India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020 - Part 2

KL Dubey · Post by **KL Dubey** » 13 Sep 2020 08:07

vijayk wrote:Can we block chinese ships in Indian Ocean? These scums need to be screwed in every possible way.

What is US reaction to this all? Trump must be thinking of how to use this for his re-election. If he can show this as Chinese fault, I am sure it helps him at this time

If war is declared, all Chinese military or "civilian" assets in the IOR - Coco listening posts, port facilities at Gwadar, Djibouti, Hambantota, etc are absolute sitting ducks on Day 1.

KL Dubey · Post by **KL Dubey** » 13 Sep 2020 08:12

hanumadu wrote:
Guddu wrote: You are right..1500 miles as the crow flies to Chengdu and approx. the same distance from Delhi-Kanyakumari.
No sir, Its 2700 as the crow flies. It's much longer by the road.

https://www.google.com/maps/dir/Chengdu ... d32.501111

Whether they try to supply from the south of Ladakh (i.e. through Tibet) or from the north (through Xinjiang), it ultimately boils down to one road: G219. This is mostly just a single-lane road and (in Aksai Chin) mostly an unmetalled dirt track AFAIK. Destruction of the road especially in hilly areas should completely shut down any significant supply line.

KL Dubey · Post by **KL Dubey** » 13 Sep 2020 08:52

The PLA actions and buildup so far, while seemingly impressive in scale, is simply insufficient for any territorial gain especially in the light of the massive Indian deployment, unfavorable geography, supply line issues, poorly trained soldiers, coming onset of winter, and Paki brownpants being what they are. The only reason to deploy in this way is because there was no choice. The threat - posed by India's consolidation of its infrastructure along the LAC and impending preparation to cross the LOC - was considered to be very high.

arshyam · Post by **arshyam** » 13 Sep 2020 08:59

vijayk wrote: https://swarajyamag.com/insta/india-chi ... -in-ladakh
India, China Troops Within Shooting Range At Spanggur Gap Near Pangong Tso In Ladakh

Further, sources said, China has deployed its militia squads to "consolidate the border" and "stabilise Tibet region". They have been tasked to try and dislodge the Indian Army soldiers from the tactical heights.

The militia is an irregular mix of mountaineers, boxers, members of local fight clubs and others. Most of the members are raised from the local population.

If this is true, it is telling that they (PLAGF) don't have the b**** to initiate an attack directly, and are instead outsourcing their work to untrained kung-fu fighters - so if the latter did something stupid provoking a response from the Army, then the PLA could claim moral victory that the Indians attacked first. Either that, or they don't trust their own frontline infantry troops to take action. What a bunch of cowards!

manjgu · Post by **manjgu** » 13 Sep 2020 09:31

arshyam wrote:
vijayk wrote: https://swarajyamag.com/insta/india-chi ... -in-ladakh
India, China Troops Within Shooting Range At Spanggur Gap Near Pangong Tso In Ladakh

If this is true, it is telling that they (PLAGF) don't have the b**** to initiate an attack directly, and are instead outsourcing their work to untrained kung-fu fighters - so if the latter did something stupid provoking a response from the Army, then the PLA could claim moral victory that the Indians attacked first. Either that, or they don't trust their own frontline infantry troops to take action. What a bunch of cowards!

this is BS of highest order...u dont send kungfu fighters to 15000 ft or 16000 ft... what happens on top of a high mountain is anybodys guess as to who started things first.. if PLA wants to go kinetic they dont need such excuses.

hanumadu · Post by **hanumadu** » 13 Sep 2020 09:40

Zozilla Pass and Rohtang pass at 3500m and 3800m are shut down during winter. How come G219 which is above 4500m can still be used in winter? I guess part of the reason ZP and RP are closed is because they are on a cliff. G219 is on a plateau and hence not as dangerous. But does it need constant clearing by a snow removal vehicle?

sudeepj · Post by **sudeepj** » 13 Sep 2020 09:43

hanumadu wrote:Zozilla Pass and Rohtang pass at 3500m and 3800m are shut down during winter. How come G219 which is above 4500m can still be used in winter? I guess part of the reason ZP and RP are closed is because they are on a cliff. G219 is on a plateau and hence not as dangerous. But does it need constant clearing by a snow removal vehicle?

