1962 and 1967 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

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1962 and 1967 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by Rakesh »

Where is the 1962 Indo-China War thread? I cannot find it at all.

If someone can find it, please move this post there and delete this thread.

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https://twitter.com/ragarwal/status/1034321999055663104 ---> Letter by Sardar Patel to Nehru on 7 Nov 1950 on Chinese threat and how to deal with it. Sardar died just about a month later, and little/no action was taken by Nehru on his suggestions. 12 years later we had the 1962 debacle.

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Last edited by ramana on 01 Dec 2022 04:05, edited 1 time in total.
Reason: Edited by ramana.
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Re: 1962 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by wig »

http://www.dailyexcelsior.com/battle-ri ... -1962-war/

The Battle of Rizangla – A Glorious Chapter of 1962 War
extracted from the above article
Major Shaitan Singh Bhatti, PVC and the soldiers under his command faced up to the Chinese. Outnumbered and outgunned the men died where they fought on 18 Nov 1962
The small Indian formation was left to their fate as the supply line was not regular. The Rizangla feature had a high hill at its back so no artillery shelling could be carried out to support the troops on Rizangla. Digging defences in the rocky soil was nearly impossible and the paucity of oxygen at a height of 16000 feet made movement of partially acclimatized soldiers difficult. The Ahirs were mainly armed with antiquated. 303 single shot bolt action rifles of the Second World War vintage which yielded an easy advantage to the enemy equipped with the modern weaponry.
Despite these locational and logistic disadvantages the Ahirs under the able leadership of their company commander Maj. Shaitan Singh Bhatti were in high spirits. On the night of 17-18 Nov. heavy snow storm had overtaken the battle zone and icy winds were benumbing any living being there.. In the early morning our patrols noticed massive Chinese intrusion through the gullies. Though the Chinese had brought their assaulting troops to their forward assembly under the cover of inclement weather, their intentions to give sudden surprise to the vigilant Ahirs failed miserably. The Indian soldiers were ready to face the assault of the dragons. Around 0500 hrs, the first wave of Chinese was sighted by the Ahirsmanning the defences and they were greeted with a hail of LMGs, MMGs and mortars fire. Scores of the enemy died, many were wounded but the rest duly reinforced and continued to advance. Soon the gullies leading to Rizangla were full of Chinese corpses. Constant wave after wave of the Chinese launched four more attacks which were beaten back. This dwindled the strength and ammunition of the defenders also and there was no hope of replenishments in the God’s forsaken place.
By now the Chinese realized that Rizangla was not a cake walk and they resorted to heavy artillery and concentrated fire of recoilless guns. Our Jawans had no artillery support and no bunkers on the rocky feature. Simultaneously the Chinese had a detour and attacked from the back. In the meantime Major Shaitan Singh was moving from platoon to platoon motivating the depleting command. In the process he was hit by the enemy LMG fire on his arm but undaunted he kept motivating, regrouping and reorganisinghis handful men and weapons. His Company Hay. Major kept persuading him to move to safer place but he did not want to leave his comrades. Grievously injured and bleeding profusely, he was later pulled to safer place behind a boulder where he froze to martyrdom during the night. The Ahirs had fought bravely and even came out with bayonets when need arose. Naik Chandgi Ram a wrestler of repute had killed 6-7 Chinese single handedly with bayonet till he fell to martyrdom. Silence of war had engulfed Rizangla as the last round had been fired and the last soldier had bled to martyrdom. The Ahirs had exhibited a rare saga of unprecedented courage, valour and supreme sacrifice. 114 out of 120 soldiers sacrificed their lives. It is one of the few battles in the annals of war history of the world where such a high percentage of fighters fought so doggedly and fearlessly and attained martyrdom. There is only one other instance in the subcontinent where a similar bravery was exhibited. In 1897, 21 brave Sikh soldiers had killed 600 Afghans in the battle of Saragarhi before laying down their lives.
In January, 1963 a local shepherd while wandering over Rizangla saw the awesome spectacle of the soldiers frozen to death but still clinging to their damaged weapons, mostly with empty magzines and bulged barrels due to excessive firing. A month later the first Indian party under the aegis of Red Cross retrieved the bodies. The grateful nation conferred Maj. Shaitan Singh with Param Vir Chakra- the highest gallantry award. Eight soldiers were conferred Vir Chakra and some others were also conferred with honours. This is perhaps the only action where so many honours have been conferred in a single operation. We pay our homage to these brave soldiers year after year on their memorials near Chushul and in Rewari, Haryana. It has been aptly inscribed on their memorial: “How can a man die better? Than facing fearful odds/ For the ashes of his father/ And temples of his Gods.”
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Re: 1962 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by Rakesh »

