CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

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ManuJ
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ManuJ »

I'm all for theatre commands, but the current plan seems confused and too army-centric.
Army's Northern Command not being part of any theatre command doesn't make any sense.
Not clear which air defense assets would be part of the theatre commands and which would be part of the Air Defense Command.
Why a single Maritime Command if the idea is to have Pakistan-centric and China-centric commands? Why not integrate Navy's western fleet into the Pakistan-centric command for example?

I'm wondering whether the first step should be creating per-service theatre commands, which would be less controversial and would allow time to fine-tune the theatre command concept, and gradually working towards inter-service joint theatre commands.
ParGha
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ParGha »

Anoop wrote:
ParGha wrote:O3-O8.
Sir, can you please correlate the numbers to ranks? Thank you.
O3 = Army Captain (or Navy Senior Lieutenant)
O4 = Army Major (or Navy Lt. Commander)
...
O8 = Major General (or Navy Rear Admiral)
ramana
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ramana »

srai wrote:^^^

IA Northern Command outside of the two new Theater Commands for Chinese and Pakistan?

Since the current CDS is from IA, they have the first take on the joint theater commands. We will see IN and IAF take when their chiefs rotate in two-three years and assume CDS position.
All CDS appointments will be by selection.
This rotation bokwas will be ended.
And criteria is known to the three service chiefs.
ramana
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ramana »

ManuJ wrote:I'm all for theatre commands, but the current plan seems confused and too army-centric.
Army's Northern Command not being part of any theatre command doesn't make any sense.*
Not clear which air defense assets would be part of the theatre commands and which would be part of the Air Defense Command.
Why a single Maritime Command if the idea is to have Pakistan-centric and China-centric commands? Why not integrate Navy's western fleet into the Pakistan-centric command for example?

I'm wondering whether the first step should be creating per-service theatre commands, which would be less controversial and would allow time to fine-tune the theatre command concept, and gradually working towards inter-service joint theatre commands.
First look at threats. China has a single command (Western Theater Command) to handle India.
Whereas India has 7 commands facing China and each talk to headquarters before they talk to their equivalent who is nearby and underfire from opponents.
All these are documented in KRC from 1999 onwards.
And politicians and services kept stalling at cost of national security.
After the overwhelming mandate in 2019, the PM took the decision to appoint CDs and tasked the CDS to form the theater commands in a time-bound manner.
From 2014 to 2019 PM has seen numerous confrontations with both Pakistan and China and seen the gaps.
Hence this decision.
Anyone has objection they can obtain political power and argue with him.
In the future based on threat perception, new commands would be created.
Air defense is total defense from air attacks.
Not land or naval!
Means ground to air, air to air assets full spectrum.
* Northern Command is unique as it has both PoK, and Kashmiri terrorist threats. All land-based.
Western theater Command will take care of all FizzleYa.

The single maritime command is created to cover both coasts as the fleet needs total coordination to handle seaborne threat which is from PLAN. TSPN is a brown water force.

As for strategy, in UK the best strategic thinkers have been two Captains who taught and trained a whole generation of officers.
Captain Liddel Hart and Captain Michael Howard.
Jointness comes from the desire to defeat and destroy the enemy, not from parades and flypasts or fleet reviews.
If anyone is in journalism go look up NaMo speech to Commanders in Gujarat under the Statue of Unity overlooking them to understand content, context, and symbolism.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ramana »

MHOW, College of Combat is the operational joint services institute.
Wellington is for joint services Staff function.
Next, they meet is National Defence College.
Special Forces is all joint services.
srai
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by srai »

ramana wrote:
srai wrote:^^^

IA Northern Command outside of the two new Theater Commands for Chinese and Pakistan?

Since the current CDS is from IA, they have the first take on the joint theater commands. We will see IN and IAF take when their chiefs rotate in two-three years and assume CDS position.
All CDS appointments will be by selection.
This rotation bokwas will be ended.
And criteria is known to the three service chiefs.
Let’s see. Doubt IAF/IN would be committed until they also get the rotation.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ramana »

Doesn't matter.
No more gymkhana club
LakshmanPST
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by LakshmanPST »

Full interview of Gen Bipin Rawat. His comment on doctrine of Air Force aside, first 17 minutes of the interview is about theaterisaton.
Total 5 Commands are coming up--->
- Air Defence Command,
- Maritime Theatre Command,
- 2 Land based Theatre Commands; Western Theatre and Northern Theatre
- Current Northern Command of the Army will continue
----
Only doubt I have is that there might be overlap between Air Defence Command and Theater Commands regarding management of Air space... Let's see how things will pan out...
chetak
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by chetak »

ramana wrote:
srai wrote:^^^

IA Northern Command outside of the two new Theater Commands for Chinese and Pakistan?

Since the current CDS is from IA, they have the first take on the joint theater commands. We will see IN and IAF take when their chiefs rotate in two-three years and assume CDS position.
All CDS appointments will be by selection.
This rotation bokwas will be ended.
And criteria is known to the three service chiefs.
and therein lies the rub.

there has always been a school of thought that has sought the CDS post for one service only.

at the end of the day, it is the army that is always at the FEBA, literally the bleeding edge.

