CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by Rakesh »

https://twitter.com/ANI/status/1648685060277821441?s=20 ---> Former Vice Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshal Sandeep Singh (Retd) has been appointed as the new Military Adviser in the National Security Council Secretariat.

https://twitter.com/zone5aviation/statu ... 71430?s=20 ---> The first IAF appointee to Military Advisor. Air Marshal Sandeep Singh (Retd) is a fine choice for the post, a great technical and strategic mind.

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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by VinodTK »

ramana wrote:Report :

The military is informed by CDS Chauhan that theatre commands are final

]Gen. Anil Chauhan arrived today to the Southern Army Command's headquarters in Pune to convey the PM's directive and advocate for military theatre commands.

With the three armed services, Gen. Chauhan's task of integration and jointmanship is considered to be a work in progress, with theater command and joint operations expected to be finished within the next two years.

#India #Defence

Theatre Commands Expected to be in Place by 2024-25 (lot of information by Nitin Gokhale)

Talk of 3 theater commands
- Northern Theater Command
- Western Theater Command
- Southern Theater Command
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ramana »

Thanks. So instead of just collapsing the current 17 commands to 7 theater commands the military transformation is underway into three commands.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ShauryaT »

ramana wrote:Thanks. So instead of just collapsing the current 17 commands to 7 theater commands the military transformation is underway into three commands.
I like the idea of three commands. It seems, we will still have the 17 commands in parallel with these three for a while. Political leadership will have to play a heavy hand to get the desired outcomes in timeframes desired, to avoid a tailspin.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ks_sachin »

What r these 17 commands?

There r 6 geographical commands.

Under these sit the various corps and then divs etc.

We will have to have establishments like the current regional commands then areas and sub-areas. Else the theater commander will be bogged down by administrative responsibilities.

For example currently Southern Command has under its ambit all training est in south India. Just think of how big an ask that is.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by VinodTK »

^^^^The 17 commands are as follows:
Army Commands : Northern,Southern, Eastern, Western, Central, Southwestern, Training
Air-force Commands: Southern, Eastern, Western, Central, Southwestern,Training & Maint.
Navy Commands : Southern, Eastern, Western

In addition to the above there are other try servoce commands:
Strategic Nuclear Command
Andaman & Nicobar joint command
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ks_sachin »

Ah thanks. I was thinking arms specific
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ramana »

VinodTK wrote:^^^^The 17 commands are as follows:
Army Commands : Northern,Southern, Eastern, Western, Central, Southwestern, Training
Air-force Commands: Southern, Eastern, Western, Central, Southwestern,Training & Maint.
Navy Commands : Southern, Eastern, Western

In addition to the above, there are other try service commands:
Strategic Nuclear Command
Andaman & Nicobar joint command

Vinod, Thanks. Also, none of them are in the same city! Hardly any collocation.



Others,
Try to understand why so many commands are there and why the need to transform them when facing the Chinese threat.
It is possible that SNC will come under Northern Command and FORTAN will come under Southern Command which is primarily maritime and air defence.
Unlike after 1965 when Western Command was split into Western and Northern command the need now is to integrate and transform.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ks_sachin »

Ramana,

Command structures below theater commands will exist. There is a lot more that goes on in the army than just manning the borders.

There is a huge amount of administrative responsibilities for the current Army commanders.

Theater commands will solve one problem but not all problems.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ramana »

The main problem of fighting the enemy effectively. As someone said an army exists to fight.
Rest is nice.
IA has become a bureaucracy since 1953 as a former general wrote.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ks_sachin »

ramana wrote:The main problem of fighting the enemy effectively. As someone said, an army exists to fight.
Rest is nice.
IA has become a bureaucracy since 1953 as a former general wrote.
Sorry, Ramana.
To fight one needs organisation.
Organisation needs administration.
Yes, some of the administration can be done away with but that "someone" is being blase.
The Seal Teams also have a tremendous amount of organisation that goes on.... training/recruitment/pay and payroll etc...
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by MeshaVishwas »

Although I am happy for the three Armed forces about the new modern HQs each are getting, could we have clubbed them all into a Pentagon-ish Joint HQ?

