India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

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pankajs
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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby pankajs » 23 Jul 2020 18:48

Twitter gyan ....

https://twitter.com/drapr007/status/1286188268560637953
Dr. APR @drapr007

#BigBreaking : China deployed more than 40K troopers with heavy weapons along the LAC in Laddakh in last 1 week. Indian Army is also sending additional soldiers in the area as tension is increasing day by day.
There were reports too the effect that China had deployed 40K in Ladakh but I did not pay attention 'cause I was under the impression that such numbers were already inducted by mid-June.

IF this is new induction then it is indeed noteworthy. Looks like we are set for at least one more round of fracas at the LAC.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby hnair » 23 Jul 2020 20:15

All central police forces are trained for repulsing assaults of facilities, from CRPF to CISF, they are taught to organize and stop everything from VBIED to concentrated assault by trained groups of attackers with light-medium arms or RPGs, until more capable troops come in to end the engagement. A lot of them have solid counter-insurgency experience from kashmir to maoists, they know how to be serious against enemies with intent to kill. Without a confirmed air superiority, the PLA will be using mostly light vehicles or manpower-intense assault groups against Indian infrastructure targets and logistics chokepoints up in the hills.

The huge number of trained manpower of central police forces will count. Also in the event of a take over of some town or village, a trained paramilitary can easily spot flaws in an occupying army and run very effective insurgencies like how Saddam's remnants did, against the mighty US of A.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby schinnas » 23 Jul 2020 20:32

ks_sachin wrote:
schinnas wrote:I didn't click on the Wire article as I dont read such motivated "news" portals. BSF is not military - it is paramilitary under home ministry. It naturally is not equipped to face enemy military attack. For that we have IA. BSF faces its equivalent para military in Pakistan and is more than capable of thwarting their mischiefs.

What is Wire trying to prove?


I think the issue is that if the Pakistan attacks in the western sector they will not oblige us by choosing to attack with their para military forces just because we have para military troops in that sector.

If the Pak Army surprises us then the BSF is toast.

Their TOE and training is also suspect in so far as support of any kind to own forces when initiating action.

A better example would be the Assam Rifles who are staffed by the Army and have a better reputation as troops. So much so that they are an organic part of at least one brigade under 17 Mth Div. What their tasking would be I will find out.


That problem should exist the other way as well. India can also spring such a surprise. Military movements at scale can easily be detected and counter mobilisation and air raids will happen. I still don't see how it's a problem.

Job of army is not border guard duty. No major country would commit their army to border guard duty unless it's an active border.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby manjgu » 23 Jul 2020 20:44

hnair wrote:All central police forces are trained for repulsing assaults of facilities, from CRPF to CISF, they are taught to organize and stop everything from VBIED to concentrated assault by trained groups of attackers with light-medium arms or RPGs, until more capable troops come in to end the engagement. A lot of them have solid counter-insurgency experience from kashmir to maoists, they know how to be serious against enemies with intent to kill. Without a confirmed air superiority, the PLA will be using mostly light vehicles or manpower-intense assault groups against Indian infrastructure targets and logistics chokepoints up in the hills.

The huge number of trained manpower of central police forces will count. Also in the event of a take over of some town or village, a trained paramilitary can easily spot flaws in an occupying army and run very effective insurgencies like how Saddam's remnants did, against the mighty US of A.



surely para mil will count.. i was only alluding to the fact, that its not good to mix the two...

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby manjgu » 23 Jul 2020 20:47

pushkar.bhat wrote:
Gyan wrote:
That is very pertinent. I wonder whats the work around? Immediate moblization, joint field training to firm up their resolve in next 1 month? Pak used Paramiliary in Kargill and even China is largely conscript or reluctant Army.


China no more has a conscripted army.


Gyan... Pak did not use para mil in kargil... the NLI is not a para mil..their Arty units were not para mil... Pak army aviation is not para mil.. Pak Rangers are Para mil.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby Gyan » 23 Jul 2020 20:58

I thought NLI is para military. My (wrong?) thinking was that NLI was Para Military and later absorbed in the military after drubbing given by India. Anyhow, if we mobilize 2-3 lakhs of our para Military & Central Police then can we train them at the front alongwith the military formations to mainly to improve their discipline, resolve, motivation, ethos?

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby krishna_krishna » 23 Jul 2020 21:05

manjgu wrote:
pushkar.bhat wrote:
China no more has a conscripted army.


Gyan... Pak did not use para mil in kargil... the NLI is not a para mil..their Arty units were not para mil... Pak army aviation is not para mil.. Pak Rangers are Para mil.


manjgu disagree respectfully, read the performance of BSF in past wars with Pakistan. There was a blog written by ex BSF officer about the details called gypsy’s diary who was settled in UK how they worked with army during war and operations they did together.

It was no surprise that during op park ran BSF was put under control of army and cost guards under IN they form essential component of military and have been, it is a shame that over a period it has been diluted but if we upgrade them they are force multipliers

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby Sanju » 23 Jul 2020 21:27

In the context of what some of the posts have alluded to, here is one from Gen. Hasnain (Retd.)