They have to advance, attack, occupy, defend, and hold territory. They bear the major brunt.

There is no way of either getting around or ignoring facts

the vietcong were bombed relentlessly but they still continued to crawl out of their burrows and strike at will.

Military's internal spat out in open; CDS terms Air Force as support arm, IAF chief disagrees
via@ani_digital·6h
Anoop
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by Anoop »

ramana wrote:All CDS appointments will be by selection.
This rotation bokwas will be ended.
Ramana, on what basis are you making this claim? I can't see how this is feasible, especially since the CDS is now touted to be an operational head, rather than a first among equals appointment. At the time of the CDS post creation, it was said in the press that each Service Chief will retain operational and functional authority over his Service, with CDS role being limited to Perspective Planning, Equipping and formulating Joint Doctrines. That role has now grown in importance, with the Theater Commands heads exercising operational control i.e. the role formerly associated with the Service Chiefs. So, in this new scenario, the selection policy you mentioned will require the CDS and Service Chiefs to select someone junior to themselves to be their higher ranking officer! Even setting aside that aspect, the only candidates who can have some experience in inter Service matters are those who have held the CIDS positions...those appointments have been given so far only to those who have had a line of sight to maximum Deputy Chief of the respective Services, not even to the Vice Chief's appointments. So, net net, what you are claiming is not feasible for another decade or two.

The most feasible option is to have the senior most Service Chief take on an additional 2 years as CDS i.e an extension of service term to the Chief of Staff Committee. This will naturally ensure rotation among Services, smooth over inter Service rivalry and set a precedent of biding your Services' time when it comes to capital allocation etc. The key is to make sure the system works and that can be best achieved by consensus developed over time in the new way of doing things.

Thanks,
Anoop
basant
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by basant »

srai wrote: Let’s see. Doubt IAF/IN would be committed until they also get the rotation.
They are military men, and they are expected to take orders. As of commitment, first let the services show it to qualified indigenous equipment. I can't respect those who turn a blind eye causing terrible strategic weaknesses that have decades of impact.
LakshmanPST
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by LakshmanPST »

Interview with Air Chief Marshal RKS Bhadauria...
He talks about Theaterization from 11:30 to 17:30...
-
The interviewer tried to push popular arguements against theaterization, supposedly made by some ppl in IAF, to extract certain responses...
Personally, I felt Air Chief didn't take the bait by refusing to answer them saying that things are still in discussions while also assuring that IAF is fully committed to integration...
Where as, CDS took the bait in the interview shared previously by giving unnecessary responses to these questions... CDS's responses gives a feeling that IAF is not fully committed to it...
kit
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by kit »

The IAF is not yet a strategic force , just my thought. It has force projection capabilities in the neighbourhood but not globally, though it has demonstrated exercise deployments.
In so far it's role would be for "shock and awe" and holding air dominance in a theater of war. Without ground forces no matter what gains earned cannot be retained. So IAF would only be a supportive role in the greater conflict.
eklavya
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by eklavya »

^^^^
Without the proper employment of air power, there will be no gains to be retained. If air power is properly employed, victory can be swift and decisive. The alternative is stalemate or worse.
ramana
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ramana »

Anoop, Lets see.
LakshmanPST
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by LakshmanPST »

Anoop wrote:
ramana wrote:All CDS appointments will be by selection.
This rotation bokwas will be ended.
Ramana, on what basis are you making this claim? I can't see how this is feasible, especially since the CDS is now touted to be an operational head, rather than a first among equals appointment. At the time of the CDS post creation, it was said in the press that each Service Chief will retain operational and functional authority over his Service, with CDS role being limited to Perspective Planning, Equipping and formulating Joint Doctrines. That role has now grown in importance, with the Theater Commands heads exercising operational control i.e. the role formerly associated with the Service Chiefs.

....

Thanks,
Anoop
I think Theater Commanders will continue to be under Chiefs of Staff Committee comprising of CDS and three service chiefs...
The service chiefs will continue to have operational authority even in the new system...
uddu
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by uddu »

Air Chief Marshal RKS Bhadauria should be the next CDS.
aditp
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by aditp »

uddu wrote:Air Chief Marshal RKS Bhadauria should be the next CDS.
He retires on 30 September 2021. BiRa retires in 2023! Can happen only if the current ACM is recalled to service. But even that cant happen as he would have crossed 65yrs of age by that time.
chetak
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by chetak »

Hopefully, this is the right read of the situation.

Let's wait and see how things unfold.


Closer Look: What General Rawat Really Said On Theatre Commands And What That Implies


Closer Look: What General Rawat Really Said On Theatre Commands And What That Implies




Venu Gopal Narayanan
Jul 4, 2021

Closer Look: What General Rawat Really Said On Theatre Commands And What That Implies


Snapshot
Many issues and questions around theatre commands collided furiously when General Bipin Rawat, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), gave an interview to a television channel on 2 July.


