Long Distance Chinese Navy Deployment - Analysis

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shiv
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Long Distance Chinese Navy Deployment - Analysis

Postby shiv » 22 Feb 2018 19:57

I have been maxed out by the dazzling number of posts and news items about hundreds of ships, thousands of missiles and billions of Dolahs that the Chinese have expended on naval power to make us crap liquid in our langotis. I believe I have had enough of that and I wish to move on to the practicalities of naval deployment at long distances.

I do not have more than a general understanding of naval deployments - and have not read (or had face to face conversations with people who know) to the extent i have had over the many decades that I have been passionate about military aviation. But let me start with a rudimentary analysis to set grey cells whirring and I invite others to add what they know. I only request that any information that guarantees Indian defeat and Chinese victory should be accompanied by some analysis of factors more than just number of missiles, ships and dollars of economy and rate of production

Googling for "China's biggest warship" - I get type 55 destroyer which (ignoring the weapons) has a cruise range of 13,000 km and a max speed of about 60 kmph. Since we are unused to knots - I am sticking to kmph.

When I search for the length of time a ship might stay out at sea without any replenishment at port or at sea - I found the 15 minutes of Googling did not give me much - I got a ballpark figure of 15-30 days after which a ship would need some sort of replenishment or refuelling.

Getting back to the Type 55 - if it sails from Hainan Island at 60 kmph - it can cover 1440 km in a day at that speed. Assuming that it can do 13,000 km at that high speed - it will use up its fuel in 9 days. Not a long deployment.

Anyhow - let us say this ship is bound for the Maldives from Hainan. I will ignore accompanying ships - anti submarine, frigates etc and their speeds and ranges for ease of analysis.

Male is about 7000 km from Hainan. That means that like like the Grand Old Duke of York who marched his men up the hill and then down again, a Type 55 can reach Male in 5 days and then it will have to turn to some port or find a sea-replenishment ship waiting. If the Chinese ship has a hostile intent against the Indian navy - it can go to either Karachi or Gwadar for replenishment (2500 km) or Djibouti (3500 km). Hambantota is unlikely. Sri Lanka will take a hit from India if a hostile Chinese warship refuels in a time of tension.

Or else a Chinese replenishment ship has to be in the vicinity and that ship could have come out any one of the above ports. For Chinese ships to be hanging about the Indian ocean they need port facilities that can be reaches within a week of sailing. Replenishment may be easy - but repairs may be impossible depending on the port. Port stays may last from 2-7 days.

So "dominating the sea" around Male requires more than just multiple missiles. Even keeping a large number of ships is not easy.

Someone asked if I was not worried about the PLAN sailing in the Indian ocean. That is an ocean. International waters. Anyone can sail. More than sitting and worrying and lamenting that they are there - they need to be tracked minute by minute - with a 30 minute lead time to sink the ships if they try any gaandmasti.

I am ignoring subs. Subs will not stop an Indian airborne landing in Male.

Now someone please do an analysis of a Chinese carrier group and the logistics involved to keep it for more than 7 days anywhere near male

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Re: Long distance Chinese navy deployment - analysis

Postby Karthik S » 22 Feb 2018 20:48

Scenario we are talking about is different, think of a scenario where Type 55 and 52Ds port in Maldives. Along with other PLA fighters and subs. Basically Maldives becoming a full cheen military base.

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Re: Long distance Chinese navy deployment - analysis

Postby chola » 22 Feb 2018 20:58

War right now means OVERWHELMING Indian advantages in the IOR.

Which is why I called and hoped for war during Doka La.

Cheen won’t go to war, they’re a mercantile power and they know it (unlike the pakis with their delusional “martial race” meme.)

No war means repeating the SCS where increasing numbers of chini ships and aircraft from their humongous industrial base change the facts at sea.

But that is what makes Cheen dangerous. They win during the 99.99% we are at peace by encrouchment and fait accompli with numbers.

Now, are we willing to start a war and make them operate in the 0.01% of the time where their little emperor force would lose?

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Re: Long distance Chinese navy deployment - analysis

Postby pankajs » 22 Feb 2018 21:09

What will a full Chinese *task force* do in Maldives or rather what to the hope to achieve by docking in Maldives or setting up a base?

If the intent is setting up a defense museum for tourist, it is fine by me. They have my full and unqualified support.

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Re: Long distance Chinese navy deployment - analysis

Postby shiv » 22 Feb 2018 21:24

Karthik S wrote:Scenario we are talking about is different, think of a scenario where Type 55 and 52Ds port in Maldives. Along with other PLA fighters and subs. Basically Maldives becoming a full cheen military base.

