Rakesh wrote:Sravan, in light of your strong background & experience, I think it is best that you touch base with the decision makers in India.
The chini can only get the reward if the intrusion was never made public. It was all behind the scene. Once it was public, GoI cannot be seen to give away any land.khan wrote:Its a low risk, high-reward thing for them. There is almost no risk of India starting a war over 8 km of desert and until the roads are built, India can't really do the same thing.
The only way India can retaliate is indirectly, by boosting the forward deployment and forcing the Chinese to match the deployment levels.
India needs to finish building the roads ASAP and get logistical parity with the Chinese. Then India can also start playing this game.
Exactly. And get its economy booming again and build its MIC ecosystem.khan wrote:India needs to finish building the roads ASAP and get logistical parity with the Chinese. Then India can also start playing this game.
Using civilian transports to move troops is a significant breakthrough. In 2020.Major Colonel Mao Lei, head of a PLA Air Force brigade training department that led the operation in the northwest, said it had made “significant breakthroughs” in terms of the scale of mobilised troops and how they were transported.
“[Using civilian transport] substantially expanded our means of transporting forces and increased efficiency in manoeuvring an entire organisation of troops,” Mao told CCTV.
In the India china border it is the M777 that will be a game changer. US has a lot of surplus M777 lying around in Afghnaistan. As far as Dhanush is concerned 90% of its parts are local. It will all come down to how fast the OFB can crank it out in numbers.Mort Walker wrote:So far only 145 Dhanush have been ordered and more like 1,450 are needed. If weight is an issue, the DRDO with the gun carriage factory in Jabalpur could have made a lightweight version, this would have been better than buying the M777. Neither the M777 or Dhanush are in enough numbers. When will India's leadership wake up?
What are you hinting at, Nam ji? Either the chini generals are crazy or the "bad & evil modi" might have put them in this position with some chankian maneuvers!nam wrote:The chini can only get the reward if the intrusion was never made public. It was all behind the scene. Once it was public, GoI cannot be seen to give away any land.khan wrote:Its a low risk, high-reward thing for them. There is almost no risk of India starting a war over 8 km of desert and until the roads are built, India can't really do the same thing.
The only way India can retaliate is indirectly, by boosting the forward deployment and forcing the Chinese to match the deployment levels.
India needs to finish building the roads ASAP and get logistical parity with the Chinese. Then India can also start playing this game.
The Chini ambassador would know this simple fact.
If we didn't have enough troops, the Chini would not have brought in more men in civilians flights. The Chinis know we maintain large amount of troops on LAC.
What if the "bad & evil modi" escalate? Any sane general in PLA would have prepared for all possible eventualities before creating a standoff.
There hasn’t been any activity at the four standoff points along the Line of Actual Control after Indian and Chinese military commanders held a 7-hour-long ice-breaking meeting over the weekend, people familiar with the developments told Hindustan Times on Monday.
India, which was the first to speak about the meeting at the Moldo-Chushul border meeting point some 14,000 feet above sea level, had underlined on Sunday that the two sides had agreed to peacefully resolve the situation. On Monday, the Chinese foreign ministry statement about the discussions over the weekend made the same point.
To be sure, the two sides are not anywhere close to a resolution of the standoff at three points in the Galwan valley and the fourth, near Pangong Lake.
Saturday’s meeting between Lt Gen Harinder Singh, commander of Leh-based 14 Corps, and a Chinese delegation headed by Maj Gen Liu Lin, commander of the South Xinjiang military region, agreed to keep talking at the brigade and battalion commander level.
The Indian assessment is that the shortest time frame that one could look at for a resolution is next month, if not later. That would be comparable to the time taken to end the Doklam standoff that lasted 73 days and ended only after conversations at the highest level.
The Indian side, however, has taken note of a defensive military buildup by the People’s Liberation Army in places such as Kashgar, the headquarters of the PLA’s Xinjiang military district some 480 km from the standoff points along the LAC.
