India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020 - Part 2

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ramana
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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020 - Part 2

Post by ramana »

mody wrote:https://www.msn.com/en-in/news/opinion/ ... hp&pc=U531

This article says that 2 out of the 3 generals who have held charge in the area also died, possibly due to the high altitude and weather-related issues after retiring. Article by Maj Gen (Retd) Ashok Kumar.
One of the most comprehensive articles on the 2020 and post-Galwan news. I highlighted the facts he brings out and left the readers to form their opinion.

Ladakh Standoff

Since the start of the standoff in Ladakh in April 2020, Indian and Chinese troops have been engaged in a high-stakes scenario that involves control over a long, disputed territory between the two countries. India’s claim over these territories has been much more comprehensively documented, both legally and historically. Despite a host of ‘peace and tranquillity agreements’ signed over the last three decades, and strategic directives at Wuhan and Mamallapuram, the Chinese converted their exercise deployments to real ones and ingressed into a number of Indian areas.
How or What led to Galwan?

Shocked by this, India mirrored the Chinese deployment in strength and equipment across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in all aspects — resorting to emergency procurements, reorganisation, re-orbatting and modernisation, and incurring costs of finance and committed manpower. However, an important issue not debated or highlighted enough in most analyses is that the costs imposed on China have been more disproportionate. China has mostly suffered financial and psychological costs apart from the usual military ones.

Speaking about the military costs first, India learnt a few lessons about China the hard way. As a result, Indian deployments were reinforced and better supplied across all fronts. The evidence of all these preparations became clear in 1967 (Nathu La), 1987 (Sumdorong Chu) and even Doklam (2017). Sustained economic support was available for both India’s modernisation and operational logistics. The current deployment has come at an even larger cost for the Chinese who have had to mobilise around 10 times more personnel from the rear to the forward areas in their Western Theatre Command, as opposed to Indian mobilisation of around 3 times more personnel to the frontlines in eastern Ladakh.

Strategically, Taiwan remains China’s short- to medium-term objective. India was supposed to be a sideshow used for the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) to practice its new theatre commands as well for Chinese President Xi Jinping’s directive of ‘training through operational action’. Since that move has been thwarted, China now faces a multi-front threat, a much more formidable challenge compared to India’s two-front threat, since the United States and even Japan have pledged military support to Taiwan against Chinese aggression.

Even along the LAC, the Chinese infrastructure buildup has been mostly in eastern Tibet opposite Arunachal Pradesh. Due to India’s mirror deployment in eastern Ladakh, there has been hasty infrastructure creation by China in western Tibet now, which has put a huge drain on their weakening economy. Evergrande was just the start and the enfeeblement can be witnessed in the slowing down of infusion of funds into the new Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects.


China’s big tech failure

India first banned 59 Chinese social media apps, including the hugely popular TikTok, in June 2020, post the Galwan clashes, and retained the ban in January 2021. This was followed by a ban on 118 more apps in September 2020 that hasn’t been revoked yet. All these bans have made it impossible for Chinese companies to enter the Indian gig and startup market, already one of the biggest in the entire world.

In May 2021, in one of the biggest thumbs down to China, India’s Department of Telecommunications granted approval to nearly a dozen companies to conduct a six-month trial for use and applications of 5G technology. These did not include Huawei and ZTE, both of which had applied. Combined with the US’ restrictions on Huawei, ZTE and Hikvision on 12 November 2021, under the ‘Secure Equipment Act of 2021’, and a reorienting of the Quad in these technologies, these moves have put excessive pressure on Chinese firms to look for alternate consumer markets.

Closely following India, the US’ Commerce Department too made it hugely difficult for Huawei to procure semiconductor chips not only directly but also from companies that use US technology, hampering the entire Huawei supply chain. This twin move, compounded by Xi’s ‘self-goal’ in hugely regulating big tech in China, has devastated the Chinese digital empire.

India also imposed anti-dumping duties on Chinese goods, especially on five Chinese products, including certain aluminium goods and some chemicals, for five years starting December 2021 to guard local manufacturers from cheap imports from China. Similarly, the psychological cost in China has been immense and the evidence has been strewn across a number of Chinese and English language reports and news items. It only needs to be collected, collated and analysed.


Troops in Ladakh

Three top Chinese generals in charge of the Western Theatre Command have been changed within one year. Out of them, two have died due to health complications related to prolonged exposure to high altitudes. Chinese lines of communication are much longer, therefore they have to spend much more than what India spends to maintain troops in eastern Ladakh. There have been some murmurs in the open-source intelligence (OSINT) circles on Twitter regarding the alleged death of some Chinese soldiers in the first week of January 2022 due to extreme winter conditions. Most Chinese soldiers have been unable to cope with the harsh weather and the inhospitable terrain, and there has been a sudden increase in the need for doctors, psychologists and counsellors in the foreign areas.

The Chinese PLA has had to scrape the bottom of the barrel while recruiting and the newly inducted personnel are neither hardy nor technically proficient to handle the brutal nature of war. The strategies to recruit them include video games and music videos. Soft peacetime ‘chocolate soldiers’ need extra comfort. This is a stark reminder that the Chinese experience of war is essentially null. Reduced educational and physical standards, combined with a focus on multiple fronts against India, Taiwan, Russia, and the US, have forced China to stretch its workforce. Consequently, the Chinese are looking at recruiting Nepalese and Tibetans to carry out deployments against India.

Not only this, but after losing close to 40 soldiers during the Galwan clashes in June 2020, China has indulged in continuous information warfare against its own citizens. The entire wasteful exercise of 2020, which was essentially engineered to unilaterally stake a claim and appropriate Indian territory, has shown no results on ground. Naturally, its propaganda machinery has been working overtime to ensure that the Chinese citizens do not question the PLA and Xi about this.

China’s costs have been mostly intangible yet intensely damaging and acute. Entanglements with India have cost China a lot and given a cause célèbre to other countries to stiffen their spines and oppose China on all fronts.

