Long Distance Chinese Navy Deployment - Analysis

[shiv]

For comparison and for perspective- let me quote Wikipedia on India's own resupply ships:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/INS_Jyoti_(A58)

It is a major force multiplier in sustaining the navy's blue water operations. It can increase the range of a naval task force without tanker support from seven days and 2400 nautical miles to 50 days and 16,800 nautical miles

One can extrapolate to say that China's type 901 can sit in the Eastern Indian Ocean and refuel a flotilla once and do a second refuelling further west - giving the PLAN a credible blue - water capability

The Type 901 and 903 are ships that would have to be tracked and targeted if push comes to shove.

[pankajs]

The Type 901 and 903 are ships that would have to be tracked and targeted if push comes to shove.

Yup and any local port based resupply facilities should/would be the target of the first barrage of missiles if the balloon goes up in the IOR region.

You know, IMHO, A base on the northern shores of Australia would serve as the perfect resupply/logistical/jump off point for any Chinese foray into the IOR region. Distance from the Indian peninsular, vast hinterland backing it up [for food, water, fuel] and closeness to the Sunda/Lombak, etc makes such a location attractive.

While we could establish air dominance around our peninsular from shore based facilities, Australia is just too far for that. Yet it is near enough for Chinese navy to make a determined bid for control of the IOR.

[shiv]

^^
Australia!! An underpopulated country ripe for being taken over?

Hanging about south of Sumatra might also do the trick

Somehow - looking at how the PLAN has to bend over backwards to wage a serious naval war off Indian shores I suspect that they will gain most by simply forcing India to divert resources, while not actually going so far as to provoke a shooting war. This is just a thought that occurred to me - and I will mull over the idea to see how that could pan out and how it could be upset..

[pankajs]

That or a base on Java [South of Sumatra]. Theoretical of course ...

[shiv]

Here is something posted on the ChinaMil thread

China plans to build nuclear aircraft carrier: Reports - AP

Chinese media reports say the country is planning to build a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier capable of remaining at sea for long durations, in what would be a major upgrade for its increasingly formidable navy.

Look at this from a different perspective. It means that the Chinese currently do not have a long distance/long stay carrier capability and will not have one till their nuke carrier is ready. Even after that - the accompanying ships will need support.

The Chinese, as is true with Pakis also, are not stupid.

I am certain they know their weaknesses. If you ask my opinion - the PLAN will be hard put to get into a fight with Indian forces in the Indian ocean. despite constant howling and self flagellatory "off season Muharram" caterwauls from jingos - India is hardly asleep.

What does this mean?

This means that China will not be stupid enough to get into a fighting war in which they can come off second best. They will do everything that they can do without giving the IN and IAF a chance to hit them and kick their butts. Over the next few days I am hoping to come up with some possible predictions of what the Chinese can do, or might do.

[pankajs]

Our next goal should be to develop anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) in the lines of the Chinese DF-21D/DF-26 as well as the necessary surveillance and targeting capabilities. A 5000 KM missile would just about touch Australia and secure most of the IOR for India.

If the Chinese ASBMs are enough to render "American use of aircraft carriers obsolete" wouldn't such an Indian missile render the Chinese Aircraft Carriers also obsolete?

The Chinese, when they where weaker, opted for access denial strategy and we too should peruse the same strategy than trying to match them boat for boat.

[shiv]

Here are two Google Earth images of Gwadar port - one from 2009 and another from 2017.

Rapid development?

https://twitter.com/bennedose/status/969555122073186304

[brar_w]

If the Chinese ASBMs are enough to render "American use of aircraft carriers obsolete" wouldn't such an Indian missile render the Chinese Aircraft Carriers also obsolete?

Yet these wonder weapons are having no impact on either US or Chinese aircraft-carrier construction. Why is this? Do the Chinese believe that India, United States, Japan, or South-Korea are incapable of developing Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles that are as capable, and accurate as theirs? Could it be that the hype far exceeds actual capability and that like any weapon, counter would involve going after the kill chain which is entirely possible in the constant cat and mouse game that is access and denial? Not only is China developing and fielding carriers, but they seem to be working a long term plan of developing and procuring multiple large CVNs which will have very large DDGs as an escort..essentially multiple - high value ships. Perhaps they too, much like others have come to the conclusion that the threat, complicated as it may be, needs to be managed via investment in capability that addresses each element of the kill chain required to find, track, fix and target such powerful and expensive ships.

[shiv]

Cross post as relevant here

I'd add a few more points. A naval base needs some hinterland to supply it. Otherwise, all supplies need to be carted in from home and stocked up. It's all fine and dandy to say that China can do all that in an Maldivian island, but those supplies will be the first target in the event of hostilities. Secondly, storage for these supplies: even if China manages to strengthen some logistical supply chain, their storage cannot be easily defended, as most, if not all Maldivian islands lack natural cover, mountains, etc. into which they could build underground facilities. The entire country has an average elevation of about 4 feet above MSL. There is also the minor issue of corrosive tropical air - they'll need to protect their storage. Same goes for placement of air defence units around these facilities - do they have good locations for such units? I'd urge folks to look at what the great khan was able to build in the best location in the area - Diego Garcia, and compare that with what the Chinese could do in not so great locations. Also keep in mind that the IOR is not hostile waters for the US.

