Intelligence & National Security Discussion - July 2018

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Manish_P
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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion - July 2018

Postby Manish_P » 09 Oct 2018 09:51

This in Mumbai

Bomb assembled in a shanty goes off in Antop Hill, two held



Two men were arrested Sunday afternoon from Antop Hill after a bomb they were assembling went off accidentally, injuring one of them.

Eye-witnesses said the explosion was so loud that it was heard in a radius of 1 km and it sent household articles tumbling down in the shanties in its vicinity.


The bomb was loaded with ballbearings, nails and glass shards, a typical terrorist hack to maximise fatalities.


One of the two arrested has been identified as Azrul Shaikh, 22, while the identity of the other has been withheld by the police because he is a minor. Preliminary investigations have revealed that both worked for BEST and MTNL as contract labourers, mainly involved in digging trenches for electric wires. The two — both natives of West Bengal — had moved in with Shaikh’s aunt at Noora Bazaar on Garib Nawaz Road in Antop Hill last week.

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion - July 2018

Postby arshyam » 09 Oct 2018 18:01

WB, eh? Right...

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion - July 2018

Postby ArjunPandit » 09 Oct 2018 19:05

well they might also be rohingyas..

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion - July 2018

Postby ramana » 10 Oct 2018 01:30

https://sniwire.com/defence-security/ma ... hitecture/




Three Deputy National Security Advisers. A Military Adviser. Reconstituted Strategic Policy Group. A dedicated think tank to monitor and assess China across the spectrum. Formation of Defence Planning Committee (DPC). Additional budget for the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS). India’s national security architecture is being transformed to meet current and future challenges.

The changes—some announced, some shrouded in official secrecy—are outcomes of the review of the national security structure ordered by the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) last year. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, sources say, felt there were too many silos in the system with no arrangement to take a comprehensive view on national security. The review, completed in mid-2018, has now led to these changes.

Appointment of two more deputy national security advisers, as opposed to just one in the earlier structure, is part of a major restructuring. Accordingly, former chief of the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) Rajinder Khanna will look after external and technical intelligence matters, Indian Foreign Service (IFS) officer, former Ambassador to Russia Pankaj Saran is entrusted with handling diplomatic affairs and RN Ravi, former Intelligence Bureau officer and interlocutor for Naga talks, has been assigned to oversee internal security matters. Ravi was Chairman of Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) until last week, when he was re-designated Deputy National Security Adviser. Khanna and Saran were already Deputy NSAs.

The three Deputy NSAs will now widen the scope and responsibility of the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS), which works directly under National Security Adviser (NSA) Ajit Doval, arguably Prime Minister Modi’s closest confidant on foreign and security policies. Doval, a former career intelligence officer—like Ravi and Khanna—has been NSA and Special Representative for talks with China since 2014. His remit has steadily increased since then and so has the budget of the NSCS. From a measly Rs 39.9 crore (actual expenditure) in 2016-17, its budget was increased to Rs 333.58 crore in 2017-18 although it could only spend Rs 168 crore at the end of the financial year 2017-18. However, for the current financial year (2018-19) it has again been allotted Rs 303.83 crore. With increase in its mandate, the NSCS will likely need more funds in coming years.

Along with the division of responsibility in the NSCS, the government has also reconstituted the Strategic Policy Group (SPG), a body that has existed since 1999 (appointed by the Vajpayee government a month before the Kargil conflict began). It was earlier headed by the Cabinet Secretary. In a partial but significant amendment to the original Office Memorandum, the SPG will now be led by the NSA, with the Cabinet Secretary and Vice-Chairman of NITI Aayog becoming members of the group. Like in its earlier avatar, it will also have the three service chiefs, the intelligence chiefs, secretaries of defence, home, finance, atomic energy, defence research and development, revenue, space, and governor of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) as members. The NSA will have the power to co-opt any other official and department as and when needed while the Cabinet Secretary will ensure coordination and implementation of decisions taken by the SPG.

In another concurrent development, a National Security Strategy document is now ready to be presented for discussion at the highest level. Those in the know say at least three versions of a National Security Strategy have been attempted in the past but none of them was either approved or released for public consumption. Despite some indications earlier this year that the Modi government may put out some elements of the National Security Strategy in the public domain, sources say, the Prime Minister has now ruled against making any part of the document public.

Another development that has largely gone unnoticed is the formation of a China-specific, MEA-run and funded think tank. Called the Centre for Contemporary China Studies (CCCS), the new entity will only study China from an Indian point of view. Manned by serving officers drawn from the MEA, the three armed forces, the Intelligence Bureau, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) and other relevant ministries and departments, CCCS will prepare reports and undertake specific studies on China at the behest of different government departments to provide real-time policy inputs to the decision-makers dealing with China. So, for instance, the CCCS can be asked to provide quick inputs by the Commerce Ministry on the impact of U.S. trade sanctions against China and the likely advantage that can accrue to India. Or recommend a future course of action in India’s (largely positive) relationship with North Korea post the Trump-Kim summit. The CCCS’ governing body is headed by the External Affairs Minister and the NSA is the deputy chairman.

Coupled with the formation of the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) earlier this year, and the recent approval given by the Prime Minister to formation of three tri-services agencies—to create a join structure for cyber, space and special operations across the three armed forces—the new focus on restructuring the national security architecture has never been more intense. Like the SPG and NSCS, the DPC is headed by NSA Doval, inviting charges of too much concentration of power in the hands of one person. No matter what critics say, recent decisions are a clear indication that the Prime Minister has entrusted his NSA to evolve a comprehensive roadmap and get it implemented. The arrangement also has pitfalls: Doval already has too much on his plate (dealing with Pakistan, China, U.S. and Russia for instance), heading the nuclear command authority and handling the overall security situation. Now to expect him to deliver on these crucial issues looks a challenging task. However, as a trusted man of the Prime Minister, the NSA has the necessary authority lacking in earlier structures that had suggested reforms and roadmaps to bring India’s national security architecture up to speed.


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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion - July 2018

Postby Neshant » 10 Oct 2018 15:12

More spyware build into electronics from China..