Its in the rain shadow area from the Himalayas. There isnt as much snow around there.

Anoop · Post by **Anoop** » 13 Sep 2020 09:44

I think there's a simpler explanation for the report about "militia/paramilitary" deployment. They are probably PAP (People Armed Police) personnel who were the border guard units until the 2018 reforms to reduce manpower. You can look at it two ways- bolstering personnel strength at a time when the PLAGF rotation is due (September), or having a political fall guy to allow a face saving withdrawal for XI, in that the PLA is not embarrassed at the Oct CCP meeting. Since 2018, the PAP was transferred to the Ministry of State Security (MSS), but the CMC still has operational control over them. Somewhat like our ITBP.

Deans · Post by **Deans** » 13 Sep 2020 09:50

vimal wrote:
hanumadu wrote:
No sir, Its 2700 as the crow flies. It's much longer by the road.

https://www.google.com/maps/dir/Chengdu ... d32.501111
Thanks for sharing this hanumadu.
So thats almost 15 hours of flight from Chendu to Ngari and 60 hours of road journey non-stop.
No wonder Hans have been so circumspect about escalating this beyond a point. There is no good way to supply the Beetroot army from so far without draining its whole treasury. Mountain routes are not the most easy to navigate and have many choke points.

That is correct. Distances are not as the crow flies and time is not (distance / max speed of vehicle). Closer to the LAC (for e.g. the route from Hotan to the LAC) a 200 km `as the crow flies' distance is 800 km by road. A lot of that road is narrow mountain roads, affected by landslides, where engines operate at barely half their power due to the altitude. When looking at rail distances, you have to factor in shunting yards, unloading points (where is the labour in Tibet, who can operate at high efficiency to unload rail wagons?). Where do the vehicle occupants stay en-route (in freezing oxygen deprived areas), or get vehicles repaired ? Add to this, acclimitisation time and the time to de-acclimitise (prolonged exposure to high altitude affects you as much as rushing to high altitude without preparation).

sanjaykumar · Post by **sanjaykumar** » 13 Sep 2020 09:50

Snowfall is not an function of altitude as in it’s cold so it snows.

The great Himalayas block the moisture laden air from the Indian Ocean/ Indian landmass. Adiabatic cooling results in snowfall but largely over Indian and Nepali mountains. Even Leh which is trans-Himalaya is 10% of the precipitation of Shimla/Kufri or Manali. Tibet is arid.

Deans · Post by **Deans** » 13 Sep 2020 09:53

sudeepj wrote:
hanumadu wrote:Zozilla Pass and Rohtang pass at 3500m and 3800m are shut down during winter. How come G219 which is above 4500m can still be used in winter? I guess part of the reason ZP and RP are closed is because they are on a cliff. G219 is on a plateau and hence not as dangerous. But does it need constant clearing by a snow removal vehicle?
Its in the rain shadow area from the Himalayas. There isnt as much snow around there.

Yes, Tibet is a cold desert with little snow. However, there is no evidence yet that the G-219 can sustain troop movements in winter - of the type needed to have an all out war. On google earth along the G-219, you will see very few vehicles and plenty of places where snow or landslides can be a bottleneck.

Haridas · Post by **Haridas** » 13 Sep 2020 10:03

KL Dubey wrote:Whether they try to supply from the south of Ladakh (i.e. through Tibet) or from the north (through Xinjiang), it ultimately boils down to one road: G219. This is mostly just a single-lane road and (in Aksai Chin) mostly an unmetalled dirt track AFAIK. Destruction of the road especially in hilly areas should completely shut down any significant supply line.

While actual war may last 10 days, both side armies would have already staged ammo for a good 4 week war, and food & fuel to last till next spring. So what diff does it make to warfare if G219 based supply is disrupted when balloon goes up?

