CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

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chetak
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by chetak »

arshyam wrote:^^ Didn't get your point saar...? Especially the ASC part - why is that specifically called out?
That's the "kaul" syndrome pioneered by the nepotistic and dynastic neverwho during the 1962 war, and a variation was the sushil redux evolved by fernandes.

You need big picture guys with hard core ops and field experience, capable of thinking on their feet, accomplished in the many aspects of a very intuitive adaptation to dynamically evolving situations, and like the virtuoso conductor of a philharmonic orchestra, commanding the diverse resources and disparate parts, melding them into one single proficient, professional and competent fighting entity, marching to the same tune and seized of the same goal.

This long delay is simply unacceptable.

Somewhere, along the way, it seems that the powers that be have gotten lost or sidetracked by vested interests.

In such a vital matter, concerning the issue of NATSEC, the situation is simply incomprehensible. Succession should be a matter of logic, procedure, and process.

There is a specific cultural milieu that is ingrained, embedded, and ineradicably entrenched in the Indian psyche that will not tolerate the ascendancy of a junior to a position of authority over the senior, especially in the situation where the command structure is pyramidical in nature.

That's why it's traditional for seniors to resign when superseded in militaries worldwide. In India, it also causes rancor and sometimes public outbursts by those who obviously feel wronged (rightly or otherwise).
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ks_sachin »

chetak wrote:
arshyam wrote:^^ Didn't get your point saar...? Especially the ASC part - why is that specifically called out?


You need big picture guys with hard core ops and field experience, capable of thinking on their feet, accomplished in the many aspects of a very intuitive adaptation to dynamically evolving situations, and like the virtuoso conductor of a philharmonic orchestra, commanding the diverse resources and disparate parts, melding them into one single proficient, professional and competent fighting entity, marching to the same tune and seized of the same goal.
Hi Chetak,

Are you saying that someone from a support arm cannot be a CDS?

That is not what I am saying.

Remember at IMA what arm you get is a bit of a lottery. So it does not follow that the best and best and brightest always go to the fighting arms.

Secondly, if these gents have reached a Lt Gen and have had an operational appointment as opposed to a staff appointment then they have likely commanded (the current chief has commanded an operational command and hence...) They would have gone through NDC etc.... because if you don't get selected for NDC etc you don't get an operational appointment AFAIK.

I am saying that there is a lot of cultural baggage (some of it, as you alluded to, carrying over from our society) and it is best to take a slightly longer term view of this and introduce change gradually. Start with serving Chiefs etc....

IF we want the Armed Forces to be a true combined all arms force then we have to start reforms right at the bottom. NDA onwards. From Brig onwards the officer should loose any visible links to his or her parent arm/regiment and truly be an all arms officer.. I am overly simplifying it I know.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ks_sachin »

chetak wrote:
You need big picture guys with hard core ops and field experience, capable of thinking on their feet, accomplished in the many aspects of a very intuitive adaptation to dynamically evolving situations, and like the virtuoso conductor of a philharmonic orchestra, commanding the diverse resources and disparate parts, melding them into one single proficient, professional and competent fighting entity, marching to the same tune and seized of the same goal.
This observation by you is also very interesting.

I would be keen to understand your take on what makes a jawan or an officer put his life on the line..
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by YashG »

Its not just ego.
1. Someone who hasn't led an entire service arm - has no real experience of what it takes to be in the shoes of a service chief. Empathising with a service chief will be tough for someone who was always a level below.

2. In terms of promotions, if our argument is that forces promotion system is flawed and not meritocratic - true but its atleast objective. Defence forces operate on discipline and objectivity ensures that promotion system cant be gamed or influenced & discipline is maintained. Very important to keep this system as least politicised as possible

This scheme that government has come up with lacks all objectivity. If there is no objectivity, then there will be way too much energies wasted on appointment and politicking - which is not in national interest. Instead if equal energies are invested into theaterization, atleast we will have less to complain about.

If CDS was to accelerate joint command and theatres - this move will (with inter personal dislike, reduce cooperation, reduce space for compromises) achieve the opposite.

This scheme is quite against our national and defence interests.
chetak
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by chetak »

ks_sachin wrote:
chetak wrote:


You need big picture guys with hard core ops and field experience, capable of thinking on their feet, accomplished in the many aspects of a very intuitive adaptation to dynamically evolving situations, and like the virtuoso conductor of a philharmonic orchestra, commanding the diverse resources and disparate parts, melding them into one single proficient, professional and competent fighting entity, marching to the same tune and seized of the same goal.
Hi Chetak,

Are you saying that someone from a support arm cannot be a CDS?

That is not what I am saying.

Remember at IMA what arm you get is a bit of a lottery. So it does not follow that the best and best and brightest always go to the fighting arms.

Secondly, if these gents have reached a Lt Gen and have had an operational appointment as opposed to a staff appointment then they have likely commanded (the current chief has commanded an operational command and hence...) They would have gone through NDC etc.... because if you don't get selected for NDC etc you don't get an operational appointment AFAIK.

I am saying that there is a lot of cultural baggage (some of it, as you alluded to, carrying over from our society) and it is best to take a slightly longer term view of this and introduce change gradually. Start with serving Chiefs etc....

IF we want the Armed Forces to be a true combined all arms force then we have to start reforms right at the bottom. NDA onwards. From Brig onwards the officer should loose any visible links to his or her parent arm/regiment and truly be an all arms officer.. I am overly simplifying it I know.
yes that's exactly what I am saying.

We are not running some equal opportunity sideshow that has to follow some woke mandated narrative.

The current training and mindset is a result of paths followed over a few centuries of colonial inculturation. It is also well tried and battle tested, besides having served us well in our own wars

Yes we can and we do need to change but that is a long and laborious process. And yes, we have already changed a great deal but a whole lot more needs to be done.

It cannot happen overnight by merely and mechanically following a sickularly designed mandalized mandate, bulldozed by some committee of babooze designed diktat like some silver bullet that will eradicate all ills plaguing the system.

Entry of women into the forces was forced by a BIF pasand card carrying member of todays aap. I have often wondered who was pulling the puppet strings at the time.

Whether that change was to the good or bad, the jury is still out.

BTW, no matter what anyone says, the teeth and the tail have very different perspectives. This is with particular reference to the forces in India.

Maybe the caste system has a lot to do with this mentality

The changes that you are asking for will take many decades and will have to weather much opposition, if they are to bring about the changes that must be done.

But the BIF want just such an army to replace their boots on the ground. They have deeply researched the battlefield and the military milieu in WWI and WWII and they are all tacitly agreed that they need such armies under their command, just like the britshits mis)used the gurkhas.