Lt. Gen Hasnain (retd) on twitter
You may be unaware that 7 Assam Rifles probably holds the record for maximum trts neutralized, way back in early Nineties. AR is a very fine force which must remain officered by the Army to retain that efficiency.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby manjgu » 23 Jul 2020 21:47

NLI was officered by PA ..trained to similar standards as regular PA ( else they wont do high alt ops) .. similar ethos as regular PA units...though its true that they got the regular PA status only after kargil to assuage their sentiments. performance of BSF has been good in previous wars and they have a role to play in future conflicts as well... i was saying that mixing the two is not good. In war, both have roles to play and BSF role is defined v clearly in the event of war when they come under armys control. BSF is the 1st line of defence and is expected to hold fort till the big boys come.
Last edited by manjgu on 23 Jul 2020 21:49, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby Manish_Sharma » 23 Jul 2020 22:03

https://airpowerasia.com/2020/07/23/vul ... ssion=true

Vulnerabilities of the People’s Liberation Army
d
Dr. Shiv
13 hours ago

It cannot be easy to maintain the largest standing army in the world. Despite serial reductions in numerical strength, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China now has about 2 million personnel. Information about the PLA is available in plenty, but does not go beyond the repetitive references to seven military regions (now five theater commands) and other organisational details which make little sense to the lay reader and do not divulge much about the soldiers. This article is an attempt to examine some of the less well known or less well publicized aspects of the PLA.

Though the army is under civilian control in name – it actually comes directly under one man, currently Xi Jinping the president and leader of the Chinese communist party. The PLA serves the communist party of China, so technically it is an army that represents the 80 million members of the Chinese communist party and not all 1.4 billion Chinese. The communist party discourages nationalist loyalty and nationalist thought in the PLA to retain loyalty to the party. This involves indoctrination during the training and close control of political thought of every regiment down to platoon level by the presence of a political commissar in every unit. For India, the loyalty of the PLA to the communist party rather than China the nation probably makes no difference because the communist party’s actions translate into Chinese national actions. The only time when the PLA has to act against Chinese citizens is when there is opposition to the ruling communist party such as was seen in the Tiananmen square protests of 1989. Less well publicized are reports of excesses against the people of Tibet and Xinjiang.

Recruitment and Training

          Every year the PLA replaces about 450,000 personnel who have completed their two year conscription term with the army. That means 20% of the army is turned over every year.  The combat arm of the army apparently depends on about 800,000 relatively unskilled conscripts serving varying amounts of a two year stint in the army.  “Conscript” is the wrong word. Chinese law states that every person between the ages of 18 and 22 years must serve two years in the army, but in practice there are more than enough young people to fill the available slots every year. However, this  fact must be looked at critically because mere availability in numbers does not get the PLA the types of recruits it wants. One constant refrain from China is that they want educated people to fight in an increased informationalized battle space. The word “informationalized” is used repeatedly indicating Chinese plans of fighting wars using high technology in future, requiring soldiers whose education is higher than school graduation. It appears that the PLA was still not getting recruits of the type they desired despite the adequate absolute numbers of 18 year old school graduates available every year. This has been explained as being due to the changing demography of China caused by many decades of a “one child only” policy that has reduced the choice of youngsters available, combined with the availability of better jobs and prospects in the civilian sector.

China has responded to this human capital crisis by raising the age up to which students can be drafted into the army to 24 years (up from 22) and by lowering physical standards. Raising of the age limit allows those who have finished college to be enlisted. As regards physical standards, the minimum height is now down to 5 feet 3 inches and people who are up to 30% over standard weight are allowed. Minimum eyesight standards have also been made more lenient. There have been reports of a very high prevalence of short sightedness (myopia) among young Chinese affecting recruitment into the Air Force. Other measures include asking colleges to reserve a seat for those who get drafted, and better opportunities for those who complete their two year term in the army. Even so, post army service employment remains a problem. Despite these measures the PLA still does not have the number of educated conscripts that it wants. More people from rural areas with lesser education enter the army than the higher educated urban youth who see a better future in private jobs. Apart from the feeling that the army would not be a good career, other impediments are the fact that the new conscripts tend to get posted in faraway places in harsh environments such as Tibet and Xinjiang.

The PLA recruitment cycle is such that those who complete 2 years usually leave by September every year so there is a drop in the strength of the PLA in September. But it is not possible to say exactly how many may be leaving after their  two year tenure and how many choose to continue, or are allowed to continue. Those who opt to stay may enter specialized units. In the PLA there is not much cross movement and personnel who enter a particular career track often spend their entire career there. Training of new recruits lasts 40 days from September to December.  This involves basic training, saluting, marching, rifle handling, history of the PLA and 16 days of political indoctrination. The physical training builds up to running five kilometers three times a week. This seems like a very low target. The recruits are then posted to various units where they must be trained further. All in all it takes 9 months to make a fully trained soldier. This creates an interesting dynamic. The PLA is fully battle ready and ready for exercises by May every year. Since recruits leave by September the US has assessed that the PLA is most ready for war in the June to September period. This in fact exactly matches the commencement of aggressive moves by the PLA on the Indian border in May-June 2020.

Overall, the PLA is top heavy and bottom heavy with a shallow middle order. There are too many officers – amounting to thirty percent and there are too many unskilled conscripts at the bottom and not enough NCOs who form the backbone of any army.

Army Exercises and Preparation for War

          The PLA hardly ever exercises with foreign armies. In fact any interaction with foreign armies is discouraged because of the potentially bad political effect it may have on PLA soldiers. However it appears that the PLA’s training has tried to emulate US methods. In the past military exercises were shams where the friendly “Red” forces always won. However this has changed with the introduction of a hostile “Blue” force which is allowed to win. After such exercises a 40 page report must be submitted where only 10% is devoted to the positives and 90% to the negatives.

