CAATSA...An Oxymoron?

Rakesh · Post by **Rakesh** » 31 Jul 2018 23:48

COMCASA will be for US equipment i.e. Armed Drones, C-130, C-17, AH-64, CH-47, etc.

Disappointing news. Did not expect this from the Modi Govt.

KrishnaK · Post by **KrishnaK** » 01 Aug 2018 00:41

Rakesh wrote:COMCASA will be for US equipment i.e. Armed Drones, C-130, C-17, AH-64, CH-47, etc.

Disappointing news. Did not expect this from the Modi Govt.

Looks like the Modi Govt doesn't think singing Hum Honge Kamiyaab is good enough insurance against China and interoperability with US & its allies like Japan is required. Signing these agreements only means India is willing to build interoperability with the US and Japan, be open to an ad-hoc alliance if required. It doesn't mean India will install those data-links everywhere, or that those data-links will always be used to share information. France operates the E2Ds. Are you telling me France willingly lets the US know the whereabouts of all its carrier ops ever since they've operated those E2Ds ? There's way too much FUD over this. Any talk of sacrificing strategic independence will get an expected rise from expected quarters. Right upto the 90s any talk of letting western capital into India would invite comparisons with the British East India company. What little there was of strategic independence vanished when the Soviet Union went down. Strategic independence at any cost is also strategic isolation.

Rakesh · Post by **Rakesh** » 01 Aug 2018 01:03

Isn't that what I said above? COMCASA will be for the US equipment i.e. AH-64, CH-47, C-130, C-17, etc. I did not say that India will be installing those communication links everywhere. From where did you get that?

Secondly, concerns over COMCASA are over listening into our communications (of US sourced equipment) and not in tracking platforms. Even the Indian Army raised that concern to the Govt.

Army fears US could leak data to Pakistan if India-US sign military secrecy pact
https://theprint.in/security/army-objec ... tan/88046/

Speaking on the proposed Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA), an official source told ThePrint, “We risk compromising our encrypted (coded) communication and a leak of information to Pakistan.” In a note to the government, the Indian Army has asked if it would be wise to sign the COMCASA.

Rakesh · Post by **Rakesh** » 01 Aug 2018 01:09

India ready to sign COMCASA pact with United States
https://www.janes.com/article/82019/ind ... ted-states

India is poised to sign the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) with the United States after nearly 15 years of negotiations to enable the transfer of advanced secure and encrypted communication systems. Official sources told Jane’s on 26 July that COMCASA was likely to be signed during the inaugural ‘2+2 meeting’ in New Delhi on 6 September between India’s defence and foreign ministers, Nirmala Sitharaman and Sushma Swaraj, and their US counterparts, James Mattis and Mike Pompeo. India has long opposed signing the agreement as it feared it could endanger its operational autonomy and compromise mission security while employing US-supplied equipment.

Rakesh · Post by **Rakesh** » 01 Aug 2018 01:18

This is what America does to strategic allies....oops, sorry I meant to say poodles

Thus the Indian Army concerns are very valid. The Amreekis are not to be trusted.

WikiLeaks cables: US agrees to tell Russia Britain's nuclear secrets
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldn ... crets.html

Information about every Trident missile the US supplies to Britain will be given to Russia as part of an arms control deal signed by President Barack Obama next week. Defence analysts claim the agreement risks undermining Britain’s policy of refusing to confirm the exact size of its nuclear arsenal. The fact that the Americans used British nuclear secrets as a bargaining chip also sheds new light on the so-called “special relationship”, which is shown often to be a one-sided affair by US diplomatic communications obtained by the WikiLeaks website. Details of the behind-the-scenes talks are contained in more than 1,400 US embassy cables published to date by the Telegraph, including almost 800 sent from the London Embassy, which are published online today.

Washington lobbied London in 2009 for permission to supply Moscow with detailed data about the performance of UK missiles. The UK refused, but the US agreed to hand over the serial numbers of Trident missiles it transfers to Britain. Professor Malcolm Chalmers said: “This appears to be significant because while the UK has announced how many missiles it possesses, there has been no way for the Russians to verify this. Over time, the unique identifiers will provide them with another data point to gauge the size of the British arsenal.”

Rakesh · Post by **Rakesh** » 01 Aug 2018 02:37

See the utter hypocrisy in the two images below....

VERSUS

krishna_krishna · Post by **krishna_krishna** » 01 Aug 2018 03:51

Rakesh wrote:COMCASA will be for US equipment i.e. Armed Drones, C-130, C-17, AH-64, CH-47, etc.

Disappointing news. Did not expect this from the Modi Govt.

This is pure harakiri, I hope this does not go through. I have seen many times such signing got postponed in the past, hoping will be the same case this time.

dinesha · Post by **dinesha** » 01 Aug 2018 06:33

India-US Military Communications Pact: US team in Delhi next week, India demands five assurances
https://indianexpress.com/article/india ... s-5285528/

KrishnaK · Post by **KrishnaK** » 01 Aug 2018 06:53

Rakesh wrote:Isn't that what I said above? COMCASA will be for the US equipment i.e. AH-64, CH-47, C-130, C-17, etc. I did not say that India will be installing those communication links everywhere. From where did you get that?

India need not install those data-links on all US sourced platforms either. Or disable them as needed if they do choose to have them installed on some.

Secondly, concerns over COMCASA are over listening into our communications (of US sourced equipment) and not in tracking platforms.

The E2Ds must be communicating its picture of the battlespace with the rest of the fleet ? Again, it's just not clear to me all or any of the US allies that have signed this are all OK with the US snooping on their communication, especially those like France or Israel. There seems to be quite a bit of FUD over this, just like over the logistics sharing agreement.

Even the Indian Army raised that concern to the Govt.

Army fears US could leak data to Pakistan if India-US sign military secrecy pact
https://theprint.in/security/army-objec ... tan/88046/

Speaking on the proposed Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA), an official source told ThePrint, “We risk compromising our encrypted (coded) communication and a leak of information to Pakistan.” In a note to the government, the Indian Army has asked if it would be wise to sign the COMCASA.

The Indian army has refuted it ever made such a statement - Reference to Indian Army is factually incorrect, Indian Army hasn't written note as mentioned in the article ‘Army fears US could leak data to Pakistan if India-US sign military secrecy pact’.@PIB_India @SpokespersonMoD @ThePrintIndia @vipulbansal2005. At least it doesn't want to publicly own to such a statement.

nvishal · Post by **nvishal** » 01 Aug 2018 13:19

COMCASA maybe required to operate predator drones which use US satellites line of sight communication.

Trikaal · Post by **Trikaal** » 01 Aug 2018 13:34

Let me get this straight. With COMCASA,
1. Now, US can listen in to our secret military communications
2.Track our military equipment
3. Hand us a huge bill everytime it unilaterally decides that the system needs an upgrade
4. Shut down all equipment and communications as a policy decision

Why are we signing this again?

nvishal · Post by **nvishal** » 01 Aug 2018 14:01

Trikaal wrote:Why are we signing this again?

I think it depends on the decision of the serving minster of defence. AK Antony and the INC have a history of dealing with the US(Nehru, cold war etc) and they base their policy according to it. The BJP is a very recent party. Nimala sitharaman is also a NRI returnee. I don't think that a person like modi or a jaitley(the right wing in general) understand geopolitics and prefer to leave that for others to handle.