Did they not try to con ABA during the gelf war to do just this...
chetak
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by chetak »

ks_sachin wrote:
chetak wrote:
You need big picture guys with hard core ops and field experience, capable of thinking on their feet, accomplished in the many aspects of a very intuitive adaptation to dynamically evolving situations, and like the virtuoso conductor of a philharmonic orchestra, commanding the diverse resources and disparate parts, melding them into one single proficient, professional and competent fighting entity, marching to the same tune and seized of the same goal.
This observation by you is also very interesting.

I would be keen to understand your take on what makes a jawan or an officer put his life on the line..
Nam, Namak, and Nishan and the shame of letting down his family, especially when the young lieutenant in whose care and hands he has commended his life, is leading from the front

Nam, Namak, and Nishan is an ancient Indian civilizational ethos, often grossly underestimated by the enemy, entirely at their peril.

"they are banias and they cannot fight" is often the last thought of the dying paki, as he bleeds out
ramana
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ramana »

Rohit posted this map on Theatre Commands

https://twitter.com/KesariDhwaj/status/ ... TqLzOOl7eg --->

Image[/img]
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by Rakesh »

ramana wrote:Rohit posted this map on Theatre Commands

https://twitter.com/KesariDhwaj/status/ ... TqLzOOl7eg --->
Ramana-ji, picture was not loading...so I edited your post.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by nachiket »

The government screwed this up for no reason. This is entirely their own fault. They had more than enough time between Gen. Rawat's untimely demise and Gen. Naravane's retirement to make the decision. I have still not seen any reason as to why Gen. Naravane was unacceptable as the next CDS. If the government is serious abut the need for the post of CDS then this cannot be an arbitrary process. They messed this up right at the start when they failed to create a standardized, time-bound process for future appointments where the civilian leadership had leeway to choose from among multiple candidates but certain rules would be laid down and followed to make sure the selection wasn't entirely arbitrary and the military hierarchy was not turned upside down.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by KSingh »

Rakesh wrote:Appointing a Lt Gen / Vice Admiral / Air Marshal as the next CDS, is not a good idea. Even if that three star officer has seniority (earlier commission date) over the current trio of Army, Navy and Air Chiefs...it is still not a good idea.

In the military, current rank and hierarchy are everything. This is not like selecting from a pool of Lt Gens or Vice Admirals or Air Marshals to be the next Army, Navy or Air Chief. That practice was established with the Modi Govt, but it had its share of controversies. This will be different and will open up a can of worms that is best left unopened. IMVHO, a disaster like the Tour of Duty concept.

Selecting a retired Chief, while controversial, will still be more palatable. But having the Army, Navy or Air Chief report to a three star officer (even though he will be a four star upon appointment) will not go down well.

More learned experts ---> please correct me if I am wrong.

P.S. General Manoj Mukund Naravane (retd), Admiral Karambir Singh (retd) and Air Chief Marshal RKS Bhadauria (retd) have all crossed 62 years of age as of now. None of them will qualify as per these gazette notifications. IMO, the best option is to select from one of the three current Chiefs, regardless of how unsavory it may seem to many. I will get skewered for saying this, but Air Chief Marshal VR Chaudhari would be the safest bet. He is the senior most among all the three Chiefs. And promote the current VCAS - Air Marshal Sandeep Singh - to the post of Air Chief.
It’s becoming apparent that service chiefs are far too powerful and are respectively disrupting all major Announced reforms to protect their little empires. Opening up the pool of candidates allows for more meritocracy- it’s silly to assume that only those that make it to 4* currently are suitable to take the CDS post- instead they may be too entrenched in the aforementioned empire building game.


That said, the idea whilst logical right now can easily
Backfire on 5-10 years when another party comes to power and now they can select CDS for god knows what reasons. India’s democratic institutions are not mature enough for this, it could quickly descend into banana republic type antics where the military commanders are appointed dependant on devotion to the party in power.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by KSingh »

YashG wrote:Its not just ego.
1. Someone who hasn't led an entire service arm - has no real experience of what it takes to be in the shoes of a service chief. Empathising with a service chief will be tough for someone who was always a level below.

2. In terms of promotions, if our argument is that forces promotion system is flawed and not meritocratic - true but its atleast objective. Defence forces operate on discipline and objectivity ensures that promotion system cant be gamed or influenced & discipline is maintained. Very important to keep this system as least politicised as possible

This scheme that government has come up with lacks all objectivity. If there is no objectivity, then there will be way too much energies wasted on appointment and politicking - which is not in national interest. Instead if equal energies are invested into theaterization, atleast we will have less to complain about.

If CDS was to accelerate joint command and theatres - this move will (with inter personal dislike, reduce cooperation, reduce space for compromises) achieve the opposite.

This scheme is quite against our national and defence interests.
This is antithetical to military leadership. The 2IC must always be in a position to take the position of the CO.

To assume only those who have risen (by in most cases the opposite of objective reasons) to service chief rank can become CDS is illogical. As it stands the CDS has no operational responsibilities, it is a largely administrative role charged with implementing reforms, if anything it might be better to pick outside of the service chief cadre for the very reason you’ve alluded to-if they’ve never work the hat of a service chief then they might not succumb to
The same service-centric thinking and will be able to see the bigger picture- the exact mandate of the post.

If current 4* generals have issues with this that is 100% their problem and an issue with their egos for which they will have to
resolve internally. There is no god given right to command and they all serve at the pleasure of civilian leadership. Times have to
Change
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by KSingh »

nachiket wrote:The government screwed this up for no reason. This is entirely their own fault. They had more than enough time between Gen. Rawat's untimely demise and Gen. Naravane's retirement to make the decision. I have still not seen any reason as to why Gen. Naravane was unacceptable as the next CDS. If the government is serious abut the need for the post of CDS then this cannot be an arbitrary process. They messed this up right at the start when they failed to create a standardized, time-bound process for future appointments where the civilian leadership had leeway to choose from among multiple candidates but certain rules would be laid down and followed to make sure the selection wasn't entirely arbitrary and the military hierarchy was not turned upside down.
Who does it serve to protect the hierarchy? Doing things the way they have always been done just because that is the way is not
justifiable

Agreed that the GoI have utterly squandered a huge chunk of time that will be costly at a time when reforms are the need of the hour.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ks_sachin »

The current Chief is Gen Pande:

To those who say he has no experience of combat arms:

1 - was appointed brigade major of a mountain brigade in Northeast India.
2 - Pande has commanded the 117 Engineer Regiment along the Line of Control (LOC) in Jammu and Kashmir. He was in command of the regiment during Operation Parakram.
3 - He then attended the Army War College, Mhow and completed the Higher Command Course.
4 - After the course, he was appointed Colonel Q at HQ 8 Mountain Division.
5 - He was then promoted to the rank of Brigadier and given command of an Engineer brigade as part of a Strike Corps in the western theatre.
6 - He also commanded the 52 Infantry Brigade, positioned along the LOC.
7 - Pande was selected to attend the prestigious National Defence College.[8] After completing the course, he was appointed Brigadier General Staff Operations (BGS-Ops) at HQ Eastern Command.
8 - Pande took command of 8 Mountain Division which was involved in high-altitude operations in western Ladakh.
9 - He then served a tenure in the Military Operations Directorate at Army Headquarters as the Additional Director General (ADG).
10 - Promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General, he served as the Chief of Staff of the Southern Command.
11 - Pande took command of the IV Corps at Tezpur The corps is deployed along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) as well as in Counter-insurgency operations in the North-East.
12 - Pande was appointed the next Commander-in-Chief, Andaman and Nicobar Command (CINCAN).
13 - he was appointed General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Eastern Command.