Yet India is sourcing critical components for a ton of Telecom and telemetry equipment from China.

-----


New Evidence Of Chinese Spy Hardware Found By Ex-Mossad Investigators; Super Micro Shares Plunge

A major US telecommunications company found "manipulated" hardware from Super Micro Computer Inc. in its network in August - bolstering claims in a Bloomberg report last week alleging that China installed bugging devices on hardware bought by Apple, Amazon and a host of other companies.

According to a new report by Bloomberg, the unnamed telecom company hired former Israeli Intelligence Corps security expert Yossi Appleboum, now of Maryland-based Sepio Systems, who provided "documents, analysis and other evidence of the discovery" following last week's report detailing how China's intelligence agencies had ordered subcontractors to install malicious chips in Super Micro motherboards between 2013 and 2015.

Bloomberg is not identifying the company due to Appleboum’s nondisclosure agreement with the client. Unusual communications from a Supermicro server and a subsequent physical inspection revealed an implant built into the server’s Ethernet connector, a component that's used to attach network cables to the computer, Appleboum said. -Bloomberg


https://www.zerohedge.com/news/2018-10- ... cro-shares

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion - July 2018

Postby Kati » 11 Oct 2018 06:23

US arrests alleged Chinese national for targeting major aviation companies
ABC News MIKE LEVINE,ABC News 2 hours 13 minutes ago
Reactions Reblog on Tumblr Share Tweet Email

US arrests alleged Chinese national for targeting major aviation companies (ABC News)
US arrests alleged Chinese national for targeting major aviation companies originally appeared on abcnews.go.com

Federal authorities have charged a Chinese national for his alleged efforts to steal sensitive technology from major U.S. aerospace firms by recruiting employees at those firms.

The Chinese Ministry of State Security operative, Yanjun Xu, has been arrested and charged with conspiring and attempting to commit economic espionage and theft of trade secrets, the Justice Department announced Wednesday.

"This case is not an isolated incident," the head of the Justice Department's National Security Division, John Demers, said in a statement. "It is part of an overall economic policy of developing China at American expense. We cannot tolerate a nation's stealing our firepower and the fruits of our brainpower."

As far back as 2013, Xu targeted key aviation and aerospace companies around the world, including GE Aviation inside the United States, on behalf of China's Ministry of State Security, according to the Justice Department. He identified experts who worked for these companies and recruited them to travel to China, often initially under the guise of asking them to deliver a university presentation, the Justice Department said.

In May of last year, a GE Aviation employee went to China and met with Xu, according to the Justice Department. They remained in contact, and in February 2018, Xu persuaded the GE Aviation employee to send him a company presentation relating to aviation that included proprietary information, U.S. authorities said. At one point, Xu tried to get the employee to meet him in Europe and to "dump" GE Aviation information onto a device for him, the authorities added.

The FBI has collected Xu's communications with Chinese government officials, reflecting their espionage efforts, an FBI official said.

Xu was arrested in Belgium on April 1, and within a few days he was secretly indicted by a federal grand jury in the Southern District of Ohio. He appealed his arrest in Belgium, but his appeals ultimately failed and he was extradited to the U.S. on Tuesday, authorities said.

The head of the FBI's counterintelligence division, Bill Priestap, called the extradition of a Chinese intelligence officer "unprecedented."

Testifying before a Senate panel on Wednesday morning, FBI Director Chris Wray said: "China in many ways represents the broadest, most complicated, most long-term counter-intelligence threat we face."

Wray said that while nations like Russia are fighting today's fight, "China is fighting tomorrow's fight."

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion - July 2018

Postby Kati » 12 Oct 2018 12:20

Pak using Chinese women to honey-trap desi babus...

https://www.oneindia.com/india/how-paki ... 91888.html

[By the way, Panda has been using this trick to trap babus in all south-east asian countries.]

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion - July 2018

Postby chetak » 12 Oct 2018 15:16

Kati wrote:Pak using Chinese women to honey-trap desi babus...

https://www.oneindia.com/india/how-paki ... 91888.html

[By the way, Panda has been using this trick to trap babus in all south-east asian countries.]


What are these desi baboo(n)s, scientists and forces guys doing guys doing that they are so vulnerable??

Aren't all these guys mostly married?? and still looking for honey??

should they all not know better??

If an offer is too good to be true, it probably is.

Instead of looking for romance on facebook etc, all these schitt for brains roadside romeos/juliets should undergo a small mandatory program, repeated every year to warn of the hazards of thinking with their schlongs and what not.

Damn fundamental rights, simply BAN all social media sites and anyone caught otherwise should immediately be dismissed. That includes families.

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion - July 2018

Postby TKiran » 12 Oct 2018 15:51

As I really saw the Chinese girls/ladies/aunties, in flesh and blood, they are not at all attractive. May be the white guys find them attractive because of their shyness or some other personality traits, they are not at all attractive to sdre's, as the sdre s like some flesh / curves which Chinese female don't have. They are absolutely unattractive.

Not only me but even my workers, who don't mind doing some mischief given a chance are so much repelled by Chinese beauties, they say, they​look like పిండి బొమ్మలు (Barbie dolls) absolutely unattractive.

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion - July 2018

Postby Kati » 12 Oct 2018 22:53

^^^^^
Chetak-saab and TKiran Saab,
In one desi babu's words (a high raking one in MEA - posted in one of these SEA countries) - "honey-trap is a PROBLEM".
Babu's are often lured and/or followed to visit these SEA countries as "tourists", and then they are offered "honey",
and quite often they get stuck like a fly in such a sticky honey.

How to counter it? ... All cases can't be tackled, but only 5% or 10% of the cases should be pursued, catch these babus,
summarily dismiss them from their jobs / give prison sentences, give these cases high publicity - just as exemplary punishment once in a while -
but do it on a regular basis.
Only that can deter the babus.
Otherwise, this 'chalta hai' attitude will continue at a great detriment to the country.