Taking down G219 could disrupt troop redeployment during war. But then one has to occupy G219 at multiple points to make a difference to troop movement. So think about how we posses portions of G219 and defend our troops (against counter attack) and have a supply line to move men & material?

hanumadu · Post by **hanumadu** » 13 Sep 2020 10:09

Suraj and others have posted before how China goes through cycles of violence and calm. Here's some one's take on why the cycles occur.
https://twitter.com/cbkwgl/status/1304902348658094089

Suraj · Post by **Suraj** » 13 Sep 2020 10:46

hanumadu wrote:Suraj and others have posted before how China goes through cycles of violence and calm. Here's some one's take on why the cycles occur.
https://twitter.com/cbkwgl/status/1304902348658094089

Their history is one of endless violence . More than half the most destructive wars by death count ever fought were internal Chinese rebellions . One could dismiss it as a function of their population but India and even Europe has large populations without that much warfare . China and Europe dominate the chart - India has just one entry in the Kalinga War, which was 2300 years ago .

Xi has already set in motion the chain of events that will trigger their next implosion, by halting the progressive transfer of power and balance between various power centers of the government . I wouldn’t say they’ll have a civil war soon. But the period of seeing China as some awesome, organized, calculating meritocratic entity run by wise leaders with long term vision ? Nope, that is over . Xi is inpatient, impulsive, lacks interest in China as much as in his own power grab.

Xi might not be their Aurangzeb but more likely their Shah Jahan - vainglorious, the point of maximum power of the state, but causing so much internal tensions (eg Shah Jahan and the 1630 famine, all the taxation to feed his vain construction activities, the internal repression of the Sikhs). The consequence is that Xi might be followed by an even more cruel leader in the mould of Aurangzeb (it would be necessary, just to be able to overthrow Xi), and that person will see the start of the real decline of the PRC.

arshyam · Post by **arshyam** » 13 Sep 2020 10:47

Deans wrote:
sudeepj wrote:
Its in the rain shadow area from the Himalayas. There isnt as much snow around there.
Yes, Tibet is a cold desert with little snow. However, there is no evidence yet that the G-219 can sustain troop movements in winter - of the type needed to have an all out war. On google earth along the G-219, you will see very few vehicles and plenty of places where snow or landslides can be a bottleneck.

Plus the cold has its impact on engine efficiency - all vehicles would need block heaters when switched off, especially at night, otherwise the engine would be a useless frozen lump of metal the next day. Multiply this by the number of vehicles they have (and they are a mechanized force these days, so even more vehicles). These block heaters would need some reliable power source to keep them running, which means an electricity grid (which they don't have in the fwd areas, and are susceptible to interdiction) which has its own maintenance requirements. Or they could use diesel generators which are more portable, but they need their own fuel logistics (again, account for all the vehicles they need to maintain and use) to the entire area over which they are spread. Now, they may have done something like the what our Sappers did at Siachen - a 64km long kerosene pipeline to supply heating fuel. But at how many places? Given all this, it's no wonder they too "stand down" in the winter despite not having much snowfall.

arshyam · Post by **arshyam** » 13 Sep 2020 10:48

As for the rail line, I'd suggest watching this video in its entirety. Yes, the railway is a force multiplier in that it can bring in a lot of supplies faster, but observe the landscape and you'll notice one missing component: people. There are no people anywhere along the rail line - so where is the labour to unload/transfer to trucks going to come from? They need to do that since the railway stops at Lhasa and the border is still quite a hike. Sure, some Tibetans would be hired, but would the Chinese trust them in the event of a conflict? What about maintenance - not talking about regular maintenance, which obviously they'd have, but during a conflict, when they'll need lots of people to be stationed at nearby points to respond quickly to a broken bridge or blown up track? Where would these people live - and can they be rushed in from elsewhere? What about acclimatization, heated housing, etc? At that altitude, how efficiently and quickly can these workers work? Do they need more workers than at sea level? So their own logistics assumes importance and eventually becomes its own story. I am reminded of the '62 accounts about the Pioneer troops used to bring supplies to troops at the NEFA border - their own logistics consumed most of what they were able to bring to the front, so effectively, their contribution was nothing. It's not a one-to-one comparison here, but one can see how the logistics challenge in Tibet quickly becomes very complex and expensive.

Now, let's look at the railway itself: the line is a single diesel track, and is totally exposed to air attacks. Next, observe the sheer number of bridges this line has - one broken bridge puts them on the back foot. How about one broken bridge over the permafrost? How long will that take to stabilize and become operational again? Also notice the rolling stock - it is entirely imported: GE diesels hauling Bombardier coaches. Sure, China will copy and build them themselves, no doubt, but their reliance on imported rolling stock despite building and exporting lots of railway equipment themselves exposes the limitations of their own tech. Also, I find the use of diesel motive power a strange choice - given the high altitude, these engines won't be efficient at all, and would need more locomotives to haul the same tonnage than at lower altitudes. Sort of a PLAAF issue redux at the ground level.