Maj Gen Ashok Kumar, VSM (Retd) is a Kargil war veteran and defence analyst. He is visiting fellow of CLAWS and specialises in neighbouring countries with a focus on China. He can be contacted at trinetra.foundationonline@gmail.com and tweets from @chanakyaoracle.
Views are personal.
Maj Gen Ashok Kumar did not talk of the Kailash Range occupation and subsequent Army Commanders level talks which have resulted in withdrawal from many of the occupied hot spots.
This forum readers are aware.
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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020 - Part 2

Post by Babui »

The Klaxon - an Aus news site - has more detail on the Galwan clash and Chinese casualties https://www.theklaxon.com.au/home/china ... eath-58xj7
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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020 - Part 2

Post by yensoy »

Babui wrote:The Klaxon - an Aus news site - has more detail on the Galwan clash and Chinese casualties https://www.theklaxon.com.au/home/china ... eath-58xj7
Great find! And now India does a diplomatic boycott of the winter Olympics where the hosts decide to honour the idiot colonel who led to this face-off. Chinese reaction will predictably be to belittle India's Olympics record and to claim India doing this under US pressure - pls prepare yourself for it.
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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020 - Part 2

Post by Cyrano »

Don't worry saar, we have no Winter Olympics record, so nothing to belittle :DDD
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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020 - Part 2

Post by Rudradev »

This pic (X-posted from Pakistan thread) may not appear to have any obvious connection to the topic of this thread. But believe me, it does.
anupmisra wrote:Dimmy arrived in Peking and was received by a low-level functionary from the foreign ministry. Dimwit was just happy to be there, away from the Baloch and economic issues.

Image
Here you see Imran Khan arriving in Beijing and being received by some random flunky (who looks about 22 years old) at the airport. The low esteem in which Xi Jinping holds Pakistan has never been more abundantly clear.

The Pakis were given just one job by the Chinese: keep CPEC safe so that it can serve its purpose as an economic corridor. Then at least there could be some return on Beijing's investment, and the flagship pilot project of OBOR could be claimed as a success.

Pakis made all kinds of tall promises in return. Not only would they make CPEC prosperous, but once America withdrew from Afghanistan, the pro-Pakistan Taliban govt in Kabul would open up Afghanistan for resource plunder and strategic use by China. Moreover, Pakistani fauj would help China to mount a two-front offensive against India, etc. etc.

One by one ALL those promises have failed to materialize. Afghanistan is a mess that China is staying well clear of. TTP militas released by the Taliban government, far from making Afghanistan safe for Chinese exploitation, are making Pakistan and POK more dangerous (murdering Chinese engineers etc). And as for the rest of the CPEC corridor, it is under a constant barrage of attacks from the TTP as well as Baloch insurgents with an intensity unparalleled over the last 4-5 years.

Pakistani soldiers, far from protecting Chinese interests, are dying like flies while failing to protect even Pakistani interests.

Consequently, any hope that China may have had of getting Pakistan's help to mount a two-front offensive against India is dashed. PLA probably never even brings up the idea in discussions with TSPA because the first thing the Pakistanis would do is stick out their begging-hand for more money. The Chinese know better than to throw good money after bad, let alone flush it down the same toilet as before.

The contemptuous public rebuff to Imran Khan at Beijing airport is only the most obvious sign of this. The Chinese can gain a LOT more advantage out of directly opening up the internal Indian front (of 5th-Column BIF elements within Indian borders) than they could ever hope to get out of Pakistan's official participation in a two-front offensive. So that's where they are targeting their resources instead. One tweet by Pravin Sawhney probably gets paid as much as 20 tweets from Imran Khan.
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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020 - Part 2

Post by Prem Kumar »

"One tweet by Pravin Sawhney probably gets paid as much as 20 tweets from Imran Khan."

Satya vachan. As someone commented, we are still facing a 2.5 front war, except that Pakis are the 0.5 front, while China & #BreakingIndia forces are 1 front each.
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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020 - Part 2

Post by Cyrano »

Spot on Rudradev ji. Pakis have reached torn condom status with China.
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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020 - Part 2

Post by SRajesh »

https://youtu.be/FFlBhmtzvQ0
Listening to Coutpa, is it true that Banditji was trying to forego this Nonsense of NAM and trying to get closer to Unkil??
And is it the reason that Tashkent neutralization and Gandhi Family returns with Chipko movement to USSR
And Unkil turning to Paks and Paks had already bedded the Chinese??
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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020 - Part 2

Post by LakshmanPST »

Babui wrote:The Klaxon - an Aus news site - has more detail on the Galwan clash and Chinese casualties https://www.theklaxon.com.au/home/china ... eath-58xj7
From the report, there were atleast two separate fights:-
1) The fight where Col Santosh Babu was killed and Qi Fabao was wounded... It says 3 PLA soldiers were killed in the scuffle and 38 PLA soldiers drowned during retreating from this fight...
2) After the initial fight, both sides called for reinforcements and mentioned that most of the 20 Indian soldiers died in this 2nd fight... It does not mention how many PLA soldiers were killed in this 2nd fight...
-
In all probability, the number of PLA soldiers killed is much higher than the 41 (3+38) mentioned in this report...
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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020 - Part 2

Post by fanne »

123 I still stick with that number. This is based on actual accounts plus bodies that floated this side. Yes for obvious reasons GOI will not publish the photos, but it is what it is.
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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020 - Part 2

Post by anupmisra »

yensoy wrote:...the hosts decide to honour the idiot colonel who led to this face-off.
Actually, viewed another way, the chinis are felicitating a fat and failed military commander who led his troops to death and dishonor. The question to then ask is how did this princeling survive? Did he run away from the battlefield?
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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020 - Part 2

