.

Lanchester and the Gulf War

Meanwhile, throughout the last half of the 1970s and through the 1980s, Bill Perry, then Defense Department undersecretary for research and engineering, and his successors concentrated on developing a set of capabilities that would reduce the Warsaw Pact's numerical advantages. Developments included better platforms (such as the M-1 tank), systems for vastly reducing the effectiveness of some enemy systems (such as stealth aircraft and C3CM approaches), and systems for greatly improved surveillance, C3, and asymmetric engagements.

Although, happily, war with the Warsaw Pact alliance was avoided, the success and broad applicability of U.S. efforts were demonstrated by the rapidity and completeness of the 1991 Persian Gulf War victory.

Here are two interesting examples:

1. Opening attacks by Tomahawk cruise missiles and stealth aircraft crippled the Iraqi C3 system. Those attacks were followed by air-launched anti-radiation missiles to finish off the high-altitude SAMs, which allowed U.S. tactical aircraft to operate with relative impunity above the coverage of short-range infrared missiles and "plink" enemy tanks and artillery with laser-guided bombs.
2. Before completing its encirclement, the famous deceptive "left hook" was apparently discovered, and an Iraqi force attempted to move into a blocking position. This movement was detected by the JointSTARS aircraft, which uses a special radar to detect and track moving ground vehicles.

In discussing the lopsided outcome of the Gulf War, Perry compared it to a basketball game that ended 100-1. Could the winning team have shot that much better or rebounded, defended, and passed that much better? No, the team that lost was blindfolded, and the team that won had perfect vision.

The war's Desert Storm operation was unquestionably one of the most studied of all time. Many groups and nations analyzed it. India, for example, produced a five-volume report. :eek: :eek: :eek:

The principal conclusion was that U.S. capabilities in conventional tactical wars were so great and represented such a sizable investment that no sensible nation would challenge the United States in a direct conventional war, provided it retained such capabilities. Suggested countermeasures were generally in two categories: high tech and low tech.

High Tech: Nearly all studies noted that the overwhelming U.S. capabilities depended on large air bases and logistic supply centers near the war zone. The high-tech counter would be to make such facilities dangerous to use. Such a counter would provide, much as the newer U.S. capabilities have, huge leverage and represent a significant asymmetric engagement capability.

{Origin of A2AD strategy by China. Hypersonics etc for 1200 nm stay out zone.}

Low Tech: It was also noted that, whereas in past battles between conventional forces the relative size and capabilities of the forces played a dominant role, there have been many cases where one side with grossly inadequate conventional forces, or none at all, adopted tactics that offset conventional capabilities. The difficulties the U.S. military had in the Vietnam War were especially noted and, thus, the low-tech counters suggested were forms of guerrilla warfare, including urban and jungle operations. Such low-tech counters largely avoid traditional battles and, therefore, thwart the effectiveness of most modern military capabilities. In addition, without conventional engagements, neither Lanchester nor its counters apply.

In the 1990s, the United States continued developing advanced asymmetric engagement capabilities, including greatly improved surveillance, situation awareness, and Global Positioning System (GPS)-guided weapons. Meanwhile, several nations, drawing on the lessons learned from Desert Storm, pursued the high-tech counter. Iran, North Korea, Syria, India, and Pakistan developed longer range, more accurate ballistic missiles that would allow them to put any nearby bases at risk and, thus, attenuate or deny U.S. capabilities.

For example, the Iranian Shahab-3 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), with a 1-ton warhead and a range of 1200 miles, can cover the entire Arabian Peninsula and more. Such a weapon, even with a conventional warhead, could create serious problems for the United States. With a WMD warhead, the situation probably would be untenable. The Shahab-3 is a derivative of the North Korean Nodong missile. Clearly, the deterrent value of IRBMs is greatly increased if they have nuclear warheads--which probably accounts for the priority efforts by Iran and North Korea to develop such missiles.

The military value of the further enhanced U.S. capabilities was demonstrated during the rapid defeat in 2002 and 2003 of Afghan and Iraqi forces using conventional combat.

After rapidly defeating the Iraqi military and toppling its dictator, the United States set about rebuilding the country and creating a democratic form of government. However, the U.S.-organized coalition has faced a serious insurgency problem in Iraq (and, to some extent, in Afghanistan). By adopting the low-tech lessons learned from the first Iraq war, the insurgents have resorted to an extreme form of asymmetry, the tactics of terrorism.

(Note: The use of terrorism by Islamic extremists is now frequently referred to as "asymmetric warfare.")

Lanchester and the Iraq War

The United States finds itself, once again, in a situation where its superb military capabilities are largely ineffective. The U.S. military is, in a sense, now on the other side of the Lanchester equation. As in Vietnam, it has great numerical superiority over its enemy but has yet to find effective ways to deal with low-tech counters.

Lanchester's Law deals with the forces engaged. By choosing the time, place, and type of action, the insurgents can achieve a huge asymmetric advantage and even, in some cases, local numerical superiority. An improvised explosive device (IED) can be covertly planted by a few people and later remotely detonated by a single, hidden individual. The insurgents can organize an attack or ambush on a small number of our troops where they have numerical advantage.
At this point, we've stretched Lanchester well beyond its applicability. A colleague has noted that Lanchester applies to armies fighting according to Marquis of Queensberry rules, something guerrillas and terrorists don't do.

The problem for the conventional force is finding and identifying someone to fight. The only way greater numbers help is that more troops can search more areas and monitor more streets, buildings, and borders. The problem is made even more difficult because the insurgents are not necessarily trying to win a battle. (After all, in Vietnam, U.S. forces decisively won nearly all the military battles.)

There's an old saying, "To a man with a hammer, everything looks like a nail." History suggests this additional version: "To the leaders of a nation with an overwhelmingly powerful military, every problem looks like it has a military solution."
Clearly, though, current U.S. military capabilities, overwhelming as they are, have not allowed the United States to squelch the insurgency.

Here's another "hammer-nail" observation: "To a nation with a superb technology base, every problem, including military ones, looks like it has a technology solution." The United States, as it has frequently done, has turned to technology to provide solutions. The record is mixed.

Technology and Asymmetry

World War II was the first time the United States organized the national scientific community to aid in the war effort. President Franklin D. Roosevelt approved establishment of the National Defense Research Committee and the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD). Directed by Vannevar Bush of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the OSRD created scientific centers to address major military issues. Each had civilian leadership and near total freedom from federal government interference. The largest were the MIT Radiation Lab, which developed nearly all the U.S. microwave radars; the Harvard Radio Research Lab, which developed intercept and jamming systems; and the Manhattan Project, which developed the atomic bomb.

Each of those organizations had a close, constructive working relationship with the uniformed military, and the use of technology to address military problems worked magnificently. After World War II, a strong coupling continued between the Defense Department and the scientific community at the Los Alamos, Sandia, and Lawrence Livermore labs. With strong emphasis on the strategic area, including continental air defense, conventional forces had about zero technical attention until the Vietnam War.

During the Vietnam War, in spite of overwhelming superiority in conventional military capability, the United States was unable to figure out how to deal with the enemy's guerrilla warfare other than using nuclear weapons or invading North Vietnam. (In retrospect, it seems clear that neither approach would have achieved a favorable long-term outcome for the United States.)

The U.S. military fielded many new systems in Vietnam, including "people sniffers," quiet airplanes, portable combat surveillance radars, infrared imaging detectors, and a system designed to interdict the flow of supplies down the Ho Chi Min Trail from North Vietnam to the Viet Cong in the south, the so-called McNamara Line. (The McNamara Line is worth further comment, because the approach, as implemented, made the common error of ignoring "feedback"--that is the reaction of those affected to changed circumstances.)

The basic idea for the interdiction system came from JASON, a group of largely academic scientists who address various difficult Defense Department problems--usually during a lengthy summer study. The system consisted of many acoustic and seismic sensing devices planted along the trail to detect people and vehicles; a comprehensive communications network tying everything together; and a large, computer-based control station in Thailand to analyze the sensor inputs and to control air strikes against the movers.

After the United States created and deployed the large, creative system and devoted thousands of air sorties as part of the operation, sufficient supplies continued to flow to the Viet Cong. In spite of its massive technology effort, the United States continued to suffer casualties and made little, if any, progress in winning the war. (It should be noted, though, that those technology efforts resulted in a number of significant additions to U.S. conventional capabilities, such as infrared detectors for night operations, laser-guided bombs, unattended ground sensors, and gunships.)

One can't help but be struck by the disturbing similarity to the U.S. drug interdiction program, where in spite of massive expenditures of resources, the street price has remained relatively constant.

Lanchester and Low Technology

In the case of the Ho Chi Min Trail supply system, the enemy mustered enough redundancy and slack to meet demand in spite of the Americans' best efforts to counter it.

Both the Ho Chi Min Trail and the illegal drug supply system designs include enough redundancy and slack to meet demand in spite of the best efforts to counter them. Moreover, neither technology nor major military or similar efforts have provided a satisfactory solution to the problem. In many ways, dealing with insurgents in Iraq is similar. There are many different situations, circumstances, and times where terrorism can be employed. The place, time, and type of action are decided by the insurgents, who are not trying to win battles, just the "war," and their timescale is very long.

When IEDs and suicide bombers began showing up, the United States brought its vast technological and intelligence resources to bear. There is a major effort by industry, not-for-profits, government labs, and the entire intelligence apparatus to counter the threats and to track down the insurgents and their leaders.

Many clever devices, techniques, and systems have been developed and fielded, and a number of isolated successes have been achieved. Although the efforts have helped and other devices and systems are likely to be deployed and to help, the United States remains a long way from solving the problem. As with the Viet Cong, the insurgents have an almost endless variety of options.

It turns out that having a great technological capability and relying on it may be a disadvantage. I recently ran across T.E. Lawrence's Principles of Insurgency. Each is pungent and seemingly applicable to Iraq, especially the second and fourth ones:

1. A successful guerrilla movement must have an unassailable base.
2. The guerrilla must have a technologically sophisticated enemy.
3. The enemy must be sufficiently weak in numbers so as to be unable to occupy the disputed territory in depth with a system of interlocking fortified posts.
4. The guerrilla must have at least the passive support of the populace, if not its full involvement.
5. The irregular force must have the fundamental qualities of speed, endurance, presence, and logistical independence.
6. The irregular must be sufficiently advanced in weaponry to strike at the enemy's logistics and signals vulnerabilities.

On reading the rules, one can't help but wish someone in authority had studied them prior to the invasion decision.

Summary

Let's recap. Starting in the mid-1970s, the United States turned its attention to countering the Warsaw Pact's substantial numerical superiority in conventional weapons, principally through the use of advanced technology. The U.S. effort, which continued throughout the 1990s, resulted in the creation of many important military capabilities.
By the end of the century, those capabilities--supplemented by an emphasis on excellent training facilities and programs involving many exercises--produced the most capable military force ever assembled. It was a force that rapidly defeated a major Iraqi force and a scattered Taliban force with minimal U.S. losses. However, it is designed to fight against other military forces; it is neither designed for nor capable of countering a determined insurgency.
Overall, one ruefully concludes that it is unlikely there is a military or a military-technical solution to the low-tech asymmetric warfare in Iraq.
That is not to say that technology won't play a part in homeland defense. It will and should play an important role.
And then there is the broader issue of worldwide Islamic violence, which some have also called asymmetric warfare or, as a British analyst said after the London subway tragedies, a "revolution in the nature of conflict." Here, also, it would seem that the eventual solutions will lie outside the military and military-technical realms.
And please see how India is tackling the TSP jihad (asymmetric warfare) in Kashmir and further into India on multiple fronts: jihad, counterfeit currency, Mumbai criminal network, Opposition political influence, Kandle Kissers, Urban Naxals.
chetak
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Re: Operational Art or War Doctrine

Post by chetak »

This is a dated document but it still has intrinsic value in the study and conceptualization of Operational Art and of Operational level of war

As it should, the 1998 FM 100-5 draft folds the concepts of war and operations other than war (OOTW) into one - Operations.

In the earlier versions of this field manual, they were seen and treated as separate.

A lot of the paki planners and senior army officers have been trained at the US army and other training facilities, as part of their higher command, leadership and staff courses.

One wonders who has fed off who during the course of such training and how have their jehadi policies been affected and optimized as a result.

One sees much of the american special forces operations in afghanistan, iraq, syria and other places as essentially jehadi in nature and the integration of drone operations into this mix only adds an additional technological dimension that raises the level of jehadi operations to a higher level by bringing in the fruits of innovation to enhance an older concept.


The New FM 100-5: A return to Operational Art

Abstract : The purpose of this monograph is to examine the development of the 1998 FM 100-5. The primary research question is: Do the changes proposed in the coordinating draft of the 1998 FM 100-5 mark a return to the concept of operational art? This monograph concludes that the 1998 FM 100-5 marks a return to operational art. A doctrinal overview section examines the development of U.S. Army doctrine over the last twenty years. The strategic outlook of the 1993 FM 100-5 marked a departure from an operational focus that the Army had nurtured over the previous decade. The result of this overview is that it shows key changes (characteristics) in the 1986,1993 and 1998 FM 100-S's. A section on operational art addresses its development and introduces Dr. Jim Schneider's eight attributes of operational art. From these eight attributes, three features of operational art are distilled and presented - size balance, and comprehensiveness. These three features of operational art provide the methodology with which to examine the characteristics of the 1986,1993, and 1998 doctrine. The methodology demonstrates that the 1998 FM 100-5 better meets the features of size, balance, and comprehensiveness.
chetak
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Re: Operational Art or War Doctrine

Post by chetak »

An older version of the US Army Field manual FM 100-5

FM 100-5 Operations (1993)
chetak
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Re: Operational Art or War Doctrine

Post by chetak »

Operational Art in the Indian Context

Operational Art in the Indian Context

Author: Lieutenant General VK Kapoor, PVSM (Retd)

Period: October 2003 - December 2003


Operational Art in the Indian Context

Lieutenant General VK Kapoor, PVSM (Retd)

Introduction

A war fighting doctrine evolved by any nation is an outcome of an assessment of factors such as the historical experience of the nation, shape and contours of future wars and the anticipated battlefield environment. This belief and conviction of the current leadership of how military forces are to be employed in support of national objectives serves as a reference, a guide to senior military commanders in the field to formulate strategies for each operational situation confronted. The doctrine gets reinforced with every successful endeavor but if the effort ends in a failure then the doctrine would have to be modified.

Such assessments along with detailed research, for over a decade, drove the US Armed Forces to adopt the doctrine of Airland Battle, which was successfully employed, with modifications in both the Gulf Wars and in Afghanistan. In their case technology was the major driving force behind their doctrine. Indian Armed Forces are also conscious of the requirement of adopting a more dynamic approach to wars in the future and are seeking a synergetic tri-service approach at the operational and military strategic levels. This mandates a study of operational art, in our context, to examine the method of war fighting that we need to adopt in the future.

Scope and Importance of Operational Art

The importance of operational art lies in the fact that operational level of warfare, being the intermediary level, acts as a bridge to join policy and strategy on one end with tactical employment of forces on the other end. Hence a commander exercising operational art has to be well versed in all three levels of warfare and consequently it demands maximum skills from a commander who is selected to exercise command at this level. While strategy is not concerned with actual fighting, operational art and tactics are. Tactical results are useful only as a part of the larger design framed by strategy and arranged, organised, coordinated, stage-managed and masterminded by operational art. It is a fact of history that by themselves factors such as superior technology, superior numbers and tactical brilliance are insufficient to achieve ultimate success in war. A sound strategy and operational excellence are the hallmarks of mature nations and leaders who understand the art of war and mistakes in these spheres cannot be easily corrected. In fact strategic mistakes live forever. Yet for all its well documented and proven importance in winning wars decisively with least cost to own side, operational art continues to be disregarded by our military experts. The basic reason is the lack of adequate awareness about the subject within the armed forces.

