Two and Half Front War Scenario

nam · Post by **nam** » 16 Jan 2018 00:19

Can i ask a question. Why would Pak + Chini want a two front war with India? What would the achievable objective?
And why would Pak+Chini think it is achievable?

Pak wanted to capture whatever it wanted to capture in 65, before India went nuclear. A valid object. It believed it can achieve due to 62, India was still building, no western tech like it had. So it had a very good chance of achieving what it wanted. Ofcourse they did not implement it well, that is a different story. It never attempted another 65 style invasion.

Chini attacked in 62. Objective pre-empt a Indian invasion in to Tibet, applied overwhelming numbers, secret preparation etc. So it had a good objective, prepared well, worked to an extent to create an impression of weak India. However Chinis realized, it cannot fight a proper war in Tibet and never attempted again, as we got wiser.

So my impression is that we have two adversaries, who seem to have planned for a proper objective before invading us. They haven't tried it so far, after their first attempt. Now we are 10 times more richer that what we were in 62/65. In 12 years, we will 2-3 more richer.

To defeat a nation in "total war", I feel these are required:
1. Enough men to fight in your army and easy replacement. Enemy not having such a luxury.
2. Terrain, through which ones army can blitz, easy for logistics etc. example France v/s Russia for the Germans.
3. Technology. Denied to the enemy.
4. Money & resources like fuel, metal etc.

So if I ask a Pak+Chini General to come up with a plan to invade and defeat in a "total conventional war", a country with
1. world's largest land army
2. A country with difficult terrain
3. 4-5 trillion GDP economy in the next 5-7 years.
4. 1.3-1.4 billion people.

what would their plan? What would their objective?

Note: Red Army was world's largest army when Germany invaded Russia. It was still the world's largest army when WW2 ended.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 16 Jan 2018 00:38

Firstly glad this thread has gone to page 2.
Secondly shiv

The only discussion is whether we agree with this or not.

Logically, if China>India>Pakistan, then China+Pakistan>India

Nuclear weapons are the joker in the pack that are intended to keep wars at a conventional level. There are a hundred different ways war scenarios can be played out while "wargaming" so anything I say will simply be my thoughts based on my reading. No one needs to agree with me - the post is not intended to upset anyone in particular.

1. Will India attack China occupied Tibet? Unlikely
2. Will India attack Pakistan: Sooner or later Pakistan will take more hits from India. Most likely short, sharp retaliations
3. Will China support Pakistan in an active military campaign? We have to prepare for the fact that like the US chose to send the 7th fleet in 1971, The US warned Pakistan about Indian movements in 2001, and the Chinese cooked up a border incident involving sheep in 1965 that they will seek to dilute any Indian advantage. Nations may support India, but they do not want to see Pakistan go down.
4. Will Pakistan attack India? Most certainly terrorist attacks and support to any dissident group in India is assured. Any dissident or frustrated political party in India can and will get support in Pakistan. Is this "internal security" or is it "external"?
5. Will China attack India: The possibility of a border incident cannot be overlooked. As I see it the LAC was not manned by India and even with minimal manning the Chinese had a free run. As India beefed up its border forces, there were more encounters with the Chinese. After Doklam - the Chinese will beef up their presence. So some incidents are highly likely. Will these lead to all out war. Probably not. My guess.

The bolded parts are the elements of this thread.

Precisely its a combination of Pak and China together attack India for the reason China+Pak> India.

Now China has large forces but has threats on its Eastern side. In 1962, India did not understand that China got assurance that its Eastern front wont be under threat when they moved and precisely when that assurance was a surety due to Cuban Missile Crisis.

Now they cant be sure of that and have to keep some portion of their forces to hedge against that.

For planning purposes I would assume that three military districts of China would be ranged against India: Tibet, Sinkiang and Chengdu.
And the Pak Army Eastern forces Kashmir, Punjab, Sind , all PN and all PAF.

Hope this helps to clarify.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 16 Jan 2018 00:43

Nam, Its not whether such a war will happen but what if it does in the unlikely event. So please get over that mental block.

IA and IAF have been shouting hoarse for last few years about this multi-front war and we are not taking them seriously.

In 1962 the big excuse was China attacking was unthinkable and when it did it led to a disaster. All planning was that Pak would attack and most of the forces were raised for that scenario.
1962 led to the raising of 8 mountain divisions and set back economic development.

So same reason to setback rise of India could be the goal for this joint attack.

