India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

[Rs_singh]

This thing was definitely operationalised by Nov 2019. Even if the CCP knew about CV, nobody else did, so there was no reason to do it as a distraction domestically or to ward off international pressure. The military operation must have been planned in 2018 and approved following the success of earlier exercises in Tibet. (very big) maybe, Ladakh UT was the trigger for final political approval. But I think it had received political approval well before that.

RaviB,

I do think option 3 is most likely as well. What’s interesting and, I completely agree with your assessment, this was planned pre covid. Covid kinda cut both ways for them and made them react sooner than they would have liked. I think they had to move up the schedule by 6 months or so with the advantage that India was caught up in a pandemic as was the rest of the world. October would have been perfect. 1 month before the winter sets in, so limited options to escalate and right smack bang at the height of the elections in the US. This might also explain why they are using talks and loooong talks at that. The delay suits them, not us. What’s more is as long as there are visible casualties on the IA, they can go home. They hide their casualty count so it wouldn’t matter anyway. A withdrawal to pre April 2020 will be politically acceptable to India and GOI can claim X times casualties on PLAGF . Both sides can claim military victory and both sides survive politically. This will be desired end state. I do not see this conflict escalating into the IOR. Neither side has the will nor the resources to fight an all out war this at the moment. I guess, what remains to be seen is when the shit finally hits the fan.

This will finally end all the nonsense talk of so called strategic autonomy, which always implied “not US”. If we play this right, just right, and a lot of balls have To fall into place for this to happen, this will the Soviet Union 1989. I have a few ideas. I’ll elaborate later.

Ks_sachin,

Indian tactical options? There are plenty of tactical options available to IA TacCom at all levels. I neither have knowledge of that terrain nor of IA doctrine or equipment, so I can’t be specific. Similar but not the same by a long shot. And if I did, I would not disclose it here in any case. As for tactical considerations feeding back into the operational level, that will hold true for both sides and it’s gamble to say how things play out before the first shot is fired. We can guess at broad strategy but it would unwise to guess specific tactical options. If I misunderstood you, feel free to correct me for I didn’t understand you completely.

[Jarita]

Their main goal is to re-draw the the boundary to their liking and present it as a done deal. The rest of things count but boundary alignment is primary driver.

Are they pushing for LAC to be made the border? If that is the case, it might not be such a bad option. Has something like that been on the table before? And is India building posts up to the LAC?

Terrible reductionist idea. There is never any border with China and they are sitting on large swathes of Indian territory.
This is the mentality that makes us progressively lose territory. They are aspiring to acquire independent nations and we want compromise with existing shrunken borders.

[Rishirishi]

https://indianexpress.com/article/opini ... h-6480700/

Reading China right
China’s past border tactics, especially in Central Asia, offer India a clue. The swoop in Ladakh is related to its growing domestic uncertainties.

A good article.

[Rs_singh]

Option 3. Initiate a border conflict, make it so the other side fires first and you are the “ defender “. Inflict visible and undeniable pain and immediately withdraw to pre April 2020 positions having demonstrated the will and might of the SHA. Simultaneously sue for peace with the withdrawal as a gesture.

Tenable internally? May be. Tenable externally? Face saver for CCP? No way in hell, assuming the Indian political / diplomatic establishment is awake and alert, not asleep at the switch or foolishly trying to save China's H&D or avoid humiliating them. The message from Delhi to the world will be "Mission accomplished! The SHA thought they could attack us, give us a bloody nose and get away unscathed. Well, look what happened: they gave us a bloody nose but we smashed their faces in and kicked their asses all the way back to their April positions".

That message, if loudly trumpeted at the UN and in diplomatic chanceries all over the world, will be a massive humiliation for China. It will also have the side benefits of raising India's diplomatic stature in the world, stiffening the spines of ordinary Indians and smothering the cowardly shivering-dhotis.

Roop,

GOI neither has the will nor the resources for an all out conflict. Specially a protracted one, which will favor the CCP anyway. As for casualties, we don’t hide ours, so they will be always visible. They can have N number of casualties and they will ALWAYS hide them and declare victory. They lost a few thousand in Vietnam, never accepted the dead or brought them back and yet declared victory. This is what I was alluding to. Casualties have never mattered to commies. For them, their hold on power is supreme and they will go to any lengths to protect it. Consider this completely fictional scenario: they kill a company or so of our boys at a place of their choosing. In the counter action we decimate a few companies of theirs and it’s a total route. What happens next? A 100 coffins come home to Indian villages and cities all over the country in full media glare. The Chinese withdraw to pre April 2020 positions and keep mum on their complete route “out of our territory”. Good so far?

Both the GOI and the CCP declare victory. CCP claim they taught us a lesson and withdrew to their positions because they are not aggressors or some such BS. The GOI declares military victory because we evicted them from from our land and restored the status quo. Both claims are just claims. Facts on the ground will remain unknown to the public at large on all sides. At that point, it becomes a narrative battle in the public domain, strictly. However, the CCP knows what it got and won’t repeat the same mistake for a couple decades. This will not be declared publicly by either side. So I’ll leave it for you to judge which side will put on top in the battle of narratives, a democracy or a communist state. The only way to counteract this will be a public show of POWs. Even in Kargil, we only released videos to compel the Pak Army to accept that it was involved. Nothing beyond. I doubt much as changed since. Regardless, any sort of action like this will have a counteraction from EN side and an escalation nonetheless. So I very much doubt anything like this will be done. Saying this, let me also make it clear, everyone and their brother thinks they can tightly control a conflict before it starts. Famous last words. Please read battle of fallujah to get an idea for what I’m saying.

