Indian Air Force News & Discussion - 23 March 2021

[Karan M]

LDev, your scenario is simplistic in the extreme.
.........

.......It would be absurd to think that the IAF hasn't even thought of these most basic of things. By no means is the S-400 invulnerable, and there are many ways to "fight" it, but your scenario would have a very low probability of success, and also put the PAF planes, from their perspective, at unacceptably high risk.

Agree with what you say, my point was purely on the suggested location. When you are armed with a sniper rifle, why should you get in range of a knife fighter?

LDev- the clear advantage of the S-400 is its mobility. You can deploy it "close" to the border (but not too close eg within arty range) for opportunistic shots at PAF aircraft far within their airspace. If a threat is discerned, the system packs up and moves. Unless the mast mounted radar is deployed, it is very mobile. That's precisely what makes it so survivable. If the IAF adopts standard tactics as envisaged by the Russians themselves, the system will highly mobile during wartime.

[Cybaru]

And at the same time the PAF could have 10 or even 15 relatively cheap JF-17s, armed with either the CM-102 and/or MAR-1 ARM, (which have a range of ~100 km when launched from altitude), loitering at 250 feet, just across the border. .

Not sure it can launch a missile at 250 meter altitude for it achieve 100 KM range.

[ldev]

Agree with what you say, my point was purely on the suggested location. When you are armed with a sniper rifle, why should you get in range of a knife fighter?

LDev- the clear advantage of the S-400 is its mobility. You can deploy it "close" to the border (but not too close eg within arty range) for opportunistic shots at PAF aircraft far within their airspace. If a threat is discerned, the system packs up and moves. Unless the mast mounted radar is deployed, it is very mobile. That's precisely what makes it so survivable. If the IAF adopts standard tactics as envisaged by the Russians themselves, the system will highly mobile during wartime.

True, unless the ARM has a mmw radar seeker , which is certainly not there either in the CM-102 or MAR-1 and also not in the YJ-91 AFAIK. But China is pushing in that direction, maybe the new missile speculated to be an ARM seen on the J-16 recently, something to keep in mind for future S-400 deployments on the LAC facing China.

[ldev]

And at the same time the PAF could have 10 or even 15 relatively cheap JF-17s, armed with either the CM-102 and/or MAR-1 ARM, (which have a range of ~100 km when launched from altitude), loitering at 250 feet, just across the border. .

Not sure it can launch a missile at 250 meter altitude for it achieve 100 KM range.

In my scenario, I was looking at a zoom climb to the relevant altitude as soon as the S-400 radars are switched on.

[Cybaru]

A Zoom climb at the border to 15-20K ft will trigger all sorts of alarms and response.

[ldev]

A Zoom climb at the border to 15-20K ft will trigger all sorts of alarms and response.

Yes, it will, no doubt. But what if this is the opening move in that short, sharp made for TV campaign orchestrated by the PRC that we spoke off in the Border thread, but instead of one front, it has two fronts. Unrealistic? Maybe, but better to be prepared.

[Cybaru]

A Zoom climb at the border to 15-20K ft will trigger all sorts of alarms and response.

Yes, it will, no doubt. But what if this is the opening move in that short, sharp made for TV campaign orchestrated by the PRC that we spoke off in the Border thread, but instead of one front, it has two fronts. Unrealistic? Maybe, but better to be prepared.

The aerostat radars can see upto 250KMs from where they are located and then there is the flycatcher radars. Your scenario escapes both. Possible if both are down.

[ldev]

Yes, it will, no doubt. But what if this is the opening move in that short, sharp made for TV campaign orchestrated by the PRC that we spoke off in the Border thread, but instead of one front, it has two fronts. Unrealistic? Maybe, but better to be prepared.

The aerostat radars can see upto 250KMs from where they are located and then there is the flycatcher radars. Your scenario escapes both. Possible if both are down.

Aerostat, yes if they are not down and are in the right location. Flycatcher may not be appropriate for this as we are looking PAF aircraft staying on their side of the border and hence Flycatcher and any air defence artillery won't have the range to intercept, nor will it be able to intercept supersonic ARMs.

The S-400 capability will be increased by an order of magnitude if it is fully integrated into the rest of the Integrated Network, besides making it less vulnerable. Unfortunately no journalists have covered that area in detail. It is all headline ra ra!!

Imagine if a Phalcon or a Netra could provide target data to the S-400 missiles seamlessly? You will have long range surveillance and long range reach.

[hnair]

Karan M, just buy F35s already and call it a day, because the military genius of pakis will anyway takeout S400s and whatever stuff ranged against them. Kind of like how Lukeskywalker took out a DeathStar because despite hearing civet cats mewling at night in the vent someone forgot to nail up a Sintex particle-board to shut that big-ass military facility's ventilation hole.

(Also pakis: uses AMRAAMs in air-to-ground mode against Su30MKIs in the sky, uses H4 to harvest mustard fields and vacuums up F16 debris to negate a kill)

[Vicky]

Desi IRST design by IRDE is showing progress. Tenders indicate T+24 Months for flight and acceptance testing to begin.

[Rakesh]

Desi IRST design by IRDE is showing progress. Tenders indicate T+24 Months for flight and acceptance testing to begin.

Fantastic news! Hopefully will see it on Tejas Mk2

[Karan M]

LDev- the clear advantage of the S-400 is its mobility. You can deploy it "close" to the border (but not too close eg within arty range) for opportunistic shots at PAF aircraft far within their airspace. If a threat is discerned, the system packs up and moves. Unless the mast mounted radar is deployed, it is very mobile. That's precisely what makes it so survivable. If the IAF adopts standard tactics as envisaged by the Russians themselves, the system will highly mobile during wartime.