Do recall that it was vajpayee who signed away Tibet to the Chinese. The right wing might be patriotic but it is also naive and delusional about things in general. Vajpayee didn't have expansionist ambitions so he automatically assumed that the Chinese didn't either lol. You can see the same thing happening again with the current right wing govt. They don't have an espionage network in the west so they assume that the US wouldn't either. They are asking the Americans for "assurances" that they won't do X and Y haha. The purpose of COMCASA is X and Y itself !!

chetak · Post by **chetak** » 01 Aug 2018 14:13

nvishal wrote:
Trikaal wrote:Why are we signing this again?
I think it depends on the decision of the serving minster of defence. AK Antony and the INC have a history of dealing with the US(Nehru, cold war etc) and they base their policy according to it. The BJP is a very recent party. Nimala sitharaman is also a NRI returnee. I don't a person like modi or a jaitley understand geopolitics and prefer to leave that to others.

I can't believe that I am saying this but MMS was actually stopped from going way, way further by the commies, in the nuke deal. The reason doesn't matter but the commies made sure that MMS stopped midway and did not go all the way and sell off the all family silver, literally and figurately.

This govt does not have a similar shortstop, to use a baseball term.

It is their political and international inexperience that is being leveraged by the US.

No matter, because using the US as an example, and following Trump's lead, we can repudiate any deal when the time comes to separate the men from the boys.

Our supreme national interest should always prevail and all the rest only come a poor second and the devil take the hindmost.

nvishal · Post by **nvishal** » 01 Aug 2018 14:24

^ The common BJP worker does not know or understand what realpolitiks is. Many senior members on this forum are patriots and subscribe to realpolitiks in some form or the other but the actual workers in the BJP are much different than us. This is something that is difficult to acknowledge.

MMS was probably convinced that the US nuke deal would get us into the NSG. After all these years, I think he has sobered up and has realised that the Americans took him for a ride.

kshirin · Post by **kshirin** » 01 Aug 2018 17:48

Trikaal wrote:Let me get this straight. With COMCASA,
1. Now, US can listen in to our secret military communications
2.Track our military equipment
3. Hand us a huge bill everytime it unilaterally decides that the system needs an upgrade
4. Shut down all equipment and communications as a policy decision

Why are we signing this again?

Why indeed?

pankajs · Post by **pankajs** » 01 Aug 2018 17:53

chetak wrote:No matter, because using the US as an example, and following Trump's lead, we can repudiate any deal when the time comes to separate the men from the boys.

Our supreme national interest should always prevail and all the rest only come a poor second and the devil take the hindmost.

That statement is true and stands by itself ... does not need any further support or elaboration.

But still ...

dinesha wrote:India-US Military Communications Pact: US team in Delhi next week, India demands five assurances
https://indianexpress.com/article/india ... s-5285528/

US officials contend that if a new government in India passes a ‘sovereign’ law which overrides COMCASA at a later stage, it defeats the purpose of signing the agreement. They told Indian interlocutors that such a clause is not required as Indian government can always cancel COMCASA after giving a notice period, besides having the option of amending it at any stage. Besides sovereignty, three major points of negotiations are about assurances India wants included in the text of the agreement.

Not to say that it will be easy because of immense diplomatic pressure and the facts that quite a bit of overlap and enmeshing would have happened BUT it is possible for a future GOI to junk the agreement.

kit · Post by **kit** » 02 Aug 2018 00:51

i suppose this is a way to assuage American "concerns" for the time being .. as also th clause to cancel it if required. So any American sanctions could potentially negate COMCASA as well . ?

Rakesh · Post by **Rakesh** » 02 Aug 2018 03:04

KrishnaK wrote:India need not install those data-links on all US sourced platforms either. Or disable them as needed if they do choose to have them installed on some.

The issue arises if it is installed on even one platform. There is no need for encrypted communication to be monitored by someone else. We are buying the equipment from the Americans. What we do with it, is our business.

KrishnaK wrote:The E2Ds must be communicating its picture of the battlespace with the rest of the fleet? Again, it's just not clear to me all or any of the US allies that have signed this are all OK with the US snooping on their communication, especially those like France or Israel. There seems to be quite a bit of FUD over this, just like over the logistics sharing agreement.

Snooping on the communications of its allies is one of their main goals. America snoops on everyone, agreement or no agreement. And secrets are readily divulged to other states to further American interests. See below....

WikiLeaks cables: US agrees to tell Russia Britain's nuclear secrets
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldn ... crets.html

KrishnaK wrote:The Indian army has refuted it ever made such a statement - Reference to Indian Army is factually incorrect, Indian Army hasn't written note as mentioned in the article ‘Army fears US could leak data to Pakistan if India-US sign military secrecy pact’.@PIB_India @SpokespersonMoD @ThePrintIndia @vipulbansal2005. At least it doesn't want to publicly own to such a statement.

They do not want to embarrass the Govt and thus they have disowned the statement. Read the article below on why COMCASA is a bad idea.

COMCASA – Should India Sign?
http://www.delhidefencereview.com/2017/ ... ndia-sign/

Rakesh · Post by **Rakesh** » 02 Aug 2018 03:09

kit wrote:i suppose this is a way to assuage American "concerns" for the time being .. as also th clause to cancel it if required. So any American sanctions could potentially negate COMCASA as well . ?

The clauses mentioned in the Indian Express article are good. I hope we enforce those clauses, if the agreement is signed. We should have the right to walk away from the agreement when we feel it is no longer in India's interests.

KrishnaK · Post by **KrishnaK** » 02 Aug 2018 09:54

Rakesh wrote:
KrishnaK wrote:India need not install those data-links on all US sourced platforms either. Or disable them as needed if they do choose to have them installed on some.
The issue arises if it is installed on even one platform. There is no need for encrypted communication to be monitored by someone else. We are buying the equipment from the Americans. What we do with it, is our business.

There's nothing except the Print's statements that says the US can trivially read encrypted communications on hardware that require CISMOA/COMCASA. I'm not convinced it's that easy. It's like saying, if you use Ciscos, the US can trivially read everything that gets transmitted over them. It should be possible to create a secure network using any gear, by ensuring there is no way to access it from the outside. Examples of breaches of such setups exist, but that requires a lot of effort.

Snooping on the communications of its allies is one of their main goals. America snoops on everyone, agreement or no agreement. And secrets are readily divulged to other states to further American interests. See below....

Compared to countries that ask for permission before snooping on their allies ? We're talking about the ability to trivially read encrypted communication over CISMOA gear, not moral standards. Israel has snooped at the highest levels on the US. Everyone does it to the best of their ability.

COMCASA – Should India Sign? http://www.delhidefencereview.com/2017/ ... ndia-sign/

Is there more to it than keying is my question. What does keying by US operators mean - are the keys known to them ? Can operational security be maintained in the face of CISMOA without relying on US assurances ? What do France and Israel do ? Are they actually OK with no communications security vis-a-vis America ? The entire platform is American, so some level of comfort with US systems exists already - can there be changes to CISMOA allowing more operational security ? What would those changes be ? Can India maintain 2 sets of communication links, one for interoperability and another for its own internal use. Both sides stand to gain enormously from enabling this - can there be a deal that addresses Indian concerns as well. None of these are explained in any depth beyond Amir Khan can read everything, all is lost onleee.