[ks_sachin]

RaviB,

I do think option 3 is most likely as well. What’s interesting and, I completely agree with your assessment, this was planned pre covid. Covid kinda cut both ways for them and made them react sooner than they would have liked. I think they had to move up the schedule by 6 months or so with the advantage that India was caught up in a pandemic as was the rest of the world. October would have been perfect. 1 month before the winter sets in, so limited options to escalate and right smack bang at the height of the elections in the US. This might also explain why they are using talks and loooong talks at that. The delay suits them, not us. What’s more is as long as there are visible casualties on the IA, they can go home. They hide their casualty count so it wouldn’t matter anyway. A withdrawal to pre April 2020 will be politically acceptable to India and GOI can claim X times casualties on PLAGF . Both sides can claim military victory and both sides survive politically. This will be desired end state. I do not see this conflict escalating into the IOR. Neither side has the will nor the resources to fight an all out war this at the moment. I guess, what remains to be seen is when the shit finally hits the fan.

This will finally end all the nonsense talk of so called strategic autonomy, which always implied “not US”. If we play this right, just right, and a lot of balls have To fall into place for this to happen, this will the Soviet Union 1989. I have a few ideas. I’ll elaborate later.

Ks_sachin,

Indian tactical options? There are plenty of tactical options available to IA TacCom at all levels. I neither have knowledge of that terrain nor of IA doctrine or equipment, so I can’t be specific. Similar but not the same by a long shot. And if I did, I would not disclose it here in any case. As for tactical considerations feeding back into the operational level, that will hold true for both sides and it’s gamble to say how things play out before the first shot is fired. We can guess at broad strategy but it would unwise to guess specific tactical options. If I misunderstood you, feel free to correct me for I didn’t understand you completely.

Rs_Singh...

What I was saying that we are looking at the options from a Chinese perspective. Our strategic response is tied to our tactical options. However there seems to be a lack that acknowledgement on this forum of that aspect.
The terrain in Ladakh and our posture puts some constraints on our tactics - not to say this this will not change in future.
I don’t want a discussions on our tactical options but just wanted to point out that this is something to consider.
Howeever I agree with your Option 3 response to RaviB

[Cain Marko]

POK would be fantastic but it and any navy ops would be escalator for our current predicament. Mostly likely response to a small incursion would be a small operation in/around the same area.

I like the PoK plan .. it is a great option. It is causus belli for the Chinese aggression. Stamping it out will be very satisfying.

Naval ops as a retaliatory measure are unlikely unless it's buzzing a few plan ships occasionally but that's just not in India's character.

It's POK where the hammer will fall. If not now, then later. And IMHO, it'll be later, when noone expects it (2-12 month window). That'll also mean India will be in a much better position hardware wise. If I were tsp, I'd be worried.

The question is how and what to hit and control. At the very least expect some damage to chicom infrastructure. Ideal scenario is achieving control of key nodes esp. on the cpec route. Possibly on the bend near j&k. I'd hope at least at a couple of spots. Good thing is India can pick and choose the time and place, and that's the way it should be.

Greater aim should be total control of crucial nodes and areas. Minimum goal should be to utterly disrupt cpec and chipak infra. Basically, if we can't have it, nor can they! In the latter case India should use any and every excuse to hit terrorists in pok and esp on the cpec nodes. What to do only. They were transporting and harboring terror groups.

IOWs all that investment and revenue should become poof.

[shaun]

Our indigenous defence acquisition is in doldrums and no push for private capabilities , biting our government big time in formulating strategies countering chin because war can not be fought with imported weapons against an adversary which have its own huge MIC. Only With pakis having imported weapons , we are more than a match . Govt can not reign on MOD is laughable , late Mr Parrikar showed how it can be done . Now this "kadi Ninda " guy is shopping abroad for weapons is pathetic.

[NRao]

Reading China right

The motive behind China’s incursion in Ladakh is to push India to settle the boundary issue and cede Aksai Chin to China. Experts phrase China’s border policies differently, but the overriding assessment is that they are essentially an outward projection of internal security concerns. The key, in essence, is to ward off the threat at the periphery to achieve internal stability.

A pattern is being noticed after China’s last experiment of settling borders with Russia and three Central Asian states in the 1990s. Fearing its sensitive Xinjiang region becoming an object of external power play after the Soviet collapse, Beijing had displayed urgency in settling the border with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The Chinese border negotiation tactics with these countries blended “incentives with coercion”. Beijing settled for a third of territories it claimed from Kazakhstan. Yet, the Kazakhs had to admit they had gained. In addition to what it had lost, Kazakhstan had to denounce Uyghur separatism and curb anti-China activities. In a similar pattern, Kyrgyzstan had to cede 1,20,000 hectares in a dubious exchange for Chinese assistance. Tajikistan was made to surrender 1,100 square miles in 2010. Here, China claimed some 28,000 sq km, but settled for 3.5 percent of it. The Tajiks had to cede land and yet were made to feel the victor.

In essence, China ultimately gained a bit of land, nixed the Uyghur issue, and pushed its economic agenda by making Xinjiang a pivotal link to the Eurasian markets. The success gave birth to a self-serving SCO, lauded as an exemplary multilateral cooperation mechanism, essentially meant to blunt any US-led Asian alliance in Eurasia. But China’s appetite for territorial expansion did not stop here. In Russia’s Far East, weaker states are induced to let out agriculture and forestland to Chinese farmers. Borders and rivers are being altered to meet China’s new interests.

