Armoured Vehicles: News & Discussion
Re: Armoured Vehicles: News & Discussion
https://twitter.com/alpha_defense/statu ... U0pl5D1M9Q ---> Bharat Electronics Limited has submitted their bid for "Development and Supply of Remote Controlled Weapon Station (RCWS)" for CVRDE's Light Tank Project. Representative Picture: BEL RCWS.
Re: Armoured Vehicles: News & Discussion
It seems that CVRDE is working on a 130mm main tank gun.
Re: Armoured Vehicles: News & Discussion
Not really. This third rate plagiarizing channel just copies other people's news and scoops and doesn't even bother to put a real human voice against it, nor do they ever credit the source. Like a youtube version of IDRW really.Pratyush wrote:It seems that CVRDE is working on a 130 MM main tank gun.
So one of the better channels/teams pranked them by putting out a tweet, that they promptly plagiarized and made into a video
https://twitter.com/alpha_defense/statu ... 9778136064
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9b2rvjSfgrQ
Re: Armoured Vehicles: News & Discussion
At this point let’s please stop using tweets and YouTube videos from armchair defense enthusiasts as credible sources for anything.
Re: Armoured Vehicles: News & Discussion
Agreed.
Has any one found what is the armored corps doctrine of Indian Army?
What are the roles and responsibilities of the tanks in the Indian Army?
In offensive and defensive battles?
We saw classic Offensive battles by Ist Armoured in Philora and Chawinda and in Basantar.
We saw classic defensive battle in Assal Uttar.
We're these per doctrine or flash in the pan?
What role did the PT 76 amphibians play in 1971 war?
What about AMX-13 in 1965.
I know M-3 Stuart tanks did play role in 1948 at Zoji La and AMX-13 at Ladakh 1962.
Was a doctrine developed on their usage in Himalayas?
All we get are anecdotal essays long after the wars?
Has any one found what is the armored corps doctrine of Indian Army?
What are the roles and responsibilities of the tanks in the Indian Army?
In offensive and defensive battles?
We saw classic Offensive battles by Ist Armoured in Philora and Chawinda and in Basantar.
We saw classic defensive battle in Assal Uttar.
We're these per doctrine or flash in the pan?
What role did the PT 76 amphibians play in 1971 war?
What about AMX-13 in 1965.
I know M-3 Stuart tanks did play role in 1948 at Zoji La and AMX-13 at Ladakh 1962.
Was a doctrine developed on their usage in Himalayas?
All we get are anecdotal essays long after the wars?
Re: Armoured Vehicles: News & Discussion
https://www.orfonline.org/research/ligh ... -army/?amp
Ignore the title.
Ignore the title.
To be sure, experience with light tanks is not new for the IA. For example, the IA used Sherman and Stuart light tanks against the Pakistan army in the 1947-1948 war at the Zojila Pass, which enabled the capture of Kargil.[1] As General Kodendera Subbayya Thimmaya observed about tanks: “I had only a few weeks before…the onset of winter and heavy snow. The plan of opening Zoji La had, therefore, favoured a blitzkrieg. The Germans did it in Europe, in better terrain, I needed to attempt it here.”[2] Zoji La was, and continues to be an inhospitable environment for the use of tanks, more than the terrain in Ladakh through which the Line of Actual Control (LAC) runs especially the Depsang Plains. There is not a single recorded case specifically during the Second World War of armour being used at the altitudes found in Zoji La. It is here that tanks were deployed and proved operationally effective on the snowy mountainous heights. Although extremely daunting and verging on the impossible given the steep gradients and the narrow paths on which tanks had to move at Zoji La, it was an inspired move reflecting great tactical and operational acumen. The rarefied air with temperatures dipping below -45 degree Celsius in Zoji La is also comparable to what exists in Ladakh. As a senior officer of the IA noted in 2016 in Ladakh: "The vast flat valleys along the mountain ranges allow for armoured movement; besides, there has been an increase in the force levels across the border as well."[3]
The 1962 Sino-Indian boundary war was another instance when French-built AMX light tanks were employed with great effectiveness against Chinese forces in Ladakh, especially in Chusul, that prevented the Chinese advance to Leh.[4] It is precisely this terrain’s role in enabling armoured operations that should serve as the rationale for acquiring light tanks.
Re: Armoured Vehicles: News & Discussion
Ramanaji Cold Start and now the formation of IBG should give you a clue to our doctrine.ramana wrote:Agreed.