Definition and Elucidation

Terms need to be defined and elucidated to share a common perspective of the subject. Essentials are:-

(a)
Operational art is the employment of military forces (tri-service in our context) to achieve strategic goals in a theatre of operations or a theatre of war through a unique contextual design, organisation and conduct of operations.

(b)
The intermediate level of warfare (called operational level), which connects strategy and tactics.

(c)
When we use the term “operational art” for the intermediate level of war, it means that there is creativity in operational planning at this level, which requires an exclusive method (sequence) to be followed and some norms to be observed. This are elucidated as under :-

(i)
Political aims set forth by political leadership are converted to military strategic aims and objectives through a regressive planning method and the art lies in designing an operational framework to achieve the laid down strategic objectives most skillfully.

(ii)
A new, unique and creative operational design is conceived for every situation confronted so as to achieve the military strategic goals with maximum efficiency and with least cost to own side.

(iii)
Economy of effort is inherent and integral to the term.

(iv)
The concept involves a tri-service approach to an emerging/existing operational problem and therefore advocates integration of all elements functioning in a theatre under a single commander.

(v)
Conduct of campaigns (major operations), their sequence, methodology and procedures, are contextually and jointly evolved. Senior officers need to learn the method of integrated operational planning within the military strategic framework evolved at the level of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) in our context, based on a joint tri-service doctrine of war fighting (non existent at present).

(vi)
The entire operation is thought through to its terminal state (end state) so that all possible contingencies that may arise are catered for including likely enemy reactions and our counter reactions for each contingency.



The minimum level at which this concept can be applied, in our context, is that of a Command (Integrated Theatre).

Why Should We Study Operational Art?

The reasons, which necessitate the study of operational art contextually, are numerous and these need to be understood in a wider operational perspective, in the backdrop of the strategic framework of the higher defence planning, so as to grasp the method of application of operational art in future conflicts.

Our traditional methods have favoured deliberate, set piece military operations, which are attrition oriented and hence tactically biased. These have inevitably resulted in high cost and causalities to own side with limited gains. The 1971 war with Pakistan in the eastern theatre was undoubtedly an outstanding military victory. But this was made possible due to favourable strategic factors like geography, air supremacy, people’s support (in erstwhile East Pakistan) and poor enemy morale, whereby we could afford to take risks in our operational conduct. In the same war, in the western theatre, due to our proclivity for more traditional methods, the story was different and the operations remained deadlocked. Moreover we have, in the past, allowed historical experiences to create pre-conceptions in our minds about the nature of wars, leading to formulation of tactically biased operational plans resulting in stalemates. Unless we breakaway from the past methodology of planning and conduct of wars, our achievements will remain mediocre.

The enlarged spectrum of conflict of conventional war with nuclear back drop on one end and terrorism and insurgency on the other and the need to apply the multi-dimensional aspects of war (such as psychological warfare, information warfare and strategic and operational level deception) to win decisively, in a short time frame, necessitates the formulation of a new methodology of planning and conduct of wars – a doctrine based on contextually relevant principles in the future.

Nuclear backdrop, a reality in our context, infers certain concerns for the Armed Forces. The first is the strong possibility of international pressure to prevent a war in the region and if it does take place then to limit it to a short duration implying that if we wish to go to war, our political and military leadership will have to be very clear on what we wish to achieve by waging a conflict. Attempts to fight attritional battles, over territory per se are likely to result in stalemates and heavy causalities. The second aspect concerns the overall operational design evolved to fulfill the political aims of war. This operational framework must enable us to achieve the strategic objectives, in a short time frame and yet not cause escalation beyond the conventional realm. This means that the political aims and military objectives of war are carefully calibrated and our senior military commanders are clear, confident and convinced regarding the doctrine of war fighting, which should be adopted for the future. The basic tenets adopted must also guide us in re-shaping our organisations and force structures for the future. These issues need to be debated, discussed and war-gamed at strategic and operational levels so that our political and military leaders fully comprehend the constraints under which they would be required to function in the future.

Another concern is about the procedure to be adopted when an adversary adopts nuclear brinkmanship as a strategy. Operational level commanders (Army Commanders and equivalents) must be aware of the implications of their operational decisions on the overall war effort and the likely reactions of the opponent and our counter reactions and hence have to be part of the strategic decision making process including nuclear response. Unawareness and innocence of the strategic realm can lead to operational embarrassments and even disasters.

The next motive for the study is the rapid advances in technology in recent times. Historically there are countless examples to illustrate that technology is one of the principle factors that drives the change in the method of fighting and we are facing an entirely new technology era but have not been able to evolve a suitable joint doctrine for the Armed Forces. Moreover higher technology confers the advantage of being able to hit almost anywhere, which requires even lower tactical level commanders to understand the operational and strategic level implications of their actions. This also demands a re-look at the training of our military leaders.

Economy of force and effort is fundamental to the art of war and without economy there is no art in warfare. With increasing costs, likelihood of proliferation and increasing consciousness in the society of the essential wastefulness of warfare, we must devise ways by which these age old principles of warfare are applied more dynamically. Hence joint operations must give way to integrated operations of the three Services. Moreover as we move towards greater development, the value of human life will keep increasing. Our nation and our people will not accept unnecessary casualties, in war, in the future. Kargil controversy refuses to die down despite logic and reasoning. With technology showing the way, we should learn to win wars with the least human cost. In the past wars have been fought with pervasive ignorance on all sides and ignorance brings forth waste and imprecision. But the current and future technology era could eradicate this flaw if we learn to integrate technologies, which help us fight with greater precision.

Professional competence is a key attribute of a military leader and operational art demands the maximum skills from a military professional because it requires of him to be equally competent in all three levels of war i.e., strategic, operational and tactical. All military officers who aspire for higher ranks must study and understand operational art as an important ingredient of the art of war. This is, currently, a weak area of training in all three Services. Moreover an over centralised command and staff culture prevails in our military, which inhibits and prevents mental and intellectual growth and maturity. This calls for a change of culture in the Armed Forces.

Wars are fought for a purpose and the political leadership provides this- as Clausewitz stated, “War is an extension of politics by other means”. The Indian way of going to war must be studied and formalised. The regressive planning procedure of evolving a political aim at the level of the National Security Council/ Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), and converting it to military aims and objectives at the level of COSC and the system of issuance of directives/instructions from the highest strategic bodies to the lower tactical formations must be formalised as a part of the joint operational methodology. At the tactical level, all weapons, Arms and Services are combined in the fighting organisations so as to achieve complementarities and fulfill all relevant principles of war. The aim at this level is to make the enemy react in order to exploit his reaction. This dynamic at the operational level needs to be studied where the tools are different. Operational war fighting involves integrated operations where we must strive for integration of land, air and naval capabilities. This process requires organisation of a national command post and integrated theatres. We also require national and military war-gaming centres, where national strategic, military strategic and operational level war games based on various types of settings are conducted. This will give us the necessary experience and expertise at higher levels to face future contingencies. There is no wisdom in the current inertia and inaction.

Our respective commands are not even co-located and below that the tactical formations are in a stand-alone mode. In the 21st century, our Armed Forces are still planning for conflicts, Service wise, essentially, the way it was done in World War II. We have not even begun our journey for integrated warfare in the 21st century.

Theoretical Foundation

All operational systems must be developed from a sound theoretic basis so that all commanders concerned understand its operational logic and the mutual confidence between commanders at higher and lower levels remains undisturbed, while there is a universal commitment towards the operational aim (strategic goal), which gives adequate freedom to the subordinate commanders to exercise their initiative.2 The criteria are:-


(a)
Cognitive Tension. This reflects the contradiction and conflict between general orientation towards the strategic aim, which is given out in abstract terms, and the specific nature of a tactical mission. This polarisation between the abstract and the specific must be present.

(b)
Manoeuvre. It must be based on an operational level manoeuvre, expressing the dynamic interaction between the various elements within the system as well the relationship between the general action and the strategic aim.

(c)
Synergy. The planned action at operational level must be thoroughly synergetic and should yield a product greater than the linear arithmetic sum of its components and achievements. Moreover, in order to be regarded as operational, the act must reflect the notion of synthesis, through combined arms combat at tactical levels and amalgamation of various forms of warfare and integration of all forces (tri-service) and formations within a geographical area.

(d)
Disruption and Not Destruction. Whereas at the tactical level the action of destruction is accepted, an operational action should aim for disruption of its opponents systems as destruction would inevitably lead to attritional warfare.

(e)
Contemplative Attitude. Reflects a contemplative approach to the factor of randomness in war. Commanders at operational level must inculcate and acquire a contemplative approach to warfare, through introspection and meditation. This will make them more astute (penetrating) in their decision-making and confer an ability to think through the entire problem.

(f)
Nonlinear. It should be structured hierarchically and express depth in operations.

(g)
Method of Achieving Strategic Goals. Must reflect a deliberate interaction between attrition and manoeuvre with the latter being employed to achieve operational objectives (strategic goals) while the former is employed at lower tactical levels.

(h)
Independent Entity. Since operational level action is directly dependant on the need to achieve strategic aim(s) of war and is allocated resources accordingly, it constitutes an independent entity and must be regarded as such.

(j)
Universal Theory. To be regarded as operational it must be related to a broad and universal theory, which can encompass all types of operational actions and all forms of warfare.

Analysis of the Criteria

From the analysis of the above norms the following issues emerge contextually:-


(a)
We need to selectively combine our operational commands of all three Services into integrated theatres, as they constitute the operational level in our case. By so doing, the directives from the COSC can go directly to integrated theatres while the Service Headquarters are taken out of the chain of operational command. Greater synergy at lesser cost will benefit the nation as well as the Armed Forces.

(b)
We need to shed our conservatism, doctrinal backwardness, and our current operational methodologies of deliberate set piece battles that are attrition oriented and adopt the manoeuvre approach to achieve strategic objectives. This is especially relevant in the mountains where set piece battles will achieve very few operational gains. Hence there is a need to develop a dynamic and focused offensive capability for the mountains by re-engineering the existing Army and Air Force resources. Suitably integrated theatres (Commands) will ensure generation of the required synergy and will also enable unity of command, which is an important principle of war.

(c)
The operational design must aim to achieve strategic goals (political aims) of war in the shortest possible time frame which in turn implies:-

(i)
Higher emphasis on manoeuvre than on attrition.

(ii)
Acquiring new military capabilities and re-engineering of existing force levels to cater for future scenarios and settings.

(iii)
Demoralising and weakening the opponent before the start of the campaign. This can be achieved through political, diplomatic and military means (psychological warfare, information warfare and deception).

(iv)
Use of regressive planning methodology from CCS, COSC and Headquarters of Integrated Commands to lower levels should be formalised for executing joint operations.

(v)
Joint operations will ensure synthesis, synergy and success.

(vi)
Joint training, which must be given a much higher priority than the current rather flippant approach.



(d)
The overall change can be brought about by appointing a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) at the earliest and by giving an appropriate push to jointness and integration. This push will have to be provided at political levels through an Act of Parliament similar to the Goldwater – Nichols Act 1986, in the case of the US Armed Forces.

Operational Design and Planning Process

Operational level of warfare has resulted in new terms being introduced in the military lexicon. This is unavoidable because the introduction of new concepts of warfare has invariably led to the evolution of new terms, which describe the new concepts most appropriately. In the case of operational art, this diachronic framework is evident in the elements (concepts), which are central to the design and conduct of major operations and campaigns. The operational level commander designs his plan of operations around a number of building blocks, which help him to visualise how the campaign will unfold from the beginning to the end.3The concepts are:-


(a) End state.
(b) Centre(s) of gravity.
(c) Decisive points.
(d) Lines of operation.
(e) Sequencing.
(f) Manoeuvre.
(g) Tempo.
(h) Culminating point.
(j) Contingency plans.
(k) Shaping of battle space.
(l) Operational synchronisation.

There should be a structured format for estimating an operational level problem to ensure that higher commanders and senior staff officers when lacking exposure or experience in certain types of terrain or forms of warfare do not omit essentials from their operational planning. No joint format exists currently though the Army War College has done some work in this field for the Army Training Command.

A conscious commitment to the planning process by using these concepts will ensure adequate and appropriate focus on strategic issues and the desired end state of war. An operational level commander must never get too involved with a tactical objective. The operational design evolved must enable him to achieve the strategic goals through a variety of ways. A single tactical objective should not be allowed to derail a plan.

Future Warfare and New Technologies

Certain periods in history have been watersheds in technology and change. Today another shift in technology and change is sweeping the world. Glimpses of this change and use of new technologies were demonstrated in US operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Indian Armed Forces need to examine the entire issue contextually in relation to our conception of future wars i.e. the new methodology of war fighting along with the use of new technologies.

Modern technology has given rise to accurate intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance operations and technologies which exploit the electromagnetic spectrum, such as sensor and counter sensor, communication and information warfare. The latter includes command and control warfare, precision strike, precision movement and precision protection operations among others. The vital aspect of modern warfare and technology is that all information generated is integrated through digital communication network so as to facilitate movement and transfer of information. The new and emerging technologies that need to be studied are:-


(a) Transportation.
(b) Communications.
(c) Information technology.
(d) Missile technology.
(e) Laser technology and directed energy weapons.
(f) Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems.
(g) Nano technologies.
(h) Biological warfare and bio-molecular electronics.
(j) Sensor technology.
(k) Precision guided munitions.
(l) Stealth technology.

The major significance of these converging technologies is that they alter the traditional theories and practices of planning for and waging wars.

Since the first Gulf War we have seen that forces equipped with precision munitions are able to strike anything they can see. Advanced technologies are bringing smaller, more rapidly deployable and flexible ground forces to conflicts. Such forces, with the benefit of situational awareness, could identify accurately the location of friend or foe, and respond appropriately. Precision munitions linked to better situational awareness allowed for rapid and surgical strikes that could engage targets while precluding collateral damage. Increased force protection for our personnel will also be enhanced by the emerging technologies. Although situational awareness is a major contributor to force protection, these emerging technologies promise much more. Soldiers can be provided with ultra-light body armour and mine resistant vehicles. Lasers and directional electro magnetic pulse weapons can destroy incoming missiles. The rapid introduction of new technologies will change the very nature of future conflict. An interesting and abiding feature of these technologies is that they apply equally well across the full range of conflicts.

Our efforts should be to bring about the transformation faster than our adversaries so that we are in an advantageous position. We need to maximise their usefulness by synthesising technology with doctrine, training, leadership, organisational structure and force development. This will mandate cultural changes in the way we operate presently.

Guiding Principles of Operational Art

Although operational art is applicable across the full spectrum of conflict, its advantages and scope can be fully exploited in high intensity conflicts. The opinion of the US military experts seems to be veering to smaller conflicts of short duration in the future. They anticipate that in the fourth generation wars (future wars), the battlefield will include the whole of enemy society where the goal will be to collapse the enemy internally by identifying his strategic centres of gravity. Action will be dispersed through the use of small groups capable of unleashing intense violence. Emphasis will be on manoeuvre and exploitation of technology. According to their view, masses of men and firepower will become redundant. There will be decreasing dependence on centralised logistics. Such a war will be non-linear with no definable battlefield or fronts and the distinction between war and peace will be blurred. Success will be dependant on joint operations.

In our context, the fundamental causes for war in and around India have not changed after the cold war. On the other hand new threats and challenges have emerged and these have yet to be analysed contextually. Moreover with disputed borders with Pakistan and China, even the external military threat to India’s territory cannot be seen as having receded. Hence our threats and challenges are more now than ever before and we have to be prepared to deal with a larger spectrum and with new dimensions of warfare. Application of operational art will bequeath the skills necessary for military commanders at higher levels, to win wars decisively, across the full range of conflict.

In this regard it is recommended that certain guiding principles, considered vital, be included as a part of the war fighting doctrine. These are given in succeeding paragraphs.

