India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

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ks_sachin
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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby ks_sachin » 28 Jun 2020 16:50

idan wrote:
ks_sachin wrote:How will that help take back land?


We can launch a massive military campaign in the border to evict the Chinese. Technically we are not invading China/Tibet but reclaiming our own territory. Had the items listed above were in surplus would we have waited? Why are we placing order for imported ordnance now as a reaction? Somewhere there is a gap I presume however we try to sugar coat it.

Again answer the question. How will you use these tactically to take and retain territory?

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby ks_sachin » 28 Jun 2020 16:55

srin wrote:*Option* of action in Malacca should depend upon the situation in Ladakh. Not having an option ties the decision makers in case the situation goes south. It is akin to not using IAF for offensive action in 1962. We can't let the adversary control our escalation ladder. If we have significant reverses, hurting them using Navy should be an option.

You don't *have* to use the option. Just knowing that the option even is considered will give the adversaries pause. IN wasn't used during Kargil but was ready as an option. Also - it isn't a binary option. It starts with intense patrolling, buzzing their vessels, Navy chief visiting A&N to check for preparedness to let them know we will make a play for it.

Before and during a war is a bit nebulous - in a salami slicing scenario we're in right now, there is only a continuous escalation ladder leading to a full fledged war. We're already on it. If de-escalation doesn't happen and they don't go back to status quo positions, then there will be escalation. We're already discussing air defense, missile attacks, artillery, shooting down of helicopters (in the previous pages). Why leave the Navy out ?


Nobody said it was a magic pill - there are no magic pills. But their economy relies on trade and energy. We can hurt them badly. Sure they can hurt us, but if we can't win in IOR, then we are in really bad shape indeed.


Thanks. I am interested in combat tactics and more so Infantry. Your post intrigued me to explore your hypothesis it further.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby ks_sachin » 28 Jun 2020 17:07

Rs_singh wrote:NRao, ks_sachin, RaviB,

Piecing together American and Indian commentaries, I’m trying to stitch together a picture. Let me know what y’all think:

1. CCP is under sever internal duress. CMC is feeling threatened by the increasingly hostile attitude the free world I s adopting towards them.
2. True to their nature, when they are weak, they must appear all strong and mighty and so you see the odd boat sunk in Vietnam, forays in Japan and ROK and the only (IMO unexpectedly bloody) clash in India. Unexpected only in that casualty count inflicted on either side is quite large.
3. In the maritime domain, having proved a point, the CCP ( and I’m using this deliberately because let’s be honest, the PLA is the armed wing and swears loyalty to thenCCP and not to the nation) has increased aggressiveness and is continually testing said defensive by repeated shallow violations into re air/maritime domains.
4. In the specific Indian conundrum, it finds itself in a Tough situation. It can’t withdraw for that would be a humiliation. It realistically can not fight a prolonged conflict because the cost inflicted in a sustained battle of attrition state on state would be too high. Not to mention, their ETC AOR starts experiencing unprecedented levels of pressure from their “other friendly states”.
5. For the WTC, I see 3 options. Option 1, continue the deployment, withdraw forces here, redeploy there. No effective change in situation on ground. I find this tenable in the medium term before the winter sets in. Beyond that, domestic political pressure in India would be too much for the government not to do anything and/or for CCP to sustain a military deployment with nothing to show for so long.
6. Option 2, sack the WTC commander, blame him for mischief and acting alone, do a wuhan redux ( perhaps wuhan is a bad idea right now). But you get the picture. Declare victory and continue as if nothing happened. I see this as tenable externally, I.e, to India, as it would mean a return to pre April 2020 positions on the ground. However, I would find this untenable internally. PRC troops were KIA, the SHA has nothing to show for it, besides the otherwise hostile world is all the more hostile yet. I see this as A gamble internally for CMC going right up to the top. Things may or may not pan out. Someone will end up swinging from the lamppost and quite visibly so,
7. Option 3. Initiate a border conflict, make it so the other side fires first and you are the “ defender “. Inflict visible and undeniable pain and immediately withdraw to pre April 2020 positions having demonstrated the will and might of the SHA. Simultaneously sue for peace with the withdrawal as a gesture. I see this as tenable internally, maybe tenable externally ? Since it provides a face saver for CCP while achieving GOIs stated goal of a restoration to pre 04-2020 GPL.

Thought, comments, criticisms welcome from everyone.


Rs_singh...Interesting.

Let me digest this.

We are talking in terms of the Chinese options and their internal compulsions. Let us pare that down to our military response —- I know I know the military option is one part of a broader strategy yadayadayada....

Where is the considerations of the Indian tactical options. This is important as it feeds into our strategy overall and what we are comfortable with. I am also talking about tactical options in the short term.

I will posit your submission to the high command..

Regards

S

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby ldev » 28 Jun 2020 17:54

Larry Walker wrote:
LakshmanPST wrote:China can not claim victory even in a short and sharp war, unless the casualties are disproportionately higher... And that is not going to happen...
The Chinese need to 'show' its military superiority to the world... It won't happen until they change the status quo or impose severe casualties...

Yes - they understand that - and that's the reason for a massive PLAAF buildup opposite to the disputed area. They want to dissuade India from using it's airforce for the limited objective of pushing back just the incursion. So choices they have put on table is - India just employs infantry to assualt the occupied posts and retake it with heavy losses or use manoeuvring and IAF and fight a full war in that sector where Chinese MIC can be brought to bear. I think they have calculated that we will go for plain infantry assault and they can inflict disproportionate casualties.

Non use of the IAF during the 1962 war haunts India. That mistake will not be repeated this time. Furthermore the IAF ISR on the PLAAF in Tibet is very good, that includes the SAM's including the HQ-9 and even the S400 if deployed.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby arshyam » 28 Jun 2020 17:56

idan wrote:What we need is the following in bulk ASAP and then we go to thrash Chinese and take back Aksai Chin and beyond:

1. Fighter jets with A2A continent even if we need to buy some second hand
2. Artillery guns, MBRLs
3. AD SAM batteries both QRSAM and MRSAM
How many would we need? How would these help us to "take back" Aksai Chin and "beyond"? What is "beyond"?