          Blue forces have won by launching nuclear strikes and by deceit such as capturing a Red commander by sending in people pretending to be providing humanitarian aid. This act of “cheating” has clearly been used by the Chinese in the June 15th 2020 face-off with Indian troops in Galwan where the brave Indian Commanding Officer Col. Santosh Babu was killed by deceit when he went unarmed for negotiation.

  In other “Red” versus “Blue” Chinese military war-games, it was assessed that Red (China) could defeat the US (Blue) by using unconventional “assassin’s mace” methods that break conventional rules such as knocking out enemy satellites or using electromagnetic pulses. One can expect that in the case of a serious India-China face off, China might try to make up for reverses by knocking off Indian satellites or a decapitation strike on Delhi. It is to be hoped that Indian military planners have gamed this “unconventional attack” possibility into their war game scenarios.

Corruption

          For about two decades after the Sino-Vietnam war PLA funding was reduced and the army had to generate its own funding by entering into business and industry. This led to a great deal of corruption and illegal profiteering of the PLA. There has been a clampdown on this in recent years but corruption has not vanished. Reports keep cropping up of the arrest of erring corrupt officers. Housing in areas where officers are posted followed by failure to vacate houses are renting the accommodation to others is one known source of corruption that has led to a housing shortage.

Chinese law does not allow marriage for men until they are at least 22 years old. In the army, men cannot marry until they are 25 years of age and women until they are 23. There are more men than women in China – with the shortage of women amounting to 30 million less than men, and 200 million people of marriageable age remaining unmarried. After joining the army, new recruits and men must stay in barracks and married couples cannot live together until the spouse has put in 10 to 12 years of army service. They are also not allowed to marry women from their own unit for unknown reasons. Yet the PLA apparently encourages marriages. They try to encourage marriages within the army by conducting blind dates in gala functions. Such events might combine a mass marriage of couples previously engaged by army dating programs. They may also feature stories from the lives of those who met and married in this way. Intra-army marriages are encouraged in other ways. China has a system known as hukou under which rural residents cannot legally move to urban areas. However in the case of military arranged marriages one partner of the couple will be permitted to change hukou from rural to urban if need be. Acquiring the right to live in an urban area offers great advantages for education and jobs but such a move is not a right in China. It is offered as a privilege to military couples.

          There is a shortage of housing accommodation for married couples. This can lead to long separations between husband and wife. However the regulations for annual leave have gradually been made more lenient from leave once in four years, later once in two years to the present where annual leave is allowed for 40 to 45 days a year. As mentioned earlier the housing shortage is caused in part by corrupt senior officers misusing their housing privileges and owning multiple houses at multiple locations. Even after long separations an aggrieved wife cannot file for divorce from an army husband without his permission. The law is heavily weighted in favour of the male serving member of the military.

Oxygen Enriched Barracks

          Of all the privileges offered as incentives for personnel to join and stay in the PLA one of the most unusual ones has to be oxygen enriched barracks in high altitude postings such as Tibet. Oxygen enrichment of living quarters has been used in the mountainous regions of China for workers who normally live at low altitude but need to work at high altitude. However if the human body gets the extra oxygen that it needs at high altitude it will not acclimatize to that altitude. This is perfectly fine for a day job in a high altitude factory or a mine from where a worker can return to his accommodation for a good night’s rest. However its use for soldiers is puzzling. If soldiers do not acclimatize to high altitudes and need to get back to an oxygen enriched bedroom at night, their ability to rough it out in combat at high altitude will be restricted.

While it is tempting to call PLA soldiers “softies” for this, the deeper reasons might be reluctance of personnel to serve in Tibet. Despite better salaries and the pumping of resources into Tibet the Chinese have not managed to raise the percentage of Han Chinese in Tibet beyond 5% – which is a low figure considering that Tibet itself has a population of 3 million compared with over a billion Han Chinese in China. It may be that the officer-heavy PLA want the comfort of oxygen enrichment to get a good night’s sleep in Tibet or the political officers who do not belong in the same category as combat troops need that luxury. Another reason might be that there are no staging areas between Tibet and Xinjiang or eastern China where soldiers can ascend gradually for 15 days of acclimatization. Aside from that, the logistics of carrying oxygen generators, cylinders and extra power supply over and above the logistical needs of an army add an extra burden in a hostile region for which everything from food to fuel has to be shipped in from faraway mainland China.

Conclusion

          In conclusion it may be said that the PLA has some very definite weaknesses. But efforts are being put in to remedy the weaknesses. In a war scenario it is unlikely that the Chinese will sit back and allow their weaknesses to halt them. They are more than likely to wage unconventional war using tactics like knocking out satellites or causing mass civilian casualties to force an adversary into capitulation. The Chinese cannot be trusted to remain within the ambit of agreements and conventions.

Author: Dr Shiv Sastry. The Author is a retired surgeon with a long term interest in military aviation. The views expressed are the author’s own.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby k prasad » 23 Jul 2020 23:15

Blue forces have won by launching nuclear strikes and by deceit such as capturing a Red commander by sending in people pretending to be providing humanitarian aid. This act of “cheating” has clearly been used by the Chinese in the June 15th 2020 face-off with Indian troops in Galwan where the brave Indian Commanding Officer Col. Santosh Babu was killed by deceit when he went unarmed for negotiation.


This is an extremely interesting observation, and points to a deeper behaviour in Chinese culture.