I have made an attempt to highlight from Gen PAnde's career the postings which would have contributed to his experience of managing troops involved in combat.

Typically an officer reaching this level will have the experience in my opinion.

Baseline if an officer gets selected for NDC then he is assumed to have the qualities to go right to the top. That includes the CDS post.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ks_sachin »

KSingh wrote:
nachiket wrote:The government screwed this up for no reason. This is entirely their own fault. They had more than enough time between Gen. Rawat's untimely demise and Gen. Naravane's retirement to make the decision. I have still not seen any reason as to why Gen. Naravane was unacceptable as the next CDS. If the government is serious abut the need for the post of CDS then this cannot be an arbitrary process. They messed this up right at the start when they failed to create a standardized, time-bound process for future appointments where the civilian leadership had leeway to choose from among multiple candidates but certain rules would be laid down and followed to make sure the selection wasn't entirely arbitrary and the military hierarchy was not turned upside down.
Who does it serve to protect the hierarchy? Doing things the way they have always been done just because that is the way is not
justifiable

Agreed that the GoI have utterly squandered a huge chunk of time that will be costly at a time when reforms are the need of the hour.
We are not protecting the hierarchy but saying that this change has to be gradual. Organisation change management applies equally to the army.
If a serving chief has a CDS someone who retired as a Lt Gen how do the rank and file of the organisation look at it?
IF you think that this has no impact then dream on....
This is just on eexample
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ks_sachin »

KSingh wrote:
This is antithetical to military leadership. The 2IC must always be in a position to take the position of the CO.
--And that is the case. But that is not what is being debated here is it?
To assume only those who have risen (by in most cases the opposite of objective reasons) to service chief rank can become CDS is illogical. As it stands the CDS has no operational responsibilities, it is a largely administrative role charged with implementing reforms, if anything it might be better to pick outside of the service chief cadre for the very reason you’ve alluded to-if they’ve never work the hat of a service chief then they might not succumb to
Why do you say the opposite of objective reason? Are you saying that there is no objectivity in the promotion system?
The Chief also has no operational responsibility generally is it not. The Army Commanders are closer to the action.
On the flip side the policy and political aspects of a Chief's role make them more suitable for a CDS role don't you think. Again that is not that is being discussed. If there is a retired chief by all means so no issue there.
If current 4* generals have issues with this that is 100% their problem and an issue with their egos for which they will have to
resolve internally. There is no god given right to command and they all serve at the pleasure of civilian leadership. Times have to
Change
They are not saying they have a god-given right to command but we will be shortsighted if we don't seriously consider the repercussions of a move. IF the move is considered and deliberate and the armed forces are taken into confidence then I have no issue. As it is this move will most likely be seen by the rank and file as another attempt by the babudom to clip the wings of the forces.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ks_sachin »

KSingh wrote: It’s becoming apparent that service chiefs are far too powerful and are respectively disrupting all major Announced reforms to protect their little empires. Opening up the pool of candidates allows for more meritocracy- it’s silly to assume that only those that make it to 4* currently are suitable to take the CDS post- instead they may be too entrenched in the aforementioned empire building game.
What empire does a chief get to build and what announced reforms have they sought to disrupt?
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ks_sachin »

Chetak,

I will beg to disagree.

Once an officer does HC and does NDC and acr deems him or her fit for operational appointment as opposed to staff appointment they in theory they will get the experience of operational commands.

HEre is an aside;

The Army allowed Armd Corps officers to command RR Bns and even Bde's. Now you will agree that ARmd doctrine is very different to Inf.

Regards

S
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by YashG »

KSingh wrote: if anything it might be better to pick outside of the service chief cadre for the very reason you’ve alluded to-if they’ve never work the hat of a service chief then they might not succumb to
The same service-centric thinking and will be able to see the bigger picture- the exact mandate of the post.
If that is the case then why even consider only service people - take someone very competent in big picture or reforms from outside services - someone competent from private sector or IAS or IFS like Jaishankar.

Essentially if the idea of this scheme is to upend the status quo - then this is not a theaterization project, this is reforms project but just not fully baked either a reform or a theaterization initiative.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by chetak »

YashG wrote:
KSingh wrote: if anything it might be better to pick outside of the service chief cadre for the very reason you’ve alluded to-if they’ve never work the hat of a service chief then they might not succumb to
The same service-centric thinking and will be able to see the bigger picture- the exact mandate of the post.
If that is the case then why even consider only service people - take someone very competent in big picture or reforms from outside services - someone competent from private sector or IAS or IFS like Jaishankar.

Essentially if the idea of this scheme is to upend the status quo - then this is not a theaterization project, this is reforms project but just not fully baked either a reform or a theaterization initiative.
Maybe, that is possibly what all this is slowly leading up to. A cut rate, one exam wonder, walking dog in the stadium type of entitled babooze at the top of the pyramid.

This was a debate and discussion that should have been done and dusted by the GoI much before it made Gen Rawat the CDS. Having such discussions now clearly indicates that the naysayers have gained the upper hand and are forcing changes/rethink that may or may not be in the best understanding of India's supreme national interests

Theaterisation refers to placing specific units of the army, the navy and the air force under a theatre commander.
Who fears theaterisation, and why are they objecting to the theaterisation initiatives. Who is pushing their buttons and why. And finally, cui bono


or has this morphed into something very different than what was envisaged earlier.

Big picture means the battlefield in its entirety, the extended border management, the war fighting resources and mobilizing the support ecosystem by unifying command and control of BSF, ICG, border state police forces etc, doctrines like cold start, tactical deployment scenarios and strategizing that have evolved from threat perceptions existing and effectively countering enemy response and buildup to blunt emerging threat vectors. Satellites have now changed the very process of the management of threats. Focussed responses are options that have opened up like never before.