Details please?

idan wrote:That is exactly the plan. If that scoundrel Antony would not have sat over fighter jet procurement for 10 years we would not have such dwindled squadrons. UPA regime couple with our DRDO PSU culture has led to loss of face. Time to rethink!
Loss of face? Since when did India care for Chinese concepts?

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby ldev » 28 Jun 2020 18:00

Rs_singh wrote:7. Option 3. Initiate a border conflict, make it so the other side fires first and you are the “ defender “. Inflict visible and undeniable pain and immediately withdraw to pre April 2020 positions having demonstrated the will and might of the SHA. Simultaneously sue for peace with the withdrawal as a gesture. I see this as tenable internally, maybe tenable externally ? Since it provides a face saver for CCP while achieving GOIs stated goal of a restoration to pre 04-2020 GPL.

Thought, comments, criticisms welcome from everyone.


After Doklam and then the Galwan valley clash where the PLA KIA were in a >2X ratio to IA fatalities and both clashes having dented the PLA's reputation, option 3 looks to be their preferred choice. They will probe and prod and decide on the exact place where they have local superiority anywhere on the 3500 km border.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby arshyam » 28 Jun 2020 18:02

nam wrote:The Chinese will simply move up to IOR and block ship transports from Chennai or even in Arabian sea from Mumbai or Gujarat.

Come on saar, isn't this a bit too fanciful? How would blocking a narrow strait be equivalent to open sea/bay, a large one at that? Like the ten-feet tall chinaman, this suggests their ships are also kilometers long :lol:

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby ldev » 28 Jun 2020 18:06

arshyam wrote:
nam wrote:The Chinese will simply move up to IOR and block ship transports from Chennai or even in Arabian sea from Mumbai or Gujarat.

Come on saar, isn't this a bit too fanciful? How would blocking a narrow strait be equivalent to open sea/bay, a large one at that? Like the ten-feet tall chinaman, this suggests their ships are also kilometers long :lol:

As of now the IN dominates the PLAN in the Indian Ocean. That may not be the case 20 years from today at the pace at which PLAN is adding major surface combatants. To really send a message IMO the IN is capable of sinking one or more PLAN ships in the Indian Ocean. A loss of one or two PLAN ships will be a humiliation which cannot be hidden by China and will puncture the facade of maritime invincibility they are trying to project. Whether the IN does so or not will be a calculation based on just how much of a war does India want. Any reinforcements that PLAN sends to the Indian Ocean from the South China and East China seas will be blocked and targeted at the Malacca and the Lombok straits.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby Rakesh » 28 Jun 2020 18:10

A Realistic Assessment Of The People’s Liberation Army Air Force’s Capability Against India
http://delhidefencereview.com/2020/06/2 ... nst-india/
28 June 2020

By Colonel Mandeep Singh (Retd) - joined the Indian Army in December 1982 and was commissioned into Air Defence Artillery. He commanded an Air Defence Group during Operation Parakaram and also commanded his Regiment along the Line of Actual Control with China.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby ldev » 28 Jun 2020 18:16

Rakesh wrote:A Realistic Assessment Of The People’s Liberation Army Air Force’s Capability Against India
http://delhidefencereview.com/2020/06/2 ... nst-india/
28 June 2020

By Colonel Mandeep Singh (Retd) - joined the Indian Army in December 1982 and was commissioned into Air Defence Artillery. He commanded an Air Defence Group during Operation Parakaram and also commanded his Regiment along the Line of Actual Control with China.

Realistic assessment IMO.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby Rakesh » 28 Jun 2020 18:21

This tweet is from Air Vice Marshal Manmohan Bahadur (Retd)

We have these MMRCA types in this thread! :lol:

https://twitter.com/BahadurManmohan/sta ... 58883?s=20 ----> MMRCA - Media Multi Role Combat Anchor. Ideal acronym for our multi tasking ballistic anchors of North Korean TV channels - who specialize in everything from politics, crime investigation to nuclear strategy and of course Galwan .

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby Manish_Sharma » 28 Jun 2020 18:34

Pangong Tso Lake: Why It's A Sore Finger In Relationship Between India And China
Discussions over jurisdiction of the lake have drawn a blank. The Chinese have even built defence structures on Indian 'portion' of Pangong Tso. Is it time to change tack?

https://www.outlookindia.com/magazine/s ... site_story

A many-layered, dynamic riddle can have no single, simple, or permanent answer. India is at this moment presented with a set of fluid questions embedded within more fluid questions, rather like a perverse Russian doll—or shall we say, a Chinese doll? And geopolitics is not a lab science where one can isolate one strand and spend years perfecting the answer. The burning matches you see on this week’s cover of Outlook are a simplification: in reality, this situation has military, diplomatic, economic and geostrategic dimensions. And none of those domains offer complete, permanent answers even within themselves, leave alone any question of them being made compatible with each other. Since ‘status quo ante’ seems out of reach, New Delhi is at present fire-fighting, trying to maintain at least a tenuous status quo, while asking itself some searching questions.

What exactly happened in Ladakh over the last few weeks, and why? And how can it be stopped? The last question was easier to attempt. So thousands of additional troops have been moved up to the LAC—itself seemingly no permanent line in the riverbed sand. Many, rushed from the blistering heat of the lowlands of Uttar Pradesh, did not get time to acclimatise to the sub-zero temperatures, but they have dug in their hastily allotted snow-boots on the rooftop of the world, dogged as Indian jawans are wont to be. Gen M.M. Naravane, chief of army staff, also flew in on June 23 to meet the freshly deployed sentinel. Checking on operational preparedness was only one of his objectives. He was also there to be debriefed by corps commander Lt General Harinder Singh about his ongoing marathon talks with his Chinese counterpart, Major General Liu Lin. Government sources chose to describe the 11-hour-long discussions as “positive, with a mutual consensus to disengage” from all friction areas in eastern Ladakh. But even that’s only a partial description.