An Indian official said the buildup at the district headquarters had happened over the last few weeks and days, around the time that China had been talking about dialogue to resolve the standoff that started from a May 5 clash between soldiers at one location in eastern Ladakh.
According to senior indian officials, India had responded and mobilised its troops also.
“Our buildup matches the Chinese deployment, if not more, in terms of troops, support elements, force multipliers and aerial support,” a senior official said.
Chinese troops did have an advantage in the initial days of the standoff when its soldiers took the first steps to adopt an aggressive stance at Pangong lake and Galwan valley. But the Indian deployment was beefed up rapidly after additional troops underwent the seven days of acclimatization required to enable them to operate at 16,000 feet height.
One official said the Chinese forces had been putting pressure on the Chip Chap river-Karakoram-Trig heights-Galwan-Depsang bulge axis after the Indian Air Force revived the Daulat Beg Oldie airfield by landing an AN-32 transport aircraft in May 2008. After a standoff with Chinese troops in April 2013, the Indian Air Force had landed the Lockheed Martin C-130J Super Hercules four-engine military transport aircraft as well.
If China can fire BM & CM from Chengdu to Lhasa what prevents us from firing missiles back at Chengdu? They have a lot more to lose. Two can play the same game.nam wrote:Here is what will happen if we "liberate" let's say Lhasa.
With PLA been driven out of Lhasa, it will become open season for the Chinese. All they have to do is keep firing their BM & CM from Chengdu fundamentally ravaging the entire city. Along with Tibetans, we will loosing troops, who have to be deployed to counter any future PLA invasion.
And what do we get in return? The "joy" of liberating what would be a barren Lhasa?
It is to show us our place! It is to demonstrate to us that PRC is 5 times our GDP and everything it entails. It is to show to us that they can come in at a time and place of their choosing and stake their claim. It is to keep us rattled and confined to south Asia.nam wrote:Would anyone have a theory on why does the PLA think it can create a standoff and get what it wants? Why are they so confident that India will not escalate? or even do a counter incursion?
I am trying to understand the reason behind their confidence.
I can see Chinis doing something like this with smaller countries. They could not get what they in Doklam. It is not as if India will agree to change a status quo so openly, specially a one which was using force.
They may have demands, but i am not sure why are they so confident of getting whatever they want.
Trying to understand why would Chini make a enemy of a it's second largest market after US.
Civilian transport, yeah right! Some of these obscure airlines like China United Airlines and Sichuan Airlines (and quite possibly Tibet Airlines) are owned by the PLA and exist for the express purpose of moving army personnel under their SoE cover & to provide commercially unviable/technically challenging routes (which also means that they can keep making small operational losses and nobody will care).NRao wrote:Using civilian transports to move troops is a significant breakthrough. In 2020.
The funny point is that they consider that to be a breakthrough. I guess they were transporting their troops on yaks all these years.yensoy wrote:Civilian transport, yeah right! Some of these obscure airlines like China United Airlines and Sichuan Airlines (and quite possibly Tibet Airlines) are owned by the PLA and exist for the express purpose of moving army personnel under their SoE cover & to provide commercially unviable/technically challenging routes (which also means that they can keep making small operational losses and nobody will care).NRao wrote:Using civilian transports to move troops is a significant breakthrough. In 2020.
But yes, they use commercial aircraft. In particular A319 which has the requisite power for high altitude airports.
600 km is speculative, that is what current govt claims was conceded in UPA time. You are right in suggesting that a lot of transport infrastructurearshyam wrote:Do we know where all this 600 sq km is distributed?Deans wrote:Rather that pipe dreams of liberating Tibet, what is doable is taking back some of the 600 odd Sq km we allowed the chinese to take,
during UPA 1 & 2. Its possible in the Demchok area in southern Ladakh - which can threaten to cut the G-219 highway and their base at Ngari.
The opening of the Rohtang tunnel will simplify logistics if we have to station a force in Demchok.