Regressive Planning Process. The method of converting political aim(s) of a conflict to military strategic aim(s) and further to operational and tactical objectives and the method of issuing directives and instructions from the CCS to COSC and from there to integrated theatres/ Service Headquarters should be formalised. This is one of the most important facets of planning and preparation for a conflict and it is termed Regressive Planning because it moves backwards from the highest strategic body to lower echelons. Currently there is no formal procedure followed in this regard. In fact our political leadership, perhaps for political reasons, shies away from giving written directives to Service Chiefs. On receipt of political directives military commanders convert abstract political aim(s) of war to achievable military aim(s) and objectives and if after analysis they come to the conclusion that the political aim set forth is not achievable, they must have the courage to say so. The nation must not go to war for an unachievable political aim.

Integration and Joint Operations. Army-Air integration for the land battle, Navy-Air integration for the battle at sea and a tri-service integration where required must become the tenet of war fighting. This involves effective joint planning, logistics, procedures and training among areas of jointness. Integrated warfare requires a type of refinement in executing integrated operations, which is lacking at present. Victory will not be feasible, in the future, without close integration at operational and tactical levels and without combined all arms action at lower tactical levels. Air power will have to be far more responsive for the type of integrated Land Air operations anticipated in the future.

Campaign Design. This takes into account the focus on strategic goals of the conflict and the end state along with a number of other factors such as the enemy, environment, own forces (including combat support and logistics), surprise and security and time. The appreciation or the estimate carried out by the operational level commander or his staff follows the normal method except that the concepts of operational design emerge as deductions, which enable the identification of innovative options (courses of action).

Non-Linearity. This calls for an attitudinal change in the military mindset. We should be able to translate our idea of fighting the close, intermediate and deep battles in near simultaneity and synchronise the destructive effects of battles at sea and in the air. Indeed, simultaneity is the essence of non-linearity.

Manoeuvre Approach. There is an imperative need to evolve manoeuvre approach as the key element underpinning our approach to war fighting, in all types of terrain including our mountainous regions. Our force development and organisations will have to cater for this offensive capability that in the future will involve close integration of air and ground troops.

Least Cost and Minimum Effort. In imbibing the concept of operational art, our endeavour should be to win the campaign and indeed the war with least possible human and material cost. This reflects on the quality and the art of generalship.

Decentralised Command and Directive Style. For successful application of operational art the command style cannot be rigidly centralised according to our current practice. A more flexible style, which encourages risk taking and maximum initiative by subordinate commanders, will have to be adopted. This will also allow subordinates to conceptually grasp the manoeuvre approach to warfare in the Indian context in all types of terrain.

Visionary Leadership. Yet another requirement of operational art is the need for effective and enlightened leadership with a large enough vision to fully comprehend the entire perspective of operational level of warfare without over identification with tactical objectives. This mandates unbiased selection procedures and sound personnel policies. The key attributes of operational level leaders are considered to be as under:-


(a) Professionally astute.
(b) Vision.
(c) Wisdom.
(d) Contemplative approach.
(e) Self-restraint and self-control.
(f) Self-knowledge.
(g) Ability to inspire as a role model.
(h) Sacrifice of personal interest.
(j ) Possess all attributes of intelligence like intelligence quotient (IQ), emotional intelligence and spiritual intelligence.

Integrate Technology into Coherent Doctrines. Technology has always been the driving force behind military development and the changing nature of war. However, technology by itself is not capable of winning wars. In fact too much focus on technology at the expense of progression in operational thinking cannot ensure success. Operational concepts incorporating and integrating new technologies must be developed into coherent doctrines. We require innovative operational exploitation of new technologies to win wars. Technology can be a vital war winning factor when it is synthesised with doctrine, training, organisational structures and force development and employed imaginatively.

Close Politico-Military Interaction. Given the restrictive aspects of short duration wars, nuclear backdrop and other factors, destruction of adversary’s strategic forces or capture of large tracts of territory will not be possible. War aims will have to be modulated, tempered and calibrated according to the environmental constraints.

Therefore, translation of political aim(s) to achievable military objectives of war and skilful conduct of war will require a close politico-military interaction throughout.

Conclusion

The current clear lines between strategic, operational and tactical levels will become increasingly difficult to differentiate because of increased precision and longer ranges derived from new weapons and munitions and secure, encrypted and networked communications. This will bring a significant increase in combat effectiveness. However, as long as distinctions between strategic, operational and tactical objectives are not erased, corresponding levels of war will remain, though the boundaries of each level may expand into the next higher level, which also implies that without a creative and skillfully developed operational design for a given operational situation, military forces will not be able to perform at their peak performance levels. This is where the application of operational art will make the difference.


Notes

1.
In the Combat Journal of March 2002, I had written in detail on ‘The Fundamentals of Operational Art – A Contextual Review’. I intend to limit this article to some vital contextual issues of operational art, which need our serious consideration and thought.

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.


———————————————————————-
Lieutenant General V K Kapoor, PVSM is a former Commandant of the Army War College (erstwhile College of Combat), Mhow
chetak
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Re: Operational Art or War Doctrine

Post by chetak »

The US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5: Operations, has national and international ramifications as well as concerns by allies about coopting their individual national doctrines on the conduct of warfighting operations as well as in integrating elements of the same to joint operations.

With the series of alphabet soup agreements that India has signed with the US, this is bound to affect us as well.

QUAD, for example, would be dominated by US doctrinal concerns and concepts while dynamically integrating elements of non US naval and air assets into the mix. This would be optimized to serve tactical as well as strategic dimensions.

The frequent exercises between navies and airforces are a serious attempt to achieve a large degree of homogeneity and explore operational flexibilities while still maintaining the overall unitary nature and integrity of multiple command and control channels as dictated by a common goal and shared objectives. The eclectic mix of sensors and weapons, derived from widely differing design philosophies and the diverse doctrines of exploitation of such systems brings serious challenges to the already complex environment.

The publication of US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, in August 1982 launched AirLand Battle as the Army's doctrine of the future. Such a revolutionary change, however, was not automatically accepted by everyone and caused some consternation and debate among our NATO allies as well as the Army's sister services.


To comprehend the doctrine contained in FM 5-0, readers must first understand the fundamentals of full spectrum operations described in FM 3-0, Operations. In addition, readers must be familiar with FM 3-90, Tactics, FM 3-07, Stability Operations, and JP 3-28, Civil Support. They must understand how offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations complement each other. Readers must also understand the fundamentals of command and control addressed in FM 6-0 and the fundamentals of leadership addressed in FM 6-22, Army Leadership.


this is the march 2010 version. There may be a newer version in 2017 perhaps but I am not sure about that.

FM 5-0 THE OPERATIONS PROCESS (MARCH 2010)
ramana
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Re: Operational Art or War Doctrine

Post by ramana »

Chetak thanks for posting the paper and the manuals on FM-100-5 and US understanding of operational art.
If you not I have been pushing for study of this from Page1.
One comment on Gen VKK paper is he should have left technology to another paper as Operational art is independent of technology. Should be two part.
He beautifully captures the 11 points of Operational Art
(a) End state.
(b) Centre(s) of gravity.
(c) Decisive points.
(d) Lines of operation.
(e) Sequencing.
(f) Manoeuvre.
(g) Tempo.
(h) Culminating point.
(j) Contingency plans.
(k) Shaping of battle space.
(l) Operational synchronisation.
Now if we study 1965 war*, 1971 West Pakistan none of the 11 points are met.
Yet same Army in 1971 East Pakistan met all of them!!!

Kargil was not even a theater. More like a sector.
Yet it had some elements:
End State- Clear the intrusion
Centres of gravity: Kargil
Decisive points: Munthalo Camp, Batalik, Tiger Hill,
etc...

Please help fill in the blanks.

* I would like to know the course work at Imperial Defence College that Gen. J. N. Chaudhri graduated from.
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Re: Operational Art or War Doctrine

Post by ramana »

https://www.classicsofstrategy.com/2016 ... -1954.html
B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (1954)
Credit to A. Bradley Potter, Johns Hopkins University SAIS

Among the most widely read strategists is B. H. Liddell Hart, famous for the “indirect approach.” Most courses analyzing military strategy or its broader cousin grand strategy devote at least a portion of their time to the central idea of Liddell Hart’s career as a strategist and historian. Writing in response to what he viewed as calamitous misapplications and misunderstandings of Clausewitzian military thought, Liddell Hart sought ultimately to create an integrated, modern vision for strategy applicable not to just military forces, but also to all government activities supporting the attainment of political aims during war. The revolutions in technology which helped define the First and especially Second World Wars, along with the destruction they wrought, spoke to the need for a new strategic framework. Liddell Hart’s book Strategy was his answer to this challenge.

This essay aims to introduce new students of strategy to Liddell Hart’s central arguments from this most famous work. First, a brief exploration of the man’s scholastic and military career sets the stage for a careful examination of his indirect approach and its implications. Following these discussions, a short review of how Liddell Hart’s thinking continues to affect the debates surrounding strategy offers a chance to apply his theories. Ultimately Liddell Hart encourages his readers to reconsider Carl von Clausewitz and cast aside misunderstandings of him while also offering an alternative, distinct vision for how war should be fought – a vision that rejects the importance of battle and rather focuses on achieving victory with minimal bloodshed.

A Strategist from the World Wars

Liddell Hart was born in Paris on October 31, 1895 to English parents. By the time he attended Cambridge at the dawn of the First World War, he displayed in inquisitive mind, but was rather bored by formal studies (Reid 2004). As fighting broke out in 1914, the young Liddell Hart joined the King's Own Yorkshire light infantry and proceeded to serve three tours in the Great War as a junior officer before beginning to write on military issues following the Armistice. As his entry in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography puts it, he became known as a keen “interpreter of the operational experience of 1918: distilling its essential principles for training purposes, and then relating them perceptively to mobility and command in a novel way” (Reid 2004). While he gained some notoriety among influential British officers, most notably General Sir Ivor Maxse and Colonel J. F. C. Fuller, his career in uniform was cut short after suffering two minor heart attacks (Reid 2004). He retired from the British Army in 1927 after being on half-pay since 1923 and filling no significant military responsibilities. He held the rank of captain.

After experimenting with several careers, the retired Captain Liddell Hart became a well-regarded journalist and military analyst who corresponded regularly with important strategists of the day, including Fuller and later T.E. Lawrence (Reid 2004). By the late 1920s, Liddell Hart’s notion of the indirect approach to strategy was beginning to take form, and an early version was published in his 1929 book The Decisive Wars of History (Reid 2004). The most complete formulation of the indirect approach was ultimately offered up in Strategy, published first in 1954 and again as a revised second edition in 1967. The book became widely read in both military and academic circles, and played an important role in repairing Liddell Hart’s image, which had been tarnished during World War II when he underestimated Germany’s martial capability, called at one point for a compromise peace with Hitler, and criticized Winston Churchill’s strategy for winning the war (Reid 2004).

His biographer Alex Danchev remarks that Strategy is the closest Liddell Hart ever came to writing a treatise on war, but it was “started too soon, distended too much and finished (or unfinished) too late to produce a truly satisfying whole” (Danchev 1998, 157). Rather than a complete vision of strategy, it offered a “grab-bag” of ideas, some of which were radically novel and others of which were fundamental and well understood (Danchev 1998, 157). These shortcomings are readily apparent to readers who pick up the volume; however, imperfect though it may be, Liddell Hart’s Strategy offers important takes on modern warfare still worth considering today. In particular, his treatment strategy as a concept, the indirect approach itself, and the implications of mechanized and aerial assaults are well worth mulling in detail.

The Indirect Approach

Origins and Method

The origins of Liddell Hart’s indirect approach are twofold. From a theoretical perspective, he is writing in response to military and political leaders who he claims misread and misapplied the theory of 19th century Prussian military thinker Carl von Clausewitz. From an empirical perspective, he is digesting the experiences of the World Wars, especially the stalemated trench warfare of the Great War and the mechanized and aerial battles of the fight against Hitler. Liddell Hart argues vigorously that the application of poorly understood Clausewitizian strategy fueled the bloodbath that was World War I and the slow adaptation of alternatives during World War II, all of which called into question the validity of the old theory and demanded reformulating how military force might be applied to achieve political aims (Liddell Hart 1967, 357).

Specifically, the massive losses and post-war exhaustion of combatants in World War I, along with the growing importance of sea power, airpower, and mechanized land forces in World War II, suggested to Liddell Hart that the interpretation of Clausewitz from the past should be revisited. Sea power had choked off Germany during the Great War; then, during the interwar period, those in charge of armies and air forces failed to appreciate the great shifts in war that were occurring thanks to new technology (Liddell Hart 1967, 359). In fact, airpower now offered the opportunity to strike at economic and moral centers without destroying the enemy in the field. Mechanized warfare, meanwhile, could not only make direct attacks, but it could also help induce the collapse of an enemy without a major battle “by cutting their supply lines, dislocating their control-system, or producing paralysis by the sheer nerve-shock of deep penetration into their rear” (Liddell Hart 1967, 358). Each of these would come to represent aspects of the indirect approach.

Additionally, these insights into a changing battlefield were not merely speculative. In World War II’s opening months, a small number of mechanized units supported by airpower created a new type of fighting – blitzkrieg – or lightening warfare. Such fighting was relatively bloodless, but was quite effective in allowing the Germans to overcome Poland and France (Liddell Hart 1967, 360 – 361). Later, Allied air operations against communications networks helped make the invasion of Continental Europe possible as it hindered Germany’s ability to mount counterattacks (Liddell Hart 1967, 361). In the most general sense, new land and air developments affected the formulation of military aims; namely, it allowed for increased direct action against civilian objectives and expanded the range of options for attacking military objectives, opening up new ways to cripple militaries without destroying them (Liddell Hart 1967, 359). Liddell Hart concludes that “the sum effect of the advent of this multiplied mobility, both on the ground and in the air, was to increase the power and importance of strategy relatively to tactics…”, which required fresh strategic thinking (Liddell Hart 1967, 359).

While these theoretical insights and first-hand experiences provided the intellectual roots of Liddell Hart’s study of strategy and formulation of the indirect approach, he based his thinking on a much larger body of historical analysis. Strategy examines wars from the fifth century B.C. to the middle of the twentieth century, including the Greek Wars, Roman Wars, Medieval Wars, Napoleonic Wars, and both World Wars, among others, to make its arguments. From a methodological perspective, each of these is treated as a type of mini-case study out of which Liddell Hart discerns patterns about how wars have been successfully waged throughout the ages. He notes that a single study of a campaign is likely to present analytical obstacles in the pursuit of truth; however, “if a specific effect is seen to follow a specific cause in a score or more cases, in different epochs and diverse conditions, there is ground for regarding this cause as an integral part of any theory of war” (Liddell Hart 1967, 25). His experience as military editor for the Encyclopedia Britannica offered him an opportunity to evaluate long periods of history and conduct the wide-reaching survey of military history that is ultimately presented in Strategy (Liddell Hart 1967, 25). In this sense, Liddell Hart and Clausewitz share a similar philosophy about the nature of war studies – it is not a realm of human pursuit suited to abstract mathematical theorizing, but rather an endeavor dominated by understanding the importance of psychology and the human experience (Liddell Hart 1967, 324).

Strategy and Grand Strategy

As in many things throughout Strategy, Liddell Hart juxtaposes himself against Clausewitz in how he defines strategy. The old Prussian officer, he argues, looked at strategy merely as “the art of the employment of battles as a means to gain the object of war” (Liddell Hart 1967, 333). This definition has two flaws. First, it “intrudes on the sphere of policy, or the higher conduct of war, which must necessarily be the responsibility of the government and not of the military leaders it employs as its agents in the executive control of operations” (Liddell Hart 1967, 333). Additionally, Clausewitz’s definition unnecessarily stresses the importance of engaging the enemy as the only means to achieve a strategic end, which leads to the profound heresy that all efforts in war should focus on setting up and fighting a decisive battle (Liddell Hart 1967, 333). While these views and critiques of Clausewitz’s concept of strategy are still debated, they are at least the understanding against which Liddell Hart directed his efforts.