Akshay Kapoor · Post by **Akshay Kapoor** » 16 Jan 2018 01:50

There are other ways that this scenario could unfold....we could stumble into it like most wars happen. A Indo China war could break out and Pak tries its various strategic genius strategies again or an Indo Pak war could break out and China tries to take advantage and try to take AP and Sikkim. Surely we will have to defend. That defence could lead to escalation and a full war could happen.

The thing is we don't know how it can happen and neither should be base policy on that but we need to be prepared for the full specturm. And that is what policy should be based on - being prepared for all eventualities by having capabilities.

I submit that the following capabilities are the most important (in descending order of importance)

1. The most important and most flexible capability is media ops and propoganda. If we get this right we can neutralise the .5 front substantially and bring national power and will to bear upon the other 2 fronts. Never forget that the Indian public has never seen total war since independence. Its always been the armed forces fighting it - far removed and in small numbers relative to the population. This war can be total war and for that we need strong national will to prevail to the end. Nothing is more important and therefore much more than equipment or numbers we need complete unity of purpose as a people.

2. Revamped political-miltary and civil-military structure - No proper war can be won without the right political leadership taking the right strategic and military decisions during war. We have a complete absence of military knowledge or experience in the decision makers - politicians and bureaucrats. This has to change. I also strongly feel that bureaucrats cannot take these decisions and we must be the only country in the world where they have so much power over defence matters. The relative status and power between the military and bureaucracy has undergone a huge shift since 1947 to the massive detriment of the nation. Unless this is completely revamped we can say goodbye to winning a war. I would invite Vidurji's comments on this.

3. The right leader - self evident

4. Military capability (non equipment) - morale, training, structure, operational art, tactics. Will discuss some elements at length later but a couple of crucial ones that need to be mentioned here. Wars are won on the ground (and sea and air) by soldiers, airmen and sailors. Ethos and morale are supreme in enabling this. I am concerned (and have been for a long time) about serious issues re morale due to many reasons - what I mentioned in point 2, the ability of the nation to take care of its soldiers, pay, izzat, leadership. The second issue is junior leadership - we have severe shortages in numbers and (it is my belief) and to some extent in competence. This is tied into the reasons I gave above. We need to resolve these issues. Its a huge job and will take a massive political effort and a big increase in defence outlay. But there is simply no other choice.

5. Military capability (equipment) - Will discuss at length later in the thread but I think the following critically short equipment will play a big role and we must address critical shortages on a war footing - submarines, ASW choppers , AWACs, refuellers, fighters, AD network, arty, cheetah class choppers, NVGs, infantry equipment I mentioned above.

6. Military capabilitary (infrastructure) - Again we can discuss later but main point is that both our defences and Our communications (roads,rail) are still pathetic. In a 2 front war we need complete flexibility to employ troops across both fronts and this needs great road and rail communication. Our defences are not hardened even at LC, forget vis a vis China. For example, China has already built up strong infra incuding 2 helipads at Doklam - this is just an exmaple to show their ability to rapidly build up. We have done f*k all. We need to build excellent hardened defences and use them to flexibly in various scenarios.

These are all aboslutely critcial issues that need to be addressed.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 16 Jan 2018 02:41

Akshay Kapoor wrote:
Karan M wrote:

Point is with improvements in night fighting (most T-72s now have Thermal sights, TISAS, if not new FCS) & basic ERA plus new radios & fire fighting gear. T-90s/T-72s are getting new commanders sights with thermal imagers. T-90s problematic Gunners sight has a unit in trials from BEL.. Arjuns have been made operational and are receiving new Ammo & LAHAT has also been modified while a new DRDO round is also headed for trials.. the list of iterative advancements continues.

If this GOI remains in power, our conventional warfighting capabilities will take a huge step up. The data backs this up, irrespective of all the motivated articles from the Pubby's and Shooklaws.
What about NVG for the poor infantry ? If we have to be ready for war we need that asap.

Akshay, I believe SF + NSG etc will get urgent updates via smaller/specialized procurements for their urgent operational needs.
This is in series production as well (http://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/techno ... 091400.ece) but the bulk production of NVGs is awaiting for the set up of XR-5 tech at BEL.
http://www.salute.co.in/bel-getting-to- ... ro-optics/

In specific:

In 2012, the plant was upgraded to produce XD-4 II Tubes with technical know-how from Photonis, France, and about 40,000 tubes were supplied. The plant is presently being upgraded to XR- 5 grade with a capacity to produce more than 30,000 Image Intensifier Tubes per year. BEL also has plans to produce MCP indigenously with ToT from Photonis once the XR-5 is fully established.