The MEA, MOD et al are the fingers which can guide the fist but the bulk of the Forces are the fist, a blunt instrument, usually meant for major traumatic use only. The surgical strike scalpel can only be wielded by special forces, operating largely away from the usual and traditionally understood/accepted command and control structures.

The Forces, when used in earlier times, were seen to be a measure of last resort until the "state supported, non state players" with their trade marked plausible deniability came along and threats posed by lone wolves took counter armed response by the state into areas and directions that were not envisaged earlier.

The Forces have a deterrent value for sure, but if not used for a long time, like the cheeni army, for instance, then the perceived efficacy is lost or you end up with an enemy keen to probe and test those "deterrent" forces.

If you bring in "outsiders" and non stake holders into the arena which is the exclusive domain of the armed forces, one risks the disasters that were precipitated by guys like McNamara who thought that the solution to any and every problem was more data, more analysis and more metrics. The problem with such an approach is that the ecosystem very soon learns to manufacture concocted data, pleasing to the boss's ears and bearing no relation to the truth.

Bomb loads dropped in faraway safe zones, far removed from hostile and well protected targets, falsified BDAs reports, patrols reported as completed but never done, are some of the consequences of the blind and foolhardy application of business metrics.

Guys like McNamara, in case of a business failure, risk, at most, a momentary dip in reputation because they have huge golden parachutes, and the ever open option of other greener pastures beckoning them seductively, under no circumstances do they ever risk physical harm, loss of limb or life or livelihood. And such guys die in the comfort of their homes or in expensive, luxurious assisted living facilities, fully paid for by their company funded insurances

The poor guys who are actually facing the enemy at the front have none of the above options.

Since the advent of the McNamara foolishness, the amerikis have lost almost every war that they have fought.
Robert Strange McNamara (June 9, 1916 – July 6, 2009) was an American business executive and the eighth United States Secretary of Defense, serving from 1961 to 1968 under Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson.

He played a major role in escalating the United States' involvement in the Vietnam War.

McNamara was responsible for the institution of systems analysis in public policy, which developed into the discipline known today as policy analysis.
this clown McNamara, brought in business metrics to the profession of arms and the amerikis have paid the price ever since.

The amerikis are running wars like a clueless startup company and trying to douse fires by offshore buildup of capabilities using contractors and unlimited resources.

Has this strategy worked for the amerikis or the europeans or the britshits. One idiotic european country even tested their weapon prototypes during coalition deployment.

Talk about cultural contempt and entitled extreme self interest brought about by malice, historic disdain and the mockery of accepted conventions of war fighting when going up against a "faceless" local enemy while the whiteys have the rigidly enforced cover of human rights violations to protect their own forces, no matter what.

The McNamara Fallacy
The McNamara fallacy is named after Robert McNamara. McNamara was a very successful man. He graduated from Harvard with an MBA in 1939. Later he became the first president of the Ford Motor Company from outside the Ford family, and eventually found himself as the U.S. Secretary of Defense during the Vietnam war and the Kennedy administration.

McNamara made his name during his time at Ford by choosing data points to measure, and then ruthlessly optimizing the processes that produced those data points to improve efficiency, costs, and quality.

He brought this same approach to the Vietnam war, where the main metric he used to determine success was body count. However, this approach failed as McNamara was blindsided by human behavior and the chaos and destruction of war. Essentially, body count is a poor measure of how a war is progressing, ignoring the mood of the public, territory gained, and strategic progress etc.

The McNamara Fallacy

Thus, the approach of reducing deeply human processes to a mere figure became known as the McNamara Fallacy, a term coined by the sociologist Daniel Yankelovitch. Yankelovitch described the fallacy in four points:

Measure whatever can be easily measured.
Disregard that which cannot be measured easily.
Presume that which cannot be measured easily is not important.
Presume that which cannot be measured easily does not exist.
The implications of each of the 4 steps of the fallacy are as follows:

This is ok as far as it goes.
This is artificial and misleading.
This is blindness.
This is suicide (at least as it applies to war).
In a nutshell, the McNamara fallacy is when a decision is based solely on numbers (e.g. metrics or statistics) and all qualitative factors are ignored. Doing this makes us blind to what is really going on, and it applies to many more situations that just war.

McNamara Fallacy Example: Business
Measurement in business is obviously crucial. Unfortunately the McNamara fallacy is present in many businesses today, where that which is easy to measure gets measured, and that which is difficult to measure gets ignored. We then place value on that which is easy to measure and try to optimize for it. Then we ignore everything else. Unfortunately, this can leave us blind to what is really going on within the business.

Let us suppose that a business has just created a new website. After a bedding in period they notice that visits to the site are up 50% and not only that, there is an uplift of 25% in the number of people who sign up to join their newsletter.

Congratulations all around, right? Not necessarily.

What if the percentage of people who never open one of their emails has increased? What if the percentage of people who unsubscribe immediately from the email list has increased? If people aren’t even reading the email then there isn’t that much if anything to celebrate.

By focussing on just those easy to measure headline metrics the business could have missed what is really going on with its users who have visited the site. By going deeper and using qualitative data as well as the hard figures, the business could have the opportunity to see the real issues, as well as the opportunities that are in front of them.

McNamara Fallacy Example: Education
In a very simplistic sense, two things are happening in every classroom, learning and performance. Performance is obviously very easy to measure, whereas learning is very difficult to measure.

Because of this, we tend to focus on what’s easy to measure, performance, using the proxy of test results. The logic then being that we can use the data from these results to improve standards. Applying McNamara’s fallacy, we can see that this is potentially the wrong way around and we should be looking to improve standards to drive up test results.

A culture of relentlessly focussing on data points will eventually in some cases lead to poor teaching and even cheating, because the focus has moved away from doing what is right, and has instead changed to focus only on hitting specific numbers. Everything else is forgotten or considered unimportant.

Summary
In a nutshell, the McNamara fallacy occurs when we focus on easy to measure numbers which don’t tell us the whole story, and we ignore everything else. The McNamara fallacy makes us blind to what is really going on. In a business sense, one way to spot the fallacy in action could be when all of your KPIs are going in the right direction yet your bottom line isn’t improving.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by chetak »

ks_sachin wrote:Chetak,

I will beg to disagree.

Once an officer does HC and does NDC and acr deems him or her fit for operational appointment as opposed to staff appointment they in theory they will get the experience of operational commands.

HEre is an aside;

The Army allowed Armd Corps officers to command RR Bns and even Bde's. Now you will agree that ARmd doctrine is very different to Inf.