New NauSena Bhavan
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by wig »

https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comme ... nds-504147

How best to set up integrated theatre commands authored by Lt Gen Harwant Singh (Retd)
extracted
Finally, in August 2019, the post of CDS was announced by the PM (not as an Act of Parliament) and a committee under the National Security Adviser met to formulate the role and powers of the CDS. In January 2020, Gen Bipin Rawat assumed office as CDS.

As far as constituting integrated theatre commands is concerned, no operational role has been assigned to the CDS. It is consequent to the formulation of overall strategic war plans related to a two- or even three-front war (China, Pakistan and Indian Ocean Region) that integrated theatre commands would be constituted. In determining their composition and areas of responsibility, a range of factors need to be considered. These include the terrain, enemy capabilities in each sector, where to be completely on the defensive, where to stage an offensive defence and, finally, where an all-out offensive is to be launched.
suggested formats
The best option could be to convert the existing five Army commands (Eastern, Central, Northern, Western and South Western) into ITCs. The South Western ITC could have a commander from the IAF, with some role (deploying IAF resources) in the Arabian Sea in support of the Navy.

These ITCs would have integrated staff. As for the IOR, there should be three ITCs — first for the Arabian Sea, second for the Bay of Bengal and third for the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.
While the CDS must be the overall operational commander, the existing Integrated Defence HQ should form a part of the CDS HQ and this setup must stand independent of the Ministry of Defence (MoD).
requirement of adhering to standards in defence materiel production
The Department of Military Affairs in the MoD, instead of being headed by the CDS, should have a three-star defence services officer with integrated staff to direct and control the working of the four establishments — the DRDO, ordnance factories, defence PSUs and DG quality assurance. It would, in practice, replace the Secretary, Defence Production. This one change will, for sure, bring about a sea change in the output of these establishments and be an appropriate step towards self-reliance in defence weaponry and equipment.

Equally, it would be premature to ban the import of such a large number of defence equipment in the hope that the same would be made in India. We have to first establish acceptable quality of such locally produced equipment before banning their import. What must not be overlooked is the importance of the quality of such equipment in war-fighting.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ramana »

It is not the transformation that is needed to take on the Chinese that the general proposes.
He is proposing more silos.
What's needed is merging the verticles and reducing the hierarchy.
And this means three geographic commands.

I am sorry he doesn't address military transformation but is increasing the complexity with all those ITCs. His solution is you can have your own ITC if you object.

OK why don't people add up all his ITCs and compare them to the 17 commands+ two that are there?

Wig as you seem familiar with his article please do so.

I get 5 ITC for the land of which IAF gets one ITC as consolation + 3 ITC for IOR.
So a total of 8 ITCs from 17 commands.
Gen Rawat came up with 7 TC plus SFC and SF. Even here he was collapsing them horizontally.
No vertical columns collapsed to reduce hierarchy.

If you do vertical and horizontal reforms you get three TCs with the SFC under Northern Command as the nuclear threat is from China.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ramana »

Why do you need an act of parliament for administrative decisions?
Under what Parliament laws were all those 17+ commands set up?
Olur generals have become bigger babus!!!
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by nandakumar »

ramana wrote:Why do you need an act of parliament for administrative decisions?
Under what Parliament laws were all those 17+ commands set up?
Olur generals have become bigger babus!!!
The Parliament passed The Army, Air Force, Navy Acts in 1950 and 1957 (Navy) to govern the respective Services. Theaterisation brings units of different Services under one unified command for operational purposes which might go against the respective Acts. That might be the reason.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ramana »

Yes and such a bill was introduced in the last session to harmonize discipline issues under joint command.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ramana »

As India works on ‘theatre commands,’ it shouldn’t undermine strategic value of air power
Brijesh Dhar Jayal
Air Marshal Brijesh Dhar Jayal served in the Indian Air force from 1955 to 1993. Post-retirement, he writes regularly on national security issues in national dailies and professional journals.