Why? Pangong Tso, for one. Here, some 230-odd km south of Galwan, the Chinese have come till ‘Finger 4’ and have built defence structures, including a bunker. Top government sources admit the statement regarding “mutual consensus to disengage” does not include Pangong Tso; the Chinese have shown no inclination to even discuss it. The spurs of the mountain range on the northern bank of the Pangong Tso jut towards the lake like a palm, with the protrusions looking like fingers. They are demarcated on the maps as ‘Fingers’. The area between Finger 1 and 4 was in India’s control; between Fingers 4 to 8 was an area that both India and China patrolled. Indian and Chinese PLA soldiers had had a scuffle on Finger 4 on May 5. Besides building a bunker, the PLA had also constructed a moat-like structure to deny Indian soldiers access to an area they regularly patrolled before. Plus, they deployed additional troops. India responded with extra troop presence too, resulting in a standoff. That has cooled, but the bunker and moat stay.

Besides military-to-military engagement, the apparatus of bilateral diplomacy is also in action. Joint secretary-level talks have started with the forbiddingly named ‘Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs (WMCC)’ meeting virtually. The mandarins of geostrategy, who have not been this busy in a long time, are not pinning too much hope on these though. They believe the time has come to craft a new China policy. Former foreign secretary Kanwal Sibal says the established systems of engagement between the two countries don’t seem to have worked. There have been 14 rounds of WMCC talks at the joint secretary level since 2012, when the mechanism was set up. There have also been 22 editions of ‘special representative-level dialogue’ between the neighbours since 2003—the last being held in December, between National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi. “Nothing much seems to have come out of these meetings,” Sibal tells Outlook.

It’s a big step China has taken this time, and it’s unlike its past incursions, says the former diplomat. “They wouldn’t have done it without detailed advance planning. They have a good understanding of Indian capabilities, but maybe they did not anticipate the mayhem. They have bitten off more than they can chew. The situation can deteriorate,” says Sibal. According to him, the situation is quite worrisome since the Chinese have entrenched themselves in Pangong Tso—even if Galwan and Hot Springs eventually see disengagement. “Getting the Chinese troops to withdraw from Pangong is not going to be easy. The question is whether China is willing to move back to Finger 8, and if they do, what will they ask from India. There are no easy answers,” he says. Sibal favours a constant, incremental push for status quo ante.

But that’s only military—he feels things should be ratcheted up elsewhere, and suggests using Tibet for leverage. “I don’t know why India has been reluctant to use Tibet; it’s the core problem between India and China. India should raise the issue of demilitarised Tibet. The time has come for China to engage with Tibet and the Dalai Lama. I don’t see any downside, and India can gain enormous manoeuvring space,” he says.

Former army chief Gen Bikram Singh, naturally, has a military solution in mind—outside of and concurrent with political-diplomatic engagement. To thwart China’s expansionism, “we must always keep our guard up along the borders. Our combat power, besides thwarting evil designs, should enable us to hit back expeditiously at places of our choosing. This requires compatible infrastructure, which must be developed at the earliest,” Gen Singh tells Outlook. What would that look like? The former army chief had pushed for raising a Mountain Strike Corps (MSC) with the capability of striking across hostile mountain territory. He believes the time has come to revive the proposal. An MSC, he feels, would provide India with “requisite deterrence” against China—“and should that fail, help win decisively any war thrust upon us.” This entails taking a leaf out of the PLA’s own book. The former general is looking at a capacity for “synergised multi-domain operations”, for which “we need to modernise and transform, like China is doing.”

But that comes up against an old peeve: lack of funds. An initial raising expenditure of about Rs 65,000 crore was required for the MSC, but a separate outlay never happened—an entire corps was expected to be raised by hiving off portions from the usual defence budget. So, while sanctioned in 2013, the MSC was stalled two years ago for paucity of funds. The army had by then managed to raise only one of its two proposed divisions: it’s now being tested for the army’s new integrated battle group (IBG) concept. Each IBG is proposed to be an agile, self-sufficient unit comprising of about 5,000 soldiers along with tanks, artillery, air defence, engineers and other support units. “This is the need of the hour,” says a senior serving army officer, “and it requires political will and support”.

The political class, of course, is embroiled in its own combat games. With the Modi regime facing one of its biggest security and diplomatic challenges, the Congress has sprung into action—keeping up a fusillade of questions. While trying to walk a tightrope so as not to be seen as opportunist, the temptation to taunt the BJP on its pet theme of aggressive ‘nationalism’ has been hard to resist. Congress leader Rahul Gandhi chose the open platform of Twitter to point-blank ask the government whether it has ceded any land to China. Even former PM Manmohan Singh weighed in, warning Modi against any “historic betrayal of people’s faith”. Referring to Modi’s claim of there being “no intrusion”, Manmohan said “disinformation is no substitute for diplomacy or decisive leadership”. Modi had told the all-party meeting on June 19 that “no Chinese troop had intruded into the Indian territory”. His office later claimed a “mischievous interpretation” of the PM’s statement.

At the CWC meeting on June 23, Congress president Sonia Gandhi too was unsparing on the Modi government, accusing it of mismanaging the border. The BJP, in turn, is certainly in no mood to take the charges lying down. Party president J.P. Nadda accused Manmohan of presiding over 600 Chinese incursions between 2010 and 2013, and having “abjectly surrendered” hundreds of square kilometres of India’s land to China. Former finance minister P. Chidambaram struck back, asking Nadda about 2,264 Chinese incursions since 2015. BJP general secretary Ram Madhav charged the previous Congress governments with signing bilateral pacts that suited Beijing’s interests. And it goes on and on.