Recalling the Pain of 1962 Indo-China War: Lessons Forgotten, Truth Buried
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spot ... ao.twitter
By Commodore C Uday Bhaskar (Retd), 22 October 2020

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Re: 1962 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by Rakesh »

https://twitter.com/majorgauravarya/sta ... 22339?s=20 ---> Today in 1962, Major Shaitan Singh and 122 men of Charlie Company, 13 Kumaon Regiment fought against thousands of Chinese Army soldiers & forever passed into the mists of legend.

This is the story of the Battle of Rezang La --> https://majorgauravarya.wordpress.com/2 ... the-brave/
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Re: 1962 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by Vivek K »

Thanks for posting such a moving story admiral sir!
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Re: 1962 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by Rakesh »

Please do not call me sir :)

Major Shaitan Singh of the 1962 Indo-China War, Jemadar Prakash Singh Chib of the 1945 Burma Campaign, the 21 brave men at Saragarhi in 1897 are some of the many stories that motivated us webmasters back in the late 90s/early 2000s to create the Amar Jawan website. These stories of these men are truly exemplary. You feel nothing but pure awe for these men. To stand directly in the face of death and not flinch, requires resolute courage.

Not related to this thread, but read this story about Jemadar Prakash Singh Chib ---> https://sv-se.facebook.com/karmwaar/pos ... %22R%22%7D

There are no words in any language to describe what Jemadar Prakash Singh Chib did, absolutely no words. The Victoria Cross that he was posthumously awarded, in my very humble opinion, was not enough. I have always wished for the next generation of Indian students to learn about these men in school. These men are the foundation of Indian history.
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Re: 1962 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by Rakesh »

I leave it to gurus to confirm picture below. Read the twitter comments as well...

https://twitter.com/KUNALBI25146617/sta ... 54656?s=20 ---> A 'RARE' snap of Indian Army tanks, at Chushul Area during the 1962 Indo-China War, that played vital role in stopping Chinese Armour & Infantry that tried to breach through the Spanggur gap on 18th & 19th Nov 1962 with intense shelling on Chushul airfield.

https://twitter.com/KUNALBI25146617/sta ... 54656?s=20 ---> The caption on the picture says Nathu La in 1962...a different sector altogether.

https://twitter.com/NarenNp/status/1329 ... 43205?s=20 ---> Nathu La by the way is not exactly tank country...also demonstrated by absence of armour since then.

https://twitter.com/RadianceZ/status/13 ... 84777?s=20 ---> 8 Cavalry was deployed in Nathu La...you correctly mentioned in picture, but wrong in tweet.


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Re: 1962 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by Rakesh »

https://twitter.com/KUNALBI25146617/sta ... 17280?s=20 ---> Here's another 'RARE' snap of Indian Army AMX-13 light tank deployment during the 1962 India-China Face Off at Sikkim.

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Re: 1962 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by Rakesh »

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Re: 1962 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by Rakesh »

https://twitter.com/TheWolfpackIN/statu ... 54210?s=20 ---> Back in March 1962, when wife of US President Kennedy was visiting India, US Army offered to give India around 200 of 155mm howitzers from it's EDA stocks within 6-7 months, but India refused due to unknown reasons.