I am not saying the above in terms of a fait accompli that the Chinese have a toehold in the IOR (however nebulous it may be). Instead I am saying that these considerations will go into Chinese calculations on whether to build up some facilities. Given a choice, they'd take Hambantota** for those reasons without a second thought. But Hambantota is not really working out, given the SL govt's clear stand on not allowing mil facilities in the port, and handing over the nearby airport to us (it's hardly 15 km away as the crow flies). I am sure a Sukhoi can cover the distance much faster . So the Chinese are really left with Gwadar and maybe Sittwe, though Myanmar will not roll over as easily as the bakis.

Gwadar is a concern, and perhaps our only concern. That's where Chahbahar and Duqm come into play. The latter is openly for our military usage. Djibouti is too far to cause us any damage, and we seem to be up to something there anyway.

So given the above, what are China's options? They don't have a good staging area in the IOR, so they have to deploy from home ports only. What will they do then? Send a nuke sub to harass our shipping? Sure, they can try that. I am sure despite our watching the ingress points, they could slip in once or twice without us knowing - after all, it is not easy to be in a watchful state forever and the IOR is not a lake. But note that I said nuke sub, not diesel (the distance is just too much for diesels to operate without replenishing supplies). But sending a nuke sub to harass shipping is a serious escalation - will they want to risk that? We could do the same, and with friendlier ports for our replenishment near their home waters. And unlike us, their shipping lines are easier to reach from our mainland, let alone locations in Lakshadweep, A&N, Duqm, etc.

My reading is that China will do everything it can to try to advance inch by inch without actually pushing us beyond our redlines*. That's nothing new - that's what they do in the mountains. In the naval arena, that means sending ships on token anti-piracy patrols with 3-4 ships, and leak the news to our media, which immediately like BRF (of late) will do rona-dhona, completing the job for them. We will all live in a state as though Chinese ships are permanently anchored off Marina beach. But beyond that, they won't really try anything, as their logistical chains are simply too long and unsustainable.

Eventually, things will settle at an equilibrium: they'll keep ICS under their thumb and ensure they have safe waters for their nuke boats (East China sea is not that safe given Japanese and Unkil presence right off their coast in the first island chain). Or they could hang out in the Yellow sea, which is even worse, given SoKo and again Unkil. Similarly, the IOR will be under our watch, specifically the ingress and egress routes. There will be the occasional pin-prick by both sides, but that's pretty much it. These games on some atolls here and there are sideshows.

* We have a responsibility to not get accustomed to moving our redlines as the Chinese push them. So if the current noise is too much, we should overtly signal some action: exercises in the ICS with Vietnam would be a nice start, accompanied by massive publicity. We should simply prevent them from pushing our redlines, that's all. No need to send troops to Maldives - it's not worth it.

** For a long time, there was so much hand-wringing about China in Hambantota - how has that worked out for them so far and why? Something to ponder about.

[shiv]

My new video

Chinese Navy Access to the Indian Ocean
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MRBhZ2ATWqI

[pankajs]

If the Chinese ASBMs are enough to render "American use of aircraft carriers obsolete" wouldn't such an Indian missile render the Chinese Aircraft Carriers also obsolete?

Yet these wonder weapons are having no impact on either US or Chinese aircraft-carrier construction. Why is this? Do the Chinese believe that India, United States, Japan, or South-Korea are incapable of developing Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles that are as capable, and accurate as theirs? Could it be that the hype far exceeds actual capability and that like any weapon, counter would involve going after the kill chain which is entirely possible in the constant cat and mouse game that is access and denial? Not only is China developing and fielding carriers, but they seem to be working a long term plan of developing and procuring multiple large CVNs which will have very large DDGs as an escort..essentially multiple - high value ships. Perhaps they too, much like others have come to the conclusion that the threat, complicated as it may be, needs to be managed via investment in capability that addresses each element of the kill chain required to find, track, fix and target such powerful and expensive ships.

Ah yes ... those pesky questions? Wouldn't it be wonderful if I could just banish them!

Note that I have used a question to just make the point that what works against the US in SCS should work against the Chinese foray into the IOR region. So while carriers may not be *obsolete*, our job is to make their job complicated and insert as much uncertainty as possible in our area of concern. BTW, the quote was directly from the American media via Wikipedia.

This is also true for other such systems like the ABM, etc but that has not prevented countries from developing and fielding them if only to complicate the environment for the adversaries.

[shiv]

Cross post:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WRfT0NicDhQ


Admiral Sunil Lanba Speaks To Arnab Goswami | Nation Wants To Know

[shiv]

3 years old but informative
https://thediplomat.com/2015/10/where-i ... s-in-2015/

Is the “String of Pearls” theory valid? This is a debate which has been ongoing since the term was coined in 2005, when the US consultancy Booz Allen Hamilton published “Energy Futures in Asia.” In this report, Booz Allen predicted that China would try to expand its naval presence throughout the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) by building maritime civilian infrastructure in friendly states in the region, a strategy dubbed the “String of Pearls.” Since then, there has been much speculation and debate surrounding the validity, extent and potential intentions behind the concept. Commentators here at The Diplomat have both supported the possibility and warned against the utility of the term.

The tricky thing about the String of Pearls debate is that there is a problem with definition. Looking at much of the available literature, the “lowest common denominator” definition is that each “Pearl” represents some form of permanent Chinese military installation in a series of locations along a “String” stretching from Southern China, through the Indian Ocean, to the areas from where China imports much of its natural resources, such as Africa and the Middle East.