Demchok seems to be hardly 50-60km from G-219 and Ngari. Close to artillery range. So a good area to focus on. But it looks like there is some work to do here - G maps has the road from Fukche marked as a minor road and seems to be mostly un-metalled. While the connection to Hanle (and a better road) is shorter, it also goes via what's marked as Photi La, and seems steep. Compared to this route, the route via Dungti is along the Indus, so upgrading it should be doable and would provide a viable alternate route. The Fukche ALG still seems to be unpaved - hope further upgrades are on the cards.
We have been using private airlines to transport the Army to Thoise and Leh for years. Flights to Thoise are exclusively for the army. Theyensoy wrote:Civilian transport, yeah right! Some of these obscure airlines like China United Airlines and Sichuan Airlines (and quite possibly Tibet Airlines) are owned by the PLA and exist for the express purpose of moving army personnel under their SoE cover & to provide commercially unviable/technically challenging routes (which also means that they can keep making small operational losses and nobody will care).NRao wrote:Using civilian transports to move troops is a significant breakthrough. In 2020.
But yes, they use commercial aircraft. In particular A319 which has the requisite power for high altitude airports.
You are right. We need more roads, food, and fuel storage facility. That in itself is the game-changer in SSN. Once we have the roads in place, we can station more troops and equipment. At the present time, we need to focus on building our MIC. In spite of Modi govt, progress is still in the snail phase. It is just impossible to punch the Chinese where it hurts until we can scale both civilian and military manufacturing capacity.Deans wrote:I fully agree with Hari Nair's earlier post about us having unrealistic dreams about liberating Tibet etc. I have not been in the service, but did some basic research for my book, which make very obvious some of the points Hari makes. To get a basic understanding of what the terrain is like, I visited North Sikkim (going upto 17000 ft at Gurudomgar lake) and Ladakh - apart from getting gyan from my former operations head who was an instructor in HAWS and a Kargil war hero. It would be a challenge for even infantry platoons to survive and be supplied at high altitude posts. The terrain favours the defender - it took 2 divisions 2 months to evict a few hundred intruders at Kargil (backed up by several times that number). In many places, on both sides, a single broken down vehicle (which happens when engines have reduced oxygen at high altitude) can block a road. They are also blocked due to snow, or landslides caused by rain, or for no reason. Quite often the weather - which can change rapidly, does not permit air activity.
Yes they were, Rao ji.NRao wrote:The funny point is that they consider that to be a breakthrough. I guess they were transporting their troops on yaks all these years.yensoy wrote: Civilian transport, yeah right! Some of these obscure airlines like China United Airlines and Sichuan Airlines (and quite possibly Tibet Airlines) are owned by the PLA and exist for the express purpose of moving army personnel under their SoE cover & to provide commercially unviable/technically challenging routes (which also means that they can keep making small operational losses and nobody will care).
But yes, they use commercial aircraft. In particular A319 which has the requisite power for high altitude airports.
Why China’s Army Still Rides Yaks
Kyle Mizokami
8/08/19 3:45PM
The People’s Liberation Army—the official name of the Chinese Army—still rides yaks to patrol some of the country’s most difficult borders. The use of yaks, basically hairy cows adapted to mountain life, allows the PLA to go places tanks and armored vehicles can’t.
https://twitter.com/SJha1618/status/127 ... 95010?s=19Because you fought in 1962, howsoever badly, you got the Line of Actual Control. Because you gave them a bloody nose in 1967, Mao signalled a detente of sorts. Because you moved in 1987, they changed their strategy. Fight now & they will come to the table in earnestness.
If I am not wrong such defensive buildups are for offensive manoeuvres? Or they are just scared of the Indian buildup opposite ?..and hence "show of force" of PLA running around in civvie buses !!.,NRao wrote:Troop movements halted at India-China standoff points but defences are up deep inside
Interesting
There hasn’t been any activity at the four standoff points along the Line of Actual Control after Indian and Chinese military commanders held a 7-hour-long ice-breaking meeting over the weekend, people familiar with the developments told Hindustan Times on Monday.