There is a reason why this rail line took so long to build (even post '62, there were mentions of Chinese plans to build this railway, having come up to Xining, Qinghai in '59 itself) - the engineering is extremely complex (and admirable), but it has its own liabilities during a military conflict.

Net net, their supply lines are very brittle even after so many decades in Tibet and that's why we should not hesitate to signal that we'd deploy our air power in case the balloon goes up. No '62-like dhoti shibbering about their "bombers dropping bombs over Calcutta".

arshyam · Post by **arshyam** » 13 Sep 2020 10:53

manjgu wrote:
arshyam wrote: If this is true, it is telling that they (PLAGF) don't have the b**** to initiate an attack directly, and are instead outsourcing their work to untrained kung-fu fighters - so if the latter did something stupid provoking a response from the Army, then the PLA could claim moral victory that the Indians attacked first. Either that, or they don't trust their own frontline infantry troops to take action. What a bunch of cowards!
this is BS of highest order...u dont send kungfu fighters to 15000 ft or 16000 ft... what happens on top of a high mountain is anybodys guess as to who started things first.. if PLA wants to go kinetic they dont need such excuses.

True, but who knows what they are doing saar? There were similar reports even post-Galwan...

samirdiw · Post by **samirdiw** » 13 Sep 2020 10:59

hanumadu wrote:Has anybody fought a war with a 3000 km logistic tail against a strong adversary before

Thats the whole point. There is no way China should be able to hold on to 100% Tibet without an ultrapacifist foe.

Suraj · Post by **Suraj** » 13 Sep 2020 11:06

The reason why so much of the Qingzang (Qinghai-Zizang aka Tibet) Railway Is built on elevated viaducts is that it is not ground underneath but permafrost . Destruction of the pillars means rebuilding into the permafrost to achieve the stable support, not merely filling in holes and relaying track. Not something they’ll manage by sending in a corps of engineers to do overnight. Each damaged section will take weeks or months to fix, the latter being the case if damage results in the alignment itself having to be altered in places. Clearly an impressive $5 billion exhibition of engineering and political will but a glass jaw in a wartime logistics chain context.

putnanja · Post by **putnanja** » 13 Sep 2020 11:33

Not sure how credible it is, but looks like there were fresh clashes on Friday night

Ladakh Standoff: Fresh clashes at Pangong Tso, Indian Army repulses PLA attack on Black Top

In a serious escalation that could further worsen the already tense situation along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Indian Army engaged in fresh clashes on Friday night.

There are reports of casualties among the PLA troops as they tried to evict the Indian Army from the Black Top and Helmet Top positions on the southern bank of the Pangong Tso.

According to sources, the Chinese soldiers faced stiff resistance and the Indian Army foiled the PLA's attempt to regain its lost positions.

Sources said that the PLA soldiers were seen carrying their men on stretchers back to their side of the LAC.

An additional three companies of the Indian Army were rushed to the strategically important positions.

Sources said that the Indian Army was anticipating an offensive from the PLA and was ready to counter the measures. The Indian Army had also laid barbed wires around their freshly acquired positions at the Black Top and Helmet Top.

The clashes have taken place despite the fact that the foreign ministries of China and India had agreed in a joint statement that their troops must quickly disengage from a months-long standoff along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

There is no word yet from the Indian Army about the incident.
...
...
However, the fresh clashes indicate that the top diplomatic meet at Moscow has not succeeded in bringing about a thaw in the tense situation along the LAC.
....

schinnas · Post by **schinnas** » 13 Sep 2020 11:34

It is very easy to cripple China's logistics chain - esp the Tibet railway and 219 highway. Few precision missile or LGB on select areas chosen for difficulty in reconstruction would do the trick. It would cripple them for months.

Their toy drones in rarefied Tibetan air cannot ferry much more than fried noodles and will serve as good slow moving target practice for our long range snipers.

pankajs · Post by **pankajs** » 13 Sep 2020 11:39

G219 will require India to sit on it and that too at specific critical points to cripple the supply line ... A few bombs craters can be repaired just as Airfield runways can be repaired in 24 hrs.