There is a mighty war raging across India, and it is called ‘theaterization’. The legions of this epic conflict are filled with countless sturdy belligerents, who strike to cut through the battle ranks of cyberspace, with the dash of an Alexander at Gaugamela, a Zhukov at Kursk, or a Harbaksh Singh at Asal Uttar.

But who exactly is fighting whom, and why, is not too clear.

The crux of the clash lies in an ongoing transformational military process being devised by the Indian government — the administrative and operational amalgamation of the three services into integrated commands, whereby, the army, the navy and the air force would function in synchrony, in different, geographically well-defined theaters of activity, under one hat, to achieve specified political objectives.

As an organisational concept, then, theaterization makes perfect sense, because it cuts costs, optimizes resources, improves focus of charter, prevents duplication, reduces response times, enhances mobility, dovetails disparate logistics, consolidates material requirements, and holistically melds olive, blue and white into the grey steel of a single, deadly blade.

Indeed, some large militaries of the world have already implemented this concept successfully, and made theaterization the new benchmark for efficiency.

This transformation becomes all the more necessary in the present age, in which, there is a higher probability of a lethal threat being issued by the click of a mouse, or upon an un-manned platform, than from the barrel of a rifle.

That is the extent to which remote sensing, emergent technologies, and digitalization have radically altered the very nature of both threats and warfare.

In such a bewildering environment, how does one reconcile a boot on the ground with a guided missile approaching at supersonic velocity, or a fighter jet racing to interdict bandits, with ten lines of surreptitiously-inserted code that could disable its avionics to fatal effect?

What if, surreal as it sounds, a tactic can also function as a strategy?

It is this blurring of traditional lines between threats, responses, services and functions, which has now finally propelled the Indian government to embrace theaterization as the way forward.

But, there are multiple issues which need to be resolved, before this truly historic transformation of the Indian military is achieved.

This is where the acrimony and belligerence outlined at the start comes in.

Part of the problem is organisational, and part of it is administrative. How do you get three services with disparate styles of functioning to work as one?

How do you define a theatre? What is the optimal degree of multi-service integration required in a particular theatre? Who would report to whom? Does anyone understand that a binary approach to solutions will not work?

Will our security be compromised if this process is executed without due application of mind? Have we thought things through enough? How much of this debate can take place in the public domain without hurting national interests?

And what do we do when the issue gets severely politicized? (You can bet it will, because this is India, and we are like this only)

All of these questions, and many more, collided furiously when General Bipin Rawat, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), gave an interview to a television channel on 2 July.

With it, a complex debate on theaterization was swiftly reduced to two main points of perceived concern: a demotion of the Indian Air Force, and an emasculation of Northern Army Command.

But what exactly did the CDS say to cause such furore, and what is the truth?

First, he said that the entire Indian airspace would be integrated into one Air Defence Command, to counter diverse threats, from drones and artillery shells, to aircraft and missiles.

Second, he said that the security of the Indian Ocean region would be managed by a single Maritime Command, integrating the resources and capabilities the three services, with those of allied agencies like the Coastguard, the provincial coastal police, and central departments handling shipping and hydrology.

Even fishermen would function as their eyes and ears.

Third, pertinently, he said that two separate theatre commands would be set up, to tackle our western adversary (Pakistan), and the one to our north and east (China).

In case of a two-front war (yes, he used those words), resources would be allocated between these two theatres depending upon which one faced the graver challenge.

Fourth, with specific reference to Northern Army Command, the CDS plainly stated that there was already a unified command in place, to tackle both the twin-external threats, and internal security in Jammu and Kashmir.

But, he said, since the situation in that area was extremely fluid right now, with the risk of escalation running high, the Northern Army would, for the time being, remain as a separate Command, in addition to the two new theatre commands being created.

The operative phrase here is ‘for the time being’.

Fifth, he said that ‘the Air Force continues to remain a supporting arm to the armed forces, just like the artillery support…or the engineers’. This is the statement which got some analysts’ goat.

Ironically, the CDS’s statement on the Air Force’s supporting role was in fact only part of two broader points he was making: one, that the concept of theatre commands had already been employed by India during the 1971 war, when land, naval, and airborne assets were under the control of General Arora as he pushed into East Pakistan; and two, that a supporting role to ground forces was one function written into the Air Force’s charter, amongst others, which included the nation’s air defence as well.

Unfortunately, online tumult and agitated headline-hunting took these two separate statements out of context, and merged them into one.

As a result, it now seemed like the CDS had cast the Air Force as a junior service subordinate to the Army (specifically to Northern Army Command, as some inferred), and, that the Northern Army would not receive the manifold benefits of theaterization.

These interpretations are incorrect, since the CDS did not even obliquely imply thus, in his interview. Nowhere in the interview did he offer a slight, even inadvertently, to the Air Force.

Rather, he was quite vociferous on the opposite: one, that the existing structure of Northern Army Command would remain intact for the time being, while the two other land based theatre commands were set up around it; and two, that supporting ground forces was just one role of the Air Force, amidst its broader duties of air defence.