In short, the GOI has likely understood the IA requirements are huge & just acquiring NVGs en masse from the pvt guys who have no TOT (despite the propaganda articles on their behalf from Shooklaw) will only lead to massive logistical and support issues down the line. So they supported BEL in getting this expensive line set up & once it stabilizes, mass orders will be placed.

Apart from this BEL is sponsoring research at IISC, IIT etc to indigenize various parts of the special materials and subcomponents. There is thought and strategy behind all these efforts & its being implemented methodically. Albeit not at a pace which we want, and for that, we have to have a mindshift change in our people's thinking (only then will politicians change their mindset).

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 16 Jan 2018 02:43

You can see parallels with the mass manufacture of many systems and subsystems the past few year. The GOI placed huge orders on the specific lines once they got fixed. The pvt firms who tied up with other WW manufacturers may scream about BEL's monopoly etc & crib about it, but frankly, I see nothing wrong with this from a strategy point of view. For the long term, they can always ask GOI for more support in R&D etc.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 16 Jan 2018 02:51

Akshay Kapoor wrote:
Karan M wrote:Gen Rawat looks like the kind who can throw down with guys half his age and make them regret even contemplating it.

Some jokers in the media and some idiot MPs have already tried to take him on. On that note I see we have an ex home minister who keeps making stupid statements 'muscular action in Kashmir has failed'. His ex cabinet colleagues including PM have been on record suggesting Paki infiltrators were 'just some unknown miscreants wearing Paki uniforms'. In a 2.5 front war this qusiling echelon also needs to be handled. Strategies have to be prepared to deal with this. Information warfare will be as critical as kinetic warfare.

I submit that in this war scenario the power of propoganda and media influence will play a bigger role than ever before and we really have to figure this out.

I agree completely, and on the forum, I cannot express my views on these gentlemen who made these comments in the proper vernacular.

Be as it may, my biggest criticism of this current GOI is entirely about its inability to handle domestic quislings and those who wage acts of subversion against society, the state, for narrow parochial gains and political advantage. I still remember the comment that Kargil was not an Indian war by these very quislings.

brvarsh · Post by **brvarsh** » 16 Jan 2018 03:10

West Bengal has everything that can start a two and a half war - A sizeable Muslim population from neighboring countrie(s) or locals who strongly associate with them or getting fast hard lined, one form of communist base that allows anti national agenda and lastly a thriving drug smuggling that altogether provides the Pakistan and China to interject enemy elements at different stages of its society that could ignite it.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 16 Jan 2018 07:46

Please read this tweet series from Ravi Rikhye

https://twitter.com/Editor_Orbat/status ... 1017058305

Host is Pak is getting ready for offensive.

That's what those 100 Chinese tanks mean.

Akshay Kapoor · Post by **Akshay Kapoor** » 16 Jan 2018 14:50

Karan, we must come up with the permitted vernacular then. Infact almost all of these comments are blatant lies and are made to forward the personal financial interests of these elements by committing treason against the people of India.

nam · Post by **nam** » 16 Jan 2018 21:21

ramana wrote:Nam, Its not whether such a war will happen but what if it does in the unlikely event. So please get over that mental block.

It is not the case that I believe such a war will not happen, rather I am trying to understand how China+Pak would go about doing it. And what will their objective.
At a strat level, the objective could be to capture land or destruction of Indian forces. For either of the objective, destruction of Indian forces is the primary requirement.

Let me put some numbers on what is required to defeat our current force levels.

We have 1.3 million standing army. Wiki says another million reserve. Let's make it 500K. Central forces another million. So overall 2.8 million available for mobilization. Conservative 2.5 million men in arms.

To defeat this force, there needs to be at-least 2:1 superiority in numbers. So Chini+Pak need 5 million is arms, to dominate what we can throw NOW.
Airpower, IAF 600 jets. Would need atleast 3:1. So 1800 jets. Ofcourse thousands of artillery and at-least 3000 tanks.

This the basic minimum Pak+Chinis need to mobilize to defeat our current forces in a total war. It gets even worse, when GoI will call for national mobilization. We can throw millions in blink of an eye.

Supplies: PLA cannot easily stream through the LAC because of the terrain. Even if they did, they will fall on a area close to UP, which is heavily populated. Moreover we could place close to million men on LAC. PLA would massive forces to dislodge million men.

The second front i.e Pak is more convenient, which allows armour and mechanized warfare. So for any major action, PLA needs to transfer their forces through Tibet, then Karakoram on to Pak lands. Supplying such a large force through a single road is well..
Moreover it is given that China has to provide most of the supplies. And because only China can afford such a large mobilization, it needs to be the major fighting force on both the front. With Pak being the secondary partner. This means China has to place a very large force in Pak and provide supplies to them through sea or karakorram.