India, which was the first to speak about the meeting at the Moldo-Chushul border meeting point some 14,000 feet above sea level, had underlined on Sunday that the two sides had agreed to peacefully resolve the situation. On Monday, the Chinese foreign ministry statement about the discussions over the weekend made the same point.
To be sure, the two sides are not anywhere close to a resolution of the standoff at three points in the Galwan valley and the fourth, near Pangong Lake.
Saturday’s meeting between Lt Gen Harinder Singh, commander of Leh-based 14 Corps, and a Chinese delegation headed by Maj Gen Liu Lin, commander of the South Xinjiang military region, agreed to keep talking at the brigade and battalion commander level.
The Indian assessment is that the shortest time frame that one could look at for a resolution is next month, if not later. That would be comparable to the time taken to end the Doklam standoff that lasted 73 days and ended only after conversations at the highest level.
The Indian side, however, has taken note of a defensive military buildup by the People’s Liberation Army in places such as Kashgar, the headquarters of the PLA’s Xinjiang military district some 480 km from the standoff points along the LAC.
An Indian official said the buildup at the district headquarters had happened over the last few weeks and days, around the time that China had been talking about dialogue to resolve the standoff that started from a May 5 clash between soldiers at one location in eastern Ladakh.
According to senior indian officials, India had responded and mobilised its troops also.
“Our buildup matches the Chinese deployment, if not more, in terms of troops, support elements, force multipliers and aerial support,” a senior official said.
Chinese troops did have an advantage in the initial days of the standoff when its soldiers took the first steps to adopt an aggressive stance at Pangong lake and Galwan valley. But the Indian deployment was beefed up rapidly after additional troops underwent the seven days of acclimatization required to enable them to operate at 16,000 feet height.
One official said the Chinese forces had been putting pressure on the Chip Chap river-Karakoram-Trig heights-Galwan-Depsang bulge axis after the Indian Air Force revived the Daulat Beg Oldie airfield by landing an AN-32 transport aircraft in May 2008. After a standoff with Chinese troops in April 2013, the Indian Air Force had landed the Lockheed Martin C-130J Super Hercules four-engine military transport aircraft as well.
). They wouldn't be putting in so much money, just to generate electricity and to sell to bankrupt power discoms in porkiland. What we are seeing is Chaos(usually followed by economic turmoil/war), Satisfying to see the govt is not panicking and letting the army take certain decisions. Chaos are needed and usually lead to long lived peace, personally hoping we will make use of the upcoming chaos.mody wrote:The most important thing at the moment is to try and understand China's motives in all this.
Maybe they are trying to do a reverse Doklam and stop the infrastructure building on the Indian side. However, the DS-DBO road has been under construction for a long time and was completed last year. .......
Some reports have indicated Chinese troop mobilisation near Kashgar in Xinjiang. Happens to be 480 Kms from LAC, but what if the Chinese move that force in Gilgit-Baltistan, via the Khunjerab pass? Maybe all this LAC noise could also be preparing the ground for permanent PLAGF presence in GB!!
Real time exercise . It is like a python. I heard a story, here it goes. Once a man rescued a small baby python, fed it and looked after it. After some days it would sleep next to him, completely stretched in a straight line. In the morning it would cuddle up with him. As it grew this went on. The man was curious and once visited his friend who was some kind of expert on snakes. His answer shocked him. He said the python was measuring itself daily , to see if it could swallow its master. One day it will.nam wrote:Reports of disengagement on Galwan and Hot Spring.
I am yet to understand what are the Chinis trying to do...
Now the question is why China, with the disparity in conventional forces and logistical challenges on its western front, is pushing the envelope.What does this data tell us? We assess that India has key under-appreciated conventional advantages that reduce its vulnerability to Chinese threats and attacks. India appears to have cause for greater confidence in its military position against China than is typically acknowledged in Indian debates.