There's some more information here - India-US communication pact faces uphill climb

To assess the key hurdles, Business Standard has scrutinised the text of the CISMOA that the Republic of Korea (South Korea, or ROK) Ministry of National Defence (MND) signed with the US DoD on October 27, 2008. That text requires Korea to provide US personnel access to Korean military bases; reserves for US personnel the right to install, maintain and inspect CISMOA-controlled equipment; bans the transfer of CISMOA-controlled equipment to any third party; bans its indigenous production; and stipulates stringent safeguards for securing, storing and accounting for COMSEC (communications security) equipment obtained from the US.
Paragraph V of the agreement requires ROK to pay the full cost of reconfiguring its communication systems to be interoperable with US military systems, and for testing the Korean systems, whenever required.

Paragraph IX of the agreement stipulates: “DoD-provided COMSEC equipment and materials, including keying materials, will be installed and maintained only by authorized US personnel… When authorized by the US, qualified ROK personnel may remove and/or replace US COMSEC equipment previously installed by US personnel.”

Paragraph X mandates that “DoD-provided COMSEC equipment and materials, including keying materials, will not be subject to any cooperative development, co-production, co-assembly or production licensing agreements.”

To be sure, New Delhi will be able to arm-twist Washington into framing a less restrictive COMCASA agreement. The Pentagon has repeatedly offered to address Indian concerns, asking New Delhi to identify objectionable clauses in the standard CISMOA draft. However, New Delhi has not conveyed its Red Lines yet, apparently because the defence ministry has little clarity on its own position.

US officials point out that New Delhi had no qualms signing highly restrictive safeguard agreements for the protective technologies installed on the prime minister’s Boeing Business Jet, which are similar to the ones that protect the US president’s aircraft, Air Force One. Says one official: “India displayed a clear understanding of the need to protect those technologies; because VVIP lives depend on that. Why is there a different standard for safeguarding technologies critical for protecting soldiers, sailors and airmen? That is the logic of CISMOA and COMCASA.”

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND REPUBLIC OF KOREA MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE CONCERNING COMMUNICATIONS INTEROPERABILITY AND SECURITY

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 02 Aug 2018 10:08

As US-Russia ties blow hot & cold, Moscow wants same military deal America has with India

Rakesh · Post by **Rakesh** » 03 Aug 2018 04:06

KrishnaK wrote:There's nothing except the Print's statements that says the US can trivially read encrypted communications on hardware that require CISMOA/COMCASA. I'm not convinced it's that easy. It's like saying, if you use Ciscos, the US can trivially read everything that gets transmitted over them. It should be possible to create a secure network using any gear, by ensuring there is no way to access it from the outside. Examples of breaches of such setups exist, but that requires a lot of effort.

I beg to differ. See below.

The whole point of signing COMCASA is to hop on board the secure American network. This is essential for platforms like the Predator drones or at least that is what we have been spoon fed by the US Govt.

If what you are claiming is true - that the US cannot trivially read encrypted communications - there would be no need for endless negotiations with the US, which have been going on for more than a decade (if not more) over COMCASA/CISMOA. The very fact that the term CISMOA got changed to COMCASA, is because India refused to sign on to the blanket agreement that America does with other nations.

I am surprised you brought up the Cisco example, because the National Security Agency (NSA) has been installing backdoors in Cisco routers for years now. Here are a few examples....

Cisco confirms NSA-linked zeroday targeted its firewalls for years
https://arstechnica.com/information-tec ... for-years/

Photos of an NSA “upgrade” factory show Cisco router getting implant
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/201 ... g-implant/

NSA reportedly installing spyware on US-made hardware
https://www.cnet.com/news/nsa-reportedl ... -hardware/

Compared to countries that ask for permission before snooping on their allies ? We're talking about the ability to trivially read encrypted communication over CISMOA gear, not moral standards. Israel has snooped at the highest levels on the US. Everyone does it to the best of their ability.

When you are the creator of the keys, you are fully aware and are knowledgeable of backdoors or alternate sources of entry. And since you have stated that everyone does it to the best of their ability (thank you for that!), I am sure the Americans are doing it carte blanche. The whole point of Snowden being a whistle blower, was to bring to attention this unchecked authority that the NSA has.

Is there more to it than keying is my question. What does keying by US operators mean - are the keys known to them ? Can operational security be maintained in the face of CISMOA without relying on US assurances ? What do France and Israel do ? Are they actually OK with no communications security vis-a-vis America ? The entire platform is American, so some level of comfort with US systems exists already - can there be changes to CISMOA allowing more operational security ? What would those changes be ? Can India maintain 2 sets of communication links, one for interoperability and another for its own internal use. Both sides stand to gain enormously from enabling this - can there be a deal that addresses Indian concerns as well. None of these are explained in any depth beyond Amir Khan can read everything, all is lost onleee.

Absolutely the keys are known to the Americans. They own and operate the secure network. How would they NOT know it?

Operational security cannot be maintained on any American platform, which is interconnected to the secure network that is owned and operated by the United States. That does not mean they are going to turn it off, but that does mean that they have the ability to listen into that conversation, as they themselves have advised above. Allow me to use a crude example ---> if someone placed a speaker in your home in which you and family live in, would you be comfortable with that? Now they are telling you that the ability to listen into the conversation is encrypted and requires keys to give someone the access. And yes, they are the creator of those keys. Would you be amenable to such a living arrangement?

France and Israel do not have hostile, nuclear-armed neighbours like Pakistan and China. For them - especially Israel - having the Americans listen into their conversations matters little. At the end of the day, Israel and America are on the same page. Hamas wants to destroy Israel. Iran wants to wipe Israel off the face of the map. There is no disagreement between America and Israel over these fundamental issues. America has been funding their existence since 1948. They have gotten huge sums of military aid from the United States. There is a sizeable and influential Jewish population in the United States that wants to see the State of Israel stay ALIVE. All valid points and thank goodness for Israel. But I digress.

On France, they have been a founding member of NATO. Post World War II, the Soviet threat was as real to France as it was to the rest of Western Europe. While, the French have been largely independent when it comes to their military industry (Mirage III, Mirage V, Super Étendard, Mirage 2000, Rafale)...they are not really doing anything that is inimical to American interests. Geo-politically, France and the US have been tied at the hip. They have serious disagreements i.e. Operation Iraqi Freedom, Weapons of Mass Destruction (during the Presidency of George W Bush) and now with trade, immigration, tariffs (in the Presidency of Donald Trump). But nevertheless, France does not really stray far from the leader of the free world.

India does NOT enjoy that level of relationship that France and Israel have. Historically, the US Govt (especially the State Department) has always been pro Pakistan and anti India. It is only with the Presidency of Donald Trump, that Pak-US relationship has seriously been degraded. But Donald Trump is not your conventional US President, however Donald Trump will NOT be President forever. At some point - either in four years or eight - he will have to demit office as per the US Constitution. We could then end up with the likes of Hillary Clinton, Robin Raphael, Strobe Talbott, Madeline Albright among others.