I think you need to flesh this out because what you are saying is simply a "fear" without saying how long it will take to build that base, how that base will be supplied with food given that Maldives itself has only fish. And how that base can be kept safe from India if they try any tricks. India will choke the life out of them - but before that - the details - the motivation, the plan, the details and not general apprehensions. The idea of this thread is to provoke thinking and not have fears assuaged.

I started this thread with a request for application of mind, not expression of fear. If you are unable to flesh it out ask that "we" whom you referred to, to do it for you. I am not going to take the trouble of tearing down your stratwman only for you to make some argument each time I make a counter. You have to put in a LOT more homework. TIA

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Re: Long distance Chinese navy deployment - analysis

Postby ramana » 22 Feb 2018 21:31

Shiv, Good thread. I was also thinking on need for it.
One observation:

21st century will be a century of sea routes.
North Arctic, Pacific, Indian Ocean. I think Atlantic loses its dominance due to global shift from Europe to Asia.

So look at China as seeking ports on these ate routes.
OBOR is land based extension of these sea routes.

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Re: Long distance Chinese navy deployment - analysis

Postby pankajs » 22 Feb 2018 21:38

shiv wrote:
Karthik S wrote:Scenario we are talking about is different, think of a scenario where Type 55 and 52Ds port in Maldives. Along with other PLA fighters and subs. Basically Maldives becoming a full cheen military base.

I think you need to flesh this out because what you are saying is simply a "fear" without saying how long it will take to build that base, how that base will be supplied with food given that Maldives itself has only fish. And how that base can be kept safe from India if they try any tricks. India will choke the life out of them - but before that - the details - the motivation, the plan, the details and not general apprehensions. The idea of this thread is to provoke thinking and not have fears assuaged.

I started this thread with a request for application of mind, not expression of fear. If you are unable to flesh it out ask that "we" whom you referred to, to do it for you. I am not going to take the trouble of tearing down your stratwman only for you to make some argument each time I make a counter. You have to put in a LOT more homework. TIA

Saars my first mijjlies would be directed towards the water desalination plants however many there are. I wouldn't just want them out of order but to be blown to bits.

Followed by fuel dumps and food storage units. Maldives does not have a hinterland to rush in supplies from *nearby* of these 3 essentials and small enough to get the job without much of a trouble.

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Re: Long distance Chinese navy deployment - analysis

Postby Karthik S » 22 Feb 2018 21:50

pankajs wrote:
shiv wrote:I think you need to flesh this out because what you are saying is simply a "fear" without saying how long it will take to build that base, how that base will be supplied with food given that Maldives itself has only fish. And how that base can be kept safe from India if they try any tricks. India will choke the life out of them - but before that - the details - the motivation, the plan, the details and not general apprehensions. The idea of this thread is to provoke thinking and not have fears assuaged.

I started this thread with a request for application of mind, not expression of fear. If you are unable to flesh it out ask that "we" whom you referred to, to do it for you. I am not going to take the trouble of tearing down your stratwman only for you to make some argument each time I make a counter. You have to put in a LOT more homework. TIA

Saars my first mijjlies would be directed towards the water desalination plants however many there are. I wouldn't just want them out of order but to be blown to bits.

Followed by fuel dumps and food storage units. Maldives does not have a hinterland to rush in supplies from *nearby* of these 3 essentials.


So every pearl in "string of pearls" will be a nice juicy target for Indian mijjlies as they are located in countries that can be attacked. Sounds good.

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Re: Long distance Chinese navy deployment - analysis

Postby shiv » 22 Feb 2018 22:11

Here is a map of the Maldives. Please note that the pastel coloured patches are NOT Islands. They are simply underwater coral reefs and the Islands themselves are miniscule almost invisible dots at the edges of each pastel patch. Try and look for the islands on Google earth without getting cross-eyed and first find a place to build a base.

Let me say - you need maybe 200 acres for a basic base. A breakwater where you are sheltered from storms. A place to house 2000 personnel with families. repair for ships and subs. Oil storage. Nearby air base. Hospital School. residence. Clubhouse. Offices. Control center. Radar. Power supply. water supply. Port. Port port. Where does the port go. Please point out the existing port/s in the Maldives.

Please find and suggest where the above can be done
Image

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Re: Long distance Chinese navy deployment - analysis

Postby kit » 23 Feb 2018 02:36

The stratfor seems to track the US naval deployments on its site .. good idea

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Re: Long distance Chinese navy deployment - analysis

Postby kit » 23 Feb 2018 02:38

chola wrote:War right now means OVERWHELMING Indian advantages in the IOR.

Which is why I called and hoped for war during Doka La

Now, are we willing to start a war and make them operate in the 0.01% of the time where their little emperor force would lose?


i was hoping a little skirmish at sea between the IN and PLAN might be good idea :mrgreen:

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Re: Long Distance Chinese Navy Deployment - Analysis

Postby ShauryaT » 23 Feb 2018 17:04

For the PLAN to deploy in the IOR to challenge India, first and foremost they have to have air dominance. Once they solve that issue, I will wake up and think about the PLAN challenge in the IOR.