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion - July 2018

Postby ks_sachin » 13 Oct 2018 08:46

TKiran wrote:As I really saw the Chinese girls/ladies/aunties, in flesh and blood, they are not at all attractive. May be the white guys find them attractive because of their shyness or some other personality traits, they are not at all attractive to sdre's, as the sdre s like some flesh / curves which Chinese female don't have. They are absolutely unattractive.

Not only me but even my workers, who don't mind doing some mischief given a chance are so much repelled by Chinese beauties, they say, they​look like పిండి బొమ్మలు (Barbie dolls) absolutely unattractive.

Where were u looking?

I have seen some stunners!

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion - July 2018

Postby suryag » 13 Oct 2018 09:27

BTW why not turn it around and let babus/agents have fun with if they want to, also provide them official sanction(for ex: this hex related engagement is because of my job and is unavoidable) but with a strict condition that no information leaks out. Essentially, what am trying to say is once you legitimize this behavior then the scope of leaks may reduce owing to the presence of official sanction of the engagement.

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion - July 2018

Postby chetak » 13 Oct 2018 10:02

ks_sachin wrote:
TKiran wrote:As I really saw the Chinese girls/ladies/aunties, in flesh and blood, they are not at all attractive. May be the white guys find them attractive because of their shyness or some other personality traits, they are not at all attractive to sdre's, as the sdre s like some flesh / curves which Chinese female don't have. They are absolutely unattractive.

Not only me but even my workers, who don't mind doing some mischief given a chance are so much repelled by Chinese beauties, they say, they​look like పిండి బొమ్మలు (Barbie dolls) absolutely unattractive.

Where were u looking?

I have seen some stunners!


+108, Very true.

If not looking at the girls, where else were you looking??

To our eyes, they all look exotic.

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion - July 2018

Postby Kati » 14 Oct 2018 00:38

suryag wrote:BTW why not turn it around and let babus/agents have fun with if they want to, also provide them official sanction(for ex: this hex related engagement is because of my job and is unavoidable) but with a strict condition that no information leaks out. Essentially, what am trying to say is once you legitimize this behavior then the scope of leaks may reduce owing to the presence of official sanction of the engagement.


^^^108...

Perfectly fine. In that case do we have a strategy in place?
If not, do it now.
Feed the exotic ladies all chafe, but save the real rice for the country's own consumption, and have fun at Panda's expense. :rotfl:

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion - July 2018

Postby ramana » 14 Oct 2018 07:29

Ok. Stop this nonsense.

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion - July 2018

Postby Manish_P » 14 Oct 2018 13:17

Wikileaks - Kamal Nath, Congress Politico, had given hints to the US about Indian Nuclear testing plans.

Wiki Leaks link - REPORT OF A PLANNED NUCLEAR EXPLOSION

Date - 1976 November 29, 13:00 (Monday)
Canonical ID: 1976NEWDE17267_b

Original Classification:CONFIDENTIAL
Current Classification:UNCLASSIFIED

Type: TE - Telegram (cable)

From:India New Delhi
To:Department of State | India Kolkata | Secretary of State


1. KAMAL NATH, BUSINESSMAN AND SANJAY GANDHI'S CONFIDANT IN WEST BENGAL, TOLD CONSUL GENERAL KORN NOVEMBER 25 THAT INDIA IS MAKING TWO MORE ATOMIC BOMBS AND HAS PLANS FOR ONE MORE "PEACEFUL EXPLOSION." NATH MADE THE OBSERVATION IN THE CONTEXT OF A DISCUSSION OF US-INDIA RELATIONS.

2. CONGEN KORN COMMENTS THAT NATH SPEAKS WITH SUCH BRASHNESS, BOASTFULNESS, AND AT TIMES NIAVE SIMPLICITY THAT ONE TENDS TO DISCOUNT IT ALL. NOATH, HOWEVER, IS CLOSE TO SANJAY, AND DOES ACT FOR THE LATTER IN MANY CAPACITIES. KORN REPORTS THAT NATH IS WELL INFORMED ON A NUMBER OF SUBJECTS, AND HIS PROFESSIONS OF FRIENDSHIP FOR THE UNITED STATES ARE SINCERE. KORN ADDS THAT THE NUCLEAR REPORT MAY BE JUST SO MUCH BRAG- GADOCIO ON NATH'S PART, BUT CAUTIONS THAT ALTHOUGH NATH MAY TAKE DELIGHT IN GIVING THE IMPRESSION THAT HE IS PRIVY EVEN TO SENSITIVE INFORMATION ABOUT INDIA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM, WE SHOULD NOT CONCLUDE HE MERELY CONJURED UP THE REPORT.

3. KAMAL NATH'S COMMENTS SPEAK ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS OF PLANS FOR ANOTHER EXPLOSION AND OFFER NO HINT OF TIME FRAME IN WHICH THIS MIGHT OCCUR EVEN ASSUMING HE HAS SOME BASIS FOR HIS COM- MENTS. SCHNEIDER CONFIDENTIAL

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion - July 2018

Postby Rahul M » 14 Oct 2018 14:29

suryag wrote:BTW why not turn it around and let babus/agents have fun with if they want to, also provide them official sanction(for ex: this hex related engagement is because of my job and is unavoidable) but with a strict condition that no information leaks out. Essentially, what am trying to say is once you legitimize this behavior then the scope of leaks may reduce owing to the presence of official sanction of the engagement.

apparently, KGB had this policy that their staff could sleep with anyone as long as they made a clean breast of it to their superiors ASAP. took honeytrap out of the equation for hostile agencies for the most part.

however, families won't be that understanding. I would guess that hostile would threaten to expose the errant people to their wives, which would be the achiles heel for even the most seasoned of operatives ! :wink:

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion - July 2018

Postby pushkar.bhat » 15 Oct 2018 19:24

apparently, KGB had this policy that their staff could sleep with anyone as long as they made a clean breast of it to their superiors ASAP. took honeytrap out of the equation for hostile agencies for the most part.


This policy exists in every service worth its name in salt. If you feel that things have gone wrong feel free to report back to CI. They will take care of you. Problems happen when people slip up and don't report back.