Regards

S
let's agree to disagree.

so many one exam wonders have already done, and many others in future will also continue to do the HC and NDC courses. It doesn't mean jack. Are you implying that these "one exam wonders" are also somehow capable of heading operational commands, merely on the completion of these courses.

Many uniformed foreigners may also attend these courses, depending on which countries the govt of the day is interested in wooing. I have yet to hear of even one non uniformed man or woman from another country being deputed by their countries to do these courses. The same also applies to the staff college at DSSC at wellington.

I could well be wrong.

Parent service wise, these one exam wonders have always enforced their "claim" to superiority. They excel, both in the application and the development of tactics and strategy, but that art is limited only to the political arena and more often than not, aimed solely at personal and family aggrandizement.

They blatantly encroach, slyly occupy and often (mis)appropriate high profile posts and vacancies not meant for them, using networks and connections with politicos to usurp. The CDS, both in terms of (rightly) deplatforming them from the ecosystem of military professionals and curtailing their influence in defence policy matters has hit such people and their colonial mentality of service hierarchy quite badly.

Since independence, one way or the other, the one exam wonders have interfered under the purposely misinterpreted guise of "civilian" control over the military and consistently fuelled fears among the insecure politicos of a paki like military take over. Zia hanging zulfikar and musharaff sun roofing handling benazir haunts them. That is why coupta could fan the flames of a military coup like he was instructed by the babooze to do.

The turf protecting one exam wonders are, very often at their freeloading best, while quaffing free single malt, and single mindedly tucking into the foreign embassy provided kakabs and other tandoori delights while loudly lamenting nostalgically, the departure of the parivaari mafia.

Ayurveda practitioners, physiotherapists and dentists, all call themselves "doctors".

Are they capable of attending medical emergencies
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by Rakesh »

Why Indian Air Force Opposes Unified Theatre Commands | AVM Anil Golani

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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ks_sachin »

chetak wrote:let's agree to disagree....
So as an example Gen Pande should not have become chief. Is that what u r saying?
Because the question is all about operational experience for offrs from combat support arms.
We have had some less than stalwart individuals as chiefs from combat arms in the last recent past.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by chetak »

^^^^^^^

agree to disagree means that no justification/explanation is required or even deemed necessary
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by eklavya »

It might be instructive to study the background of the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The US has had 21 of these officers, so their experience could be worth studying. Starting with the current Chairman, and going backwards, the previous role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs:

1. Mark Milley: Chief of Staff of the US Army
2. Joseph Dunford: Commandant of the Marine Corp
3. Martin Dempsey: Chief of Staff of the US Army
4. Michael Mullen: Chief of Naval Operations
5. Peter Pace: Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, US Southern Command (theatre command)
6. Richard Myers: Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) and US Space Command
7. Hugh Shelton: US Special Operations Command (SOCOM)
8. John Shalikashvili: Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)
9. Colin Powell: Forces Command (a US Army command); previously NSA to President Reagan
10. William Crowe: US Pacific Command (now the US Indo Pacific Command)
11. John Vessey: Vice Chief of Staff of the US Army
12. David Jones: Chief of Staff of the USAF
13. George Brown: Chief of Staff of the USAF
14. Thomas Moorer: Chief of Naval Operations
15. Earle Wheeler: Chief of Staff of the US Army
16. Maxwell Taylor: retired and recalled, Chief of Staff of the US Army
17. Lyman Lemnitzer: Chief of Staff of the US Army
18. Nathan Twining: Chief of Staff of the USAF
19. Arthur Radford: US Pacific Fleet
20. Omar Bradley: Chief of Staff of the US Army
21. William Leahy: retired and recalled, Chief of Naval Operations

So, I count:
1. 13 former service chiefs (of which 2 had retired and were recalled)
2. 2 former Vice Chiefs of the Joint Chiefs (both former theatre commanders)
3. 3 former theatre commanders
4. 2 former single service command commanders
5. 1 former single service Vice Chief

Seems like a job that the US gives to predominantly serving officers (19 of 21), and being a service chief (13 of 21) or theatre commander (5 of 21) is also a key “qualification”.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by eklavya »

KSingh wrote: It’s becoming apparent that service chiefs are far too powerful and are respectively disrupting all major Announced reforms to protect their little empires. Opening up the pool of candidates allows for more meritocracy- it’s silly to assume that only those that make it to 4* currently are suitable to take the CDS post- instead they may be too entrenched in the aforementioned empire building game.
The most powerful (and by some distance) defence official in India has historically been the Defence Secretary. As far as the IAS is concerned, they would like the CDS to be a Chaprasi to the Defence Secretary.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by chetak »

eklavya wrote:
KSingh wrote: It’s becoming apparent that service chiefs are far too powerful and are respectively disrupting all major Announced reforms to protect their little empires. Opening up the pool of candidates allows for more meritocracy- it’s silly to assume that only those that make it to 4* currently are suitable to take the CDS post- instead they may be too entrenched in the aforementioned empire building game.
The most powerful (and by some distance) defence official in India has historically been the Defence Secretary. As far as the IAS is concerned, they would like the CDS to be a Chaprasi to the Defence Secretary.
The narrative that the babooze are selling and it already has a large number of takers among the gawar political crowd is this:
The biggest fear is in concentrating the military power of the three defence forces in the hands of one military officer and that is being sold as highly dangerous for the Indian democracy.
one service in particular has been baulking at the very idea and concept of the CDS. To this service, the babooze have always insidiously sold another story which is well known and does not bear repeating.

The name of the game is the age old principle of divide ac regulae or divide and rule which was first introduced into India as a policy by lord minto, to target the Indian nationalists and to break the unity of the Indian people.

After the 1857 joint uprising of the Hindus and the muslims against the britshit rule, the surprised, shocked and panicked britshits the managed to supress the uprising and then they decided to start the policy of divide and rule.

that policy is still being applied by the mafia famiglia, the commies, abrahamics, and the BIF.

The huge and spontaneous outpouring of grief for Gen Rawat after his demise attested to the popularity of the departed CDS. Many politicos were badly shaken by the regard in which the ordinary Indian on the street held Gen Rawat.

FM Manekshaw was also sidelined by the politicos and the babooze for the very same reason.