In effect, there would be three land-based theatre commands lining our northern mountain chain, plus one maritime and one air defence command; a total of five, which would come down to four when Northern Army Command is eventually subsumed, at some future point of time, by its two neighboring theatres.

With regard to ‘fears’, that the Air Force’s already-sparse assets were being spread too thin, the CDS nearly rolled his eyes. As he patiently explained, dispersal of air assets is the norm during peacetime; formations assemble in designated sectors only when a threat emerges.

Air Chief Marshal Rakesh Badhauria supplemented this by saying that the Air Force’s reservations — and he candidly admitted that there were a few — would be resolved soon through internal deliberations.

Of course, some may not concur with this, yet it is what it is: if the charter assigned to Northern Army Command includes some elements of the Air Force in a supporting role, and if the political leadership believes that it would be unwise at present, to re-jig the Northern Army’s structure into two different theatres, then, quite frankly, commentators have little option but to defer to such views.

Besides, referring to the process and timelines for theaterization, the CDS was clear that he expected service chiefs to revert with firm plans only within a year or so.

It’s not like anything new is going to be implemented in the short term.

Consequently, the jeering Jominis of Jor Bagh, the grumbling Guderians of Greater Kailash, and our crafty Clausewitzs of Koramangala, most of whom can barely tell a rifle from a gun, but are presently outraging over implied snubs by the CDS to the Air Force, and a theatrical theaterization, would do well to gain a sense of proportion and smoke the peace pipe, if they are not to create a theatre of the absurd for themselves.

Venu Gopal Narayanan is an independent upstream petroleum consultant who focuses on energy, geopolitics, current affairs and electoral arithmetic. He tweets at @ideorogue.
ramana
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ramana »

It conforms to my understanding too.

In effect, there would be three land-based theatre commands lining our northern mountain chain, plus one maritime and one air defence command; a total of five, which would come down to four when Northern Army Command is eventually subsumed, at some future point of time, by its two neighboring theatres.
Rest is all water and shall pass.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by srai »

COIN best left to police and paramilitary forces under the home ministry or state or city. Low-intensity terrorist/separatist type of on-going insurgency requires different personal, training, weapons and intelligence apparatus than the army who fights other National armies. Local police are better with intelligence of their neighborhoods. Police SWAT units should be able to take care of armed situations within townships. Remove the visible presence of army within population areas. For outside of population centers, paramilitaries like the BSF and RR are better equipped for it. They too should have their own commando units to take on high-risk situations in the mountains and forests. Give them UAVs and Dhruvs too. IA for its “training” can continue to choose to deputize some of its personal on a rotating basis.

Northern Army J&K command then can assume Western/Northern theater role.

Added later:
The IA COIN elements have been at it for a very very long time. Most of the insurgency activities have devolved into what everyday large cities face with gangs, mafia, and other criminals.
  • ~60 years North East (since 1960s)
  • ~40 years J&K (since 1980s)
Time for a change. This is 2021 India. Put local authorities in-charge. Build infrastructure. Bring in investments and jobs. Empower locals. Change the perception of J&K and NE (and its people) in the common folks from the main heartland.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by shyamd »

Worth reading my posts on this topic for greater clarity on what is going on
Link 1

Link 2
They are just starting the long journey to create integration because vested interests had to be protected.

In some years we’ll say integration hasn’t gone far enough and defence as a whole isn’t delivering its output efficiently.
Transformation of the Indian military requires a more active role of the political executive
The formal creation of the office of the Chief of Defence Staff was heralded as perhaps the most important military reform since Independence. The CDS is the instrument through which the Indian military would adapt to both contemporary and future threats.

Traditionally, the three arms of the Indian military have operated largely in silos. Consequently, there are 17 single service commands. The CDS, Bipin Rawat who was the Army Chief earlier, is supposed to oversee the transition to a unified warfighting strategy that would be executed through at least four theatre commands, each with a single commander in charge of the assets of all three services. Jointness is the overarching aim.

The transition clearly has not been smooth because it involves a reboot of the military’s mental approach. This is where clear-headed political leadership has been lacking in the exercise. In a democracy, the military is an instrument of political policy. It is designed to function in sync with a security doctrine that has the stamp of the political executive. CDS Rawat’s characterisation of the air force as a support arm of the army has triggered a public reaction from retired personnel that suggests differences in vision between the two arms.

This issue can be put to rest only if the political executive plays a more direct role in the transition. It’s impractical to expect the military to manage a transition that requires a reboot. That is the responsibility of the political executive as they draw the red lines in security.

Mark my words - Air Defence Command will end up in failure in a few years... wait and see. Ultimately it is the NSA or Def Min's job to fix the issues in integration, however this requires certain qualification/in-depth understanding of history, technical aspects of national security and defence (how joint warfighting occurs)
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by chetak »

shyamd wrote:Worth reading my posts on this topic for greater clarity on what is going on
Link 1

Link 2
They are just starting the long journey to create integration because vested interests had to be protected.