Addressing the recently-concluded Combined Commanders Conference 2023 in Bhopal, the Prime Minister directed the commanders to push for ‘Integration and Operational synergy,’ a vision that is not only worthy and long overdue, but one that is inescapable when preparing for modern-day warfare. However, this complex though desirable objective has of late been reduced to a hastily conceived concept of ‘Theatre Commands,’ where there are problems and differing perceptions. The choice of an administrative route to a major national security reorganisation effort, rather than following a deliberative process right up the chain to the Parliament enacting a law, is where the problem lies.

What perhaps is less evident to those out of uniform is the unique character of each of the three services, which not only are governed by their respective service acts but also have their own ethos of service tradition, pride and sense of comradeship which in combination with evolving technologies make for a cohesive fighting force that makes self-sacrifice an accepted element of one’s profession. Any changes to the existing structure of how the services train and fight must be approached with due care and sensitivity, such that this uniqueness of professional skill, ethos of comradeship and self-sacrifice is not dented.

That there are differing perceptions amongst the forces towards the proposed model of theatre commands, is public knowledge. Subsequent reports indicate that whilst the implementation of the concept is irreversible, the delay is only to bring about a wider consensus. Clearly, it would appear that in the eyes of the department of military affairs, the optimum route to greater integration and jointmanship remains via the proposed model of theatre commands where air power potential remains emasculated. It needs to be recalled that the first Secretary DMA under whose authority the proposed model of theatre commands was initially conceived had during an interview with a TV channel stated, “Do not forget the IAF continues to remain a supporting arm just as artillery support or engineers support the combatant arm in the Army. They will be a supporting arm.” This was not the IAF’s view, reflected in a response of the then chief to the same channel when he said, “It’s not a supporting role alone. Air power has a huge role to play. In any of the integrated battle areas, it’s not an issue of support alone. A whole lot of things go into any air plan that’s made. And those are the issues that are under discussion.”

Looking back, one can only conjecture that at the stage when the model of theatre commands was conceived, the strategic and deterrent value of air power was not considered worthy of note by the planners in the newly created DMA in the MoD. Ironically, this would still appear to be the position to this day!

Since history helps us understand and grapple with complex dilemmas by studying how the past shaped the evolution of modern militaries and the deeper strategic import of air power, the youngest of air/land/sea fighting domains, it is perhaps worth delving briefly into some aspects of air power’s historic and somewhat troubled evolution and the challenges this new element in warfare brought about by technological evolution faced in its formative years.

With the arrival of the first dirigibles followed by fixed-wing aircraft at the turn of the 19th century, it was Major Giulio Douhet, a commissioned engineer in the Italian army, who had the vision to recognise the military potential of this new technology. Even at that infant stage, he saw the pitfalls of allowing air power to be fettered by ground commanders and began to advocate the creation of a separate air arm commanded by airmen. When WW1 began, he reportedly said: “To gain command of the air was to render an enemy harmless.” Writing in the Air Force Magazine of April 2011, Robert Dudney quotes Phillip S Meilinger, an airpower historian and analyst, calling Douhet “the first great air theorist” and “perhaps the most important air theorist.” He termed Douhet’s basic work ‘The Command of the Air’ published in 1921, as the first comprehensive analysis of airpower. In this book, Douhet argued that air power was revolutionary because it operated in the third dimension. Aircraft could fly over surface forces, relegating them to secondary importance. The vastness of the sky made defence almost impossible, so the essence of air power was the offensive and this in turn was good defence. The air force that could achieve command of the air by bombing the enemy air arm into extinction would doom its enemy to perpetual bombardment. Command of the air meant victory.

Looking back, by emphasising only the strategic offensive, Douhet underplayed the potential of air power towards other roles of air defence and tactical support of the ground battle. But those were formative years of military aviation and not surprisingly, Douhet’s visionary journey in furtherance of the potential of air power would have evolved with military aviation’s maturing. Ironically, faced as he was with opposition, his journey was by no means smooth and took him through a court martial, imprisonment, exoneration, and subsequent promotion to General rank.

In many ways, air power in our country faces a similar challenge. Today, we are proposing to tie down our air power resources tactically to theatre commands tied to the land borders. This notwithstanding peace-time lessons like one of Balakot and the deterrent value that the strategic potential and reach of our air power pose to potential enemies. This self-inflicted emasculation of air power potential will no doubt be music to our potential adversaries.