If the China threat did not affect US interests in the Pacific, India today would be sanctioned under CAATSA. And sanctioning India would be counterproductive to that goal. Even in that, the CAATSA waiver stipulates that India must show that it is reducing its dependence upon Russian military hardware.

Since you brought up the point that signing CISMOA helps both parties enormously, please illustrate how CISMOA helps India. We are doing just fine with the American platforms we operate now without CISMOA. So how does CISMOA help India?

KrishnaK wrote:There's some more information here - India-US communication pact faces uphill climb

Although Ajai Shukla would like to portray the Govt as idiots, the reality is otherwise. The Govt of India has raised five objections, which are;

India-US Military Communications Pact: US team in Delhi next week, India demands five assurances
https://indianexpress.com/article/india ... s-5285528/

1) The first is an assurance that the American side won’t use the access it gets to the military communications system for spying on India.

2) The second is about the misuse of control equipment, as it is part of proprietary American network, which can be used by US military against Indian forces.

3) The third assurance being sought by New Delhi is that the US government should not switch the whole equipment off or shut the Indian military network down as part of a policy decision.

4) Another contentious issue is about backward compatibility of the equipment under COMCASA, which involves the cycle of upgradation that India wants to have a choice over, besides being guaranteed without any time limit. The US has argued that having the choice of upgradation negates the purpose of COMCASA as many upgrades are required to overcome vulnerabilities and compromises in the system.

5) The Indians are worried about the cost of these upgrades. The likely solution could include either a specified time limit, after an initial guarantee period, or a cost-sharing model.

In response to these five assurances, the American side has responded by stating, "India is insistent on these assurances being inserted in the text, arguing that COMCASA is an India-specific pact, based on Communication and Information on Security Memorandum of Agreement, a generic pact which the US signs with other countries. But the Americans contend that the person signing this pact, a senior US military officer, doesn’t have the authority to give those assurances which have to come from a political authority."

So we are signing a pact with a senior US military officer, however the US political authority is under no obligation to follow that pact. Now I understand, why CISMOA will benefit both parties so enormously.

From Ajai Shukla's article....

To assess the key hurdles, Business Standard has scrutinised the text of the CISMOA that the Republic of Korea (South Korea, or ROK) Ministry of National Defence (MND) signed with the US DoD on October 27, 2008. That text requires Korea to provide US personnel access to Korean military bases; reserves for US personnel the right to install, maintain and inspect CISMOA-controlled equipment; bans the transfer of CISMOA-controlled equipment to any third party; bans its indigenous production; and stipulates stringent safeguards for securing, storing and accounting for COMSEC (communications security) equipment obtained from the US.

Paragraph IX of the agreement stipulates: “DoD-provided COMSEC equipment and materials, including keying materials, will be installed and maintained only by authorized US personnel… When authorized by the US, qualified ROK personnel may remove and/or replace US COMSEC equipment previously installed by US personnel.”

The bolded parts are quite frankly nonsense. We bought the equipment from you. Why should you inspect it? How can you tell us what we should do with them? Otherwise, you only keep it

US officials point out that New Delhi had no qualms signing highly restrictive safeguard agreements for the protective technologies installed on the prime minister’s Boeing Business Jet, which are similar to the ones that protect the US president’s aircraft, Air Force One. Says one official: “India displayed a clear understanding of the need to protect those technologies; because VVIP lives depend on that. Why is there a different standard for safeguarding technologies critical for protecting soldiers, sailors and airmen? That is the logic of CISMOA and COMCASA.”

Hai! Hai! Very nice spin by Shukla!

What role does a VVIP Boeing Business Jet play in a conflict versus a COMCASA-controlled military platform? That is a nonsensical analogy.

Viv S · Post by **Viv S** » 03 Aug 2018 15:49

Rakesh wrote:I beg to differ. See below.

The source of the that quote appears to be an article in The Print -

Army fears US could leak data to Pakistan if India-US sign military secrecy pact

Refuted by the Army -

Absolutely the keys are known to the Americans. They own and operate the secure network. How would they NOT know it?

It isn't clear what the COMCASA would entail, much of the commentary on its consequences being just speculation because no one has seen the actual text of the document. For example, the IAF is adopting the ODL fleet-wide while the IN uses Data Link II. They have absolutely no intention of switching to the MIDS, and I don't think anybody believes otherwise.

What is a possibility (and here I'm speculating) is that COMCASA would enable US exports of comm modules for secondary installation on some Indian & most US-origin equipment. Another possibility is that they'll opening up Link 16-type waveforms (as well as precision GPS) as a function for BEL modules, without impinging on domestic systems operating independently.

Operational security cannot be maintained on any American platform, which is interconnected to the secure network that is owned and operated by the United States. That does not mean they are going to turn it off, but that does mean that they have the ability to listen into that conversation, as they themselves have advised above. Allow me to use a crude example ---> if someone placed a speaker in your home in which you and family live in, would you be comfortable with that? Now they are telling you that the ability to listen into the conversation is encrypted and requires keys to give someone the access. And yes, they are the creator of those keys. Would you be amenable to such a living arrangement?

That's a possibility.

There's also another - lets say you have a dual sim smartphone. You've got an Airtel sim with pan-India coverage that you use on a daily basis but you have to travel for business to the US, so you buy a AT&T sim as well with a global coverage, signing their ToA/EU document. Now that potentially gives them access to your metadata when you're over there or using the network elsewhere in the world, but it doesn't stop you from switching to your local network whenever you want within the country.

Again like I said before, its all speculation, much like we saw earlier with the LEMOA which some were convinced, right up to the end, would give the US the right to set up military bases on Indian soil. Which turned out to be very much not the case.

If the China threat did not affect US interests in the Pacific, India today would be sanctioned under CAATSA. And sanctioning India would be counterproductive to that goal. Even in that, the CAATSA waiver stipulates that India must show that it is reducing its dependence upon Russian military hardware.

Not according to the explanatory statement issued with the Senate-House reconciliation of the NDAA-19 bill. According to that the executive also has the option of issuing a waiver on the grounds that the country in question is "cooperating with the United States Government on other matters that are critical to United States strategic national security interests".

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 03 Aug 2018 20:35

VivS, It does not make sense for India to sign up to COMCASA as its a case of "Ah bains mujhe maar!'

India has always sought strategic autonomy.
US already monitors extensively Indian military for 'stability' concerns.
Recall those sat pictures shown to ABV of 2 Corps locations.

Also I don't see why you want US to have a veto on Indian military options?
The italics is precisely that similar to the armed harem guards in Mughal Sultanates.

Indian military will become that type of guard force subject to US whims and fancies.

kit · Post by **kit** » 04 Aug 2018 02:31

Out of curiosity if the COMCASA enables the US to eavesdrop on Indian mil communications is the reverse also possible? ..( someone says yes ! .. just a little bit of work and the right gear! )

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 04 Aug 2018 08:37

kit wrote:Out of curiosity if the COMCASA enables the US to eavesdrop on Indian mil communications is the reverse also possible? ..( someone says yes ! .. just a little bit of work and the right gear! )

Not really we are the end user , US controls the hardware and software encryption part of communication we are just the user and they are the gate keeper

That’s an extremely dangerous thing to happen to any country if you don’t control both the hardware and software end of encryption tool you are dead.