India desperately wanted to join the Chinese-led SCO, without perhaps understanding its game. The Belt and Road Initiative has since been added by Xi Jinping in 2013. A view popular now is that the early surrender to China was a mistake. Its tactics are fuelling tensions and resentments across Asia.

China’s past border tactics should offer some example, if not a complete cue to Chinese strategy. Ever since India and China agreed in 2005 on a new set of guiding principles to settle the vexed boundary dispute through the Special Representative (SR) level talks, China has been seeking a substantive adjustment concession especially on Tawang. India probably prefers having a marginal modification in the current alignment of the boundary to settle the issue. For India, ceding Tawang confronts a political difficulty. This was reflected in the drafting of the guiding principles. But both countries hoped to clinch a solution through this mechanism.

In March 2013, China once again pushed for a settlement. Remember, the motive behind the PLA’s 19-km intrusion in Depsang in April 2013 was to press India to show “urgency” and “redouble” efforts to settle the boundary issue. Post-Depsang events showed the officials of two sides had drawn certain lessons. The officials described the Depsang standoff as an “isolated” incident, but the important thing was to underscore how it was resolved without making the issue big enough to affect relations. Importantly, the boundary resolution was deemed important from the Chinese point of view.

So far 22 rounds of special representative-level talks have been held since the drafting of the guiding principles. But a framework agreement still eludes these talks. Meanwhile, China has created more suspicion through its economic expansion in and around India. India too has responded while building up its infrastructure along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

China’s recent swoop in Ladakh can’t be unrelated to its growing domestic uncertainties and on India’s front, about future plans in Xinjiang and Tibet that border Ladakh. Beijing doubts India would raise the Tibet issue. But, it does suspect the US-Japan-India coalescing to encircle China. Therefore, a stronger assertion may be a euphemism for deterring India plus others harming China’s core interests. Of course, China retains the option to offset the three by fronting Iran, North Korea and Pakistan.

Through the Ladakh incursion, the Chinese are possibly trying to convey three essential points. One, settle the boundary dispute on its terms. Two, that it intends to solve the Tibet problem internally and does not want any Indian interference in the post-Dalai Lama developments. Three, it wants to point out that a US-led QUAD strategic forum should not be encouraged.

China seems to be pushing for a formal settlement along the LAC in Ladakh, where they have nothing to lose. Probably, they also assume that India has accepted fait accompli. And, to our disappointment, it may not involve swapping India’s claims over Aksai Chin for China’s claims over Arunachal Pradesh, which many in India thought to be a pragmatic thing to accept. This time, Chinese may be making a tricky move to let India, in the first step, forego its claim over 38,000 sq km (Aksai Chin), thereby de-link Ladakh from the overall boundary dispute. But, should that happen, India, by implication, will have to give up not only Aksai Chin, but also cede its notional claim over the 5,047 sq km (Skyasgam valley) and the Menser Enclave (five villages) near the Mansarovar Lake. China’s “minimal demand” that Tawang is non-negotiable had been aired through Chinese academics. This tactic was also applied with Central Asian states.

If India falls for some kind of Chinese position over Aksai Chin, Beijing will then shift the focus to Arunachal to emphatically claim 90,000 sq km from India. Ceding Aksai Chin would fundamentally alter the status of J&K and Ladakh. By implication, India would have to forget about PoK and Gilgit-Baltistan as well. India should tread carefully unless both sides are willing to make a move for grand bargaining.

[NRao]

As India and China clash, it is time to heed Chanakya | Opinion

He warned that your immediate neighbour is your natural enemy. India has been too lax in defending its borders


PV Narasimha Rao Vajpayee Manmohan Singh and now Narendra Modi have all held out the hand of friendship to China seen as a great Asian power and counterpart to India

In conversation with leaders of the Opposition recently, Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi clarified that no one had entered Indian territory or captured any border post with reference the deadly border clashes with China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in Ladakh’s Galwan Valley. The Opposition asked him several questions on the border stand-off at the virtual meeting. It is not clear whether they were satisfied with the answers they got. But one thing is clear. There is little at the moment to reassure people on the nature of the conflict with a resurgent and belligerent China.


India has officially fought four wars since Independence. In all these, there are many unanswered questions which successive generations have been exercised about. Across the world, narratives about wars are scripted to suit political interests. But the people have a right to know what were the circumstances in which Pakistan and China dared to take India on and what has been done to minimise this possibility in the future.

To understand this, let us take a walk down history. Till today, it is not clear whether China actually attacked India in 1962 or, as some claim, Jawaharlal Nehru ordered this offensive, completely overlooking ground realities.Whatever the truth, the official stand is that China stabbed us in the back even as Nehru sought friendship with it and that our brave soldiers were defeated despite putting up a valiant fight. But it was more than just a defeat; China occupied a few thousand square kilometres of Indian territory at that time. Our Parliament has always sworn that we will not rest until we get all of it back.

I wonder if today’s generation knows that this land is still with China.

Five years after that war, there were bloody clashes in 1967 and again in 1975. These were not wars but underlined the threat posed by China.

