nachiket wrote:Karan M wrote:
We actually have a lot of desi gear and even imported gear which has cleared trials but is awaiting orders because of low Capex. Opening up the funding spigot can make a significant difference to the order and induction pipeline in both the short, and medium terms beyond the longer term alone.
I was talking about the big ticket items like fighter aircraft, refuelers, LCH, ATAGS, NAMICA, WhAP, MGS etc. We have shortfalls everywhere. It takes time to set up or expand production for those. Even if the govt. orders them now they will not impact the current situation. There is no immediate solution for IAF's lack of numbers which you were talking about earlier. The only item they may be able to get quickly might be more K9 Vajras. But even there we have allowed the production line to shut down and are now thinking of more trickle orders in two digits.
Even big ticket items are available if we had significant funding.
In some cases, they can be transferred from existing stocks. For instance if the situation was truly dire and we made a case for it, a weapons provider might transfer airframes from in service inventory with the proviso they'd be upgraded to Indian standards later. We've proven with the Rafale we can rapidly induct and operationalize.
At the end of the day it's all about willingness to spend. You turn up with a big bag of cash and the other side will try and meet you halfway.
Frankly, we've run through the peace dividend with the PRC and Pak but GOI seems to have convinced itself that it's doing OK with its limited inductions and can continue as is. It's a mindset I am forced to disagree with as the situation has changed for the worse in the past two years, and the steady, modernisation method is too slow. OROP broke the bank and even most emergency purchases till 2019-20, came from within the already stretched regular budget.
The problem with the current approach is that for one, our opponents are not deterred (as seen from the constant low level attacks in Kashmir and the constant salami slicing), and second, we are actually overusing our existing stock to keep up a high operational tempo.
The constant desire to balance the books the Fin Min advisors seem to suffer from is going to be counterproductive in the medium to long term when a lot of our eqpt is going to need replacement even faster than it otherwise would, because already older, hard to sustain airframes like the Jaguars were heavily flogged.
We have no plan for that either. If MRFA is ordered giving into the IAFs arm twisting (and they have operational reasons to ask for it, see the above), we won't have money for the MWF.
Our R&D budgeting has also been so-so. While there have been increases, the projected spend has never been met. For a mere few billion$ a year the benefits in accelerated devpt would have been huge.
Aatmanirbharat campaign is a great idea but with intermittent orders its not ramping up as fast as it should.
This Govt has made huge strides in making the AF battle worthy by focusing on serviceability and WWR, the pace of large scale new inductions trickled to a stop between 2014-16. Thereafter it picked up again but in fits and spurts when it came to big ticket platforms losing us time.
IAF is now at 30 sq, IA towed arty is in a sad state, we lack CIWS, heavy shelters in substantial numbers for most of our key AFB, we need to accelerate inductions of force multipliers like AWACS, EW assets, PGMs and IFR, and for that we need more funding. Not a single new Phalcon is in service. Not a single new IFR asset. Not even the 33 extra Flankers or MiG-29s have been ordered. The Su30 upgrade remains unsigned. We've made huge strides in the Navy but gaps remain.
Its unfair to the current GOI as they inherited this total mess from the UPA but it is what it is.
When you run short of technology you turn to manpower. Actually, we are moving all our reserves and force surplus vs Pak to face off against China. Now we are in this state, where we are stuck in opex heavy deployment, because we haven't focused enough on the ISR or speartip either to preempt or deter our adversaries.
Fact is we need to spend more. At the end of the day the soldiers and the political executive plus the nation, pay the price for a conflict, any loss of territory plus huge damage to civil and military infra.
The cost of fixing that will dwarf any military spend today.