In the US till 1935, command of all combat air units resided with the army. The formation of General HQ Air Force in 1935 represented a compromise between strategic airpower advocates and ground force commanders who wanted the air corps mission to remain tied to that of the ground forces, a mindset and debate that still seems to prevail within our DMA. Finally, it was with the introduction of the National Security Act of 1947, that the US department of the air force was created signalling the birth of the USAF as a separate force.

This happened over continuing objections of the navy as well, which feared losing its air arm and strategic role to the newly created air force, a fear that it had long harboured. Indeed in the 1920s Brigadier General Billy Mitchell, the then Deputy Director of Air Service sought to wrest control of coastal defence from the navy and in the ensuing tussle was court martialled, convicted and resigned. At the time, aviation was in its infancy and there was considerable interest in this field amongst the American public which, in turn, resulted in Mitchell not just becoming a public icon, but compelling the war department to strengthen the air corps. Mitchell’s main argument was that air power had to be autonomous and had to be controlled by fliers who understood the new technology, new tactics, and new strategies, and who would not waste precious air assets in trying to assist old-fashioned armies and navies.

Canada went a step further in exploring the unification of the three armed forces and a white paper towards this was introduced in Parliament in 1964. The public explanation for the reorganisation was that unification would achieve cost savings and provide improved command, control, and integration of the military forces, an argument that is familiar in the context of our own efforts at attempting reorganisation into proposed theatre commands. The proposal faced strong opposition from personnel of all three services and resulted in the dismissal of a senior naval commander as also forced retirements of other senior military ranks. Notwithstanding this, the government implemented the ill-fated scheme in 1968. Over the ensuing decades, as the futility of unifying the armed forces sunk in, many elements of unification were incrementally reversed to reflect the original individual armed forces till in 2011 the Canadian Armed Forces reverted back to their historical independent service designations, namely ‘Royal Canadian Army/Navy/Air Force.’

In the US, problems of inter-service rivalry that had emerged during the Vietnam War and during later joint operations resulted in the framing of ‘The Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defence Reorganisation Act of 1986.’ This brought in the most sweeping changes since the department was established in 1946. Recognising that resolving challenges was a long-term exercise, the US defence department’s Joint Vision 2010 (of 1996) and Joint Vision 2020 (of 2000) flowing from this Act, accepted that for the US military forces to be fully joint intellectually, operationally, organisationally, doctrinally, and technically, was a progressive and on-going task.

Clearly, whatever spin we may want to put on the present model of theatre command debate, it boils down to one of inter-service rivalry borne not out of any personal issues, but the medium and at the way each of the forces views and trains for their respective operational missions and indeed the special character of each warfighting domain. When viewed from the brief historical perspective, it is worth reflecting on whether in our enthusiasm to implement the proposed model of theatre commands, without studying other operationally viable organisational options, we are not underestimating the human resource challenges that such a major and challenging reform will entail. Indeed mere administrative reorganising without the accompanying human ethos of jointness in intellectual, operational, doctrinal and technical terms, may well have negative consequences.

If indeed the PM’s vision of integration and jointness with a corresponding enhancement of our deterrent posture and warfighting potential is to be achieved, then one lesson that emerges from the past is not to underestimate the strategic value of air power both in terms of its deterrent potential and its first strike impact. Towards this, much like the US, we too need to bring into being a National Security Act (suitably debated in Parliament) that not only paves the way for military forces to be fully joint intellectually, operationally, organisationally, doctrinally and technically, but one that identifies a clear road map towards its ultimate achievement whilst recognising that this must be a long and deliberate process not amenable to artificial deadlines. Rushing through half-baked reforms will cause irreversible harm to the fighting ethos of the Indian soldier, sailor and airman and in turn, to national security at a time when we are faced with two hostile neighbours.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by Vips »

How delayed are we from formation of the Theatre Commands as originally planned? If memory serves me right 3 commands were supposed to be operational by 2024 end.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ramana »