True, unless the ARM has a mmw radar seeker , which is certainly not there either in the CM-102 or MAR-1 and also not in the YJ-91 AFAIK. But China is pushing in that direction, maybe the new missile speculated to be an ARM seen on the J-16 recently, something to keep in mind for future S-400 deployments on the LAC facing China.

Discerning the right target from a bunch of mobile ones isn't easy for a mmW seeker either. The current ARMs are basically meant for static targets. Can be extended to mobile ones tomorrow but it's still a, fair distance away.

[Karan M]

Karan M, just buy F35s already and call it a day, because the military genius of pakis will anyway takeout S400s and whatever stuff ranged against them. Kind of like how Lukeskywalker took out a DeathStar because despite hearing civet cats mewling at night in the vent someone forgot to nail up a Sintex particle-board to shut that big-ass military facility's ventilation hole.

(Also pakis: uses AMRAAMs in air-to-ground mode against Su30MKIs in the sky, uses H4 to harvest mustard fields and vacuums up F16 debris to negate a kill)

[Rakesh]

Rakesh precisely. Also, the IACCS today feeds off of radars which include a range of low level, medium altitude and high power systems, plus the AEW&CS/AWACS. Add to this the multiple batteries of Akash, MRSAM, SpyDer, and the upgraded SA-3, all of which come with their own radars. Then add additional sensors which are completely passive in nature and which the PAF can't even pick up like our ELINT networks.

One of the key attributes of the S-400 is its mobility. It fires, relocates, it fires, it relocates. Its emplacement, displacement times are within minutes. With what accuracy can a PAF surveillance aircraft geolocate and direct effective fire against such a mobile system? The US and allies expended 100s of HARMs with low benefit during the Balkan air ops.

Well said KaranM. See what I found on radars (and this is just a sample!). And the best part - it is all Indian.

The S-400 system is just one piece of a large and intricate puzzle. On top of all this sits the IACCS and the AfNet, if I am not mistaken. Highlighting the deficiencies of one system - without taking into account the other pieces of the puzzle - is very amateurish. Also shows an utter lack of any knowledge or depth of the IAF's air defence network.

In the deep seated desire to trash the S-400 system, will throw logic right out the window. Billions spent on S-400 results in that many less billions available for Amreeki F-15EX, F-18SH Block III, F-21 (Block 70++), F-35 Block Infinity and 65,000 ton aircraft carrier with EMALS + nuclear power to influence events (and even crustaceans) from Alaska to the South China Sea. Thus the takleef and khujli.

https://twitter.com/lca_tejas_/status/1 ... 17602?s=20 ---> 1. Air Defence Tactical Control Radar (ADTCR)



https://twitter.com/lca_tejas_/status/1 ... 71298?s=20 ---> ARUDHRA Medium Power Radar



https://twitter.com/lca_tejas_/status/1 ... 63426?s=20 ---> Ashwini Low Level Transportable Radar (LLTR)



https://twitter.com/lca_tejas_/status/1 ... 83969?s=20 ---> Swordfish Long Range Tracking Radar



https://twitter.com/lca_tejas_/status/1 ... 20642?s=20 ---> Rajendra multi-function electronically scanned phased array radar.



https://twitter.com/lca_tejas_/status/1 ... 94496?s=20 ---> 3D Medium Range Surveillance Radar (Rohini)



https://twitter.com/lca_tejas_/status/1 ... 17665?s=20 ---> ATULYA-Air Defence Fire Control Radar



https://twitter.com/lca_tejas_/status/1 ... 57155?s=20 ---> Radar for Ground based SAM systems



https://twitter.com/lca_tejas_/status/1 ... 29954?s=20 ---> Tactical Control Radar



https://twitter.com/lca_tejas_/status/1 ... 83365?s=20 ---> INDRA-Indian Doppler Radar Mk 1 & 2





https://twitter.com/lca_tejas_/status/1 ... 03776?s=20 ---> LSTAR-Long range Solid state ACTIVE aperture array Radar (primary radar for Netra AEW&C). Used to great effect at Balakot





https://twitter.com/IndianDefenceRA/sta ... 92608?s=20 ---> Phalcon AWACS - 3 in service + 2 more coming.

[asbchakri]

Rakesh-ji please dont be hard on them, they are all hoping that looking at their post's Vivek Ahuja sir will come out of hybernation and start a new detailed scenario (long overdue), that only he does best, with all the new toys we are and will get.

[Mihir]

LDev/Karan M: I feel we are missing a key point here—air defence (and by extension, SEAD) is a numbers game. No IADS is designed to be impregnable; instead, it is designed for resilience. In other words, can it be hit with multiple waves of attacks and still keep fighting cohesively? If the enemy manages to create a gap, can that gap be plugged quickly? How much effort is the enemy going to expend in taking it down again? And for how long can it continue assaulting the same defences again and again?

If a PAF strike package has needs to be accompanied by, say, two flights of JF-17s armed with CM-102s to suppress air defences, that's eight aircraft not striking something more important, like an air base or an ammunition dump. If the PAF loses a dozen aircraft every time it attempts to destroy an S-400 firing unit, is the trade worth it? Ultimately, it all boils down to volume. If the enemy degrades the IADS to the point that it is barely functioning, but has lost a majority of its strike aircraft in the process, who has won?