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion - July 2018

Postby ramana » 15 Oct 2018 21:21

TKiran Please don't reduce this to defunct L&M thread.
RahulM, Et tu?

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion - July 2018

Postby kit » 17 Oct 2018 16:52

How Chinese intelligence operates

https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/sting-operation-lifts-lid-chinese-espionage

The case was unprecedented: On Oct. 10, Belgium extradited a Chinese intelligence officer to the United States after an Ohio court had indicted the operative on charges of "economic espionage involving theft of trade secrets from leading U.S. aviation companies." Belgian authorities arrested Xu Yanjun, a deputy division director of the Sixth Bureau of China's Ministry of State Security (MSS) in Jiangsu, on April 1 in Brussels, based on an arrest warrant issued in connection with a U.S. criminal complaint. Once Belgian authorities extradited Xu to the United States on Oct. 10, American authorities unsealed the indictment and the initial criminal complaint.
The Big Picture

The Chinese government recognizes that the economic model it has followed for the past three decades is unsustainable. At the same time, its shift to a new model will require a great deal of technical development. Because the consequences of failure in this transformation are huge, Beijing and Chinese companies are experiencing a great deal of pressure to acquire the necessary technologies. Finding that it is often quicker and cheaper to steal technology than it is to develop it, Chinese entities have begun aggressively engaging in industrial espionage — and they are not the only ones.
See China in Transition

The arrest of a Chinese operative in a third country, followed by his subsequent extradition to the United States, lays bare the threat of industrial espionage. At the same time, the release of the complaint and indictment also provides a rare and interesting glimpse at China's tradecraft, as well as some insight into the dynamics of industrial espionage tactics in human intelligence recruitment. Much of that process is now conducted online, in contrast to the old days, when it required face-to-face interaction to spot, develop and pitch an agent. More prosaically, the case sends a clear signal to Beijing that Washington and its allies are serious about addressing the constant threat of Chinese industrial espionage and are willing to take decisive action.
China's Shopping List

Like all espionage cases, the Xu case began with a shopping list of information that Chinese authorities have directed the Ministry of State Security to collect. In the case of Chinese intelligence agencies like the MSS, this list includes not only intelligence pertaining to political and military developments in countries of interest but also technologies that China wishes to acquire from foreign companies. Beijing has frequently demonstrated its brazenness in its attempts to obtain such technology. One such case is the Science and Technology Ministry's long-running National High-Tech Research and Development Program, also known as the 863 Program. The program provided guidance and funding for the acquisition or development of technology related to information, biology, agriculture, manufacturing, energy and other fields that would have a "significant impact on enhancing China's overall national strengths." But even if the ministry's website spoke about the domestic development of such technologies, practicalities have long dictated that it is much cheaper and faster to simply acquire them — by hook or by crook, if need be.

More recently, the Chinese government announced a 10-year development plan called "Made in China 2025" in May 2015 to target cutting-edge technologies — namely, aerospace and aviation equipment, new materials, next-generation information technology, high-end numerical control machinery and robotics, maritime engineering equipment and high-tech maritime vessel manufacturing, advanced rail equipment, energy-saving and new-vehicle technology, electrical equipment, biomedicine and high-tech medical devices, as well as agricultural technology, machinery and equipment.
This chart shows the process by which intelligence operatives seek to recruit assets.
The Drive to Recruit an Asset

As my colleague Matthew Bey has noted elsewhere, China's policy of mandating technology transfers in joint ventures with U.S. firms is one contentious means by which it acquires its desired technology. But as seen in the Xu case, another controversial method is espionage. According to the indictment, Xu attempted to steal designs for composite jet engine component technology (which China needs to wean itself from Russia) from "Company A," which media reports have identified as Ohio-based GE Aviation — which would make sense given that the case involves the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Ohio.

As part of the initial spotting phase of the human intelligence recruitment process, Xu likely worked to assemble a list of people who have access to the desired information before assessing which individuals might be most receptive to recruitment. Then, when he had identified a potential target, Xu allegedly worked with the deputy director of the Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics (NUAA) to invite "Employee 1," an engineer at Company A, to participate in an exchange at the university. Xu is alleged to have even sent an email to Employee 1 posing as "Co-conspirator 1."

Employee 1 accepted the offer and traveled to China to give his presentation at NUAA on June 2, 2017. The university reimbursed the engineer for his travel expenses and gave him a $3,500 cash speaker's fee. During the trip, NUAA's deputy director, who is listed as Co-conspirator 1 in the indictment, introduced Employee 1 to Xu, who was operating under the cover name Qu Hui and claimed to be from the Jiangsu Science and Technology Promotion Association (JAST), an NUAA affiliate. Xu took Employee 1 out for meals before and after the presentation and informed the American engineer that JAST had provided the speaker's fee. Xu soon proceeded to the development phase of the human intelligence recruitment process, as he maintained contact with the engineer after the latter returned to the United States.

In their continuing correspondence, Xu pressed Employee 1 for technical data while holding out the carrot of another speaking engagement in China and another cash payment. When Xu requested patently sensitive information — signifying the shift to the pitching phase of the human intelligence recruitment process — Employee 1 said he categorically could not send such information from his company computer, prompting the Chinese operative to encourage him to send it via another email account. Xu also discussed how he and Employee 1 could establish a continuing relationship, hinting at a deal to exchange information for cash.

Xu continued to communicate with the engineer and press him to send more sensitive information. Employee 1 sent him a copy of a company presentation featuring the company logo, as well as a warning that it was proprietary information, which Xu received enthusiastically. Later, Xu sent Employee 1 a list of desired information, asking the American engineer to indicate which topics he was familiar with. Employee 1 responded, saying some of the topics were company trade secrets, to which Xu countered that they could discuss the matter in person.

Xu also asked Employee 1 to provide a copy of the file directory of the hard drive of his company-issued laptop. Employee 1 duly provided a copy, but only after the company had sanitized it and approved it for release — suggesting that Employee 1 had notified his company and U.S. authorities much earlier in the process and that they were all stringing Xu along.