Has any one found what is the armored corps doctrine of Indian Army?
What are the roles and responsibilities of the tanks in the Indian Army?
In offensive and defensive battles?
We saw classic Offensive battles by Ist Armoured in Philora and Chawinda and in Basantar.
We saw classic defensive battle in Assal Uttar.
We're these per doctrine or flash in the pan?
What role did the PT 76 amphibians play in 1971 war?
What about AMX-13 in 1965.
I know M-3 Stuart tanks did play role in 1948 at Zoji La and AMX-13 at Ladakh 1962.
Was a doctrine developed on their usage in Himalayas?
All we get are anecdotal essays long after the wars?
Please watch = https://www.bing.com/videos/search?view ... 7&q=Indian Army Special Forces&shtp=GetUrl&shid=c180fae3-a74a-455d-8325-2bfd22de5937&shtk=U3BlY2lhbCBSZXBvcnQgKEFnZW5kYSAyMDE0KSAtIEluZGlhJ3MgTWlsaXRhcnkgRG9jdHJpbmU%3D&shdk=VGhpcyBzcGVjaWFsIHJlcG9ydCBvbiBJbmRpYSdzIE1pbGl0YXJ5IERvY3RyaW5lIGdpdmVzIHlvdSBhbiBleGNsdXNpdmUgaW5zaWdodCBpbnRvIHRoZSBkYXlzIGZvbGxvd2luZyB0aGUgYXR0YWNrIG9uIFBhcmxpYW1lbnQgSG91c2UgYnkgdGVycm9yaXN0cyB3aXRoIFBha2lzdGFuaSBsaW5rcyBhbmQgdGhlIHRpbWUgd2hlbiBJbmRpYSBjYW1lIGNsb3NlIHRvIGxhdW5jaGluZyBhbiBvcGVyYXRpb24gYWdhaW5zdCBQYWtpc3Rhbi4gQWxzbyBkaXNjdXNzZWQgaXMgdGhlIHVyZ2VudCBuZWVkIGZvciBhIHRyaS1mb3JjZXMgY29tbWFuZCBhbmQgb3RoZXIgbWF0dGVycy4gQW5jaG9yOiBWaW5lZXQgRGlrc2hpdA%3D%3D&shhk=c%2FsSV70IS6GUziBNwsMjBaUsSxYKSM234Kxpvh1Yccc%3D&form=VDSHOT&shth=OVP.bP2QT1tU-K02V_pYFS8jDwEsCo
Armd Corps doctrine is tied to the overall offensive defence approach we have had. In that sense it does not have and independent doctrine. Rather the Indian Army has plans on how Armd Corps / Mech will be employed in any given sector which are part of the plans spanning many scenarios.
Any doctrine has to be adaptable to the fog of war and the first contact with the enemy. That being the case all subsequent actions in a campaign could be considered reactive yes?
Re: Armoured Vehicles: News & Discussion
BEL to supply of 957 commander sights for T-90 Battle Tanks.
Providing a further boost to the ‘Make in India’ initiative of the government in the Defence Sector, the acquisition wing of the Ministry of Defence has on Thursday has signed a contract for Rs 1,075 crore with Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) for the retro-modification of commander sight of Battle Tanks-T-90. The retro-modification will be carried out in 957 T-90 tanks of the Indian Army.
Commander sight of Battle Tank T-90, India’s premier battle tank, is presently fitted with an image converter (I/c) tube-based sight for night viewing. Based on the requirement projected by the Indian Army, DRDO and BEL have jointly designed and developed an advanced Mid Wave Thermal Image (MWIR) based sight as a replacement for the existing IC-based sight.
The new retro-modified commander sight employs a thermal imager capable of detecting the targets at 8 kms during day and night and a Laser Ranger Finder (LRF) to find the ranges accurately up to 5 Kms, thereby enhancing its capability to engage target at longer ranges. With the corrections from ballistic software and LRF, the commander of T-90 can detect, engage and neutralize the targets with phenomenal accuracy. The indigenously developed sight completed extensive evaluations under field conditions successfully.
The successful indigenous development of thermal imager based commander sight will provide further fillip to indigenous R&D and defence manufacturing.
Providing a further boost to the ‘Make in India’ initiative of the government in the Defence Sector, the acquisition wing of the Ministry of Defence has on Thursday has signed a contract for Rs 1,075 crore with Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) for the retro-modification of commander sight of Battle Tanks-T-90. The retro-modification will be carried out in 957 T-90 tanks of the Indian Army.