Post by stephen »

fanne wrote:123 I still stick with that number. This is based on actual accounts plus bodies that floated this side. Yes for obvious reasons GOI will not publish the photos, but it is what it is.
While the Chinese keeps on releasing images after images from these fights to bolster their propaganda,showing post clash soldier exchanges as prisoner return. Its hard to understand our strategy with regards to psy-ops, nothing to deflate their egos then "leaking" a few images of cheeni soldiers being returned by the IA.
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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020 - Part 2

Post by anupmisra »

stephen wrote:While the Chinese keeps on releasing images after images from these fights to bolster their propaganda,showing post clash soldier exchanges as prisoner return. Its hard to understand our strategy with regards to psy-ops, nothing to deflate their egos then "leaking" a few images of cheeni soldiers being returned by the IA.
Indian policy is dictated by this strategy: वसुधैव कुटुम्बकम Vasudhaiva kutumbakam.
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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020 - Part 2

Post by fanne »

nope more like practical reasons -
China is itching to prove that it is the new Supawah. TSP is it's catpaw. Most likely it will do something against Taiwan. The opposite camp imagines the world in their image - Everyone bows to their Gods/values/economics.....TSP is also their catpaw along with various conversion mafia and the BIF gang.
We are caught in the middle, trying to find a place for ourselves, grow our economy, survive our WAY OF LIVING.

In this fight, it is foolish to get yourself bloodied...for some intangible ego. Till something strategic is at risk, why get yourself into a fight that is not yours, and where both parties have nothing but contempt for you and wished you licked their boot.
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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020 - Part 2

Post by S_Madhukar »

If your opponent wants to commit suicide no need to alert him… gently step out of the way, be timid and unseen and unheard. Beyond the Sinosphere there is a universe of truth and justice and we must believe and invest in that!
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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020 - Part 2

Post by k prasad »

anupmisra wrote:
stephen wrote:While the Chinese keeps on releasing images after images from these fights to bolster their propaganda,showing post clash soldier exchanges as prisoner return. Its hard to understand our strategy with regards to psy-ops, nothing to deflate their egos then "leaking" a few images of cheeni soldiers being returned by the IA.
Indian policy is dictated by this strategy: वसुधैव कुटुम्बकम Vasudhaiva kutumbakam.
Empty pots make the most noise. The Chinese are doing these psyops because they got clobbered, and they're trying to salvage pride in whatever way they can find it. Let them. GoI and IA have done a reasonably good job in explaining our position and keeping people confident. As long as we stay vigilant and well-stocked on the border, we don't need to stoop to the Gobar Times level. The truth is coming out through other sources, so why do we need to pump our own chests?
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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020 - Part 2

Post by Pratyush »

The question to ask is why is CCP doubling down on this particular issue.

What are they hoping to accomplish?
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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020 - Part 2

Post by Avik »

would love to hear shyamd's views. Wonder why he isnt on the board these days?!
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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020 - Part 2

Post by Larry Walker »

Maybe GoI is playing games - spooking CCP using some 'known' CPC agents that release of Galwan footage by IA is now imminent and then CCP tries to stay ahead in the game by releasing their propaganda first ?
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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020 - Part 2

Post by Barath »

Also a good reference for Indian maritime claims

https://www.state.gov/wp-content/upload ... lement.pdf
P 55 on Indian claims UNCLOS and corresponding baselines..for Andaman, Nicobar and Lakshwadeep

deposited at https://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIO ... ES/IND.htm

For a discussion : https://www.lawfareblog.com/us-state-de ... -law-claim

India also tried to show scientific evidence to extend the claim, based on geology. Not sure what came of this one.
https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/ ... 096905.ece
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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020 - Part 2

Post by Rakesh »

India-China War. How will the PLA Fight? By Lt Gen Ravi Shankar

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020 - Part 2

Post by rohitvats »

- In this episode of The Perspective, we will look at road network already put-in place, and those under-construction or planning, to improve connectivity of Daulat Beg Oldi Sector with Leh.
- The analysis will also show how the road network is being done in a manner so that to reduce the risk of the interdiction or destruction by the Chinese.
- Further, will will see how multiple roads being put in place provide back-up capability if one road axis becomes unavailable.

- This episode will cover the following road alignments:
(1) DSDBO Road (Darbuk - Shyok - Daulat Beg Old Road)
(2) Sasoma - Saser La Road:
- The alternate alignment being built across the Karakorum Range. And where the government is studying the possibility of building a tunnel under the Saser La pass to give all weather connectivity.
(3) Depth to DSDBO Road on Depsang Plains:
- The alignment of DSDBO road has been changed on the Depsang Plains to give it more depth, and keep it as far away as possible from the Chinese claim line.
(4) Sasser Brangsa - Gapshan - DBO Road:
- This very critical road extends the DSDBO road further north along the Shyok river, and provided rear entrance towards DBO.
- This will ensure that in case the DSBO Road within the Murgo gorge to Qizil Langar segment becomes unavailable, the connectivity with Depsang Plains, and DBO sector is not lost.

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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020 - Part 2

Post by Deans »

Another very informative and well researched video Rohit ji.
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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020 - Part 2

Post by rohitvats »

Deans wrote:Another very informative and well researched video Rohit ji.
Many thanks, Sir.
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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020 - Part 2

Post by ramana »

Very good video. Clarifies a lot.
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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020 - Part 2

Post by g.sarkar »

Rohitji, a great video. It answers a lot of questions that I had in my mind. Thank you.
Gautam
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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020 - Part 2

Post by k prasad »

From 2016, environmental clearances:

http://forestsclearance.nic.in/Download ... a/Addinfo/
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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020 - Part 2

Post by SidSoma »

rohitvats wrote:- In this episode of The Perspective, we will look at road network already put-in place, and those under-construction or planning, to improve connectivity of Daulat Beg Oldi Sector with Leh.
- The analysis will also show how the road network is being done in a manner so that to reduce the risk of the interdiction or destruction by the Chinese.
- Further, will will see how multiple roads being put in place provide back-up capability if one road axis becomes unavailable.