By acquiring the company presentation and file directory, Xu appears to have believed that he had successfully recruited Employee 1, leading him to request more from the American engineer: the entire contents of the hard drive of his company-issued laptop. Since the employee would not be permitted to bring his laptop to China, the pair arranged to meet in Europe during a trip Employee 1 had previously scheduled. But instead of heading to Brussels to collect a treasure trove of intelligence, Xu walked straight into a sting operation.

Instead of heading to Brussels to collect a treasure trove of intelligence, Xu walked straight into a sting operation.

The Newest Trends in Industrial Espionage

Intelligence agencies have long viewed technical conferences as rich hunting grounds for recruiting agents with access to technical intelligence. Beyond merely visiting conferences organized by others, agencies such as China's State Security Ministry often host conferences and technical exchange programs using cover organizations, including universities, trade associations and think tanks. In addition to inviting groups to attend conferences, operatives will frequently invite people of interest to make individual visits to the cover organizations. Chinese intelligence, for instance, recruited Kevin Mallory after the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences invited the former CIA officer to travel to China to provide his perspective on current issues in exchange for compensation. U.S. authorities eventually caught up with Mallory, who was convicted of espionage in June.

While the Chinese intelligence services are working overtime in their efforts to acquire the technologies outlined in the "Made in China 2025" program, they are not alone. Russia has compiled its own list of 77 foreign technologies that it wishes to develop domestically rather than acquire from foreign sources. Under President Vladimir Putin — a former KGB officer — Russian intelligence agencies have become aggressive at pursuing industrial espionage in addition to their hacking, traditional espionage, disinformation and assassination operations.

Of course, it is also critical to remember that it is not just states that engage in industrial espionage. While companies linked to such places as China and Russia benefit greatly from the largesse of intelligence agencies and the technology they provide, hackers, rogue employees and private companies also pose risks to the intellectual property of companies and other organizations. And in the information age, it is now easier for someone to exfiltrate massive quantities of data or become an advanced and persistent insider threat. Because of this, it is more important than ever for organizations to maintain robust security programs to protect themselves. Such a program not only includes tools to mitigate such online threats, but training programs to teach employees about human intelligence recruitment and what to do if approached.

Based on the events in the Xu case, it would appear that Employee 1 had received training, possessed an awareness of the sensitive nature of his projects and their importance to foreign intelligence services, and knew what to do if approached. In pursuing this case, the United States has placed China on notice that it will work to constrain Beijing's industrial espionage activities. Chinese intelligence agencies such as MSS, however, are under tremendous pressure from their masters to acquire specific technologies, meaning it is highly unlikely that prosecutions will halt China's aggressive pursuit of technology. But due to the sequence of events in the Xu case, the next time — and it is inevitable that there will be a next time — Chinese agents approach an employee at Company A in possession of sensitive information, they are likely to be a bit more careful, lest they find themselves caught once more in a sting operation.

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion - July 2018

Postby JTull » 17 Oct 2018 17:21

How many of these threads are there?

Admins, pls lock the other one!

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion - July 2018

Postby Kati » 19 Oct 2018 19:28

The recent Chinese effort to recruit GE engineer is just one of the numerous instances they have enticed the western
scientists/scholars to acquire scientific know-how. First it started sort of an open honey-trap. Attractive young female
"scholars" with technical background were sent to the western countries as doctoral students or post-doc scholars to work under
targeted academicians, - mostly at universities, but priorities were given to the research centers, like CERN, Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, etc.
Many of the senior scholars soon started living together with their exotic oriental research scholars, and some had seen their marriages
ended, and some ended up marrying their "research scholars". In higher academics, this is pretty much an open secret. Many of these
exotic scholars, who are definitely have scholarly backgrounds, are now deep insiders in the western research establishments, and
directing western tax-payers' money in promoting research in areas where China has tremendous interest. From early 90s to 2010
it went smoothly. Their interest is mainly now in NIH. However, the western governments are waking up from their slumber very
recently, pretty much since 2010.

Since 2010, China expanded its net to cover other countries, especially South Korea, Japan, Taiwan (which has been hollowed out
by the PRC "exchange students"), Australia and NZ .... and India.

China has been making a two-tier effort - at a lower level establishing contacts with junior faculty members / research scholars, and
at a higher level where it targets very senior people who have established research track record. Under the second category, India is
under the Chinese scanner.

They have started contacting retired directors, senior professors of reputed universities / research institutes (like IIT, IISc, TIFR, etc)
and inviting them for research presentations (just like the GE case). They are particularly interested in those who have had research
projects with DRDO. The interest is so much so that the Chinese side is directly sending business class tickets, and also economy class tickets
for their spouses. They are showered with five star treatment, given smartly trained "interpreters", given local tours, etc. - all free.
Then they are given a proposal to do "joint research" with Chinese researchers. In some cases, offers were made to the targeted
researchers to visit Chinese research center(s) for 3 to 6 months, with a handsome salary. .... The objective is to juice out their
know-how, and see where Bharat stands in technical capabilities.

Needless to say, some desi unfulfilled souls are falling in such Chinese trap.

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion - July 2018

Postby Vips » 22 Oct 2018 20:08

India's National Security is being transformed

Prime Minister Modi felt there were too many silos with no arrangement to take a comprehensive view on national security. The PM has entrusted NSA Ajit Doval to evolve a comprehensive roadmap and get it implemented, reveals Nitin Gokhale, Editor-in-Chief, Strategic News International.

Three Deputy National Security Adviser.

A Military Adviser.

A reconstituted Strategic Policy Group.

A dedicated think-tank to monitor and assess China across the spectrum.

Formation of a Defence Planning Committee.

Additional budget for the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS).

India's national security architecture is being transformed to meet current and future challenges.

The changes -- some announced, some shrouded in official secrecy -- are outcomes of the review of the national security structure ordered by the Prime Minister's Office last year.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi, sources say, felt there were too many silos in the system with no arrangement to take a comprehensive view on national security.

The review, completed in mid-2018, has now led to these changes.

Appointment of two more deputy national security advisers, as opposed to just one in the earlier structure, is part of a major restructuring.