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Re: Long Distance Chinese Navy Deployment - Analysis

Postby shiv » 23 Feb 2018 19:21

I have been having a detailed look at the Chinese String of Pearls - which actually look like a Series of Farts.

I can't understand how we and our own media - with such powerful tools in our hands can do no more than put both thumbs in our Musharraf and howl loudly about China in the IOR boxing us in.

2017 images:
Sittwe, Burma: Nothing
Gwadar: Nothing much. ONE cargo ship (Chabahar has several)
Hambantota: Zilch
Maldives has no space for a serious port and is well within range of a variety of Indian platforms.

Djibouti has an American base and a Japanese base and a Chinese base. That Chinese base is the only one that has something to see.

What string of pearls?

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Re: Long Distance Chinese Navy Deployment - Analysis

Postby chola » 23 Feb 2018 19:54

I’ve been saying for ages that the “String of Pearl” idea is nothing but stupidity. It even sounds stupid. A few ports here and there cannot stop the rise of India especially when you compare it to the cordon of actual bases with real honest heavy metal and firepower that the US keeps around Cheen.

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Re: Long Distance Chinese Navy Deployment - Analysis

Postby abhik » 23 Feb 2018 20:20

The pre-eminent naval power in the Indian Ocean region is not the IN or PLAN, but it is the US Navy (nobody wonders if USN ships run out of gas while deploying all the way from San Diego or Norfolk). We we have let a foreign power from the other side of the world like the US out muscle us in our own backyard, why is it so hard to imagine China doing the same in another 10-20 (or what ever) years?

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Re: Long Distance Chinese Navy Deployment - Analysis

Postby shiv » 23 Feb 2018 20:29

The US does not run out of gas because it has bases everywhere - including Djibouti, Diego Garcia and in the Gulf nations. Nobody asks about the US because the name China causes instant anxiety among a section of Indians. But the US was not the first. For IOR domination it was the Portuguese followed by the Brits.

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Re: Long Distance Chinese Navy Deployment - Analysis

Postby bmallick » 23 Feb 2018 21:37

The island bases that China has built in the South China Sea should be seen as outposts. Just like any outpost they are not very far away from the actual force concentration.

The same cannot be said for a base that China makes in the Maldives. It would require far more assets and infrastructure.

With regards to us letting US become the dominant power in the Indian Ocean, it is a bit unfair to blame us. During WW2 the dominant navy here was the RN. Post it's vacating the Indian ocean, the USN, the then dominant navy took its place. During this period we were not in any position to take up that mantle.

Now any navy trying to become a super power in the Indian ocean would definitely be a direct challenge to the USN hegemony. Does PLAN have that wherewithal is something to be seem. Or would USN give up Indian ocean meekly. Under current US power struggle with China, they would allow us to grow, but once they think that China is contained, they would not tolerate sharing. We would have to use the current condition to increase our strength and then take what is right fully ours at the opportune moment.

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Re: Long Distance Chinese Navy Deployment - Analysis

Postby shiv » 24 Feb 2018 08:28

Interesting analysis from Yusuf DFI
Quad needs both economic & military plan for Indo-Pacific
Exercise Malabar provides the template for maritime cooperation between the Quad with focus on anti- submarine warfare, antipiracy operations, sea interdiction, humanitarian and disaster relief and joint patrolling, which India has been non-committal about so far. Assigning areas of responsibility will allow better allocation of naval assets.

India will be responsible for the security of the Indian Ocean which it considers as its primary area of interest. The new US national security strategy states that it supports India’s leadership role in the security of the Indian Ocean and throughout the broader region This will allow the US which has major presence in the IOR to allocate more naval assets in the Pacific Ocean and the South China Sea.

This will help India as it will force the Chinese Navy to allocate more resources in that region than expand its footprint in the Indian Ocean.

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Re: Long Distance Chinese Navy Deployment - Analysis

Postby Bart S » 24 Feb 2018 15:46

shiv wrote:I have been having a detailed look at the Chinese String of Pearls - which actually look like a Series of Farts.

I can't understand how we and our own media - with such powerful tools in our hands can do no more than put both thumbs in our Musharraf and howl loudly about China in the IOR boxing us in.

2017 images:
Sittwe, Burma: Nothing
Gwadar: Nothing much. ONE cargo ship (Chabahar has several)
Hambantota: Zilch
Maldives has no space for a serious port and is well within range of a variety of Indian platforms.

Djibouti has an American base and a Japanese base and a Chinese base. That Chinese base is the only one that has something to see.

What string of pearls?