At US universities, cheating among chinese students is rampant. This includes extreme collaboration on homeworks, plagiarism, short-cuts, solving take-home exams together, and even blatant copying during tests. What is interesting though is that the students dont see this as cheating, and express confusion when confronted. Instead, they see it as "being smart". In their mind, anything done to achieve the goal justifies the means.

This has, of course, been pointed out before in this thread, but I thought it was an interesting parallel with battle strategy. Very Sun Tzu, and also Chankian ('koota-yuddha'), except that Chanakya suggested kootayuddha only as a retaliatory response to an enemy who used such tactics first, whereas Sun Tzu suggests it as a matter of practice. The idea of 'ethics' does not seem to exist within the Sun Tzu worldview, nor within the current PRC establishment.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby Manish_Sharma » 24 Jul 2020 00:03

TWITTER

DrApr007:

#BigBreaking : China deployed more than 40K troopers with heavy weapons along the LAC in Laddakh in last 1 week. Indian Army is also sending additional soldiers in the area as tension is increasing day by day.

#IndiaChinaFaceOff

https://twitter.com/drapr007/status/128 ... 37953?s=19

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby chola » 24 Jul 2020 00:29

k prasad wrote:
Blue forces have won by launching nuclear strikes and by deceit such as capturing a Red commander by sending in people pretending to be providing humanitarian aid. This act of “cheating” has clearly been used by the Chinese in the June 15th 2020 face-off with Indian troops in Galwan where the brave Indian Commanding Officer Col. Santosh Babu was killed by deceit when he went unarmed for negotiation.


This is an extremely interesting observation, and points to a deeper behaviour in Chinese culture.

At US universities, cheating among chinese students is rampant. This includes extreme collaboration on homeworks, plagiarism, short-cuts, solving take-home exams together, and even blatant copying during tests. What is interesting though is that the students dont see this as cheating, and express confusion when confronted. Instead, they see it as "being smart". In their mind, anything done to achieve the goal justifies the means.

This has, of course, been pointed out before in this thread, but I thought it was an interesting parallel with battle strategy. Very Sun Tzu, and also Chankian ('koota-yuddha'), except that Chanakya suggested kootayuddha only as a retaliatory response to an enemy who used such tactics first, whereas Sun Tzu suggests it as a matter of practice. The idea of 'ethics' does not seem to exist within the Sun Tzu worldview, nor within the current PRC establishment.



Indeed, cheating might be necessary for any sort of success if the army can't recruit better.

Seriously, the image is that of short fat near-sighted soldiers who can't handle the outdoors. lol

We should had ran over them at Doklam for sure. Even with their currently buildup we could probably still do it now. The only real problem is they might cheat -- which could be anything up to nukes. The commander hostage taking they probably already tried with 16 Bihar.

China has responded to this human capital crisis by raising the age up to which students can be drafted into the army to 24 years (up from 22) and by lowering physical standards. Raising of the age limit allows those who have finished college to be enlisted. As regards physical standards, the minimum height is now down to 5 feet 3 inches and people who are up to 30% over standard weight are allowed. Minimum eyesight standards have also been made more lenient. There have been reports of a very high prevalence of short sightedness (myopia) among young Chinese affecting recruitment into the Air Force. Other measures include asking colleges to reserve a seat for those who get drafted, and better opportunities for those who complete their two year term in the army. Even so, post army service employment remains a problem. Despite these measures the PLA still does not have the number of educated conscripts that it wants. More people from rural areas with lesser education enter the army than the higher educated urban youth who see a better future in private jobs. Apart from the feeling that the army would not be a good career, other impediments are the fact that the new conscripts tend to get posted in faraway places in harsh environments such as Tibet and Xinjiang.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby Rishirishi » 24 Jul 2020 02:23

Every year the PLA replaces about 450,000 personnel who have completed their two year conscription term with the army. That means 20% of the army is turned over every year. The combat arm of the army apparently depends on about 800,000 relatively unskilled conscripts serving varying amounts of a two year stint in the army. “Conscript” is the wrong word. Chinese law states that every person between the ages of 18 and 22 years must serve two years in the army,


This strategy was used in most of the western nations during the cold war and has an advantage.
In case of war, there will be lots of trained military people. If they are desperate they can probably raise somewhere like 4-5 million soldiers within a few days. All planning is done beforehand and each person has a meeting point where they are units are formed and soldiers are equipped.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby shyamd » 24 Jul 2020 02:37

shyamd wrote:RE: Negotiations

The current pullback is only for the next few weeks, till the complete pullback from depth locations. Border will be out of bounds for both sides and no foot patrol is allowed, so that no Galwan type incident occurs again.

GOI/IA view is that negotiations are going in favour of PRC. IA message to GOI is that we should not allow this buffer zone and holding of territory to become the new normal.

PRC/GOI have to decide whether to go in for another round of local talks or discuss via the usual PRC/India boundary committee (Yang and Doval).

Dilemma - continue talking while PRC just drag their feet and entrench OR conduct a mil operation.... The longer these talks go on the more ready PRC is...

IA asking for green light. GOI only gave amber for preparations. IA now slowly going public to force hand of politicians.

My view is they’ll opt for Yang/Doval option with a call with Xi. Last ditch... expect the worst possibility.


WMCC to meet on friday

PLA has not kept to it's end of the bargain - they have reinforced and brought additional troops to Depsang. Mil commanders recommended for WMCC option - Doval to lead discussion to push through change on ground. IA view is "no more talks at military level - please give green light soon".

Basically IA, IAF, IN are ready and just want green light. They have been conducting drills, reconnaissance et al... PLA reinforcement is because of heightened mil exercises by IA & IAF. Watch the chinese take this up with Doval tomorrow...