Recall the snowmen incident where yahoo MSN google and all big corporates were just letting their servers and encryption read by NSA no holds bar , our situation will be the same they will read all our traffic and we will never know about it and US NSA and DIA will keep the charade of we don’t read any thing from our allies much like they lied in senate pre snowden only to be caught with pants down

KrishnaK · Post by **KrishnaK** » 04 Aug 2018 08:47

Rakesh wrote: If what you are claiming is true - that the US cannot trivially read encrypted communications - there would be no need for endless negotiations with the US, which have been going on for more than a decade (if not more) over COMCASA/CISMOA. The very fact that the term CISMOA got changed to COMCASA, is because India refused to sign on to the blanket agreement that America does with other nations.

The LEMOA had no intrusive inspections and yet took a decade.

I am surprised you brought up the Cisco example, because the National Security Agency (NSA) has been installing backdoors in Cisco routers for years now. Here are a few examples....

Cisco confirms NSA-linked zeroday targeted its firewalls for years
https://arstechnica.com/information-tec ... for-years/

Photos of an NSA “upgrade” factory show Cisco router getting implant
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/201 ... g-implant/

NSA reportedly installing spyware on US-made hardware
https://www.cnet.com/news/nsa-reportedl ... -hardware/

And I'm not surprised you missed the point entirely. Strong end-to-end encryption on top of compromised Ciscos will work just fine. Isolating the network entirely from the rest of the world will work too. From the point of the attacker these situations can be and have been worked around as well, but involves effort. That sort of effort to compromise a secured network would yield results, irrespective of whether the routers are compromised or not.

When you are the creator of the keys, you are fully aware and are knowledgeable of backdoors or alternate sources of entry.

Knowledge of keys (i'm assuming these are ones used for encryption) and knowledge of backdoors have nothing to do with each other.

Since you brought up the point that signing CISMOA helps both parties enormously, please illustrate how CISMOA helps India. We are doing just fine with the American platforms we operate now without CISMOA. So how does CISMOA help India?

I don't think India's doing fine. Establishing the capacity for interoperability means China has to take that into account. They have to guess if US and/or Japan will intervene on India's behalf or the other way around. There need not be an alliance. The uncertainty suits both parties just fine.The point is to reduce China's options and scope for action. The ideal scenario is to deter China from starting anything. India, clearly, is the weakest of the all the parties involved. My guess is the situation is bad enough for India to stop playing the strategic autonomy card. It isn't the pressure from the US/Japan both of which would definitely prefer to have India more firmly on their side, it's the pressure from China's that's causing this rethink.

This the gap - your (and the popular) narrative is that India's being forced into an arrangement which it has no interest in or need for. That doesn't seem to be true at all. Fixing procurement and DRDO is going to improve the situation, but isn't going to change the balance against a country with a GDP 5 times Indias' and none of its democratic compulsions. It will be decades before India manages to catch up.

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 04 Aug 2018 11:21

KrishnaK wrote:Knowledge of keys (i'm assuming these are ones used for encryption) and knowledge of backdoors have nothing to do with each other

Oh well very much , You can always share the keys and say its encrypted and safe ( that applies to commercial and military propietary technology ) since you have the code to the keys you can very much introduce the backdoor to the software or the algorithm the key uses.

Same goes to propietary hardware too its a black box with no insight to how it works or what backdoor or kill switch there is to it. You cant really trust any proprietary SW or HW unless you are 100 % sure about each line of code that goes into SW and the hardware is designed and build by you.

It would be foolish for Indian Military and Sensitive Establishment to use HW and SW encryption from any nation or commercial vendor there will always be a backdoor or weak link in that or they these nation can introduce a Backdoor or BUG later on as part of upgrades/patches , best is to let DRDO build both the HW and SW encryption. Any thing less is like signing your own death warrant.

Trikaal · Post by **Trikaal** » 04 Aug 2018 18:59

Noob question:
Can someone please explain to me what is so much superior about American communications systems and data links that we are running after it like it is an elixir of life. I mean, can we not produce military grade encryptions(hardware and software). What exactly makes these so valuable that we are ready to sign away our sovereignty? Also, is chinese/Russian communications systems and data links so much inferior to american that acquiring these will give us a very significant edge over our neighbors?

P. S. - I know about the interoperability argument but that is an incentive mainly for US. US wants our equipment(mainly naval) to help it keep an eye on its regional rival China. This will reduce the cost for US since it will have to station less ships in Indian Ocean. We hardly get anything out of it since Indian position vis-a-vis China is mostly defensive and land based in a region where most of this equipment can't be deployed in the first place. Our main take-away is these super awesome communications systems and data links.

Viv S · Post by **Viv S** » 04 Aug 2018 20:01

ramana wrote:VivS, It does not make sense for India to sign up to COMCASA as its a case of "Ah bains mujhe maar!'

India has always sought strategic autonomy.

Question is, do we know what the COMCASA entails? Be it with regard to hardware or software, or indeed sovereignty. They haven't even finished drafting it.

We've been here before. With GSOMIA that was guaranteed to tie India into the US intelligence grid. With the EUMA which was guaranteed to have US inspectors running rampant all over the Indian military installations. With the LEMOA which was guaranteed to lead to US military bases popping up all over the country.

Yet when each of deals were done it turned out that the Indian negotiating side wasn't staffed with dopes, and those 'foundational agreements' had been watered down into 'enabling agreements' and stuffed with enough legalese & loopholes to allow the US govt to work within its domestic law while leaving India control over all sovereign matters.

Also I don't see why you want US to have a veto on Indian military options?
The italics is precisely that similar to the armed harem guards in Mughal Sultanates.

The italics is not from the COMCASA. Its from the NDAA-19 i.e. giving direction to the US govt not the Indian govt. That aside, its been phrased to be broad (eg. it doesn't define 'critical matters' or 'strategic interests') so as to give the executive adequate elbow room in managing foreign policy.

India's official and functional position is plenty clear and has nothing in common with 'harem guards', to whit - US laws don't apply to India. Period.

Viv S · Post by **Viv S** » 04 Aug 2018 20:21

Trikaal wrote:Noob question:
Can someone please explain to me what is so much superior about American communications systems and data links that we are running after it like it is an elixir of life.

The deal has been in the works for 15 years so we're hardly 'running after it like its an elixir of life'.

I mean, can we not produce military grade encryptions(hardware and software). What exactly makes these so valuable that we are ready to sign away our sovereignty? Also, is chinese/Russian communications systems and data links so much inferior to american that acquiring these will give us a very significant edge over our neighbors?

Do we still have our sovereignty today? Because I remember it being declared with quite a bit of vehemence that we'd be losing it we signed the LEMOA.

As for the agreement's applicability - most weapon system with mid-course guidance employ some type of data-link as well as GPS. Those acquisitions will become somewhat easier. The IAF or IN will still not be switching to NATO-spec C4I.

P. S. - I know about the interoperability argument but that is an incentive mainly for US. US wants our equipment(mainly naval) to help it keep an eye on its regional rival China. This will reduce the cost for US since it will have to station less ships in Indian Ocean. We hardly get anything out of it since Indian position vis-a-vis China is mostly defensive and land based in a region where most of this equipment can't be deployed in the first place. Our main take-away is these super awesome communications systems and data links.