You are correct as far as military goes, although some presence is better for China than no presence whatsoever. And it's only going to increase as their capabilities get more sophisticated. But yes, there are limits to what they can do given India's position in the IOR.

However the real string of pearls that actually hurts India are the rapid inroads economically and politically into countries all around us. Whether this will backfire on China or not, time will tell, but it is not a threat that we can take lightly or wish away. And this is a much more insidious strategy undermines our security without firing a shot.

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Re: Long Distance Chinese Navy Deployment - Analysis

Postby Philip » 24 Feb 2018 18:39

The " long distance deployment" of the Chins that has
made the GOI blink are highly mobile assets called "people".The Maldives have been stealthily already overrun by so-called "tourists".The highest visiting the v.upmarket Maldives too. Not too long ago I posted a report that that the previous day thetd were only Chin tourisys from Asia at Male airport.These " tourists" are being used as human shields which will incur for us some collateral damage should we move in.Similarly, Sri Lanka is also being flooded with Chin " tourists". Do not for one moment imagine ghat these are genuine.They have been sponsored by the Chin military.No elderly ones visiting too as you see with the Japanese and Koreans!

The Chins therefore have already " deployed" the advancd parties of their ground forces.Supplied with weapons from Chin merchantmen or even subs, they could complicate the situ enormously should we choose to intervene.Why I recommend a naval and air blockade first ,for evacuation of tourists and escape of the ungodly species, suppression of logistic supplies to the islanders forcing them to rise up and if poss. seize power through the masses.Evacuation of firangs will lessen the chances of casualties and prevent the escape of "atoll Sultan"!

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Re: Long Distance Chinese Navy Deployment - Analysis

Postby shiv » 25 Feb 2018 07:37

There remains the possibility that anyone willing to take power in the Maldives is already corrupt and worthless while the people are all illiterate and incapable of doing anything other than fishing. So removing one despot will bring in some other worthless moron. The US has tried this "blockade and replacement of leader" in so many places and failed that I would not endorse fiddling with one useless government with fingers crossed that the ahole who emerges will be a great leader. He will most likely be just that - yet another greedy ba$turd. So no point in fiddling with the "government" of 600 minuscule coral Islands imagining that governance will magically spring up.

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Re: Long Distance Chinese Navy Deployment - Analysis

Postby Deans » 25 Feb 2018 11:25

China and HK between them have a shipping tonnage (GRT) of approx 115 million tonnes.
India's tonnage is 8.6 million (most of it is small ships plying routes along the coast).

India's international trade will not be affected if our ships are targeted, as most of our trade is carried out on foreign flagged vessels. China cannot declare a trade embargo if they can't enforce it. If they announce one, we can do the same. The world shipping community will do a equal equal and boycott both countries. That will have a catastrophic effect on China, whose economy is entirely dependent on JIT supply of manufactured goods.

China's seaborne trade passes through easy to attack and difficult to defend choke points, like the Malacca straits & straits of Hormuz.
There are over 25 times more Chinese vessels passing through the malacca straits than Indian ships and 15 times more Chinese vessles in the
Persian gulf. Thus a single Indian sub will have exponentially more targets (15-25 times) to attack, compared to a Chinese sub. I don't think the history of Naval warfare would have presented a more target rich environment than chinese vessels in for e.g. the Malacca straits.
We will be more able to deploy subs, support vessels and anti sub vessels in these areas compared to the PLAN, notwithstanding their dozens of `string of pearls' bases.

Closer to home, their entire coastline is boxed in by disputed areas (see the nine dash line). A very significant part of the Chinese fleet has to stay within that area, simply to defend their claims - while being opposed by the IJN. USN and the Philippine and Taiwanese navies, who might decide to take back some of the artificial reefs etc that China has constructed. Even if they don't, China has to assume they will (or support even a single sub we might deploy there). Because they can't be everywhere at the same time (in any case there is also a shortage of support infra), there is an inadequate force to be based on each of the string of pearls bases, making them not a threat but a target, for a concentrated IN force with a better logistics tail.

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Re: Long Distance Chinese Navy Deployment - Analysis

Postby ramana » 26 Feb 2018 08:08

X-Post..

SSridhar wrote:China's ocean observatory in Maldives sparks fresh security concerns - Sachin Parashar, ToI
A Joint Ocean Observation Station which China is looking to establish in the Maldives could prove to be another security challenge for the Indian government with the Maldivian opposition leaders claiming that the observatory will also have a military application with provision even for a submarine base.

The observatory location in Makunudhoo, the westernmost atoll in the north (not far from India), will allow the Chinese a vantage point of an important Indian Ocean shipping route
through which many merchant and other ships pass, said political sources in Male. It will be uncomfortably close to Indian waters and test red lines with regard to ties with Maldives.