When the late Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leader Atal Bihari Vajpayee was foreign minister, during the Janata Party government, he visited Beijing. But by then, there was a perception that ties with China should be normalised even with issue remaining on the back-burner. This is why Indira Gandhi stepped up efforts to cement ties with Beijing in 1981. Her son and successor Rajiv Gandhi took this forward, and his historic 1988 visit laid the framework for India-China ties, which has persisted till data. Subsequent prime ministers , PV Narasimha Rao, Vajpayee, Manmohan Singh and, now, Narendra Modi have all held out the hand of friendship to China, seen as a great Asian power and counterpart to India. Over time, the resolve of Parliament and the pain of defeat faded away. But this cannot be the basis for diplomacy. Chanakya, India’s great ancient philosopher, said that your immediate neighbour is your natural enemy as he covets your territory and resources and is positioned to take them if he is more powerful than you.

The only exception to this trend towards considering China as a potential friend was the late George Fernandes, defence minister in the Vajpayee government. He was emphatic that China is our enemy number one. He was roundly attacked for this. Though he was under pressure, he kept discussing this informally with military officers. As defence minister, Mulayam Singh Yadav, too, saw China as a clear threat and raised some serious questions about the Tibet policy.


After the Galwan Valley clashes, I thought of George Fernandes. Why did we choose to ignore the issues he raised? Why did India’s establishment continue to focus on a much weaker country such as Pakistan and view it as our main enemy? We merely managed the border with China; New Delhi did not put in place concrete infrastructure until recently. China, on the other hand, prepared ceaselessly. It built roads close to the Line of Actual Control, laid railway tracks and put together all the necessary infrastructure its army would need for an eventual confrontation. Today, we are paying the price.

It is this same lackadaisical attitude to defending India’s borders that allowed Pakistani soldiers to enter Kargil in 1999. Even that conflict did not teach the government the right lessons. Those in charge feel that the answer is to blame everything on Nehru and the Congress But that is not good enough.

When PM Modi was holding his conversation with Opposition leaders, I was busy in an online conversation with General VP Malik, Indian Army chief during the Kargil war. Let me quote him. “National security is the biggest issue. It is a matter of great sadness that our political parties are publicly raising their fingers on the issue of national security. Of course raising questions is your right, but instead of doing it publicly, discuss it in the meeting, it would do more good.”

[Cain Marko]

^Aksai chin for PoK? Is that what they're hinting at as the grand bargain?

[Deans]

To add to this:
As you rightly mention, the perception (among the global trading community) that India can hurt China's maritime trade is a deterrent. We do not have to replicate the U boat campaign of WW2 and physically destroy a significant quantity of shipping, just demonstrate the capability to affect China's commerce.

<snip>

A significant part of Chinese shipping has to pass through certain choke points. i.e the Malacca straits, Strait of Hormuz, Suez canal & strait of Gibraltar. If an Indian and a Chinese sub wait for targets at these choke points, the chances of the Indian sub hitting something are 20 times higher because there are 20 times more enemy ships. Putting it differently, the chances of a Chinese sub being detected are significantly higher because it would take that much longer to find an Indian flagged ship to target.

Well, we can simply stop and search, can't we? Have the Coast Guard and Customs (no Navy) intercept a few merchant ships off Trivandrum/Kanniyakumari or some channel via the Lakshadweep and inspect them for "hazardous cargo". Would be a good enough message without upping the ante militarily, methinks..

It will have the same effect as delaying customs clearance of our imports. Ultimately the importers suffer. Also, such acts are against International conventions and we will get a reputation of hindering our own trade.

[ChanakyaM]

Thanks. That is a pleasant surprise. I was not following it closely. It's got a range of 100 km so fairly decent.

It would be a good surprise, if Israel sends across the ER version, which has got 150KM. Fundamentally Barak8 with a booster. Everything else remains the same.

A couple of tests with the boosters and we would have a potent SAM to form a counter to HQ9. Not to mention the fact that Barak 8 was designed for CM interception.

Chini SAM, along with CM & BM are the biggest threat. BM hopefully can be counter to some extent by AAD.

Just a curious question How would these be comparable against the S400's?

[Cain Marko]

It would be a good surprise, if Israel sends across the ER version, which has got 150KM. Fundamentally Barak8 with a booster. Everything else remains the same.

A couple of tests with the boosters and we would have a potent SAM to form a counter to HQ9. Not to mention the fact that Barak 8 was designed for CM interception.

Chini SAM, along with CM & BM are the biggest threat. BM hopefully can be counter to some extent by AAD.

Just a curious question How would these be comparable against the S400's?

None of them are comparable. The s400 has better range numbers than even the best s300s, let alone Chinese clones. Aforementioned Chinese Sam threats can be neutralized by brahmos. Probly by newer kh31s too. More challenging though with s400. Which is why we are getting reports that they've moved the system to the Tibetan plateau. It'll be very tricky for any ADS to handle multi directional inbounds from brahmos and scalp eg.

[ldev]

None of them are comparable. The s400 has better range numbers than even the best s300s, let alone Chinese clones. Aforementioned Chinese Sam threats can be neutralized by brahmos. More challenging though with s400. Which is why we are getting reports that they've moved the system to the Tibetan plateau. It'll be very tricky for any ADS to handle multi directional inbounds from brahmos and scalp eg.

Won't it be ironic if the balloon does go up and the IAF is faced with confronting the S-400 in Chinese hands even before India get's it? And what if via a combination of Brahmos, Scalp and NGARM they are able to neutralize it. I wonder if that will cool the desire for the S-400 acquisition knowing that it can be neutralized with the right PGMs and tactics.