Commander sight of Battle Tank T-90, India’s premier battle tank, is presently fitted with an image converter (I/c) tube-based sight for night viewing. Based on the requirement projected by the Indian Army, DRDO and BEL have jointly designed and developed an advanced Mid Wave Thermal Image (MWIR) based sight as a replacement for the existing IC-based sight.
The new retro-modified commander sight employs a thermal imager capable of detecting the targets at 8 kms during day and night and a Laser Ranger Finder (LRF) to find the ranges accurately up to 5 Kms, thereby enhancing its capability to engage target at longer ranges. With the corrections from ballistic software and LRF, the commander of T-90 can detect, engage and neutralize the targets with phenomenal accuracy. The indigenously developed sight completed extensive evaluations under field conditions successfully.
The successful indigenous development of thermal imager based commander sight will provide further fillip to indigenous R&D and defence manufacturing.
Re: Armoured Vehicles: News & Discussion
The same sight when fitted to the Arjun will make it an even more frightening opponent.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles: News & Discussion
ks_sachin: Cold Start was a Pakistan specific doctrine. Actually shows how Paki-centric our thinking has been. We need to have one vis-a-vis China too. Example: will we ingress and occupy territory like we did with Kailash range? Is Aksai Chin part of the equation? etc
I don't believe an offensive doctrine exists vs China, though tactical actions like Kailash range occupation can give the basic skeleton over which one can be built.
I don't believe an offensive doctrine exists vs China, though tactical actions like Kailash range occupation can give the basic skeleton over which one can be built.
Re: Armoured Vehicles: News & Discussion
Tibet and SCS/Malaccas should be part of the equation too! This is where the light tanks and a strong navy come in. We can't keep playing on the back-foot vis-a-vis China.Prem Kumar wrote:ks_sachin: Cold Start was a Pakistan specific doctrine. Actually shows how Paki-centric our thinking has been. We need to have one vis-a-vis China too. Example: will we ingress and occupy territory like we did with Kailash range? Is Aksai Chin part of the equation? etc
I don't believe an offensive doctrine exists vs China, though tactical actions like Kailash range occupation can give the basic skeleton over which one can be built.
Any response to chinese aggression should include a credible threat of large-scale retaliatory incursions through the Karakoram pass, Demchok, Chushul or elsewhere in other sectors into Tibet or Xinjiang. Even if we don't actually do that, the capability to do so acts as a deterrent in its own way.
So far, we've tended to be too limited in our responses, but there seems to be some limited robustness and nimbleness that this government has shown in its military responses, whether it be the surgical strikes, the Balakot bombing, or with China, in using SFF and reacting in the Spanggur sector. We need to go much further in terms of combat capacity.
Re: Armoured Vehicles: News & Discussion
What makes you think there is no doctrine with regards to China. Work in pursuance of that doctrine has been done since the 1980s. The doctrine against China has been defensive and will continue to be.Prem Kumar wrote:ks_sachin: Cold Start was a Pakistan specific doctrine. Actually shows how Paki-centric our thinking has been. We need to have one vis-a-vis China too. Example: will we ingress and occupy territory like we did with Kailash range? Is Aksai Chin part of the equation? etc
I don't believe an offensive doctrine exists vs China, though tactical actions like Kailash range occupation can give the basic skeleton over which one can be built.
Also my response was to Ramana’s question re Armd Corps so please don’t assume anything other than that from my response.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles: News & Discussion
I said we don't have an offensive doctrine against China (like Cold Start). Didn't say we don't have a doctrine.
A purely defensive one won't cut it against China, as we saw in Galwan. What brought them to the negotiation table was the occupation of the Kailash ridge. This needs to be formalized as a strategy and we should kit up accordingly.
Agree with k prasad's views.
A purely defensive one won't cut it against China, as we saw in Galwan. What brought them to the negotiation table was the occupation of the Kailash ridge. This needs to be formalized as a strategy and we should kit up accordingly.
Agree with k prasad's views.
Re: Armoured Vehicles: News & Discussion
You call it offensive. I call offensive defence. Capturing high ground in such a limited manner is not really offensive. This was a tactical op to bring pressure to bear. These kind of plans have existed or else how did we know so quickly what we wanted to occupy.Prem Kumar wrote:I said we don't have an offensive doctrine against China (like Cold Start). Didn't say we don't have a doctrine.