Indian officials confirmed that an official agreement titled Protocol on Establishment of Joint Ocean Observation Station between China and the Maldives was finalised last year around the time the countries also controversially signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). They, however, said they'll have to check the specifics of the agreement before offering a comment.

With both China and Maldives sharing few details of the project though, a leader of the main opposition MDP party said the challenge for India is to ensure that the observation station doesn’t turn out to be another significant addition to Beijing's alleged 'String of Pearls' encirclement of India and one that undercuts India's traditional security ties with Maldives.

The problem for India is that the observatory sounds worryingly similar to the one which Beijing announced for South China Sea (SCS) last year. The SCS observatory is meant to signify to the world, not least to the US, Chinese control of SCS waters.

Strategic affairs expert Brahma Chellaney said India should treat the Maldives as a red line issue and that it should warn the Maldivian and Chinese governments that it will not brook such an ocean observation center.

The Maldives crisis, however, does not offer easy choices for India and any move to lean too hard on the current government can further destablise the situation and increase the possibilty of civil unrest. The international community it keenly looking at India's response to Maldives and the China card in its backyard. So far India has insisted President Abdulla Yameen restore democratic functioning but side stepped urgings that it should intervene militarily.

"The underwater ocean observation center in the South China Sea will be dual purpose, with civilian and military applications. China’s supposed plan to build such a center in the Maldives would effectively open a Chinese maritime front against India, in the same quiet way that China opened a Himalayan front against India in the 1950s," said Chellaney.

Sources here [New Delhi] said that India at some stage, like it did with the FTA, will have to seek a clarification from Male as to what the observatory was all about. Former Maldives President Mohamed Nasheed told TOI in an interview last month that China had already acquired 17 islands in the Maldives and that there was not enough clarity about Chinese activities on these islands.

For the past couple of years, reports that China is looking to build a port in the southern part of the country - in Laamu atoll – have had Maldives agog. While the Abdulla Yameen government has denied it, it hasn’t helped the government’s cause that people from the Gadhoo island (Laamu atoll) have been evacuated and the Chinese have been found building roads in that region. As TOI had pointed in an earlier report too, this island sits at the entrance to the one-and-a-half degree channel which is a major international shipping passage that crosses the Maldives.

Yameen last week extended Emergency in the Maldives paying little regard to India’s call for restoration of the democratic process or to even his own prosecutor general who described the extension as against the Constitution.

Strategically placed next to some of the most important shipping lanes in the world, the Maldives considers itself instrumental in facilitating China's OBOR in the Indian Ocean region. For India though, Chinese investments and projects are marked by a lack of transparency and commercial loans which come at concessional rate but which is offset by the inflated cost of projects.

"All major procurements contracted to Chinese companies are at 2-3 times the actual cost. There’s no disclosure of sovereign guarantees given by Yameen to commercial loans given by Chinese banks," said an opposition leader, adding that islands were leased to China for a fraction of estimated value. A case in point is the strategically located Feydhoo island which was leased for only $ 4 million.

"Most Chinese projects have not undergone proper environment impact or viability assessment. There has been no disclosure of the actual terms of contracts," said the leader.

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Re: Long Distance Chinese Navy Deployment - Analysis

Postby NRao » 26 Feb 2018 08:18

India cannot keep quite now.

Kept quite while the nuclear deal went through. Made limited noise in POK. This is unacceptable.

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Re: Long Distance Chinese Navy Deployment - Analysis

Postby shiv » 26 Feb 2018 09:01

NRao wrote:India cannot keep quite now.

Any ideas about what must be done?

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Re: Long Distance Chinese Navy Deployment - Analysis

Postby shiv » 26 Feb 2018 09:03

This is a Google Earth image of Hambantota. Nearby - there are buildings that are built in a shape that acppear like "CHINA-SLK" from the air.

But this is odd. Can anyone read Chinese?

https://twitter.com/bennedose/status/967964980174667777

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Re: Long Distance Chinese Navy Deployment - Analysis

Postby Deans » 26 Feb 2018 15:59

NRao wrote:India cannot keep quite now.

Kept quite while the nuclear deal went through. Made limited noise in POK. This is unacceptable.


What we could do (might be happening to some extent), is :
- Work with the quad partners, in tracking Chinese subs (sharing of sonar signatures of PLAN subs. their characterstics etc). This does not require
more high profile joint exercises and that will bring the Aussies on board, even they don't want to displease China. The Japanese surface ships have the best anti submarine capability in Asia, while the USN has the best subs.
- Our subs should start tracking Chinese merchant shipping (which they probably already do)
- More ships making friendly visits to Vietnam. Philippines, Japan & Taiwan.
- Basing rights in Vietnam & Chabahar.

