1962 and 1967 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

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ramana
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Re: 1962 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

Rakesh wrote:Why senior leaders fail field commanders and impose decisions devoid of ground reality
https://www.firstpost.com/opinion-news- ... 65601.html
03 Nov 2022
An ostrich-like approach – led by the political class - would set into the culture of decision-making in the Indian Army in the 1950s and early 1960s.

Am posting in full and will comment as it deserves a serious reading.
After the 1962 Sino-Indian war, Lt Gen Thorat, retired and settled in Maharashtra, was summoned by Prime Minister Nehru about a report placed before him. The war was over and Indian forces had suffered a debacle. Nehru was astonished to find a detailed assessment that Lt Gen Thorat had written about the Chinese threat much before the India-China conflict. In 1960, more than two years before Chinese troops attacked Indian forward posts on 20 October 1962, Lt Gen Thorat had warned about the Chinese threat and advised against having inadequate Indian preparation to counter it. “Why was the report not shown to me?” a baffled Nehru asked the general. Thorat told the prime minister that he should be asking his Defence Minister this question.

{This shows how disconnected Nehruji was from the border. He had surrounded himself with Yessmen who were afraid to tell him the truth. and even the IB Director B.N. Mullick was exaggerating PLA air power capability. When Intelligence lies to you, you get blindsided.}

Lt Gen Thorat, then Eastern Army Commander, was tasked by General Thimayya to assess the situation and prepare a report on the threat from China. Thorat wrote “Previously, the only real threat against India which merited consideration was from Pakistan. To this now has been added the threat from China.” The report went in vain. Unlike pre-independence, British governments where a strategic template guided by ambitions of military expansion fostered a culture of leadership where key emphasis was laid on ground-level threat assessments, India’s immediate post-independent governments – having little understanding of wars and conflicts didn’t believe in military advice. In fact, the whimsical defence minister, VK Krishna Menon was led by his own beliefs and biases – which were far removed from the actual situation on the ground. The defence minister’s conviction on a military aspect that China would never attack India was based on an assessment that jettisoned military advice.

{Even Nehruji was deluded that China would never attack India. He thought police pickets would stop the PLA and his flippant "throw the Chinese out" command to the Indian Army shows what he thought. All hagiographers lay the blame on Gen Kaul, Krishna Menon and even Thapar, but the real blame is with Nehru. See how he said to Thorat why he was not shown the report! And what would he have done differently? despite his fake query, he ignored Indian military advice to use IAF and relied on Galbraith to not use it and Mullicks ravings!


An ostrich-like approach – led by the political class – would set into the culture of decision-making in the Indian Army in the 1950s and early 1960s. One of the disreputable examples of clueless leadership is manifest in this anecdote recounted in Kunal Verma’s book ‘The War That Wasn’t’. Lt General Brij Mohan ‘Bijji’ Kaul – perhaps the most infamous and disastrous example of nepotism in post independence Indian Army was visiting the forward areas. He was speaking to troops, outlining a plan of attack on the Thagla ridge across Nam Ka Chu – which was a ridiculous plan by itself. After his talk, he asked if anyone had a question regarding the plan. There were senior officers, JCOs and jawans in the audience. One man stood up. He was Subedar Dashrath Singh – who had fought in the World War and was known to be pretty candid. “This is the first time I’ve seen a battle being planned where we are sitting in the valley while the enemy is holding heights above us,” Verma’s book quotes the subedar as saying. The subedar had asked a simple but tough question to which Kaul had no answer. The General flew into a rage and threatened dire consequences for the subedar.

{Rajini Kothari the social science scholar wrote in 1964 in his paper "Congress System in India", to paraphrase Congress is a Party System that manages the various parts of the system by giving autonomy and dissipating any dissent. "Thus in civil-military relationships, the military is given more and more autonomy on its internal administration, as well as in the making of policy, thus making for a relationship of mutual confidence and trust and for a high state of morale and respect for civilian authority. Basically they promote chiefs who dissipate dissent and cool things. My point is Congress did not promote such duds. The system promoted the duds. Congress was the outward face of this system. As the movie #TKF says System hamara hain!}

Eleven days later, the Chinese attacked – killing most of the men that had listened to Kaul and his orders. A brave and resilient Subedar Dashrath fought gamely and survived after having had an entire AK-47 magazine emptied into his stomach. What of Lt General Kaul? He had left the battlefield earlier and then reported sick – leaving a warfighting army in the lurch.