A serving security official can’t see the point in this trading of barbs. “All successive governments have failed to read China. It’s high time we acknowledge that India’s China policy, as a collective, has not worked in the past seven decades and rules of engagement need to change drastically. The time has come to rethink how we deal with China and the world,” he adds.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby chola » 28 Jun 2020 19:09

ldev wrote:
arshyam wrote:Come on saar, isn't this a bit too fanciful? How would blocking a narrow strait be equivalent to open sea/bay, a large one at that? Like the ten-feet tall chinaman, this suggests their ships are also kilometers long :lol:

As of now the IN dominates the PLAN in the Indian Ocean. That may not be the case 20 years from today at the pace at which PLAN is adding major surface combatants. To really send a message IMO the IN is capable of sinking one or more PLAN ships in the Indian Ocean. A loss of one or two PLAN ships will be a humiliation which cannot be hidden by China and will puncture the facade of maritime invincibility they are trying to project. Whether the IN does so or not will be a calculation based on just how much of a war does India want. Any reinforcements that PLAN sends to the Indian Ocean from the South China and East China seas will be blocked and targeted at the Malacca and the Lombok straits.



Rakesh wrote:A Realistic Assessment Of The People’s Liberation Army Air Force’s Capability Against India
http://delhidefencereview.com/2020/06/2 ... nst-india/
28 June 2020

By Colonel Mandeep Singh (Retd) - joined the Indian Army in December 1982 and was commissioned into Air Defence Artillery. He commanded an Air Defence Group during Operation Parakaram and also commanded his Regiment along the Line of Actual Control with China.


It is pretty apparent that we dominate Cheen in both the air and the sea in any likely theater. We also have (or had) a huge numbers advantage on the ground.

So how do you think the PRC will react going forward? If they are irrational and attack then our problem is solved, we'll crush them militarily.

But the problem is they are not irrational. There is a reason why they haven't fought in 40 years. They don't do things they are disadvantaged in -- like fighting.

The action they will take on the LAC is the easiest and most successful one for them. They will build up infrastructure and men year after year along the gray zone and challenge us to match them. It will be a contest of infrastructure building and supply. Every inch of land we can't reach or supply will be taken over by their boots.

There will no longer be just patrols but permanent basing.

They want to make it a logistics contest instead of a combat one. The question is whether we want to match here which is to their advantage or we go kinetic which is to ours?

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby sanjayc » 28 Jun 2020 19:12

More dirt on Shookla ji.

Enemy at the gates, so don’t cry wolf

Learn to master the ancient Indian art of maunvrat.

Rinderpest is also more commonly known as the “foot and mouth” disease and in the past, it has swept through the subcontinent with catastrophic results. In the last ten-odd days since the tragic loss of 20 Indian soldiers in the icy region of the Galwan Valley to Chinese machinations, one can only watch in mind-numbing amazement as many of our countrymen, some of whom have once donned the uniform and served, have suddenly taken leave of their senses.

Add to this the mushrooming crop of self-styled defence experts and analysts. Just as the Pakistanis at Longewala in 1971 were intercepted, radioing for help as IAF Hawker Hunters decimated their tanks, “ek jata hai toh ek aata hai aur bees-bees minute ooper nachta hai” (as one goes, the other comes and dances around above us for 20 to 40 minutes) we watch equally helplessly as we evolve into a country of professional blabber mouths. From a channel even describing the intake of a certain type of fighter aircraft that had landed at Leh and speculating on what sort of armament it could carry, another was showing satellite maps and pointing out where our tanks were harboured. The presenter was in so much of a breathless hurry to spill even more beans that he was actually running from screen to screen.

In matters relating to national security, the standard response across the globe is “we neither confirm or deny”, and the media by and large self regulates and does not give out any information that can compromise the safety of your own troops, or your own larger interests. However, for Indian journalists, schooled in the desperate need to get “breaking news” and blurting out whatever information they may have, the threat from the Chinese is today secondary to ratings.

This then has been having a cascading effect, getting worse day by day. Soldiers on the ground watch in amazement as their frontlines and assets are being discussed by didactic anchors sitting in far-away studios. Unfortunately, these “reports” fuel a piranha-like frenzy, and more and more teams armed with cameras descend on the area. Those who cannot somehow get to where the action is, then start putting out “human interest” stories, which more often than not, add to the confusion.

If only the same zeal of our reporters could be exported and applied to the Chinese or Pakistani side of the border. Then not only would we know which troops, battalions, companies of the PLA were deployed when and where, we would even soon know the dietary preferences of their previous commanding officers. And since they are the aggressors here, we would have had their plans as soon as they were hatched—though it’s a different matter that we may have still not acted on it. In this cacophony of opinions, it doesn’t take long for the pressure to start building on the entire system. And pressure situations, especially in a democracy like ours, invariably lead to the abandonment of cold reasoning and logic. Statements once made, like the waters of the Galwan or any other river, cannot flow backwards.

Unlike Doklam, in all probability, Galwan is not necessarily the critical point of conflict and may well have been a feint for consolidation in the Pangong Tso or maybe even the Depsang Valley. For that matter, the incidents in Ladakh may all together be an even bigger smokescreen for yet something else. Unfortunately, the Chinese media has not as yet told us what President for Life Xi Jinping or his Communist buddies are thinking. Our intelligence agencies, most of them reporting directly to the highest office in this land, also obviously had no clue. That Military Intelligence had been defanged around 2012 is also one of the strange quirks that ails India, but therein lies another tale.

The Chinese have been intruding, pushing and probing for the last four years. That they are today in the Pangong Tso area, the Galwan River Valley and the Depsang Plains is not something new and these events in the past have been handled by the ITBP and sometimes by the Army. What is interesting this time, apart from the numbers, is the selective playing up of the intrusions by a certain journalist, whose information, though accurate on the ground, seemed aimed at stirring up a hornets’ nest. Given the fact that this person had served in the Army and was extremely well connected through marriages, it has been presumed he got his information from “highly placed inside sources”. Smokescreens are wonderful things—ask any tank man and he’ll tell you how well it works. With all the sophisticated equipment at NTRO’s disposal, it would indeed be interesting to know who his real sources were.

‘SIACHEN HAND OUT’

It is not the fact that the intrusions were brought out that is bothering in this case—it is how and at what level it was done. The same person, this time around perhaps acting on behalf of himself or other puppeteers had ironically played a major role just eight years ago in what was then termed as the “Siachen Hand Out”. It is perhaps worth recounting briefly just what happened then.