In seeking what he considered a more accurate definition of strategy, Liddell Hart turned to Helmuth von Moltke the Younger who claimed strategy is “the practical adaptation of the means placed at a general’s disposal to the attainment of the object in view” (Liddell Hart 1967, 334). According to Liddell Hart, this definition makes clear that the military is responsible to the government employing it and allows the government to intervene in strategy, amend it, and push it in a direction that may not simply be the overthrow of an enemy’s military (Liddell Hart 1967, 334). Such a nuanced vision of what strategy is and ought to be offers a start for understanding how Liddell Hart viewed the issue; namely, he defined strategy as “the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfil the ends of policy” (Liddell Hart 1967, 335). He went on to offer that “…strategy is concerned not merely with the movement of forces – as its role is often defined – but with the effect” (Liddell Hart 1967, 335). In contrast to the extreme interpretations of Clausewitz, Liddell Hart argues that strategy “…has for its purpose the reduction of fighting to the slenderest possible proportions… The perfection of strategy would be, therefore, to produce a decision without any serious fighting” (Liddell Hart 1967, 338). He cites several historical examples to back up his ideal concept, among them Julius Caesar’s Ilerda campaign, Moltke’s encirclement of MacMahon’s army at Sedan, and General Allenby’s 1918 encirclement of Turkish forces in Samaria (Liddell Hart 1967, 338).

There is an additional aspect of strategy that sets Liddell Hart apart from many earlier strategists – the belief in and application of grand strategy. The British strategist suggests that grand strategy is the “policy which guides the conduct of war” and may be conceived of as “policy in execution” (Liddell Hart 1967, 335). He goes on to argue that “…the role of grand strategy – higher strategy – is to co-ordinate and direct all of the resources of a nation, or band of nations, toward the attainment of the political object of the war – the goal defined by fundamental policy” (Liddell Hart 1967, 335 -336). Further separating it from traditional understandings of strategy, grand strategy deals with economic, diplomatic, commercial, ethical, and military aspects of war in addition to questions about securing peace after a conflict (Liddell Hart 1967, 335 -336). Grand strategy envisions what is today called a whole-of-government approach to waging war and establishing and maintaining peace. While decidedly separate from the strictly military strategy that makes up most of Liddell Hart’s book, the concept of grand strategy ultimately benefits from the application of the indirect approach as well.

The Indirect Approach

What of the indirect approach? The seeds of it are in Liddell Hart’s understanding of strategy and his review of history. After careful study of past wars, Liddell Hart was convinced that conflicts are generally won when the means of war are applied in a way that an opponent is unprepared to meet, that is, employed in an indirect fashion (Liddell Hart 1967, 25). A strategy does not need to overcome resistance, but rather exploit the elements of movement and surprise to achieve victory by throwing the enemy off balance before a potential strike (Liddell Hart 1967, 337). Liddell Hart argues that if a strategist is charged with winning military victory, then he has:

“… responsibility is to seek it under the most advantageous circumstance in order to produce the most profitable result. Hence his true aim is not so much to seek battle as to seek a strategic situation so advantageous that if it does not of itself produce the decision, its continuation by a battle is sure to achieve this. In other words, dislocation is the aim of strategy; its sequel may be either the enemy’s dissolution or his easier disruption in battle” (Liddell Hart 1967, 339, emphasis in original; bold emphasis added).

Following dislocation, the situation must be exploited to ensure maximal gains from victory. By exploitation, Liddell Hart means that a commander takes advantage of the new opportunities that come from a successful dislocation and blow against an enemy before he has time to recover (Liddell Hart 1967, 349). The indirect approach, then, is the application of movement and surprise to dislocate an enemy and attain and exploit military victories to achieve a defined political objective. The most skillful strategists employing this approach will not need to apply a maximum of violence since they have forced their enemy into a position from which he can defend only poorly. “The business of war, therefore, was not position and attrition, and mutual exhaustion, but analysis and paralysis, the maximal preservation,” Danchiv muses about Liddell Hart’s indirect approach (1998, 161). Most armies and generals, however, are trained mostly for the military “blow,” the period between the dislocation and the exploitation when fighting may occur; thus, few are well equipped to best engage in either of the two more important activities (Liddell Hart 1967, 349).

There are nuances to the actualization of the indirect approach that are best captured in Liddell Hart’s eight axioms. These axioms represent a checklist of sorts for ensuring the application of the indirect approach. In his words they include:

Adjust your end to your means
Keep your object always in mind
Choose the line (or course) of least expectation
Exploit the line of least resistance
Take a line of operation which offers alternative objectives
Ensure that both plan and dispositions are flexible – adaptable to circumstances
Do not throw your weight into a stroke whilst your opponent is on guard
Do not renew an attack along the same line (or in the same form) after it has once failed (Liddell Hart 1967, 348 – 349)
Liddell Hart forcefully contends that for the indirect approach to be successful, indeed for any strategy in war to be viable, the political ends must be in line with the total military means available for achieving them (Liddell Hart 1967, 336). Should this condition be met, a real economy of forces might be realized (Liddell Hart 1967, 336). If wars are waged to attain political objectives, then those objectives should not be beyond the accessible military means to achieve them. If they are, the prospect of engaging in a futile war is realized and surely violates Liddell Hart’s goal of achieving a positive result with the minimal bloodshed. Some ends simply cannot be achieved using the means available, and accepting this reality will ensure that the ends and means are adjusted appropriately.

The second axiom is closely related to the first but requires some additional definitions. Namely, there is a distinction between the political and military objectives in war, though this difference is often lost to the confusion that surrounds using the term “objective” to signify both at the same time. Liddell Hart offers an alternative. Rather than using the word “objective” at all, he suggests that “the object” be used for the policy goal and “the military aim” be used for the way forces are used to achieve a particular policy (Liddell Hart 1967, 351). Generally speaking, the object of war is what Liddell Hart calls “a better state of peace,” or the realization of a policy goal that makes peaceful existence “better” for at least one of the combatants (Liddell Hart 1967, 351). He further argues that military victory, that is winning battles, does not automatically ensure attaining the object. Rather, the military aim should be aligned with the political object if the application of military force is to ultimately result in the attainment of a political object (Liddell Hart 1967, 351). By placing the object always in one’s mind, it may drive military activity rather than military activity becoming an end in and of itself.

Axioms three and four are fall generally in the spirit of dislocating the enemy. By choosing the line or course of least expectation, an enemy may be pushed off balance in a psychological sense. These lines or courses of action begin with a physical maneuver, however. A physical dislocation:

“(a) upsets the enemy’s dispositions and, by compelling a sudden ‘change of front’, dislocates the distribution and organization of his forces; (b) separates his forces; (c) endangers his supplies; (d) menaces the route or routs by which he could retreat in case of need and reestablish himself in his base or homeland” (Liddell Hart 1967, 339 – 340).

Psychological dislocation follows. It is the impression that the physical dislocation makes on the minds of commanders and is strongest when sudden or when there appears no way to counter the dislocation (Liddell Hart 1967, 340). “Psychological dislocation fundamentally springs from this sense of being trapped.” (Liddell Hart 1967, 340). To dislocate an enemy in this way requires one to put himself in the shoes of an opponent, determine the course of action he might least suspect, and then strike in just that way (Liddell Hart 1967, 348).

The line of least resistance is the physical equivalent of the line of least expectation (Liddell Hart 1967, 341). “They are the two faces of the same coin,” suggests Liddell Hart, and only when combined is the indirect approach fully employed and the enemy actually dislocated (Liddell Hart 1967, 341). The line of least resistance is the equivalent of moving against an enemy’s rear or weak flank rather than attacking him head on (Liddell Hart 1967, 341). Before attempting dislocation, however, moves must be made to distract the enemy and thus inhibit his “freedom of action” (Liddell Hart 1967, 341). One can easily imagine how air forces, capable of flying over defended positions on the ground, or mechanized units, able to push around fortified positions, might each be employed to find the least line of resistance and thus achieve the indirect approach (Liddell Hart 1967, 358). Additionally, there may be good reasons not to concentrate forces, since alternative distributions may threaten the enemy in different ways and offer new approaches to the line of least resistance, whatever it may be (Liddell Hart 1967, 342). Provided that the line of least resistance offers access to an objective congruent with attaining the political object, it should be pursued whenever possible (Liddell Hart 1967, 348).

This raises the point of axiom number five. Having multiple objectives puts an opponent “on the horns of a dilemma” (Liddell Hart 1967, 348). What should he defend? Where will you attack? How should forces be distributed to secure all possible objectives? This distracts the enemy from his opponent’s principle objective and at the very least makes the attainment of some objective easier (Liddell Hart 1967, 343). Provided these alternative objectives are all in line with the political object, they truly put an enemy into a bind. Additionally, they prevent an enemy from consolidating to meet a particular concentration of opposing forces since the pursuit of multiple objectives will naturally disburse forces on both sides to some degree (Liddell Hart 1967, 347). Liddell Hart discusses the nexus between technological improvements and dispersed advances in some detail and lauds these as central to the restoration of military strategy in the 20th century:

“A revival of the distributed strategic advance was required in order to revive the art and effect of strategy. Moreover, new conditions – air power and motor power – point to its further development into a dispersed strategic advance. The danger of air attack, the aim of mystification, and the need of drawing full value from mechanized mobility, suggest that advancing forces should not only be distributed as widely as is compatible with combined action, but be dispersed as much as is compatible with cohesion” (Liddell Hart 1967, 346).

In this way multiple objectives might be threatened and attained in support of realizing the political object.

As objectives are attained or missed, axiom six comes to the fore. Liddell Hart stresses that a plan “should foresee and provide for a next step in case of success or failure, or partial success” (Liddell Hart 1967, 349). Indeed, much in war is uncertain and strategic realities shift quickly as the tides of a conflict ebb and flow. Planning as much as possible for these eventualities helps ensure that the indirect approach may be applied in more than one direction, whether the prosecution of the war goes favorably or poorly.

Finally, the last two axioms are what Liddell Hart considers “negative” lessons from his survey of military history, or practices out of line with the successful application of the indirect approach. Axiom seven seems obvious, but for commanders obsessed with engaging in battle as the only means of defeating their enemy, it is often forgotten. Liddell Hart reminds his readers that an enemy must first be “paralyzed” before an attack may be successful (Liddell Hart 1967, 349). This guidance flows from the notion that dislocation must occur before any blow against an opponent. Finally, the last axiom merely reminds us that successive attacks on the same point or of the same type, if the first has failed, are unlikely to succeed in the future (Liddell Hart 1967, 349). As much as a commander might like to think his initial volley weakened a particular point that did not break, it is foolish to think that the enemy did not realize this too and has not acted to reinforce any weakness along prior lines of engagement.

While these eight axioms and related details do not examine every implication of the indirect approach, they offer the student of strategy a helpful entryway into Liddell Hart’s fundamental insights. The indirect approach is best captured by the notions of maneuver and surprise. Each is important to the dislocation of the enemy and the exploitation of a victory. Each helps prepare the battlefield in such a way that makes the actual fighting, should there even be any after dislocation, as bloodless and swift as possible. This is the aim of Liddell Hart’s indirect approach. Why force direct battle and waste time, energy, and resources, when the political object might be achieved using more cleaver, indirect means?

Liddell Hart and Clausewitz

Liddell Hart’s distain for the application of Clausewitzian strategy in the first half of the twentieth century is easy to see. It nearly bleeds off of Strategy’s pages. Carl von Clausewitz’s readers took his ideas too far, argues Liddell Hart, well beyond where the Prussian had ever thought appropriate. Because of misunderstandings surrounding Clausewitz’s concepts, for “more than a century the prime canon of military doctrine has been that ‘the destruction of the enemy’s main forces on the battlefield’ constituted the only true aim in war” (Liddell Hart 1967, 352). As a result, the merits of the indirect approach, which throughout history had been so central to the successful prosecution of a war, were lost in favor of a view that held the bloody destruction of the enemy by battle as the highest and most effective form of warfare. According to Liddell Hart, the misinterpretation of Clausewitz is the result of his “philosophical mode of expression” and abstract presentation that made understanding the nuance associated with his more blunt statements difficult for most students of war (Liddell Hart 1967, 352 - 353). Particularly confusing was that Clausewitz would often write as if he were about to make one conclusion before turning his prior reasoning about face just at the end of a particular point (Liddell Hart 1967, 353).

Liddell Hart cites many examples of such confusion. In one, while discussing the tendency toward the use of maximal force, Clausewitz wrote at some length that battle was the only means of achieving a political end via war, only to admit later in his book that this was the ideal, only applicable in the abstract (Liddell Hart 1967, 354). This is easily puzzling to a reader unaccustomed to Clausewitz’s style or who is unable or unwilling to read the man closely. It also speaks to a broader issue with which Liddell Hart took exception. While Clausewitz himself may have been able to differentiate in his thinking and writings between the perfect world of military pursuit and the actual imperfect world of these pursuits, these subtleties were so twisted up in his work that they became especially difficult for practitioners to understand (Liddell Hart 1967, 354 – 355). This was Clausewitz’s great sin. Ultimately, “… it was the ideal, and not the practical, aspect of his teaching on battle which survived… he fixed the distortion in the minds of his pupils by hammering on the abstract ideal” (Liddell Hart 1967, 355). As disciples of Clausewitz focused on the abstract ideal, the linkage between strategy and policy became decoupled, and commanders were willing to fight wars to such extremes and exhaust so much strength that there could be no post-war benefits (Liddell Hart 1967, 356). Clausewitz may not have intended this interpretation, but it was his legacy according to Liddell Hart.

The British captain does make a small effort to put On War, Clausewitz’s massive study of war, in the proper perspective. He reminds us that the book was written over twelve years, a time in which time the Prussian’s views evolved, and was never finished by its author, who died of cholera before completing revisions (Liddell Hart 1967, 357). In fact, these revisions generally abandoned the concept of ‘absolute’ war, or the tendency toward extreme mobilization for the purpose of battle, which Liddell Hart saw as especially foolhardy (Liddell Hart 1967, 357). Additionally, Liddell Hart quotes a note that Clausewitz had left with his unfinished manuscript. It read: “Should the work be interrupted by my death, then what is found can only be called a mass of conceptions not brought into form… open to endless misconceptions” (Liddell Hart 1967, 357). These are precisely the misconceptions Liddell Hart laments. In the end, the British captain claims that the Prussian was a codifying thinker rather than a creative one (Liddell Hart 1967, 353). Clausewitz’s great contributions to the study of war were those that emphasized the psychological nature of combat, called into question the mathematical analysis of war that strips from it the human factor, and captured the effects of “danger and fatigue” and the “value of boldness and determination” (Liddell Hart 1967, 353). Even given these compliments, Liddell Hart scorns the lessons of Clausewitz. It is against the backdrop of these lessons playing out in the World Wars that Strategy was written.

How Does Liddell Hart Fit the Literature?

The place for Strategy among the great analyses of war and peace is a hotly debated one. In many ways, Liddell Hart was merely relearning and applying the indirect approach to new technologies. In the opening pages of his book, Liddell Hart quotes Sun Tzu at length and the many ways that this ancient strategist had already advocated for the indirect approach (Liddell Hart 1967, 11 – 12). Writers ranging from Belisarius and Shakespeare to Moltke and even Clausewitz are also cited as having had glimpses of Liddell Hart’s strategic vision centuries earlier (Liddell Hart 1967, 12). In this broadest sense then, Liddell Hart was advancing a well-established position, one rooted in surprise and maneuver that aimed to achieve some larger goal that the simple destruction of an enemy’s forces.