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Re: 1962 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by Rakesh »

1962 War: The Role of the IAF
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/inte ... f-the-iaf/
17 Feb 2021

From the Book Excerpt: My Years with the IAF by Air Chief Marshal PC Lal (retd)

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Re: 1962 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

https://twitter.com/daeroplate_v2/statu ... 19234?s=19

Short review of Shiv Kunal Verma's book
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Re: 1962 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by Rakesh »

Wow! :roll:

https://twitter.com/daeroplate_v2/statu ... 65537?s=20 ---> Declassified papers JFK library, letter that Nehru wrote to JFK after fall of Bomdilla. Groveling in tone, it was so bad Indian Ambassador in NYC apparently considered withholding it. Wanted 12 squadrons of F-104 manned by USAF pilots to fight cheen directly.
Link ---> https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer ... SF-111-016

https://twitter.com/daeroplate_v2/statu ... 17541?s=20 ---> Now in parallel, the IB chief who was a capable but seasoned durbari had come in with a bs report that PLAAF was 19 feet tall, armed with hordes of bombers and apart form ravaging north India would bomb madras also! (Maybe clever trick to get Krishna Menon all riled up).

https://twitter.com/daeroplate_v2/statu ... 57985?s=20 ---> Next, inspite of Canberra recce pics from Ladakh to Walong showing no PLAAF infra worth the name and un-intercepted Canberra flights all down the Himalaya over Tibet, Nehru and IB chief browbeat the ACM that this was true and IAF must only transport not attack.

https://twitter.com/daeroplate_v2/statu ... 61248?s=20 ---> So ace Canberra pilots who later did unescorted strikes into Quetta, Peshawar and Sargodha sat out the war while they could have flattened PLA logistics dumps and rear areas like Rutog, Xigatse and worked over Spanggur Kabila base as well (transport pilots warned of build up).
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Re: 1962 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

And Nehru-ji wrote to JFK seeking F104 squadrons and B57 bombers manned by US pilots. Despite not committing one armed plane.
This is right after Cuban Missile crisis.

How did he expect US to leap forward when they had just stepped back from the brink and he did not commit all his forces to the fight?
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Re: 1962 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by Atmavik »

^^ i Listened to Shiv Kunal Verma's book on Audible a few months ago. this is covered in chapter 17.

looks like Nehru was worried that if he used the airforce then the Chinese would bomb Indian cities. BN Malick told Nehru that the Chinese could bomb Madras. IB also mentioned that IAF lacked fighters for night interdiction whereas PLAAF had Mig 17 that could intercept at Night and neutralize our canberras.

in reality, the Chinese could not even reach Gorakhpur because of the soviet embargo on aviation fuel. the book is highly critical of Air HQ.
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Re: 1962 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by Aditya_V »

The problem was everything including promotion was based on being yes man and connections . And willing to Service the anglo saxon agenda. So merit and competence go out the window, that is the INC secular ecosystem in India. Even today these people are up to their same tricks and ecosystem by controlling media, Poonawalla type industries, NGO, mandis , media film have too much control of everything in the nation
HR, IIM recruitment all are set to filter out people who want to do the right thing for the nation. Even if someone thinks correctly like General Thimmiyya, they are kicked out. After 1962 defeat the ecosystem badly needed a victory and stayed out of the way until 1971 but at the same time preserving Pakistan. Since many of these people have arrangements outside India for themselves and family, they don't mind burning the house down within India. The only silver lining I see is when enough people from the subcontinent migrate to Australia, North America, Europe, the natural xenophobia will make the controllers reevaluate thier policies towards us.
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Re: 1962 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by Deans »

ramana wrote:https://twitter.com/daeroplate_v2/statu ... 19234?s=19

Short review of Shiv Kunal Verma's book
I've read several books on 1962, incl. the Henderson-Brooks report. This is by far the best.
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Re: 1962 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by Deans »

Atmavik wrote:^^ i Listened to Shiv Kunal Verma's book on Audible a few months ago. this is covered in chapter 17.

looks like Nehru was worried that if he used the airforce then the Chinese would bomb Indian cities. BN Malick told Nehru that the Chinese could bomb Madras. IB also mentioned that IAF lacked fighters for night interdiction whereas PLAAF had Mig 17 that could intercept at Night and neutralize our canberras.