Aksi China if mostly flat with very few bridges and a lot of options to go offroad and continue.

suryag · Post by **suryag** » 13 Sep 2020 11:52

So did the kungfu fighters go back on stretchers ?Now they have to get Jackie Chan only but he is from HK so he wont come

Cain Marko · Post by **Cain Marko** » 13 Sep 2020 11:53

pankajs wrote:G219 will require India to sit on it and that too at specific critical points to cripple the supply line ... A few bombs craters can be repaired just as Airfield runways can be repaired in 24 hrs.

Aksi China if mostly flat with very few bridges and a lot of options to go offroad and continue.

Okay - this might be a very naive line of thought but - Who will come and from where to repair said craters saar? As I understand it, this is not like an airfield but a superlong highway without too many human settlements in sight for 100s of km.
If it takes them 24 hours to repair on area, India could create another crater in 10 minutes in some other spot. They can play whackamole for a long time before they get a clear path to bring in supplies.

arshyam · Post by **arshyam** » 13 Sep 2020 12:02

pankajs wrote:G219 will require India to sit on it and that too at specific critical points to cripple the supply line ... A few bombs craters can be repaired just as Airfield runways can be repaired in 24 hrs.

Aksi China if mostly flat with very few bridges and a lot of options to go offroad and continue.

Aksai Chin, yes, but to get there? The road from Hotan is not that easy, and that's where we'll focus. Or near Ngari. Heck, even Rudok is not that free with alternative routes. There are plenty of points to choose from if we want to interdict them.

P.S. On BRF, can we stop using the name Aksai Chin and start using Gosthana? Given that there is already a Sanskritic name for the place, we should try to make that popular - a Sanskrit name means that our people (at least a few thousand years ago since Sanskrit is very old

) already knew about these places, hence they are our territory onlee (turn the tables on the Chinese argument using some "old" maps and Chinese names).

pankajs · Post by **pankajs** » 13 Sep 2020 12:07

Cain Marko wrote:
pankajs wrote:G219 will require India to sit on it and that too at specific critical points to cripple the supply line ... A few bombs craters can be repaired just as Airfield runways can be repaired in 24 hrs.

Aksi China if mostly flat with very few bridges and a lot of options to go offroad and continue.
Okay - this might be a very naive line of thought but - Who will come and from where to repair said craters saar? As I understand it, this is not like an airfield but a superlong highway without too many human settlements in sight for 100s of km.
If it takes them 24 hours to repair on area, India could create another crater in 10 minutes in some other spot. They can play whackamole for a long time before they get a clear path to bring in supplies.

What do you think Rutog and Ngari are?

How will you play "whackamole"? Presumably IAF? Will IAF be able to enforce complete air dominance about 100-150 km from the LAC for it to create the scenario that you suggest?

pankajs · Post by **pankajs** » 13 Sep 2020 12:25

arshyam wrote:
pankajs wrote:G219 will require India to sit on it and that too at specific critical points to cripple the supply line ... A few bombs craters can be repaired just as Airfield runways can be repaired in 24 hrs.

Aksi China if mostly flat with very few bridges and a lot of options to go offroad and continue.
Aksai Chin, yes, but to get there? The road from Hotan is not that easy, and that's where we'll focus. Or near Ngari. Heck, even Rudok is not that free with alternative routes. There are plenty of points to choose from if we want to interdict them.

P.S. On BRF, can we stop using the name Aksai Chin and start using Gosthana? Given that there is already a Sanskritic name for the place, we should try to make that popular - a Sanskrit name means that our people (at least a few thousand years ago since Sanskrit is very old ) already knew about these places, hence they are our territory onlee (turn the tables on the Chinese argument using some "old" maps and Chinese names).

1. The route to Hotan has multiple Chinese bases along the way. Those will be used to repair the G2019.

2. Check the back areas of Ngari and Rutok and you will find alternative routes. Ngari has another highway labeled as S301 that connects it back to Lhasa plus Rutok has a clear track/road going back that ultimately links up with S301. Between Rutok and Ngari there is another path that goes back and does the same. So between Rutok and Ngari, there are 3 road/track that could be used to re-route supplies if G219 is temporarily disabled.