Now the generals may decide it is not practical to have such a mobilization and it is better to have two front short wars. In this case, not sure what the objective will be. In short wars, you cannot capture large areas. There might be "teach a lesson" objective, however we as a nation generally are very poor in "learning lessons".

Moreover, it is not necessary that India will keep the war "short".

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 16 Jan 2018 21:36

nam wrote: It is not the case that I believe such a war will not happen, rather I am trying to understand how China+Pak would go about doing it. And what will their objective.

That is the objective of this thread...
Again you are not trying to follow the process and getting to the conclusions.
Bear with us and follow the process I outlined in first post.

I am not trying to curb free thinking but a structured analytical thinking will get us there more reliably.

I am trying to bring back analytical rigor the Forum was known for.

Akshay Kapoor · Post by **Akshay Kapoor** » 16 Jan 2018 22:14

nam wrote:
ramana wrote:Nam, Its not whether such a war will happen but what if it does in the unlikely event. So please get over that mental block.
snip .

These issues are best analysed in a rigorous way with some terms of reference. I think we should follow what Ramanaji is saying and stick to a terms of reference. Ramanaji why not make 2/3 syndicates and appoint one syndicate leader. These syndicates can be given 2/3 of the 9 reference points you gave and they can analyse the issues within that and present for synthesis by you.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 16 Jan 2018 22:22

Yes right now its the encyclopedic scope that is bothering people to come to the end chapter.

Philip has volunteered for the Naval part. So he needs help and back up in all things maritime.

Khalsa volunteered to study Pak Army Order of battle. Again he needs help and back up.

So who want to study PAF? PLAAF?

I want tsarkar, Deejay and Akshay to keep us straight and guide the studies.

Akshay Kapoor · Post by **Akshay Kapoor** » 16 Jan 2018 22:36

Sir, as far as our capabilities are concerned what are your thoughts on the 6 points I gave in the post above ? Recap - 1 - Media/Advocacy, 2- MOD restructure and Higher Defence Management, 3- Leadership , 4 - Military capability (non equipment), 5- Military Capability (equipment), 6 - Military Capability (infrastructure)

Akshay Kapoor · Post by **Akshay Kapoor** » 16 Jan 2018 22:38

Khalsa, I would be happy to join you study Pak Orbat and also Pak rail and road communication maps, irrigation canal layouts etc etc. I would like to eventually come up with a plan for attack by our mech forces.

ArjunPandit · Post by **ArjunPandit** » 16 Jan 2018 22:54

Ramana sir,
Great thread. Would it be a good idea to include impact of a total war of duration over a war affects major metros/cantt cities, e.g., communication, utilities/electricity/financial/food networks for a long duration facing shortages.

Majority of people dont even have heard a war story apart from Border movie or LoC Kargil/Lakshya. Activities like blackouts, food/water storage, daytime cooking with minimal use of fire or nightly radio broadcasts were passed on to me by my parents/grandparents (being closer to border areas in Rajasthan). The GW1 had petrol shortages.

For a sustained two front war, esp with China with significant cyberwarfare capabilities (lungi shiver), non trivial bombing capability into our major cities lying gangetic plane will come into play along with their significant communication disruption or disinformation network. Which areas will we be vulnerable due to chinese intrusion into supply chains.

In such an environment how is the majority population kept motivated and the "aasteen ke saanp" under check. How can our civic set up be prevented from falling apart in such an environment.

And most importantly, if we will and how will we inflict the same to our opponents?
I am not very coherent, but still wanted to check your thoughts on this.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 17 Jan 2018 02:35

Akshay Kapoor wrote:Sir, as far as our capabilities are concerned what are your thoughts on the 6 points I gave in the post above ? Recap - 1 - Media/Advocacy, 2- MOD restructure and Higher Defence Management, 3- Leadership , 4 - Military capability (non equipment), 5- Military Capability (equipment), 6 - Military Capability (infrastructure)

I guess I need to add a new 9 ) India's Response before the 10) conclusion.

I think its time to revisit the Two front war scenario that the services are preparing for.

In order to make sense of what is being talked about I suggest we create short chapters on:

1) Geopolitical situation from now to 2030
2) Relative military power of China, India, and Pakistan
3) India's frontier problem : Two front and internal security
4) China Front: What changes will reduce China factor?
5) Pakistan Front : what changes will reduce Pakistan factor?
6) Internal Security: Naxal and Islamist jihadis, regional issues fed by opposition parties. What changes will reduce this factor?
7) External Powers meddling : West - Political and religious card, Islamist - Sunni bloc, Shia bloc, who else? What changes will reduce this factor?
8 ) Nuclear role
9) India's response
10) Conclusion

Your sections can be sub-chapters of that.