[Rakesh]

Very good points Mihir. Not KaranM and I am sure he will reply. But my two cents (and something you are well aware of);

If in the first wave of attacks the PAF gets severely mauled (with severely being subjective), how much gumption will the PAF have to repeat the same feat again? At the end of the day, Pakistan operates on psyops and loss of H&D will be a severe blow. If DG-ISPR ran with gusto to hide the F-16 shoot down at Balakot, to avoid getting shamed & beaten by their own citizenry, how will they handle multiple losses of a PAF strike force? We lost a MiG-21 at Balakot and a pilot of ours was captured. Our citizenry dealt with that quite well. Is the reverse true?

There is also the flip side - how much degradation of capability can the IAF handle, before the PAF moves on to another opportunistic target? A point you alluded to in your post and something to certainly think about.

[Karan M]

LDev/Karan M: I feel we are missing a key point here—air defence (and by extension, SEAD) is a numbers game. No IADS is designed to be impregnable; instead, it is designed for resilience. In other words, can it be hit with multiple waves of attacks and still keep fighting cohesively? If the enemy manages to create a gap, can that gap be plugged quickly? How much effort is the enemy going to expend in taking it down again? And for how long can it continue assaulting the same defences again and again?

If a PAF strike package has needs to be accompanied by, say, two flights of JF-17s armed with CM-102s to suppress air defences, that's eight aircraft not striking something more important, like an air base or an ammunition dump. If the PAF loses a dozen aircraft every time it attempts to destroy an S-400 firing unit, is the trade worth it? Ultimately, it all boils down to volume. If the enemy degrades the IADS to the point that it is barely functioning, but has lost a majority of its strike aircraft in the process, who has won?

Thing is these are not just air defense systems in the classic sense. By extending their bubble into PAF airspace they can free up IAF aircraft and resources from other missions, and put the PAF on the defensive. I've addressed the points you mentioned already here. See the third post.

viewtopic.php?f=3&t=7848&p=2524001#p2524001

Even versus Pakistan that depends on whether or not we get masts for our radars. A standard range at which most low flying targets may be picked up is 40km. That's quite sufficient for the Akash or even the S-400 to engage it.

And against Pakistan, because much of the terrain is flat, all their aircraft are vulnerable when flying at any fuel efficient altitude. For instance, even flying at a relatively low, non optimal, 3km altitude would have them picked up at 260 km from a non mast mounted radar.

Well not almost on take off as the radar horizon comes into play. But once they climb to a decent operating height, then yes. Even 1 km would be around 120 km detection range. If they remain at 500 mtrs, radar horizon is limited to 100km.

But even that complicates their mission planning, as their fuel burn goes up heavily and they will need IFR or to base their aircraft close to the border. Former will be easier for us to detect and latter makes their aircraft vulnerable to IAF counter strikes.

Basically a lot of their advanced BVR tactics of flying high, fast etc will become much more risky for them as IAF can choose to have the S-400/MRSAM combo be the first respondent even as it chooses to use the fighter fleet to prevent SEAD attacks on the S-400. Even there its not easy for the Pakistanis, they need 250+ km ranged SEAD weapons to target the S-400 batteries, which even if these were cruise missiles have to run the gamut of not being shot down. And since the system is highly mobile, the battery can constantly relocate. The battle management aircraft for instance, trying to run the operation itself will have to stay 400km behind the battery to avoid the longer ranged 400km stick, which means it can't detect IAF aircraft seeking to ambush the fighters. Its radar range itself will be limited thanks to staying so far behind, which means its ability to counter long range BVR equipped IAF fighters will reduce. It will detect them only a few minutes before their BVR attack. All in all, it complicates PAF mission planning like crazy.

Is it invulnerable, surely not. But it will be integrated into the IAF's larger Integrated Air Command and Control system. And that makes it even more crazy. Because if the Russians and Indians work it out, the S-400 will be taking passive inputs from the IACCS, and passing it on to the battery fire control radar. which turns on only for missile guidance.

The structure of the S-400 is such that it consists of the main battery HQ element with its control cabin (55K6E) and Big Bird radar (91N6E) and then 2 batteries, each with a fire control radar (92N6E) and presumably 8 launchers with 4 missile tubes each. Now consider we have paid top $$ for this, and I surmise we have also purchased individual surveillance radars for these batteries. That means things get even more nasty for the PAF. So what can happen is thanks to the IACCS you can continue getting the big picture while the baseline radars focus on specific sectors and target classes (of course this would mean we would need to work with the Russians to fuse the sensors, but they do offer third party sensor integration). Now even without integration, thanks to an extra battery level surveillance radar, the capability of the system goes up manifold.

I haven't even got into the MRSAM structure and what the Akash (new order) will bring to the table. Those two will also add substantially to our aircover. The only two things missing are a full fledged BMD unit (via the DRDO unit, to complement and even take over some of the responsibilities off of the S-400) and a cheap gun AAA solution with proximity fusing for IAF AFB. But they too will arrive.

Ok, since I started off I might as well add a few more points. People like Bedi are going on and on about the S-400 radar and its instrumented range - well IAI and DRDO would like to have a word with them, given the fact the existing radars IAF has inducted and is trialing are actually every bit as capable vs most similar targets.

The S-400s USP is that its multi-function, the same set can be used for both long range BMD work (3k km class) and standard air breathing targets, and can be hoisted upon a mast too (which makes it immobile so the IAF will carefully consider its pros and cons, even if it has purchased the capability). But it can do one function at a time, but the fact it can do so many makes it very capable.