in reality, the Chinese could not even reach Gorakhpur because of the soviet embargo on aviation fuel. the book is highly critical of Air HQ.
The PLAAF's capability in 62 was fairly basic, but so was ours. In all fairness to the IAF, they had not planned for interdiction of infantry in the
mountains. It would not have been easy to even locate Chinese infantry in foggy weather in the mountains. If they did, the weather may not have permitted attacks - which given the rugged terrain and type of ordnance, would have had a limited impact (as the USAF found out in Korea). If the IAF wanted to venture into Tibet and the Chinese rear areas, the PLAAF had anti aircraft units ready for that. The IAF did undertake a lot of supply missions even in adverse weather.
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Re: 1962 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

Did they plan to fight by 1999 Kargil or 2020 Ladakh,?
They love the disaster relief supply mission even now.
Even now Hammer bombs were bought as after thought to Rafale.
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Re: 1962 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by Deans »

ramana wrote:Did they plan to fight by 1999 Kargil or 2020 Ladakh,?
They love the disaster relief supply mission even now.
Even now Hammer bombs were bought as after thought to Rafale.
That's my point Ramana ji. Even in 1965, Air-ground coordination was poor. In the IAF's first missions, to check the Pak thrust towards Akhnoor,
we lost 4 Vampires, before the aircraft and doctrine being followed were deemed unsuitable. It was worse in 62. The army had only just replaced
the Assam rifles in Arunachal. They barely had maps of the area - the IAF'S maps were of WW2 vintage (no GPS yet !). It was estimated that only
50% of the supplies airdropped for 4th Infantry division actually reached. That was 50% of supplies dropped in those missions that were not aborted due to weather.
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Re: 1962 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

viewtopic.php?p=2464814#p2464814

My earlier thoughts on what led to 1962 debacle.
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Re: 1962 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by wig »

https://www.news18.com/news/opinion/120 ... 97170.html

120 Indian Soldiers Fought Off 5000 Chinese in 1962 at Rezang La—and None Believed It

please do go through the full article
excerpts
In the first week of February 1963, a Ladakhi shepherd happened to visit Rezang La. The temperature was still fluctuating between minus 10 and minus 20 degrees Celsius and it was too early for the predators to start hunting for food. The entire moonscape of Rezang La was as white and as frigid as it was on the morning of the battle on 18 November 1962.
description of the battle scene
One of the members of this search party was Capt. Kishori Lal. In an essay published in The Gods of Valour, he records his first impressions on arrival at Rezang La as follows: ‘We reached Rezang La on 10 February 1963. There we saw the brave sons of mother Bharat sleeping in eternal sleep. We saw there was a heavy bombardment that the Chinese had done to wipe them out. There were deep pits all around. We picked up blind bombs and weighed them. Most of them were over 80 pounds. Each body of our valiant soldiers there had over thirty–thirty-five bullet wounds. As many as forty seven bullets had sunk into Jemadar (Naib Subedar) Hari Ram’s body. On one bunker shield, we counted 759 bullet holes.’

The following excerpt from the official account of the Kumaon Regiment of the Indian Army provides more details: ‘No bunker in Rezang La was found intact, corrugated iron sheets were found in bits, the ballies (wooden poles/logs used for making temporary shelters) had been reduced to matchwood sticks, and the sandbags were just shreds. But there was no sign of panic or withdrawal. Every single jawan was found dead in his trench; each had several bullets or splinter wounds, still holding their weapons; broken light machine guns/rifles bore witness to the intensity of the enemy fire. Jemadar (Naib Subedar) Hari Ram was found with a bandage on his head. He had apparently tied it in a hurry while rushing from one of his sections to another and was killed there: the body, when received, was still in crouching position.’
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Re: 1962 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by Rakesh »

#PoliceCommemorationDay

https://twitter.com/LestWeForgetIN/stat ... 93985?s=20 ---> The ten gallant Indian Braves of the CRPF who made the supreme sacrifice defending India against a Chinese attack at Hot Springs, Aksai Chin, Ladakh, on this day - 21 October in 1959.