Yet, Strategy was not just a rehashing of old ideas. Michael Howard, the well-known British military historian, has argued that Strategy is “perhaps the most original contribution to strategic thinking since Jomini and Clausewitz” (Howard 1966, 59). Howard agrees with Liddell Hart’s analysis of World War I’s failed strategies and suggests that the interwar period in which the indirect approach was first proposed was ripe for new strategic thinking (Howard 1966, 59). Ultimately, as World War II hung in the balance, it was Liddell Hart’s notions of threatening multiple of alternative objectives that helped spread German forces and set up ultimate victory (Howard 1966, 59). Howard concludes that the legacy of Liddell Hart is that of the “man who, more than any other in this century, has shown us how to think clearly and sanely about war” (Howard 1966, 16). This is glowing praise indeed.

John Mearsheimer, meanwhile, attacks the notion that Liddell Hart really was some visionary with important new ideas for World War II or any war. The University of Chicago professor suggests that Liddell Hart’s concept of the indirect approach shifted several times; it was only in his memoirs published late in life that he attempted to show how these ideas were prescient and relevant to strategy during World War II (Mearsheimer 1988, 88 – 93). In a sense, Liddell Hart was retroactively fitting his early theories to explain history. Mearsheimer concludes that Liddell Hart’s earliest work, that which was produced during the early 1920s, used history in an analytically rigorous way to examine critically the roles of infantry and armor in warfare (Mearsheimer 1988, 220). However, by the late 1920s and certainly in the 1930s, the period of time where he was expanding on the indirect approach, Liddell Hart was so consumed with the “lessons” of World War I that he was no longer employing history as an objective guide; his ideas became less visionary than they were reactionary to a particular event in history (Mearsheimer 1988, 220 – 222). As such, their widespread adoption today should be taken quite carefully and their value not oversold.

Finally, a few comments on Liddell Hart’s understanding, or rather misunderstanding, of Clausewitz. Throughout Strategy the British strategist seems to confuse what Clausewitz actually said with how poorly people understood the Prussian. To be sure, Liddell Hart’s criticism of Clausewitz’s unclear writing style is fair, though the Clausewitz admitted himself that this problem was likely given the incomplete state of his book. What is ill founded is to blame on Clausewitz all of the faulty application of his strategy in the centuries after his death. While the juxtaposition of the theoretical, “absolute” type of war with the realities of actual war is sometimes difficult to follow, Book I of On War, which was the closest to completion at the time of its author’s death, is quite clear about the modifications to theoretical warfare in reality. If commanders reading these lines failed to appreciate their nuance, that fault is not on Clausewitz alone, and it surely does not undermine the quality of his arguments once properly understood. Informed analysis of On War offers important insights even today. Additionally, and perhaps most central, while Liddell Hart implies that Clausewitz’s definition of strategy allows for the privileging of military means over political ends, this flies in the face of Clausewitz’s own words. Repeatedly the older strategist stresses that war is “a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means” (Clausewitz 1976, 87). By necessity it means war should be in the service of politics, military leaders in the service of their governments. Later readers may have mistaken Clausewitz, but Liddell Hart’s criticism oversteps its bounds and cheapens the actual insights provided by On War to a careful reader.

The Enduring Relevance of Strategy

So why should we continue to read this book? What does Liddell Hart offer the student of strategy and diplomacy today? In short, the indirect approach matters. While scholars may argue about its influence in the past, the insights it provides are valuable grist for future debates on military strategy. While he may vilify Clausewitz too much, Liddell Hart is correct to criticize the faulty application and misunderstanding of Clausewitzian thinking. His focus on the importance of maneuver and surprise are timeless and may well be applied to new advances in technology and new strategic questions. Finally, Liddell Hart’s delineation of grand strategy and its domain are useful not just to military men and academics, but to practitioners across government who have a role to play during wartime. These are no small things, and they ought to be remembered.



Bibliography

Bond, Brian. Liddell Hart: A Study of his Military Thought. Rutgers University Press, 1977.

This older work offers a survey of Liddell Hart’s military writings, including, but going well beyond, Strategy. Students looking for an outside take on Liddell Hart’s military thinking may benefit from this source, especially if they are attempting a more in-depth study of the man and his ideas.

Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Translated and Edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.

This is the book against which Liddell Hart rails throughout Strategy. While unfinished, it has become the starting point for most scholars aiming to understand the evolution of Western military strategy. Given its major influence on the development of strategy and enduring relevance, it is still taught in most military schools of higher education and in a wide range of civilian international affairs programs. Sometimes difficult read and often a bit convoluted, it is still a must read for any serious student of strategy. Indeed, a careful reading of On War should be a natural companion to a reading of Liddell Hart’s Strategy since the latter book is so often engaged in a close dialogue with the earlier effort.

Danchev, Alex. Alchemist of War: The Life of Basil Liddell Hart. London, UK: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1998.

This is generally considered the most complete biographical work on Liddell Hart. While the style of its writing makes it sometimes difficult to follow, the many original sources, including writings and letters, which it cites help provide a clear glimpse into a man who aspired to greatness within the realm of military strategy. One chapter in particular examines Liddell Hart’s indirect approach in some detail.

Danchev, A. (1999). Liddell Hart and the indirect approach. The Journal of Military History, 63(2), 313-337. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/1956 ... ntid=11752

This article is essentially the portions of Danchev’s Alchemist that deal directly with Liddell Hart’s book Strategy, which makes it a useful starting point for students most interested in the strategic implications of Liddell Hart’s work, rather than his life or the body of his writings. Especially useful are the significant quotations from Strategy and other contemporaneous sources that help outline Liddell Hart’s views most clearly.

Hart, B.H. Liddell. Strategy, Second Revised Edition. New York, NY: Fredrick A. Praeger Publishers, 1967.

While not his first attempt at sharing his insights regarding the indirect approach to strategy, it is certainly Liddell Hart’s best known and most relevant. Assigned reading in many strategic studies programs, Strategy is a necessary companion to the study of Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Moltke, Fuller, and a host of other well-known thinkers on military affairs. While not a perfect book or perfect conceptualization of military strategy, its clearly written style offers an easy entry point into larger debates on the use of military force.

Hart, Basil Henry Liddell. The Memoirs of Captain Liddell Hart. Vol. 1 & Vol. 2. GP, 1965.

This two volume set of memoirs comes from the hand of Liddell Hart himself. Published just five years before his death, they attempt to put into context his great mass of writings on military and strategic thought. Though some historical claims in them have been called into question, they offer a window into how Liddell Hart viewed his own life and the works he produced.

Howard, Michael. “The Liddell Hart Memoirs.” Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 111, no. 641 (1966): 58 – 61.

Famed military historian Michael Howard reviews Liddell Hart’s memoirs in his brief journal article. He helps to put the work of Liddell Hart into wider perspective among that of other military strategists and offers a glowing review of the indirect approach.

Mearsheimer, John J. Liddell Hart and the Weight of History. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988.

Mearsheimer challenges the notion that Liddell Hart’s insights into military strategy and its application during World War II were either prescient or correct. This book challenges a good deal of the conventional wisdom surrounding Liddell Hart and is an important counterpoint to many of his champions.

Reid, Brian Holden. “Hart, Sir Basil Henry Liddell (1895–1970),” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 2008 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/33737, accessed 10 Jan 2016]

Reid’s excellent entry into the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography offers a quick and easily digestible account of Liddell Hart’s life and major works. While it does not address Strategy directly, it does make an effort to put the indirect approach into context and offers a pithy account of Liddell Hart’s rise, fall, and resurrection within the public eye, military establishment, and academy. Students should use this as a first reading for background of the experiences of Liddell Hart.
ramana
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Re: Operational Art or War Doctrine

Post by ramana »

Clausewitz says after 18th century, national will represented by people became added to the dyad between Executive or the ruler and the military or Army.
Col Summers in his book "On Strategy"says however the mass casualties of the 20th century disenchanted the public and reduced their role. The national will being invoked is important for carrying out other measures short of combat. Eg. Economic boycott, trade wars etc.

I say in India, as continuation of Mughal and British rule the people were never part of the triad even after being a democracy. In effect post Independent India was in effect tied or confined to 18th century relationship between Executive and military. National will was not invoked till after the debacle.

Then comes friction between Executive and Military due to fears, economy, hubris etc.

Friction within MoD whose main job was to "prepare for war" which became a resource struggle and fountain of corruption such that the preparation for war got relegated to the back and even diminished.
Then friction between civilians and military with gradual downgrade in relations and not seeking military advice and using them on police actions like Hyderabad and Goa, and UN peacekeeping roles.
Next friction with in military between headquarters, within branches, between services like Army and Air force. Navy was oddman out.
Bigger friction was the myth of danger from PLA and its vast manpower.
Next friction was doctrine of forward posts versus firm bases.

Biggest friction was dogma of Panchsheel that politicians held steadfast like straw for drowning man despite knowing the Chinese perfidy.
The fiasco after the engagement which in Clausewitzian terms is "proper conduct of war" has been described by many biographies and analyses.

All these contributed to 1962 debacle.

The national will has to be invoked and the pinch points eliminated for successful and "proper conduct of war" whose end goal is lasting peace.
ramana
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Re: Operational Art or War Doctrine

Post by ramana »

NaMo has reduced friction between the civilians and military, brought unity of command in the military, and rekindled the national will with surgical strikes and Balakot. And economic boycott, app bans, revival of industry hit by Chinese imports also added to national will.

The Galwan warriors added to the national will. That's what I feel while looking in Clausewitz terms at 1962 and now.
Mukesh.Kumar
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Re: Operational Art or War Doctrine

Post by Mukesh.Kumar »

ramana wrote:NaMo has reduced friction between the civilians and military, brought unity of command in the military, and rekindled the national will with surgical strikes and Balakot. And economic boycott, app bans, revival of industry hit by Chinese imports also added to national will.

The Galwan warriors added to the national will. That's what I feel while looking in Clausewitz terms at 1962 and now.
Incisive analysis Ramana-ji. I would say that the role of BRF and BRFites is to plant seeds in the minds of people. For a democracy like ours it's the people more than the Executive and Military who will determine the outcome of Absolute War. In a way I feel it's the People who have replaced both the King and There Nation.

Today as a country we are still to accept that there will be a war where we will have to be the aggressors. Doesn't gel with our self image of inheritors of Ghandian 'ahisma'. We still say proudly that we are not aggressors but should a war be 'thrust' on us we will not back down. This will change at some point. Only after that will we liberate Tibet and POK.

And it will change. As long as we don't allow the sapping of independent thought by "wokeness" introduced into our society. All we need is to build a brick of 10% or so of our population who think practically.

We may laugh at Lal Topi. But the world is entering a phase where democracies will be extremely vulnerable to self limitation because of manipulation of the mindsets of the population. This is my biggest fear - the different BIF forces are making us question our identity and whether or not national cohesiveness is in our best interest.

Truth be told, whether it was WW1, WW2, Vietnam there have been sizable movements by elites in all countries which was contrarian to national interest. But today with a far more open world democracies are more vulnerable to manipulation because of larger numbers of people being open to manipulation.

It's easy to fight an enemy with guns. How do you fight an enemy that uses ideas as a virus against your population. Where your own population becomes zombie vectors.
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Re: Operational Art or War Doctrine

Post by ParGha »

ramana wrote:Clausewitz says after 18th century, national will represented by people became added to the dyad between Executive or the ruler and the military or Army. Col Summers in his book "On Strategy" says however the mass casualties of the 20th century disenchanted the public and reduced their role. The national will being invoked is important for carrying out other measures short of combat. Eg. Economic boycott, trade wars etc.
This is incorrect. It was the gradual realization of the speed and devastation of nuclear weapons that made the universal male conscription less and less useful for the US, NATO and WP countries. They came to realize that conscripts are not good for long-drawn, proxy-wars like Vietnam and Afghanistan and Chechnya. Hence they told the vast majority of the public to stand-down (though mechanisms for mass-mobilization are still available, like selective service registration and Defense Industrial Production laws).
ramana
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Re: Operational Art or War Doctrine

Post by ramana »

But net result is the people got detached from the triad after WWII and Korean War. And it reverted to 18th century practise.

Thats the point. And by doing so they lost public support for Vietnam War.
There are many volumes debating this and since then every limited war US gets a Congressional approval.
As for universal conscription there are other reasons too.
Mukesh.Kumar
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Re: Operational Art or War Doctrine

Post by Mukesh.Kumar »

ParGha wrote:
ramana wrote:Clausewitz says after 18th century, national will represented by people became added to the dyad between Executive or the ruler and the military or Army. Col Summers in his book "On Strategy" says however the mass casualties of the 20th century disenchanted the public and reduced their role. The national will being invoked is important for carrying out other measures short of combat. Eg. Economic boycott, trade wars etc.
This is incorrect. It was the gradual realization of the speed and devastation of nuclear weapons that made the universal male conscription less and less useful for the US, NATO and WP countries. They came to realize that conscripts are not good for long-drawn, proxy-wars like Vietnam and Afghanistan and Chechnya. Hence they told the vast majority of the public to stand-down (though mechanisms for mass-mobilization are still available, like selective service registration and Defense Industrial Production laws).
ParGha ji, universal conscription was only practiced by select countries and that too for relatively short periods of human history.

What was there, and still exists, in training of a high number of reservists. Whether it be Western Europe or Russia, al these powers keep having military service for a couple of years to familiarize a larger number of citizens with basic military discipline and especially train in non combat roles. Given that T3R globally it's around 1:3 it makes sense.

But that's nitpicking. The key element is without public support it is difficult to prosecute war.
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Re: Operational Art or War Doctrine

Post by chetak »

ramana wrote:NaMo has reduced friction between the civilians and military, brought unity of command in the military, and rekindled the national will with surgical strikes and Balakot. And economic boycott, app bans, revival of industry hit by Chinese imports also added to national will.

The Galwan warriors added to the national will. That's what I feel while looking in Clausewitz terms at 1962 and now.


The babucracy has been moved from its hitherto central perch and as a result, it has been quietened. The swift developments in ladakh and doklam, the raw ferocity of the galwan incident has brought home to the babooze the sheer futility and the utter inadequacy of MOD babooze in overseeing the handling operational matters best left to the fighting forces.

"war is too important to be left to the generals" is a silly homily that has been thoroughly misunderstood and misused by the Indian babooze. It only means that generals do not declare war and politicians do not fight in war. In reality, the babooze are nowhere represented in the above equation but over the years, have very cleverly appropriated for themselves the teflon coated role of unaccountable and blameless middlemen.

this CDS has ever so smoothly taken over the role of the single point interface with the political leadership and is directly involved in the actual coordination, planning, advise and unfiltered presentation of tactical objectives achieved and real time battlefield observations confirming the efficacy of the deployments that can be quickly evaluated within the overall strategic objectives as outlined by the political leadership.

happily, this has also resulted in a significant enhancement in the clarity and quality of communications that in turn has resulted in a quick and sure footed response that is benefitting the operational commanders in the FEBA who may need to immediately counter the PLA on the battlefield, as and when they make a move.

In swiftly developing scenarios, the IA's field commanders now have a greater degree of freedom to respond and that has the deterrence value of blunting the PLA's appetite for little adventures when in close quarters.

the PLA's command structures in ladakh may not be as flexible, given the implications of another galwan like episode which, one strongly suspects, may not play out quite so benignly as the first time, especially in the higher echelons of their command structure

one can now see why the congis, commies, babooze and the BIF through the mafia famiglia,especially the mafia queen, so vehemently, and for such a long time, opposed the establishment of the CDS.
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Re: Operational Art or War Doctrine

Post by ParGha »

Mukesh.Kumar wrote:ParGha ji, universal conscription was only practiced by select countries and that too for relatively short periods of human history.
When Clausewitz talks about "people's participation", he was specifically talking about universal conscription that was introduced by the French Revolutionary governments, and which allowed Napoleon to mobilize massive armies and crush the better-disciplined Prussians. Clausewitz was a Prussian staff officer, and much of his writings are deeply influenced by the bitter defeat under the hands of Napoleon.
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Re: Operational Art or War Doctrine

Post by chetak »

KILLERS VERSION 2.0: CARRYING FORWARD THE ILLUSTRIOUS LEGACY






KILLERS VERSION 2.0: CARRYING FORWARD THE ILLUSTRIOUS LEGACY

The Killers 2.0 were not only worthy successors to their illustrious predecessors, but have also kept the glorious legacy alive with their professional excellence, panache, resoluteness and a ‘can do’ spirit.