To be fair, Lt Gen Kaul had once proposed to withdraw troops from Nam Ka Chu. But, in a meeting the defence minister VK Krishna Menon, and then army chief, General Pran Thapar had advised the prime minister against doing so. Once again, leaders far removed from the battle scene and with little experience of the area disdainfully trashed the ability of leaders on ground. The culture would become the bane of leadership, paralysing tactical situations in India’s military history – barring the times where exceptional leaders such as Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw, Generals Sagat, Harbaksh, Hanut, Umrao Singh, and later General Sundarji led. Fortunately, after the blundering military leadership of 1962, India found military leaders who were bold, decisive, innovative and fearless.

The first indications of changing leadership would be the appointment of Sam Manekshaw as Corps commander of 4 Corps in Tezpur, Assam. He declared upon arrival, “Gentlemen, I have arrived and there will be no withdrawal without written orders and these orders shall never be issued.” This was in obvious reference to the infamous withdrawal of forces that Indian army generals resorted to during the course of the short war even after having been assured by ground commanders that they could hold defences and fight. It was a war led by a few generals without a fight in them. One example was when Captain Haripal Kaushik – Olympic hockey star and gallant company commander – chose to fight on at Bum La Pass, the higher headquarters instructed him to withdraw from a strong position to Sela Pass where a historic disaster awaited a withdrawing army.

In 1965, Lt General Sagat Singh was faced with the same conundrum when China pressurized India during the India-Pakistan war. The dilemma: stick to the status quo and obey uninformed instructions to withdraw or exercise the other option: take a bold call, thwart pressure, occupy a key forward post. The latter also meant possible failure. He chose the latter – and the Chinese were thwarted in occupying Nathu La. He would cannily avoid phone calls from his boss in order to ensure that the decision was his own – he was clear and unambiguous that a commander on ground was the commander of the destiny of his troops. In the 1971 India-Pakistan war, India hadn’t planned to capture Dhaka but Lt General Sagat Singh – commanding his corps as a wartime general – used unconventional means to do so. Initially, it appeared he was against the plans of his superiors, but history would prove his decisions right.

Two decades later, the Indian Army chief General Sundarji would once again establish the importance of muscular decision-making based on ground information rather than calls made from oblivious quarters – such as in the 1962 war.

After the 1962 war, the Indian army stayed south of Namka Chu. However, in the 1980s, an occasional team from the Intelligence Bureau would visit Sumdorung Chu, a few kilometres east of the site of the first clash of 1962 between India and China. They discovered an incursion of Chinese soldiers into Indian territory. A standoff ensued. General Sundarji held firm and airlifted a brigade into Zemithang, Arunachal Pradesh, leaving the Chinese quivering with his audacity. When prime minister Rajiv Gandhi learnt of the developments at the border at the Navy Day reception, a bureaucrat told Sundarji that the prime minister wasn’t too happy with the Chief’s aggression at the border. In Delhi, it was feared that the standoff might result in a clash. Sundarji, on the other hand, understood the local equation and used the ground to dominate the Chinese. He told the ministry that the prime minister needed better advice.

{Who was that anonmouse bureaucrat? Such rascals have always protected identity.}


Many years have passed since, and the ghosts of 1962 have been largely exorcised. However, the repugnant culture of bypassing on-ground opinions and pressuring field commanders raises its ugly head once in a while, with disastrous results. In Galwan, 2020, when local Indian army commanders, including Colonel Santhosh Babu were negotiating with their Chinese counterparts about withdrawing the latter’s tents, sources say there was intense pressure on both Babu and the local brigade commander to hasten the eviction of the Chinese, without taking into account the local interaction between the two sides, own resources, preparation and evaluation of possible outcomes. The fact that the situation went terribly out of hand led to no one owning the unintended disaster of an inept decision. The fact that no senior army commander was censured for the events of 15/16 June is a travesty.

{Again unnamed sources!!! Have been following the Galwan very closely. Never heard of this scurrilous charge by unnamed sources.}

Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw once famously remarked: A yes man is a dangerous man. He may rise high but can never make a leader. He will be used by his superiors, disliked by his colleagues and despised by his subordinates. The failure of a leader to stand by one’s decision is a weakness, just as the inability to comprehend and value on-ground decisions is a recipe for disaster. As a professional army, we have come a long way from the debacle of 1962, but to continue the traditions of sound leadership would require us to consistently reiterate the value of a moral compass, identify pitfalls of genuflection, acknowledge failures as learning and recognise true, dynamic leadership – however much we might disagree with the latter.