As I said action is imminent..

I'm surprised at how irritated ladakhis are at IA/ITBP - they are claiming serious negligence on part of security establishment including a decision to close down tourist camps/tours/treks to border areas late last year?

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby V_Raman » 24 Jul 2020 04:38

I would not phrase it as to force hand of politicians.

I would say to prepare the public for the political green light.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby shyamd » 24 Jul 2020 07:24

^^ I disagree. In a sea Articles on how “everything is fine and Chinese are pulling back”, the army was doing selective leaks to say the opposite

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby Cain Marko » 24 Jul 2020 08:49

chola wrote:[ The only real problem is they might cheat -- which could be anything up to nukes. The commander hostage taking they probably already tried with 16 Bihar.

Eh ji? What eej meaning of this... Can you elaborate on the nuke part?

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby g.sarkar » 24 Jul 2020 09:37

Manish_Sharma wrote:https://airpowerasia.com/2020/07/23/vulnerabilities-of-the-peoples-liberation-army/amp/?__twitter_impression=true
Vulnerabilities of the People’s Liberation Army
Dr. Shiv
Author: Dr Shiv Sastry. The Author is a retired surgeon with a long term interest in military aviation. The views expressed are the author’s own.

It is nice hear from our Hakeem Saab. As usual interesting stuff.
Gautam

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby Deans » 24 Jul 2020 09:59

manjgu wrote:NLI was officered by PA ..trained to similar standards as regular PA ( else they wont do high alt ops) .. similar ethos as regular PA units...though its true that they got the regular PA status only after kargil to assuage their sentiments. performance of BSF has been good in previous wars and they have a role to play in future conflicts as well... i was saying that mixing the two is not good. In war, both have roles to play and BSF role is defined v clearly in the event of war when they come under armys control. BSF is the 1st line of defence and is expected to hold fort till the big boys come.


I agree that para military men cannot be mixed with the army - though I am still of the view that it can be experimented with in the RR (no more than one company per battalion), since half of each battalion comprises men across different arms. In a war situation I see para military units being placed under army command (which happens anyway) with BSF/ ITBP/ Assam Rifles units with a IA commanding officer, holding defensive positions in less active sectors of the front, with the intent of preventing infiltration. In many cases the terrain and secondary importance of the area would mean that they would be opposed only by enemy infantry. For e.g. there are very few entry points (for the movement of a large non mechanised force) across the LAC in Arunachal or Himachal. Secondary ingress points are usually tracks in the mountains, where no more than platoon sized forces can advance on foot and can easily be defended by light infantry.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby Deans » 24 Jul 2020 10:19

My contention is that every day that the Chinese delay implementing the disengagement process, strengthens us.
For the first time, we are applying economic pressure to counter Chinese intransigence on the border. First it was FDI, then apps, then banning from bidding from Govt/ PSU contracts. Next will be increased import duties & restrictions. The longer it takes China to settle, the more their economic loss - the trade balance is so much in China's favour that reciprocal action will not hurt India to the same extent.
The continued Chinese threat will also act as the impetus to fill gaps in our defence procurement and complete border infrastructure projects.
Possibly, the extra division we moved to Ladakh, may become a permanent fixture and better balance our deployment against China.

At the same time, China is facing pressure from the US and other Western countries - there has never been more pressure on unfair trade, HK, Ughyurs, Chinese expansionism etc. At some stage the Chinese have to determine if it is worthwhile opening another front against India - particularly if it means a large number of men spending the winter at 5000m in Tibet.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby Philip » 24 Jul 2020 10:38

The Chinks have now moved in 40K troops to the Ladakh theatre,fully supported by tanks,arty,SAMs,etc.,along with rhe requisite air support. From reports in our media,we are matching them in size as well. Thus far,the time has still been too short for us to establish the logistic support chain with enough supplies to last through the winter for such a large force. I feel that we ned immediate acquisition/ lease of more heavylift and med. utility helos for the same purpose.Spl.forces will also require adequate helos tasked for their ops. Tass defence had a pic/ report on a new modified spl.forces' MI-8 ,which had an aircraft styled nose looking as if it had a new radar installed,plus a v.heavy load of ATGMs,rockets,etc. Our armed Dhruvs ,Rudras,and other armed med. helos must be increased to support the few Apaches available.Even here more could be leased from the US,etc.Heliborne ops by spl. forces are sure to play a key role when the balloon goes up.

One feels that the GOI has reconciled to itself that there is going to be no backdown and redeploymennt of PLA forces to the earlier positions along the LAC and is preparing for the worst.If as some analysts say,that the creation of buffer zones mainly in our traditional territory with the PLA maintaining its positions is the aim of XI.He can then tell his homecrowd that he has scored a tactical victory over us and Modi,teaching is a lesson and to the other countries of Asia. The ball is in our court ,let's hope that the logistic efforts succeed and we have enough time for all preparations.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby pahadig » 24 Jul 2020 10:45

“The order for the HAMMER missiles is being processed and the French authorities have agreed to supply them to us at a short notice for our Rafale combat aircraft,” government sources told ANI. In view of the urgent requirement for these missiles by the Air Force, the French authorities would be delivering the missiles to India from the existing stock meant for some other customer, they said.