The US military presence & assets in the IOR & East Asia are not discrete. Both regions are covered by the Pacific Command - so its the same number of ships available either way. Case-in-point:

US, Indian navies sharing information on Chinese subs, says Pacific Command chief - "We work closely with India to improve India's capability. (There is the) Malabar (exercise) that now (also includes) Japan... we are getting better together with our ability to track Chinese submarines in the Indian Ocean Region. There is sharing of information on Chinese maritime movements. I am not getting into specifics beyond that." - Admiral Harris

Trikaal · Post by **Trikaal** » 04 Aug 2018 21:29

Viv S wrote:
Do we still have our sovereignty today? Because I remember it being declared with quite a bit of vehemence that we'd be losing it we signed the LEMOA.

As for the agreement's applicability - most weapon system with mid-course guidance employ some type of data-link as well as GPS. Those acquisitions will become somewhat easier. The IAF or IN will still not be switching to NATO-spec C4I.

Firstly, the argument that just because the last time people were worried for nothing, then next time the cause for alarm doesn't have merit is a faulty one.
Secondly, in case of LEMOA, the US officials too said that it does not not lead to automatic right to establish military bases. In case of COMCASA, the US officials have themselves stated that theoretically, US does have the ability to decode Indian military communications through this equipment since they are the ones generating the keys. Anyone who believes US assurance that they won't snoop because of their utmost respect for Indian sovereignty is kidding themselves.

Not just that, these are the concerns that I have:
1.Since US generates and manages the keys, in event of an India-Pak war that US doesn't approve of, they can easily turn all US equipment in India blind. Sure we can replace the equipment with local in that eventuality but all that takes time. Time which we may not have if Cold Start or something similar is our strategy. The first initiative will be lost by the time the equipment can be changed.
2.Everytime US decides the equipment needs an upgrade, they can hand us a fat bill. Some careful timing can theoretically ensure that US can roll out a new upgrade everytime we are getting ready for a big ticket russian purchase like the S-400 that the US disapproves. Since operating existing equipment will take precedence over buying new, we could be cleverly starved of money to kill those deals.

The US military presence & assets in the IOR & East Asia are not discrete. Both regions are covered by the Pacific Command - so its the same number of ships available either way. Case-in-point:

Yes, Pacific command has a fied number of ships. But operating ships in high seas is more costly than ships in port. Without sharing data with Indian Navy, US will have to deploy a lot more ships to get the same amount of data. Right now, this data sharing is because of goodwill and approval of Indian Navy. COMCASA is US's way of formalizing this sharing to make us legally bound to share this data. Again, nothing wrong with sharing data but COMCASA makes this sharing official and much more streamlined.

Rakesh · Post by **Rakesh** » 04 Aug 2018 21:30

Viv S wrote:It isn't clear what the COMCASA would entail, much of the commentary on its consequences being just speculation because no one has seen the actual text of the document. For example, the IAF is adopting the ODL fleet-wide while the IN uses Data Link II. They have absolutely no intention of switching to the MIDS, and I don't think anybody believes otherwise.

What is a possibility (and here I'm speculating) is that COMCASA would enable US exports of comm modules for secondary installation on some Indian & most US-origin equipment. Another possibility is that they'll opening up Link 16-type waveforms (as well as precision GPS) as a function for BEL modules, without impinging on domestic systems operating independently.

It is clear what COMCASA entails, otherwise the Indian Govt would not make the following demands;

India-US Military Communications Pact: US team in Delhi next week, India demands five assurances
https://indianexpress.com/article/india ... s-5285528/

1) The first is an assurance that the American side won’t use the access it gets to the military communications system for spying on India.
2) The second is about the misuse of control equipment, as it is part of proprietary American network, which can be used by US military against Indian forces.
3) The third assurance being sought by New Delhi is that the US government should not switch the whole equipment off or shut the Indian military network down as part of a policy decision.
4) Another contentious issue is about backward compatibility of the equipment under COMCASA, which involves the cycle of upgradation that India wants to have a choice over, besides being guaranteed without any time limit. The US has argued that having the choice of upgradation negates the purpose of COMCASA as many upgrades are required to overcome vulnerabilities and compromises in the system.
5) The Indians are worried about the cost of these upgrades. The likely solution could include either a specified time limit, after an initial guarantee period, or a cost-sharing model.

The Govt would not be making the above demands, if there were serious concerns with the CISMOA which has been now changed to COMCASA. The standard CISMOA agreement is not palatable to the Indian Govt, so a watered-down agreement has to be drafted. And even in that, the Indian Govt has responded with the above five demands. One does not have to see the actual document to ascertain that there are serious concerns on the Indian side. And the fact that India and US are likely signing this document, indicates that those demands are likely to be met.

Regardless, I believe this agreement is being signed for the Predator drones that are coming. I am sure the US side has made it clear to the Indian side, that if you want the Predator drones then you have to sign COMCASA. So if COMCASA-equipped platforms are limited to just the drones, that perhaps may be palatable to the Indian Govt.

The above concerns must be met, among others + along with the ability to walk out from the agreement as per India's choosing. We must have that freedom and cherry pick what is best for us. Because the reverse is also true on the American side --- As per the US negotiating team, this pact is being signed by a senior US military officer, however the US political authority is under no obligation to follow that pact.

Viv S wrote:There's also another - lets say you have a dual sim smartphone. You've got an Airtel sim with pan-India coverage that you use on a daily basis but you have to travel for business to the US, so you buy a AT&T sim as well with a global coverage, signing their ToA/EU document. Now that potentially gives them access to your metadata when you're over there or using the network elsewhere in the world, but it doesn't stop you from switching to your local network whenever you want within the country.

And that is not a concern? Tomorrow if we had to use a COMCASA-equipped platform against Pakistan, what is the guarantee that they will not divulge the metadata with Pakistan?

The issue lies in the fact, they why must anything be shared with them? It is our military platform. We bought it, not leased it. What we do with it, is our business, no?

Thirdly - using your dual sim smartphone analogy - apart from international exercises, which of these American-sourced platforms does India need to travel to the US for? The main purpose of these platforms is to be used in war and we must not compromise those platforms in war.

Viv S wrote:Again like I said before, its all speculation, much like we saw earlier with the LEMOA which some were convinced, right up to the end, would give the US the right to set up military bases on Indian soil. Which turned out to be very much not the case.

And that is a very good thing, because we certainly do not need them in the country. Refuel/Replenish and then be on your way.

Viv S wrote:Not according to the explanatory statement issued with the Senate-House reconciliation of the NDAA-19 bill. According to that the executive also has the option of issuing a waiver on the grounds that the country in question is "cooperating with the United States Government on other matters that are critical to United States strategic national security interests".

To quote your own words (from page 6 of this thread) ---> OR being the operative word. So the reverse is also true, correct?

Viv S wrote:Its what the document says. To quote the relevant section (page 266) -
__________________________________

The President would be further required to certify that the government with primary jurisdiction over the person who engages in the significant transaction is:

(1) taking or will take steps to reduce its inventory of major defense equipment and advanced conventional weapons produced by the defense sector of the Russian Federation as a share of its total inventory of major defense equipment and advanced conventional weapons over a specified period;

OR cooperating with the United States Government on other matters that are critical to United States strategic national security interests.
__________________________________

^the operative word being 'OR'.