In some years we’ll say integration hasn’t gone far enough and defence as a whole isn’t delivering its output efficiently.
Transformation of the Indian military requires a more active role of the political executive
The formal creation of the office of the Chief of Defence Staff was heralded as perhaps the most important military reform since Independence. The CDS is the instrument through which the Indian military would adapt to both contemporary and future threats.

Traditionally, the three arms of the Indian military have operated largely in silos. Consequently, there are 17 single service commands. The CDS, Bipin Rawat who was the Army Chief earlier, is supposed to oversee the transition to a unified warfighting strategy that would be executed through at least four theatre commands, each with a single commander in charge of the assets of all three services. Jointness is the overarching aim.

The transition clearly has not been smooth because it involves a reboot of the military’s mental approach. This is where clear-headed political leadership has been lacking in the exercise. In a democracy, the military is an instrument of political policy. It is designed to function in sync with a security doctrine that has the stamp of the political executive. CDS Rawat’s characterisation of the air force as a support arm of the army has triggered a public reaction from retired personnel that suggests differences in vision between the two arms.

This issue can be put to rest only if the political executive plays a more direct role in the transition. It’s impractical to expect the military to manage a transition that requires a reboot. That is the responsibility of the political executive as they draw the red lines in security.

Mark my words - Air Defence Command will end up in failure in a few years... wait and see. Ultimately it is the NSA or Def Min's job to fix the issues in integration, however this requires certain qualification/in-depth understanding of history, technical aspects of national security and defence (how joint warfighting occurs)
The politicos neither have the technical proficiency nor the required minimum cognizance of strategic imperatives that must need to be deployed and sustained for a national defence posture. So, politicos focussed on constituencies, cabinet reshuffles, votebanks, and re elections are overly dependent on revengeful babooze who are very upset at the downward revision of their hitherto exalted status, especially in the MoD.

The recent talks with the cheeni for the withdrawal of troops in ladakh have exposed what these disastrously ignorant babooze gifted away to the hans during all the previous boundary "discussions" because they didn't know how to read maps and were unfamiliar with the terrain, ground features and the tactical advantages of either retaining or ignoring such features. Plus, the MEA entering the field in a newly discovered "national interest" mode has devasted the cheeni and destroyed the credibility of the congi/commie cheerleading mafia who previously had a dominant say in all such matters

The babooze, by their very nature and training, will revert to their ever successful britshit birthed tactics of divide and rule. The presstitute reports are a fallout of such media guerilla warfare tactics to conquer by fomenting dissension in the ranks.

the congis, influenced as they are by the entrenched and embedded commies, are dependent on the likes of JNU led academia and the virulently slanted babooze who march to the beat of a different drummer.

So, if the govt changes, as it will, sooner or later, the policy framework that will then be applied by them is going to be very different. Such strategic profligacy does not bode well for the country.

air defence is a subset of the larger defence posture developed and designed to aid the strategic narrative and the supreme national interests which do not and should not change.

There are no cowboys in this game but pulling as a team is the need of the hour. There will be changes to meet evolving threats perceptions and emerging flashpoints.

No one could have predicted doklam or ladakh or galwan but now a broad consensus and an adaptive command and control philosophy has become de rigueur. Without the CDS, and left solely to the wisdom of the entrenched babooze, such flexibility would have been impossible plus the fact that vital inputs would have been leaked to the lootyens presstitutes and the single malt preferring diplomatic corps keen on knowing what India is up to on the china and paki fronts.

Spy agencies would have done their homework but general gossip and anti India criticism is mostly missing in the woke media

One very positive development is that: The babooze are out and the professionals are in

Instead of this, silly questions have been and are being raised in the dork media so as to amplify minor matters that will be taken care of en passant, were the situation to deteriorate

military assets are always disbursed in peacetimes and repositioned as needed, based on threat perceptions.

The cha cha idiot's not using air assets in 1962 is just one case in point that ignorance is not always bliss, especially in military matters, where the price is often paid in blood and seen in returning body bags.

no one wants to see a return of those times and we have not yet fixed the responsibility for that debacle that continues to haunt us to this very day. That in a nutshell, is the power of the babooze, and their woke control over the perception that has shaped our strategic narratives and made us subservient to the hans right after 1962, by inducing a PTSD like manifestation that became a stranglehold affecting the very self confidence of the nation.

let the CDS do his job and if required let the services give their inputs in appropriate forums but certainly not via grandstanding press interactions.

The NSA has almost no role in the integration and management of theatre commands or even in their reorganization
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by srai »

^^^
Equal rotation of the CDS between three services every 3-years is the key. Each will address the shortcomings of the commands according to their strength. Maybe new ones will be propped up. In a decade, joint commands will be well established with each service being able stamp its mark.

If the CDS succession continues to favor one service i.e. IA then joint commands won’t be very successful. Other services will be seen as supporting arms.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by chetak »

srai wrote:^^^
Equal rotation of the CDS between three services every 3-years is the key. Each will address the shortcomings of the commands according to their strength. Maybe new ones will be propped up. In a decade, joint commands will be well established with each service being able stamp its mark.