The writer is the author of ‘Watershed 1967: India’s Forgotten Victory over China’. His fortnightly column for FirstPost — ‘Beyond The Lines’ — covers military history, strategic issues, international affairs and policy-business challenges. Views expressed are personal. Tweets @iProbal
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Re: 1962 and 1967 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by ks_sachin »

Ramana Sir,

Unnamed sources is how sometimes things work sometimes. So please don't throw the baby out with the bathwater.


Regarding the Gen Sundarji incident in Sumdorung Chu in the 1980s I have heard of the disquiet in political circles but considering the lily livered Congress government, I would take a calculated guess that Rajiv Gandhi being unhappy would likely be the case. Plus past form of the previous governments - you do know what the term proportionate response means when used in those official GoI press releases on firing on the LoC meant. The army always had its hands tied behind its back!!!

Also with regard to the Galwan incident, the report does not say where the pressure came from. But pressure there would have been. After all the Bde Commander is answerable to the Corps Commander who is in turn answerable to the North Army commander etc. We saw that previously in Kargil as well when initially the local formations were asked to evict intruders without higher commanding making efforts to understand the extent of the intrusions.

Really this boils down to the quality of leadership. Like in all things you get good leaders and not so good leaders. But the fact that the leadership agreed to send in men armed only with sticks without backup tells you a lot does it not?
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Re: 1962 and 1967 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by Prasad »

There is the fact that the China Study Group called the shots right upto unit level on the border with China. So it isn't too far fetched to surmise that what is written above isn't fact.
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Re: 1962 and 1967 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by shaun »

Prasad wrote:There is the fact that the China Study Group called the shots right upto unit level on the border with China. So it isn't too far fetched to surmise that what is written above isn't fact.
Adding Col Babu was neutralized at the very initial stage during inspection ( possibly PLA throwing rock at him) , the brawl started there after . It was pre-planned . Not carrying arms is a legacy issue with CSG calling the shots , as rightly pointed out . I feel all these years CSG policies are all to pacify chinese and bargain some favors for us . A white paper on their activities should be published.
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Re: 1962 and 1967 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

ks_sachin wrote:Ramana Sir,

Unnamed sources is how sometimes things work sometimes. So please don't throw the baby out with the bathwater.

{I can understand unnamed sources if there is fear of retaliation. The Indian state has not retaliated even against the worst offenders. So I don't buy that reason. Most hidden mace and poisoned chalices are tactics of Iagoian subterfuge. Don't sanctify them. Our Forum is quick to demand sources of even innocuous posts!}

Regarding the Gen Sundarji incident in Sumdorung Chu in the 1980s I have heard of the disquiet in political circles but considering the lily livered Congress government, I would take a calculated guess that Rajiv Gandhi being unhappy would likely be the case. Plus past form of the previous governments - you do know what the term proportionate response means when used in those official GoI press releases on firing on the LoC meant. The army always had its hands tied behind its back!!!

{A tool of statecraft is plausible deniability. The leader needs to be insulated but for a minion to convey what he claims is the PM's mind is ridiculous. Rajiv Gandhi was quite aware of what happened in 1962 and another Chinese land grab in a Congress govt would end the party. BTW same lily-livered Congress built up the Indian military in the 1980s which led to the near bankruptcy in 1990 due to oil shock. And asserted Indian eminent domain over near abroad (Maldives and Sri Lanka) with massive loss of prestige (IPKF losses). It's not all one-sided.}

Also with regard to the Galwan incident, the report does not say where the pressure came from. But pressure there would have been. After all the Bde Commander is answerable to the Corps Commander who is in turn answerable to the North Army commander etc. We saw that previously in Kargil as well when initially the local formations were asked to evict intruders without higher commanding making efforts to understand the extent of the intrusions.

{From what I read so far in the last 2 years there was no such pressure. I think this is a scurrilous thrust at the current Army commander due to parochial interests and the support for IBG of the mountain troops. Kargil was a different environment and the Military has changed a lot since then. we shouldn't hang on to past models.}

Really this boils down to the quality of leadership. Like in all things you get good leaders and not so good leaders. But the fact that the leadership agreed to send in men armed only with sticks without backup tells you a lot does it not?