And now, the CDS is being targeted in an all out turf war that will have no winners but will entirely benefit the BIF.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by chetak »

eklavya wrote:
KSingh wrote: It’s becoming apparent that service chiefs are far too powerful and are respectively disrupting all major Announced reforms to protect their little empires. Opening up the pool of candidates allows for more meritocracy- it’s silly to assume that only those that make it to 4* currently are suitable to take the CDS post- instead they may be too entrenched in the aforementioned empire building game.
The most powerful (and by some distance) defence official in India has historically been the Defence Secretary. As far as the IAS is concerned, they would like the CDS to be a Chaprasi to the Defence Secretary.
one is gung ho, another is so so and yet another is dead set against.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by eklavya »

chetak wrote:
The narrative that the babooze are selling and it already has a large number of takers among the gawar political crowd is this:
The biggest fear is in concentrating the military power of the three defence forces in the hands of one military officer and that is being sold as highly dangerous for the Indian democracy.
Sir, in my (admittedly limited) experience, most politicians in India are well aware that the greatest danger to Indian democracy are the politicians themselves. And your contention is that they would like to keep it that way. :)
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by chetak »

eklavya wrote:
chetak wrote:
The narrative that the babooze are selling and it already has a large number of takers among the gawar political crowd is this:

Sir, in my (admittedly limited) experience, most politicians in India are well aware that the greatest danger to Indian democracy are the politicians themselves. And your contention is that they would like to keep it that way. :)
It is not my contention...

since the days of neverwho, the politicos in India have always been terrified of a coup by the army, a la paki ishtyle.

and this is how the babooze are spinning the issue of the CDS to try and build political consensus to stall/stop it

every politico in India knows that while the army may respect the structure of the power hierarchy, the army has nothing but contempt for most politicos and their shenanigans and that's what scares them the most
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ramana »

During Gen Rawat's tenure some gaps were identified by him.
These could be corrected during this selection process.

One big gap looks like the babus wanted CDS to report to Def Secy.
This was not the intent of KRC report.
So org chart could also be revised

Indian military evolved from British and retained the worst features and very few of the best features.
Let's see. Am hopeful.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ks_sachin »

chetak wrote:^^^^^^^

agree to disagree means that no justification/explanation is required or even deemed necessary
Yeah yeah. Did the rant make u feel better?
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by eklavya »

chetak wrote: the politicos in India have always been terrified of a coup by the army, a la paki ishtyle.
I respectfully disagree sir. The political and civil service cadre and the public at large in India know that the Indian Army is the foremost guarantor of India’s democratic structure and constitution. A coup in India is simply inconceivable.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by chetak »

eklavya wrote:
chetak wrote: the politicos in India have always been terrified of a coup by the army, a la paki ishtyle.
I respectfully disagree sir. The political and civil service cadre and the public at large in India know that the Indian Army is the foremost guarantor of India’s democratic structure and constitution. A coup in India is simply inconceivable.
You need to study the situation a bit more in detail, eklavya ji.

The fact that a coup in India is simply inconceivable is very true but the fear of a coup among the politicos is a very real phobia that has been regularly stoked and insidiously ingrained into their psyche by the power hungry babooze, the brown sahibs.

This is to the entire credit of the Indian Armed Forces, their deeply ingrained ethos of discipline, and their inherent essence of dedication to national service. They were always apolitical and will always remain apolitical, no matter who leads them. The civilians neither understand this philosophy and neither do they care.

why is there the need for a plethora of armed services distributed in the states and also other armed services under the sole control of the home ministry. Why do they even exist.

Why is there another set of armed services under the MoD with no connection or contact with those in the home ministry.

Why is there a need for assam rifles, BSF, cobras, provincial armed constabulary, Bihar Military Police, Haryana Armed Police, Jharkhand Armed Police, Karnataka State Reserve Police, Kerala Armed Police, Madhya Pradesh Special Armed Police, Mizoram Armed Police, Odisha Special Armed Police, Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB), Indo-Tibetan Border Police Force (ITBP) and the list goes on endlessly and what is it exactly that these guys do that the normal state police or the IA cannot not do...

They have also duplicated most of the functions of the IA. This is a huge luxury for a poor country like India. It was neverwho and his babooze who did this to ensure that trained forces wielding arms were also available outside the command and control structures of the Army. These were meant to oppose and block the IA in case any coup was attempted against the head of the govt. The glaring example of the pakis was staring neverwho and his woke commie pals in the face.

In which other country are ranking generals at the beck and call of a BA pass, one exam wonder babooze. is this what was meant by "civilian control" of the IA or was the duly elected and officially appointed minister a mere mukhota while the unelected babooze wielded the actual power. The babooze truly shines in such situations because he is as happy as a pig wallowing in schitt - and he is in his element - "full authority and nil responsibility"

When the IA is called to help in case of emergencies caused by riots or natural calamities, a full col or a brigadier comes under the official control of a gawar, still wet behind the ears DC or DM on his very first posting.

why is there open hostility among the IPS, IAS and the Military. Who keeps them always at loggerheads.

why do the HM forces come under a centralised army command only during national emergencies and immediately thereafter revert back to the parent control.

why are demobbed IA soldiers/officers almost never recruited into these non Army armed services. They are extremely well trained, disciplined, experienced, blooded in operational scenarios and a lot of them have seen the stress of battle.

why is there so much of intra service animosity among the leadership of all these armed services and who keeps this pot always boiling..

why did coupta cause so much of panic in the Govt when he claimed in a headlined newspaper article that a coup was in progress, led by the IA. The very same General who was under suspicion of attempting the coup is today a minister in the Modi govt.

So, who would you believe, the Modi govt or this lying @h0le coupta

would such a thing have been possible in the UK, EU or amrika.

In any country other than India, coupta would have been kicked out of his job, banned from all employment and he would died penniless. He lied through his false teeth and he could only have been pushed to do this by the mafia famiglia using a babooze cut out. and yet the liar is thriving today, still lying thru his teeth and cooking up stories.

So, any which way one chooses to slice it, one simply cannot dismiss the rabid fear of the politicos, slyly fuelled and stoked by the cunning babooze, that the IA is just waiting to take over the country after a coup against the central govt.

IG and her babooze used the very same narrative when they maliciously side lined FM Manekshaw, and did not pay his salary as a FM for decades and the payment was made only when President Kalam visited FM Manekshaw at the hospital during his last days and was horrified to discover that the babooze had vindictively held up his payments.

A junior babooze joker was sent post haste with the cheque covering all the pending payments that had been with held over the decades and that was because President Kalam was mightily pissed off at the entire tribe of babooze.

AFAIK, not a single politico or service chief attended FM Manekshaw's funereal. This is how we treat our national heroes. Not a single service chief attended this great human being's last rites

The government, too, was poorly represented, with just minister pallam raju, MOS defence sent to attend the funereal ..

They feared that he had gotten too popular after the 1971 war and also too well known as well and that resulted in the old fears of a coup being dusted off and resurrected.

Ergo, they just sidelined him and blanked him out of the public's memory and making it quietly known to all in govt circles that he was a PNG.

IG was no less paranoid than her pater neverwho, and that very same paranoia of a coup drives the mafia famiglia too.