The point I am making is we can already figure out moment a PAF plane takes off from most of their primary AFB unless terrain gets in the way (it doesn't for the most part) and the IACCS distributes that information to all the sub-command nodes. That's how in Feb 2019, we were able to quickly send the Bisons to bounce the Vipers. The PAF thought they had caught us during when we were recycling our AD assets and we had too few on station. But Sq Ldr Agarwal had a birds eye view on the whole situation thanks to the IACCS, and was already surging assets into play.

But our fighters were deliberate tripwires, intended to surge the MiG-21s and other fighters into the fray. Now with the S-400, you don't even need to put your limited AD fighters in the outer bubble. It has 4 classes of missiles - 400 km, 250km, 120km and 40 km. A single battery can carry an entire mix of those missiles. What this means is a PAF formation headed towards an Indian target has no idea of what range it may be engaged at until it gets the Gravestone FCR lock-on, especially if we integrate the IACCS to feed the surveillance feed into the Command and Control setup. Its eye in the sky, their AWACS have to stay further behind and can't really assist the PAF formation as it penetrates deeper into Indian airspace. Why does this matter? Because the PAF needs their AEW&CS to coordinate functions.

So suppose we use the S-400 to engage the outer AEW&CS and EW aircraft, and the IFR, all turn and run. The PAF fighters move forward to target the battery - the S-400 fires on them too, or MRSAM does. The PAF coordinates a BM, CM strike on the geo-located S-400 battery (if they think they can pull it off), but the S-400 can target that too, and if the area is covered by two batteries, both classes of targets can be engaged.

It makes PAF mission planning very very hard. They have to now think of a range of potential threats moment they take off - its not just being detected but targeted during wartime. Add Meteor armed Rafales, and soon (hopefully!) Astra Mk2 armed Su-30s, MiG-29s and Tejas to the mix and the PAF will be really hard-pressed. Because at this point they can't really fight the S-400 battery alone - as their AFB and air assets are at siege from IAF aircraft on strike missions. And the Brahmos SSM squadrons operated by the IAF, and Harop/Harpy. And soon a range of UAS from HAL/NS/ADA and other private vendors.

The PAF may think it understands the S-400 limitations if PRC is kind enough to show them everything (does PRC even trust them that much!) but its not just the S-400, its the IACCS, its MRSAM, its Akash and a whole bunch of systems we have and are procuring that will be their problem in the coming years. The transitory gap they created thanks to US largesse - AMRAAMs and Erieye is fast fading.

On vulnerabilities etc, IAF should have procured better etc.

Simply put, either we trust the IAF or we don't. But lets be logical - the IAF knows exactly what system it is procuring given it has the best of equivalent radar systems from Israel, France and India to compare against and yet it chose the S-400. They do this stuff for their daily eval - including ECCM, so it would be presumptuous to state we haven't tested the S-400 or evaluated it properly. They have first class technical people, have full access to desi developers to back them up and obviously received classified briefings and had access to test eval. And they have had access to the S-300 for years now, given it was evaluated for the BMD Network too.

I am not going to go into the Pantsir details as claims it failed are quite debatable - there have been multiple reasons for losses, and it has also scored a high attrition against UAVs. Which is the entire point of SAM systems - they exist to impose losses and are part of a layered network.

But what's more germane is the fact its easier to add high-end complex capabilities to larger systems than smaller ones.

Armenia operated the S-300 PS - amongst the oldest (https://www.defenseworld.net/uploads//n ... webp/ngcb8). Unless we know how it was defended, and whether the outer layers failed, speculating is meaningless.

Russian systems in IAF service have performed well against EW (which is why IAF continues to take them seriously). The S-400s radars are huge enough (hundreds of Kw, peak power) that one would literally need huge jammers and even those would be vulnerable to counter-attack, this even discounting sophisticated processing (always easier for a ground based system vs an airborne system running low on space and volume, and power). Plus the S-300 itself ran on SAGG, making it even harder to counter and jam, and it stands to reason the S-400 would have retained that and added ARH as well for some missiles.

The S-400 low RCS capability is also widely remarked - the US does not want any ally to procure it lest its radars detect the F-35 and the data gets back to Russia.

No radar system will perform "excellently" against the lowest flying targets unless it's mast mounted, radar horizon comes into play. Only the S-3/4-XX systems come with such huge masts (38/28 mtr high masts). In return you sacrifice mobility. Is that trade-off worth it, that depends on the situation.

The bird issue exists for most radars because of filtering concerns - set the filter sufficiently broad enough and literally every target in the sky is picked up. Having said that this is not a new issue and systems like the S-400 will obviously have a filtering mechanism based on velocity, a very low RCS, high speed target will be flagged. Whereas a slow, low RCS target might require more discernment. This is the reason most countries are using mixed EO/radar systems and dedicated anti-drone units for their services despite having huge SAM system setups. Even AI cannot predict things accurately unless it has a huge dataset to base things off of. The IAF knows this and has invested in anti-drone systems.

Of course Turkey, China have a similar system - but we don't have the exact same one. Each customer's system will be different tailored to their unique requirements and what Russia is willing to share. Given Turkey's NATO links and China sharing a border plus ripping off whatever it gets, its actually logical to surmise that the Indian system is the most capable "all-up" export variant there is.

Can they exploit any vulnerabilities - sure, that risk is there with all our imports, including Rafale, but at the end of the day, they will have to dedicate a ton of assets to that effect, which is the entire point of having a strategic SAM system, it forces the opponent on the defensive or have them take away resources from elsewhere. And apart from the brute force method, its not easy to fight such a system. Its not like either Turkey or China will share data with each other or with France or anyone else to develop a counter for Pak's sake.

