India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020
Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020
A question from a philistine! Why does nobody mine their line of claim in the oceans to restrict chinese incursions? One the mines are laid chinese vessels intrude at their own risk, correct?
Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020
What happens when a third country's civilian ship or fishermen accidentally hit the mines and blow up? It becomes a big international incident, in much the same way as shooting down a civilian airliner might.
Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020
Even if it hits a Chinese vessel, it will become an act of war. It is pointless mining the sea, unless you are ready to fight a war.
By the way, there were rumors last year on SM that Vietnam was interested in AkashNG. Don't know what happened to it.
They would really like to have some long range SAM. S400 might be expensive for them.
By the way, there were rumors last year on SM that Vietnam was interested in AkashNG. Don't know what happened to it.
They would really like to have some long range SAM. S400 might be expensive for them.
Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020
I take your point but in my opinion, its my land/sea, I have mined it and you transgress at your own risk. Let a brave captain now sail a ship at his own risk once the mining is public knowledge or better still let the chinese de-mine the area. IMHO, it would be interesting to see how the chinese react particularly if a ship is at risk.
Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020
5 pak intruders shot dead in punjab (armed with ak 47, cocaine and currency) trying to enter via the Punjab border, a day after SMQ meets Chinese minister.
Seems to be too much to be a coincidence. We will definitely need a long term strategy of border management along both sides.
Perhaps more frequent punishment via air and missile strikes against Pakistan in order to send a message to China. God knows Pakistan is in no condition to reply.
Seems to be too much to be a coincidence. We will definitely need a long term strategy of border management along both sides.
Perhaps more frequent punishment via air and missile strikes against Pakistan in order to send a message to China. God knows Pakistan is in no condition to reply.
Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020
Fighter aircraft in Xinjiang don't have the range for meaningful sorties outside J&K. It's not a question of range of fighters vs, distance to Indian air bases. Aircraft take time to form up, take a flight path that avoids early detection, after which, combat consumes fuel at a higher than average rate. Quite possibly many aircraft that survive combat over India, will run out of fuel before reaching their bases in Xinjiang. (running out of fuel was the biggest cause of our own aircraft losses over Bangladesh in the 71 war).abhik wrote:The airstrips in Xinjiang don't face any altitude issue, they have already militarised 2 of them with upgrades in support infrastructure. There are 2 more (including one under construction) that are not yet militarised. Also for these, radar early warning may not be that much of an issue or will be a 2-way street.Deans wrote:
The advantage in the air we have, is not because the PLAAF has unfinished airbases, but because the high altitude (which they cannot change) has an enormous penalty on the payload of the aircraft. I'm not sure how the reflexes of pilots will be affected after a prolonged stay at 5000m.
The additional problem of bases close to the LAC is that Chinese radar (even if it is an AWAC) will have less than a minute's warning before the base is attacked by incoming aircraft - whose approach gets hidden by the Himalayas.
What the PLAAF bases in Tibet need before they can go to a war footing are a 2nd runway, individual hardened shelters, fuel storage, Radar, SAM etc. All our IAF bases have these. Compare for e.g. Srinagar or Ambala with Ngari. The PLAAF starting serious work on their airfields is a sign that they are taking this a lot more seriously.
Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020
Deans ji, couldn't they fly in from say, Hotan, attack an Indian air base and then land at Ngari instead of flying back to Hotan? They just need to refuel on the ground and then fly off to Hotan, they have probably gotten rid of their weapons so are lighter as well.Deans wrote:
Fighter aircraft in Xinjiang don't have the range for meaningful sorties outside J&K. It's not a question of range of fighters vs, distance to Indian air bases. Aircraft take time to form up, take a flight path that avoids early detection, after which, combat consumes fuel at a higher than average rate. Quite possibly many aircraft that survive combat over India, will run out of fuel before reaching their bases in Xinjiang. (running out of fuel was the biggest cause of our own aircraft losses over Bangladesh in the 71 war).
Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020
Additionally, from an AWACS at 40000 ft elevation, you get a 400 km line of sight, which is pretty much the distance from Leh to Hotan.Deans wrote:Fighter aircraft in Xinjiang don't have the range for meaningful sorties outside J&K. It's not a question of range of fighters vs, distance to Indian air bases. Aircraft take time to form up, take a flight path that avoids early detection, after which, combat consumes fuel at a higher than average rate. Quite possibly many aircraft that survive combat over India, will run out of fuel before reaching their bases in Xinjiang. (running out of fuel was the biggest cause of our own aircraft losses over Bangladesh in the 71 war).
Given the topography, it should be possible to look down at aircraft in Xinjiang with long range radars (say aerostats, or AWACS, etc) even if they are relatively close to the ground, and certainly when they 'pop up' over the mountain. However, this will require the AWACS to (a) fly very close to the LAC, (b) have a radar capable of look-down detection at extreme range - i.e., very powerful, extremely good clutter mitigation, etc.
It also depends on whether the aircraft can maintain nape-of-the-earth flight from Xinjiang or Tibet into SSN. We can, at our end, and since the plains on our side are screened by the Himalayas, the PRC warning time is probably very low. I don't think the PLAAF aircraft can do that very well, since the ground elevation at Tibet is much higher, and they'll need to 'pop-up' when flying from Xinjiang.
We have a large number of air bases very close to the Shivaliks, which means that even if PLAAF detects our strike packages when they 'pop-up' over the mountains, shallow strikes will give the PLAAF very little warning time, unless they are deployed IN FORCE all along the LAC and IB, and/or have extensive embedded SAM assets. Conversely, we might not be able to do very deep strikes into Tibet / Xinjiang, which makes long-range stand-off weapons especially important.
The aerial advantages we have vis-a-vis PLAAF in case things go kinetic are fairly significant.
That will certainly increase their time on station somewhat, but the issue is still, for example, the issue of deployment time... how long it'll take the aircraft to get to the merge point, especially in case of CAP. Strike operations are less the issue (the J-11 and J-20s probably have enough combat range to do strike operations and RTB) than CAP and Aerial Engagements.RaviB wrote:Deans ji, couldn't they fly in from say, Hotan, attack an Indian air base and then land at Ngari instead of flying back to Hotan? They just need to refuel on the ground and then fly off to Hotan, they have probably gotten rid of their weapons so are lighter as well.
Quick response will require either a permanent PLAAF CAP presence or deployment to forward bases in Tibet. However, deployment in Tibet has the altitude issues, which will decrease CAP time, and weapons load (not so much an issue with an A2A missile-only load out), but the fuel load is an issue. Either way, it'll mean that PLAAF needs way more aircraft cycling through deployment, eating up airframe hours or racking up breakdowns very quickly.
China is certainly looking at negating the payload issue by having ultra-long runways (>4000 m) in Tibet. However, there are still limitations there, because, looking at the equations of flight, a larger take-off weight requires higher lift, which increases with the squared velocity. However, as velocity increases, thrust drops with increasing velocity, and can never be as much as at sea level due to lower density (this is also a relatively linear relationship). Its a double whammy that can't be undone even with a really long runway, so either fuel (i.e. range) or weapons load are permanently degraded to stay within safe / max takeoff speeds.
Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020
China digs heels in for winter, continues building roads and bridges on own side of LAC
“The Chinese construction activity shows that they are getting ready for the winter and are preparing for any possible action from the Indian side. It also shows that they are pushing their new claims strongly,” a source said.
The source added that the Chinese are building bridges, camps and roads. Asked where all, the source mentioned Galwan Valley, and Lanak La in occupied Aksai Chin, without getting into details.
Indian security agencies have noted that the Chinese are upgrading a road between Lanak La and Krgymo Traggar, a distance of about 40 km.
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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020
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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020
India rejects China's suggestion of 'equidistant disengagement' from Finger area in Ladakh
"The Chinese side had made a suggestion that both India and China should go back equidistantly from the Finger-4 area. The suggestion is not acceptable to the Indian side," Sources told ANI.
Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020
India has 'military options' to deal with Chinese transgressions if talks fail: CDS Rawat
NEW DELHI: Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Bipin Rawat on Monday stated that India has "military options" to deal with the Chinese on the issue of transgressions if talks between both the countries at the military and diplomatic level don't yield any results.
"The military option to deal with transgressions by the Chinese Army in Ladakh are on but it will be exercised only if talks at the military and the diplomatic level fail," Rawat said here on the ongoing dispute between India and China in Eastern Ladakh.
India and China are engaged in a standoff since April-May over the transgressions by the Chinese Army in multiple areas including Finger area, Galwan valley, Hot springs and Kongrung nala.
The talks between the two sides have been going on for the last three months including five Lieutenant General-level talks but have failed to yield any results so far.
The CDS, however, refused to discuss in detail the military options that India could exercise to push back the transgressions by the Chinese Army in Ladakh sector.
The Chinese Army has refused to withdraw or disengage completely from the Finger area and seems to be buying time to delay its disengagement from there.
While efforts are underway to resolve the ongoing border dispute, India has rejected the Chinese suggestion to disengage equidistantly from the Finger area in Eastern Ladakh.
Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020
https://indianexpress.com/article/india ... ith-china/
We have had no movement for the last one month plus in talks - don't see what what new we are bringing to the table.The decision to hold the talks at the military level, sources said, was taken after a review of discussions during the meeting Thursday of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC) on India-China Border Affairs.
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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020
This looks more like a warning rather than a statement...Ashokk wrote:India has 'military options' to deal with Chinese transgressions if talks fail: CDS RawatNEW DELHI: Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Bipin Rawat on Monday stated that India has "military options" to deal with the Chinese on the issue of transgressions if talks between both the countries at the military and diplomatic level don't yield any results.
"The military option to deal with transgressions by the Chinese Army in Ladakh are on but it will be exercised only if talks at the military and the diplomatic level fail," Rawat said here on the ongoing dispute between India and China in Eastern Ladakh.
Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020
That's very well explained. A couple of other points:k prasad wrote:Additionally, from an AWACS at 40000 ft elevation, you get a 400 km line of sight, which is pretty much the distance from Leh to Hotan.Deans wrote:Fighter aircraft in Xinjiang don't have the range for meaningful sorties outside J&K. It's not a question of range of fighters vs, distance to Indian air bases. Aircraft take time to form up, take a flight path that avoids early detection, after which, combat consumes fuel at a higher than average rate. Quite possibly many aircraft that survive combat over India, will run out of fuel before reaching their bases in Xinjiang. (running out of fuel was the biggest cause of our own aircraft losses over Bangladesh in the 71 war).
Given the topography, it should be possible to look down at aircraft in Xinjiang with long range radars (say aerostats, or AWACS, etc) even if they are relatively close to the ground, and certainly when they 'pop up' over the mountain. However, this will require the AWACS to (a) fly very close to the LAC, (b) have a radar capable of look-down detection at extreme range - i.e., very powerful, extremely good clutter mitigation, etc.
It also depends on whether the aircraft can maintain nape-of-the-earth flight from Xinjiang or Tibet into SSN. We can, at our end, and since the plains on our side are screened by the Himalayas, the PRC warning time is probably very low. I don't think the PLAAF aircraft can do that very well, since the ground elevation at Tibet is much higher, and they'll need to 'pop-up' when flying from Xinjiang.
We have a large number of air bases very close to the Shivaliks, which means that even if PLAAF detects our strike packages when they 'pop-up' over the mountains, shallow strikes will give the PLAAF very little warning time, unless they are deployed IN FORCE all along the LAC and IB, and/or have extensive embedded SAM assets. Conversely, we might not be able to do very deep strikes into Tibet / Xinjiang, which makes long-range stand-off weapons especially important.
The aerial advantages we have vis-a-vis PLAAF in case things go kinetic are fairly significant.