A purely defensive one won't cut it against China, as we saw in Galwan. What brought them to the negotiation table was the occupation of the Kailash ridge. This needs to be formalized as a strategy and we should kit up accordingly.
Agree with k prasad's views.
A Doctrine is not a binary offensive or defensive but a combination of the two in pursuance of the objectives set by the executive. Doctrines exist but till now what has not existed is a govt that has the balls to allow the forces to execute or prosecute an engagement effectively.
Re: Armoured Vehicles: News & Discussion
Agree on the nomenclature you use, at least for the Kailash range operation. However, I would argue that we need to show the capability, capacity, and the will to engage in truly offensive operations rather than even the more limited offensive defense operations. In their calculus, the Chinese might yet be okay with us gaining small ground in one sector if they can gain even more ground or more strategically precious territory. Unfortunately for us, due to the geography of the location, real estate on our side of the Ladakh border is more precious than for the Chinese. The only way we can truly threaten them is if we can put the G219 under threat, which requires incursions and holding of tens of kilometers of territory, while the Chinese only need to advance a couple of kilometers to put entire sectors of ours at risk, like they tried in Galwan.ks_sachin wrote:You call it offensive. I call offensive defence. Capturing high ground in such a limited manner is not really offensive. This was a tactical op to bring pressure to bear. These kind of plans have existed or else how did we know so quickly what we wanted to occupy.Prem Kumar wrote:I said we don't have an offensive doctrine against China (like Cold Start). Didn't say we don't have a doctrine.
A purely defensive one won't cut it against China, as we saw in Galwan. What brought them to the negotiation table was the occupation of the Kailash ridge. This needs to be formalized as a strategy and we should kit up accordingly.
Agree with k prasad's views.
A Doctrine is not a binary offensive or defensive but a combination of the two in pursuance of the objectives set by the executive. Doctrines exist but till now what has not existed is a govt that has the balls to allow the forces to execute or prosecute an engagement effectively.
We need to show the capacity and appetite for much larger and painful operations if we can have enough wiggle room to operate at parity with the chinese on the escalation ladder. We cannot allow the top rung of our escalation ladder to be a relatively limited operation. We cannot also have large gaps in this ladder - for example, we should not be in a situation where our next play after limited incursions and holding operations is a sector-wide division-level assault with aerial support. We need more flexibility in between. Otherwise the PLA will be happy to go one or two steps above us in their ladder, knowing that our only play might be too risky for us to attempt.
Re: Armoured Vehicles: News & Discussion
Agree 100%.
Problem is that our political class has never set the direction and over the years the army leadership has become so used to the political establishment making the armed forces operate with one hand tied behind their back. Modi sarkar has been the first time that a gov has signalled intent and matched that intent with clear direction to the forces to prosecute a course of action.
All that nonsense in GAlwan was because the Govt was prepared to let our men go out and meet the Chinese with clubs and sticks!!!! I bet you those rules of engagement were proposed by the Chinese and we agreed as we tend to.
Our doctrine in the Ladakh AoR has always been defensive. I know this because dad and our battalion has served in the area extensively. Interdicting G219 would be part of the strategy but the fundamental point is that the resourcing for that kind of activity then has to happen accordingly. Because we have a defensive mindset and that has been beaten into the senior leadership the tasking and ToE in the AoR for the relevant formations is kinda defensive in nature.
The mountain strike corps is a sign that this started to change but then you can see how much the army has struggled to raise these.
Also, the intense focus on CI Ops has taken given an edge to our troops but detracted from training and preparedness on our doctrines.
Problem is that our political class has never set the direction and over the years the army leadership has become so used to the political establishment making the armed forces operate with one hand tied behind their back. Modi sarkar has been the first time that a gov has signalled intent and matched that intent with clear direction to the forces to prosecute a course of action.
All that nonsense in GAlwan was because the Govt was prepared to let our men go out and meet the Chinese with clubs and sticks!!!! I bet you those rules of engagement were proposed by the Chinese and we agreed as we tend to.
Our doctrine in the Ladakh AoR has always been defensive. I know this because dad and our battalion has served in the area extensively. Interdicting G219 would be part of the strategy but the fundamental point is that the resourcing for that kind of activity then has to happen accordingly. Because we have a defensive mindset and that has been beaten into the senior leadership the tasking and ToE in the AoR for the relevant formations is kinda defensive in nature.