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Re: 1962 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by Rakesh »

Twitter thread on the Battle of Rezang La. Please click on link below.

https://twitter.com/Maverickmusafir/sta ... 13890?s=20 ---> In the picture, soldiers of 13 Kumaon days before the Battle of Rezang La, a rare example in the annals of world military history, when the Chinese attacked in total seven waves and death was writ all over, the men fought till the last bullet and the last man
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Re: 1962 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by disha »

Today is Karthik Poornima and in some sampradayas is celebrated as Dev Diwali. Or the "Lords Diwali". This is basically the slaying of Tripasuras by Lord Shiva.

On this day

The heroes of Rezang La defeated the Cheeni Asuras (and Pisachas) today, celebrating their own Diwali, and became Devas. Imagine ~20 year old kids who did not see their first aircraft or snow and barely out of training (or taken out of training) and pressed into a fight without any acclimatization gave such a bloody nose to the Cheeni Pisachas that they had to break off the further engagement and call a ceasefire.

Here is a fitting tribute by Hon RM Rajnath Singh'ji



This episode of interview of two veterans from Rezang La by Maj. Gaurav Arya needs to be seen.



The sheer chicanery & cowardice of the babu generals of 1962 needs to be seen and heard to be believed. One of the veterans is de-briefed in Delhi in presence of an American. What is the American doing there? The veteran is threatened with court-martial when his account is not believed! What were the babu generals hiding?

Only a chance discovery by a shepherd brings the valor of the Rezang La company to the fore. It appears that even the Gods could not comprehend such sheer bravery and decided to preserve their bravery for generations to come.

A bunch of ill-equipped shivering Ahir kids who are not considered to be of the "martial" class led by a Rajput who claims that he is also an Ahir and becomes one of them and leads them to a glory which only a few can dream off was so unbelievable that the initial accounts were ignored and their family was shunned as if they were desserters and cowards.

See at ~55 sec here:

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Re: 1962 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by disha »

The number of Cheeni causality quoted is ~1300+ Cheenis only admitted to ~500 in 1962. Given that they do not admit their own dead, I would think the Cheeni causalities will be around ~2k. Almost 2/3rd of their total deaths in 1962. The advantage gained by the Rezang La company was not pressed forward by the babu (or baby) generals. Still, think about it, 59 years hence the Cheenis are at a disadvantage in Ladakh. All due to Rezang La Company.

When the Cheenis declared ceasefire, the great Lehru learned it two days later from the newspapers.
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Re: 1962 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by niran »

disha wrote:The number of Cheeni causality quoted is ~1300+ Cheenis only admitted to ~500 in 1962. Given that they do not admit their own dead, I would think the Cheeni causalities will be around ~2k. Almost 2/3rd of their total deaths in 1962. The advantage gained by the Rezang La company was not pressed forward by the babu (or baby) generals. Still, think about it, 59 years hence the Cheenis are at a disadvantage in Ladakh. All due to Rezang La Company.

When the Cheenis declared ceasefire, the great Lehru learned it two days later from the newspapers.
read a book written by a Siamese prince he was present in cheen according to him PLA lost some 3 lacs during march to base deployment
later on that book and its trace vanished alond with all online PLA casauality data, since Galwan they stopped publishing soldiers feuneral advt. it is cheena tradition to keep dead body for long a king or similarly rich and powerful for an year with daily publishing of what happened through the day 3 monyhs after Galwan all data such publishing on soldiers just vanished
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Re: 1962 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by TKiran »

The story of The Mahaveer Chakra Rifleman Jaswant Singh Rawat (who was able to inflict 300 casualties on PLA single handedly fighting 72 hours) (between 28:00 min and 33:00 min)

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Re: 1962 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by Rakesh »

Don't have a dedicated thread for the 1967 Indo-China clash, so posting this here.

https://twitter.com/Victorforce2/status ... 78464?s=20 ---> Colorized photos, during the Nathu La and Cho La clashes, sometimes referred as Sino-Indian War of 1967.

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Re: 1962 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by Rakesh »

Definition of stupidity...

https://twitter.com/IndiaHistorypic/sta ... 84641?s=20 ---> 1963: Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit Said India Supports UN Seat For Mao's China Despite Attack On India.