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ind ... 124650.cms

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby Manish_Sharma » 24 Jul 2020 11:14

https://www.news18.com/amp/news/opinion ... ssion=true


China May be Drawing Up Plan to Hit India Around Winters as Floods, Pandemic Make 'Situation Ideal'


In a closed door international seminar in a foreign country eight years back, some speakers opined China could use tactical nukes to force India submit vital territory. In the current scenario, it could even be tactical bio-bomb.

UPDATED ON: JULY 23, 2020, 2:00 PM IST

Lt Gen (Retd) PC Katoch

India does not have a National Security Strategy (NSS). HQ Integrated Defence Staff invited the National Security Advisor (NSA) few years back to put across how military can help draft the NSS. The Deputy NSA came instead but cut short the presentation midway saying forget all this; tell me about Nepal – the royal massacre had just happened. He was told that a comprehensive assessment was sent to NSA three months back how events will shape in Nepal in five phases. He said he had not seen the paper. Few years later, HQ IDS again invited the NSA for the same presentation. This time the NSA came but lost his temper within 10 minutes saying: “Who has asked you to work on this? We already have a NSS”; this despite government admitting in Parliament there is no NSS but few relevant orders exist in different ministries.

Last year media reported the present NSA is tasked to define the NSS, which apparently is still in the making. How our intelligence agencies are tasked in absence of NSS remains a mystery. But more galling is void of a Strategic Defence Review (SDR) without which numerous aberrations are noticeable with respect to the current standoff in Eastern Ladakh. These are discussed in succeeding paragraphs.

Media recently quoted the China Study Group (CSG) stating they have been closely monitoring China for years – so how come China sprang this surprise in Ladakh? A foreign scholar has detailed satellite imagery of world's largest sand-scale landform in the Ningxia region (China) representing Eastern Ladakh built in 2004 in order to train PLA for operations in Ladakh. Why was our intelligence and CSG unaware of this? Our intelligence at all levels was complete failure despite PLA having built a road 4 km short of Galwan. Some say Chinese aggression was because of India developing border infrastructure to capture Aksai Chin but given the military asymmetry China unlikely sees such threat in the foreseeable future.

Without the SDR and belief there would be no conflict, we went for a truncated Mountain Strike Corps and arbitrarily decided on downsizing Army by 100,000 without examining LAC deployments. For example, the Division in Eastern Ladakh has frontage of over 800 km and had little surveillance means. Successive defence budgets negative in actual terms have adversely affected military modernization, including foreclosing some operational information systems under development by army to fight network-centric war.

Terming intrusions under “their perception of LAC” doesn’t alter the ground truth. Belief that PLA will have to withdraw in winter due to logistics problems too is faulty. Earlier PLA infrastructure were at elevation of 4,000m but now their new encampments are at 6,000m, new support bases at 5,500m and new heliports at 4,500m. It is also opined that PLA will ‘have’ to de-escalate but de-escalation apparently has already reached a dead-end. PLA withdrawing to April 2020 locations is out of the question. They will unlikely withdraw intrusions, especially in Depsang and Pangong Tso areas.

It is also believed that Beijing cannot afford conflict due to adverse world opinion but China never expected garlands even when triggering Wuhan Virus. China may consider this the best opportunity against India battling the pandemic, floods, emergency purchases, winter logistics nightmare, virulent domestic politics and part focus on periodic elections. Some say ball is in China’s court, which it is ‘not’ unless India accepts fait accompli. China continues to claim entire Galwan Valley and PLA intrusions include a deep one in Depsang, besides a mechanized division and other forces on Chinese side of LAC opposite Demchok and Depsang. Ball in India’s court does not preclude further offensive by PLA at opportune time. That is why Defence Minister Rajnath Singh has asked the military to be prepared for two-front war.

The SDR in the Indian context implies defining the threat (short, medium and long-term) much more in detail than the NSS, recommend the size and shape of the military required to build hard power for defending the nation and threat in being enabling unhindered growth of India as a rising power, taking into account multi-domain scenarios through the spectrum of conflict; which would also indicate technologies India must acquire. SDR should also cover worst case scenarios. Periodic review of the SDR is essential because of fast paced situational dynamics. For example, post calling off the Doklam Standoff, China has located a brigade plus force in close proximity. With new illegal claim over Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary in Bhutan, China may be planning operations in Bhutan to force another standoff with India.

The SDR and periodic reviews would take time but in the current India-China standoff notably China maintains India is the aggressor while talking of de-escalation but continues with intrusions at least at Pangong Tso and Depsang while also claiming entire Galwan Valley. China would be unimpressed with military demonstrations shown to Defence Minister Rajnath Singh at Stakna near Leh, being on stronger ground. Recent statement by China’s foreign ministry that India should maintain its independent foreign policy is noteworthy, which followed External Affairs Minister Jaishankar saying that non-alignment was thing of the past. China could well initiate conflict with India before, during or after winter ‘without’ activating South China Sea. China could activate fronts through Bhutan, Ladakh and northeast with Pakistan activated through POK. What support would India get from US or Quad in such scenario beyond posturing?

In a closed door international seminar in a foreign country eight years back, some speakers opined China could use tactical nukes to force India submit vital territory. In the current scenario, it could even be tactical bio-bomb.

If we are not prepared for worst case, this could be a surprise. PLA has equipped soldiers with waterproof cold clothing to wade waters of Galwan River; they could be equipped for CBRN operations too. We have nukes including nuclear tipped BrahMos but hopefully these scenarios have been debated already and responses decided least we scramble the National Command Authority after getting hit and then start debating escalation. If the oil wells fire in Assam is an indication we could be fighting three-front war, which with China will involve high level of cyber-cum-electromagnetic attacks and vertical envelopment.