That will certainly increase their time on station somewhat, but the issue is still, for example, the issue of deployment time... how long it'll take the aircraft to get to the merge point, especially in case of CAP. Strike operations are less the issue (the J-11 and J-20s probably have enough combat range to do strike operations and RTB) than CAP and Aerial Engagements.RaviB wrote:Deans ji, couldn't they fly in from say, Hotan, attack an Indian air base and then land at Ngari instead of flying back to Hotan? They just need to refuel on the ground and then fly off to Hotan, they have probably gotten rid of their weapons so are lighter as well.
Quick response will require either a permanent PLAAF CAP presence or deployment to forward bases in Tibet. However, deployment in Tibet has the altitude issues, which will decrease CAP time, and weapons load (not so much an issue with an A2A missile-only load out), but the fuel load is an issue. Either way, it'll mean that PLAAF needs way more aircraft cycling through deployment, eating up airframe hours or racking up breakdowns very quickly.
China is certainly looking at negating the payload issue by having ultra-long runways (>4000 m) in Tibet. However, there are still limitations there, because, looking at the equations of flight, a larger take-off weight requires higher lift, which increases with the squared velocity. However, as velocity increases, thrust drops with increasing velocity, and can never be as much as at sea level due to lower density (this is also a relatively linear relationship). Its a double whammy that can't be undone even with a really long runway, so either fuel (i.e. range) or weapons load are permanently degraded to stay within safe / max takeoff speeds.
The Tibet plateau is flat. An AWAC on our side of the LAC can see well into Tibet, whereas the `view' of the Chinese AWAC will be affected by the Himalayas, which will shield aircraft at a lower altitude.
An additional problem of high altitude - affecting every base in Tibet, is the effect of oxygen deprivation on the reflexes of a pilot. A half second delayed reaction in a fighter pilot, in combat, will kill him.
PLAAF Bases close to the LAC - Ngari, Purang (Nepal border) and Nyingchi airport (near Arunachal) are vulnerable to long range artillery, air strikes - very little warning if the IAF pops up from behind Himalayan cover. They do not have the infrastructure for a large number of aircraft to operate (see google maps).
Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020
I wonder how come the Chinese have not yet made a threat of CM;s against Indian cities, how would our Population react to such a threat? I found it very disappointing when many IT industry chiefs attacked the govt in Operation Parakram when Pakis threatened us with Nukes.
Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020
Psy Ops on Cheen from CDS himself or mind preparation on Indian Populous.LakshmanPST wrote:This looks more like a warning rather than a statement...
Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020
With ITvity people working from home and no clients touring India, at least we should not have that excuse this timeAditya_V wrote:I wonder how come the Chinese have not yet made a threat of CM;s against Indian cities, how would our Population react to such a threat? I found it very disappointing when many IT industry chiefs attacked the govt in Operation Parakram when Pakis threatened us with Nukes.
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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020
I think its a very important signal from the CDS, mainly for Indians but also for the Chinese.
Indians: because there will be a crowd that'll moan why we started a pre-emptive war. Unlike Kargil, where things went kinetic very soon, there has been too long of a lull here. So, time to wake people up
Chinese: to warn them. We will choose a time & place, but a semblance of a redline has been drawn
Indians: because there will be a crowd that'll moan why we started a pre-emptive war. Unlike Kargil, where things went kinetic very soon, there has been too long of a lull here. So, time to wake people up
Chinese: to warn them. We will choose a time & place, but a semblance of a redline has been drawn
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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020
The only one who needs to wake up is political leadership. Indian populace at large is patriotic and stands behind the armed forces. Everyone had hoped we would have responded sooner than let Chinese fortify themselves.
Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020
We are talking of BRF, yes many of us do not believe only Soldiers have to take risks, even civilians have to take the risk when our red lines are crossed if the enemy chooses to attack our cities, but we need to fight to save our integrity.Pashupatastra wrote:The only one who needs to wake up is political leadership. Indian populace at large is patriotic and stands behind the armed forces. Everyone had hoped we would have responded sooner than let Chinese fortify themselves.
But was very very disappointed by folks outside BRF in 2002. That is why we are not respected by our enemies.