The mountain strike corps is a sign that this started to change but then you can see how much the army has struggled to raise these.
Also, the intense focus on CI Ops has taken given an edge to our troops but detracted from training and preparedness on our doctrines.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles: News & Discussion
https://swarajyamag.com/news-brief/agil ... ed-project
Make-I project to develop Light Tanks approved. 350 tanks to be procured, as per the original RFI. Finally!
Last para of the article talks about the Battle of Chushul and how our tanks played a big part in it. Given our own experience, its a shame that we did nothing with this knowledge and the idea to design such a tank comes so late in the day - after we see the Chinese do the same.
Seems like there is no accountability for this kind of flat-footedness
Make-I project to develop Light Tanks approved. 350 tanks to be procured, as per the original RFI. Finally!
Last para of the article talks about the Battle of Chushul and how our tanks played a big part in it. Given our own experience, its a shame that we did nothing with this knowledge and the idea to design such a tank comes so late in the day - after we see the Chinese do the same.
Seems like there is no accountability for this kind of flat-footedness
Re: Armoured Vehicles: News & Discussion
Don’t ban me but I would name this Tank ‘Abhimanyu’
Re: Armoured Vehicles: News & Discussion
When our politics are reactive and meek the doctrine / strategy and tactics are meek and defensive and everything results from that.Prem Kumar wrote:https://swarajyamag.com/news-brief/agil ... ed-project
Make-I project to develop Light Tanks approved. 350 tanks to be procured, as per the original RFI. Finally!
Last para of the article talks about the Battle of Chushul and how our tanks played a big part in it. Given our own experience, its a shame that we did nothing with this knowledge and the idea to design such a tank comes so late in the day - after we see the Chinese do the same.
Seems like there is no accountability for this kind of flat-footedness
Now gov has supported more offensive posture and forces r waking up. 50 years to a defensive mindset and 30 odd years of pure CI creates a kind of inertia.
Re: Armoured Vehicles: News & Discussion
I am unable to understand the rationale for the light tank in Ladakh, given that we have already successfully deployed medium tanks there. Are they coming back south of Leh, now that armor has disengaged?Prem Kumar wrote:https://swarajyamag.com/news-brief/agil ... ed-project
1. The problem of needing special lubricants and starting tanks twice a day will remain for the light tanks.
2. A lighter tank can achieve larger speeds, but at the cost of less protection. Given that the Demchok and Spanggur Gap are very narrow funnels, there is not much lateral room for tank movement to take advantage of the lighter tank's higher speed and mobility. On the other hand, better armor protection would have helped to run the gauntlet, especially in the Demchok region.
Given that the IA knows what it's doing, I can only imagine that these light tanks will be useful in the Depsang area, particularly for induction along the proposed Saser La route which might prove difficult for the heavier tanks given the gradients, or by air to DBO. In addition, it might be easier to have them travel along the DSDBO road towards Chushul for maintenance etc., given the weight limitations on the bridges along this route (a 70 ton MLC rating may not be sufficient for a 55 ton tank given the dynamic load during movement?). And in the Depsang valley, there is enough room to take advantage of it's higher speed and to minimize its vulnerability in protection. I also suppose that the logistic tail for a light tank (fuel supply, armd recovery vehicle weight, spares and maintenance) is lesser, which is important in such inaccessible terrain. Given the large distances to cover, maybe these tanks can keep up with the BMPs as part of the combined arms operation into Depsang.
Re: Armoured Vehicles: News & Discussion
The t 90 is easily supportable in wherever we need to take our light tank. The fuel consumption figure will not be substantially different if both the tanks have 1000 hp engine's.
The only real difference between 35 ton 1000 hp combat vehicle and a 1000 hp 47.5 ton combat vehicle is the power to weight ratio. With the lighter combat vehicle having poor protection parameters compared to the heavier combat vehicle.
Is that going to be the difference between life and death and victory and defeat?
The only real difference between 35 ton 1000 hp combat vehicle and a 1000 hp 47.5 ton combat vehicle is the power to weight ratio. With the lighter combat vehicle having poor protection parameters compared to the heavier combat vehicle.
Is that going to be the difference between life and death and victory and defeat?
Re: Armoured Vehicles: News & Discussion
Perhaps they have not been as easy to use as portrayed?Anoop wrote:
I am unable to understand the rationale for the light tank in Ladakh, given that we have already successfully deployed medium tanks there. Are they coming back south of Leh, now that armor has disengaged?