Accordingly, former chief of the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) Rajinder Khanna will look after external and technical intelligence matters, Indian Foreign Service officer, former ambassador to Russia Pankaj Saran is entrusted with handling diplomatic affairs, and R N Ravi, former Intelligence Bureau officer and interlocutor for the Naga talks, has been assigned to oversee internal security matters.

Ravi was chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee until he was re-designated deputy national security adviser.

Khanna and Saran were already Deputy NSAs.

The three deputy NSAs will now widen the scope and responsibility of the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS), which works directly under National Security Adviser Ajit Doval, arguably Prime Minister Modi's closest confidant on foreign and security policies.

Doval, a former career intelligence officer -- like Ravi and Khanna -- has been NSA and Special Representative for talks with China since 2014.

His remit has steadily increased since then and so has the budget of the NSCS.

From a measly Rs 39.9 crore/Rs 399.9 million (actual expenditure) in 2016-2017, its budget was increased to Rs 333.58 crore/Rs 3.3358 billion in 2017-2018 although it could only spend Rs 168 crore/Rs 1.68 billion at the end of the financial year 2017-2018.

However, for the current financial year (2018-2019) it has again been allotted Rs 303.83 crore/Rs 3.0383 billion.

With the increase in its mandate, the NSCS will likely need more funds in coming years.

Along with the division of responsibility in the NSCS, the government has also reconstituted the Strategic Policy Group, a body that has existed since 1999 (appointed by the Atal Bihari Vajpayee government a month before the Kargil conflict began).

It was earlier headed by the Cabinet Secretary.

In a partial but significant amendment to the original office memorandum, the SPG will now be led by the NSA, with the Cabinet Secretary and vice-chairman of the NITI Aayog becoming members of the group.

Like in its earlier avatar, it will also have the three service chiefs, the intelligence chiefs, secretaries of defence, home, finance, atomic energy, defence research and development, revenue, space, and governor of the Reserve Bank of India as members.

The NSA will have the power to co-opt any other official and department as and when needed while the Cabinet Secretary will ensure coordination and implementation of decisions taken by the SPG.

In another concurrent development, a National Security Strategy document is now ready to be presented for discussion at the highest level.

Those in the know say at least three versions of a National Security Strategy have been attempted in the past, but none of them was either approved or released for public consumption.

Despite some indications earlier this year that the Modi government may put out some elements of the National Security Strategy in the public domain, sources say, the prime minister has now ruled against making any part of the document public.

Prime Minister Narendra Damodardas Modi with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Wuhan, April 27, 2018. Photograph: MEA/Twitter

Another development that has largely gone unnoticed is the formation of a China-specific, MEA-run and funded think-tank.

Called the Centre for Contemporary China Studies, the new entity will only study China from an Indian point of view.

Manned by serving officers drawn from the MEA, the three armed forces, the Intelligence Bureau, the Research and Analysis Wing, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police and other relevant ministries and departments, CCCS will prepare reports and undertake specific studies on China at the behest of different government departments to provide real-time policy inputs to the decision-makers dealing with China.

So, for instance, the CCCS can be asked to provide quick inputs by the commerce ministry on the impact of US trade sanctions against China and the likely advantage that can accrue to India.

Or recommend a future course of action in India's (largely positive) relationship with North Korea post the Trump-Kim summit.

The CCCS' governing body is headed by the external affairs minister and the NSA is the deputy chairman.

General Bipin Rawat, chief of the army staff, brief Prime Minister Narendra Damodardas Modi on the security situation in Kashmir after four soldiers were slain in a firefight with terrorists, February 14, 2017. Photograph: Kamal Singh/PTI Photo

Coupled with the formation of the Defence Planning Committee earlier this year, and the recent approval given by the prime minister to the formation of three tri-services agencies -- to create a join structure for cyber, space and special operations across the three armed forces -- the new focus on restructuring the national security architecture has never been more intense.

Like the SPG and NSCS, the DPC is headed by NSA Doval, inviting charges of too much concentration of power in the hands of one person.

No matter what critics say, recent decisions are a clear indication that the prime minister has entrusted his NSA to evolve a comprehensive roadmap and get it implemented.

Doval already has too much on his plate (dealing with Pakistan, China, the US and Russia for instance), heading the nuclear command authority and handling the overall security situation.

Now to expect him to deliver on these crucial issues looks a challenging task.

However, as a trusted man of the prime minister, the NSA has the necessary authority lacking in earlier structures that had suggested reforms and roadmaps to bring India's national security architecture up to speed.

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion - July 2018

Postby Kati » 23 Oct 2018 14:12

^^^
What happened to the CCCS that was set up with so much interest by Raman-sir?
Also, do we have a unkil-type "bubble room" where crucial NSCS meetings should take place to deter all kinds of
eavesdropping.

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion - July 2018

Postby rkhanna » 23 Oct 2018 15:56

Kati wrote:^^^
What happened to the CCCS that was set up with so much interest by Raman-sir?
Also, do we have a unkil-type "bubble room" where crucial NSCS meetings should take place to deter all kinds of
eavesdropping.


You mean the american "SCIF" (Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility) ? Its a fancier Faraday Cage. not entirely rocket science. dont see why we wouldnt have them.

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion - July 2018

Postby ramana » 23 Oct 2018 22:46

Kati wrote:^^^
What happened to the CCCS that was set up with so much interest by Raman-sir?
Also, do we have a unkil-type "bubble room" where crucial NSCS meetings should take place to deter all kinds of
eavesdropping.

CCCS is very much functioning and some Chennai based memebrs attend their talks.

In India the bane is xerox machine not eavesdropping.
Former NSA SSM had and still has gmail account! Go figure.

So to avoid the xerox hazard nothing really important is written down. Mrs Gandhi standing orders.
Hence the utmost trust worthy get into PMO and and are constantly monitored.


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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion - July 2018

Postby ramana » 25 Oct 2018 21:20



Headline is inflammatory.
The IB staff were on routine surveillance not spying. If it was the latter they would not have their IDs.
Also manhandling IB will have severe consequences for the are eyes of Sarkar.