[Aditya_V]

If we were smart, Nirbhay even with a pulsejet engine can be inducted in numbers , a few hundred of these with 600km range will be very useful. SImilarly Pralay, Pinaka 2 etc.

[ldev]

Naval ops as a retaliatory measure are unlikely unless it's buzzing a few plan ships occasionally but that's just not in India's character.

I agree it is unlikely. But in fact it is the easiest to mount.

10 million barrels of oil goes to China from the Persian Gulf every day, the shipping lanes pass within 100 km of India's south western coast. That is 66% of China's daily oil consumption.

60% of China's exports bound for Europe the Middle East and Africa go via the Malacca Straits and as these ships exit the straits to the west, they pass less than 100 km south of Car Nicobar.

PLAN ships going in and coming out of Djibouti and Gwadar can be picked off and sunk.

The interdiction of Chinese merchant shipping and oil tankers will shake up global markets and bring the immediacy of the war to every continent and cause economic chaos in China. And that is why the West will be against such a move. As I posted in an earlier chart, China accounts for 28% of global manufacturing output. If that output is disrupted, global supply chains everywhere get disrupted. There will be shortages of all manufactured goods and household items globally. The West is trying to do something which IMO is impossible i.e. tame and contain China without disrupting China's manufacturing output which keeps the world supplied with virtually all manufactured products.

[Roop]

I have read that Chinese fighter jets spotted in POK. If they are opening a new front, how will we defend?

We can't. Let's go home onlee..

Good. This thread was overdue for a chuckle.

[Cain Marko]

None of them are comparable. The s400 has better range numbers than even the best s300s, let alone Chinese clones. Aforementioned Chinese Sam threats can be neutralized by brahmos. More challenging though with s400. Which is why we are getting reports that they've moved the system to the Tibetan plateau. It'll be very tricky for any ADS to handle multi directional inbounds from brahmos and scalp eg.

Won't it be ironic if the balloon does go up and the IAF is faced with confronting the S-400 in Chinese hands even before India get's it? And what if via a combination of Brahmos, Scalp and NGARM they are able to neutralize it. I wonder if that will cool the desire for the S-400 acquisition knowing that it can be neutralized with the right PGMs and tactics.

Life is fill of ironies wonlee Saar. Imagine the irony if IAF had bought your desired fteen and had to face the same vs the pakis!

Btw just because India might be able to neutralize the s400 with a rather unique combination of 3 different missiles, doesn't make it any less effective against chipak as neither of them can field such a curry of spices. In any case, I'll venture that the system is mainly to keep the tspaf at bay. And in that role it is unmatched. The fizaya have no answer to it. Effectively neutralizes their entire force's offensive capability. Esp. When combined with lrsam, Akash and Spyder types. The s400 itself provides a very heavily layered defence. Combine it with the above variety, and it is overkill for most AFs, let alone tspaf. Freeing up our fly boys to concentrate on the plaaf.

The IAF calls it a game changer for a reason and pushed it ahead of even the mrca acquisition. They know what they're doing.

[Cain Marko]

Naval ops as a retaliatory measure are unlikely unless it's buzzing a few plan ships occasionally but that's just not in India's character.

I agree it is unlikely. But in fact it is the easiest to mount.

10 million barrels of oil goes to China from the Persian Gulf every day, the shipping lanes pass within 100 km of India's south western coast. That is 66% of China's daily oil consumption.

60% of China's exports bound for Europe the Middle East and Africa go via the Malacca Straits and as these ships exit the straits to the west, they pass less than 100 km south of Car Nicobar.

PLAN ships going in and coming out of Djibouti and Gwadar can be picked off and sunk.

The interdiction of Chinese merchant shipping and oil tankers will shake up global markets and bring the immediacy of the war to every continent and cause economic chaos in China. And that is why the West will be against such a move. As I posted in an earlier chart, China accounts for 28% of global manufacturing output. If that output is disrupted, global supply chains everywhere get disrupted. There will be shortages of all manufactured goods and household items globally. The West is trying to do something which IMO is impossible i.e. tame and contain China without disrupting China's manufacturing output which keeps the world supplied with virtually all manufactured products.

Agree with the effect of this move but I'm not sure about it's timing. Does India really want to play global spoilsport so early in the game? Especially when there are juicier low hanging fruit in the offing?

[Cain Marko]

If we were smart, Nirbhay even with a pulsejet engine can be inducted in numbers , a few hundred of these with 600km range will be very useful. SImilarly Pralay, Pinaka 2 etc.

Yes. Hopefully in the near future. For now it'll have to be the brahmos that'll carry the burden of anti Sam and anti aew.

As for near future Desi acquisitions, the goi seems to be showing absolutely zero urgency... Note that Hal expects long promised mk1a order only in December! I'm shocked at the apathy.

[vimal]

. ot

[chola]

[

It is pretty apparent that we dominate Cheen in both the air and the sea in any likely theater. We also have (or had) a huge numbers advantage on the ground.

So how do you think the PRC will react going forward? If they are irrational and attack then our problem is solved, we'll crush them militarily.

But the problem is they are not irrational. There is a reason why they haven't fought in 40 years. They don't do things they are disadvantaged in -- like fighting.

The action they will take on the LAC is the easiest and most successful one for them. They will build up infrastructure and men year after year along the gray zone and challenge us to match them. It will be a contest of infrastructure building and supply. Every inch of land we can't reach or supply will be taken over by their boots.