{Not carrying arms was a CBM since the 1993 Treaty on Peace and Tranquility signed by PVNR and Deng Xiaopeng governments. And also the Chinese did not carry firearms. Both are nuke powers and it is a tacit deescalation objective to ensure no hot fires happen which could lead to a slippery slope. Since 1948, US and FSU never had a hot clash unlike FSU and PRC in Ussuri River clashes and even there it was a very remote area. Unlike that LAC is a vital area for India and the same template won't fit. In Galwan and Kailash ranges action IA displayed the finest leadership qualities and excelled themselves. So I don't agree about that generalization. If Balakot ended the Pak nuke terrorism template, Galwan and Kailash Ranges' actions ended the ten-foot-tall Chinaman myth of 1962.}
My comments in italics and bold. Let us not belittle a great achievement from unnamed sources.
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Re: 1962 and 1967 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

Prasad wrote:There is the fact that the China Study Group called the shots right upto unit level on the border with China. So it isn't too far fetched to surmise that what is written above isn't fact.

The CSG is an advisory group one of many and is headed by a retired Army Lt Gen.

To think they call shots is erroneous.
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Re: 1962 and 1967 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

shaun wrote:
Prasad wrote:There is the fact that the China Study Group called the shots right upto unit level on the border with China. So it isn't too far fetched to surmise that what is written above isn't fact.
Adding Col Babu was neutralized at the very initial stage during inspection ( possibly PLA throwing rock at him) , the brawl started there after . It was pre-planned . Not carrying arms is a legacy issue with CSG calling the shots , as rightly pointed out . I feel all these years CSG policies are all to pacify chinese and bargain some favors for us . A white paper on their activities should be published.
1. Not carrying arms is a legacy issue with CSG calling the shots, as rightly pointed out.

Not carrying arms is CBM from the 1993 Treaty on Peace and Tranquility signed by PVNR and DX. This is to avoid a hot shooting war on the borders which could lead to escalation. The twist was PLA carried improvised weapons and assaulted the IA patrol party.


2. I feel all these years CSG policies are all to pacify chinese and bargain some favors for us . A white paper on their activities should be published.

CSG is one among many advisory groups. It is headed by a senior retiree familiar with China. The current head is retired Army Lt Gen.
Yes from open sources please do write a white paper and we should publicize it.
The policy is made by the PM and the RM. Implementation is by the military.

Very clear chain of command. Even the lowest soldier knows what the PM wants since 2014.
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Re: 1962 and 1967 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by shaun »

ramana wrote:
shaun wrote:
2. I feel all these years CSG policies are all to pacify chinese and bargain some favors for us . A white paper on their activities should be published.

CSG is one among many advisory groups. It is headed by a senior retiree familiar with China. The current head is retired Army Lt Gen.
Yes from open sources please do write a white paper and we should publicize it.
The policy is made by the PM and the RM. Implementation is by the military.

Very clear chain of command. Even the lowest soldier knows what the PM wants since 2014.
Yes but PM and RM too depends on CSG among others, for making policies , and being a china centric body , its weightage should be higher if not the highest.
what informations CSG feeds, is the question. Chinese intrusion into our perceived line is one thing and reinforcing
the same ,making roads should have rang alarm bells long ago . Bud did it ?? We were content ,managing few patrols until stopped by Chinese.
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Re: 1962 and 1967 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

Trust me it is not. GOI has enough China inputs.
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Re: 1962 and 1967 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by SRajesh »

Ramanaji
A question then:
Just as EAM (a post FS level inductee) should RM be a similar post CDS type Ex-Serviceman
Two of the key portfolios in 2024 (if BJP wins and I sincerely hope that is the case) be for the people inducted laterally to cabinet with a RS seat??
Only asking because they may enunciate freely the GOI policy without carrying any political baggage or face attacks from local BIF-scums for their party leanings
Some might argue this is a slow turn to Presidential system (with a Parliament :lol: )!!
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Re: 1962 and 1967 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

Not really.

War is an extension of politics.

And Raksha Mantri is a political job.

In the US we find generals as Secy Def are not doing any great job.