We can't replace S-400 with a domestic system (yet) because most countries will struggle with developing the kind of integrated "all in one set" the S-400 is with 4 classes of missiles all in one compact set, with very high automation, literally very low emplacement/displacement times, and then the phenomenal mobility thanks to having everything on large highly mobile trucks. Plus, the S-400 offers both capability against air-breathing targets and BMD both. Given the situation, the IAF can deploy the same system for either class of target. That flexibility plus performance mix is why they wanted it.

[Karan M]

Only 10 mig 29 acquired in 1995 and 21 new can have uttam radar as they will serve up to 2040 and is economical.
70 mig 29 of 1987-89 vintage will retire in 2032-34 after 45 year calender life and 4000 hours flying life,

Mig 29 k will serve up to 2040 and 41 nos remaining can have Uttam aesa radar.

Even if they retire 10 years from now, adding a true long range AESA radar will be exceptional value.

[YashG]

I'm not knowledgeable enough to verify how good it is. But it is at best a stimulation , so take it fwiw

[YashG]

Only 10 mig 29 acquired in 1995 and 21 new can have uttam radar as they will serve up to 2040 and is economical.
70 mig 29 of 1987-89 vintage will retire in 2032-34 after 45 year calender life and 4000 hours flying life,

Mig 29 k will serve up to 2040 and 41 nos remaining can have Uttam aesa radar.

Even if they retire 10 years from now, adding a true long range AESA radar will be exceptional value.

If IN transfer Mig29K to IAF - will it add to IAF's aircraft zoo or Mig29K will count as a Mig29 in terms of logistics chain?

[ldev]

LDev/Karan M: I feel we are missing a key point here—air defence (and by extension, SEAD) is a numbers game. No IADS is designed to be impregnable; instead, it is designed for resilience. In other words, can it be hit with multiple waves of attacks and still keep fighting cohesively? If the enemy manages to create a gap, can that gap be plugged quickly? How much effort is the enemy going to expend in taking it down again? And for how long can it continue assaulting the same defences again and again?

If a PAF strike package has needs to be accompanied by, say, two flights of JF-17s armed with CM-102s to suppress air defences, that's eight aircraft not striking something more important, like an air base or an ammunition dump. If the PAF loses a dozen aircraft every time it attempts to destroy an S-400 firing unit, is the trade worth it? Ultimately, it all boils down to volume. If the enemy degrades the IADS to the point that it is barely functioning, but has lost a majority of its strike aircraft in the process, who has won?

The discussion is not complete if it is not recognized that India faces a two front confrontation. It is not just Pakistan, but China and Pakistan. So the numbers game has to take into account the combined forces of the PLAAF and PAF. Here is former Indian Air Force Chief Arup Raha:

A collusive two front challenge cannot be ruled out. This subject has been uppermost in the minds of strategic security analysts and military leadership in India for a long time.

The narrative has been building up progressively with China determined to stymie the rise of India as another ‘Pole’ in Asia. The situation is unfolding rapidly after the outbreak of the virus in Wuhan and skirmishes in Ladakh.

To the extent that China is determined to stymie the rise of India as the Air Chief says, China will do what it has to be done to ensure that the PAF gets the necessary equipment with funding for the same courtesy China.

However, 36 Rafales may prove to be effective in winning a skirmish against our adversaries but they may not be enough to deter a full-scale conflict in the region. The IAF requires the full complement of 126 aircraft for air dominance as envisaged in the original MMRCA procurement project.

Saturday interview: Integrated air defence may be difficult

Some numbers for the PLAAF 4.5 Gen aircraft, the numbers denoted in red are IMO the more accurate numbers. From this available pool the PLAAF should be able to currently deploy ~300 4.5 Gen fighters and about 60 bombers against India. Add to that the PAF Force of ~200 JF-17, 75 F-16s and the 36 J-10Cs on order which are expected to be delivered in March:


https://twitter.com/RupprechtDeino/stat ... 66/photo/1

Three articles linked below on the challenges to the Air Defence Command announced in the recent past. While some of it is certainly carping from Air Force types reluctant to handover assets, other aspects of the discussion make sense.

Air Defence Command - Some salient aspects - Part 1

Air Defence Command - Some salient aspects - Part 2

Challenges of Integrated Air Defence

For executing this responsibility, the Air Force at the national level has established an Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS). Following points are stated as regards IACCS :- ( open source only)
Riding on the Air Force Net (AF Net) and configured on SATCOM the IACCS comprises of a series of ADCRS nodes from the highest (national level) downwards.
At some point in this chain, the IACCS hand-shakes with the ADCRS nodes of the Army and the Navy which extends right up to the weapon end.

The need of the hour is to remove the glitches in the IACCS system in forging a ‘complete’ and‘seamless’ handshake of the national level ADCRS system with the other two services rather than a physical amalgamation of distinct core competencies. The sum of the parts far exceeds the sum of the whole.

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[Rakesh]

https://twitter.com/RAFIndia_/status/14 ... 08064?s=20 ---> Indian Air Force to commence Vayu Shakti Firepower Demonstration at Pokhran, Rajasthan, from 10 February 2022. Multiple core and support components of modern warfare, ranging from air defence systems to fighter aircraft will take part in the operations.