It was supposed to be announced on Independence Day 2022. It got delayed to 2023 due to IAF.
I have a question for AM Jayal. How does he expect to provide the strategic value of air power when IAF has shunned bomber planes since 1973?
Canberra was already obsolete in 1965 as many pilot accounts state.
What has IAF done to preserve the strategic value of air power since then?
Many opportunities came; Tu-16s, Tu-22s, TU-160, B-1B.
Even with great reluctance Su-30MKI was accepted. It was chosen by PVNR and endorsed by Mulayam Singh Yadav.
IAF complained will need to double the pilot numbers and wondered what targets are there that require Su-30MKI.
BTW I have all the press clippings since 1995.
IAF is single-minded in getting MRFA.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ShauryaT »

ramana wrote:It was supposed to be announced on Independence Day 2022. It got delayed to 2023 due to IAF.
I have a question for AM Jayal. How does he expect to provide the strategic value of air power when IAF has shunned bomber planes since 1973?
Canberra was already obsolete in 1965 as many pilot accounts state.
What has IAF done to preserve the strategic value of air power since then?
Many opportunities came; Tu-16s, Tu-22s, TU-160, B-1B.
Even with great reluctance Su-30MKI was accepted. It was chosen by PVNR and endorsed by Mulayam Singh Yadav.
IAF complained will need to double the pilot numbers and wondered what targets are there that require Su-30MKI.
BTW I have all the press clippings since 1995.
IAF is single-minded in getting MRFA.
I do not think the problem is of the IAF alone here. Has anyone given them an objective to bomb Beijing or be ready for a sustained war over Tibet? Their new mission seems to be defend against China with the meager resources it has and also BTW be ready for the 2nd front. The IAF has traditionally counted on its technological superiority over PLAAF assets. With the PLAAF asset base fast changing, their only game seems to be to get the western technology to play this defensive game with limited numbers.

One way to overcome this persistent IAF objection is to infuse capital assets into this force with clear objectives. It is high time the GOI does its part to raise capital budgets, which has been in a long term decline. But yes, at root is also the issue of hierarchies and being subsumed by lack of understanding amongst political masters and their perceived inabilities to understand strategic force doctrines. The hierarchies issue the IAF will simply have to give and the other is a vexed issue with no easy answers.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ramana »

I think you are confusing two things in my post.

I said TC is delayed due to IAF which is the first part.

Second I asked AM Jyal about how the strategic value of air power can be provided without bombers since 1973.
The second part is addressed to his essay. It is not to IAF.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ShauryaT »

ramana wrote:I think you are confusing two things in my post.

I said TC is delayed due to IAF which is the first part.

Second I asked AM Jyal about how the strategic value of air power can be provided without bombers since 1973.
The second part is addressed to his essay. It is not to IAF.
Thanks for the clarification. Your point on bombers is valid, however did not get even a whiff that AM Jyal was thinking of bombers in his reference to strategic but rather was scoring brownie points against late first CDS Gen Bipin Rawat's comments.

The undertone that seems to be coming from the IAF in subtle and not so subtle manners is the fear of being subsumed by the views of the army in an integrated force structure both due to hierarchies and threat perceptions in political circles, with an under appreciation of the force multiplier effect of the Air Force. The 2nd objection they seem to be carrying is the lack of enough resources to go around to the multiple commands. What I was proposing is to buy the second objection of the IAF with budgets and use that to thrust integration.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ramana »

There was news today about Tu-160 bombers interest. Let us see.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by pravula »

Will they survive s400 and clones that prc is gonna deploy in numbers? Both land and sea based…
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ShauryaT »

pravula wrote:Will they survive s400 and clones that prc is gonna deploy in numbers? Both land and sea based…
Sea based S400? That is news!
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by pravula »

It would be a logical progression. Any bombers would be around for 40+ years imho.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ramana »

From Telegram channel
Indian Air Force, Indian Navy and Indian Army, will come forward for all the joint military exercises in future under Theatre Command System

The initiative will be taken under the 'Theatre Command System', which aims to bring synergistic coordination between the three branches of the Indian Armed Forces. The Theatre Command System also aims to develop separate commands for the Indian Army, Indian Navy, and Indian Air Force under a unified command headed by a single commander. The integration process would lead to unified military assets under one operational head who would be responsible for directing and controlling their activities in a given situation.