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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020
Several reasons why today is different from 2002:
1) Back then, the ruling NDA was much weaker. C-system was much stronger than today
2) Generally, the pro-Indics were much less vocal than today. Thanks to social media & some pre-Indic channels/outlets, this has changed
3) ABV himself sent a weak signal by not attacking Pakistan. Everyone, including BRFs I'm sure, knew that Parakram was only for show. It was like the barking dog that wouldn't bite. With Modi, after 3 surgical strikes, the public knows that this Govt means business
If any of the IT-vity honchos try their 2002 stunt now, they'll be raked over the coals. And they know it.
1) Back then, the ruling NDA was much weaker. C-system was much stronger than today
2) Generally, the pro-Indics were much less vocal than today. Thanks to social media & some pre-Indic channels/outlets, this has changed
3) ABV himself sent a weak signal by not attacking Pakistan. Everyone, including BRFs I'm sure, knew that Parakram was only for show. It was like the barking dog that wouldn't bite. With Modi, after 3 surgical strikes, the public knows that this Govt means business
If any of the IT-vity honchos try their 2002 stunt now, they'll be raked over the coals. And they know it.
Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ioAy9x6s9Fg
A sobering discussion with Lt. Gen. Pannu (R), ex 14 Corps Commander. Talks about the Chinese advantage in holding key passes in the Ladakh area as well as the military implications of having to defend map lines that connect along watersheds with key passes not in our possession. Unfortunately, the prescription - that the dispute is best settled through diplomatic and military level talks - is not making much headway and is likely to favor the Chinese claims since they are squatting.
A sobering discussion with Lt. Gen. Pannu (R), ex 14 Corps Commander. Talks about the Chinese advantage in holding key passes in the Ladakh area as well as the military implications of having to defend map lines that connect along watersheds with key passes not in our possession. Unfortunately, the prescription - that the dispute is best settled through diplomatic and military level talks - is not making much headway and is likely to favor the Chinese claims since they are squatting.
Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020
The biggest factor will be the airpower. The side which gains air superiority on the area of action, will be able meet the objectives.
There will be heavy air denial action on both side. Chini's pounding our airbases with BM, we trying DPSA on their airbases. SAM's flying all over the place..
As IAF & PLAAF duel in the sky, on the ground it will basically be a stalemate. Until the airpower comes in and knocks out positions on the heights with LGB's.
By all parameters, it will not be a localised fight. It will be a proper war. A heavy air war.
There will be heavy air denial action on both side. Chini's pounding our airbases with BM, we trying DPSA on their airbases. SAM's flying all over the place..
As IAF & PLAAF duel in the sky, on the ground it will basically be a stalemate. Until the airpower comes in and knocks out positions on the heights with LGB's.
By all parameters, it will not be a localised fight. It will be a proper war. A heavy air war.
Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020
On the question of PLAAF not having enough airbases..As long as the airbase are active, the number of fighters on those bases will be constant.
PLAAF will simply be replacing all losses from the East. You knock off a sqd of J11, another sqd will come from the East!
PLAAF will simply be replacing all losses from the East. You knock off a sqd of J11, another sqd will come from the East!
Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020
The PLAAF's main adversaries - in terms of deployment & training are:nam wrote:On the question of PLAAF not having enough airbases..As long as the airbase are active, the number of fighters on those bases will be constant.
PLAAF will simply be replacing all losses from the East. You knock off a sqd of J11, another sqd will come from the East!
1. Taiwan + USAF (deployed in East Asia).
2. Japan + USAF (deployed in East Asia)
3. Vietnam / South China sea countries (PLAAF has to plan for USAF intervention even if it does not happen)
4. SoKo + USAF
5. IAF
The PLAAF, excluding the forces of the Western theatre just about has air superiority against adversary 1 or 2 (assuming similar quality of pilots).
Transfer of more squadrons from East to West (Tibet) seriously hurts their ability to fight a war against their principal adversaries.
Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020
Assuming Chinis are only fighting us.
In a two front scenario for them, yes they will have a drawback. However I am sure, their production lines will bringing out J10 & J11 at rapid pace..
Any Taiwan fight will now depend on our time of action.
In a two front scenario for them, yes they will have a drawback. However I am sure, their production lines will bringing out J10 & J11 at rapid pace..