[Karan M]

Those Chinese fighter numbers appear absurd. Andreas Rupprecht unfortunately acts more PRC than the most jingoistic PRC types themselves. His behavior on social media at times is pretty nuts. During the Indo China, stand off he was busy attacking Indians and repeating PRC propaganda verbatim, and telling Indians that they best prepare to be defeated etc. At any rate, his claims bear crosschecking. So I went and checked.

The Pentagon’s 2021 China Military Power Report quotes PRC 4th gen fighter numbers at 800 airframes out of a, total of 1800 fighters. Unlike Rupprechts amateur analysis which claims 2800+, this is Govt verified data. The US has no incentive in downplaying PLAAF airpower. If anything, the reverse.

[brar_w]

The unclassified China report has generally mentioned "more than 800" for the Chinese 4 gen fleet for a number of years now. They haven't updated that for a while. They don't go into exact numbers in the open report but it is probably in the 800-1000 range given losses, retirements, trainer variants and what not. Annual build rates for J-10, Flanker clones, and now increasingly J-20 are more important to look at.

[Karan M]

Agree about it being 800-1000, or even more in the worst case but about 800 seems more accurate. Seems the most Conservative and hence should be the baseline. Plus, they've updated the missile data periodically.

Even if it was more than 800 but not 1800, it clearly doesn't match Rupprechts estimate of 2876 4th and above gen fighters.

It was all the 1800, the report would have mentioned it as such. The build rates required to reach 2876 4th/+ Gen fighters would have to be world leading, and whhy would the US hide them. US analysts would have to be phenomenally incompetent to miss a build up of this magnitude and I doubt it.

So I went and checked again.

The Pentagon's report for 2019 mentions about 600 4th generation fighters of about 2000 total combat aircraft (of all kinds not just fighters). In short, they have added 100 to 250 fighters a year by 2021 using that metric (200-500 additional airframes by 2021). One can quibble about serviceability metrics etc if the vast majority use WS series engines.

2020 says over 800 of more than 1500 operational fighters.

Anyhow Rupprechts numbers appear absurd. The Chinese build rate is impressive - adding 5 squadron eqvts a year, at even the lower threshold (800 fighters by 2021), but it's not at the overall numbers projected of 2900 fighters etc.

At any rate India can't be complacent or dismiss the IAFs ask for 42 squadrons, to merely get back to the numbers it once had.

A mere 5-10 squadron increase would get us a 100 to a better 200 additional aircraft over the current 540-600 airframes in service and restore us to what levels we once had a decade back. A tough ask given the number of aircraft retirals we'd be facing.

These would need to face a significant PLAAF and PAF fighter fleet.

The PLAAF trend is clear.

2019: 600, 4th and above gen fighters of 2000 total combat aircraft (excluding transports)
800+, of 1500 total fighters
800 to 1100, of 1800 total fighters

India can't be complacent even given PRCs well known issues with quality control.

[Mihir]

A collusive two front challenge cannot be ruled out. This subject has been uppermost in the minds of strategic security analysts and military leadership in India for a long time.

That's fair. My only point is that the S-400 is not a prestige target. It is supposed to absorb heavy punches and keep fighting. So the discussion should ideally be around whether the components are hardened enough, what redundancies are built in, what the level of fusion with the IACCS is, and so on. Not whether a single component could be taken out by a one-off airstrike. If the enemy treats it as a prestige target and expends an unreasonable quantity of resources going after it, more power to them.

[brar_w]

PLAAF is planning to/about to ramp up to a capacity of producing 36-48 J-20's a year. I think 60-80 new fighters/year should be a conservative estimate of their internal capacity (induction). The actual number is likely higher but not all of those go to PLAAF and they may decide to decrease J-10/11 build rates as they ramp up J-20 build rates. Mid-long term they will likely want to match the USAF/N rate of 110-120 new fighters inducted each year. But they are not there yet limited no doubt by propulsion constraints.

At least 40 J-20s have been produced so far, but certainly no more than 60-70. It is alleged that CAC set up a fourth J-20 production line in 2019, each line able to produce one fighter per month. At this rate, the J-20 should approach total production numbers of the American F-22 by 2027. This would amount to at least 200 fighters, making it the world's second-most common stealth fighter behind the F-35.

Read more at:
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/ne ... aign=cppst

[ldev]

The sum of the parts far exceeds the sum of the whole.

==== <Admin note,> please do not ask questions on factoids that are not in public domain, continue discussion with what's known or has been reported in public, this behaviour from you is repeating and next time will earn a warning and ban </Admin note> ====

I think that deleted part of my post has been misunderstood.

I was responding to Mihir's comment about making the Air Defence System more resilient. My point was that by making the ability of individual sensors to cue individual shooters, it would not matter as much if a single sensor/radar was destroyed because the rest of it's components would still be operational e.g. if a Phalcon could cue S-400 batteries, then the loss of an individual S-400 acquition radar would be less crippling, as the 16 TELs could still be operational/cued by other radars, than if it operated as 5 individual systems which India is buying. This train of thought in turn has flowed from the earlier discussion about locating the radars far too close to the border and my statement would make the location of individual radars less relevant and the overall system more resilient.I probably put that in the context of a question as sometimes maybe because I do not want to appear to come across as declarative/arrogant. But my intention was to state that in my mind, that deleted comment is what I would ideally like the IAF to move towards. It would realize the objective of the last line of that quote from one of the authors of the linked ADC articles which I have left in the above quote i.e. "the sum of the parts far exceeds the sum of the whole." Hopefully this is clear. Thanks.