If the CDS succession continues to favor one service i.e. IA then joint commands won’t be very successful. Other services will be seen as supporting arms.
The other services are indeed supporting arms in the event of any confrontation with the pakis or the cheenis. It is a part of their declared service doctrines. Regional powers, even large ones such as ourselves, need to balance ambition with ability. In 1971, some of these concepts were used successfully.

a CDS in the rotation will not change ground realities.

we don't can't project power much beyond our shores/boundaries as the amerikis or the russkis do. We have never wished to.

Others covet our territory for various reasons but we do not covet theirs. Under the circumstances, our best posture is aggressive and/or offensive defence as the situation dictates.

Both maldives and SL were aberrations that will not be repeated. That sort of immature cowboy behavior cost us dearly and at the end of the day, we have gained nothing except the enduring distrust of neighbors and the two countries are not even remotely grateful.

the beedis are another fine example of the sly and grasping neighbor, just like all the other freeloaders that we have "helped". Nepal is like a dagger to the heart and yet we tolerate the cheeni backed political scum in power.

until doklam, the "neighbors" thought that we were scared and were sucking up to them for support on various fora.

At least now, such a view has changed and India must capitalize on the advantage by showing a bit of steel in neighborly relations so that historic contempt for timidity is replaced by a healthy caution in all their dealings with us.

They are not our equals and nor will they ever be.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by srai »

^^^
Thinking is bit limited to old ways. You are in some ways making argument to continue status quo.

India in the 21st century needs to think bigger. It will be one of the top three world economy and power. Her strategic interests will continue to expand far beyond her physical borders/shores.

Each service will bring in new strategic thoughts and will be backed with authority. That is sorely needed.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ramana »

Chetak wrote:
The recent talks with the cheeni for the withdrawal of troops in ladakh have exposed what these disastrously ignorant babooze gifted away to the hans during all the previous boundary "discussions" because they didn't know how to read maps and were unfamiliar with the terrain, ground features and the tactical advantages of either retaining or ignoring such features. Plus, the MEA entering the field in a newly discovered "national interest" mode has devasted the cheeni and destroyed the credibility of the congi/commie cheerleading mafia who previously had a dominant say in all such matters

The babooze, by their very nature and training, will revert to their ever successful britshit birthed tactics of divide and rule. The presstitute reports are a fallout of such media guerilla warfare tactics to conquer by fomenting dissension in the ranks.

the congis, influenced as they are by the entrenched and embedded commies, are dependent on the likes of JNU led academia and the virulently slanted babooze who march to the beat of a different drummer.

So, if the govt changes, as it will, sooner or later, the policy framework that will then be applied by them is going to be very different. Such strategic profligacy does not bode well for the country.
Actually, Babus are part of govt. Earlier the MoD force posture was meek for a variety of reasons.
So MEA's only tool was negotiations as all else was off the table again for a variety of reasons.
In negotiations, there is give and take.
Since all other options were off the table MEA's only posture was India gives and everybody takes from the US to the Maldives.
Hence some MEA folks used to act as representatives of foreign govts in India instead of vice versa.
And some found green pastures abroad!
Once in a while, an MEA official would get tough with Nepal who would run into China's arms.
So don't be hard on them. And think in their shoes.
Now under S. Jaishankar, a variety of tools are being used.
In fact the whole gamut from Acharya Chanakya.
Rest am not going to comment as it's waste of time for us.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ramana »

srai wrote:^^^
Thinking is a bit limited to old ways. You are in some ways making arguments to continue the status quo.

India in the 21st century needs to think bigger. It will be one of the top three world economies and power. Her strategic interests will continue to expand far beyond her physical borders/shores.

Each service will bring in new strategic thoughts and will be backed with authority. That is sorely needed.
Exactly the reason that CDS and Theatre commands are being created.
The resistance is the old way.
In fact, maybe the NaMo govt should bring in the Parliament act just like the US had to bring Goldwater-Nichols Act.
These were suggested 20 years ago in the KRC report and went through many reviews yet one service is still studying the proposals. All the time they were drawing salaries and pushing files like babus.
The IN came up with a clear plan of implementation and we see the results.
I submit it is the old fogeys who are pressing the chief to continue the muddled thinking they created since 1965. He knows we are at the crux of history and they will act in the best interests of the country.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ramana »

Shiv's Youtube on Air Power perspective

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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by Atmavik »