Any Taiwan fight will now depend on our time of action.
Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020
Just to add, to give an idea to the effect of able to push in fighter numbers, even if inferior. Comparison with Russian effort against Ops Barbarosa.
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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020
True. And add to this the Modi factor. he is no "poet" ala Vajpayee in such matters. He showed that with Uri, Burma and Balakot. Pakka baniya, will have his piece - at the right time.Prem Kumar wrote:Several reasons why today is different from 2002:
1) Back then, the ruling NDA was much weaker. C-system was much stronger than today
2) Generally, the pro-Indics were much less vocal than today. Thanks to social media & some pre-Indic channels/outlets, this has changed
3) ABV himself sent a weak signal by not attacking Pakistan. Everyone, including BRFs I'm sure, knew that Parakram was only for show. It was like the barking dog that wouldn't bite. With Modi, after 3 surgical strikes, the public knows that this Govt means business
If any of the IT-vity honchos try their 2002 stunt now, they'll be raked over the coals. And they know it.
Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020
With Winter approaching many passes may get closed. So the places for both India and China doing the surging will be limited.
Can we use that time, to take a mild action to restore Status Quo(Apr 2020) with mild/minimum force.
When we do that, China can choose to retaliate , but there are limitations due to harsh winter. Giving us the time till next summer for preparation.
Can we use that time, to take a mild action to restore Status Quo(Apr 2020) with mild/minimum force.
When we do that, China can choose to retaliate , but there are limitations due to harsh winter. Giving us the time till next summer for preparation.
Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020
Given that we are a status quo power, our military objectives should reflect this. There is no point spending billions maintaining massive strike corps, when we know we are are not going to take over Pak or Tibet. Or 3-4 carriers.
Instead we should have spend money on building up a very powerful airforce and submarine fleet. Any land incrusion over the status quo line should invite major air strikes and decimation of adversary's airpower supporting that incursion.
No land army can survive without airpower and no surface fleet from prowling enemy subs. This is what drives US power. Their airpower and sub fleet are the crown jewels of their power.
Instead we should have spend money on building up a very powerful airforce and submarine fleet. Any land incrusion over the status quo line should invite major air strikes and decimation of adversary's airpower supporting that incursion.
No land army can survive without airpower and no surface fleet from prowling enemy subs. This is what drives US power. Their airpower and sub fleet are the crown jewels of their power.
Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020
Indian troops with shoulder-fired air defence missiles deployed on heights near China border
"Indian troops armed with the Russian-origin Igla air defence system have been deployed on the crucial heights along the border to take care of any enemy aircraft trying to violate the Indian air space there," sources told ANI here.
While building up in the Eastern Ladakh sector including areas such as Galwan valley and Patrolling Point 14, the Indian forces had observed that a number of Chinese choppers had tried to come inside Indian territory near the flashpoints.
Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020
Stand-off with PLA pushes India to go for new snow-free axis to Ladakh.
India’s national security planners are pushing hard to complete an all-weather strategic route to Ladakh that will link Darcha in Himachal Pradesh to Nimu via Padum in Kargil’s Zanskar valley, people familiar with the matter said. Nimu is 35 kilometres from Leh town and headquarters of XIV Corps responsible for the defence of East Ladakh and Siachen Glacier.
This would be the first all-weather route to Ladakh that is already connected by two other routes; the first via Zoji La in Jammu and Kashmir and the second, via Himachal’s Manali-Upshi-Leh axis. The 9.02 kilometre Atal tunnel at Rohtang La, which will reduce the distance between Manali and Leh by 46 km, is set to become operational next month.
Senior military commanders said the third route to feed Ladakh by road is urgently needed given how Pakistan and its all-weather friend, China were eyeing the Siachen Glacier and Daulat Beg Oldie.
The defence ministry’s road project is being given its hardest push by road and highways minister Nitin Gadkari and his colleague Gen VK Singh after China provoked a standoff along the Line of Actual Control in East Ladakh and started mobilising troops in depth areas. New Delhi perceives Beijing’s reluctance to disengage despite reminders as an effort to set a new normal at the border.