The United States was fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan and at that time Pakistan needed sops to keep it honest. It was speculated that the highest office was offered a Nobel Peace Prize if indeed he could “disengage” the troops from the glacier and withdraw to the Shyok River. Talks between India and Pakistan had been going on for a while, but they were not making any headway. The Indian side in the natural flow of discussions, saw the talks falter. The Army, on its part, was extremely vocal about any disengagement, but had there been a settlement, they would have had no choice. Commanding 14 Corps in 2005, Lieutenant General Milan Naidu, bluntly told the Prime Minister that if ordered to pull out so be it, but do not ask us ever again to recapture the area. General J.J. Singh, the COAS, had told the PM a withdrawal was “doable”. As DGMO he had even worked out a plan to “hold the heights”

After official talks had failed, as reported by M.D. Nalapat at the time, the PMO activated its Plan “B”. This involved a retired Indian one-star general (yes, the same one with the energetic son) who was sent to Ottawa in Canada to work with a Pakistani brigadier on a “workable” plan for the “disengagement”. The blue-print having been prepared, it was fairly obvious that even though there was a pliable chief, others down the chain of command were not going to be as amiable. A carefully selected team was then put together under the umbrella of holding Track 2 discussions to build confidence building measures. The Indian side, consisting of 12 members, was headed by a former IAF chief, while the 12-member Pakistani delegation was led by their former army chief, General Mirza Beg, who after retirement was involved in all sorts of murky deals where millions of dollars from intelligence funds were involved.

The lowest ranking member in the Indian delegation was a well-connected-former-Army-cum-journalist. In 2012, when the PM finally decided that all the bases were covered and it was time to implement the “Siachen Sellout”, fortunately Lieutenant General Prakash Katoch, who had commanded the Siachen brigade, got wind of what was happening. However, the PMO, monitoring and shepherding the “deal” ensured no television channel or paper would expose what was going on. Katoch, by then joined by M.G. Devasahayam and me then briefed General V.K. Singh, who had just retired as the chief.

Time was fast running out and at that time we only had the broader picture. I had written the story based on what we had pieced together and fortunately at that time, Anil Tyagi, the enterprising editor of G-Files, decided to cock a snook at the PMO and run the article. The Hindi edition of Outlook then followed suit with a two-page write-up where I asked just one simple question—if we withdraw from Siachen, where will the new defensive line be? As expected there was no answer to that question.

At the time we had no idea that the journalist was the kingpin in the deal. Furious that the deal had been exposed and scuttled, he then wrote three e-mails in the space of two hours—first to Katoch, then Devasahayam and finally to me. Apart from the profanity and personal attacks (he also called me fat), in the first mail to Katoch, like a petulant child who hadn’t got what he wanted, he wrote saying “you are jealous because you didn’t get the goodies”, which others on the Track 2 team got. In 2013, in a formal complaint to the Press Council and the Ministry of Home Affairs, General V.K. Singh had filed a complaint for treason against not just this person, but also an editor of a daily who had made up and perpetuated the coup story. Needless to say nothing happened.

NO MORE LEAKS

With this background, let us return our attention to Ladakh while keeping an eye on the entire 3,500 km-long border extending up to Kibithu. The Chinese have declared their intent, and though we might engage them diplomatically or otherwise, we have to make sure there are no more leaks in INS India. Taunting the PM saying “at least Nehru fought in 1962” and trying to whip up fear hysteria, clearly show what the person’s agenda was as the Galwan talks were on. India is in for a long haul—the Chinese haven’t built up in Ladakh to have a picnic—and it is imperative that the commanders on the ground have the country’s full trust and support. Even in 1962 our men were rock solid, but they were ordered to withdraw, sometimes even from a position of strength. The bulk of our people were shot in the back by the PLA after the ceasefire—that is something we must never forget.

Government after government on our side of the Himalayas has been playing merry hell with our own security apparatus over the years. It wasn’t just Chacha Nehru who tampered with the structure and acted as if we didn’t need an Army. The similarities with what happened in the build-up to 1962 and many things that are happening now are all too obvious. With the dragon at the door, even now there is time to try and repair some of those horrendous cracks. For a start, the government should pass a whip saying no one, especially retired service personnel, should comment on the China situation. Like in the case of the Kargil War, keep the public informed through official briefings for a lack of information can also be extremely counter-productive.

China has played its hand and the fireworks have only just begun. Given our centralized way of functioning, the fuse has to be in Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s absolute control. He has to read the tea leaves carefully and take every decision far from the glare of publicity. Those advisors who have already failed him must go and more competent people brought in. Just remember, in War there is no place for the loser.

Shiv Kunal Verma is the author of the highly acclaimed “1962: The War That Wasn’t” and “The Long Road to Siachen: The Question Why”.


https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/opin ... t-cry-wolf

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby ldev » 28 Jun 2020 19:31

sanjayc wrote:
Enemy at the gates, so don’t cry wolf

Learn to master the ancient Indian art of maunvrat.


China has played its hand and the fireworks have only just begun. Given our centralized way of functioning, the fuse has to be in Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s absolute control. He has to read the tea leaves carefully and take every decision far from the glare of publicity. Those advisors who have already failed him must go and more competent people brought in. Just remember, in War there is no place for the loser.

Shiv Kunal Verma is the author of the highly acclaimed “1962: The War That Wasn’t” and “The Long Road to Siachen: The Question Why”.


https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/opin ... t-cry-wolf


Perhaps in time this author can write another piece about these advisors who have failed the PM and why they have failed him.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby darshan » 28 Jun 2020 19:38

There's a long list of brown lizards that should have already been populated and being acted against. Still waiting to hear on that.

Long list of lessons learned need to be compiled. Starting with no local MIC and no induction of local weapons.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby nam » 28 Jun 2020 19:39

Regular politicians will not be perfect at National security topics, because they don't come from security background. Nor can do they see value in whole nuances of "Strategic issues" and international relations.Only dictators are good at feeding security apparatus, because they relay on it for survival. Internal & external. Democratic politicians don't.