- This episode will cover the following road alignments:
(1) DSDBO Road (Darbuk - Shyok - Daulat Beg Old Road)
(2) Sasoma - Saser La Road:
- The alternate alignment being built across the Karakorum Range. And where the government is studying the possibility of building a tunnel under the Saser La pass to give all weather connectivity.
(3) Depth to DSDBO Road on Depsang Plains:
- The alignment of DSDBO road has been changed on the Depsang Plains to give it more depth, and keep it as far away as possible from the Chinese claim line.
(4) Sasser Brangsa - Gapshan - DBO Road:
- This very critical road extends the DSDBO road further north along the Shyok river, and provided rear entrance towards DBO.
- This will ensure that in case the DSBO Road within the Murgo gorge to Qizil Langar segment becomes unavailable, the connectivity with Depsang Plains, and DBO sector is not lost.
It also partly answers the importance of Galwan. The site of the intrusion is one of the closest points to the road and the Development of this road has rattled chinese. Imagine how many rivers will be yellowed when the complete road grid is developed. Amazing video Rohit Ji
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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020 - Part 2

Post by k prasad »

One of the things we absolutely need once the first set of roads get blacktopped in Phase II of Project Himank is to move extremely fast on building tunnels under the major passes along the Ladakh and Karakoram Ranges - Khardung La, Saser La, Chang La, Shinku La, etc. Apart from the all-weathering, these will significantly reduce the need for open roads with multiple hairpin bends, which both increases travel times and makes military equipment difficult to transport.

There's been talk and planning for all these tunnels, but the govt needs to start working on these on a war footing to create multiple logistics routes to the Ladakh territories - the Chushul Sector, Siachen, SSN, and Turtuk. Right now, the two routes into Leh are from Manali (which has the Atal Tunnel through Rohtang La), and from Srinagar (with the Zoji La - ZMorh tunnels under construction), but neither of these are truly all-weather all-year roads. Multiple further tunnels are required to make it so:

1) Combined with the Atal Tunnel, the Shinku La tunnel will provide alternate route all-weather access to Leh from Manali through the Nimoo-Padum-Darcha road.
2) If we also get tunnels under Baralacha La & Naki La, that can potentially provide a faster all-weather route to Nyoma & Chushul (assuming Polokongka La can be kept all-weather), rather than using the Shinku La route and then swinging all the way down from Leh.
3) To SSN, we'll need tunnels under either Chang La or Khardung La, followed by a tunnel under Saser La. This also provides access to Siachen
4) Then, there's the all-weather road & tunnels required on the Kargil-Leh road, which will combine with the Zoji La - Z Morh tunnels, and the rail route being built to Banihal. We'll need tunnels through Namika La & Fotu La, possibly another to cut through the mountain, and save traveling on about 60 km of exposed highway just after Drass (near Chokial).

If we can get all of these, we should have 3 all-weather roads across Ladakh to Siachen, SSN, and Chushul sectors.

Btw, Rohitvats-ji, other posters... does anyone have any information about the tunnel project between DBO and Depsang? It seems to have been reported at https://www.tunnelsonline.info/news/ind ... on-8195189 from back in 2020, but it looks suspect.
India plans to build up to ten tunnels totalling over 100km to facilitate year-round military movements in the high altitude regions of Ladakh and Kashmir. Some of the tunnels will lie at altitudes of well over 5,000m and include the 7km Khardung La Tunnel which will lie in a strategically important area bordering both China and Pakistan. An 8km ‘all-weather’ tunnel is proposed to connect Karu to Ladakh, while another proposal for the 7km Nimmu-Darcha-Padam Road through the Shnku La Pass is planned.

Alternate connectivity is the aim of the planned tunnel between Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO) and Depsang Plains in eastern Ladakh. Other tunnels planned will lie on the Manali-Leh highway and include excavated lengths of 13.7km, 14.7km and 7.32km. Construction has already started on the 14km tunnel through the Zojila Pass and on the tunnel between Sasser-Brengasa to Murgo which will reduce a 25km journey to 10km.

The areas in which the tunnels are proposed have seen huge military build-ups following the continuing border tension with China which resumed in May.
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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020 - Part 2

Post by ramana »

In December 2021, former NSA SS Menon [2010-2014] wrote this article for Seminar, Jan 2022.

https://www.india-seminar.com/2022/749/ ... 0MENON.htm

Its the former NSA's view of the India-China border situation.

The crisis in India-China relations


SHIVSHANKAR MENON

India-China relations remain in crisis at the end of 2021. The entire Line of Actual Control (LAC) is live, over 100,000 troops from both countries will spend another winter at inhospitable heights along the Himalayan border, and the relationship is marked by distrust as deep as in the sixties.

Today, the factors causing stress in India-China relations outweigh the common interests and understandings that could introduce an element of predictability in the relationship. What are these factors and is there a way to minimize the unproductive effort and risks of conflict that they induce?

The proximate cause of the present situation, of the heightened risk of conflict and an uncertain future, is the Chinese PLA’s attempt since spring 2020 to change the ground situation along the LAC, thus calling into question the legally binding commitments that China made in the 1993 Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement and thereafter, to maintain the status quo on the border.

The deaths in the Galwan valley in June 2020 of 20 Indian troops and at least four Chinese soldiers {it is much more than that and SSM shows his oisseauleness} were the first on the border in 45 years. Indian troops have been prevented from patrolling where they did before for many years, and satellite pictures show the changed situation created by the Chinese build-up of troops, infrastructure, and villages on Indian territory. This is particularly worrying in sensitive areas like the Depsang plains but is not confined to one or two areas or sectors, extending to the Arunachal Pradesh border as well. Both sides have, since spring 2020, built up permanent infrastructure to support troops and operations all along the line.