Cmde Srikant B Kesnur
May 15, 2020

KILLERS VERSION KILLERS VERSION 2.0: CARRYING FORWARD THE ILLUSTRIOUS LEGACY

When we were commissioned in the mid-eighties the Osa class Killer Boats were the stuff of legend. They would be nestling together, usually at the Barrack wharf or the Cruiser wharf, and one spoke reverentially about their hallowed past. We also admired their squadron culture which engendered a feeling of loyalty among all Killers and envied the fact that their in-living officers stayed in Command Mess, then the Mecca for all bachelors. However, even then, it was becoming clear that they were getting on in age and, while they were coping with it gracefully, the signs were visible. While the josh was high, obsolescence along with limited sea legs and suboptimal habitability meant that the Navy needed a newer generation of missile boats — one that carried the spirit of the pioneers but were more contemporary in design and warfighting abilities.

The Naval Headquarters paying heed to this need decided on the Soviet Tarantul class missile corvettes as the replacement. These came to be known as the 1241 RE after the project or the Veer class (for a while) in India after the first one to be so commissioned in March 1987. Nirbhik, Nipat, Nishank and Nirghat followed INS Veer in quick succession. It must be remembered that the period between 1985 and 1990 was a particularly important one with regard to our hardware and platforms as the Navy practically had a new inventory. The last two SNFs, the last two G class, the aircraft carrier Viraat, Khukri class, LST M, Magar, the EKM and SSKs, the TU 142s, the 1241 REs and PEs, almost all of them were inducted into the service in this half decade plus. So, it was an exciting time to be in the Navy and to be young in it was very heaven (with apologies to William Wordsworth). Thus, in early 1989, when we were doing our PCT for minesweepers in Kochi many of our course mates were selected as the Commissioning crew of Nishank and Nirghat and as the first change crew for the first three ships.

Suddenly, the “balance of power” had shifted and the REs were the new queens of the ramp. To be selected as their crew was prestigious and we were, understandably, envious. Of course, most of those selected were ‘hotshots’ and it seemed that the best talent was being earmarked for these ships. The earlier OSA class of the 25th Killer Squadron continued to serve with distinction — in fact the last of them were decommissioned in the first decade of this century — but it was clear that it was now the 22nd Killer Squadron or 22 KS where the action was. For officers of my and subsequent generations, it is the Killers 2.0 that have been more visible, more operational and occupying a bigger space in our mindscape. And now, as they too have begun to be retired from service, with few of them decommissioned already, it is perhaps right to doff our caps in tribute to them.

It may seem ironical coming from a man who has never served on the Veer class ships — my closest brush with the REs was when there were galley packets in Vizag of my being appointed as K 22 after my tenure as CO Jalashwa; they were just as quickly dismissed by the originator of the rumours on the grounds that as I had not served on them earlier I was not qualified to be the ‘Kay’. I felt that this Catch-22 situation was unfair and in any case no fault of mine but one has no way of dispelling such gossip or machinations where people on the field plan appointments and transfers blissfully unknown to the P branch. But, on balance, it may be just right that someone who is not a ‘Killer cowboy’ writes about these ships because it would seem impartial and without bias. In the 25 to 30 years that they have served the Navy and nation it would be fair to say that the 22nd Killer squadron ships have a rich catalogue of achievements. While the country has fortunately not seen a full-fledged war since 1971, our volatile neighbourhood has necessitated several war-ready deployments, most particularly during Op Vijay (Kargil) in 1999 and Op Parakram in 2002.

On both these occasions many of my contemporaries were in Command or XOs, so one got a feel of readiness and adrenaline flowing through these ships. I am also sure that on several other occasions in the early nineties when the security situation was fraught, later post-26/11, and more recently in the aftermath of terrorist attacks in Pathankot and Uri and our strikes in Balakot, as well as post abrogation of Article 370, when our western neighbour made threatening noises, the ships of this class would have been called to duty and first to respond. In fact, on account of their ideal mix of firepower, habitability, speed and flexibility these ships have been the first responders where maritime security imperatives have necessitated swift and commensurate deployment. One or two REs forward deployed in our areas of interest or ports to render both offensive punch and defensive assurance has provided force multiplier effect to our operational posture. In fact, it can well be said that these ships have played an invaluable part in sustaining peace and to keep the conflict possibilities below a certain threshold. While a latterday historian would undoubtedly ferret out the many and multisplendoured missions and activities of this squadron — there were 16 ships at their peak strength — it would be safe to surmise that they did much else besides providing terrific firepower and quick deployment options. I clearly remember that they were deployed to provide succour and relief in Gujarat after the massive earthquake in 2001 and did a stellar job. Despite their relatively limited sea legs they have also shown our flag at few places and they have been used in SAR/HADR missions too whenever such requirements arose. I vividly recollect the SAR for the Seaking that had crashed off Mumbai in 1990, my ship Alleppey was amongst the earliest at scene of action but one of the REs — either Nipat or Nirbhik — was already there and, in fact, the first one to locate the debris. One of the REs — Prahar — was also involved in the joint Navy-CG operation to capture the pirated ship Alondra Rainbow, in October 1999.

And this is simply a quick and random recollection. While this fact has not been given much credit, I also think that these ships did much for the Navy’s public diplomacy efforts. Since they gave us the options to deploy them at various small and minor ports, whether as part of our operational design or for testing OTR facilities or proving forward basing or for Navy week activities, they, naturally, were visited by government officials, port authorities, local media, citizens and the aam aadmi and thus developed a natural affinity with the ports visited and people there. This furthered awareness about Navy in these far-flung places. There were also several other things that these ships brought into the mix. I can think of three important ones. The first was that they incubated excellence and represented the very best of the Navy at the junior leadership level. To be selected as the CO of a 1241 RE as a Lt Cdr signified that you were the crème de la crème in your batch. Similarly, to be the XO or GO (fresh from Long G at Dronacharya as first appointment) or non-specialist NO or EO or LO on these ships meant you were ahead of the pack. This had a domino effect wherein anyone posted on these ships, even if not the topper variety now aspired and worked hard to get there.

Second, as a consequence of the above, these ships and officers always exhibited high levels of professionalism, derring-do and bonhomie. This peculiar alchemy of professional and personal attributes meant that these ships often punched above their weight be it in fleet exercises or sports fixtures. Despite the small size of their crew and minuscule number of officers, their versatility, josh and fierce sense of exceptionalism earned them many awards and kudos. This was particularly marked during exercises at sea with fleet ships when the station keeping or gunnery exercises or reactionex serials often found these little fellas besting their big bros. This was also seen in sharp focus when the FOCWEF and FOMA often were arranged on opposite sides of tactical exercises and the REs not only provided the latter with firepower but much frisson and chutzpah. Third, this also led to some valuable professional and operational inputs and advances. Most of the senior commissioning crew of the first few boats were those who had earlier done tenures on other Soviet ships. The REs added to their knowledge of the Ruski doctrines, tactics, SOPs.

This, in turn, contributed to the broad stream of understanding Russian Operational Art and consequently into integrating that with our own approach, largely derived from the British. While our tryst with the Russian hardware started in the late sixties, it could be argued that the integration of Russian, Western and Indian platforms, tactics, even traditions reached their peak in the late eighties and early nineties when we had adequate numbers in our inventory from all sources. The REs and their officers played a vital role in this, not least because the sixth ship (Vidyut) onwards were built in Indian shipyards on the Soviet design but with progressive improvements. The REs, thus, contributed a great deal to our Continuing Professional Education. They were also often the launch pads for innovation. The use of IGLA SAM to add to antiair capability is a case in instance and I am sure there are more that those who served on them will recollect. They also happened to be pioneers in network-centric operations in our Navy courtesy the tech innovations carried out by B.S. Ahluwalia, J.T. Mundekel and M.P. Anil Kumar — X officers all — which then worked as the template for the rest of our Navy.


A lot of this spirit and talent was also evident in the many Killer nights or in the fine annual journal ‘First Strike’ or in the conception of Light and Sound Show or in the maintenance of our heritage structures along the Caste Ramparts which was their den or the many in-house talks, seminars and workshops they used to conduct (now alas a fading tradition). And, above everything, the fierce Killer spirit that pervaded them all. It was as though they belonged to a separate breed. I know of at least one crew (Commissioning Crew INS Nirghat) that made it a point to get together every five years or so long after all of them had gone their separate ways. I guess the same spirit, in different manifestations, is present in every crew of every Killer boat from inception to the present. Thus, we can conclude that the Killers 2.0 were not only worthy successors to their illustrious predecessors but have kept the glorious legacy alive and vibrant with their professional excellence, panache, resoluteness and a ‘can do’ spirit that was the envy of their contemporaries in the service. Here is a loving toast, a salute and three cheers from an admiring outsider. And as the REs approach their sunset years, here is hoping that future generations and the next avatar of Killers maintain the brand equity of the Killers and leave behind even more lasting legacies.
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Re: Operational Art or War Doctrine

Post by ramana »

Some great man wrote

"Strategy is political, while operational is military!"
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Re: Operational Art or War Doctrine

Post by ramana »

Chetak, You bring an important aspect.
Naval operational art. What is it?

I think above writer threw in the word for translating the Land battle to Sea would mean to hit deep opposing forces being formed up.
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Re: Operational Art or War Doctrine

Post by ramana »

ramana wrote:Shiv, Thanks for posting ...


This is a problem because, Desportes insists, numbers matter and most conflicts require controlling space rather than simply locating and attacking the enemy. Controlling space requires “volume.” The result is a French military that can prevail in a battle but cannot win a war.
very insightful profound statement.
...

The first and second Iraq wars are major battles and not wars by this definition. Hence the long drawn War.
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Re: Operational Art or War Doctrine

Post by ramana »

Very good essay clarifying strategy and tactics


https://www.benning.army.mil/MSSP/SPDOW/
Why Does Strategy Matter to Maneuver Leaders?
An understanding of the components of strategy - the tactical and operational elements that must coalesce in order to achieve political outcomes - can contribute to your development as leaders. It can offer a richer understanding of the elements that will drive a war to victory, or defeat.

As other essays in this series explain, maneuver leaders must be able to integrate sister service capabilities into operations: capabilities such as intelligence and fires. The ability to integrate is required in the strategic domain as well, since maneuver leaders will often be required to draw upon other types of non-combat expertise - from development know-how, to economics, to knowledge of infrastructure and rule of law - to achieve U.S. objectives. The 2009 Army Capstone Concept captured this requirement in its concept of wide area security. Wide area security is the application of the elements of combat power in coordination with other military and civilian capabilities to deny the enemy positions of advantage; protect forces, populations, infrastructure, and activities; and consolidate tactical and operational gains to set conditions for achieving strategic and policy goals. Army forces use combined arms maneuver and wide area security operations to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. They establish wide area security to protect forces, populations, infrastructures, and activities. Wide area security also denies the enemy the ability to gain physical, temporal, or psychological advantages. Effective wide area security is essential to consolidating tactical and operational gains that, over time, set conditions for achieving strategic goals.

A consideration of strategy can also help you anticipate (and thus prepare better for) the many factors that can and often do, go wrong in war. For instance, in his classic essay, The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy, Michael Howard explained that war is conducted along four dimensions: the operational, the logistical, the social, and the technological. Successful strategy requires taking into account of all of these dimensions, but under different circumstances, one or another might dominate. Howard pointed out that during the American Civil War, the North's victory was not due to the operational capabilities of its generals, but to its capacity to mobilize its superior industrial strength and manpower into armies. Ultimately, he observed, the logistical dimension of strategy proved more significant than the operational.

More recently, in Afghanistan, the logistical dimension of strategy was critical as well. The need to maintain reliable supply lines to a land-locked country shaped U.S. strategy toward Pakistan, which in turn had significant negative implications for U.S. and allied troops on the ground, since Taliban safe havens were operating from Pakistan. Your actions as leaders in wartime will be magnified, shaped, and often necessarily constrained by how tactics and operations are connected to broader political goals.

Moreover, by thinking strategically - remembering the moving parts that are driving toward the desired political end state - you will be better prepared to anticipate what your adversary may be considering and employing against you. Most likely, he is pursing more than one line of effort to defeat you. The 9/11 attacks were not solely tactical successes for Al Qaeda - they were linked to a broader political campaign designed discredit American actions and objectives in the Middle East. Throughout the Iraq war there were countless examples of U.S. effort to build trust among Iraqi civilians that were deliberately undermined by radical Sunni and Shia-backed militias who were thinking about their desired political end-state. As leaders, you will need to develop tactics and operations that make it harder for enemies to turn U.S. actions to their advantage; this requires an understanding of political dynamics at play. Strategy, like war itself, is interactive.

Strategy and the Political Dimensions of War

No one starts a war - or rather no one in his sense ought to do so - without first being clear in his mind what he tends to achieve by that war and how he tends to conduct it. The former is its political purpose; the latter its operational objective."[1]

There is no dearth of definitions of military strategy. "Tactics," wrote Carl von Clausewitz, is the art of using troops in battle; strategy is the art of using battles to win the war." Liddell Hart, a British soldier and historian, described military strategy as the "the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy." The British historian Michael Howard observed that "strategy concerns the deployment and use of armed forces to attain a given political objective. An Army officer turned academic put it this way: "At its most basic, strategy is a matter of figuring out what we need to achieve, determining the best way to use the resources at our disposal to achieve it, and then executing the plan."[2] And if, for a moment, we take a step back from these military-focused definitions, it is worth noting that grand strategy is about how nations integrate their political, economic, and military goals in order to preserve their long-term interests in times of war and peace.

For the purposes of this essay, however, the focus will be on military strategy and the importance of connecting military tactics and operations to desired political outcomes. Just as you study the importance of combined arms and the need to integrate all arms into the fight, maneuver leaders must have an understanding of the need to connect battle field actions to political objectives.

In war, politics is as contested as territory. Holding territory requires an understanding of the politics that govern the territory. No matter how threats and conflicts are characterized – whether conventional, small, irregular, or hybrid – what is common to virtually all such contingencies is that the political landscape will drive the character of these conflicts. In virtually any scenario in which the United States Army will be involved, the politics of the situation on the ground will shape the context for the intervention and how the conflict unfolds.

This political dimension of war is not new to the United States Army. Throughout its history, the Army has engaged in "politics on the ground."[3] Virtually all of the wars in which it has fought have involved the problem of managing local actors in order to restore stability and basic order. U.S. Army officers directly supervised the creation of new governments in a range of wars. These include the well-known success stories of Germany and Japan during World War II, as well as Italy and Korea. In addition, cases that have traditionally garnered less attention include the Mexican War in the 1860s, reconstruction during the Civil War, Puerto Rico and Cuba during the Spanish American War. Governance operations took place during the Cold War period too: the Dominican Republic 1965, Grenada in 1986, and Panama in 1989. Not counting the more recent post Cold War period, Army personnel under the theater commander's operational control supervised and implemented political and economic reconstruction. In virtually all of the Army's major contingencies Army personnel remained on the ground overseeing the political transitions that were essential to the consolidation of victory.

An Approach to the Study of Strategy

First, maneuver leaders should become familiar with some of the classical thinking about strategy. You should read all or at least parts of parts of On War. If that seems intimidating, you might first read several articles that synthesize Clausewitz's views, and then dive into the parts of On War that interest you. You should also read some of the classic modern thinkers on military strategy, such as Michael Howard (see the article noted below). This will help provide a context for original texts that you might read.

Second, you should explore relevant Army doctrine that captures the importance of strategy. Some examples of this doctrine are included below. While it might not engender the most fast paced reading, some of it is actually well-written and it provides insights into contemporary debates about how the Army is thinking, which will help you engage in contemporary discussions.