Moreover, the primary objection against the CDS has always come from the very top of the congi and commie hierarchy. This so called elite fear the lamp post more than anything else. The lamp post is a well known and historic fascist tradition

A pox on all their houses




https://indianexpress.com/article/news- ... ying-govt/

The January night Raisina Hill was spooked: Two key Army units moved towards Delhi without notifying Govt

Army called it routine exercise but so deep is distrust, alarm bells rang at highest levels in govt.



Written by Shekhar Gupta , Ritu Sarin , Pranab Dhal Samanta | New Delhi |

April 4, 2012 2:39:14 am

This is a story you would tell with extreme care and caution. But it so starkly characterises the current state of top-level politico-military relations that it is a folly to keep it under wraps,as the entire establishment has tried to do for a full 11 weeks now. It has also taken this team of The Indian Express reporters that long to establish the story and the dramatic developments during,say,about 18 very difficult hours on January 16-17 earlier this year. While many,including the spokesmen for the defence establishment,say it was much ado about nothing (see box),it is a story of a most unusual night when Raisina Hill was spooked as never before in peace time.

indian express troop movement report The Indian Express front page on April 4, 2012
Essentially,late on the night of January 16 (the day Army Chief General V K Singh approached the Supreme Court on his date of birth issue),central intelligence agencies reported an unexpected (and non-notified) movement by a key military unit,from the mechanised infantry based in Hisar (Haryana) as a part of the 33rd Armoured Division (which is a part of 1 Corps,a strike formation based in Mathura and commanded by Lt Gen. A K Singh) in the direction of the capital,150 km away.

Any suspicion was still considered much too implausible,but lookouts were alerted as a routine step. This was part of a protocol put in place in June 1984 when some mutineers from Sikh units had moved towards the capital in the wake of Operation Bluestar.

The lookouts confirmed the movement of what looked like a sizeable unit. It was soon identified as an entire unit of Mechanised Infantry,with its Russian-made Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFVs),carried on 48 tank transporters. The movement was towards the capital,which was odd.

It was still a cause for curiosity and some confusion — more than much concern — because,over the decades,New Delhi has come to be totally relaxed and trustful of the apolitical and professionally correct nature of its military leadership.

The situation changed rapidly,though. Reports came in of yet another military movement “towards” Delhi. This unit was identified as a large element of the airborne 50 Para Brigade based at Agra.

The lookouts were activated south of Delhi as well and the column was identified.

By this time,both columns were being tracked and “watched”. A bemused establishment raised an alert of sorts. The Defence Minister was informed. Immediately, the Centre put in motion an old contingency plan to delay just such a move.

It issued a terror alert with instructions to police to carefully check all vehicles on the highways leading to Delhi. The objective was to slow down traffic. The Prime Minister was informed at the crack of dawn on January 17. Quiet checks carried out on the location and status of key formations and their commanders,particularly in the northwestern region,revealed nothing abnormal at all. Defence Secretary Shashi Kant Sharma was asked to cut short his visit to Malaysia. He returned.

After the briefing,he opened his office late at night and asked Lt Gen. A K Choudhary,Director General Military Operations,to see him and explain what was going on. Gen. Choudhary,it seems,knew about the move of the Paras (the Para Brigade is controlled directly by the DGMO) and said it was a routine exercise.

He was asked to return with full facts about the mechanised unit. This he did soon enough. The explanation was still the same: the Army was carrying out exercises to check its ability to make quick deployments of key units during fog. He was told to send the units back immediately. Both formations were halted,and sent back within hours.

The mechanised unit,sources said,had parked itself at an industrial park near Bahadurgarh abutting West Delhi’s Najafgarh. The Paras were staying put in the barracks of an artillery regiment — 79 Medium —not far from Palam.

The Army’s explanation that it was all a simple fog-time exercise was then viewed with scepticism at the highest level. The question: Why was the well-set protocol,that any military movement,at any time,in the NCR (National Capital Region) has to be pre-notified to MoD (Ministry of Defence) not followed?

The Army’s justification for the specific movements did sound plausible though. The mechanised units,they said,were checking out their ability to move and deploy rapidly in fog,should a contingency arrive. It could not have driven westwards (towards Ferozepur or Fazilka) as that would have alarmed Pakistan since the move had not been notified to them.

There was a more elaborate explanation for the paratroopers’ movement. The mandated time for the Agra-based Paras to get airborne in an emergency is just two hours. It was simpler when they were transported by aircraft based “in situ”,at the same military complex in Agra.

The new designated transport for them is the faster,bigger and brand new C-130J Hercules. The IAF has based the C-130s at Hindon,across the Yamuna,east of Delhi. Since fog lifts in Agra much later (11.30 am) than at Hindon (8.30 am) in January,the Army was checking out the possibility of transporting the paratroopers to Hindon by road to “marry” them with the C-130s,rather than wait for the planes to land at Agra,and thereby save time.

In the process,the Army said,they discovered many glitches. These are now being ironed out. For example,it was found that the shoulder-fired missiles,standard equipment with Para units,were stored not in Agra,as decided several years earlier,but at Bharatpur as was the case originally.

So the columns were delayed by that detour and the stop at Bharatpur to pick up their missiles,and thereby also forced to take a longer route to Delhi. The good lesson learnt: all of the Paras’ equipment must now be based where their home is,at Agra.

But this was questioned too. Did the mechanised units have to come as far as the outskirts of Delhi to check out their readiness? And Hindon is a long distance from Palam/Gurgaon. Even on a reasonable day,an Army convoy might take longer moving from here to Hindon given the snarls on Outer Ring Road and NH-24,than if only it had crossed the Yamuna at Agra itself and driven through Uttar Pradesh,parallel to GT Road. Why was the IAF not informed of this exercise? Again,the Army’s explanation is they did not want to hold an elaborate exercise involving the IAF etc,or cause alarm.

The government also noted the fact that the C-130s were not even in Hindon then. They were in Jaisalmer,rehearsing at their staging base for the Republic Day flypast. Yet another reason some in the government were curious was that between Army Day (January 15),and Republic Day (January 26),when so many Army units are involved in parades,such exercises are rare,particularly around the capital.

The Indian Express has had detailed conversations with key people and sources at the very top of the political,civil and military leadership. There is unanimity over General V K Singh’s impeccable reputation as a sound,professional soldier,earned over nearly 42 years of distinguished service to the Army. Nobody is using the “C” word to imply anything other than “curious”. All else is considered an impossibility.

But so strained has the political-military relationship been these weeks,that nothing is easily dismissed as a routine misdemeanour. The timing — the Chief’s petition on his date of birth was filed on the morning of January 16 — did not help.