And "temporary" is the key word. Unless Indian Army sits of G219 there is NO way to block it. AND Indian Army has to sit on G219 at "strategic" points else there are sufficient bypasses.

This "drop a bomb" or "wackamole" concept will not work. The air space will not be un-contested and the closer one goes towards Hotan the more contested it will become for IAF to operate freely. Btw, At one of the most critical chock points on the G219 from the Indian POV, the Chinese have built a new base in the last 3-5 years. I had pointed this out a while.

UPrabhu · Post by **UPrabhu** » 13 Sep 2020 12:43

Forget bombing the road to create craters what if we bomb a big convoy (like highway of death in Iraq) and put fear of God in them..offcourse airspace will be contested, but if we get live intelligence of convoy with supplies moving on G219... we can interdict it with air force. That will make them rethink their supply lines..

williams · Post by **williams** » 13 Sep 2020 12:55

From Spanger lake to Rutog is 85 km. You will have to control the road that leads to Rutog and probably take over control of Rutog to disrupt G219. Not an easy task. Just using IAF won't cut it. You need boots on the ground. You will have to do that while defending all other sectors of LAC. It is a big ask for our armed forces with the current force structure and the 2 front assumptions. Add to that the current economic woes and Covid pandemic. You won't get that kind of political approval in the current situation unless Chins provoke us by going kinetic first.

sanjayc · Post by **sanjayc** » 13 Sep 2020 13:39

From the NewsWeek

The Chinese Army Flops in India. What Will Xi Do Next? | Opinion
GORDON G. CHANG , AUTHOR, COMMENTATOR, LAWYER

In China, "another brutal purge" is coming.

Ruler Xi Jinping, already roiling the Communist Party with a "rectification" campaign and mass persecution of foes, has risked his future with recent high-profile incursions into Indian-controlled territory.

Unfortunately for Xi, he is the "architect" of these aggressive moves into India and his People's Liberation Army (PLA) has unexpectedly flopped.

The Chinese army's failures on the Indian border will have consequences. As an initial matter, they give Xi an excuse to pick up the pace of replacing adversaries in the armed forces with loyal elements. Heads, therefore, will roll.

More important, the failures motivate China's aggressive ruler—who as chairman of the Party's Central Military Commission, is the leader of the PLA—to launch another offensive against Indian positions.

Beginning in early May, Chinese forces advanced south of the Line of Actual Control, the temporary border between the two giants, principally in three separate areas in Ladakh, high in the Himalayas. The boundary is not well-defined, and for years Chinese troops trespassed into Indian-controlled territory, especially after Xi became Party general secretary in November 2012.

The May incursions took New Delhi by surprise. As Cleo Paskal of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies tells Newsweek, Moscow in April had assured India that large-scale Chinese maneuvers in its Tibet Autonomous Region were not preparations for a move below the Line.

China also took India by surprise on June 15 in the Galwan Valley, the northernmost of the three areas of incursion. In a premediated move, Chinese troops killed 20 Indian soldiers. It was the first deadly confrontation between the two giants in 45 years.

Beijing is accustomed to getting its way in disputed territory, especially because Indian leaders and soldiers, "psychologically paralyzed" by their loss in the 1962 border war with China, played only defense.

Paralyzed no more. China is thought to have suffered at least 43 deaths in the Galwan clash. Paskal says the number of Chinese killed could exceed 60. Indian troops fought back ferociously. Beijing won't admit the extent of the debacle.

Then, beginning late last month, for the first time in a half-century, India carried out an offensive against China, taking back high ground the Chinese recently grabbed. China's forces were surprised when Indian troops mounted their attempt to retake strategic high points. Stunned Chinese soldiers retreated.

China's subsequent efforts to counter the Indian moves proved ineffective. At least for the moment, India's troops, in the southernmost of the three areas of conflict, are in control of territory once in Chinese hands.

Can the Dragon fight? The Ground Force of the People's Liberation Army can move against undefended targets, as a series of incursions south of the Line of Actual Control demonstrate, but it is not clear how effective it is in battle.

The Ground Force does not have a track record of success in contested situations. Its last major engagement was in 1979 when, in the effort to "teach Vietnam a lesson," the Chinese launched what they called a "defensive counterattack" into Vietnamese territory and, in the process, were repelled and humiliated by their much smaller neighbor.