[ldev]

Those Chinese fighter numbers appear absurd. Andreas Rupprecht unfortunately acts more PRC than the most jingoistic PRC types themselves. His behavior on social media at times is pretty nuts. During the Indo China, stand off he was busy attacking Indians and repeating PRC propaganda verbatim, and telling Indians that they best prepare to be defeated etc. At any rate, his claims bear crosschecking. So I went and checked.

The Pentagon’s 2021 China Military Power Report quotes PRC 4th gen fighter numbers at 800 airframes out of a, total of 1800 fighters. Unlike Rupprechts amateur analysis which claims 2800+, this is Govt verified data. The US has no incentive in downplaying PLAAF airpower. If anything, the reverse.

That Andreas Ruppercht twitter shot shows a total of 1146 Flanker/Flanker clones/J10s/J20s. The rest which are not specified are older F-7s etc. 1146 is not far removed from 800+ of a few years ago when you consider production per year of various types over the last few years.

Another event to look forward to is the supposed fly past of 25 J-10Cs which the PAF is supposed to get sometime in March. If they actually show 25 of them flying past, then you do know that at least as far as the J-10C is concerned, production numbers are healthy.

[Karan M]

Even considering what you said, his numbers are adding up to 1335, 4 Gen and above platforms. The original estimate itself (1146) is on the high side considering its part of an estimate which is adding up to 2900 fighter airframes compared to the US Congressional submitted numbers of 1800 fighters of which 4Gen and above are 800+. I used 1100 as a worst case scenario assuming the +300 airframes from 1500 to 1800 were all 4 Gen plus fighters.

The original Chinese unsoyrced claim says 1146 4 and 4.5 Gen whereas a bunch of those J-10s and Flankers are firmly 4 Gen. So a discrepancy there too. Rupprecht adds another 189 airframes to that. In short he's literally 40-50% above the 800-900 US Congressional estimate.

Plus we can't state that merely because 25 J-20Cs are flown indicates anything but PR. It says little but the fact that that number of aircraft were available. If IAF did an elephant walk of xx Rafales, all it means is that number of Rafales were available at that point of time. Not much about future orders etc.

The limiting factor of all their ambitious programs is propulsion. If they've cracked that, at high MTBO per unit, then our challenges become far worse than they already are.

So far we've seen them put up 150 aircraft formations vs ROC every 3-4 days indicating that's the amount of surge they can handle at a regular (not wartime) tempo. Thats pretty low given the number of sorties even a MiG-21 would pull in a month. Indicates the fighters they do deploy require heavy maintenance per flight hour.

At any rate - the IAF needs more airframes and the GOI needs to commit to that. Its the trend which is a concern. Even if they have 1146 aircraft and only say 700 are available (60% serviceability, sustained, a very optimistic estimate despite their QC issues) and half of those are deployed vs the IAF, say 300, we can't forget they are complemented by the formidable PLARF whose salvos will be disrupting IAF ops.

[brar_w]

Another point of note is that there air-force/air-component modernization trails their naval modernization by well over a decade. Partly because their commercial shipbuilding subsidized their defense shipbuilding and that they had to overcome more difficult challenges in developing an aerospace industry. That said, they are now competing in that space and we can expect a fairly significant ramp up over the next decade in terms of the pace of their modernization across tactical fighters, bombers, unmanned, munitions and force multipliers. I am not sure they are there doctrinally and this will be an area where the IAF will enjoy a very significant lead. In my private discussions with folks who study their doctrine, training and other literature the sense they all get is that they are not very well integrated into net centric warfare and that airpower is well behind their naval and space capabilities. That's one area that can be exploited. Integrating Russian, and Chinese fighters, HQ-9, S-400, other mix of legacy Russian and Chinese AD, Chinese AEW all into a net centric force is a 15-20 year problem and cannot be done overnight no many how competent or well funded SMEs they have. This is difficult enough if you have 100% of your own systems, but it is completely at a different level when you have disparate systems designed to different standards and across generations like they do. This is just speculation on my part but I suspect they'll shoot down a lot of friendlies if they get into a combined ground-air operation with a large employed force.

[Karan M]

To be honest I think that assumption would be unwarranted. If the IAF can integrate a far more diverse inventory of imported and local systems into the IACCS, we have to assume the Chinese can do likewise with the bulk of their fighter fleet bar the oldest Flankers which would need proprietary Russian datalinks. Even those can be integrated into the command control network via their control cabins linked to GCI. The S-300, S-400 etc anyhow offer that level of integration to the customer.

[rohitvats]

LDev/Karan M: I feel we are missing a key point here—air defence (and by extension, SEAD) is a numbers game. No IADS is designed to be impregnable; instead, it is designed for resilience. In other words, can it be hit with multiple waves of attacks and still keep fighting cohesively? If the enemy manages to create a gap, can that gap be plugged quickly? How much effort is the enemy going to expend in taking it down again? And for how long can it continue assaulting the same defences again and again?

If a PAF strike package has needs to be accompanied by, say, two flights of JF-17s armed with CM-102s to suppress air defences, that's eight aircraft not striking something more important, like an air base or an ammunition dump. If the PAF loses a dozen aircraft every time it attempts to destroy an S-400 firing unit, is the trade worth it? Ultimately, it all boils down to volume. If the enemy degrades the IADS to the point that it is barely functioning, but has lost a majority of its strike aircraft in the process, who has won?

- And you get a kissy-wissy award for this common-sense statement. (MODS: We need smilies to express our love to fellow posters )

- This is something which literally dawned on me when I was doing my research on S-400 for the video.