Officials said the third route requires upgrading the Darcha-Padum-Nimu trekking route into a metalled road and building a 4.5 kilometre tunnel under Shingo La on the Darcha-Padum route. The project, which has been in the pipeline for a decade, is scheduled to be completed by the defence ministry within two years.
In an effort to ensure that the project meets its two-year deadline, Gadkari’s ministry has proposed that the task to build the tunnel should be given to the company that constructed the 9.02 km tunnel at Rohtang La on the condition that it meets the timeline.
According to military commanders, the need to build the third axis was felt as tunnelling would be required under four more high mountain passes on the existing Manali-Leh route if the road has to be kept open throughout the year. The Atal tunnel at Rohtang La on this route has been built at a height of 10,171 feet and is already the world’s longest at this altitude.
The four passes that would require tunnels on the existing Manali-Leh route are at higher altitudes: Baralacha La (16,500 feet), Nakee La (15,547 feet), Lachung La (16,616 feet), and Tanglang La (17,480 feet). These passes are only open for traffic between mid-May to mid-November and covered with deep snow remaining part of the year.
However, the Darcha-Padum-Nimu route requires only a single 4.5 km tunnel through the 16,570 feet Shingo La between Darcha and Padum to ensure that the road is closed only for two months in winter (The lack of common sense is simply Mind-numbing. Shouldnt this tunnel have been built first rather then the Rohtang tunnel which by itself is meaningless and requires four other tunnels to be built to ensure year round connectivity to Ladakh). Darcha is 147 kilometres from Manali and lies on the highway to Leh after Jispa and Keylong across Rohtang La.
The distance between Darcha and Padum is about 148 kilometres with the Zanskar sub-divisional town connected to Kargil via a 230-km long single lane road. Work is already on to construct the Darcha-Padum road with another 260 km road work in progress between Padum and Nimu, the 14 Corps headquarters in Ladakh.
“We are looking to build a road that bisects the Leh-Kargil highway around Lamayuru monastery and connects Darcha via Padum. This road will allow Indian military and the local population to get round-the-year supplies. The route is not under the prying eyes of the Pakistan Army as in Kaksar in Kargil district or the DSDBO (Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie) route that is under observation of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA),” said a former army chief.
Apart from keeping the supply lines open for the military guarding Siachen, Kargil and DBO sectors, the Darcha-Nimu route will also develop the new union territory of Ladakh to match the aspirations of its people.
India’s national security planners are pushing hard to complete an all-weather strategic route to Ladakh that will link Darcha in Himachal Pradesh to Nimu via Padum in Kargil’s Zanskar valley, people familiar with the matter said. Nimu is 35 kilometres from Leh town and headquarters of XIV Corps responsible for the defence of East Ladakh and Siachen Glacier.
This would be the first all-weather route to Ladakh that is already connected by two other routes; the first via Zoji La in Jammu and Kashmir and the second, via Himachal’s Manali-Upshi-Leh axis. The 9.02 kilometre Atal tunnel at Rohtang La, which will reduce the distance between Manali and Leh by 46 km, is set to become operational next month.
Senior military commanders said the third route to feed Ladakh by road is urgently needed given how Pakistan and its all-weather friend, China were eyeing the Siachen Glacier and Daulat Beg Oldie.
The defence ministry’s road project is being given its hardest push by road and highways minister Nitin Gadkari and his colleague Gen VK Singh after China provoked a standoff along the Line of Actual Control in East Ladakh and started mobilising troops in depth areas. New Delhi perceives Beijing’s reluctance to disengage despite reminders as an effort to set a new normal at the border.
Officials said the third route requires upgrading the Darcha-Padum-Nimu trekking route into a metalled road and building a 4.5 kilometre tunnel under Shingo La on the Darcha-Padum route. The project, which has been in the pipeline for a decade, is scheduled to be completed by the defence ministry within two years.
In an effort to ensure that the project meets its two-year deadline, Gadkari’s ministry has proposed that the task to build the tunnel should be given to the company that constructed the 9.02 km tunnel at Rohtang La on the condition that it meets the timeline.