Operation Vayu Shakti of the Indian Air Force (IAF), will be one such exercise that will have events for all three services. It will take place early next year.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by Ankit Desai »

Three theatre commands on anvil as tri-services ‘concur’
The plan primarily is now to have three integrated theatre commands, headed by senior three-star generals (Lt-Generals, Air Marshals or Vice Admirals), to handle the northern borders with China, the western front with Pakistan and a maritime command in peninsular India.

The proposal for an Air Defence Command (ADC) has been junked. IAF had strongly argued that a stand-alone ADC would be “counter-productive” since “air defence” and “offensive air” missions were interdependent and could not be executed in isolation during conflicts. Moreover, it would be operationally unwise to divide “limited air assets” – the force, for instance, has just 31 fighter squadrons when 42 are authorised – among different theatre commands.
-Ankit
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by wig »

https://www.msn.com/en-in/news/other/mi ... 2fcb&ei=67

Military theatre commanders to hold four-star rank at par with service chiefs
extracts
Defence Ministry is putting the finishing touches to a plan that will add momentum to its effort to create theatre commands or so-called jointsmanship of the three services, with four-star rank theatre commanders being at the heart of this radical idea, HT learns.

That would put the theatre commanders — there are expected to be three, two land theatres and one maritime one — at the same rank as the three chiefs of services, with the Chief of Defence Staff coming on top of all six
While the government is tight-lipped about the military theatre commands, it is understood that the commands will be adversary specific with one maritime theatre command to handle the Indo-Pacific. Importantly, the government has decided to ensure that other verticals such as Cyber, Space, Intelligence, Missile, Drone, National Defence University and logistics command are created so that there is no loss of jobs at the three-star (Lt General), two star (Major General) or one star (Brigadier) level after the theatre commands are created.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ramana »

Looks like all chiefs an no Indians!
Why are they so obsessed with rank like civilian bbus whom the despise?

Four plus three general rank officers!

They are not even commanding field armies like Rommel or Patton or Harbaksh Singh or Joginder Singh.
All will sit in plush offices.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ramana »

"Importantly, the government has decided to ensure that other verticals such as Cyber, Space, Intelligence, Missile, Drone, National Defence University and logistics command are created so that there is no loss of jobs at the three-star (Lt General), two star (Major General) or one star (Brigadier) level after the theatre commands are created."

This untrue. Don't know who is feeding this crap.
It's not ajobs program but to make the forces agile and fighting trim.
If rank and fiehave Agniveers to cut the flab maybe the officers need similar trimming.
ramana
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ramana »

"India’s plan for theatre commands is in line with similar hierarchies in the US or China with theatre commanders holding four-star rank. In India, the theatre commanders will report to the CDS who is also the Permanent Chairman of Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC)."
The US has global responsibility. The Chinese are an expansionist power trying to match the US.
All of India is just a sector on global scale.

Why not award themselves Field Marshal ranks while at it!
And it's scurrilous of the service chiefs if they need to be reminded who they work for: the President.
Would like to know which service chief won't support a theater commander of lesser rank. He will be fired in a moment if he didn't have the sense to resign.
KSingh
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by KSingh »

ramana wrote:"India’s plan for theatre commands is in line with similar hierarchies in the US or China with theatre commanders holding four-star rank. In India, the theatre commanders will report to the CDS who is also the Permanent Chairman of Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC)."
The US has global responsibility. The Chinese are an expansionist power trying to match the US.
All of India is just a sector on global scale.

Why not award themselves Field Marshal ranks while at it!
And it's scurrilous of the service chiefs if they need to be reminded who they work for: the President.
Would like to know which service chief won't support a theater commander of lesser rank. He will be fired in a moment if he didn't have the sense to resign.
I remember when CDS was announced and many here were getting all wound up that CDS wasn’t going to be a 5* rank and merely a 4* ‘first amongst equals’ fearing the deeply hierarchical military would not abide by his remit.