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Re: 1962 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by chetak »

Rakesh wrote:Definition of stupidity...

https://twitter.com/IndiaHistorypic/sta ... 84641?s=20 ---> 1963: Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit Said India Supports UN Seat For Mao's China Despite Attack On India.
Stockholm syndrome and the scared "freedom fighter's" family.

today they seem to have progressed to signing MOUs.
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Re: 1962 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by Rakesh »

https://twitter.com/mananbhattnavy/stat ... BCXYTOU1Vw ---> A proclamation that will hunt us forever.

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Re: 1962 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

Link: https://www.indianmilitaryhistory.org/i ... u1962.html
India 7th Infantry Brigade at the Battle of the Namkachu 1962
v.1.1 March 31, 2002

We acknowledge with thanks “Famous Battles” from http://www.bharat-rakshak.com

This battle extended in phases over 31 days and ended with the sacrifice of 7 Infantry Brigade for no purpose.

Before the battle, Lt. General B.M. Kaul, GOC IV Corps, when repeatedly requested by his subordinate commanders for artillery for the brigade, made one of the most fatuous utterances in the long and illustrious history of the Indian Army: "Determined infantry do not need artillery," said the General.

Indian Army officers are taught how not to do things using the example of the Battle of the Namakachu. In fairness, every senior officer from the original corps commander on down tried unsuccessfully to impress on the Army and Army HQ commanders the reality of the situation. This battle was fought in an era when every man in a combat battalion understood he was not free to withdraw without orders; 7th Brigade stood by this code and paid the price for the stupidity of the Army's senior most commanders.

The problem began in Delhi, when the Government decided the Chinese had to be thrown out of their positions at Thagla Ridge, on the north bank of the Namkachu – “chu” is Tibetan for stream or river, “la” means mountain pass. For reasons beyond the scope of this brief narrative, the higher military leadership had been so beaten down and cowed by the Government, that the senior officers who should have set the terms and the timetable for this offensive remained silent. They let Lt.-General B.M. Kaul, then Chief of the General Staff (a position that was later abolished in the Indian Army) dictate military events.

General Kaul has been justly vilified in Indian history, but he was neither the coward nor the buffoon he has been made out to be. He was brilliant, articulate, energetic, and efficient, and in the events leading to the China War and during it, he missed no chance to take risks to his personal safety. He made a mistake fatal to his career and his reputation when, as a newly commissioned graduate of Sandhurst, he went to the Army Service Corps instead of to a fighting arm. He realized the error, and tried to get back to a combat formation, but was never able to do so. Instead, he used his charm and kinship with Prime Minister Nehru to advance to his high and prized position.

Where other generals were prone to point out the difficulties in throwing the Chinese out given the logistical realities and the years of neglect that had reduced the Army to a hollow shell, General Kaul promised the Prime Minister and Defense Minister he would do the job. With the Prime Minister’s backing, he proceeded to browbeat anyone who tried to explain the ground situation. In later years, when proper histories of the period are written – 40 years later even the official history has not been published – General P.N. Thapar, Chief of the Army Staff, and Lt.-General L.P. Sen, GOC-in-C Eastern Command, will come in for the heaviest criticism of all because of their failure to control General Kaul.

Before we judge these men, we need to understand that in the Indian Army of the day, to oppose General Kaul was to risk the worst consequences: the end of one’s career, an investigation by the Government and civilian intelligence, even petty harassment such as one’s pension withheld. Nonetheless, the dilemma Generals Thapar and Sen faced was no different from those faced by military leaders in every war: to do one’s duty to one’s men by protesting and risking dismissal, or to do one’s duty and carry out suicidal orders. In recent history, this dilemma was faced on the largest possible scale by Hitler’s generals.

Yet, India in 1962 was no Germany in 1942. It was a strong, functioning democracy with a free, vibrant press. Had the generals handed in their resignations, the madness that General Kaul unleashed would have been brought to a stop. In the event, it was not, and 7th Infantry Brigade paid the price with its blood.