Military 'Theatre'-Isation: Tri-Service Conundrum

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oIgNBvfREMg

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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by wig »

https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comme ... ate-280695

The theatre command debate-Turf rivalries and disagreements must be brought to an end
excerpted
when the idea of a CDS was apparently first brought up after the 1971 War — and it was suggested that Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw should be made the first CDS — his candidature was apparently vetoed by then Air Chief Marshal PC Lal (with whom Manekshaw was not quite on talking terms, at least during the 1971 War, as per Lt Gen JFR Jacob in his biography), and the then Defence Secretary, KB Lall, since Manekshaw was known to bulldoze his way past the bureaucracy. The matter thereafter lay in limbo for another four decades, as the bureaucracy was quite happy to see that the three service Chiefs were not on the same page, at least on this issue. Even during the Kargil conflict, it was said the then Army Chief, Gen VP Malik, and then Air Chief Marshal Anil Tipnis had major differences on the use of airpower and helicopter gunships against Pakistani bunkers. Such differences and delays do cost lives of soldiers on the ground. However, it was eventually resolved, and the IAF became a force multiplier.
and
the opposition to the idea of the CDS comes from the concern within each of the three Chiefs and their headquarters that the appointment of a supreme military commander, like the CDS, will lead to the depletion of their respective clout within each of their service flock. But the role mandated to the CDS is to get India’s armed forces move beyond operating in silos, despite each service having its own doctrine, its own equipment purchase requirements, and its own professional traditions and culture. Hence, the need for theatre commands, and consequently its opposition, particularly by the IAF, that has limited resources today, and doesn’t wish to further allow them to be frittered away into various theatres that are now proposed: two land theatre commands — one facing Pakistan and another China — an air defence command and a maritime command, with each having resources from all three services.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by Vidur »

Since this matter has deep long term implications for the nation's defence I think its important to share some honest thoughts

1. Army officers are defensive in their thinking and cannot conceive of shaping the battle deep in enemy territory thereby achieving a big victory with low casualties. Defensive thinking has increased many fold over the decades due to CI Ops and Op Sadhbhavna. They try to be soldier diplomats instead of military professionals with deep understanding of all military domains including air

2. IAF, especially fighter pilots are offensive in their thinking due to nature of their training and nature of air power. It was IAF chief who wanted to strike after 26/11 and gave the offensive inputs last year as well. Army was short sighted thinking tactically and defensively. IAF is the only truly offensive service which can shape battlefields and achieve decision over enemy territory.

3. There is disdain for IAF in the army and current proposals for theatrisation reflect that. Army does not understand air power and does not want to. Those who call this a take over by the army are largely correct.

4. Current proposals will split the IAF into 4/5 air forces and substantially weaken national power. This will have grave consequences.

5. IAF's concerns must be carefully listened to, not bulldozed. Very valid questions have been raised by Air Marshal Nambiar, Air Marshal Chopra, AVM Subramaniam and others. I have not seen any serious attempt to address the questions except by Maj Gen Asthana.

6. If we continue on this path, we may seriously regret it in the years to come
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by chetak »

One doesn't think that many of the so called erudite commentators have read, understood or even digested the import of the CDS's comments.

A general of the CDS's calibre will not ever say publicly what the media says that he said. The BIF owned presstitutes have purposely provoked this inter-service dispute and many have needlessly and foolishly waded in to vent in the media.

OTOH, hoary old chestnuts, long debunked and discarded as calumny are being dusted off and paraded once again as new gyan.

The BIF want the CDS to fail and revert to the old system with the babooze in control. They are using any and every means at their disposal to discredit and scuttle the CDS.

No one controls the battlefield like the grunts with their bloodied boots on the ground.

fluff like "force multiplier" etc are an over used concept. At best, it can give one a temporary advantage or a momentary edge to be quickly exploited.

The USAF for all its vaunted global capabilities and virtually unlimited resources did its limited thing and left it to the soldiers to consolidate.

And vietnam was lost, in spite of the many carriers and hundreds of thousands of sorties flown by the USAF and the USN and the hundreds of thousands of tons of ordinance deployed.

so the alleged superiority or inferiority of any service is always to be taken with a cart load of salt.

our agni series and the nuke/conventional subs are very credible deterrents. This is what has scared the cheenis more than anything because they know that whatever the defence, some warheads will always get through. Hence the S-400 order, followed immediately by an Indian order for the same system from the same source.

just because someone said strike the enemy after some terrorist incident doesn't mean batshit. we have to be able to handle the retaliation, as well as, the political fallout if the retaliation succeeds. The congis and the commies were never willing to do this so they bowed lower and lower with each passing incident.

there is a world of difference between the Govts run by the slimy sardar and Modi. Modi instils genuine fear in the paki, all that the sardar ever instilled in the pakis was contempt. nawaz shariff even referred to him as "dehati aurat"

If the pakis have not retaliated, it is because of Modi and his actions during the time of the Indian strike that was monitored by the superpowers and fed back to the pakis.

If the cheeni did not support the pakis in 1971 despite the desperate begging for cheeni help by the pakis, it was because the cheeni had not forgotten the drubbing that they had received at the hands of the IA during the 1967, where India and the cheeni faced off on the heights of Cho La and Nathu La at the Sikkim border. And just like sunderji, modi too inspires fierce loyalty.

they have not forgotten that drubbing even today, and Modi reminds them of sunderji, who was unconventional, clever, unorthodox, unpredictable and decisive but was not a cowboy like pappu's papa.

The IA is now officered and led by proud and well qualified Indians, just like the IN and the IAF. These guys know what is to be done.

the congis and the commies are not in the decision making loop anymore and that single, as well as, simple fact, hurts the pakis and the cheeni more than any force multiplier ever could.