PLA actions in 2020 were the culmination of a series of escalating incidents and face-offs along the border in the last decade. In 2013 PLA troops intruded in Depsang and setup camp but Indian actions led them to vacate the area after two and a half weeks. In September 2014, while President Xi Jinping was visiting India, Chinese troops intruded in large numbers in Chumar. And in 2017, the PLA attempted to build a road on Bhutanese territory in the Doklam plateau, leading to a stand-off with Indian troops that lasted for 72 days. The series of incidents, escalating in size and nature, culminated in the deaths in the Galwan valley in 2020.

There is no indication that a way out of the present military stand-off is imminent or likely. The Government of India seeks the restoration of the status quo and is ambiguous on accepting a new border management arrangement involving buffer zones and separation of forces as a first step. China, however, has indicated no flexibility and expects withdrawals to be from the new reality that she has created. This would amount to China keeping what she has gained by stealth and force. An arrangement was negotiated and implemented in February 2021 around the Pangong Tso, where India had riposted to Chinese moves forward north of the lake by occupying heights in the Kailash Range south of the lake. Since these dominated Chinese concentrations and positions, a mutual withdrawal was negotiated, creating a buffer zone of sorts, but not quite restoring the status quo. But along most of the border, the stand-off continues.

{Again SSM is economical with the truth. The fact that China withdrew from Pangong Tso sites after India occupied Kailash Ranges shows they are also flexible, which negates his picture of an inflexible China facing a Gumby India. And the Commanders Conferences did agree to a road-map that each area will be negotiated individually. So to keep claiming that "border stand-off continues" while true is also obscures any progress made.}



The operational problem on the border is that if one is to defend every inch of that long border, one must be stronger than the adversary at every possible point of ingress. The attacker, on the other hand, only has to be stronger where he chooses to take the initiative. The defender is therefore forced by the logic of this circumstance to a strategy of ripostes, of taking territory elsewhere when the adversary moves in one area. There is thus a built-in logic of escalation in this situation unless there is a rough and effective balance of forces along the border to deter adventurism. Clearly, that deterrence broke down in spring 2020 and needs to be restored.

{A balance of forces will lead to a repeat of Chinese salami slicing. For deterrence, India needs to have an adequate number of troops determined by the security establishment and supply infrastructure and modern weaponry. That is what is being done as Rohit vats pointed out in his video commentary.}

Besides, China is signalling a steady hardening of its stance on the border. After eight months of official silence, (though the ‘Global Times’ and Chinese netizens had a field day commenting on the clashes) the Chinese state is now releasing video and commentary to buttress its version of events and glorify the PLA, arousing nationalist sentiment, and publicizing all that it is doing to strengthen its control of the Himalayan borderland. By passing a new land border law in late 2021, China has made it harder to negotiate a settlement of these issues, since they are now framed as sovereignty questions, which are sacred and inviolable. This is in contrast to the past when China spoke of the boundary as a dispute left over from history, therefore something that could be settled by give and take through negotiation. The newly stepped-up nationalism of Xi Jinping’s China has made territory and sovereignty non-negotiable, and this now has official sanction in Chinese law and official propaganda.

{This is irrelevant to the situation and shows that China feels compelled to pass laws seeking to hang on to what they grabbed. its sign of weakness and not the strength of PRC.}


This brings us to the second source of stress in India-China relations – China’s internal politics and trajectory. It is difficult to believe that the Chinese decision to change the status quo all along the line and to flout existing agreements and protocols for border management was purely a military one, taken for tactical or local military considerations. It has to have been a decision taken at the top of the Chinese system, for political, strategic, and other considerations.

The move was undertaken just after the Covid pandemic first became known, when the Chinese regime was under pressure at home and abroad for having first suppressed information about Covid, and when its competence was in doubt. There were several signs at the time that the regime was under internal pressure and divided. External diversions such as tension on the Indian border, the crackdown on dissent in Hong Kong, and stepped-up anti-US rhetoric were probably useful to a leadership under siege.

{Despite being a former envoy to China and NSA, SSM shows poor understanding. Off-course China always acts outwards to deflect internal problems. They have a long history of that pattern. Nothing new. Even this SSM article is to address Indian domestic audience!}

By the end of April, however, the CCP leadership seems to have united in the face of public and foreign criticism and pressure and agreed on a changed direction in China’s domestic politics, that is now becoming evident in a stress on an increasingly self-reliant ‘dual circulation’ economy, on ‘Common Prosperity’ addressing inequalities, and in stronger CCP control of all sectors including the hitherto booming giant tech firms. All in all, we are dealing with a China where regime legitimacy is increasingly tied to nationalism, indeed to a form of hyper-nationalism.

Third, there were imbalances and opportunity for China built into the India-China relationship that encouraged Chinese risk taking on the border in 2020. Previous agreements and protocols to preserve the status quo had worked for almost thirty years, keeping the peace and the border roughly as it was and where it was. But in that time, the relative balance of power between India and China changed. From a rough equivalence in the eighties in the size of their economies, their technological levels, and their integration into the global economy, today the Chinese economy is four times larger than India’s, is technologically more advanced, and is much more integrated into global markets and supply chains, most of which pass through China. The economic rise of China has fuelled a signifiant military build-up by the PLA in the last thirty years. The imbalances these created could have tempted China to change the ground situation on the border when she could, when India was preoccupied with responding to the Covid pandemic, and when the world was distracted.

{This speaks volumes on India's governing elite who instead of building up the economy formed unstable govts and scams. Meanwhile, China raced ahead in economy and thus the military.}

One consequence of the growing economic gap between the two countries has been the creation of Indian economic dependencies on China. There have been calls for economic decoupling from China after the border clashes, but that seems neither possible nor in our interest. China is now India’s largest trading partner, having overtaken the USA in 2020, the year of the clashes. And India-China trade in 2021 has set new records, crossing US$ 100 billion by October. India’s export production has become more dependent on China in the last two decades. China’s percentage share of value added in Indian exports has risen from 6.2% in 2000 to 25.8% in 2018, according to UNCTAD. By 2019 dependence on China had grown considerably in important sectors such as pharmaceuticals (68% of APIs), auto parts, electronics, telecom gear and power equipment.