There will no longer be just patrols but permanent basing.

They want to make it a logistics contest instead of a combat one. The question is whether we want to match here which is to their advantage or we go kinetic which is to ours?

Nice assessment and summary. But why do you doubt that the army still has the advantage in the border? Have the Chinese built up that much?

The general feel of the news and tweets. There are talks of new mechanized divisions in Tibet that were never there before (3rd and 4th?) and satellite photos.

https://mobile.twitter.com/Raol_1/statu ... 8272911361

We probably have overall numbers but not at the same ratios we had. That ratio is important because offensive action in the mountains requires something like a 10-1 advantage over the defender. And that ratio would go down progressively as we speak.

People can talk about Cheen wanting a war, short, quick or whatever. But you can't have a quick war successfully with a lower number of aircraft and men, especially in the mountains which exponentially aids the defense. They don't seem like the irrational Paki "we are martial race" type. In fact, I see nothing that tells me that after going 40 years without fighting that they will suddenly turn around and go gunho suicidal against an obviously superior force.

This is Doklam part deux. The words they used then were just as bellicose if not more than now. Everyone waited for the other shoe to drop but it never did. It never does for the chinis, they simply don't fight. They bully and threaten but never fight. Because after Vietnam, they saw their weakness and worked out more suitable solutions to their skillset which is obviously building stuff not fighting.

After we stared them down, they simply went and built up all around Doklam -- except the 100m to the Indian border we told them not to touch. And they did it by staying through the winter.

They will do the same here, I think. They'll stay through the winter with hyperbaric chambers and other amenities from their industrial and infrastructure base.

Unless action happens soon, the ratio between troop numbers will reach a point that the offensive option is no longer tenable and it becomes a logistics contest.

[vimal]

@Chola your analysis made the most sense to me on this thread so far and I concur. We are missing wood for trees across the entire border. LAC like LOC is an imaginary line and whoever can build a permanent defensible structure there controls the line. Fits perfectly with Chinese way of taking by inches what you cannot by yards philosophy. They think in decades, we think in knee-jerk last minute acquisitions paid for by the blood of our soldiers.

[ldev]

One other ticking bomb. It is not a question of IF but when will China start to formally tinker with water as a weapon. It has already started by putting up dams on the Tsangpo (Brahmaputra) in Tibet without sharing water data with India. All of the major north Indian rivers originate in Tibet and come into India either directly or via Nepal. Large scale tinkering with the river headwaters in Tibet will devastate North and East India. If for no other reason but to secure it's water security India has to either control Tibet or ensure that it becomes a neutral buffer state.

[Roop]

Roop,

GOI neither has the will nor the resources for an all out conflict. Specially a protracted one, which will favor the CCP anyway.

Okay, but under your hypothetical scenario, it is not India but China who will start this war (to teach us a lesson etc.). Once it starts, we have very limited choices -- fight them or surrender. We will take casualties either way, but under the "fight" option we will inflict them too.

As for casualties, we don’t hide ours, so they will be always visible. They can have N number of casualties and they will ALWAYS hide them and declare victory. They lost a few thousand in Vietnam, never accepted the dead or brought them back and yet declared victory.

They declared a victory which no one believed, except for their own gullible population of robots. The whole world believed that Vietnam kicked their ass good and hard.

Consider this completely fictional scenario: ... Both the GOI and the CCP declare victory. ... Both claims are just claims. Facts on the ground will remain unknown to the public at large on all sides. At that point, it becomes a narrative battle in the public domain, strictly.

And I'm saying that GoI (under this hypothetical scenario we are discussing) will have to boldly, loudly and repeatedly declare its side of the story, not like that wishy-washy PR job we saw in Balakot. If we don't lie about our own casualties, why would we lie about theirs? And if they had no casualties, why did they scamper back to their April positions? Because they are non-expansionist peace-lovers? Please!! Any PR department that lets China get away with this lie unchallenged deserves to be kicked out of their job. And these (truthful) accounts of SHA casualties should start right from the top (i.e. the PM himself, in the Lok Sabha and the UN).

Saying this, let me also make it clear, everyone and their brother thinks they can tightly control a conflict before it starts. Famous last words. Please read battle of fallujah to get an idea for what I’m saying.

Yes, I know. Wars are easy to get into but not so easy to get out of on acceptable terms. But let me remind you again, India is not the one advocating a start of this "teach them a lesson" war, China is (under your scenario). If you don't like my answer, fine; but how about you tell us what your answer is -- China attacks us to "teach those black-bean devils a lesson" and we should do what?

P.S. And one more thing -- in this day and age of spy satellites, electronic eavesdropping and social media, there is no way in hell China can keep its casualties secret from the world. From their own people, maybe (and even that is hard enough -- how did the rubes on Chinese social media hear about their casualties on June 15?). But secret from the world? No way!

[Cain Marko]

Btw do the jags carry any ARM? Agm 88?

[ldev]

Btw do the jags carry any ARM? Agm 88?

Was supposed to get it for the Jaguar - 1500 units AGM-88E

[ChanakyaM]

Just a curious question How would these be comparable against the S400's?