For theatre commanders to have any effectiveness they have to have the rank to go with it, service cheifs absolutely should be taking care of organisational and procurement matters not getting involved in operational affairs

Long term the top-heavy general class will be right sized too as the agniveers won’t be feeding so many flag staff into the system (10-15 years down the line this will be felt) but to keep the current crop of officers happy they have to engage in a horse and pony show/jobs program lest they voice their dissatisfaction as they had been ‘promised’ general ranks (and all the privileges that goes with that rank)


+ i notice not a single mention has been made of AFSOD/SOCOM, sadly india still doesn’t recognise the strategic value of SOFs
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by wig »

https://www.dailyexcelsior.com/moving-f ... -commands/

Moving forward with theatre commands by Maj Gen H Kakar (Retd)

excerpts
The first is cross posting of officers of Majors and Lt Cols rank between the services. The army would post 40 to its sister services while the navy 30 and the air force 32. These would be stationed largely in missile and UAV units. The intent is to create cross-functional teams as also comprehend individual service cultures as a prelude to theaterization. This stage has largely been completed.
The second is developing a common Annual Confidential Report for senior officers (brigadiers and above) as also their cross postings. The official statement mentioned that the objective is to achieve commonality in ‘procedures and assessments resulting in better outcomes thereby contributing to jointness and integration.’ The numbers to be cross posted have yet to be announced. The process is ongoing.
The third is acceptance of establishing three theatre commands, one each for the northern and western adversary as also a maritime command. It is possible that these would be implemented by next year. The air defence command which was suggested earlier has been discarded as the air force believes that ‘air defence and offensive air missions would not be carried out in isolation.’
An added input is that the MOD is considering making theatre commanders into four-star generals, equating them to service chiefs. The intent appears to be to reduce influence of service chiefs in force employment, which will be the domain of theatre commanders. The CDS would remain the overall head. The actions taken thus far indicate a defensive approach to defending India.
IAF objections
A major drawback is that the air force continues to block acceding air assets to theatre commands, claiming these will finally be allocated depending on the operational scenario.
This is based on the premise that once allocated, theatre commanders may not release them for other tasks, as also that current aircraft are multirole and their capabilities would be underutilized. Added are shortfalls in holding as the air force currently has 32 squadrons against a sanctioned strength of 42.
What the air force appears to be missing is that theatre commanders are select officers of the armed forces, operating in a chain of command, orders of which they cannot ignore. Distances between theatres are not such that movement of air assets would be an impediment. Further, theatre commanders would invariably adhere to suggestions of their air force advisors on employment of air power, exploiting allocated resources to the maximum. Finally, by doing so, is the air force claiming to be the service of last resort?
The air force reluctance also implies that the emerging northern and western theatre commands would basically be enlarged army commands with air force advisory staff as at present. In reality, they would not be integrated theatre commands, though would be termed as such.
J&K faces two hostile countries
J and K, currently India’s Northern Command. The region faces two opponents, has limited axis for movement as also common administrative facilities for forces catering to both adversaries. There is no doubt that additional axes to Ladakh are under construction, however, most administrative echelons will continue to exploit the common axis.
When the Galwan crisis emerged, Rashtriya Rifle troops deployed in the hinterland of the Jammu Sector to counter Pak backed terrorism were redeployed in Ladakh to enhance troop strengths to challenge the Chinese. They continue to remain. This was possible because the region was under one commander who was aware of which set of troops were readily available for redeployment. By splitting the region into two different theatres, management of administrative facilities and rapid decision making on movement of troops may be impacted.
conclusion
The sudden momentum in pushing theatre commands despite them not being genuine theatre commands, as air power is missing, appears to be due to political push with 2024 elections drawing close. The government intends to complete its agenda of creating theatre commands prior to elections, drawing mileage for its decision and implementation, even if what has been created is half baked. Military planners are missing out that what is once created cannot be easily changed resulting in India possessing flawed structures. Finally, current theatre commands display a defensive mindset with no organization responsible for force projection to protect national interests.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by VinodTK »

Three theatre commands on anvil as tri-services ‘concur
NEW DELHI: India is now once again determinedly working towards the creation of theatre commands to build an integrated war-fighting machinery in a cost-effective manner, with a “consensus” being achieved among the Army, Navy and IAF after the original plan was tweaked to address all concerns.