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Re: Long Distance Chinese Navy Deployment - Analysis

Postby shiv » 26 Feb 2018 18:17

On Twitter, re Ocean observatory: (Retired Navy Twitter handles)
https://twitter.com/subnut/status/967989868726030336
Arun Kumar Singh
‏ @subnut
8h8 hours ago
Replying to @JaggiBedi @sachinpTOI and

Yes. The Chinese are planning to collect data (thermoclines, biological & environmental noise, Salinity etc) over the next few years so that their SSBNs & SSNs can be deployed optimally.


https://twitter.com/JaggiBedi/status/967985691731922945
VAdm Jaggi Bedi(Rtd)
‏ @JaggiBedi
8h8 hours ago
Replying to @sachinpTOI @Chellaney

@subnut @theUdayB @SandeepUnnithan Needs accurate and reliable hydrological data for sub surface operations. Precursor to prolonged deployment of SSBN/SSN operations in the Arabian Sea. To be read in conjunction with surveys conducted off Gwadar to analyse tectonic activity.

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Re: Long Distance Chinese Navy Deployment - Analysis

Postby shiv » 28 Feb 2018 08:27

Researching this topic - I have come across some interesting data points.

The Malacca straits cannot take any ships that require a depth of over 25-27 meters. The Sunda straits are even more shallow. However, even the USS Nimitz has gone through Malacca - it's not a big deal for large warships. However any Chinese ship entering the Indian ocean this way will be under open surveillance of the Indian navy.

When it comes to submarines it gets more interesting. If Chinese subs go across Malacca, they cannot go submerged - they have to sail through like ships. That sort of kills the stealth factor of subs. If Chinese subs must enter the Indian ocean fully submerged and stealthy, then they must pass through either Lombok or Ombai straits further east almost near Australia. By the time these subs touch the souther Indian ocean they will have already travelled 7000 + km - more than half of their endurance and will not be able to return without refuelling. So this route is best for nuclear subs. However the Chinese could possibly make innovative use of supply ships - I am less sure of how subs get refuelled from supply ships.

That said - in peacetime - the Chinese can stop over at a lot of bases to pick up food and fuel - including Malaysia, Sril Lanka etc. So running out of fuel/food as a cause of reduced range is less likely.

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Re: Long Distance Chinese Navy Deployment - Analysis

Postby Rakesh » 28 Feb 2018 08:46

Great thread Hakeem.

shiv wrote:I am less sure of how subs get refuelled from supply ships.

Subs cannot taken in anything from a surface vessel, without exposing herself and thus negating its sole advantage. Thus they do not take anything once they are underway. You basically live of whatever you took in at home port.

shiv wrote:That said - in peacetime - the Chinese can stop over at a lot of bases to pick up food and fuel - including Malaysia, Sri Lanka, etc. So running out of fuel/food as a cause of reduced range is less likely.

Yes, that is possible and thus they could stop at a base, refuel + stock up (food, supplies, etc) and then go on their way again. But even in that scenario, you run the risk of exposing yourself at a foreign port (even if it is a friendly one). This is where a nuclear boat becomes valuable. In a nuclear boat, you are limited only by food and other necessary supplies.

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Re: Long Distance Chinese Navy Deployment - Analysis

Postby pankajs » 28 Feb 2018 15:19

One thread ...
Snehesh Alex Philip‏ @sneheshphilip

#SriLanka Chief of Defence Staff Admiral Ravindra Wijegunaratne assures that #Hambantota port will not be used for any military activity #China #IndoPacificRegionalDialogue @indiannavy
Snehesh Alex Philip @sneheshphilip Feb 26

Says #SriLanka will not be part of any military alliance that threatens India's security #IndoPacificRegionalDialogue @indiannavy #China
Chandru‏ @ChandrusWeb Replying to @sneheshphilip @indiannavy

The only port that China will be able to use for military purposes is Gwadar. The rest is all hype.
Nitin A. Gokhale Verified account @nitingokhale 6h6 hours ago Nitin A. Gokhale Retweeted Chandru

But who tell this to our ‘cry wolf’ brigade?

Then
Chandru @ChandrusWeb 6h6 hours ago Replying to @ChandrusWeb @sneheshphilip @indiannavy

There is absolutely no way that Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Bangladesh and even Maldives will allow Chinese to use their land for military activities.
To which someone
Hash @asinharoy 4h4 hours ago

China fights its wars with a multi-pronged, long term strategy.
In last 20yrs they have leveraged their economic might to bulldoze & buy their way into many countries in Africa/Asia.
Economically weak countries r susceptible to & may eventually give in to Chinese pressure.
Chandru @ChandrusWeb 4h4 hours ago

And become easy targets for an Indian retaliation. No country will risk that
No country will risk its own land/people for China but for Bakistan. That is why Gwadar remain the only viable Miliraty port for China.

But we should not just rely on the flow of history but prepare to target all ports that will dare host the Chinese Navy in the IOR in the event of a conflict.