Jaishankar is uniquely talented.
Any other IFS babu will pull out the rule book to the PM.
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Re: 1962 and 1967 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by SRajesh »

Sir
I did not mean automatic extension a la SC judge or HC judge
Not as a sinecure
Offering RS seat and a Cabinet berth one would be picky and choose correctly no
my question was should we continue with lateral induction or this just a one-off affair!
sorry if digressing from the thread (Indo-China war)
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Re: 1962 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by Kersi »

Rakesh wrote: https://twitter.com/TheWolfpackIN/statu ... 54210?s=20 ---> Back in March 1962, when wife of US President Kennedy was visiting India, US Army offered to give India around 200 of 155mm howitzers from it's EDA stocks within 6-7 months, but India refused due to unknown reasons.

Image
WE ARE A PEACEFUL COUNTRY

We do not need army, our police is sufficient

We do not need 200 mm howitzers, our lee Enfield 0.303 is more that enough

:evil: :evil: :evil: :evil:
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Re: 1962 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by Kersi »

ramana wrote:And Nehru-ji wrote to JFK seeking F104 squadrons and B57 bombers manned by US pilots. Despite not committing one armed plane.
This is right after Cuban Missile crisis.

How did he expect US to leap forward when they had just stepped back from the brink and he did not commit all his forces to the fight?
Let us no forget that China attacked us in 1962 when US was deeply embroiled in Cuba crisis, barely recovering from a severe nuclear threshhold
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Re: 1962 and 1967 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by Kersi »

I had attended the Mumbai book launch of Shiv Kunal Verma's book, 1962 The War that Wasn't.

The chief guest was Wing Commander Jag Mohan Nath. He spoke about his experience in 1962 war. He had flown Canberras, recce version, over China, before and during 1962. He was personally called by JL Nehru about his flights. He had over flown China but the Chinese had made not attempt shoot him down, they did not have any suitable weapons. But the "GREAT" JLN did not believe him and hence refused to get IAF into the picture. WCo Nath said that if IAF was used to counter attack, there was precious little the Cheeni could have done. The war could have ended differently.

I think Wco Nath is a MVC with a bar.
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Re: 1962 and 1967 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by vijayk »

Don't know what is wrong with Nehru but he always acted against India's interests. The western leaders might have ROTFL ...

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Re: 1962 and 1967 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by chetak »

vijayk wrote:Don't know what is wrong with Nehru but he always acted against India's interests. The western leaders might have ROTFL ...
wasn't auntie bedwina there/specifically chosen to lead him by the ....errr... nose..

all done only for queen and country, of course
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Re: 1962 and 1967 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by Rakesh »

chetak wrote:
vijayk wrote:Don't know what is wrong with Nehru but he always acted against India's interests. The western leaders might have ROTFL ...
wasn't auntie bedwina there/specifically chosen to lead him by the ....errr... nose..

all done only for queen and country, of course
Nehru was a stooge of the British Empire. There was little to no difference between him and the British Raj.

It was a masterful stroke by the British to appoint him as PM. Him and his mini-me (VK Krishna Menon) were two peas in a pod!
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Re: 1962 and 1967 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by chetak »

Rakesh wrote:
chetak wrote: wasn't auntie bedwina there/specifically chosen to lead him by the ....errr... nose..

all done only for queen and country, of course
Nehru was a stooge of the British Empire. There was little to no difference between him and the British Raj.

It was a masterful stroke by the British to appoint him as PM. Him and his mini-me (VK Krishna Menon) were two peas in a pod!
and sirji, no one fought harder than the stretcher bearer of the empire to wilfully cheat, manoeuvre and maliciously side line all other worthier candidates, like Bose and Patel...

masterful play kiska tha, especially when the stretcher bearer had received his orders a long time ago and getting high on goat's milk, sold us all down the river.

This was an epic deep state play by the empire.

the anticipated nobel was stalled for many years and then quietly deep sixed to ensure that no one looked too deeply into what was being done in the name of the fight for freedom

a "political" party that was founded by the britshits is still being run by white skins and that sure says a lot about us, no
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Re: 1962 and 1967 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

Guys lets stick to military facts and not bring in political issues.
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Re: 1962 and 1967 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by Barath »

ramana wrote:
ks_sachin wrote: ..Galwan and Kailash Ranges' actions ended the ten-foot-tall Chinaman myth of 1962.}[/i]
.
That was ended by the 1967 border clashes
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Re: 1962 and 1967 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

Gen KVK Rao "Prepare or Perish"

The Border War October


http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news ... ober-1962/

The Border Waar November

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spot ... mber-1962/

Appreciation: Observations, Comments, and Lessons

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spot ... lessons/0/
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Re: 1962 and 1967 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

Barath wrote:
ramana wrote: .
That was ended by the 1967 border clashes
If that was the case none of the incursions after 2008 would have happened.
Congress Party forgot too about 1967.