Now, after decades of an unprecedented modernization effort, the Ground Force is far better equipped and trained, but it is apparently not much more effective on the battlefield.

India is not giving the invaders the opportunity to improve. Both sides have just accused the other of violating decades-old rules of engagement by firing warning shots. It appears, however, the Chinese are the ones closer to the truth: India's troops are displaying newfound boldness.

India has effectively ditched these rules intended to limit casualties. "The game has changed," Paskal told me. "You can say the Indians are more aggressive or more aggressively defensive, but they are in fact bolder and better."

We are going to learn more about Chinese capabilities soon. The setback in the Himalayas poses problems for Xi, which means it poses a problem for everyone else. Jayadeva Ranade, a former senior Indian intelligence official and now head of the New Delhi-based Centre for China Analysis and Strategy, said Xi needs "a victory" and could force further conflict in Ladakh.

In that conflict, the Chinese, Richard Fisher of the Virginia-based International Assessment and Strategy Center tells Newsweek, could roll out "joint mechanized warfare for which they have been preparing for 30 years."

Given the rapid buildup of Indian forces and their high state of readiness, Xi is not assured of the success that Ranade believes he craves and needs—especially because India's army has brought mechanized vehicles of its own to Ladakh.

In China's highly politicized system, the setbacks in Ladakh cannot be perceived as Xi's fault, so he will almost surely purge elements of the military. "PLA leaders begin to see little choice but to undertake offensive military actions to avoid becoming a victim of Xi's internal terror," Fisher says.

"What we are learning in 2020," Fisher notes, "is that Xi wants victories, and as the PLA is judged to have reached requisite levels of strength by rearming and reorganization, Xi is increasingly willing to use the military."

China's leader has shown he is good at political mobilization of the army and that he can spend large sums on military equipment. He has also perfected the art of intimidating other countries.

Xi Jinping, however, has yet to show his military, in a fight, is worth a damn.

Other nations will take notice that China's military is deficient. Why is the PLA less than the sum of its parts? It can be excessive political control of army operations—a problem in all communist militaries—or something else. Yet the failure to push around the Indian military means Xi's ability to intimidate anyone is much reduced.

Unfortunately, it looks like China's leader, who had looked invincible, now has something to prove. As a result, he appears absolutely determined to make his point by launching another attempt to break India apart.

https://www.newsweek.com/chinese-army-f ... on-1531170

williams · Post by **williams** » 13 Sep 2020 13:49

https://www.newsweek.com/chinese-army-flops-india-what-will-xi-do-next-opinion-1531170

Slowly international press is catching up and Chins are getting public humiliation. I hope our leadership understand Chinese pyche. Talks will not yield anything. PLA needs to gain upper hand. Otherwise heads will roll and it will be matter of time before Xi's leadership will be questioned. So PLA generals may risk a massacre to gain upper hand and avoid being purged.

Rishirishi · Post by **Rishirishi** » 13 Sep 2020 14:05

A question for the Air Defence Gurus here. How good are the Indian SAM's ? Will PLAF be able to bomb positions in Leh, Manali ? How will an Air battle work out ? Gvien the main PLAF bases are very far away.

pankajs · Post by **pankajs** » 13 Sep 2020 14:10

UPrabhu wrote:Forget bombing the road to create craters what if we bomb a big convoy (like highway of death in Iraq) and put fear of God in them..offcourse airspace will be contested, but if we get live intelligence of convoy with supplies moving on G219... we can interdict it with air force. That will make them rethink their supply lines..

Consider the reverse too ... You know that the Chinese too have intelligence, PLAAF and missiles! One basic mistake we make is we tend to think of action but no reaction or worse no action from an opponents. Don't fall for such mental traps!

Similar (not same) kind of resources, strategy and its psychological impact will operate for the Chinese. Works both ways.

chola · Post by **chola** » 13 Sep 2020 14:13

sanjayc wrote:From the NewsWeek

The Chinese Army Flops in India. What Will Xi Do Next? | Opinion
GORDON G. CHANG , AUTHOR, COMMENTATOR, LAWYER

Gordon Chang made his initial fame through his book "The Coming Collapse of China" -- back in 2001. It sounds nice to our ears but this guy is no Cassandra or maybe he is but just a three or four decades late kind of seer. Anyways, don't bank on his predictions to come through any time soon.