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Re: Long Distance Chinese Navy Deployment - Analysis

Postby Prasad » 28 Feb 2018 15:25

It doesn't take much to revert to China's side. A sub docked at H'tota ffs. And a mil presence in tiny maldives, even if on a couple of islands, will ensure we're hampered. Even if its a mosquito buzzing around the ears, it is a distraction and takes away a bit of attention/focus. This is our backyard and there shouldn't even be a chance for someone to gain a toehold let alone a few islands <1000km from our coast.

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Re: Long Distance Chinese Navy Deployment - Analysis

Postby pankajs » 28 Feb 2018 15:37

Chinese Navy is on regular *Piracy* patrol in the IOR region often < 1000 km from our coasts. Think of the route from Malacca to Arabian sea/Gwadar. There is no way we can force them from going around and about in the international waters or visiting ports in the region.

We should prepare to target ports that allows them visits during Military campaigns against us.

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Re: Long Distance Chinese Navy Deployment - Analysis

Postby shiv » 28 Feb 2018 17:41

Prasad wrote:It doesn't take much to revert to China's side. A sub docked at H'tota ffs. And a mil presence in tiny maldives, even if on a couple of islands, will ensure we're hampered. Even if its a mosquito buzzing around the ears, it is a distraction and takes away a bit of attention/focus. This is our backyard and there shouldn't even be a chance for someone to gain a toehold let alone a few islands <1000km from our coast.

This is like a "policy statement" but I would like to look at practicalities.

The Chinese cannot be stopped from operating in international waters. The already have a listening station in the Coco Islands, and have made port visits to Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Pakistan. That said "port visits" per se mean nothing given the logistical issues the Chinese face. The Indian navy too regularly visits waters that the Chinese think they own and berth in places like Vietnam.

A Naval base is a big thing - not just berthing. Currently (as of 2017) the Chinese have nothing of the sort in Myanmar or Hambantota. Hambantota will not be open to military ships from China in any case - but either way both Hambantota and Gwadar are sleepy. Currently. We need to see what they are up to. In war these ports will all be unsafe for the Chinese. In peacetime they may even visit India.

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Re: Long Distance Chinese Navy Deployment - Analysis

Postby shiv » 28 Feb 2018 19:42

How long/far can warships sail without refuelling? Alternatively, how often must they refuel?

This is not an easy question to get answers for,

Using Google - Amreeki info is the easiest available. US warships are refuelled every 3-4 days to keep them almost topped up and ready for action any time.

But let us say there is a Chinese Type 55 with a stated range of about 13000 km

Sailing at a sedate 30 kmph the ship will run out of fuel in 20 days after sailing 13000 km assuming it is running at an optimum cruise speed. Smaller ships of course have a lesser range. Starting from Hainan Island going via Malacca or Sunda the ship can sail to Mynamar or Hambantota and back But smaller ships of a flotilla will have to turn back sooner unless they can be refuelled on the way. Sailing to Male would be cutting it a bit fine. It would not have enough fuel to return and will have to proceed to a friendly port to refuel - either Myanmar or Sri Lanka or Pakistan - sailing in full view of Indian Navy surveillance. I doubt if supply ships can accompany them all the way - they will empty themselves and will have to return. However a Chinese fleet could refuel near the Sunda strait and top up the fuel used up in 3500 km from Hainan - giving them an extra 3500 km of endurance.

So for straight sailing the Chinese navy has more options if they refuel-restock once as they enter the Indian ocean - maybe south of Sumatra. .Just me "navy ignorant" guesswork. I wonder if anyone could fill in. This is not something we have discussed AT ALL on BRF AFAIK

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Re: Long Distance Chinese Navy Deployment - Analysis

Postby Prasad » 28 Feb 2018 20:58

shiv wrote:
Prasad wrote:It doesn't take much to revert to China's side. A sub docked at H'tota ffs. And a mil presence in tiny maldives, even if on a couple of islands, will ensure we're hampered. Even if its a mosquito buzzing around the ears, it is a distraction and takes away a bit of attention/focus. This is our backyard and there shouldn't even be a chance for someone to gain a toehold let alone a few islands <1000km from our coast.

This is like a "policy statement" but I would like to look at practicalities.

The Chinese cannot be stopped from operating in international waters. The already have a listening station in the Coco Islands, and have made port visits to Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Pakistan. That said "port visits" per se mean nothing given the logistical issues the Chinese face. The Indian navy too regularly visits waters that the Chinese think they own and berth in places like Vietnam.

A Naval base is a big thing - not just berthing. Currently (as of 2017) the Chinese have nothing of the sort in Myanmar or Hambantota. Hambantota will not be open to military ships from China in any case - but either way both Hambantota and Gwadar are sleepy. Currently. We need to see what they are up to. In war these ports will all be unsafe for the Chinese. In peacetime they may even visit India.