Decoupling does not, therefore, seem a viable alternative in any reasonable time frame such as, say, less than ten years. Instead, India might limit dependence on China, first turning elsewhere rather than inward; build Indian manufacturing through self-reliance not autarchy; and use such leverage as we have in the relationship, particularly in Chinese project exports. India contributes 16% of China’s overall trade surplus. Between 2000 and 2018 the Chinese trade surplus with India grew 291 times! This should constitute leverage, as should access to the Indian data market. While we cannot turn our back on China now when China is the major source of growth in the world economy, we can certainly rebalance the economic relationship. But that would also mean a much more active economic integration of the Indian economy with that of the region and the rest of the world, and in global value chains, not walking away from RCEP and raising tariffs as we have done recently.

{In case SSM noticed, GOI banned Chinese apps, investments, bidding for contracts, built-up infrastructure to reduce dependence on Chinese precursor materials. BTW, 2008 is when Congress signed the Beijing accords which led to the ballooning of the trade deficit. Nearly 550B trade surplus was built in that ten year period. And RCEP is a one-sided agreement that he wants to be signed. India is now re-negotiating the FTAs with Japan and ASEAN to prevent the rebranding of Chinese goods. Tariffs are being raised to afford protection for Indian industry to build capacity and not get killed. The imports now are useful goods and not frivolous imports.}


The international situation has also contributed to instability in India-China relations, in two respects – worsening China-US relations and China’s rising stakes in the subcontinent. For some years Chinese scholars and officials have questioned whether India is still non-aligned or neutral – a code for saying that India has chosen to align with the US against China. At a time when China is facing much stronger US pushback to her assertive policies under both Presidents Trump and Biden, this conclusion would have removed any restraining Chinese concern about pushing India into a closer alignment with the US. Besides, the worse China-US relations became, the higher the incentive for China to try to pacify or control her periphery and neutralize US influence in it.

The Indian subcontinent, like Korea, is one of the few parts of her periphery where China cannot be confident of getting her way and faces a strong local power with its own ideas and interests. The subcontinent has become much more important to China over time. Pakistan may have initially been important to China as a check on India. Today, Pakistan hosts the flagship BRI project, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, Gwadar offers the PLA Navy a base at the mouth of the Persian Gulf from where her oil supplies flow, Pakistan is critical to managing international Muslim reactions to China’s actions against the Uighurs in Xinjiang, and Pakistan’s links with the Taliban offer hope of preventing Uighur separatists from finding bases and training in Afghanistan.

{Korea is important for China for if NoKo collapses it will bring US troops on China border. Hence they support NoKo survival. And Pakistan is a basket case and not worth talking about. Yet SSM honours them as power,}

South Asia as a whole has also become increasingly important to China: Nepal for Tibet at a time when China has stepped up attempts to assimilate Tibetans into Han culture; Bhutan as a potential crack in India’s Himalayan wall; Sri Lanka and the Maldives for their strategic positions astride the Indian Ocean sea-lanes, and Bangladesh for its proximity to India and Myanmar, China’s other corridor to the sea apart from Pakistan.
{With his GOI service record, he should continue to use the term Indian sub-continent. In reality, the Chinese Himalayan strategy is the "Palm and Five fingers". Tibet is the Plam and the five fingers are Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Ladakh, Arunachal Pradesh.}

The result is China’s stepped-up commitment to Pakistan, her raising Kashmir at the UN Security Council in 2020, for the first time in over forty years, after we read down Article 370, and her active pursuit of a strategic foothold in the ports, economies and politics of the subcontinent and the Indian Ocean region in the last decade. And these relationships in the subcontinent, to which China has committed over US$ 100 billion in BRI projects and funds, serve to limit India’s influence and ability to create outcomes in its own periphery. China’s moves on the border with India could well also be an attempt to show our neighbours that they cannot rely on India for their security since India has its hands full taking care of itself and that not very successfully.

{Just fear mongering passing off as analysis!}

With China itself, it seems likely that the relationship will continue to exhibit a combination of engagement and competition, though the balance between them may continue to shift. However, since the border clashes in 2020, none of the stress factors in the relationship have been mitigated. Nor have they mutated into a more benign form. What might India do to respond to these challenges and to improve the situation?

India’s first reactions to the spring 2020 Chinese actions were naturally to stabilize the military situation on the border, strengthening troop deployments, hasten infra-structure build up, and, in August-September 2020, to occupy heights in the Kailash Range south of Pangong Tso. Public opinion in India turned strongly against China, convinced that China had once again betrayed India, as in 1962, and there were calls for a boycott of Chinese goods. The government imposed a prior approval requirement on Chinese investments in India, limited Chinese participation in government procurement and the bidding for India’s transition to 5G, and banned several Chinese apps.

Government of India’s public statements on the relationship with China and the need for China to restore the status quo have become stiffer with time. Externally, the government of India opened a back-channel with Pakistan and both countries recommitted to the ceasefire of November 2003, which had not been observed for almost a decade, thus seeking to limit the possibility of a two-front collusive conflict with both China and Pakistan at the same time. Since then, the situation on India’s borders with both China and Pakistan has settled into an armed confrontational stalemate that raises uncertainty and the risk of armed conflict escalating by miscalculation or design.


{While it is true that a ceasefire along LOC is welcome, Pakistan is not in any position to open a front against India. And once Imran Khan gets removed it might go back to a to front like it was after Art 370 removal. It was the hammering from the Indian Army that induced Pakistan to agree to a ceasefire and not any back-channel scratching. INDIA anti-narcotics action via MHA has killed planned Pakistani drug income reward through Afghanistan. It was supposed to be Pakistan reward for services rendered to the US.