I have seen t72 on the Tibetan plateau. Not easy to manage
Plus I get the feeling that there is a shift in our strategy which could mean the employment of light tanks in areas we r not sure may support heavy tanks
Re: Armoured Vehicles: News & Discussion
Sachin,
If the thought process is that a c 17 can deploy 2 per flight and only one T 90. That does give a substantial advantage.
WRT, the T 72/90, in the sector. I wonder if upgrade to modern higher powered engine ( say 1200 hp) coupled with a modern automatic transmission will help. In terms of mobility and maintainability.
If the thought process is that a c 17 can deploy 2 per flight and only one T 90. That does give a substantial advantage.
WRT, the T 72/90, in the sector. I wonder if upgrade to modern higher powered engine ( say 1200 hp) coupled with a modern automatic transmission will help. In terms of mobility and maintainability.
Re: Armoured Vehicles: News & Discussion
Pratyush look at it from the prism of how we would like to prosecute an engagement. Hitherto we have been defensive? Does a lighter tank coupled allow us something more?Pratyush wrote:Sachin,
If the thought process is that a c 17 can deploy 2 per flight and only one T 90. That does give a substantial advantage.
WRT, the T 72/90, in the sector. I wonder if upgrade to modern higher powered engine ( say 1200 hp) coupled with a modern automatic transmission will help. In terms of mobility and maintainability.
Transport is not an issue as we have built sufficient no’s of the T series.
Re: Armoured Vehicles: News & Discussion
Lot of pictures on the web showing destroyed Russian and Ukrainian tanks with ERA bricks intact. What kind of munitions/attacks are making this possible? Do we need to question the efficacy of Russian ERA tech?
Re: Armoured Vehicles: News & Discussion
ERA, when penetrated will leave most of surrounding bricks intact. The molten jet of the shaped charge warhead will cook off internal ready to use ammunition supply along with stored ammunition.
This is a well known issue with Russian tanks. Due to lack of internal subdivision in ammunition stowage areas. Especially the T 72/90. The T90 MS is an effort to address this issue.
However, multiple western tanks such as Turkish operated Leopard 2 on Syrian border and US Army Abrams in Iraq have also suffered from such events. When utilised in sub conventional conflict. Inspite of have seperate spaces for ready to use and stored ammunition. But those tanks were not equipped with ERA during the encounter.
This is one of the reasons why active protection systems are becoming prominent on modern battlefields.
This is a well known issue with Russian tanks. Due to lack of internal subdivision in ammunition stowage areas. Especially the T 72/90. The T90 MS is an effort to address this issue.
However, multiple western tanks such as Turkish operated Leopard 2 on Syrian border and US Army Abrams in Iraq have also suffered from such events. When utilised in sub conventional conflict. Inspite of have seperate spaces for ready to use and stored ammunition. But those tanks were not equipped with ERA during the encounter.
This is one of the reasons why active protection systems are becoming prominent on modern battlefields.
Re: Armoured Vehicles: News & Discussion
^ But doesn’t it seem like Leopard, Merkava and M1As seem to be able to withstand multiple rpg or ATGM hits where as T-72/80/85/90 seem to get taken out in 1 hit ?
Re: Armoured Vehicles: News & Discussion
Yup. These things are coming across as 'Tin Cans' in the literal sense and we have thousands of them.John wrote:^ But doesn’t it seem like Leopard, Merkava and M1As seem to be able to withstand multiple rpg or ATGM hits where as T-72/80/85/90 seem to get taken out in 1 hit ?
Last edited by Jay on 06 Mar 2022 10:04, edited 1 time in total.
Re: Armoured Vehicles: News & Discussion
Seems like the Russians are outnumbered and out-equipped in most of the engagements I’ve seen. They don’t match the media narrative of mass Russian armored forces rolling over heroic, outnumbered Ukrainian defenders.
I think one of the great lies of this war is how they’ve managed to make everyone think the Ukrainians are outnumbered or ill equipped. Quite the opposite: they’ve actually enjoyed a significant numerical advantage from the very start, and that numerical advantage is only growing with each day. Nor are the Ukrainians poorly equipped compared to the Russians. The Ukrainians have a distinct edge in their comms, night vision and thermal sights, GPS, drones, anti-tank missiles, man portable SAM’s, and logistics in general. Not to mention they enjoy satellite intel from the US, JSTARS info on all Russian ground movements from nearby JSTARS aircraft, constant AWACS monitoring of all airspace in theater, and all sorts of other force multipliers the Russians lack.