None of them are comparable. The s400 has better range numbers than even the best s300s, let alone Chinese clones. Aforementioned Chinese Sam threats can be neutralized by brahmos. Probly by newer kh31s too. More challenging though with s400. Which is why we are getting reports that they've moved the system to the Tibetan plateau. It'll be very tricky for any ADS to handle multi directional inbounds from brahmos and scalp eg.

so if we overwhelm them with Brahmos then we can neutralize the threat is that a wild possibility?

[Cain Marko]

Nice assessment and summary. But why do you doubt that the army still has the advantage in the border? Have the Chinese built up that much?

The general feel of the news and tweets. There are talks of new mechanized divisions in Tibet that were never there before (3rd and 4th?) and satellite photos.

https://mobile.twitter.com/Raol_1/statu ... 8272911361

We probably have overall numbers but not at the same ratios we had. That ratio is important because offensive action in the mountains requires something like a 10-1 advantage over the defender. And that ratio would go down progressively as we speak.

People can talk about Cheen wanting a war, short, quick or whatever. But you can't have a quick war successfully with a lower number of aircraft and men, especially in the mountains which exponentially aids the defense. They don't seem like the irrational Paki "we are martial race" type. In fact, I see nothing that tells me that after going 40 years without fighting that they will suddenly turn around and go gunho suicidal against an obviously superior force.

This is Doklam part deux. The words they used then were just as bellicose if not more than now. Everyone waited for the other shoe to drop but it never did. It never does for the chinis, they simply don't fight. They bully and threaten but never fight. Because after Vietnam, they saw their weakness and worked out more suitable solutions to their skillset which is obviously building stuff not fighting.

After we stared them down, they simply went and built up all around Doklam -- except the 100m to the Indian border we told them not to touch. And they did it by staying through the winter.

They will do the same here, I think. They'll stay through the winter with hyperbaric chambers and other amenities from their industrial and infrastructure base.

Unless action happens soon, the ratio between troop numbers will reach a point that the offensive option is no longer tenable and it becomes a logistics contest.

So they have wrested the initiative away from us. That was expected to done extent considering India's rather passive and defensive policy.

Let them build and let them hold the craggs beyond the LAC. So long as it's on their side. The expense is theirs to pay, and pay they will because their fighting The geography itself. Indian forces are an addition.

Our business is more in GB now. And I think they know it hence all this tamasha. But can't do jack about it. Unless they overtly commit to joining up with tsp...

[arshyam]

Well, we can simply stop and search, can't we? Have the Coast Guard and Customs (no Navy) intercept a few merchant ships off Trivandrum/Kanniyakumari or some channel via the Lakshadweep and inspect them for "hazardous cargo". Would be a good enough message without upping the ante militarily, methinks..

It will have the same effect as delaying customs clearance of our imports. Ultimately the importers suffer. Also, such acts are against International conventions and we will get a reputation of hindering our own trade.

True, but we have already taken one step with the manual customs inspection at ports. All I am saying is that if we want to send a message to the Chinese about our sea control, we don't need to take kinetic/escalatory actions using the Navy, as a few others have suggested, but simply take an action like this - it doesn't even need to be for each ship, but randomly pick a few Chinese flagged vessels here and there based on "inputs" and release them after a cursory "safety" check. No diversion, no interception, minimal delay - the ship merrily goes on its way, and our point is made without firing a shot.

[Cain Marko]

Btw do the jags carry any ARM? Agm 88?

Was supposed to get it for the Jaguar - 1500 units AGM-88E

Well that's one more arrow in the quiver... The jags could play a niche role here.
It seems like Vivek Ahujajis scenario is close to playing out.

[sooraj]

End Run | Full Movie | Inspired from 2019 Balakot Airstrike | Republic Day 2020

[ldev]

Was supposed to get it for the Jaguar - 1500 units AGM-88E

Well that's one more arrow in the quiver... The jags could play a niche role here.
It seems like Vivek Ahujajis scenario is close to playing out.

The Jaguar upgrade to Darin 3, with the famed Elta 2052 (sans the engine upgrade) is equipped with the AGM-88E. I don't know how many have been upgraded by HAL so far. Total to be upgraded was 60? Or something like that.

[Cain Marko]

so if we overwhelm them with Brahmos then we can neutralize the threat is that a wild possibility?

Not so wild imvho... Perhaps knowledgeable gurus can elaborate. Although I'm not sure how many bmos ALCMs they can muster...

[SRajesh]

Reading China right

The motive behind China’s incursion in Ladakh is to push India to settle the boundary issue and cede Aksai Chin to China. Experts phrase China’s border policies differently, but the overriding assessment is that they are essentially an outward projection of internal security concerns. The key, in essence, is to ward off the threat at the periphery to achieve internal stability.

A pattern is being noticed after China’s last experiment of settling borders with Russia and three Central Asian states in the 1990s. Fearing its sensitive Xinjiang region becoming an object of external power play after the Soviet collapse, Beijing had displayed urgency in settling the border with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The Chinese border negotiation tactics with these countries blended “incentives with coercion”. Beijing settled for a third of territories it claimed from Kazakhstan. Yet, the Kazakhs had to admit they had gained. In addition to what it had lost, Kazakhstan had to denounce Uyghur separatism and curb anti-China activities. In a similar pattern, Kyrgyzstan had to cede 1,20,000 hectares in a dubious exchange for Chinese assistance. Tajikistan was made to surrender 1,100 square miles in 2010. Here, China claimed some 28,000 sq km, but settled for 3.5 percent of it. The Tajiks had to cede land and yet were made to feel the victor.