That is why they relay on specialist. But in our case the suggestions given by our specialist are out of reality of the budget we have.

As someone rightly, our services want to be US Army, USAF & USN with 1/10 of the budget!

How to deal with China?
Army: need gold platted MSC!
Airforce: Need 200 Rafale at $180M each !
Navy: Need Nuke powered Carrier!

These are delusional demands, ably driven governments who give in to taking the shortcut of imports in the name of national security. The babus get the piece of the pie by leading the DPSU empire.

China was running two fighter programs: J10 & J11 when it was 1T GDP economy! Pak is a pain in the back even with 12B defence budget.

It is time our Security establishment come to it's senses.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby darshan » 28 Jun 2020 19:52

It's also time that many within the country continue to reach out to PM about alternatives. Especially when this PM is likely to listen to them. People who have proper credentials should keep reaching out to PM. Alternate stream of knowledge would make him ask better questions.

If IAF knows that only certain percentage wants silver bullets but the rest would be happy with LCAs, then many retired people should reach out in open. Same for other services.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby Sumair » 28 Jun 2020 20:02

sanjayc wrote:More dirt on Shookla ji.

Enemy at the gates, so don’t cry wolf

Learn to master the ancient Indian art of maunvrat.


‘SIACHEN HAND OUT’

After official talks had failed, as reported by M.D. Nalapat at the time, the PMO activated its Plan “B”. This involved a retired Indian one-star general (yes, the same one with the energetic son) who was sent to Ottawa in Canada to work with a Pakistani brigadier on a “workable” plan for the “disengagement”.

https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/opin ... t-cry-wolf


Can someone please identify this former general being refereed to here.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby suryag » 28 Jun 2020 20:06

Gurmeet Kanwal(one star is typically brigadier)

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby Manish_Sharma » 28 Jun 2020 20:42

srin wrote:Nobody said it was a magic pill - there are no magic pills. But their economy relies on trade and energy. We can hurt them badly. Sure they can hurt us, but if we can't win in IOR, then we are in really bad shape indeed.


very true, many pages back somebody wrote they have thousands of merchant ships, while our fleet of merchant ships is miniscule compared to them, so they can't harm us much in this move.

Hopefully naval intelligence is tracking chinese merchant ships...
Last edited by Manish_Sharma on 29 Jun 2020 02:50, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby SriKumar » 28 Jun 2020 20:48

Some random un-related comments-
1. Per Chola's comment, if they are doing the logistics fight and not a kinetic one, many of those new constructions (all of them?) will be vacated in winter. Do artillery practice on them during winter and they will be back to building it again next year (unless Indian patrols stop them proactively before they construct).
2. A long drawn out, no-war also has its benefits. It will galwan-ize the country into rejecting Chinese maal, and also into taking a look at the consequences of slow file pushing (also, slow production in factories). Because everyone knows that after the winter-withdrawl, Chinese will come back next spring so there will be pressure on all through winter. So I hope some MoD babus are sent over there early spring to inspect the effects of their file-pushing speed.
3. Since CPC does not reveal its battlefield casualities (and neither does India reveal Chinese casualities) limited, kinetic border action initiated by India will send a message to CPC and yet not result in a loss of face.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby pankajs » 28 Jun 2020 20:51

I hope folks have heard of escalation ladder and that we climb iit gradually and deliberately and not get stampeded into reaching for the some of the top most options.

It brings to my mind the baki habit of reaching for the atim bum as the first and only option in any conflict with India.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby bharathp » 28 Jun 2020 21:00

According to the June 27 order issued by the director of the Food, Civil Supplies and Consumer Affairs Department in Kashmir, an adviser to Jammu and Kashmir Lt Governor G C Murmu has passed directions in a meeting on June 23 "to ensure sufficient stocks of LPG in the valley as the supply of the same gets affected due to closure of the National Highway on account of frequent landslides"

https://www.indiatvnews.com/news/india/ ... ews-629727

havent heard this step in the previous years (which were equally prone to landslides).

points to something brewing?

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby srin » 28 Jun 2020 21:03

Manish_Sharma wrote:
srin wrote:Nobody said it was a magic pill - there are no magic pills. But their economy relies on trade and energy. We can hurt them badly. Sure they can hurt us, but if we can't win in IOR, then we are in really bad shape indeed.


very true, many pages back somebody wrote they they thousands of merchant ships, while our fleet is miniscule compared to them, so they can't harm us much in this move.

Hopefully naval intelligence is tracking chinese merchant ships...


This is where I expect the "quad" and regional allies - Vietnam, Philippines, Singapore in the east and hopefully some gulf countries in the west - to help us. We can't expect their official help, but unofficially and with full plausible deniability, heavy maritime patrolling to gather information on the Chinese naval activity and passing it on to us would help immensely.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby CRamS » 28 Jun 2020 21:15

I have no clue if there is a massive conspiracy at work, but reading various accounts of Siachen sell-out frauds like Ajai Crooklaw, it is very clear that these frauds want to use the Chincom aggression to demolish the '56" chest' aura of ModiJi in the eyes of the people.

And that at least so far they have not been able to create a dent is a sore point for them. So they become abusive.

From time to time, I read the twitter line of that b!tch Christine Fair who has now morphed into a viscous anti-Hindu, anti-BJP, anti-ModiJi snake. Even she, without offering any substantive arguments just quote the likes of crooklaw to attack ModiJi for his so called 'surrender' to China.

Its very clear that there is an agenda at play, conspiracy or not.

In a very strange way, there is a parallel that many of us in BR have with TSP RAPE and these crooklaw type scums have with BJP.

We know how TSP masquerades as 'moderate Muslims' with scotch whisky drinking, white womanizing, Oxford English etc; and the white west then does an equal equal between TSP and India.

And for us, there is considerable frustration that TSP manages to side with the west (most notably post 9/11) and escape their wrath that their Arab co-religionists have to endure..