Doubtful public humiliation will do much harm to them. Information is restricted so all they have to do is lie. Xi is a dictator. Cheen is having giant pool parties in Wuhan and they are going to the movies in droves. Xi has that population believing they are better off than anyone even the US because of their superior handling of the virus they themselves unleashed (though they will never be told this.)

To be perfectly honest, I think this kind of "haha Xi will be shamed into losing dictatorship" talk gives us an excuse to not go kinetic. They are not being humiliated or isolated by the world to any extent that remotely affects their population. Even their exports are picking up again and in a massive way too.

We need to take and keep land and go kinetic with extreme prejudice if the shoe drops. Hoping that international public opinion could stop Pooh is fool's gold. Part of being a dictator means you don't have to listen to opinions.

pankajs · Post by **pankajs** » 13 Sep 2020 14:23

williams wrote:From Spanger lake to Rutog is 85 km. You will have to control the road that leads to Rutog and probably take over control of Rutog to disrupt G219. Not an easy task. Just using IAF won't cut it. You need boots on the ground. You will have to do that while defending all other sectors of LAC. It is a big ask for our armed forces with the current force structure and the 2 front assumptions. Add to that the current economic woes and Covid pandemic. You won't get that kind of political approval in the current situation unless Chins provoke us by going kinetic first.

The ONLY way to control roads leading in and out of Rutog is to sit on Rutog physically block all access. That will cut G2019 into two given that the strech between Rutog and Ngari passes through some rough terrain without any "natural" bypass. One can be constructed through the hills and mountains surrounding but that will take time.

The provocation from the Chene has to be really BIG for India to make a play for Rutog or G219, perhaps a missile barrage at Leh or something on that scale or worse. Else India is interested in status quo and peace on the LAC.

Now for some bad news ... I "think" the Chinese are building a bypass to the G219 but especially the section that goes to Hotan as it leaves the Aksai chin plateau North-west. Please google Chiliyar Pass / Keriya Pass. Can you see the possibilities?

Mandeepsajwan · Post by **Mandeepsajwan** » 13 Sep 2020 14:32

https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q ... XCa9CeQ7FI

vimal · Post by **vimal** » 13 Sep 2020 14:41

Please post content from the links you are posting or else they’ll just be ignored.

Rishirishi · Post by **Rishirishi** » 13 Sep 2020 14:45

chola wrote:
sanjayc wrote:From the NewsWeek

Gordon Chang made his initial fame through his book "The Coming Collapse of China" -- back in 2001. It sounds nice to our ears but this guy is no Cassandra or maybe he is but just a three or four decades late kind of seer. Anyways, don't bank on his predictions to come through any time soon.

Doubtful public humiliation will do much harm to them. Information is restricted so all they have to do is lie. Xi is a dictator. Cheen is having giant pool parties in Wuhan and they are going to the movies in droves. Xi has that population believing they are better off than anyone even the US because of their superior handling of the virus they themselves unleashed (though they will never be told this.)

To be perfectly honest, I think this kind of "haha Xi will be shamed into losing dictatorship" talk gives us an excuse to not go kinetic. They are not being humiliated or isolated by the world to any extent that remotely affects their population. Even their exports are picking up again and in a massive way too.

We need to take and keep land and go kinetic with extreme prejudice if the shoe drops. Hoping that international public opinion could stop Pooh is fool's gold. Part of being a dictator means you don't have to listen to opinions.

I think the greatest weapon against the CCP is making them look weak. It puts the gods fear in them. How this fear can be utilized should be evaluated (if IA havent already have not done it).

Mandeepsajwan · Post by **Mandeepsajwan** » 13 Sep 2020 14:46

Deleted

putnanja · Post by **putnanja** » 13 Sep 2020 14:52

Mandeepsajwan wrote:https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q ... VgW_WRi7UC

Please don't post random links, it doesn't add much to discussion. Please post a brief synopsis of what the article says. And you can use the URL tag like below

[ url=<link> ] Put title of article here from teh webpage [ / url]

,

that will be more meaningful. In the example provided, remove spaces in square brackets when you use it.