A way ahead must begin by addressing the causes of stress to stabilize India-China relations. Immediately making the relationship more predictable and less accident-prone by working out crisis management measures would be a useful beginning to the larger process of addressing the China challenge. Much of what is needed is long-term, and some is not in India’s hands. But there is still much to be done.

To begin with, self-strengthening is essential. In my experience, China operates on her perception of the relative balance of power or correlation of forces. Military reform in India, which has begun but needs to be continued and carried through, strengthening our manufacturing capabilities and economic weight in the world, and internal cohesion are the essential bases without which no amount of clever diplomacy or active politics will meet the multiple challenges that China poses to India today.

While the long-term goal must be to eliminate power imbalances in the relationship, in the short term we might seek to reduce economic dependencies on China and build a more balanced economic relationship, using such leverage as is available to us.

{Completely agree that India should reduce China's propensity to initiate armed conflict. And GOI is working on that as can be seen from many steps. The sad accidental death of Gen. Rawat slowed military reforms but they should be on track soon.}

With China itself, if the relationship is to recover from the present crisis and find a new equilibrium where it is both stable and predictable, a sustained strategic dialogue at authoritative levels would be necessary to establish each side’s core interests, where they are in conflict and how to settle or manage them. Prime Minister Modi and President Xi Jinping met 18 times before the clashes, but not since then. A new strategic dialogue could prepare for the leaders to meet again and attach their prestige to any new strategic framework for the relationship. Should the dialogue not result in a new understanding of the way forward for the relationship, or China be reluctant to enter into such a dialogue, that in itself would be useful to know. We would then draw the appropriate conclusions and act accordingly. A way forward should also seek to shape the environment so as to influence Chinese behaviour.

{Yes after Mammallpuram the expectation was an annual summit between India and China with venue rotation. However, Covid and Chinese action in Galwan put paid to that. To be honest, until November 2022, India cannot expect movement on this front till the PRC completes the 20th Congress and takes care of its leadership issues. TIll then it is best to build up forces and infrastructure to reduce the Chinese inclination for War}

It is important that India step up its contribution to our neighbours’ prosperity and security, ensuring that we are a factor of stability in the subcontinent and the Indian Ocean region. This requires a closer integration of economies, connectivity in various forms, and building on the affinities that history, geography, and a common culture have given us. It does not require India to imitate China or to do what they do best, but to concentrate on the considerable comparative advantages that we enjoy in our immediate neighbourhood. To do so would be in our own self-interest, for without a peaceful periphery our task of developing and transforming India will only get harder.

{This is going on as can be seen by the numerous work of MEA in the near abroad.}

In the broader Asian neighbourhood, we would continue to work with other powers such as ASEAN, Japan, Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, Australia, and others on our critical shared interests, such as maritime security. For instance, the PRC attempt to territorialize the South China Sea could affect freedom of navigation in an international waterway that carries 38% of India’s foreign trade. It is clearly in India’s interest to work with others to keep the South China Sea and maritime Asia, in general, free, open and safe. The USA is a critical partner in this effort, and also for the transformation of India. Similarly, for our continental interests in Eurasia, we would need to work with Russia, Iran and other partners.

{While this looks good to say. very few of the ASEAN have security problems with China. Only those having disputes are amenable to working with India. At the same time, they value their trade relations with China. It's not a zero-sum game.}

But a policy of active political, security and defence engagement with our Asian neighbours would need to be complemented by active economic engagement with them. We cannot walk on one leg. Our economic integration with them and openness to them will influence the success of our political and defence outreach.

{Actually if you think of security as a ring of concentric circles, diplomacy is the outermost circle which works in first contact, next comes trade and economic relations, trade barriers and tariffs circle, then paramilitary, military and lastly the Cabinet}

Is it possible to work simultaneously with multifarious partners, such as Russia and the US and Iran and Japan, not all of whom enjoy particularly warm relations with each other? One solution to that problem is issue-based coalitions of the willing, including those partners who are willing and able to contribute in groupings to achieve outcomes on specific issues. Transnational issues, such as maritime security, cyber security, climate change, pandemics, and nuclear risks, for instance, are all beyond the capability of one or a small group of powers to solve and settle. The answer would seem to lie in a variable geometry of coalitions that address these issues, as we found in dealing with and largely eliminating piracy off the Malacca Strait and off the Horn of Africa.

{Issue based coalition is jargon. The world is not there yet. There has to be a collapse of the current world order for real issue-based coalitions.}


If this sounds like a wide-ranging agenda of tasks, it is because China poses challenges to Indian policy across multiple domains. The response too has therefore to be multifaceted. Reducing the heightened risk of conflict, unpredictability and instability in the relationship is the immediate priority, and that requires a broad effort. Nothing short of a grand strategy, integrating national effort across domains, iterative, flexible and realistic, will do.

{No its not complex. It is just complicated juggling of many spheres. And is being done quite well for a discerning observer. People throw grand strategy quite often but are hard-pressed to say what exactly it is. What's needed is the vision statement and strategy to achieve it follows from it.}


Jai Hind!!!!
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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020 - Part 2

Post by k prasad »

I'm trying to create a map of all the road tunnel projects and major road and rail development plans for J&K and Ladakh. I hope this will be an appropriate place to do so, since these projects are aimed at improving all-weather connectivity to Ladakh & remote parts of J&K.

There are 30 road projects in J&K, including (according to Gadkari) 20 tunnels of 32 km in J&K, and 11 tunnels totaling 20 km in Ladakh.

Some of the J&K projects include:

* Goha-Khellani-Chatroo-Khanbal road
* Chenani-Sudh Mahadev (might be part of the previous link) - 2 tunnels at Goha & Dranga, and the Vailoo tunnel under Sinthan Pass
* Kathua-Basohli-Doda link
* Doda-Baderwah-Chamba (With Khelani & Kishtwar tunnels)
* Atholi-Machail-Zanskar-Kargil road. This is a major new road, if my understanding from Google maps is correct, because it will provide a third road to Ladakh, apart from NH1A and the Manali-Leh road.It will almost certainly require a major tunnel to get from Machail to Padum.
* Bani-Basohli Bhaderwah road
* Mughal Road upgrade - includes a tunnel from Chattapani to Zaznar for all-weather access between Poonch & Rajouri.