According to military commanders, the need to build the third axis was felt as tunnelling would be required under four more high mountain passes on the existing Manali-Leh route if the road has to be kept open throughout the year. The Atal tunnel at Rohtang La on this route has been built at a height of 10,171 feet and is already the world’s longest at this altitude.
The four passes that would require tunnels on the existing Manali-Leh route are at higher altitudes: Baralacha La (16,500 feet), Nakee La (15,547 feet), Lachung La (16,616 feet), and Tanglang La (17,480 feet). These passes are only open for traffic between mid-May to mid-November and covered with deep snow remaining part of the year.
However, the Darcha-Padum-Nimu route requires only a single 4.5 km tunnel through the 16,570 feet Shingo La between Darcha and Padum to ensure that the road is closed only for two months in winter (The lack of common sense is simply Mind-numbing. Shouldnt this tunnel have been built first rather then the Rohtang tunnel which by itself is meaningless and requires four other tunnels to be built to ensure year round connectivity to Ladakh). Darcha is 147 kilometres from Manali and lies on the highway to Leh after Jispa and Keylong across Rohtang La.
The distance between Darcha and Padum is about 148 kilometres with the Zanskar sub-divisional town connected to Kargil via a 230-km long single lane road. Work is already on to construct the Darcha-Padum road with another 260 km road work in progress between Padum and Nimu, the 14 Corps headquarters in Ladakh.
“We are looking to build a road that bisects the Leh-Kargil highway around Lamayuru monastery and connects Darcha via Padum. This road will allow Indian military and the local population to get round-the-year supplies. The route is not under the prying eyes of the Pakistan Army as in Kaksar in Kargil district or the DSDBO (Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie) route that is under observation of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA),” said a former army chief.
Apart from keeping the supply lines open for the military guarding Siachen, Kargil and DBO sectors, the Darcha-Nimu route will also develop the new union territory of Ladakh to match the aspirations of its people.
Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020
nam wrote:Assuming Chinis are only fighting us.
In a two front scenario for them, yes they will have a drawback. However I am sure, their production lines will bringing out J10 & J11 at rapid pace..
Any Taiwan fight will now depend on our time of action.
China will use pakistani resources for a 2 front attack by india and allies
Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020
Galwan clash a ‘brief moment’ in history: Chinese envoy
China wants India to “reserve differences”, Chinese ambassador
China wants India to “reserve differences”, Chinese ambassador
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- BRFite -Trainee
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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ind ... 754565.cms
Seems like another Tashkent may be brewing . India should be wary of indulging Russia to manage China.
Seems like another Tashkent may be brewing . India should be wary of indulging Russia to manage China.
Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020
"Distrust & verify".uskumar wrote:Galwan clash a ‘brief moment’ in history: Chinese envoy
China wants India to “reserve differences”, Chinese ambassador
Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020
Here is H.E. Sun Weidong, Chinese Ambassador to India's web speech on 25 Aug:
http://in.china-embassy.org/eng/embassy ... 809145.htm
And here are some lame questions:
http://in.china-embassy.org/eng/embassy ... 809143.htm
May be we should organise a BRF web event and invite him for a friendly discussion !
http://in.china-embassy.org/eng/embassy ... 809145.htm
And here are some lame questions:
http://in.china-embassy.org/eng/embassy ... 809143.htm
May be we should organise a BRF web event and invite him for a friendly discussion !
Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020
Chinese Ambassador will play only if you promise to bowl underarm with no spin.amar_p wrote:Here is H.E. Sun Weidong, Chinese Ambassador to India's web speech on 25 Aug:
http://in.china-embassy.org/eng/embassy ... 809145.htm
And here are some lame questions:
http://in.china-embassy.org/eng/embassy ... 809143.htm
May be we should organise a BRF web event and invite him for a friendly discussion !
Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020
and well outside off stump.
No one takes these fellows seriously except the BIF and the useless MSM in our country.
No one takes these fellows seriously except the BIF and the useless MSM in our country.