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion - July 2018

Postby chetak » 26 Oct 2018 18:38

ramana wrote:


Headline is inflammatory.
The IB staff were on routine surveillance not spying. If it was the latter they would not have their IDs.
Also manhandling IB will have severe consequences for the are eyes of Sarkar.


Before a new tenant occupies the house, it's always best to pay unfailing attention to the vital aspect of administrative hygiene and serious pest control, otherwise one will land up in the exact same situation that the current incumbent of the house finds himself in today.

It's unimaginable that such a savvy and madly efficient bunch find themselves in extremely hot water today. The ominous signs were always there for them to see.

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion - July 2018

Postby disha » 26 Oct 2018 21:04

ramana wrote:


Headline is inflammatory.
The IB staff were on routine surveillance not spying. If it was the latter they would not have their IDs.
Also manhandling IB will have severe consequences for the are eyes of Sarkar.


What's worse is that their cover is now blown. Anyway, the deep state is unravelling everywhere. Now all of Pappus non-sense makes sense. It is non-sense still, but the unravelling of some parts of deep state is making him sing the pappu song. Particularly the import lobby is unnerved.


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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion - July 2018

Postby Kati » 31 Oct 2018 07:30

....talked about this months ago.....

Chinese military secretly placing scientists in U.S. universities

https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/20 ... versities/

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion - July 2018

Postby Kati » 31 Oct 2018 07:33

Chinese Military May Gain From Western University Ties, Report Warns

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/30/world/australia/china-scientists-military-research.html

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion - July 2018

Postby Kati » 04 Nov 2018 20:48

Is this a psy-op to give Iran and China a sense of self-achievement? No one, in sane mind, would divulge the name of a defense contractor who
identified a falw in the communication system.


Dozens of US spies killed after Iran and China uncovered CIA messaging service using Google
The Telegraph Margi Murphy,The Telegraph Fri, Nov 2 9:10 PM CDT
Reactions Reblog on Tumblr Share Tweet Email
Spies were using the flawed systems even after a worker blew the whistle - PA
Dozens of American spies were killed in Iran and China after a flawed communications service that allowed foreign foes to see what the agents were up to using Google, official sources have claimed.

Between 2009 and 2013 the US Central Intelligence Agency suffered a “catastrophic” secret communications failure in a website used by officers and their field agents around the world to speak to each other, according to a report in Yahoo News, which heard from 11 former intelligence and government officials about the previously unreported disaster.

“We’re still dealing with the fallout,” said one former national security official. “Dozens of people around the world were killed because of this.”

The internet-based communications platform was first used in the Middle East to communicate with soldiers in war zones and had not been intended for widespread use but due to its ease of use and efficacy, it was adopted by agents despite its lack of sophistication, the sources claimed.

Cracks only began to show when Iran, angered that the government under Barack Obama had discovered a secret Iranian nuclear weapon factory, went out with a fine tooth comb to find moles.

It discovered the existence of one of the websites used by US agents using Google. US officials believe that Iranian spies were able to use Google as a search tool to find secret CIA websites, unbeknown to those using them.

By 2011, Iran had infiltrated the CIA spy network and in May it announced that they had broken up a 30-strong ring of American spies.

Some informants were executed and others imprisoned as a result, the sources claimed.

This was corroborated by a report on ABC news at the time, which referred to a compromised communications system after a tip off from the CIA.

Meanwhile in China 30 agents working for the US were executed by the government after compromising the spy network using a similar means. Beijing had managed to break into a second temporary communications system, splintered from the initial platform and were able to see every single agent the CIA had placed in the country, the sources told Yahoo.

The sources said that it the general consensus was that that Iran and China had traded technical information with each other to form a two-pronged attack.

A CIA agent in Russia who was warned about the attacks were able to change communication channels before anyone was uncovered.

The government had already been warned about the hackability of the system by a defence contractor named John Reidy, whose job it was to hire human sources for the CIA in Iran. He alerted authorities in 2008. His official statement claimed that 70 percent of operations at the time may have been compromised already and that any agents using versions of the system were in danger. “The design and maintenance of the system is flawed,” he said.

Mr Reidy was later fired for “conflicts of interests”. According to Yahoo’s report, there is anger among the intelligence community that there has been no accountability for the failure, despite being discussed in a secret hearing at the House and Senate Intelligence committee. One former official claiming that “our biggest insider threat is our own institution”.

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion - July 2018

Postby rkhanna » 05 Nov 2018 09:48

@Kati - The breach of CIA Level II comms is true. It set back HUMINT within the PRC decades for the Americans. SOFREP had a seriesof articles on this issue.

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion - July 2018

Postby Vips » 06 Nov 2018 06:37

Bengaluru blasts: Stringent conditions for Madani lead to a prosecutor change.

The Karnataka government took a very surprising decision, when it decided to change the Special Public Prosecutor representing the high profile Bengaluru blast case in which Abdul Nasar Madani is also an accused.

While the state government is well within its right to change a prosecutor, the timing is quite surprising considering the trial was in its final stages. A new prosecutor is most likely to add to a delay in the trial as he would need to study the case papers afresh. It may be recalled that the Karnataka High Court had on September 20 directed that the trial in the case be completed within 2 months. This ideally would mean that the prosecution has time until November 20 to complete the trial.

The change came to light when former prosecutor, K Rudraswamy informed the special terrorism court in Bengaluru about a notification that he had been appointed the special public prosecutor for the rest of the trial in the case. Sadashivamurthy who was the prosecutor in the case said that he was replaced as he had fought the case very strongly.

Quoted by the Indian Express, he said hat he had demanded stringent conditions when the court had granted Madani permission to go to Kerala between October 29 and November 4 to visit his mother, who is ailing.

His appointment comes at a time when the prosecution and the court had already examined over 2,000 witnesses and 6,000 documents. The news of a new prosecutor being appointed has not gone down too well, although Rudraswamy said that it would not hamper the trial. He had argued the case when he was the SPP in the early stages, it may be recalled.