The author is veteran of Indian Army. His views are personal.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby manjgu » 24 Jul 2020 11:31

Deans wrote:My contention is that every day that the Chinese delay implementing the disengagement process, strengthens us.
For the first time, we are applying economic pressure to counter Chinese intransigence on the border. First it was FDI, then apps, then banning from bidding from Govt/ PSU contracts. Next will be increased import duties & restrictions. The longer it takes China to settle, the more their economic loss - the trade balance is so much in China's favour that reciprocal action will not hurt India to the same extent.
The continued Chinese threat will also act as the impetus to fill gaps in our defence procurement and complete border infrastructure projects.
Possibly, the extra division we moved to Ladakh, may become a permanent fixture and better balance our deployment against China.

At the same time, China is facing pressure from the US and other Western countries - there has never been more pressure on unfair trade, HK, Ughyurs, Chinese expansionism etc. At some stage the Chinese have to determine if it is worthwhile opening another front against India - particularly if it means a large number of men spending the winter at 5000m in Tibet.


Agree...and if the chini do withdraw it will be near winter ...else it will be viewed as a chini loss. As usual we are busy fulfilling our perennial shortages with emergency purchases ... i think companies like huawei have still not been banned as goi sees the situation getting resolved in due course??

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby ramana » 24 Jul 2020 12:43

If China does not vacate it's new positions there will be war.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby Yagnasri » 24 Jul 2020 12:55

I do not see them doing that. We may be looking at war now. At least a border one. It would be better now for MEA and MoD stop saying that Chinese are doing the right things as agreed by them. Optics wise it will be very bad later on when ( not if) the fight starts.

Time so start some serious taxes on China made products and take other steps. There is no reason to wait till the firing starts. Chinese need to know that we expect them to go back on their word and it will be war.

We are going to avange 1962 now.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby g.sarkar » 24 Jul 2020 14:43

ramana wrote:If China does not vacate it's new positions there will be war.

India may decide to wait it out. Indian army has spent long winters facing the enemy in Siachen. The question is can 40k Chinese conscripts face winter at those heights? I have a feeling that they will withdraw after finding a way to save face. Things will go critical around October.
Gautam

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby Philip » 24 Jul 2020 15:16

I think that the threat or use of tactical nukes by the PRC would bring about a massive blowback, and the wrath of the entire democractic nations of the globe,with at very least massive dpl. sanctions,dpl.expulsions as we're seeing now,the tip of the berg with the closure of the Texas consulate. Secondly,we too could use tactical nukes against the PRC. We aren't a deprived Libya or Iraq where Gadhaffi and Saddam suffered western wrath becos they lacked WMDs.Asininely the Libyan Col.gave up his nuclear ambitions! He could've kept the west guessing and avoided attack.

Thus far until Galwan,where the truth has still not been told to the PRC Chinks, the PLA has not suffered war losses,which would dent its reputation especially at home.It has relied upon brazen bullying and blackmail to annexe territory in the ICS. Bharat Karnad has advocated India moving some of its tactical nuke missiles to the region and giving the PRC an ultimatum for waithdrawal,de- escalation. If as suggested by the analysts thf PRC plans a " surprise" winter attack, it would play right into our hands, giving us extra time to mobilise ,plug gaps along thd LAC and acquire essential winter gear for all our troops. THE PAC/ CAG has made some scathing remarks in a report about delays in procuring essential winter wear,housing,etc.,for those serving at Siachen and other high alt. regions.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby Aditya_V » 24 Jul 2020 15:34

Guys looking at gooogle maps coordinates 27.309306, 89.007382 along the Torsha River, can anyone identify if these are 1) Chinese postions 2) Bhutanese or 3) Indian positions just South of Doklam, reason I ask this is pretty close to Hasimara Airbase - where we are suppose to base some of our Rafale aircraft.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby pankajs » 24 Jul 2020 16:09

^^
It cannot be an Indian position because it is not on our territory.

The neatness and the arrangement of the plan does suggest it to be like Chinese position. However, it could possibly be a Bhutanese position too but I doubt it.

There are 3 positions further south along the banks but they are not as well arraigned likely still under planning. Best to track road/track back to get an idea about the party.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby pankajs » 24 Jul 2020 16:28

There are 5 positions in total East of Doklam plateau all of which seem to be connected from the North. I see no road/track going up from the South or East so one can safely assume them to be Chinese positions.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby Aditya_V » 24 Jul 2020 16:36

So the Chinese have invaded Bhutan then.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby rsangram » 24 Jul 2020 17:53

LakshmanPST wrote:
rsangram wrote:Thanks a lot Lakshman.

Your map shows Chinese presence well on their side of LAC.

Why is there this general belief then, including statements from even non-Shukla and sane Ex-Army officers, that Chinese have INGRESSED at Depsang and changed status quo there and are not moving out.

Using your map, can you please explain how the Chinese have changed the status quo since April in this sector - where they were prior to April and where they are now, and the impacts and implications.

Thanks.


The 'ingress' in Depsang is mainly at Bottleneck area at PP10-PP13, not in actual plains near PP8 and PP9 in North...

The problem at Bottleneck area is somewhat like Finger Area of Pangong Tso...
The Google Earth LAC is more or less the line that indicates actual ground control of India and China... That red line is NOT the Indian claim of LAC...
Indian claim of LAC is on East of PP10-PP13 which almost coincides with the Chinese road running from PP11-PP13...
From what I have seen on Google Earth, the only way to access PP10-PP13 is through Bottleneck/Y-junction... From Y-junction, troops used to walk along Raki Nala and other small rivulets and nalas to reach the PPs and come back on a multiple day trek... Total length of walk is more than 100km...