I'm looking to find all the other tunnel projects as well, to include it in a map. Please let me know if you find any resources that list these projects.

I have a first pass at marking the major tunnel projects in the Jammu and Kashmir region is uploaded on imgBB. I'll try and include Please let me know if there are any tunnel projects I've missed so far. I have also marked the Pir Panjal railway line's approximate alignment.

Image
(Click for full size)

Overall, if these projects are undertaken with utmost speed and urgency, within 8-10 years, we can have multiple all-weather access routes into all parts of Jammu & Kashmir, as well as into and across Ladakh. Combined with the Jammu-Baramulla rail link, this should allow us to quickly surge forces into the region. The high-altitude railway line to Leh I will assume, for now, is a much longer way off.
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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020 - Part 2

Post by ramana »

Good initative.
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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020 - Part 2

Post by k prasad »

Good sirs,

As a follow-up to my previous post, I figured it was much easier to make such a map using Google Maps, and I guess I was right.

I have created a larger map with the key passes, as well as major and proposed routes to Leh, proposed and completed tunneling projects, and existing Airfields, and existing & proposed ALGs. All of this is based on OSINT, so no non-public information has been used. Where possible, I have tried to provide reference links for my information about the status.

Please let me know if there's anything I have missed, or any data points you'd like me to add. I'm hoping to add the proposed alignment of the Jammu-Baramulla rail link.

https://www.google.com/maps/d/view?mid= ... sp=sharing

Some observations:

1) There are now 3 routes to Leh - (A) the Srinagar-Leh highway (depending on the condition of Namik La & Fotu La in winters, this will be all-weather once the Zoji La tunnel is complete), (B) the Manali-Leh highway, and (C) the Nimmu-Padum-Darcha highway (all-weather once Shinku La tunnel and the Zanskar sections from Zangla to Honia & Lingshed to Chilling are completed).

2) Interestingly, I also saw a proposal for yet another route from Paddar to Machail to Padum, which will hopefully begin work soon, and provides a fourth route to Leh.

3) There are also 3 motorable routes now to the Nubra valley, through Khardung La, Wari La, and Chang La. None of these are all-weather, but tunnel projects have been proposed.

4) The alternative access route to Demchok through Photi La & Umling La is completed, which can allow force deployment away from prying chinese eyes, which are located just across the Indus all the way from Koyul to Demchok (a 30 km stretch). These are hair-raising roads at extremely high altitudes, but hopefully, some tunnel projects will be proposed there soon. The roads are excellent though - Umling La is a perfect blacktop at the moment (see the Autocar video of the Lambo being taken up there. There was another video of a Lambo on the Khardung La road).

5) Land acquisition for the Bilaspur-Leh railway line began a week ago
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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020 - Part 2

Post by LakshmanPST »

https://twitter.com/SJha1618/status/149 ... sjqrA&s=19
The PLA is currently engaged in tank exercises in the Tarim Basin. The tank units in Lhasa are also out on exercises. Yes, China's tempo opposite Taiwan might be higher & there are reports of blood being stocked. But there is no reason to think Xi is only 'screening' in Tibet.
They may not attack Taiwan for now, but I feel they'll try something with India...
Currently, India is in a difficult position diplomatically with respect to Ukraine crisis... China may feel this is an ideal time to attack us...
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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020 - Part 2

Post by k prasad »

Depends on how our force posture along the LAC is... it is deep winter in the mountains right now, and at least till April, a lot of places are snowbound. The risk comes in May, once the snows melt. At this moment, I suspect it'll be more positional strengthening in preparation for coming operations.

That said, China often times actions along its borders with destabilization in the west, be it the '62 war or the Galwan incidents, coming as they did just as Covid was hitting the west hard.
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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020 - Part 2

Post by GShankar »

LakshmanPST wrote:https://twitter.com/SJha1618/status/149 ... sjqrA&s=19
The PLA is currently engaged in tank exercises in the Tarim Basin. The tank units in Lhasa are also out on exercises. Yes, China's tempo opposite Taiwan might be higher & there are reports of blood being stocked. But there is no reason to think Xi is only 'screening' in Tibet.
They may not attack Taiwan for now, but I feel they'll try something with India...
Currently, India is in a difficult position diplomatically with respect to Ukraine crisis... China may feel this is an ideal time to attack us...
If PRC is serious about taiwan, then they need to create a posture against us. And vice versa. Don't need to be careless but I think we are fine. Only missing piece so far for us, is to capitalize on the gains achieved.

Another missing piece for us is a munna in the norther indonesian / philippino sea. time to declare the first shipment of brahmos (i know too soon..)
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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020 - Part 2

Post by mody »

https://www.msn.com/en-in/news/world/as ... hp&pc=U531

New Chinese road G216 connecting Tibet and Xinxiang under construction. Will be an alternate route to the G219 highway through Aksai chin
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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020 - Part 2

Post by Aditya_V »

Well if they G216, they dont need the land on which G219 runs through in Aksai Chin.
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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020 - Part 2

Post by mody »

There was always a danger of Indian forces cutting off G219 in the event of a conflict. In fact on this thread also most people have listed it as one of the objectives that IA should pursue in case of a conflict. Whenever the G216 highway becomes operational, it would give them an alternate route, which would be far away from IA reach. Sure IAF could bomb the highway, but on a flat tibetan plateau, it would not do much damage.

The G216 would reduce the strategic importance of G219 for the Chinese and might make the negotiations with them a little easier if they are willing to soften their stance.
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Re: India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020 - Part 2

Post by k prasad »

It's just the same as we're doing in Ladakh with multiple access routes - four routes to Leh, two to DBO (DSDBO & Saser La), and similar projects in NE as well.
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