So basically the waiver won't apply to any 'significant transaction' with the GRU (easy since the GRU doesn't participate in the arms trade) and the executive will have to certify that the country in question is working with the US on critical strategic matters (a nebulous term allows easy justifications to be found).

So post-2022, when the next Akula boat joins the Indian Navy - since the lease of INS Chakra (ex-Nerpa) will be complete by 2022) - does that qualify as a significant transaction with Russia? I hope we can go with the OR as you have indicated above, because the US Congress is very unreliable. And in 2022, we may have a President who is from the Democratic Party who will be intent on punishing Russia (and her allies) for 2016 election interference.

And even if President Trump wins a second term, we could likely have a US Congress with a Democratic majority in the House and the Senate, that will veto anything he signs. Already the Democrats in the US House of Representatives is poised to get a majority in the 2018 mid-term elections. And once that happens, who knows if the COMCASA agreement we may sign next month will even be honoured by the Democrats post January 2019.

chetak · Post by **chetak** » 04 Aug 2018 21:43

nvishal wrote:COMCASA maybe required to operate predator drones which use US satellites line of sight communication.

I doubt if we will use US satellites. It would leave us completely at their mercy. Moreover, a lot of the times, the US MIL and the CIA think very differently, say on pukistan, for instance.

We could easily reroute the same links via our own sat links.

Any of the recently launched ISRO satellites, within say the past year or so, could easily be carrying encrypted Indian MIL data link facilities. It would be the sensible thing to do.

The arrival of the drones would have been known well in advance.

chetak · Post by **chetak** » 04 Aug 2018 21:56

I would be wary of reports that appear in the wire and other commie/naxal media of that ilk. Even the Indian express and coupta's rag are shoveling fake news almost daily. This govt has cut off access to many journos so they manufacture their own news. That american bumpkin, siddharth varadarajan is also a big purveyor of fake news.

If you quote from any of the above rags or even similar rags, best to check closely and verify from multiple sources before you accept it as the gospel.

KrishnaK · Post by **KrishnaK** » 04 Aug 2018 23:27

Austin wrote:
KrishnaK wrote:Knowledge of keys (i'm assuming these are ones used for encryption) and knowledge of backdoors have nothing to do with each other
Oh well very much , You can always share the keys and say its encrypted and safe ( that applies to commercial and military propietary technology ) since you have the code to the keys you can very much introduce the backdoor to the software or the algorithm the key uses.

The reason I'm arguing this is to point out the lack of understanding on even such a simple thing, let alone something as complicated as CISMOA/COMCASA. If you have the keys, assuming it's for encryption, there's no need to introduce any backdoors to the software or the algorithm AFTERWARDS. One can just decrypt and read the plaintext provided the encrypted data is available. And why introduce backdoors to the software or algorithm afterwards ? You're just spreading half-baked information and lies as usual.

Rakesh · Post by **Rakesh** » 04 Aug 2018 23:29

KrishnaK wrote:The LEMOA had no intrusive inspections and yet took a decade.

Yes, because when you are dealing with America you have to be careful. Untrustworthy and Unreliable is their hallmark.

KrishnaK wrote:And I'm not surprised you missed the point entirely. Strong end-to-end encryption on top of compromised Ciscos will work just fine. Isolating the network entirely from the rest of the world will work too. From the point of the attacker these situations can be and have been worked around as well, but involves effort. That sort of effort to compromise a secured network would yield results, irrespective of whether the routers are compromised or not.

Good luck with that!

Compromised Cisco routers spotted bimbling about in the wild
https://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/09/1 ... o_routers/

The NSA practice of intercepting networking kit and installing backdoors before boxen reached customers became public in May 2014. Cisco responded this year by offering to send kit to vacant addresses in order to avoid NSA interception profiles. Whether such a basic ruse would fox determined spies consistently was always a bit doubtful and the latest findings from FireEye suggest miscreants have managed to implant malware on routers one way or another.

Although it might easily be assumed the prime target for criminal or state-sponsored hackers might be databases or servers, the position of routers on the edge of an enterprise network can readily be turned against potential victims to snoop on sensitive traffic. Such threats are difficult to detect and potentially deeply damaging, as Cisco itself warns in stressing the importance of integrity assurance to its customers.

KrishnaK wrote:I don't think India's doing fine. Establishing the capacity for interoperability means China has to take that into account. They have to guess if US and/or Japan will intervene on India's behalf or the other way around. There need not be an alliance. The uncertainty suits both parties just fine. The point is to reduce China's options and scope for action. The ideal scenario is to deter China from starting anything. India, clearly, is the weakest of the all the parties involved. My guess is the situation is bad enough for India to stop playing the strategic autonomy card. It isn't the pressure from the US/Japan both of which would definitely prefer to have India more firmly on their side, it's the pressure from China's that's causing this rethink.

Oh my! Not the same old China threat narrative again.

Admiral Sunil Lanba threw that theory of "guess if US and/or Japan will intervene on India's behalf or the other way around" out the window, when he said that the Quad does not have a military angle to it. Also during Doklam, when the Chinese threat was real, the Chinese did nothing. They are more talk than action. The most they did was throw stones at our soldiers. So much for Dragon Fire. The situation is not as grave or serious, as you claim it is. The reality is we do not need the Americans as badly, as the Americans need India.

Secondly, India will not intervene on America's behalf. Why should we anyway? Where are interests converge, we will assist. But we are not about to fight your wars. You can handle that yourself. And the reverse is true for India. In a future border conflict against China, I do not see America or Japan rushing to India's aid either. India will have to fight that all on her own. Even during Doklam, the Americans did squat and why should they anyway?Doklam was our issue and we dealt with it.

We played the strategic autonomy card just fine (and will continue to do so, as it suits us) when Defence Minister Sitharaman plainly told the Americans that CAATSA is a US law and not a UN law. And India only recognizes UN laws. This Aesop's Fable that the Wolf is Coming (aka pressure from China is causing a rethink) has been harped repeatedly on BRF only to fizzle out on numerous occasions. The rhona-dhona was for all to see (and enjoyable) during the first MMRCA downselect, the election of President Donald Trump, then in the cancellation of the SE fighter contest, etc.

KrishnaK wrote:This the gap - your (and the popular) narrative is that India's being forced into an arrangement which it has no interest in or need for. That doesn't seem to be true at all. Fixing procurement and DRDO is going to improve the situation, but isn't going to change the balance against a country with a GDP 5 times Indias' and none of its democratic compulsions. It will be decades before India manages to catch up.

And joining with America at the hip, will definitely plug that gap, with $21+ Trillion in debt and the Chinese owning a large portion of that debt. That is a fabulous strategy for India. America cannot stand up to China alone. They cannot risk a conflict with China. America is broke. They need countries like India, Japan, Australia and others to create an alliance to stand up to the Dragon. That is the real crux of the issue.

The King is Naked, but the King still wants to play King Maker.