In those days the papers just reported some firings and it was much, much later that books were written.
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Re: 1962 and 1967 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

Vice Admiral Roy comments on 1962 war lessons:

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spot ... t-of-1962/
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Re: 1962 and 1967 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

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Re: 1962 and 1967 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

A quote on ancient China.
The Wuzi—another military text thought to be written by a famous general of this era, Wu Qi, and later codified along with The Art of War into the Seven Military Classics of Ancient China—[bdescribes the relationship between formation and battle through a description of the “four discords” of military operations:[/b]

If there is discord in the state, then you cannot deploy the army;
If there is discord in the army, then you cannot organize your formations [陳];
If there is discord in your formations, then you cannot join battle [戰];
If there is discord in battle, then you cannot achieve victory.[10]

India in 1962, had all four discords except at the lowest fighting level.
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Re: 1962 and 1967 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by Rakesh »

Twitter thread on Major Shaitan Singh, PVC and his men of 13 Kumaon...a must read!

https://twitter.com/Maverickmusafir/sta ... 00134?s=20 ---> “We carved not a line, and we raised not a stone, But we left him alone in his glory.” In cold February of 1963, three months after the battle of Chushul, bodies of soldiers of 13th Kumaon were collected & cremated with full military honours. Major Shaitan Singh’s body was found+
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Re: 1962 and 1967 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by Rakesh »

https://twitter.com/jai_samota/status/1 ... 87648?s=20 ---> “We carved not a line, and we raised not a stone, But we left him alone in his glory.” My article on the Battle of Chushul, on which I spent almost three years researching and made a visit to Chushul and an ICU. To read, click on the link below.

‘We Stared in the Eyes of Death’: The 1962 operations in Chushul
https://indiasentinels.com/opinion/we-s ... ushul-5871
28 May 2023

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Re: 1962 and 1967 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by Rakesh »

https://twitter.com/jai_samota/status/1 ... 97696?s=20 ---> No one knows when the Major breathed his last. But as much as I know him, with every breath ebbing out, subtracting last few seconds of his life, he certainly would have smiled a little and thought of his company. Who fought such a fierce battle against the mighty enemy.

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Re: 1962 and 1967 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

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Re: 1962 and 1967 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by fanne »

I hope IAF has a plan A and Plan B to counter this. Throwing tantrums and not buying anything will be fatal for us.
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Re: 1962 and 1967 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

They have Plan C too.
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Re: 1962 and 1967 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

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Re: 1962 and 1967 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by Rakesh »

https://x.com/jai_samota/status/1722249 ... 10229?s=20 ---> At this time, on this day in 1960, a party was going on at 129, Allen By Lines, The Officers' Mess of 13 Kumaon located in Ambala. It was Dining-in party of Major Shaitan Singh, PVC as he had joined 13 Kumaon for the first time. Today, exactly 63 years later from the same date, I happily and proudly release the cover of his first ever biography in six decades. What a beautiful journey it has been...

Image

Image
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Re: 1962 and 1967 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by Rakesh »

India: Never Forget 19 November 1962
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news ... mber-1962/
20 Nov 1962
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Re: 1962 and 1967 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by Rakesh »

India-China War: Indian bravehearts had to pay the price for Nehru’s weak leadership
https://indianexpress.com/article/opini ... p-9034845/
21 Nov 2023
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Re: 1962 and 1967 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by bala »

Why did Nehru Sabotage India, the 1962 Indo-China war and other follies makes one wonder why such idiotic decisions were made at the highest level in India. When the Britshits divided Bharat into two nations without any pre-planning or idea of orderly resettlement of people, the two new nations were controlled by the Britshits in the initial phases. Promptly the Brits instigated the nation of Pukes to engage in a battle for Kashmir since the northern points of Gilgit were used as a listening post by the Britshits on USSR and China. Nehru as leader did not secure the borders of India, instead like a cry baby he ran to the UN to highlight the issue of Kashmir. The Britshits were laughing uncontrollably at this folly. The UN made the issue as a worldwide international problem so that their fangs got deeply embedded into Kashmir. BTW the powers who created the UN offered India a permanent security coucil seat for India which was promptly rejected by the idiotic Nehru, he gave the seat to communist China. The Indian communist and kangress have always been hand in glove with each other.