Sources speak of confusion and unease in the government. To be fair,the MoD’s considered view now seems to be that it was a false alarm,caused by some non-adherence to Standard Operating Procedures (SoPs) by the Army and an alarmist civil/political reaction on a particularly distrustful day.

We learn,however,as a consequence,that certain “important correctives” have been put in place. Incidentally,the Home Ministry has turned down the Army Headquarters’ recommendation (subsequent to the events of January 16/17) to appoint Lt Gen. Choudhary as D-G Assam Rifles,the paramilitary force it controls.

These are the bare facts of an unusual set of events. It is too early to answer all the ‘hows,whys and the what-nexts’ of this. Or to say whether it was an avoidable case of neurosis the Indian establishment is — mercifully — not familiar with.

These facts may indeed be officially denied for now. But these will be debated for a long time,forcing the UPA to introspect on its mismanagement of the delicate civil-military relationship,bruised as it is now by charges of corruption,bribes and bribe offers and indiscipline. These will also have a bearing on the future course of higher defence organisation and control in India.

(Ajmer Singh contributed to this report)

What Happened

* On Jan 16,an entire unit of mechanised infantry based in Hisar with its fighting vehicles began moving towards Delhi. It parked near Najafgarh

* Sizeable section of the Agra-based 50 Para Brigade also moved to near Palam

* Both were stopped and ordered to be moved back

What Army says

* These were exercises to check effectiveness in fog

* Troops moved towards Delhi,not outward,westward since Pakistan hadn’t been notified

* The Paras were being moved to check out possibility of their “marrying” with the C-130s in Hindon

Unanswered questions

* Why wasn’t Ministry of Defence notified?

* Did the units have to come so far towards Delhi?

* Why was the IAF not informed?

Baseless reports,says Ministry of Defence

Defence Ministry spokesperson Sitanshu Kar:

“Such reports are completely baseless and we categorically deny the same.”

Army does not deny movement: Routine training

Maj Gen S L Narasimhan,Additional Director General,Public Information,did not deny the movements,but said these were routine.

“These were routine training at the formation-level to check the effectiveness of mobilisation as per Standard Operating Procedure of local formations. Almost all units of the Army carry out a number of such training at different times of the year.”

* Asked if mobilisation from the two cantonments were authorised,Narasimhan said: “Such routine training does not need authorisation.”

* Why were the troops suddenly called back? “Once the effectiveness of the mobilisation was checked,the troops were called back as per Standard Operating Procedure.”

* When was the last time that troops were moved on this scale? “Even formation-level (higher than this scale) mobilisation practices are carried out routinely.”

* Asked if the Ministry of Defence sought written reports from the commanders,Narasimhan said: “No such explanation has been asked by the MoD.”
Last edited by chetak on 11 Jun 2022 10:17, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by wig »

https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comme ... ter-402784

Ensure no dilution of CDS’s role, charter by Gen Deepak Kapoor (Retd)
extracts
However, herein lies a major dilemma. All Army commanders and equivalent-level officers of the sister services have to their credit 39-40 years of distinguished service with all of them having been cleared for promotion to successive ranks above Lt Colonel/equivalent by a stringent selection board where almost 60% get rejected every time. Statistically speaking, just 0.7% reach the rank of the Chief. Thus, all commanders who have come through this baptism of fire are equally competent. Making a choice from among these to select the CDS and Chiefs is not easy, especially if the seniority principle has to be given the go-by.

By tweaking the policy and including retired Army commanders/equivalents below 62 years of age, the government has widened the field for selection of the CDS. While this may provide it with wider choice for selection, it lays itself bare to the criticism of possible political manipulation. To keep the services apolitical is a principle which has been successfully followed most of the time since Independence.


In the seniority-conscious services, the possibility that a retired three-star officer may well be senior to some or all of the current serving Chiefs with regard to date of commissioning is strong. Hence, the inclusion of retired Army commanders and equivalents below 62 years of age in the selection process may not raise too many hackles. In any case, though ‘first among equals’, the CDS is as much a four-star officer as the service Chiefs.

The issue that should be a major concern in the interest of national security is that the right person is selected to carry forward the tasks that unfortunately could not be completed during Gen Rawat’s time. We are lagging way behind other modern nations in achieving jointness and interoperability amongst the three services. Service-centric approach and attempts at empire building/protecting needs to give way in the interest of national security and achieving optimum utilisation of scarce national resources. Atmanirbharta or self-sufficiency also has a huge role to play in this context.
suggestion
In a refinement of the previous policy decision on the CDS, wherein he is mandated to be the single-point adviser to the Raksha Mantri (RM), it is suggested that instead he should be the single-point adviser to the Prime Minister who is the head of the government. The service Chiefs have as much access to the RM as the CDS, thus denuding his single-point advisory role. It would also be in greater consonance with the Kargil Review Committee recommendations (2001), which had been accepted for implementation by the government and which form the basis of creation of the post of CDS.

As a follow-up of the above principle, the operational responsibility, which is the crux of the single-point advisory role, should shift to the CDS once theatre commands are created. The theatre commanders should be reporting directly to the CDS on operational aspects. The service Chief’s charter should be revised along the lines of the US system with suitable modifications to meet our requirements.
ramana
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ramana »

The theatre commanders should be reporting directly to the CDS on operational aspects.
That's the idea always from KRC times.
Service chiefs will be matrix organizations providing resources including manpower.
All this is in line with Clausewitz's principles.
ks_sachin
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ks_sachin »

Heard from a chaiwallah that Gen Naravane was not very popular for not being a “yes man” and hence not considered for post. Babooze may not have liked him hence all this tamasha..FWIW
ramana
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ramana »

If you go meet that chaiwala tell him he is erroneous.
He doesn't meet the 62 years criteria.
ks_sachin
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ks_sachin »

Will do
nandakumar
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by nandakumar »

ks_sachin wrote:Heard from a chaiwallah that Gen Naravane was not very popular for not being a “yes man” and hence not considered for post. Babooze may not have liked him hence all this tamasha..FWIW
In a tangential note, isn't that being unfair to Gen Rawat? More so when he is no longer alive?
ks_sachin
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ks_sachin »

nandakumar wrote:
ks_sachin wrote:Heard from a chaiwallah that Gen Naravane was not very popular for not being a “yes man” and hence not considered for post. Babooze may not have liked him hence all this tamasha..FWIW
In a tangential note, isn't that being unfair to Gen Rawat? More so when he is no longer alive?
Is it? Damn my wife keeps saying that I have no EQ!!!

Gen Rawat's record exists and speaks for itself - whether he is alive or dead.

Gen Rawat also superseded Gen Bakshi and Gen Hariz BTW...
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