So the Ukrainians have both the qualitative AND the quantitative advantage, as well as the home turf advantage, and still they’re barely holding on? The Russians are doing quite well, all things considered.
I think one of the great lies of this war is how they’ve managed to make everyone think the Ukrainians are outnumbered or ill equipped. Quite the opposite: they’ve actually enjoyed a significant numerical advantage from the very start, and that numerical advantage is only growing with each day. Nor are the Ukrainians poorly equipped compared to the Russians. The Ukrainians have a distinct edge in their comms, night vision and thermal sights, GPS, drones, anti-tank missiles, man portable SAM’s, and logistics in general. Not to mention they enjoy satellite intel from the US, JSTARS info on all Russian ground movements from nearby JSTARS aircraft, constant AWACS monitoring of all airspace in theater, and all sorts of other force multipliers the Russians lack.
So the Ukrainians have both the qualitative AND the quantitative advantage, as well as the home turf advantage, and still they’re barely holding on? The Russians are doing quite well, all things considered.
Re: Armoured Vehicles: News & Discussion
The execution of composite armour in the last generation of western MBT provides a substantial advantage. Not to mention extra 20 tons in armour coupled with seperate armoured spaces for ammunition, with excellent internal subdivision.John wrote:^ But doesn’t it seem like Leopard, Merkava and M1As seem to be able to withstand multiple rpg or ATGM hits where as T-72/80/85/90 seem to get taken out in 1 hit ?
The domestic Russian studies of the the performance of armour in the first Chechen war are consistent with what is happening to Russian tanks in Ukraine. The Russian efforts over the last nearly 25 years since then have ended up polishing the turd.
It's only with T 90 MS that the Russians have obtained a design which theoretically should not go up with a bang. But they have lacked the financial and industrial resources to execute the solution fleet wide.
The Armata is step in a completely different direction. But i am not sure that it level of roof armour is sufficient to protect against top attack munitions.
This is precisely why I am so dismayed with the Indian armour corps and it's love affair with Russian tanks.
Arjun represented an opportunity to change our orientation. But the Indian army missed the opportunity for over 30 years.
Re: Armoured Vehicles: News & Discussion
Kanan I have replied to you in Ukrainian conflict discussion thread
Re: Armoured Vehicles: News & Discussion
The tactical and strategic ineptitude of the Russians has been quite stark. Since the Georgian war the Russian army has spent a lot of money in reequipping and combined arms ops. But nothing visible!!!Y. Kanan wrote:Seems like the Russians are outnumbered and out-equipped in most of the engagements I’ve seen. They don’t match the media narrative of mass Russian armored forces rolling over heroic, outnumbered Ukrainian defenders.
I think one of the great lies of this war is how they’ve managed to make everyone think the Ukrainians are outnumbered or ill equipped. Quite the opposite: they’ve actually enjoyed a significant numerical advantage from the very start, and that numerical advantage is only growing with each day. Nor are the Ukrainians poorly equipped compared to the Russians. The Ukrainians have a distinct edge in their comms, night vision and thermal sights, GPS, drones, anti-tank missiles, man portable SAM’s, and logistics in general. Not to mention they enjoy satellite intel from the US, JSTARS info on all Russian ground movements from nearby JSTARS aircraft, constant AWACS monitoring of all airspace in theater, and all sorts of other force multipliers the Russians lack.
So the Ukrainians have both the qualitative AND the quantitative advantage, as well as the home turf advantage, and still they’re barely holding on? The Russians are doing quite well, all things considered.
The Ukrainians are outnumbered. They don’t have a quantative edge else they would have held ground better. After all if held ground effectively you would not like to let the enemy come to the gates of your cities! They don’t have an army big enough to cover the entire frontage and they are doing what is the best option. Use the intel and the kind of weapons being supplied and make life difficult for the Russians.
The Ukrainians are fighting the only way they can land punches.
Re: Armoured Vehicles: News & Discussion
gentle folks all of you have forgotten NE, Light tanks is for NE Burma terrain is noodle bowl like the low plain is soft ground thick forest with streams rivers every 3kms, notice integrated MLRS and Tube art with UAV unit, these are to defent any attack light tanks with APCs are for counter attacking and or chasing PLA into Xinxiang military zone on Thailand Cheen border.