When communist China was ensconced in the UN, they walked into free Tibet and occupied the land. The so called buffer state of Tibet vanished immediately and India was faced with a new security challenges right on its borders. In 1962, the Army was ill prepared mainly due to the neglect of Kangress in equipping the Army properly with clothes, shoes, guns, ammunition and much more. China occupied Aksai Chin area and took parts of ladakh permanently. Nehru refused to engage the Indian air force in the tussle and let the army defend the intrusions. The Indian Air force would have bombed the Chinese to smithereens and perhaps even freed Tibet from the clutches of the CCP. Any leader who loses land to another nation would have been promptly replaced with a more capable leader. However Indian voters were a docile lot who kept Nehru as PM.

The current military build up to defend the borders is draining the exchequer. The India army has to defend high altitude glacial mountain tops like Siachen. Subsequent border clashes with China post 1962 have been adequately repulsed but tensions persist to this day. All of this thanks to one man - idiot par excellence Nehru.

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Re: 1962 and 1967 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by bala »

1962 War in Ladakh I Battle of Rezang la I Col Ajay Raina I Aadi

1962 war in Ladakh was a battle for survival against all odds for the Indian Army. A great battle was fought in Rezang La. What is the story and how did we loose. The true story of the war told by Col. Ajay Raina in such detail, you will be spellbound.

// Amazing recounting by Col Ajay Raina, remembers every detail vividly and recalls so many veer warriors who fought for India, true patriots, so much sacrifice to guard the borders. I owe my debt to these brave men who sacrificed their everything. My blood boils and my Kshatriya instinct is stirred (tears trickled down my eyes) by the asinine leadership of India both political and some high ups in the Army. Such rank incompetence, Neverwho was a curse upon India, he was such a bad choice as PM for a just independent nation, imposed by Brit Agent Candhi.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HAJDbneA1js

1962 war in Arunachal I The Painful Story I Col Ajay Raina I Aadi

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7GBq6KpR07I

// take some time to watch these YT to get a gripping, almost first hand story telling by the good Col Ajay Raina.
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Re: 1962 and 1967 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by bala »

Indian loss in the 1962 war is a wound that will never heal. Who was at fault and why did we loose this war inspite of having forces and equipment.

Colonel Ajay K. Raina explains the events that led to the 1962 war in the YT below.

China was at the receiving end of the opium wars and opium culture fanned by the Brits, who used Bharat for poppy cultivation (instead of rice/food) and used the area for drug processing and worldwide trade.

British had come up with the McMohan line, in which Tawang of Arunachal Pradesh (NEFA) was the boundary between India and Tibet. Tibet vasi used to claim that Tawang is theirs and in fact Taiwan also considers the same. ROC was involved in formation of UN.

In 1947 India got its independence from the Britshits. India believed in suzerainty of china over tibet as opposed to sovereignty. In 1949 Neverwho declared that Pukes were the enemy not China, India desires peace and will work towards world peace. The Army was de-emphasized and Neverwho wanted only police force.

In 1949 China took over xinjiang region. Chinese aggressions on land was very clear. Their next goal was Tibet. B N Mallick of IB had pre-warned about China trying to occupy Tibet.

PRC government troops entered the Tibetan region on October 7, 1950. India actually provided rice to sustain the troops of China in Tibet! The US was willing to help India prior to this event. They wanted India to provide the troop strength and were willing to airlift a substantial portion into Tibet. However India did not have the wherewithal to raise such numbers and provide the logistics support for the troops.

Now some cabinet members grumbled against Neverwho and warned him that the next target will be India territory like ladakh, Arunachal Pradesh for the Chinese. So the dyslexic Neverwho wrote a protest letter to the Chinese and ooh, they were scared, no they laughed at it. India did not take any action and let China walk into Tibet and take it over. India had small infantry posts in Lhasa, Tibet prior to the invasion.

Sardar Patel had written to Neverwho about NEFA and neverwho instituted a study of NEFA. At that time NEFA was under MEA. Ralengnao (Bob) Khathing was a civil servant under Assam governor (who was close to Sardar Patel). In Tawang, the local tibetans were collecting tax and effectively ruling. Bob Khathing gave an ultimatum to the tibetans that they stop the practice otherwise they will be sent across. He was instrumental in keeping Tawang with India otherwise the Chinese would have walked in and captured Tawang.