In essence, China ultimately gained a bit of land, nixed the Uyghur issue, and pushed its economic agenda by making Xinjiang a pivotal link to the Eurasian markets. The success gave birth to a self-serving SCO, lauded as an exemplary multilateral cooperation mechanism, essentially meant to blunt any US-led Asian alliance in Eurasia. But China’s appetite for territorial expansion did not stop here. In Russia’s Far East, weaker states are induced to let out agriculture and forestland to Chinese farmers. Borders and rivers are being altered to meet China’s new interests.

India desperately wanted to join the Chinese-led SCO, without perhaps understanding its game. The Belt and Road Initiative has since been added by Xi Jinping in 2013. A view popular now is that the early surrender to China was a mistake. Its tactics are fuelling tensions and resentments across Asia.

China’s past border tactics should offer some example, if not a complete cue to Chinese strategy. Ever since India and China agreed in 2005 on a new set of guiding principles to settle the vexed boundary dispute through the Special Representative (SR) level talks, China has been seeking a substantive adjustment concession especially on Tawang. India probably prefers having a marginal modification in the current alignment of the boundary to settle the issue. For India, ceding Tawang confronts a political difficulty. This was reflected in the drafting of the guiding principles. But both countries hoped to clinch a solution through this mechanism.

In March 2013, China once again pushed for a settlement. Remember, the motive behind the PLA’s 19-km intrusion in Depsang in April 2013 was to press India to show “urgency” and “redouble” efforts to settle the boundary issue. Post-Depsang events showed the officials of two sides had drawn certain lessons. The officials described the Depsang standoff as an “isolated” incident, but the important thing was to underscore how it was resolved without making the issue big enough to affect relations. Importantly, the boundary resolution was deemed important from the Chinese point of view.

So far 22 rounds of special representative-level talks have been held since the drafting of the guiding principles. But a framework agreement still eludes these talks. Meanwhile, China has created more suspicion through its economic expansion in and around India. India too has responded while building up its infrastructure along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

China’s recent swoop in Ladakh can’t be unrelated to its growing domestic uncertainties and on India’s front, about future plans in Xinjiang and Tibet that border Ladakh. Beijing doubts India would raise the Tibet issue. But, it does suspect the US-Japan-India coalescing to encircle China. Therefore, a stronger assertion may be a euphemism for deterring India plus others harming China’s core interests. Of course, China retains the option to offset the three by fronting Iran, North Korea and Pakistan.

Through the Ladakh incursion, the Chinese are possibly trying to convey three essential points. One, settle the boundary dispute on its terms. Two, that it intends to solve the Tibet problem internally and does not want any Indian interference in the post-Dalai Lama developments. Three, it wants to point out that a US-led QUAD strategic forum should not be encouraged.

China seems to be pushing for a formal settlement along the LAC in Ladakh, where they have nothing to lose. Probably, they also assume that India has accepted fait accompli. And, to our disappointment, it may not involve swapping India’s claims over Aksai Chin for China’s claims over Arunachal Pradesh, which many in India thought to be a pragmatic thing to accept. This time, Chinese may be making a tricky move to let India, in the first step, forego its claim over 38,000 sq km (Aksai Chin), thereby de-link Ladakh from the overall boundary dispute. But, should that happen, India, by implication, will have to give up not only Aksai Chin, but also cede its notional claim over the 5,047 sq km (Skyasgam valley) and the Menser Enclave (five villages) near the Mansarovar Lake. China’s “minimal demand” that Tawang is non-negotiable had been aired through Chinese academics. This tactic was also applied with Central Asian states.

If India falls for some kind of Chinese position over Aksai Chin, Beijing will then shift the focus to Arunachal to emphatically claim 90,000 sq km from India. Ceding Aksai Chin would fundamentally alter the status of J&K and Ladakh. By implication, India would have to forget about PoK and Gilgit-Baltistan as well. India should tread carefully unless both sides are willing to make a move for grand bargaining.

Raoji
https://youtu.be/-vaBQM3l9Q0
Whether this will come true or not I think there is too mantan going on in Chin and whether COVID will act as the 'Eno Salt' to the batter time will tell!!

[chola]

End Run | Full Movie | Inspired from 2019 Balakot Airstrike | Republic Day 2020

I like!

[V_Raman]

Me like it

[Larry Walker]

If Chinese are able to maintain this deployment longer than us - then we have lost it. Moment we move our forces back - they will create a false flag kind of operation and push back the skeleton deployment we will leave after demobilisation. It also gives them ample of time to buildup the second front. And longer the wait the firmer the perception that GoI is weak - since media cannot be managed after a short while. This standoff is ok for a a month or two - beyond that it starts to hurt as it serves no purpose. Men and material fatigue and costs never come down. This extended cost will itself kill quite a few modernization projects and that suits the Chinese. We need to get this monkey off our back quickly.

[Philip]

The BRI masterplan of the Chinsis hitting v.rough weather as borrower nations esp. in Africa are unable to service their debts.However like SL beggar nations may be forced to hand over territory to the Chins,not ahappy thought at all.

[Larry Walker]

The difference between Dokalam and this incident is that Dokalam was in a jest kind of incident where they assumed that IA will not stand it's ground and PLA was nonchalant - as the incursion was in Bhutan. So IA staring down PLA in Bhutan was taken as a huge embarassment and humiliation in PLA as they could not even beat down Bhutan. This op is a revenge op for Dokalam and has been planned taking into account that IA will NOT rollover.