We will not retell the painful logistical details of Operation Leghorn because these are too well known. Instead, we will note that 7th Brigade needed almost 600 tons of supplies to mount its ordered offensive; it probably had less than 20% that. It had two light howitzers with 260 rounds for artillery – the Indian guns were outranged by Chinese mortars. Its defensive positions on the Namkachu and the paths used for movement were completely exposed to Chinese observation and fire. Heavy weapons were conspicuous by their absence. Men went into battle straight from the plains, pushed so hard across the unaccustomed high mountain terrain that many died of altitude sickness before they reached the front line. They wore their cotton uniforms with a thin sweater, and they had a single blanket for the freezing nights. Often even that one blanket had to be shared. Once facing the Chinese, often they fought with 60 rounds for their bolt-action rifles; most often, there was no resupply available at their forward positions. Battalion mortars had no ammunition. "Hard rations" was a euphemism for no tea, sugar, or salt, indeed, for such limited quantities of any food that the already weakened men weakened more. Air drops went awry, less than 1 in 3 reached the men when dropped by the C-119 Packet, which could not slow sufficiently to make accurate drops. To save money, the Indian Army had been recovering and repacking supply parachutes, many were so worn they broke. After a load was successfully dropped, the men had to haul it over distances of several kilometers and elevations of thousands of vertical feet.

General Kaul was personally present for the planned start of the operation. When the Chinese instead attacked, and he saw for himself, for the first time, what he had sent his men into, he had three reactions. (a) He was evacuated sick. There is ample evidence he was not as sick as he said; nonetheless, a 50-year old man had no business to be at that altitude. (b) He sent a message to the Government that India was faced with overwhelming Chinese strength and only intervention by the Americans and British could save the day. (c) After fussily instructing the brigade commander to move a platoon here and a platoon there, he uttered another of the India Army’s Famous Last Words when he told the brigade commander before leaving: “Its your battle now”.

That the Indian infantry stood and fought and died in the conditions and circumstances of the Battle of Namkachu had nothing to do with its senior officers, and everything to do with its company and battalion officers and its traditions of honor – honor to your brother soldier, to your unit, to your officers, and to your flag.

It was not just the men of 7th Brigade who died on the Namkachu. It was the unspoken compact between the fighting men and their generals: look after us the best you can, our lives are yours in return. And yet, the tragedy need not have been. In the west, in Ladakh, the generals while operating under the same messed up instructions from Delhi, went about their job quietly and competently. Perhaps 10% of the losses in 1962 were in the west; but for the probable failure of withdrawal orders to reach C/13th Kumaon at Rezang La, the percentage would have been even less. How many people outside the Indian Army remember the names of Brig.T.N. Raina and Lt.-General Daulet Singh? Very few. The converse is true with Lt.-General Kaul. It is indeed an oddity of fate that the men who did their job well have passed into anonymity. Instead, we remember the names of those who failed us.

A last word. When we read vivid history, each of us comes away with an indelible impression stamped on their mind. For most, the defining picture might be the scene repeated over and over again at the Battle of the Namkachu: men refusing to retreat and being cut down when their ammunition gave out. For this writer it is another image. When General Kaul reached 7th Brigade at Tawang, he wanted to inspect the front lines himself. Because of the altitude, he was already exhausted. No pack animals were available. So a local porter helped create what must be a unique event in modern warfare. He cheerfully hefted the General Officer Commanding, Indian IV Corps and temporarily-on-leave Chief of the General Staff on his back, and hauled him off to the front like a sack of flour. One wonders what the soldiers, carrying their own heavy loads, thought of this sight and of their general as he went by.

Higher Command

HQ Eastern Command [Lt.-Gen. L.P. Sen] located at Lucknow, moving to Calcutta :roll:

HQ IV Corps [Lt.-Gen.B.M. Kaul] at Tezpur

HQ 4 Division [Maj.-Gen. Nirinjan Prasad] at Bombdila :roll:



7th Infantry Brigade [Brigadier John Dalvi – POW, tactical commander for the battle]

- 1/9th Gorkhas [Lt. Col. B.S. Alhuwalia]

- 2nd Rajputs [Lt. Col. Maha Singh Rikh] Lost 282 KIA, 81 WIA, 90 POW in a single day. 60 escaped.