In 1953 Neverwho signed the panchsheel agreement with China and he had no issues with them. All the outposts were withdrawn. During this time, the US offered India a seat on the security council and as usual dyslexic Neverwho refused and provided the reason that he did not want China to get angry with India. { kya blunder and what bad luck to have such leaders of India. I don't think you can get a worse moron than Neverwho}

In 1954 China started cartographic claims. Chou-enlai told Neverwho to ignore the maps, they are old stuff don't bother, we are friends. In 1952 stateman newspaper reported that there was G129 highway construction connecting Tibet and Xinjiang and IAF pilots on Canberra took of from Ladakh and entered India via Tawang routinely, photographing the highway construction. In 1959 China was firing at border areas of Tawang and Ladakh. Dalai Lama came to India during this time. In 1955 there were revolts by Tibetians in China occupied Tibet. There used to be 100 guards for the Dalai Lama in Tibet, china rounded them and gunned them down mercilessly.

In parliament, the opposition parties cornered Neverwho and sheepishly Neverwho admitted culpability of the Chinese. He also grandly announced that NEFA will be under the army. Previously neverwho did not want the army in NEFA, the eastern command was in Lucknow. Gen Thimmaya was shocked at the announcement. There was no troops he could deploy. That other scoundrel VK Menon gave a dressing down to Gen Thimmaya. This turned into Thimmaya resigning. VK Menon was an outright commy and Neverwho was a socialist. Both sympathetic towards China. Neverwho wanted him to retract the resignation and he reminded him of the Chinese threat. VK Menon got junior B M Kaul who had no experience in managing war and thrust him into a key decision position in the army. This character is one of the reasons why India lost the war in 1962.

Do la is a place at the Tri-junction of Bhutan, India and Tibet, named as Thagla ridge. In 1961, MEA asked India to occupy the do la area. The Chinese protested. Many consider this as a trigger for the 1962 war.

In 1962 war, the Indian airforce was forbidden in offensive role. If India had used the airforce then the chinese would have panicked and vacated Tibet. Neverwho asked the US airforce for bombing the chinese, which the US refused.




// if Indians don't understand the causes and all the incorrect decisions made (by political, civil servants and the armed forces), then no lessons are learnt and a repeat can happen in the future. Having the armed forces tutored about the past is very important and so should the civil services learn about this. The politicos are the issue, they don't want to learn, but I think they need to learn about Arthashastra as a minimum to qualify for the post, this is basic stuff. The rest of India needs to be on top of such things.
// Neverwho lost 1948 against the Pukes and 1962 against the Chinese. Makes you wonder on whose side he was. I think he wanted to leave behind the enduring legacy - if you pick a moron, a skirt chaser, a britshit agent to lead a nation this is what you will get, you Indians, Wear this albatross around your necks, you future generations.
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Re: 1962 and 1967 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by bala »

Hidden Reasons Behind 1962 War. Why did the Chinese attack India in 1962. Bertil Lintner of Sweden has a different take. Lintner lives in Chiang Mai, Thailand with his wife Hseng Noung, an ethnic Shan from Burma. They have a daughter who was born in Kohima, India.

Could be any of the following:

1. India accepting Dalai Lama in 1959. Even before Dalai's acceptance, Mao and Deng had a meeting and they agreed to settle accounts with India for interference in Buddhist leadership issues in Tibet. So, the chinese had 3 years to prepare for an attack on India.

2. Domestic compulsion: Great leap of Mao was a disaster for CCP. He was about to be booted out of leadership. The 1962 war, turned around sentiments in China for Mao and he became maximum leader.

3. India's leadership in non-alignment in Asia was seen as a nuisance by China, when China wanted to dictate world revolution.

China wanted to show it is capable of taking on Indian forces and out of their "good heart" retreated after the initial attack on India. This was of huge propaganda value which they used with their people and even the world.

The Chinese never wanted to settle any issues with India, they wanted things to simmer. Internally the Chinese thought of Neverwho as a lackey of the Britshits despite all the bhai-bhai nonsense.

Neverwho not using IAF, which could have pounded the Chinese forces to smithereens, is a huge glaring blunder of the highest order. The Indian army fought bravely. There was huge interference in the leadership of the Indian Army and also poor logistics/ammo contributed to some battles being lost. After 1962, the Indian army has given a sound thrashing to any forays by the Chinese army.

For more see YT
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kFDIBUJKE94
Last edited by bala on 12 Dec 2023 10:03, edited 1 time in total.
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