The plan primarily is now to have three integrated theatre commands, headed by senior three-star generals (Lt-Generals, Air Marshals or Vice Admirals), to handle the northern borders with China, the western front with Pakistan and a maritime command in peninsular India, top defence sources told TOI.

The proposal for an Air Defence Command (ADC) has been junked. IAF had strongly argued that a stand-alone ADC would be “counter-productive” since “air defence” and “offensive air” missions were interdependent and could not be executed in isolation during conflicts. Moreover, it would be operationally unwise to divide “limited air assets” – the force, for instance, has just 31 fighter squadrons when 42 are authorised – among different theatre commands.

“All the three services are now onboard for the theatre commands. Air assets, for instance, will not be owned by a theatre command but will shift from one to another based on the contingency faced,” a source said.

“Work is under way simultaneously on three prongs -- jointness, integration and theaterisation. The aim is to create the three theatre commands by sometime next year,” he added.
Creation of the unified commands was stalled after the first chief of defence staff (CDS) General Bipin Rawat died in a helicopter crash in December 2021. With General Anil Chauhan taking over as the CDS in September last year, the government introduced the Inter-Services Organisations (Command, Control and Discipline) Bill in Parliament in March this year for the existing tri-Service organisations as well as the proposed theatre commands.

The “bottom-up” approach underway includes “creating the spirit of working together” among the Army, Navy and IAF, which often pull in different directions. Towards this end, the first lot of 102 officers (Army 40, IAF 32 and Navy 30) in the rank of Majors and Lt-Colonels were recently “cross-posted” to other services.

“This cross-staffing has been done in areas of commonality in equipment like UAVs, BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles etc among the three Services,” an officer said. IAF, for instance, has posted Squadron Leaders and Wing Commanders, including pilots as well as those in logistics, engineering and other wings, to Army units and Navy warships.

Another move is to have “common annual confidential reports” for all two and three-star generals across the armed forces. “This step to synergise the appraisal system for undertaking tri-Service appointments has been approved. Implementation will take three-four months,” another source said.

Similarly, “integration” is in progress on several fronts, ranging from operations and communications to logistics and procurements. “Combat exercises are also now increasingly being conducted with elements from all three Services to bolster operational synergy. More joint logistics nodes are also being set-up to add to the three existing ones at Mumbai, Guwahati and Port Blair,” another officer said.

India currently has only two unified commands, the geographical Andaman and Nicobar Command and the functional Strategic Forces Command to handle the country’s nuclear arsenal, which were set up in 2001 and 2003 after the Kargil conflict with Pakistan. In sharp contrast, there are as many as 17 single-Service commands (Army 7, IAF 7 and Navy 3).

China, incidentally, re-organised its 2.3-million People’s Liberation Army into five theatre commands in early-2016 to boost offensive capabilities and establish better command-and-control structures. Its Western Theatre Command, for instance, handles the entire 3,488-km Line of Actual Control from eastern Ladakh to Arunachal Pradesh. India, in contrast, has four Army and three IAF commands for the northern borders with China
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Last edited by ramana on 30 Jun 2023 09:28, edited 1 time in total.
Reason: Added bold ramana
ramana
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ramana »

The bottoms up approach was with JDW which became NDA.

The services' cadets were to train together jointly right before they became officers.
The Military Academies unlearn all the jointness they got and then service posting distills the decoction.
As folks can see am quite skeptical until I see it implemented.
Sadd that CDS is not laying down the law and still retired folks can still give gnanam.
So they know they work in the military and obeying a command is not a choice.
Everybody civilians and military works for the President who is also the Commander-in-Chief.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ramana »

OK. When the service leader becomes a Theatre Commander he gets the rank of Lt General.
I don't want them to have service ranks for they still will bat for their silos.

We saw that in Kargil.

They can revert to service rank if they get selected to head the service.
ramana
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ramana »

Even US is seeing the need to reorganize its theater commands!

https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/06/ge ... r-periods/
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