Rakesh · Post by **Rakesh** » 04 Aug 2018 23:33

KrishnaK wrote:
Austin wrote:Oh well very much , You can always share the keys and say its encrypted and safe ( that applies to commercial and military propietary technology ) since you have the code to the keys you can very much introduce the backdoor to the software or the algorithm the key uses.
The reason I'm arguing this is to point out the lack of understanding on even such a simple thing, let alone something as complicated as CISMOA/COMCASA. If you have the keys, assuming it's for encryption, there's no need to introduce any backdoors to the software or the algorithm AFTERWARDS. One can just decrypt and read the plaintext provided the encrypted data is available. And why introduce backdoors to the software or algorithm afterwards ? You're just spreading half-baked information and lies as usual.

So that confirms that they can read the encrypted data, because they have the keys. They are the creators of the equipment after all, aren't they? Unless you will now claim that equipment comes from the Star Trek planet of Romulus and the Americans are only the facilitator of that equipment to India.

I ask again ---> Since you brought up the point that signing CISMOA helps both parties enormously, please illustrate how CISMOA helps India.

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 05 Aug 2018 10:58

KrishnaK wrote:
Austin wrote:
Oh well very much , You can always share the keys and say its encrypted and safe ( that applies to commercial and military propietary technology ) since you have the code to the keys you can very much introduce the backdoor to the software or the algorithm the key uses.
The reason I'm arguing this is to point out the lack of understanding on even such a simple thing, let alone something as complicated as CISMOA/COMCASA. If you have the keys, assuming it's for encryption, there's no need to introduce any backdoors to the software or the algorithm AFTERWARDS. One can just decrypt and read the plaintext provided the encrypted data is available. And why introduce backdoors to the software or algorithm afterwards ? You're just spreading half-baked information and lies as usual.

Backdoors are needed as additional assurance , its a covert ways of reading things and keys are direct way both are needed.

Almost all US technology companies are forced by NSA to have a backdoor to their product , its NSA insurance of getting into things.

NSA director defends plan to maintain 'backdoors' into technology companies

https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/201 ... -companies

Viv S · Post by **Viv S** » 05 Aug 2018 12:24

Rakesh wrote:It is clear what COMCASA entails, otherwise the Indian Govt would not make the following demands;

India-US Military Communications Pact: US team in Delhi next week, India demands five assurances
.
.
The Govt would not be making the above demands, if there were serious concerns with the CISMOA which has been now changed to COMCASA. The standard CISMOA agreement is not palatable to the Indian Govt, so a watered-down agreement has to be drafted. And even in that, the Indian Govt has responded with the above five demands. One does not have to see the actual document to ascertain that there are serious concerns on the Indian side. And the fact that India and US are likely signing this document, indicates that those demands are likely to be met.

My point exactly. The Indian side is clearly alive to all possible issues with the COMCASA and they're working on those issues. They didn't buckle when it came to previous agreements, they didn't buckle when it came to the S-400 deal, they didn't buckle when it came to retaliatory tariffs against US exports. I don't see why they'd buckle when it comes to ring-fencing sovereign areas from this deal.

I've never denied that there are some very real very pertinent concerns about the pact. My only question is - how do we know that those concerns cannot be or will not be addressed when they hammer out the final draft of the document this week?

Regardless, I believe this agreement is being signed for the Predator drones that are coming. I am sure the US side has made it clear to the Indian side, that if you want the Predator drones then you have to sign COMCASA. So if COMCASA-equipped platforms are limited to just the drones, that perhaps may be palatable to the Indian Govt.

There are also other things it could apply to. Datalinks & precision GPS for guided weapons (eg. SDB II, JSOW). Inter-operability is another, particularly between naval forces; eg. enabling data-flow between P-8As & P-8Is to track PLAN deployments.

The above concerns must be met, among others + along with the ability to walk out from the agreement as per India's choosing. We must have that freedom and cherry pick what is best for us. Because the reverse is also true on the American side --- As per the US negotiating team, this pact is being signed by a senior US military officer, however the US political authority is under no obligation to follow that pact.

The IE article makes no sense - its probably got it wrong. The LEMOA was signed by the US Secretary of Defense and the Indian Minister of Defence. And they're looking to sign the COMCASA at the 2+2 meet next month. Obviously both sides are represented by a political authority.

And that is not a concern? Tomorrow if we had to use a COMCASA-equipped platform against Pakistan, what is the guarantee that they will not divulge the metadata with Pakistan?

The issue lies in the fact, they why must anything be shared with them? It is our military platform. We bought it, not leased it. What we do with it, is our business, no?

Thirdly - using your dual sim smartphone analogy - apart from international exercises, which of these American-sourced platforms does India need to travel to the US for? The main purpose of these platforms is to be used in war and we must not compromise those platforms in war.

Mainly international exercises, not just with the US but also Japan, France, UK, Australia, Israel, Singapore, UAE etc., as well as on maritime surveillance in the Indo-Pacific. In all other cases, including wartime, we'd could use our own domestic comm systems.

Israel is one model. For example, they're a member of the Link 16 working group enabling interoperability with US and European forces, and data-integration in multi-national exercises. At the same time, they have their own independent comm & IFF systems and were they ever to go to war, that's what they'd operate with.

And that is a very good thing, because we certainly do not need them in the country. Refuel/Replenish and then be on your way.

That is a good thing that started off as a not so good thing i.e. LSA. Similarly, the COMCASA is not the CISMOA and we don't know what it'll be, until it is.

To quote your own words (from page 6 of this thread) ---> OR being the operative word. So the reverse is also true, correct?

So post-2022, when the next Akula boat joins the Indian Navy - since the lease of INS Chakra (ex-Nerpa) will be complete by 2022) - does that qualify as a significant transaction with Russia? I hope we can go with the OR as you have indicated above, because the US Congress is very unreliable. And in 2022, we may have a President who is from the Democratic Party who will be intent on punishing Russia (and her allies) for 2016 election interference.

And even if President Trump wins a second term, we could likely have a US Congress with a Democratic majority in the House and the Senate, that will veto anything he signs. Already the Democrats in the US House of Representatives is poised to get a majority in the 2018 mid-term elections. And once that happens, who knows if the COMCASA agreement we may sign next month will even be honoured by the Democrats post January 2019.

The 'or' was introduced into the waiver to ensure that, in Mattis' words, India-US relations weren't set back by a decade or more (directly benefiting the Russians). It bypasses the 'significant transactions' clause covering systems like the S-400 and Akula.

The reality facing any future President considering cancelling the waiver is the same as that exists today - blowing a massive hole in India-US relations (which would probably be stronger at that point) doesn't punish Russia. They'd be popping the bubbly in Moscow the next day, because India has made it amply clear that its trade with Russia will carry on regardless. Also, while elected legislators (in most countries) tend to be a bit myopic when it comes to foreign policy, the President would face unrelenting pressure from the Pentagon (which swung the current waiver) to stay the course.

As regards US internal politics - there was a Democrat at the top for 8 years before the Trump-era began. Wasn't an issue for India, on the whole. And truth be told, there hasn't been a huge change even after the Trump administration was sworn in. And once the Trump reality show goes off air, the Russia fever will start fading as well. The news cycle doesn't end, they'll be something else to preoccupy the public and their representatives.

Relations with India aren't really a partisan issue. For example, two-thirds of the India caucus of the Congress is comprised of Democrats. And the NDAA-19 bill that contained the waiver, as well as some MDP implementation clauses, was passed by a 87-10 majority in the Senate and a 359-54 majority in the House (despite the Republicans having only a slender majority in both chambers).