So also, for crooklaw & Co, they want ModiJi to launch into a war with Chincoms and as things get messy and body bags come home, they can say see, we told you, Brhaminical RSS led by ModiJi is war mongering and sending troops to die for political purposes. Recall his propaganda post 2016 surgical strikes and Balakot

The likes of Adhothi and Fair and Rana Ayyub will then follow this up the caste composition of the martyrs.

That ModiJi with support of 'Bhakts' (a despicable dog whistle to refer to Hindus in general) is taking a cool, calculated, pragmatic approach frustrates them no end.

But by far the most laughable assertions that crrooklaw and Fair type frauds make is that ModiJi has no guts to take on Chincoms, but his and his"bhakts" attack Pakis, aggressive on J&K because they are anti-Muslim.

Wow, even a dunce with negative IQ will tell you that whether its internal or external, the J&K conflict is all about Islamic fascism, but for those crooks, ModiJi thwarting the TSP/KM Islamio fascist game-plan to dismember the Kashmir valley from India is "anti Muslim".
Last edited by CRamS on 28 Jun 2020 21:17, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby SSridhar » 28 Jun 2020 21:16


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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby pankajs » 28 Jun 2020 21:17

banrjeer wrote:
ldev wrote:I was able to locate Marsimik La and Ane La, very interesting, but could not locate Piu La. Is it on the "other side". Pincer move?


G219 road disappears starting from a moderate zoom level on all online maps. It’s too deep inside the Chinese area to be a realistic target Right now.
The resolutions available are adequate for G219. I was able to pick all major arteries the branch off the G219 into Ladakh/Aski Chin area.

Not only that, I am able to track many local unpaved roads and dirt track.

In some segments the maps are very old and sometime there are no images of medium resolution. Also, Google Earth sometimes has chacheing issues with the work around being to close the instance and load the app again.

For segments that are too old or have missing image, I have started used https://zoom.earth to search the feature/alignment and use the co-ordinates off that to update my Google earth install and proceed hence.

Hope it helps.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby pankajs » 28 Jun 2020 21:19

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvQTRiELg-I
India-China: A General’s View with Lt Gen (Dr) Jatinder Singh Bajwa (Retd)


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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby darshan » 28 Jun 2020 21:22

Chinese have resorted to pretty large merchant fleet to make it cost prohibitive. Coalition to tackle would be one way but that weakens the execution as intelligence sharing would require lot of trust and there would be too many chefs in kitchen.

Lot of US weapons being developed have specific requirements to be cheap and be in dense quantity to be able to take out these cheap merchant fleet and not go broke.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby TKiran » 28 Jun 2020 21:22

Gurus, can someone tell what will happen to the fortifications between F8-F4 in pongong tso on the Tibet side during the November-March?

Can Hans stay in there with whatever supplies they already got till October even after their rear supply lines get cut off due to 30 feet snow?

Can't we go there and ask them to vacate the place and remove red flags and put up tricolors?

Is my assumption that there will be 30 feet snow is valid at all?

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby pankajs » 28 Jun 2020 21:25

TKiran wrote:Gurus, can someone tell what will happen to the fortifications between F8-F4 in pongong tso on the Tibet side during the November-March?

Can Hans stay in there with whatever supplies they already got till October even after their rear supply lines get cut off due to 30 feet snow?

Can't we go there and ask them to vacate the place and remove red flags and put up tricolors?

Is my assumption that there will be 30 feet snow is valid at all?

I think they can stock for a season and stay back IFFFF that is what the politico-military call is.

To assume otherwise is to underestimate the enemy.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby pankajs » 28 Jun 2020 21:31

pankajs wrote:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvQTRiELg-I
India-China: A General’s View with Lt Gen (Dr) Jatinder Singh Bajwa (Retd)

One important point that the Lt. Gen. makes and I have been making is that the Chinese want India out of DBO/Depsang plains and make the Kararokam ridge on the Indian side of the Shyok the eventual boundary.

The reason is simple, the G219 is always vulnerable from the DBO/Depsang plains with there being no major defensive features in between.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby Shameek » 28 Jun 2020 21:34

Look at what they have been doing in the South China Sea. Building artificial islands and bases over the years and claiming more territory by building proper infrastructure. Tearing down a tent is easier than breaking up a concrete structure. And then they paint others as aggressors if they try to attack or even dispute these structures.

Its like the 'illegal' constructions you see in cities. Start with temporary structures and slowly make them more and more permanent.


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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby Deans » 28 Jun 2020 21:56

srin wrote:*Option* of action in Malacca should depend upon the situation in Ladakh. Not having an option ties the decision makers in case the situation goes south. It is akin to not using IAF for offensive action in 1962. We can't let the adversary control our escalation ladder. If we have significant reverses, hurting them using Navy should be an option.

You don't *have* to use the option. Just knowing that the option even is considered will give the adversaries pause. IN wasn't used during Kargil but was ready as an option. Also - it isn't a binary option. It starts with intense patrolling, buzzing their vessels, Navy chief visiting A&N to check for preparedness to let them know we will make a play for it.

Before and during a war is a bit nebulous - in a salami slicing scenario we're in right now, there is only a continuous escalation ladder leading to a full fledged war. We're already on it. If de-escalation doesn't happen and they don't go back to status quo positions, then there will be escalation. We're already discussing air defense, missile attacks, artillery, shooting down of helicopters (in the previous pages). Why leave the Navy out ?

Nobody said it was a magic pill - there are no magic pills. But their economy relies on trade and energy. We can hurt them badly. Sure they can hurt us, but if we can't win in IOR, then we are in really bad shape indeed.