Akshay Kapoor · Post by **Akshay Kapoor** » 17 Jan 2018 02:46

ramana wrote:
Akshay Kapoor wrote:Sir, as far as our capabilities are concerned what are your thoughts on the 6 points I gave in the post above ? Recap - 1 - Media/Advocacy, 2- MOD restructure and Higher Defence Management, 3- Leadership , 4 - Military capability (non equipment), 5- Military Capability (equipment), 6 - Military Capability (infrastructure)
I guess I need to add a new 9 ) India's Response before the 10) conclusion.

I think its time to revisit the Two front war scenario that the services are preparing for.

In order to make sense of what is being talked about I suggest we create short chapters on:

1) Geopolitical situation from now to 2030
2) Relative military power of China, India, and Pakistan
3) India's frontier problem : Two front and internal security
4) China Front: What changes will reduce China factor?
5) Pakistan Front : what changes will reduce Pakistan factor?
6) Internal Security: Naxal and Islamist jihadis, regional issues fed by opposition parties. What changes will reduce this factor?
7) External Powers meddling : West - Political and religious card, Islamist - Sunni bloc, Shia bloc, who else? What changes will reduce this factor?
8 ) Nuclear role
9) India's response
10) Conclusion

Your sections can be sub-chapters of that.

Perhaps have two parts - Capabilities needed and India’s response. We can never be sure what the situation will be that’s why flexible broad spectrum capability is needed. And then response.

Khalsa · Post by **Khalsa** » 17 Jan 2018 03:21

Akshay Kapoor wrote:Khalsa, I would be happy to join you study Pak Orbat and also Pak rail and road communication maps, irrigation canal layouts etc etc. I would like to eventually come up with a plan for attack by our mech forces.

Thanks Akshay. Yeah it would be great to have you onboard.
Just clearing the decks and getting started. I will be contributing just in this thread.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 17 Jan 2018 04:02

Khalsa I suggest a Pak order of battle thread. This way you won't lose the flow of information.

Atulya P · Post by **Atulya P** » 17 Jan 2018 17:36

Ramana sir, in your structure where would the other 0.5s lay? The structure should include potential insurgency from Tibetans, Uighurs, Balochis and Shias in PoK.

Akshay Kapoor · Post by **Akshay Kapoor** » 17 Jan 2018 19:22

Should we have budgets as well ?

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 17 Jan 2018 22:33

Its growing in scope. What I had in mind when I started the thread was to map out the threats in that so another thread can map out responses to survive and emerge victorious. However the first counter post started mapping the responses and we are losing focus.
So I would prefer this thread stick to the mapping of the threat.
Counter can come in a differ thread.

Put yourself in charge of Western Command (Army, Air Force & Navy): What would you want to know?
Same with the other Commands.

Akshay Kapoor · Post by **Akshay Kapoor** » 18 Jan 2018 00:00

Okay sir. Let’s do that.

We can have the following structure - Theatre Commander West (western command, SW command and Southern Comman plus control of air assets of WAC and SWAC), Theatre Commander East (Eastern Command plus control of air assets of EAC) , Theatre Commander North (plus some air assets of WAC), Theatre Commander Western seaboard , Theatre Commander Eastern Seabord , Commander AIr Forces West and Commander Air Forces East.

So I am in Theatre Commander West plus Theatre Commander Western Seaboard ?

Deans · Post by **Deans** » 19 Jan 2018 10:55

All parts of the 2.5 front war would take place in Kashmir. Much as I like the idea of fewer commands and preferably integrated ones, I believe
the North should be retained as a separate command for the army (with its 4 corps, if the Yol based corps is included).

Akshay Kapoor · Post by **Akshay Kapoor** » 19 Jan 2018 12:46

Ramana sir, I will come back with my requirements as theatre commander west next week. It requires some serious thought and I’m out till Monday.

Deans , I agree. Northern theatre will face both China and Pak and of course the terrorism.

IX Corps is Western Command not Northern Command.

nam · Post by **nam** » 19 Jan 2018 17:16

Deans wrote:All parts of the 2.5 front war would take place in Kashmir. Much as I like the idea of fewer commands and preferably integrated ones, I believe
the North should be retained as a separate command for the army (with its 4 corps, if the Yol based corps is included).