Third, you should read case studies of strategies in war. A good place to start would be to read two books, Makers of Modern Strategy (which is probably worth having on your bookshelf) and The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War. The First title includes essays by renowned historians and thinkers and essay subjects include ones on Napoleon, Jomini and Clausewitz, World War I, Russian strategy, World War II, conventional war and revolutionary warfare. The second title focuses on how rulers and states develop strategy through seventeen essays ranging from the ancient past to modern day. As a part of your case study reading, it would also be worth reading some of the more recent articles and discussions about the problems of strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq. Your generation of soldiers has been shaped by these wars so understanding the debates about them will be important as you continue to grow as leaders.

[1] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, p.579

[2] Christopher Bassford, Policy, Politics, War, and Military Strategy; available on line at http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bass ... tegyDraft/. This was published in 1997 and updated in 2006.

[3] Nadia Schadlow, Organizing to Compete in the Political Terrain Army Strategic Studies Institute Monograph, August 2010. http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.ar ... pubID=1007
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Re: Operational Art or War Doctrine

Post by ramana »

This thread tries to ask and answer these questions so we can understand military operations.

Reflections
What is strategy? How would you define it when talking to your cohorts?
As you read about specific wars throughout this course of Self Study and more broadly, keep in mind the political aims of these wars. Are U.S. civilian leaders clear about these aims? Are their military counterparts clear about these objectives? How did the battles and operations in these wars contribute to the achievement of these aims? How were they shaped by them?
Are there strategic principles that endure? What are they?
What are some examples in war in which tactics and operations did or did not advance the political outcomes that the United States sought to achieve?
How did our enemies, in various wars, exploit the politics of war?
What training can I implement into my unit so that subordinates will develop a better understanding of military strategy?
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Re: Operational Art or War Doctrine

Post by ramana »

So in light of these questions can we look at:
1) 1948 J&K war
2) 1962 Goa
3) 1962 Chinese Aggression
4) 1965 Pakistan War
5) 1971 Bangladesh War
6) 1987 IPKF Sri Lanka.
7) 1999 Kargil
8 ) 2001 Parakram

Bonus 1984 Siachen.
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Re: Operational Art or War Doctrine

Post by ramana »

Chetak please lead these discussions as you seem only ex-military interested one!
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Re: Operational Art or War Doctrine

Post by ramana »

Galwan is too fresh. So may be later.
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Re: Operational Art or War Doctrine

Post by ramana »

On Sir Michael Howard

https://tnsr.org/roundtable/captain-pro ... el-howard/
Captain Professor Sir: Some Lessons from Michael Howard
Contributors: Beatrice Heuser

In this featured roundtable essay for Vol. 3, Iss. 2, Beatrice Heuser writes about the life and work of the late Sir Michael Howard.

In 1967, the professor of war studies of King’s College London, then still an integral part of the University of London, was invited to give the ninth Harmon Memorial Lecture in Military History at the U.S. Air Force Academy. Ostensibly speaking about “Strategy and Policy in 20th-Century Warfare,” the speaker, Michael Howard, used this occasion to make a plug for widening military history to become more of a historiography of war. He argued it should explain the traditional campaign history in the larger context of the history of war, which, in turn, is an intrinsic part of the history of society. Combat activities should be seen as ”methods of implementing national policy, to be assessed in the light of political purposes which they are intended to serve.”1 Influenced by Edward Mead Earle’s famous Makers of Strategy, he identified this linkage between “national policy” and the use of force as “strategy.” Almost 40 years later, this is how he put it in his autobiography:

The history of war, I came to realize, was more than the operational history of armed forces. It was the study of entire societies. Only by studying their cultures could one come to understand what it was that they fought about and why they fought in the way that they did. Further, the fact that they did so fight had a reciprocal impact on their social structure. I had to learn not only to think about war in a different way, but also to think about history itself in a different way. I would certainly not claim to have invented the concept of ‘War and Society’, but I think I did something to popularize it.2

I first encountered Michael Howard when his star was at its zenith and he was invited to give another celebrated lecture to another set of students, this time civilians. In 1981, as the incumbent of Britain’s most prestigious chair in modern history — the Regius Chair, which is appointed by the monarch on the prime minister’s advice — he gave the annual Creighton Lecture at the University of London. It was the last peak of the Cold War, and the lecture, entitled “The Causes of War,”3 was given in the university’s Senate House, Britain’s most glorious fascistoid piece of architecture. Into this lecture I drifted, then myself a confused history student at the London School of Economics and a member of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, to find that it was the most inspiring thing I had heard on the subject of war. Sitting in the cold marble Art Deco lecture room, I realized that I had discovered my academic model: a scholar who started a lecture with Thucydides’ explanation of the origins of the Peloponnesian War and ended it with a pointer to the horrendous dangers inherent in balance-of-power thinking. He conjured up the nightmare that a nuclear power might be tempted to go to war to prevent an adversarial nuclear power from growing to the point that it would become unbeatable. Not only did he articulate the fears of Campaigners for Nuclear Disarmament, but he also intuitively caught the essence of how Soviet military leaders felt in the face of NATO’s deployment of the Euromissiles or Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces.4

Moreover, here was a historian who did not hesitate to sketch the big picture. I had had my fill of lecturers who, when asked about parallels across time and space, claimed not to be able to comment because that was “not their period.” I had also had my fill of lecturers who thought the study of history was worth pursuing because it was intriguing, entertaining, and fascinating, but who proclaimed that history should be studied exclusively for its own sake — that it holds no wisdom for the present. I realized that I had found the approach to history that I have since made my own, not l’art pour l’art or history as entertainment, [/b][/u]but a database for the study of human behavior, our only guide to understanding rerum causas — the origins of things, of configurations of the present and the future[/u][/b].

Howard was well aware of the potential for the abuse of history.5 History, he said, does not teach lessons; historians do, some wisely, some less so. New evidence constantly emerges, requiring a constant re-evaluation of our understanding of past times, just when we thought we understood this causality or that period reasonably well.6 Historians can make few predictions of the future, but as historians perceived with glee, particularly in the late 1980s, the many theories of international relations could not do more. History furnishes us with patterns — not identical patterns as found in wallpaper, which would allow us to formulate a verifiable, hard-and-fast theory that whenever there is a grey circle, then a brown square follows. But we do find an erratic, unreliable, but nevertheless discernible repetition of basic configurations — structure and process, in the words of Howard7 — of human interactions, such as jealousy and competitive behavior between rivals and colleagues; the dynamics of group decision-making in a cabinet of ministers or the NATO Council; inter-service rivalry; conspiracy theories; bureaucratic politics; the individual’s temptation to defect from the group and follow his or her own shortsighted, narrow interests; and the distrust of any rising power, however peaceful and democratic it is, and the dangerous window-of-opportunity thinking that might bring on avoidable conflicts. History also provides examples of moral dilemmas that resurface time and again: what balance to strike between the liberty of the individual and the sacrifice made for the collectivity or how to identify the lesser evil, given that the choice in politics and international relations is generally between several bad options, rarely between good and bad.

The Lessons He Taught

Two years after hearing him speak, when I applied to do a DPhil at Oxford, I was assigned Howard as my supervisor. I sent him a gushing note to express my excitement about this. He wrote back, kindly: “It is nice to be appreciated.” He must have wondered how to respond to this effervescence of enthusiasm, and clearly, his British reserve kicked in. When, in the second year of my DPhil, he absconded to Princeton for a sabbatical, however, he wrote glowing reports home in private letters about the enthusiasm of American students (letters now in the Liddell Hart Archive at King’s College London). So he too could gush, but only in private!

I worked with him for long enough then, and later, to take on board some of the major lessons he passed on beyond that of marrying history and the present. One was that of his engagement as a government adviser: I have never seen the point of studying international relations if one does not want to engage with practitioners. Knighted in 1986 and honored with further distinctions, Sir Michael Howard has been greatly honored by the British establishment, even though it was not always plain sailing, as his opposition to a number of government decisions illustrates. He clearly did wield influence in Whitehall through his articulate and lucid statements at conferences and the wisdom of his insights, presented in a sincere yet tactful way. His was always the approach of avoiding outrightly offending an adversary, rather seeking to persuade and to stimulate thinking. (Occasionally he gave in to the temptation of gentle mockery, but he would equally turn this on himself.)

Persuasion, rather than hostile confrontation, was to him a cardinal goal. I once was examiner to a PhD student who, to terminate NATO’s intervention in Afghanistan, advocated bombing in winter the villages of tribes known to back the mujahideen. The student’s argument was that it would kill enemy supporters, and those who were out during the day — gathering firewood perhaps — would die of exposure. The candidate added that “unfortunately” the “Obama circles” in Washington refused to contemplate this measure. Having read much the same about Wehrmacht tactics in occupied Russia in World War II, I was horrified, and I turned to Howard for moral guidance. His answer: make the candidate write as many pages on why it is that the “Obama circles” refuse to contemplate this measure. That would force him to take an even-handed approach to the subject.

In the same vein, Howard opposed the outlawing of “Holocaust denial” in the United Kingdom: He did not think it a parliament’s business to legislate on the truth. By contrast, he thought one should not cease to engage with those denying that genocide had taken place — under German occupation, or under the Young Turks, or under Pol Pot or Mao — and to confront them with evidence. Dialogue to him was key. In the heated debates about war and peace and nuclear deterrence, he realized a long time before many of us that Whitehall and the military had the same goal as the antinuclear campaigners: to avoid World War III. The disagreement was about how to do so, not about the goal itself. The disarmers merely showed more concern about the ever-present danger of war, including nuclear escalation, by accident or miscalculation, while the deterrers — who included Howard — argued and continue to argue that nuclear weapons make major war an impossible rational choice. As he put it in 1981,

Society may have accepted killing as a legitimate instrument of state policy, but not, as yet, suicide. For that reason, I find it hard to believe that the abolition of nuclear weapons, even if it were feasible, would be an unmixed blessing. Nothing that makes it easier for statesmen to regard war as a feasible instrument of state policy, one from which they stand to gain rather than lose, is likely to contribute to lasting peace.8

In the furtherance of dialogue, one of his great achievements was his leading role in setting up the Institute for Strategic Studies (later the International Institute for Strategic Studies) in London. Yet, in his memoirs, he was skeptical about the true enthusiasm with which this was greeted among government officials (the institute scrupulously refused any government financial support). He recalled: “Seldom can bureaucrats have listened so courteously to academics, and academics have basked so gladly under the happy illusion that their ideas were being taken seriously in the corridors of power.”9 There is no doubt, however, that this institute has provided an exceptional forum for international debate about war and peace, and for the exchange of knowledge between the government and scholars.

It was also Howard who founded the world-leading interdisciplinary Department of War Studies at King’s College London, which, under the leadership of his disciple, Sir Lawrence Freedman, bloomed into the world’s largest research and teaching institution on war-related subjects. Its students are not merely normal civilian undergraduates and graduates (as in London) — its Shrivenham branch is now mainly responsible for the academic part in the education of most British higher officers.

Occasionally, this growth in war studies, pursued with great enthusiasm by lecturers and students alike, could lead to misunderstandings. When Howard was invited back to King’s College from Oxford for, as usual, a very stimulating guest lecture, an undergraduate asked him, “Sir, what is your favorite war?” He took a deep breath and, realizing that just such a misunderstanding had occurred, replied with a voice like thunder: “My favorite war? Why, I hate them all!” Indeed, his memoirs of his own experience in World War II are full of regrets. These include the likely unavoidable inaction of the British contingent in Gorizia while Yugoslavs wrought their revenge on Italians for what Italian occupation forces had done to Yugoslavs shortly before.10 Years later, Howard was invited to lecture in an Italian town, and found that not everybody gave him a warm welcome: It turned out that the British contingent that had liberated it had been unaware that in a town nearby, a bloody reckoning was taking place between two different factions of Italians. He wrote in his memoirs that he was still wondering what else he could have done.11 He, for one, was never so naïf as to think there was a good answer to every such question.

In dialogue with government officials as well as civilian students and military officers, Howard followed a number of rules typical of the English School of Strategic Studies, of which another captain (one world war earlier), Sir Basil Liddell Hart, was the father. It is not by accident that Liddell Hart would also become Howard’s chief mentor. True to the tradition of another “captain who taught generals” (as was said of Liddell Hart), Howard passed on the following advice to his own disciples: Do not shroud your writing in jargon. Write clearly so that any halfway educated person can understand what you are saying, and cite solid historical evidence to make your point, rather than indulging in a game of theories. Find quotations from the original sources to illustrate your point; do not quote or clutter your text with the names of other academics unless you intend to disagree with them. Write and speak succinctly. Your main argument is what matters. Don’t go off on tangents with details that thrill you but that distract your audience and readers from the main argument.

Howard had a particular gift of finding the right words in his writing: He could summarize complex issues most beautifully and succinctly. Sitting in an antique armchair in his exquisitely decorated office at Oriel College (I have a vague memory of pastel colors including light green, grey, and pink, which he also sported in his ties), an ornate 18th-century golden clock ticking away above the fireplace, he shared with his student a cup of tea or a crystal glass of sherry as well as his recipe on how to write a good lecture or chapter. It was derived from the old Oxbridge essay style: Do all your reading, then retire for the evening with a good glass of red wine. In nocte consilium: Rise early, write the whole thing in one go, and then go back to your notes to insert the footnotes. If you look closely, the chapters of his great think-piece books, such as War and the Liberal Conscience or The Invention of Peace, are all roughly the length of a good 50-minute lecture.

Howard also knew what scholars can and cannot contribute. His wisdom was to contribute a wider perspective, whether in a debate behind closed doors or in public, about any live issue, with an understanding of history that shed light on a topic from a different angle. Few scholars have real-time insights into diplomatic and policymaking activities or could ever have the detailed knowledge of the issues facing government officials and military officers directly involved in negotiations within governments, alliances, or other international organizations or arms control fora. Technical details of weapons systems, for example, are usually the last to be declassified. And Howard, for one, was acutely aware that changes in technology could significantly change arguments about strategy.12 Yet, sometimes choices emerge that are clear enough even to outsiders without knowing all the technical details involved. It is especially here that scholars can weigh in and comment in ways that can enrich and enlighten the debate, as Howard did in the debate about the United Kingdom’s acquisition of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces and of Trident in the early 1980s — he was against both and thought the American commitment to Europe’s defense in NATO sufficient13 — or the debate on the U.S. “War on Terror” following the 9/11 attacks. (In the latter context he rightly pointed out that it is nonsense to speak about waging war on an abstract noun, while promoting a conflict with terrorists to the status of war would only give them combatant protection.14) He saw that, as a historian, the best contribution he could make was to put any issue in a wider context, to highlight the bigger picture, the recurrent patterns and questions, and the ethical dimensions beyond the specific technicalities of any ongoing negotiations, while insisting on precision in language and argument. This is an important lesson that academics can learn from the career of Michael Howard: It is in such contexts that they can make themselves most useful.

Translating Clausewitz
It is often said that Howard owed his reputation above all to his book on the Franco-Prussian War.15 But his real rise to fame came when, jointly with Peter Paret, he edited a new translation of Clausewitz’s On War, just as, in the wake of the Vietnam debacle, the idea that America had betrayed its Napoleonic-Clausewitzian “way of war” in Vietnam and should return to a true “American Way of War” was seizing hold of the American military. Clausewitz became the flavor of the age, and Howard and Paret, together with their late colleague Angus Malcolm of the British Foreign Office, turned obsolescent German into pithy, up-to-date English prose. Clausewitz, of course, has more to offer than merely comments on high-intensive conflict or how to organize large-scale resistance (“people’s war”) against an occupation regime (an aspect of On War that impressed Mao Tse-tung).