To add to this:
As you rightly mention, the perception (among the global trading community) that India can hurt China's maritime trade is a deterrent. We do not have to replicate the U boat campaign of WW2 and physically destroy a significant quantity of shipping, just demonstrate the capability to affect China's commerce.
It's not about which side has more ships and Subs (China is way ahead) but:

China is more heavily dependent on International trade than India.
China moves a far larger percentage of that trade on its own vessels
China has 8000 ocean going merchant ships. India has 400.
If each side declares it will sink all merchant shipping sailing on an Indian (or Chinese) flag, 70% of China's sea borne trade will be at risk
compared to 15% of India's.
They can't target 3rd party flagged shipping (e.g A Saudi oil tanker) unless they want to be at war with that country
If 2 Chinese ships are sunk and markets fall by 15% (because Apple is not confident that phones will hit stores by Christmas) that is a loss of
1 trillion $ (one third of India's GDP).

A significant part of Chinese shipping has to pass through certain choke points. i.e the Malacca straits, Strait of Hormuz, Suez canal & strait of Gibraltar. If an Indian and a Chinese sub wait for targets at these choke points, the chances of the Indian sub hitting something are 20 times higher because there are 20 times more enemy ships. Putting it differently, the chances of a Chinese sub being detected are significantly higher because it would take that much longer to find an Indian flagged ship to target.

If Chinese subs are tracked by the USN, or the Japanese as they leave their home ports (something that the quad can discreetly decide to do) they lose their numerical advantage. Even the perception that their subs can be tracked, will cause them to review their strategy.

The string of pearls is intended to be a `showing the flag' deterrent and logistics base, but a huge disadvantage in combat, because it places ships thousands of miles from home, their presence known to us, without air cover and with the ships of the other `pearls' too far away for mutual support.
Last edited by Deans on 28 Jun 2020 22:00, edited 2 times in total.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby idan » 28 Jun 2020 21:59

ks_sachin wrote:
idan wrote:
We can launch a massive military campaign in the border to evict the Chinese. Technically we are not invading China/Tibet but reclaiming our own territory. Had the items listed above were in surplus would we have waited? Why are we placing order for imported ordnance now as a reaction? Somewhere there is a gap I presume however we try to sugar coat it.

Again answer the question. How will you use these tactically to take and retain territory?


The positions occupied by the Chinese recently can all be cleared from stand-off distance. We move in to secure our LAC and push forward to Aksai Chin using Chinese infra through the narrow channels/river banks used by PLA. Why do we have steep dive Brahmos, SPICE-2000 et al if we cannot soften their forward bases radars and AD installations. I mean just across the LAC this radar is a sitting duck exposed.There are so many sites we can take off in one go.

Image

There has to be an element of surprise ... executed with meticulous planning and sequential execution. India has a large number of airborne troops that can be dropped behind the lines. Once Aksai Chin is taken we can force China to accept it as international border through diplomatic and UN interventions. China is occupying illegally is well known and documented. Next in line would be GB.

Somebody needs to stand up and say enough is enough. It is the same army that was dropped behind enemy lines in Burma Chindits campaign.
Last edited by idan on 28 Jun 2020 22:21, edited 2 times in total.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby NRao » 28 Jun 2020 22:04

Shameek wrote:Look at what they have been doing in the South China Sea. Building artificial islands and bases over the years and claiming more territory by building proper infrastructure. Tearing down a tent is easier than breaking up a concrete structure. And then they paint others as aggressors if they try to attack or even dispute these structures.

Its like the 'illegal' constructions you see in cities. Start with temporary structures and slowly make them more and more permanent.


Nothing is illegal in Tibet-Ladakh-Arunachal. There is a Line of Actual Control. China has been claiming all those regions for eons. And China has been using might to get what she considers hers. I guess there are no nationS, even combined, that have any might any longer. Only speeches by leaders and analysis by "experts".

It is the rest of the world that for whatever reason wants to play her game over and over again. All of complain, but do not want to break the chain, absorb the pain in the process, cut China to size and move on. Trade, CBM, diplomatic gymnastics, analysis over analysis, now with YT views galore, alliances, quads,.......... Nobody is willing to act. A few thousand Chinese soldiers, building islands with sand and some silly defensive positions here and there have dismantled very carefully orchestrated 20-year-old Malabar Exercises and Red Flags!!!

Well, I guess IAS and IFS chapters on China will be revised. All Exercises will be modified for humanitarian situations. More Raisina dialogue. Yelling on TV channels. Invite more experts and surround their faces, on the TV screen, with all sorts of flashy, repetitive scrolling messages - never mind that there is an expert they have invited.

I think the non-China nations, and there are more of them, have handed the UN, WHO WTO, the International Court of Justice to China. Might as well hand over Indo-Pacific. Why spend money of ships that we will never use? What use is a frigate built on the FREMM other than to go to Wisconsin to get votes for reelection. The HMS QE - in a tweet - showed a "4 ship" (Wow) F-25B out to do something. Waste of bandwidth.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby arshyam » 28 Jun 2020 22:08

Deans wrote:
srin wrote:Nobody said it was a magic pill - there are no magic pills. But their economy relies on trade and energy. We can hurt them badly. Sure they can hurt us, but if we can't win in IOR, then we are in really bad shape indeed.


To add to this:
As you rightly mention, the perception (among the global trading community) that India can hurt China's maritime trade is a deterrent. We do not have to replicate the U boat campaign of WW2 and physically destroy a significant quantity of shipping, just demonstrate the capability to affect China's commerce.

<snip>

A significant part of Chinese shipping has to pass through certain choke points. i.e the Malacca straits, Strait of Hormuz, Suez canal & strait of Gibraltar. If an Indian and a Chinese sub wait for targets at these choke points, the chances of the Indian sub hitting something are 20 times higher because there are 20 times more enemy ships. Putting it differently, the chances of a Chinese sub being detected are significantly higher because it would take that much longer to find an Indian flagged ship to target.

Well, we can simply stop and search, can't we? Have the Coast Guard and Customs (no Navy) intercept a few merchant ships off Trivandrum/Kanniyakumari or some channel via the Lakshadweep and inspect them for "hazardous cargo". Would be a good enough message without upping the ante militarily, methinks..

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby vijayk » 28 Jun 2020 22:19

I have read that Chinese fighter jets spotted in POK. If they are opening a new front, how will we defend?


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