The mountains provide a equalizer against a large invasion force. This may not what the Chinese want, if their objective is to degrade our forces.

I am tempted to believe PLA might prefer a mechanized attack across IB and through Burma. Pak IB is a given, however Burma might be bit difficult to convince. Ofcourse they can do a Tibet and capture Burma.

Across plains is where China's arms productions capability can bear an effect. It also boils down to the objective. Kashmir may be valuable to Pak for it's water. China may not care for it and would prefer a attrition warfare.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 19 Jan 2018 22:20

Folks What I wanted to define the parameters has been achieved. Time to get to work. If you want to contribute to the 10 chapters template please post here or else hold your peace.

Thanks for the contributions so far.

Ramana

nachiket · Post by **nachiket** » 20 Jan 2018 13:49

My 2 paisa -

What we need to do to avoid this scenario is in many respects similar to what we need to win if it actually happens, because diplomatic moves to avoid this, although essential will only take us so far. What ultimately matters is how our military strength and willingness to use it is perceived by our enemies. The Doklam standoff is a good example. The robust diplomacy that eventually solved it was a refreshing change and essential but it would have gone nowhere without the Army's firm stand on the ground and clear communication of intent.

To deter a hot war against Cheen+Pak, our armed forces do not need to be stronger than both combined. That is impossible to achieve. But they need to be equipped and supplied well enough to ensure the enemy's aims cannot be achieved at a reasonable cost. And they need the right support from the political establishment and the country's transport and communications infrastructure. With the current establishment in power I believe they do have the political support. Of course this is subject to change after the next elections.

The transport and communications are adequate on the western front, except perhaps in J&K to an extent. The new tunnels and rail projects in J&K will help in this regard. The Northeast is the biggest problem in this. Several major road projects need to be completed on a war footing and the BRO is overstretched. I believe the government recently took stock of the situation and is trying to address it. Needs close coordination with the army to ensure their needs are taken care of along with the local populace while designing the roads/bridges and tunnels.

The equipment shortfall is well known here. I won't make a distinction on the two fronts even though the terrain is different. The Army needs a great infusion of modern artillery, helicopters, IFV's, radios, NVG's, BPJs, MMGs, rifles and sights. And most of these need to be local solutions to avoid spares and sanctions issues. The air force needs to augment its squadron strength without an enormous expense plus get more refuelers and AWACS. The Navy needs ASW helos, minesweepers, submarines and surface ships. That's a pretty long list and although things have improved with the current government, our acquisitions process is still far too rigid, brittle and tied in red tape. The DPP needs to be overhauled and a national strategy for local weapons and equipment development created and adhered to.

The internal security part is hardest to handle IMHO. I still have reservations about calling this a front in an actual war because this is something that is ongoing and always active at different levels. Its not like the pakis stop helping the islamists and cheenis the naxals in peace time so I'm a little skeptical about what they could do more to suddenly make the situation serious enough to be included in this war scenario.
The reason I think it is difficult to tackle is not related to cheeni or paki support but rather the striking ignorance of a large section of our population about the nature of this threat and serious attempts by past governments to downplay it for potential political gains (invention of saffron terror nonsense, etc.). Plus the penchant of the same politicians and their media cronies to try to convince the Indian Muslim population that this is a RSS/Hindutva conspiracy to malign Islam and the success of that policy in convincing a large section of the same. Similarly the clear collusion between the supposedly liberal JNU intellectual class and journalists and the Naxals. Too many variables and issues, no clearly identifiable enemy like a nation state (cheen, pak), presence of a small but effective fifth column, attempts to muddle the issues by people who do not see beyind political/monetary gains and no clear solutions. Plus the previously suggested solutions for the other two actual "fronts" will have no impact in improving this situation. Probably why this needs to be talked of separately and not as a part of a single scenario IMHO.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 20 Jan 2018 22:31

Folks all I want is the threat to be defined and people have already decided how to counter it.

If 20 years on this forum has not taught how to think, why bother with this thread?

You cannot counter what you don't know.

Read The bios of many generals who grew up in.the 60s. All say one thing. No one envisioned a hit border along Tibet on two areas separated by 1500km.

This 2 front war headline is quoring from Gen.Rawat who is in best position to see it coming. ACM Dhanoa also said it.

Yet folks here say it's implausible.

The scenario is there. I kust want to.list the threat.

Don't be strategic and Nehruvian.