You are looking at today. I'm talking about 5 years down the line. Even the scs islands were nothing but having gained a foothold, they're build expanded. A toehold today can become a bigger facility tomorrow. Not letting them get one should be the objective.

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Re: Long Distance Chinese Navy Deployment - Analysis

Postby shiv » 28 Feb 2018 22:50

Prasad wrote:
shiv wrote:This is like a "policy statement" but I would like to look at practicalities.


Not letting them get one should be the objective.

This is what I mean by a policy statement - an expression of a desired outcome. Without knowing about today you will never know what might happen 5 years from now. Do you have any ideas about practicable methods of "not letting them get a toehold" that go beyond your policy statement about a desired outcome? If you do please post. It is easier to state wishes than make them come true.

How to achieve the goal, not what the goal is. Everyone has an idea about a goal. How to do it is what I would prefer to see on this thread.

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Re: Long Distance Chinese Navy Deployment - Analysis

Postby shiv » 01 Mar 2018 07:52

Innovative non military use of the Maldives:
http://alert5.com/2018/03/01/jmsdf-p-3- ... transfers/
JMSDF P-3 caught North Korean ship-to-ship cargo transfers

A Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force P-3 maritime patrol aircraft caught a Maldivian-flagged tanker “Xin Yuan 18” in a ship-to-ship transfer with North Korean-flagged tanker “Chon Ma San” on Feb. 24. Such transfers of goods is in breach of UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions.

Read more at http://alert5.com/2018/03/01/jmsdf-p-3- ... dKfdAPt.99


Image

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Re: Long Distance Chinese Navy Deployment - Analysis

Postby shiv » 01 Mar 2018 09:10

http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomac ... upply-ship


China commissions new naval supply ship

Image

China has commissioned its newest and largest naval supply ship as the country tries to beef up its capacity to protect its maritime interests.

The Type 901 replenishment vessel – which helps supply naval ships with oil, ammunition, food and water – was seen at a port in Zhanjiang, Guangdong province on Monday bearing the number 965, indicating it has been commissioned into the PLA Navy.

The new supply ship has almost double the displacement tonnage of the Type 903 supply ships currently being used for escort and anti-piracy missions off Somalia.

But one analyst said bigger supply ships were no substitute for more overseas bases when it came to supporting the expanding mission of China’s naval fleets.

Beijing has been trying to build up a blue-water navy that can operate globally and support its maritime security, including rolling out its first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, last year. But it still lags behind the United States Navy.

The Type 901 ship was first seen in satellite images in September 2015 at a shipyard in Guangzhou and was launched in December that year, according to a Jane’s Defence Weekly report late last year.

Multiple hoses on both sides of the ship meant it could supply aviation fuel and refuel an aircraft carrier simultaneously, the report said.

It has a top speed of around 25 knots and a full displacement of around 40,000 to 45,000 tonnes – similar to the US Navy’s Supply-class replenishment ships, according to US news portal Global Security.

Military commentator Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo told state television in June that the Type 901 had met the standards for supporting carrier strike groups.

“[Big supply ships] are one of the core parts of a carrier group,” Yin said. “The larger their displacement is, the stronger the carrier group in long battles.”

Ni Lexiong, a Shanghai-based military expert, said the supply ship could be deployed to support warships on missions around the world.

But he said China still needed more overseas ports to strengthen the navy’s long-range capabilities.

“No matter how big the supply vessels are, they are still small compared to harbour cities,” Ni said. “The vessels can only provide support for a limited amount of time.”

The defence ministry in a 2015 white paper vowed to shore up the navy’s capabilities in open oceans.

So far China has only one overseas naval base, which was formally opened in Djibouti in the Horn of Africa on Tuesday. That compares to the United States, which maintains dozens of naval bases abroad.

This article appeared in the South China Morning Post print edition as: P.L.A. eyes blue waters in new ship


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Re: Long Distance Chinese Navy Deployment - Analysis

Postby shiv » 01 Mar 2018 09:15

Type 901 resupply ship
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/ ... t_PLAN.jpg
Displacement:

20,500 tonnes for Type 903[1]
23,400 tonnes for Type 903A[2][3]

Length: 178.5m
Beam: 24.8m
Draught: 8.7m
Propulsion: 2 diesels 24,000 hp, 2 shafts
Speed: 20 knots
Range: 10,000 nm at 14 kts
Capacity: 10,500 tons of fuel oil, 250 tons of fresh water, 680 tons of cargo and ammunition
Complement: 130
Armament: 4 x H/PJ76F twin 37mm
Aircraft carried: 1 Z-8 helicopter or 1 Z-9 helicopter[4]
Aviation facilities: hangar and flight deck


Image


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