Yes, the CDS has teething problems but there was a huge war between the RAF and the RN during WWII even as the war was being fought. If they could finally resolve it, so can we.

1971 was fought broadly on the theatre concept with all forces under one commander. Yes, some independent sorties were flown over beediland both by the IAF and the IN even as the IA was advancing on the ground.

was there even a single incident where the so called "force multiplier" changed the course of the 1971 war.

or was the IN attack on karachi too mundane seen in the light of a "force multiplier" type of action by a service that used existing resources way, way beyond their design capabilities and intended operational exploitation doctrines.

The 1962 war was run by glory hunting political pygmies in uniform, the relatives, jathwallas and gaonwallas of neverwho and on the advice of a psychopathic commie defence minister who did not know enough to distinguish his elbow from a hole in the ground, just like his fearless leader.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by Rakesh »

Great post. Good job chetak.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by chetak »

Rakesh wrote:Great post. Good job chetak.

and to you, for the support saar.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by khatvaanga »

thanks chetak ji. great post. It looks more and more like BIF led media than anything the CDS said. Your post reinforces my doubt.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by Yagnasri »

One question as mango man - Is there any training or cross posting to make them familiar with the roles, doctrines, utility, effectiveness, weaknesses of each service are known to senior officials of other services? I do not see there is any serious effort in this as on today. I will be happy if I am wrong. Unless we start training and develop service level exchange of knowledge and basic expertise in use of other services

How effective the theater commands if the Commanders do not know how to make use of other service assets allotted to him? As Vidurji said the defensive minds set of our political and administrative set up seems to have reached IA leadership also. Of course the services with their confidential reports etc may not give much chances of promotions to the officers who are unorthodox or "too aggressive".

That defense mindset is somewhat changed now at least in the political leadership and hope IA takes the hint. I have no hope for MoD baboons and armchair experts who still think that united pakiland is good for us.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by chetak »

Though one rarely agrees with this guy, but he is dead right as regards the CDS imbroglio.

this "first among equals" was specifically created to placate the babooze and not upset the "balance of power" equation which has always been the bane of the Indian defence ecosystem.

A field marshal or equivalent rank would have affected everything from basic pay to the warrant of precedence, trampling upon fragile egos and changing the all important channel of reporting which is the established and fundamental source of power of the babooze.

Nowhere in the world does civilian control mean babooze, it means the elected political authority, and NEVER, the twice born, "selected" one exam wonders as it does in "democratic" India.

neverwho's morbid fear of the army coup still runs deep in the mafia famiglia. The babooze thus clambered to the top of the heap to insulate and reassure the politicians.

The congis invested in ‘secularism’ because it was their BIF mandated, minority heavy, business plan, but that pakistan, a theocratic state was also banking on our ‘secularism’ is a twist that many knowledgeable analysts have missed or have deliberately chosen to ignore or played down. Thus the congi "appeasement policies" have reverberations and repercussions far beyond our borders and the paki army including niazi and bajwa are totally flummoxed that the long established "appeasement" that they were banking upon has come back to bite them in their sharia flavored gluteus maximus.

The gelf states, however, seem have reoriented themselves rather quickly to the changed circumstances and without a doubt, will once again very nimbly reorient themselves reiteratively to status quo ante, should the ecosystem change.

the danse macabre between pappu, xi and niazi-bajwa is grotesque to watch. The music has changed and the Indian partners from lootyens liberandu goondas to the retired babooze-militrocracy track thoo aspirants have been defanged due to lack of access and the hurdles in the once freely flowing govt sourced inputs. Sharab and kabab are still available but there are almost no takers among the once garrulous mujra and mehfil loving single malt quaffing shahibs

The hard realization has dawned on the paki establishment that Modi is not the anticipated politically reincarnated slimy sardar marching to the congi led BIF drum.

This CDS business has badly hit the business plans of the pakis, the cheeni as well as the amerikis who were all well used to and well versed in pulling wool over the eyes of the cartographically challenged, tactically ignorant and strategically naive babooze and hence the BIF cacophony in the presstitute media to revert back to pre CDS status quo ante.


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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ramana »

Vidur, Thanks for the feedback. It will surely be considered.
One thing to realize is the nature of challenges to India from its neighbors and anyone else are of a tactical nature and wars will be over in days if not weeks.
The IAF concept of strategic strikes comes from WWII Bomber Command concept of an attrition air war.
Doesn't help when you have short sharp wars.
And these are not locked in stone. And adjust and as needed based on lessons learned.

PLA has one unified Western Theatre Command that has both ground and air forces.
India facing that has 7 IA and IAF commands.
And even when they are located in the same state, they have to communicate to Delhi and the comms passed down is what we hear.
So need to change that. The status quo is not tolerable.
Besides in each conflict, it's the local airforces that functioned with the local armies.
In 1971, East Pakistan theater worked like a charm with all three services together.
In West Pakistan, each service fought its own war.
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Re: CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

Post by ramana »

Chetak About your feedback.
CDS Rawat might have the same four-star ranking but he is senior in service.
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