Chinese effectively captured this area in 2013 after the stand-off... This is the 640 sq km area which is often talked about... However, I guess they re-allowed Indian patrols after the standoff is over...

Chinese have easier access to Y-junction and from Pankaj's map provided above, there seems to be a new Chinese Road to Bottleneck which is not there on Google Earth (Most Google Earth images of the area are 10-15 years old)...
-
Now what happened is Chinese blocked access to India at Bottleneck due to which the entire area from PP10-PP13 is now inaccessible to us... This is the change in status quo...

There might have been thousands of Chinese troops in the entire Depsang Area (which includes Bottleneck and PP10-13), but most of them are on their side of LAC and probably in plain areas above...
At Bottleneck, it is really difficult to post 1000s of troops... Only few troops can be maintained there...
----
To summarize about Depsang area--->
Did Chinese ingress in areas which India considers as our side of LAC...? Yes
Did Chinese occupy any new areas in Depsang area, which are effectively not in their control until now...? No
Did Chinese deploy thousands of troops in Desang area...? Probably yes
Did Chinese deploy troops on Indian side of Indian-claim-LAC...? Yes, but probably couple of hundreds
Did Chinese deploy thousands of troops on Indian side of Indian-claim-LAC...? No, practically not possible


Excellent Sir. Very well explained and in simple terms, so even a lay person like me can understand.

Your post has genuinely enhanced my knowledge. Thank you.

Please post more.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby Deans » 24 Jul 2020 17:53

g.sarkar wrote:
ramana wrote:If China does not vacate it's new positions there will be war.

India may decide to wait it out. Indian army has spent long winters facing the enemy in Siachen. The question is can 40k Chinese conscripts face winter at those heights? I have a feeling that they will withdraw after finding a way to save face. Things will go critical around October.
Gautam


Not so much winter (which is manageable) but high altitude. No army has as much high altitude experience as IA. Every IA infantry officer above the rank of Captain probably has experience of both combat (RR unit and LOC) AND high altitude. The Chinese lack both. The other thing that will hit morale is when soldiers wonder what is it they are doing in such a godforsaken place - IA is defending the country, the Chinese aren't.
The PLA had the advantage of surprise, but have lost that since has had time to build up. They should have gained a lot more than 4 km of Pangong Tso (as the crow flies) lakeside.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby abhik » 24 Jul 2020 19:15

Aditya_V wrote:Guys looking at gooogle maps coordinates 27.309306, 89.007382 along the Torsha River, can anyone identify if these are 1) Chinese postions 2) Bhutanese or 3) Indian positions just South of Doklam, reason I ask this is pretty close to Hasimara Airbase - where we are suppose to base some of our Rafale aircraft.

Wow good find, that a full 5 km of incursion. And since some other maps are not showing it, this has to be quite recent, less than 2 years ago and well after Doklam standoff.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby KL Dubey » 24 Jul 2020 19:41

pankajs wrote:There are 5 positions in total East of Doklam plateau all of which seem to be connected from the North. I see no road/track going up from the South or East so one can safely assume them to be Chinese positions.


Not sure. There is a road along the river that goes south of the border deep into Bhutan. There seem to be multiple enclosures/fenced off areas along the west bank of the river that have been cleared, and some kind of construction going on. The last such enclosure is about 500 ft of the border with China. At the border there seems some kind of watch tower (presumably Bhutanese). It seems the Bhutanese are constructing positions.

About two miles downstream (27.261741, 89.017975) there seems some kind of tree logging operations. Maybe the logs floating in the river were sent downstream by the construction going on upstream. Or I wonder if all this is Bhutanese economic activity on the west bank.

It seems the east bank is part of a protected nature reserve, so nothing going on there.

Regarding Doklam about 2 miles to the west, the Bhutanese road (27.310888, 88.960614) seems well connected to the Chinese road. That does not necessarily mean an incursion. Also about half a mile west on the road there is an installation with an establishment called "PRC Army Bar". :lol: Hopefully that is a joke by the Bhutanese.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby Deans » 24 Jul 2020 19:47

abhik wrote:
Aditya_V wrote:Guys looking at gooogle maps coordinates 27.309306, 89.007382 along the Torsha River, can anyone identify if these are 1) Chinese postions 2) Bhutanese or 3) Indian positions just South of Doklam, reason I ask this is pretty close to Hasimara Airbase - where we are suppose to base some of our Rafale aircraft.

Wow good find, that a full 5 km of incursion. And since some other maps are not showing it, this has to be quite recent, less than 2 years ago and well after Doklam standoff.


My view is that its probably a Bhutanese army camp. There is no info on a PLA incursion that far into Bhutan, but it is within the Chinese claim area so it would be a logical place for the RBA to deploy. I don't think anything more than light infantry can use that track.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby Aditya_V » 24 Jul 2020 19:51

The worry is about Artillery and Chinese foot patrols incursions in 1962 like using the Bailey trail to Hasimara Airbase, we must have a plan with our artillery to to cot of the troops in Doklam and stop Chinese foot Patrols.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

Postby KL Dubey » 24 Jul 2020 19:58

Aditya_V wrote:So the Chinese have invaded Bhutan then.


I suggest not to create false alarms.


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