Deans · Post by **Deans** » 21 Jan 2018 09:50

I have written a scenario (part of a paper on Pakistan) that deals with fighting a limited conventional war against Pak, with the aim of degrading Pakistan's economic potential. The paper has been evaluated by CLAWS & a national security expert. It would be particularly relevant in a 2 front war. It is not confidential but I've been asked to restrict circulation. I can share this with Ramanaji / Admin offline. I can be contacted.

Deans · Post by **Deans** » 21 Jan 2018 10:38

Our national security policy, as I understand it, would be based on 2 underlying facts:
- We will not initiate war &
- There is a strong China-Pak nexus aimed against India.
Hence, the working assumption of our planners should be that If we are involved in a major conventional war (anything more than Kargil sized), it will be a 2 front (or 2.5 front) war. I believe the 2 most likely ways this can come about are:

1. Pak initiated: Terrorist strikes against India, lead to significant cross border retaliation by IA. Pak army replies & we move up the escalation ladder towards a conventional war. Pak dials China for help based on their pre-war understanding. It is difficult for Pak to figure out which strike will be successful and might consequently invite unacceptable retaliation. Hence China cannot know in advance that a war might happen and can only react once it does. China's mobilisation time (bring troops to Tibet and concentrating them would take longer than it would for IA & PA to mobilise against each other and start fighting. China can hope to gain from this scenario, only if there is a prolonged India-Pak conflict, which draws in IA reserves and depletes supplies, leaving us more vulnerable against the Chinese.

OTOH, a short sharp war against Pak would mean our forces deployed against China are undisturbed and China would most likely, only attempt Doklam style incursions.

2. China initiated: China's bubble economy starts tanking and Eleven is looking to unify the people. He starts more Doklam style incursions. We react more forcefully than in the past and China decides to `teach us a lesson', as they did in 62. Pak is asked to join in once China begins hostilities. Pak, being Pak and also not trusting Panda, will do so, only if IA suffer some setbacks and weaken the Western border to support the East. Again, a short war, where China gives up after being unable to make gains on the ground (while IA fully deploys in the West to pre-empt Pak) will mean Pak is not in a position to join hostilities.

On both scenarios, China will most likely attack in the West (Ladakh) rather than in the East, because we have far stronger defensive positions manned by Three strong corps (as opposed to half that number of divisions, in the Ladakh/Himachal/UT sectors) and because a joint Pak-China attack in J&K (the only state where we might actually fight against 2 armies) has a better chance of unhinging our defences.

Given Chinese mobilisation times (the `latest Chinese boast thread' comprehensively discusses this) it is unlikely we will be taken by surprise.

I'm not sure the 0.5 front will be a major factor. I believe we have broken the back of militancy and are now dismantling the funding and support networks. If AIF's in the valley are asked to start an insurrection in wartime, we would retaliate more strongly against stone throwers and be less conscious of collateral damage during firefights with terrorists - who would be forced out of cover and into attacks with little preparation.

A Deshmukh · Post by **A Deshmukh** » 21 Jan 2018 11:59

Most scenarios that we think are realistic, are optimistic for us and hence unrealistic.
Playing a devils advocate, with a pessimistic scenario:

China plays grandmaster and initiates the war.
China mobilizes Army, AF, Navy (upto Gwadar, Djibouti, Hambantota, and Maldives ports), without initiating conflict.
China raises tension in the South China sea & North Korea, tieing down US Navy there.
Terrorists start major attacks in Mumbai, Delhi and Bengaluru.
Our Mir Jaffers initiate riots in Gujarat, UP, Bengal, TN.
Prodded by China TSP initiate actions at multiple fronts - Kashmir, Punjab, Rajasthan, Kutch.
China unleashes asymmtric attacks - computer and biological viruses.
TSP submarines fires at our ships.
This ties down half of our Army, AF, and Navy towards handling TSP.
After a week or two of hostilities with TSP, Chin (already mobilized) joins conflict.
Conflict involves naval attack on IACs, submarine.
Sinks a few of our crude oil ships coming from Gulf.
Attacks our Ladakh and Eastern fronts.
Then crosses collaborating Nepal and attacks from UP front.

Deans can add economic attacks in parallel.
this is a 2.5 front scenario.

Thakur_B · Post by **Thakur_B** » 21 Jan 2018 13:38

VKumar wrote:Today signed online petition for BPJ. Infantry is being neglected. The soldier as a total fighting system concept has to be pursued.

viewtopic.php?p=2241447#p2241447

Deans · Post by **Deans** » 21 Jan 2018 19:48

Deshmukh ji, The concern I have with the sequencing of your scenario, is that I don't see Pak initiating an attack - and risking the dismemberment
of their country, in order for China to gain territory. They also remember that China did nothing to help in 65. 71 and Kargil, though India was weaker then, relative to China, compared to now. They would rather prefer that China initiate hostilities, while they play the role of hyena and try to seize parts of Kashmir, if India is defeated. If China starts mobilisation, India has enough time to react, while maintaining enough of a deterrent in the West. There is however the X factor of cyber warfare etc which you have rightly highlighted.