- I looked at the deployment pattern of S-300 XYZ system in Russia and China. Plus, how the USSR went about creating their AD grid.

- The gravity when it comes to AD network is actually the Fire-Control-Radar. No FCR, no targeting, no missiles getting fired.

- Surveillance radar becomes critical when the missile regiment is not hooked-up into bigger AD network like IACCS. And it has to rely on main Regiment level surveillance radar for getting the overall air picture, threat identification, and threat allocation.

- Not to forget that their was much power/range differential between Regiment level surveillance radar, and battery level FCR.

- Soviets used to stuff their AD Regiment with additional battery level surveillance radars. They also used to enmesh various AD assets together. And have a larger network of surveillance radars independent of AD assets.

- Today, you've Regiment level surveillance radar, battery level surveillance radar, and the FCR itself has considerable range. And all of that is plugged into IACCS.

- Each Battery today can operate in autonomous mode; so taking out the Command Post at Regiment level will also not help.

- If you want to take out any AD system today, you need to take out the FCR. Just taking out the main surveillance radar will not help.

- This problem gets amplified when you've overlapping surveillance and AD network.

- I can bet that an S-400 Regiment will be so sited in a manner that approach paths will be covered by MRSAM.

- A PAF strike package will have to get past IACCS network, MRSAM, may be Akash SAM as well, and IAF fighters to reach an optimal place to launch stand-off weapon against S-400 FCR.

- And if we have 3-4 Fire Units per S-400 squadron, that's different attacks on each FU.

- Let's assume we lose FCR for 1, or even 2 FU.

- Each FU can control up to 12 TELs. If we have 4 x FU per S-400 Squadron with 6 TEL/Squadron, I can simply transfer the TELs from other two batteries/FU to balance FUs.

- Good luck trying to solve the S-400 problem!

[Aditya_V]

Plus Fighters from basis deeper in India who can engage the incoming aircraft with BVR AAM's.

[ldev]

The limiting factor of all their ambitious programs is propulsion. If they've cracked that, at high MTBO per unit, then our challenges become far worse than they already are.

In December 2019 there was a regulatory filing by the Hebei subsidiary of China’s Central Iron & Steel Research (CISRI) that disclosed the production numbers of military engines for the next decade.

Data provided by Hebei Cisri Dekai Technology Co. Ltd. shows a maximum of only five WS-15 and WS-19 engines each year from 2020 till 2026. The WS-15 will power the J-20 stealth fighter while the WS-19 is being develop for the FC-31 fighter.

The WS-18 engine is running into trouble with development half suspended as the company research into new materials. The WS-18 is designed for the H-6K bomber and Y-20 airlifter.

Another alternative engine for the Y-20, the WS-20 will also enter limited production starting from 2024.

The WS-10, which powers the J-10, J-11, J-15, J-16 fighters is having a successful production run. The company sees gradual increase in annual production numbers starting from 320 engines in 2020 till 450 engines by 2026.

The success with the WS-10 is why they are able to produce and sell/donate 25 J-10Cs to the PAF in one installment in March (projected according to Pakistan). 320 WS-10s in 2020 and probably a slightly larger number in 2021 will ensure that Flanker derivatives J-11, J-15 and J-16 which use 2 engines each as well as the single engine J-10C will have adequate production, in theory they can produce 160 of the twin engined derivatives, in reality some lower number. The 5th gen J-20 and the almost still born 5th gen FC-31 production has suffered because of engine development issues, although there are certain pictures recently seen on twitter of what looks like an early build FC-31 in a carrier borne role and the J-20 production will probably continue at a low rate using the Russian AL-31/41 engines. What is impressive however is the sheer number of engines that China is working on simultaneously.

China still struggling to develop new military turbofan engines

[Manish_P]

X-Post from the Light Utility Helicopter thread...

Modi govt scraps missile, chopper tenders to push 'Make in India'
https://www.business-standard.com/artic ... 469_1.html

Wonder if Putin's visit was to ensure us giving the go ahead for more S-400 systems (or S-550) in lieu of the canceled Kamovs.

[Pratyush]

X-Post from the Light Utility Helicopter thread...

Why must India procure a BMD in lieu of a chopper that we don't need.

Why not focus on a domestic solution, now that the S400 is in place.

Such as PAD,AAD, XRSAM.

[Rakesh]

X-Post from the Light Utility Helicopter thread...

Modi govt scraps missile, chopper tenders to push 'Make in India'
https://www.business-standard.com/artic ... 469_1.html

Wonder if Putin's visit was to ensure us giving the go ahead for more S-400 systems (or S-550) in lieu of the canceled Kamovs.

The December meet between Modi and Putin will surely have involved discussions over additional S-400 (or perhaps S-500) units. Foreign procurements are usually bought in batches. Media reports were abuzz with rumours of Russia offering the S-500. Lets see what happens.

[Rakesh]

By the way, that deal for those 21 MiG-29s lying mothballed in Russia? Not happening.

That is why at the Putin-Modi summit, the Russians reportedly offered up to 50 new build Su-30MKI "Rambhas". Also keeping money aside for a small batch of additional Rafales or another MRFA (I hope not!).

Cybaru, if you are reading this....

https://twitter.com/RAFIndia_/status/14 ... 01696?s=20 ---> The Indian Ministry of Defence (MoD) has scrapped multiple tenders of various defence acquisitions. Very Short Range ADS, towed artillery guns, surface-to-air missiles, shipborne UAS, additional P-8I MPA and MiG-29 combat aircraft.