Re: Armoured Vehicles: News & Discussion
WRT Arjun currently onree blitzkriez through Gujarat Rajshthan doctrine SOP developed, city war or canal infested Poonjab plains need different tactics translate into different SOP and training translate into 3 to 5 years process.
Re: Armoured Vehicles: News & Discussion
Good points it's shocking how poorly they have performed and our decision to continue to stick with it. Top armor seems critical to defect with how deadly Javelin is and Russian strap on contraception to defeat it have been a failure.Pratyush wrote: The execution of composite armour in the last generation of western MBT provides a substantial advantage. Not to mention extra 20 tons in armour coupled with seperate armoured spaces for ammunition, with excellent internal subdivision.
The domestic Russian studies of the the performance of armour in the first Chechen war are consistent with what is happening to Russian tanks in Ukraine. The Russian efforts over the last nearly 25 years since then have ended up polishing the turd.
It's only with T 90 MS that the Russians have obtained a design which theoretically should not go up with a bang. But they have lacked the financial and industrial resources to execute the solution fleet wide.
The Armata is step in a completely different direction. But i am not sure that it level of roof armour is sufficient to protect against top attack munitions.
This is precisely why I am so dismayed with the Indian armour corps and it's love affair with Russian tanks.
Arjun represented an opportunity to change our orientation. But the Indian army missed the opportunity for over 30 years.
Also this conflict once shows the importance of APS and how complelty useless Shtora is, atleast glad we didn’t buy that.
Re: Armoured Vehicles: News & Discussion
Oh good. we only have been sitting on our behind for 2 decades now, another 3 or 5 years would be nothing. We will bullshit about Weight of Arjun and how awesome T90's are while sipping Vodka and endlessly doing these Summer, Winter, Monsoon trials. Its absolutely depressing how incompetent out armor procurement, planning, and deployment is. God help us if there is a conflict and Pakis get a hand on these Javelins, NLAWS or similar armament.niran wrote:WRT Arjun currently onree blitzkriez through Gujarat Rajshthan doctrine SOP developed, city war or canal infested Poonjab plains need different tactics translate into different SOP and training translate into 3 to 5 years process.
Last edited by hnair on 07 Mar 2022 06:19, edited 1 time in total.
Reason: Warning issued for casual allegations of incompetence against Indian forces
Reason: Warning issued for casual allegations of incompetence against Indian forces
Re: Armoured Vehicles: News & Discussion
WE will have four regiments all together of Arjun when the Mk2 is delivered. Where all do you think they will be deployed and how will they be used in offensive / defensive ops?Jay wrote:Oh good. we only have been sitting on our behind for 2 decades now, another 3 or 5 years would be nothing. We will bullshit about Weight of Arjun and how awesome T90's are while sipping Vodka and endlessly doing these Summer, Winter, Monsoon trials. Its absolutely depressing how incompetent out armor procurement, planning, and deployment is. God help us if there is a conflict and Pakis get a hand on these Javelins, NLAWS or similar armament.niran wrote:WRT Arjun currently onree blitzkriez through Gujarat Rajshthan doctrine SOP developed, city war or canal infested Poonjab plains need different tactics translate into different SOP and training translate into 3 to 5 years process.
Re: Armoured Vehicles: News & Discussion
Of many years on Brf this the first I am reading abt an armored battle to be fought by us in Burma.niran wrote:gentle folks all of you have forgotten NE, Light tanks is for NE Burma terrain is noodle bowl like the low plain is soft ground thick forest with streams rivers every 3kms, notice integrated MLRS and Tube art with UAV unit, these are to defent any attack light tanks with APCs are for counter attacking and or chasing PLA into Xinxiang military zone on Thailand Cheen border.
Let’s cover our main theaters first.
Re: Armoured Vehicles: News & Discussion
You are again trolling in this forum. Your casual slapping on of incompetence label to the Indian Army has been noted.Jay wrote: Oh good. we only have been sitting on our behind for 2 decades now, another 3 or 5 years would be nothing. We will bullshit about Weight of Arjun and how awesome T90's are while sipping Vodka and endlessly doing these Summer, Winter, Monsoon trials. Its absolutely depressing how incompetent out armor procurement, planning, and deployment is. God help us if there is a conflict and Pakis get a hand on these Javelins, NLAWS or similar armament.
Warning issued