I think the naval threat comes from Chinese nuclear submarines, not surface vessels, or diesel subs operating from places like Gwadar, I am sceptical about the ability of Chinese overseas bases to threaten us - on the contrary their ships would be highly vulnerable to IN vessels operating closer to home. Sinking merchant shipping works both ways. China has far more merchant shipping than us and they operate across choke points like a Malacca straits, which will present a target rich environment for even a single IN sub. The sinking of even a single Chinese merchant vessel, will hit business sentiment (China's export oriented economy depends on sea borne trade to a far greater extent than India'). That coupled with the chance of a full scale war going nuclear, will lead to capital and business flight, which will again hurt China a lot more than India. I therefore see the Chinese opting for a 1962 style `short sharp war to teach India a lesson' war, after a lot of planning. There are too many variables if Pak is allowed to start that war, so it will have to be initiated by China, with Pak joining in, if Pak sees a path to a relatively risk free land grab.

A Deshmukh · Post by **A Deshmukh** » 21 Jan 2018 22:48

Deans ji, I am trying to conjure a worst case 2.5 scenario for us, however unlikely it may seem now.
( we can handle both TSP or Chin easily in a 1:1 scenario. the only scary part is 2.5 front scene)
TSP can initiate the hostilities, if it gets an assurance that Chin will attack from other fronts. they will be involved in the planning. (at least in this imagined scenario),
Chin will mobilise many nuc submarines (hidden) and some surface ships in the guise of exercises with TSP.
I think where Ramana wants to lead the thought exercise, is at what level of threat, this becomes a credible worry for us and then how to handle.
Suppose there are 50 Chin ships+submarines in Arabian sea and IO at 5-6 different locations. Can IN tackle this level of threat and TSP submarines?
Can they make a preemtive attack with cruise missiles and take out Vizag, Karwar and bases in A&N simultaneously.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 21 Jan 2018 23:06

The 2.5 scenario increases by the day as Pak is getting iemboldened by the day as the Chinese further ensconced themselves at Gwadar, Djibouit, ,POK, SL and the Maldives.

I was recently told that the presence in the Maldives is extremely heavy with signs at Male airport now also in Chinese! We have really let the ball slip from our hands over here.Young Chinese are being sent to get a "feel of the place " as they will be posted there later once the huge Chinese population invasion takes place in these countries ostensibly to work in their exclusive eco. zones.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 22 Jan 2018 00:28

That's a huge number of assets.The logistic support for such an Armata would tax any navy operating even from home ports let alone in hostile IOR dominated by the IN.
Let's look at the possible bases from which such ships can operate from.

SL at Htota.No naval base facilities allowed, perhaps refuelling, etc.But if the Chins get their hands on the vast land lease of thous of hectares,for a Chin SEX, then stockpiling of munitions,spares and even ship repair facilities would be inevitable.The Chins are true cheats, lying scumbags and will cheat on agreements as long as the GOSL owes them money.However, should that start happening, Htota will in my opinion have a short but exciting career.It is close enough to the mainland to be taken out in several ways.

The Maldives.More than HT it is the Maldives that I am most worried about.There are dozens of atolls where in a v.short time you will see a similar situ as we've seen in the ICS.Here India has to plan for "enemy action" which may come sooner rather than later.The current leadership are thugs with no love lost for India fondly imagining that they can bluff their way through with us while selling themselves body and soul to the Chins and Wahaabis of the house of Saud and evil land of Pakistan.

brvarsh · Post by **brvarsh** » 22 Jan 2018 03:34

I really suspect you can fight a two and a half front war with two nuclear armed enemies in a pure clean war with two countries joining forces and we defend ours. The two front war has been a reality for quite sometime now. A war with a nuclear armed India has also been prepared in China and in Pakistan, the reason they have over the years have created their elements in India that in case of war will be used as a "half" side of the story. The same has to be done by India. We are already at two front war not in its conventional sense and it is critical to have our own elements strong enough in the respective countries that discourage and weaken any misadventure by them. And these elements does not have to be human in form, it could be broader economic interests, likelihood of severe defense depletion that could be exploited by their other enemies, a mere suspicion some can revolt against their own governments.