A source tells OneIndia that the possible reason for the change could have been due to the demand for stringent conditions. After the permission had been granted, there was a delay and also lack of communication. It could have also been due to the demand for very stringent conditions by the prosecution, that may have led to this change.

The worry for investigators is that the trial may slow down due to this change. The trial has come a long way and was on the verge of completion. Moreover there is a deadline to cater to as directed by the High Court and if the same is not complied with, the prosecution/police and the court can get pulled up.

Former Director General of Police Shankar Bidari took exception to the happenings and said, " what is the reason for changing the Special Public Prosecutor in Bangalore Blast Cases of 2008 and 2010? Trials are in concluding stages. Hope the Government is not acting on pressures from accused and has changed SPP with the intention of getting accused acquitted."

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion - July 2018

Postby Haridas » 10 Nov 2018 23:17

srin wrote:Wow - supermicro ! The implications are just mind-boggling.

Supermicro is a really big deal when it comes to network appliances and also servers. Two of my old companies used supermicro chassis - one for a network security appliance and another as a datacenter server (Supermicro is way cheaper and customizable for workloads than Dell or HP). I have personally negotiated purchase deals with their distributors here in India.

Assume there are hundreds of thousands of these systems in the most secure places (banks, defense etc) - and ironically to provide network security in some cases - and the possibility that even some of them may be compromised is just really terrible.

I don't know what cybersecurity guidelines are there in India for hardware for Govt, defense and banks, but we need to be really really worried.

I had defined Supermicro as standard for our server application platform. 3 yrs ago one of my customer's IT director called me asking why my server on his network pinging with strange source ip that I could not fathom coming from our provided supermicro server. Heated discussion on ownership & responsibility ensued. Ended with him firewalling the traffic from spurious IP source.

Now when this exposure came I feel embarrassed.

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion - July 2018

Postby Kati » 16 Nov 2018 12:02

Read the following article carefully... see how AI generated fake news / fake videos can cause havoc / chaos...

https://www.theguardian.com/technology/ ... news-truth

GoI should steps to star an open dialog through the civil society / media to educate public to be aware of this trap.
Create so much buzz that the common aam abdul doesn't fall for these.

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion - July 2018

Postby Kati » 17 Nov 2018 11:46

Inside the Mysterious Intelligence Firm Now in Mueller’s Sights

https://www.theguardian.com/technology/ ... news-truth

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion - July 2018

Postby Vips » 18 Nov 2018 21:17

An undercover life.

He stands ram-rod straight, has a firm handshake and is polite to a fault. When in a conversation, he listens more than he speaks; and when he does, his words are measured. Despite his advancing years, 68-year-old Balakrishna Kamath appears to possess a photographic memory.

Having spent 39 years working on “national security assignments” for his employer — whom he refers to as the ‘agency’ — Kamath is reluctant to talk about his time in India’s internal spy agency, the Central Intelligence Bureau (IB). He retired six years ago and, perhaps out of habit, is still cagey about disclosing routine personal details, like his Mumbai residential address or how he spends his time now. “In the agency, one never retires,” he says, without explanation.

But you might catch a glimpse of his secret life in a new novel Kamath has written — a 371-page work of ‘fiction’ called The Velvet Gloves, which was released on Saturday. The book is — what else? — a spy thriller set in Mumbai. It is about an ‘agency’ officer who excelled in his career. But with whom it rankled that his long and uncertain hours at work left him with very little time for his wife Radha, who has cancer.

When prodded, Kamath opens up a little about his professional past, but provides only scrubby details. He talks about his most ‘sensitive’ assignments, but does not reveal any dates. One such assignment involved spending 25 days in extreme weather with a colleague, somewhere on the Indo-China border. The two-man team would trek up craggy rock-faces in the Himalayas during a fixed two-hour period at night to avoid being spotted and shot by vigilant Chinese border guards.

Both the IB men had been selected for the mission because of their mountaineering skills. Their meticulous preparations, however, were no match for the chilly, minus 35 degree Celsius night temperatures, and winds roaring at over 100 km per hour. “The only way to survive was to find shelter inside a hill cavity and stay in our sleeping bags,” Kamath says. They worked at night and out of sight during the day. But Kamath will not reveal which side of the border the hills lay on. The operation was a success, and Kamath and his colleague were feted by the ‘agency’ in a low-key event. Such official acknowledgement came many times in Kamath’s career, and he is proud of the fact.

Kamath, however, does regret that he couldn’t share what he does with relatives, friends and neighbours. He could sense they were in awe of him, but also wary, and would not share any information they felt could be used against them. “I could sense their suspicion and fear. Spies are believed to be denizens of a murky, shadowy world after all. There is no awareness about the kind of work we do, the challenges we face and the personal sacrifices we have to make.”

Kamath decided to channel his resentment and regret into a book, and says he wishes to reach out to the man on the street and give him a peek into the secret world of Intelligence. While writing the book, he drew from his personal experiences, embellishing them to make it more informative and entertaining for the lay reader. Along the way, he also initiates the reader into the world of techniques used by security agencies, such as interrogation and shadowing. With some home truths. “A law-abiding citizen should be careful while using means of communication. There is always a signature that is left behind,” Kamath says.

Kamath’s gems on interrogation and the difference between a terrorist and a gangster are riveting too. “While interrogating, never thrash the target. What one must look for is the lie, the deception. Once you catch the lies, you can confront the target to break him open,” he says, slipping easily into terms security officials use. He cites the example of a Pakistani terrorist who was interrogated for “48 hours”, and stonewalled every attempt to make him spill the beans.

Finally, Kamath called his bluff when the terrorist claimed he had taken a train to Bengaluru from Mumbai Central. “There was no such connection,” Kamath says, with a laugh. “It is easy to break a gangster as money is their soul. He is not ready to die. A terrorist is ideology-driven and is ready to die. His ideology needs to be breached to try and make him regret the lives he may have taken [for his cause],” Kamath says. Will Kamath’s novel meet the same happy end as many of his missions did? The ‘spy’ is waiting to find out.


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