Clausewitz was to give Howard much of the intellectual ammunition that he was still groping for when he gave his lecture at the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1967: As director of Prussia’s General War School, Clausewitz was at odds with his staff over their excessively positivist determination to teach warfare through formulae — what would later be called the principles of warfare — and make it calculable and predictable. Clausewitz thought that “[a]ll these attempts to base the conduct of war upon arithmetic and geometrical principles are to be discarded, as the application of the rule exclude the genius [probably better translated as ‘judgment’] and limit the activity of intelligence.”16 In his “Abstract Principles of Strategy” of 1808/1809, Clausewitz wrote:

The more I think about this part of the Art of War [i.e. what we now call Strategy], the more I become convinced that its theory can posit few or even no abstract principles [Sätze]; but not, as is commonly thought, because the matter is too difficult, but because one would go under in stating the all-too-obvious [Trivialitaten].

On the one hand, he argued,

In war, there are so many petty variables [Umstände] which contribute to affect action that if one wanted to include them appropriately in his abstract rules, one would appear as the biggest pedant.

On the other hand, to ignore the many variables would be unrealistic.17 Nor did Clausewitz think it appropriate for the teacher to prescribe the military commander’s every actions in all contexts: Howard liked to quote the passage from On War in which Clausewitz defined the role of the teacher as to “educate the mind of the future military leader or rather give him guidance in his self-education, but not accompany him onto the battlefield, just as a teacher guides and facilitates the spiritual development of a youth, without, however, keeping him strapped in leading strings all his life.”18

Published in 1976, this new translation of On War, with its lengthy introductory chapters, gave Howard the material for many wise spin-off articles and lectures. The very next year, Howard left London for Oxford there to take up the Chichele Chair of the History of War — a chair created in 1910 as the Chair of Military History and renamed in 1946 to cover “war” more generally — which perfectly suited Howard’s agenda of moving research from traditional military history to the history of war and of strategy.

But besides being the acknowledged lead historian of war in the United Kingdom, the incumbent was the obvious person to invite to conferences — public and private — on all matters military, and to bring over to Whitehall whenever one needed a more academic (and historical) perspective on matters related to defense. Here, Howard’s forte would continue to be to provide the larger picture, and this he did outstandingly. This larger picture, and the memory of similar questions that had been on the table a decade or several decades before, is what government institutions notoriously lack, and do not have the time or manpower to research with the patience and thoroughness of a scholar.

His Legacy
What of his heritage, half a century later? The International Institute for Strategic Studies and King’s College London are flourishing and have both expanded to a size even their founder would not have dreamt of in the 1950s and 1960s. Military history has truly changed into the history of war, wherever it is tolerated. Unfortunately, that is not in many universities, as many scholars are still suspicious of anybody studying war. The “war and society” approach has grown greatly, but with a massive emphasis on social history, so that, outside the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, and a small handful of chairs at universities and the military academies, academics studying war are more likely to study soldiers’ wives or patterns of desertion than strategy. Graduate degrees including the term “strategy” or “strategic” are most likely to deal with business or climate change, or include a token session on Clausewitz, taught by somebody with at best a passing acquaintance with the Paret and Howard translation, rarely the ability to read his works in the original. The English School of Strategic Studies, of which Howard’s obituaries proclaim him to be a scion if not the founder, is now threatened by extinction. It just about flourishes still in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, but that is not immune from the steady spread of jargon, reductionism — “one independent variable, one dependent variable” — and confirmation bias — “this essay will argue” or “this article will show that.”

Also waning are sensitivities for cultural diversity and the acquisition of “the language of the past” — and of other languages tout court. They have been drowned in “monoglot illiteracy” (to quote Lord Dacre)19 and the ever-increasing fashion of quantitative and theoretical analysis that has flooded Europe coming from — sorry, folks — American academe. Historical evidence — particularly anything that happened more than about 30 years ago — is disregarded or brushed aside, myths are created and happily passed on if they fit theories, and the names of obscure scholars and the jargon-heavy, and worse still monocausal, theories they have produced reign supreme. Encrypted language prevails in this discourse addressed exclusively at the initiates, which is also true for most internal government documents, although the acronyms and the jargon differ from those of the social scientists. This makes dialogue between academics and practitioners a dialogue of the deaf. It should thus perhaps not surprise us that an increasing number of international relations scholars see no way to — and have no ambition to — make themselves useful to government: Speaking different languages, they would not be able to communicate anyway. Others, with their three-case-studies approach, will claim to have created, proved, or disproved theories that, in reality, have no predictive quality for the next case. But it would be dangerous in the extreme to expose civil servants or military officers with an engineering background to such theories, which might fit even complex machines, but not the much greater complexity of multiple human interactions.

Meanwhile, the split in academia between history and international relations seems complete in all but a handful of universities, with a few aging academics still keeping a foot in both camps. Gone from international relations is an understanding that human societies are constantly evolving and are not an unalterable clockwork, the mechanism of which can be understood by any one theory. International relations, as taught today, seems to have begun in 1991, or at best, in 1945 (with a brief back-hand to a supposed Westphalian system that never existed and a Soviet-American division of the world at Yalta, which never happened), and furnishes an eclectic database — usually centering on U.S. foreign policy — for largely abstract theoretical cloud-cuckoo lands. Howard’s eminent successors as Chichele Professors of the History of War were progressively barred from supervising doctoral students who were not working on a purely historical subject with a narrowly historiographic methodology. Brilliant students, often military officers, from the world over had come specifically to study with Howard, and after him, Robert O’Neill (one of his own disciples, and one-time director of the International Institute of Strategic Studies) and Hew Strachan (who had previously founded the Scottish Centre for War Studies at the University of Glasgow). For the last decade or so, they found themselves turned away from working with the Chichele Professor if their subjects had a strong contemporary angle. Instead, those students were kept firmly in the social sciences faculty, as though examining what happened after 1945 had to differ in methodology from examining what happened before, and as though one period concerned only the arts and humanities, the other the social sciences. Their work was shoehorned into international relations methodologies, with modelling, quantitative approaches, and, above all, monocausal theories — “show me one ‘independent variable’ in war” as Michael Howard used to say — and they were made to write in jargon-laden, impenetrable prose.

Perhaps we will find, looking back in some years, that Sir Michael Howard’s death marks the passing of the understanding that we are part of eternal change not of unchanging mechanisms. And it may mark the passing of the use of lucid, jargon-free, universally intelligible prose in strategic studies that practitioners can immediately understand without themselves having to read about arcane international relations theories.
Very insightful tribute to a scholar historian.
ramana
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Re: Operational Art or War Doctrine

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A very useful article on applying Lanchester Equations to WWII combat and the way forward is described.

http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/blog/2018 ... l-warfare/

What the research shows is the straightforward application of the power and liner equations gives erroneous conclusions.
However realizing if it's an attacker or defender, taking terrain, and weather into account gives meaningful results to study battle.
Results of the linear regressions by defense posture are shown in Table 7. For each posture, the equation that seemed to give a better fit to the data is underlined (Note 15). From this table, the following very tentative conclusions might be drawn:

In an attack on a fortified position, the attacker suffers casualties by the square law; the defender suffers casualties by the linear law. That is, the defender is aware of the attacker’s position, while the attacker knows only the general location of the defender. (This is similar to Deitchman’s guerrilla model. Note 16).

This situation is apparently reversed in the cases of attacks on prepared positions and hasty defenses.

Delaying situations seem to be treated better by the square law for both attacker and defender.
Another fascinating aspect of both the attacker and defender are the variables:

Image

While we don't force ratios etc. know the important battles of 1965 we do know that Assal Uttar and Chaiwinda narratives and outcomes.
We can make general remarks on them.
ramana
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Re: Operational Art or War Doctrine

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Here is a detailed description of the two battles of Hilli, in the 1971 war.

https://archive.claws.in/images/journal ... hibber.pdf

So let us enumerate the 12 factors as listed above for attacking and defending forces.
Ignore factor 2.
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Re: Operational Art or War Doctrine

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ramana
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Re: Operational Art or War Doctrine

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Link to book review on Gen Sagat Singh

viewtopic.php?p=2532338#p2532338
ramana
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Re: Operational Art or War Doctrine

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Recall I talked about British Naval operational Art?

Book Review of Rules of the Game by Andrew Gordon

https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/06/a- ... -the-game/
A naval classic revisited: Andrew Gordon’s fascinating study ‘The Rules of the Game’
'The Rules of the Game' is thick, meticulously researched, often tedious, frustrating but ultimately fascinating book about the slow and unwitting transformation of the British Royal Navy from the glory days of Trafalgar in 1805 to the indecisive and controversial battle of Jutland in 1916, when the British fumbled the ball.
By Thomas E. Ricks



By Robert Killebrew
Best Defense chief sailing correspondent

The Rules of the Game is thick, meticulously researched, often tedious, frustrating but ultimately fascinating book about the slow and unwitting transformation of the British Royal Navy from the glory days of Trafalgar in 1805 to the indecisive and controversial battle of Jutland in 1916, when the British fumbled the ball.

As the U.S. Navy’s great sea victories of 1942-45 recede in time, Rules of the Game should be on the desk of every serving naval officer, starting with the CNO, and of every other military officer as well. It is the enormously complicated story of how a great institution declines, imperceptibly and unknowing, from the supreme heights to unconscious mediocrity.


The late Victorians would have found such a statement astounding. In the late nineteenth century the Royal Navy stood supreme on the seas, it’s reputation as the world’s foremost naval power unchallenged, and its role in underpinning the British Empire undisputed. Its rich heritage was based, more than any other period of history, on its exploits of the Napoleonic era, when, in Mahan’s words, the Royal Navy’s “distant, storm beaten ships” stood between Britain and Napoleon’s domination of Europe.

But those “storm beaten ships” were part of a navy that was at war for almost an entire generation of sailors, a period that ruthlessly paired down the navy’s officer corps into a hard professional body whose character was molded by fighting admirals like Jervis, Hood and, of course, Horatio Nelson, whose aggressiveness and spirit infused the fleet before Trafalgar and for a generation afterward.” In the event signals can not be understood,” Nelson famously instructed his “band of brothers,” “No captain can go far wrong who puts his ship alongside that of an enemy.” No finer example of “mission orders” exists in military history.

But in the generations after Trafalgar, the service that had been formed and hardened by war began to change, slowly, affected by both personalities — and Gordon does a mind-bogglingly good job of tracing the networks of friendships, professional cliques and Royal favors that fed the old-boy leadership of the Service — and by technologies — above all, the conversion from sail to steam, during which the traditions and fighting concepts of the “old navy” continued to frustrate and derail innovation, above all in tactics.

During the age of fighting sail, techniques of sailing by flag hoist by combinations of code flags had become common; by the use of repeating frigates and other means, vast fleets of line-of-battle ships tacked and wheeled when the “haul down” execute order was given by the flagship. As steam replaced sail, meticulous attention to detail — in spit-and-polish (especially in the Mediterranean fleet), in behavior, and in every detail of execution — became the sine qua non for professional advancement. In the forward, Admiral Sandy Woodward catches the transformation nicely when he says, “The keynote of battle-doctrine in Victorian times stemmed from the imperative to try to regulate everything — even the nature of combat, which of course, cannot be done.”

But they tried, and they prevailed, unconsciously, by promoting a long line of admirals who thought and acted like all the other admirals. The single exception was — and his name should be remembered — Admiral Sir George Tyron, who died in a collision that sank his flagship, the Victoria, and killed 350 of her crew in 1893 while experimenting with Nelsonian battle maneuvers. The shock of the tragedy and the subsequent court-martial effectively ended any “new thinking.” Ship-handling, attention to detail, and signaling became the watchword — especially signaling. An excerpt from the chapter titled “The Long, Calm Lee of Trafalgar” captures the moment:

"The yeoman would stand on the foredeck, his telescope glued to his eye, and his whole frame quivering with excitement, like a pointer about to flush a covey of partridges. Up would go a hoist of flags in the flagship. As each flag was hoisted clear of the deck… the yeoman spotted what it was and shouted it down to the signalmen on the bridge. There would be a rush toward the flag-locker and rolled up flags would be hauled out of their pigeon holes, bent together and hosted in a frantic effort to get them to the masthead before the flagship mastheaded her signal. The yeoman would report the meaning of the signal to the captain, the navigator and the officer of the watch. Down would come the signal on board the flagship, and at the same time down would come the signal on board the repeating ship.

“Signal’s down, sir,” would shout the yeoman, repeating the significance of the signal, over would go the wheel, and the ships, all over 10,000 tons and spaced at intervals of 300 yards, would swing together into the new formation."

“It bothered a few,” Gordon writes, “that in battle there would be shell splinters and machine-guns to slice through halyards and… even kill the admiral. But no matter; one can readily understand how the new steam-tacticians were seen as representing the Royal Navy’s triumphant assimilation of the industrial revolution.”

Personalities come into the narrative. By 1916 the commander of the entire front-line British Grand Fleet in its northern anchorage at Scapa Flow was Admiral John Jellicoe, whose career Gordon follows from his days as a sub-lieutenant on a Nile gunboat through his climb through the ranks to his flag. The pressures on him were enormous. Across the North Sea lurked the German High Seas fleet at Williamshafen. If the Germans were to break out, or, worse, defeat the British battle fleet — unthinkable to the British — the war in France could conceivably be lost. (Churchill, as First Lord of the Admiralty, said that Jellicoe was the “only man who could lose the war in a day,” hardly words to encourage an aggressive fighting spirit.)

Jellicoe had divided his fleet at their anchorages, sending his battle-cruisers (faster mini-battleships) to Rosyth, near Inverness and — a point that matters — more accessible to the public and press than the remote anchorage at Scapa Flow. There was also a great difference in the commanders: Jellicoe, with the main fleet of 24 dreadnought battleships and other fleet assets, was a fast-track but careful professional. He is described by Gordon as a reserved, quiet man, “a manager rather than a heroic leader” and as “the Uncle Arthur of Admirals.” His subordinate commander of the Battle Cruiser Squadron, though, was quite the opposite. David Beatty was, according to Gordon, “… a scion of hard-hunting, hard-playing Irish landowning gentry (with) charisma and panache… unequaled by any other naval officer this (20th) century.” Riskily married to a rich American divorcee, he left turbulence in his wake, but became, at 38, Britain’s youngest rear admiral since Nelson. He loved the press and, like Nelson, the press loved him.

Inevitably, stationed apart, each man pressed his personality on his fleet — Jellicoe’s deliberate approach on the dreadnaughts, Beatty on the dashing, more public and more Nelsonian battle cruisers. So when the High Seas Fleet did come out, the climactic battle — to which Gordon gives considerable space — becomes, on the British side, a series of misunderstood signals, confusion and missed chances; the analysis of the battle is thorough and a gripping story for professional seamen and laymen alike, replete with heroics and diagrams that lead the reader through the complexities of dreadnaught warfare. Afterward, controversies between the “Jellicoe” and “Beatty” factions roiled the Royal Navy, and led to changes in doctrines, training and aggressiveness that stood the Navy in good stead in the dark days on 1939-45. Of the officer corps of 1914, Gordon writes that “They thought they were good, but in ways that mattered, they were not. They thought they were ready for war, but they were not.” What a damning indictment.

Nothing is more important to a fighting service than sound doctrine — its common agreement on how to fight. As Gordon’s book so thoroughly points out, doctrine is a combination of personality, culture, and technical capability more than codification in a manual or rulebook; it is actually the way a Service behaves in wartime. Without the pressure of war, as Woodward points out in his preface, “continuous peace will produce a predominance of regulators, as evidenced by the pre-1914 Navy.” Gordon’s book is the best I have ever seen that explains how this kind of transformation from “fighting” to “regulating” took place in the world’s preeminent navy from 1805 to 1914. Rules of the Game should be on the bookshelf, and should be read and discussed, by every naval officer now on active duty.

Bob Killebrew is a retired U.S. Army colonel who consults and writes about issues of national defense, with especial interest in the age of sail.
How I wish Brig Ray C were around to get his insights.

I see a lot of common factors to the Indian Army in 1962.
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Re: Operational Art or War Doctrine

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