- 4th Grenadiers [Lt. Col. K.S. Harihar Singh]

- 9th Punjab [Lt. Col. R.N. Mishra]

- One company, 6th Mahar Machine Gun Regiment

- One troop, 17 Parachute Field Regiment (4 guns, only 2 operational, 260 rounds, no sights or FOO)

- 34 Heavy Mortar Troop (Minus one platoon; No ammunition)

- 100 Field Company (Engineers)

- One platoon, Assam Rifles

- 450 civilian road construction crew, Border Roads Organization, used as porters

Chinese forces directly attacking 7th Brigade included 11th Division [Tsona Dzong]. A second division and a separate or independent regiment joined 11th Division in the subsequent fight against 4th Division.



Notes:

A. 1 Sikhs rotated out of the brigade before the battle. This battalion participated in heavy fighting at another part of the front, losing 134 killed including its commanding officer, but winning one of the three Param Vir Chakras awarded for the 1962 operations.

B. The area originally came under XXXIII Corps (Lt.-Gen. Umrao Singh). Because, however, GOC XXXIII Corps repeatedly protested the unprofessional arrangements underway to evict the Chinese from their positions, the corps area of responsibility was divided. XXXIII Corps was confined to Sikkim/Western Bhutan; a new IV Corps was raised for NEFA/Eastern Bhutan at Tezpur and put under Lt.-Gen. B.M. Kaul, who as a distant relative, friend, and confidante of the Prime Minister was considered both by the Prime Minister and Army HQ to more supportive of the political and military plans. Lt.-Gen. Kaul was evacuated sick before the battle.

C. Both IV and XXXIII Corps originally fought under the legendary Field Marshall William Slim's 14th Army during World War II. 4 Infantry Division was the famous "Red Eagle" Division from 8th Army. Along with 8th Division it was considered among the best of any British or Dominion divisions.

D. Please note that "Gorkha" is the correct spelling for Indian regiments; "Gurkha" is the British spelling. After Independence the regiments remaining with India - 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, and 9 had the spelling changed to Gorkha; the regiments that went to the British Army - 2, 5, 6, 7, and 10 retained the spelling Gurkha. 11 Gorkhas is an Indian raised regiment with no ties to the old British-Indian Army.
Cain Marko
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Re: 1962 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by Cain Marko »

Not sure this has been discussed...
Why India didn't use the air force in 62 (supposedly)

The Print: 'Great mistake' or not? Why India decided against deploying Air Force in 1962 war with China
https://theprint.in/defence/great-mista ... a/1174578/
21 Oct 2022
Aditya_V
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Re: 1962 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by Aditya_V »

Cain Marko wrote:Not sure this has been discussed...
Why India didn't use the air force in 62 (supposedly)

The Print: 'Great mistake' or not? Why India decided against deploying Air Force in 1962 war with China
https://theprint.in/defence/great-mista ... a/1174578/
21 Oct 2022
If you go by this article, the Prime Minister in 1962 went with US and British advice and ignored Indian advice.

A common malice with Indian leftists.
Rakesh
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Re: 1962 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by Rakesh »

Why senior leaders fail field commanders and impose decisions devoid of ground reality
https://www.firstpost.com/opinion-news- ... 65601.html
03 Nov 2022
An ostrich-like approach – led by the political class - would set into the culture of decision-making in the Indian Army in the 1950s and early 1960s.
ramana
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Re: 1962 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

Rakesh
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Re: 1962 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by Rakesh »

https://twitter.com/BahadurManmohan/sta ... OsJMuXbMoQ ---> The National War Memorial was inaugurated with so much media hype & sloganeering!

BUT NEITHER THE GOVERNMENT NOR THE SERVICES PLACED EVEN A WREATH TO HONOUR THE DEAD of the 1962 War.

SHAMEFUL. All crocodile tears. No soul left.

Thanks @ajaynewsman for penning this. Jai Jawan!

Image
ramana
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Re: 1962 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

It will be done.
Don't worry. All these exfaarts never had the guts to speakup earlier!!!
and Tribune is from Chandigarh the dalal GHQ of India
ramana
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Re: 1962 Indo-China War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

BTW Ravi Rikhye wrote for me about the two battles of Walong and Rezang La.
I posted his write-up of the Namka Chu action above.
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