1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

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1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by Rakesh »

I can't seem to find a thread on this topic. So starting one in light of the 50th anniversary of the conflict.
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Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by Rakesh »

Plans to liberate East Pak began in ’65, says Vice Admiral Chawla
https://www.hindustantimes.com/cities/b ... 94200.html
24 Oct 2021
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Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by Rakesh »

https://twitter.com/KumariDiya/status/1 ... 58405?s=20 ---> Remembering my father, late Brigadier H.H. Maharaja Sawai Bhawani Singh Ji, MVC on his birth anniversary today. A war hero, distinguished polo player, exemplary leader, will always be remembered for his courage and valor during the 1971 Indo-Pak War.

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Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by Rakesh »

Sapper’s Day Out: An untold tale of casual heroism of a combat engineer in 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War
https://www.indiasentinels.com/opinion/ ... n-war-4921
23 Nov 2020

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Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by Rakesh »

https://twitter.com/VinodDX9/status/131 ... 96322?s=20 --->

Possibly rarest of rare, last year managed to find out a good quality photo of the legend. Courtesy to owner, at this moment I really can't remember. The photo which inspired the famous portrait of Second Lieutenant Arun Khetarpal.

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Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by Rakesh »

https://twitter.com/defence_in/status/1 ... 34817?s=20 ---> Surrender or we wipe you out.

Courtesy : The Photograph Owner's.

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Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by Pratyush »

There is something about the way the men are carrying themselves. Their photos make them look larger than life.
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Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by Rakesh »

From Lieutenant General KJS Dhillon...

https://twitter.com/Tiny_Dhillon/status ... 37474?s=20 ---> 03 Dec 1971. On this day half a Century ago, began a military campaign that was to become the biggest decisive military victory of our times with the creation of a new Nation Bangladesh (Erstwhile East Pakistan) and highest military surrender post World War II.

93,000.

Jai Hind!

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Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by Rakesh »

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Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by Haridas »

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For me he is the biggest IAF Air Warrior
Wg.Cdr Padmanabh Gautam, Maha Vir Chakra & Bar, Vayu Sena Medal (Gallantry)

https://m.tribuneindia.com/news/feature ... bar-231635

When his fighter crashed in peacetime, I bolted from KV school to look out for the wreckage in Poona, albeit on the wrong end of the runway.
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Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by Rakesh »

https://twitter.com/armybratspeaks/stat ... 91683?s=20 ---> First Surgical Strike Inside Pakistan. Operation Mandhol’s anniversary. India’s finest SF, 9 Para SF.

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Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by Rakesh »

https://twitter.com/NarenKadian/status/ ... 00545?s=20 ---> THIS IS OUR HERITAGE: A Mother watching her 'Son in Glory' whom she told to 'Fight like a Lion’ and he sure fought like one unto death. Mrs Maheshwari Khetarpal, 85, mother of 2/Lt Arun Khetarpal, Param Vir Chakra (Posthumous), gazing at her son's bust. Our SALUTE to the brave Mother.

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Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by Manish_Sharma »

TWITTER


Today is the 50th anniversary of the partition of Pak. On this day 50 yrs ago one general Niazi was cowering. Today another general Niazi is desperately trying to avert a 2nd partition of Pak. Only this time at the hands of Islamists who Pak ironically created to check India.

https://twitter.com/RShivshankar/status ... rxrxw&s=19
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Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by ks_sachin »

Folks,

Some memories of Bangladesh liberation war from dad and mom captured by a Bangalore based film maker. Can I request members to like and comment on the video on YT so we can encourage such people.

https://youtu.be/IXME4SykMCo

Regards
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Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

Very handsome dad and mom. A great recounting of their life during that war.
Pranam to them.

I used to have that Kodak box camera during my school days. Next was Agfa click camera.
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Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by ks_sachin »

Thanks Ramana
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Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by jamwal »

A documentary about Battle of Longewala from Indo-Pak war of 1971, released by Indian Air Force.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SVCq3m03RO4
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Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by Rakesh »

https://twitter.com/danvir_chauhan/stat ... 80290?s=20 ---> My father late Lt Col Balbir Singh initially with Mukti Bahini and later with his unit fought the Pakistani army. He and his men captured Durgabarkati. A battle honour, ever since this is celebrated as Durgabarkati day in 2 Sikh LI each year. #1971IndoPakWar

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Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by Rakesh »

1971: How India won the war

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Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by Rakesh »

How the MiG-21 tilted the 1971 war in India’s favour with its 13/1 success ratio
https://www.firstpost.com/world/how-mig ... 12001.html
16 December 2021
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Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by Rakesh »

https://twitter.com/kakar_harsha/status ... 47584?s=20 ---> The US ambassador writes to General Manekshaw. He praises the Indian Army and criticizes conduct of Pak forces. Remember US was a Pak ally then.

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Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

Note the form of address. My dear Sam...
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Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

One surprise to me is the total lack of activity of 1st Armoured Division, aka Black Elephant division.

On the Western front, we saw action in Kashmir(defensive), Shakargarh(Basantar), Rajasthan (Longewala and the Para raids).
But not much action in the Punjab sector except for the Battle of Basantar (a brigade-level attack).

Why?
Was Basantar a prelude to launch 1 st Armored?
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Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by vimal »

Interesting letter but then the part where he praises the magnanimity of Indian army reminded me of Prithviraj Chauhan!
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Post by Rakesh »

1971 | Full Movie | Manoj Bajpayee | English Subtitles| National Award for 'Best Hindi Feature Film'

Youtube Link ---> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gp3otKG7o6g
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Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by ParGha »

ramana wrote:One surprise to me is the total lack of activity of 1st Armoured Division, aka Black Elephant division. Why?
Per PN Haksar, the Prime Minister's secretary, who was part of the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty negotiations: The Soviets agreed to veto the inevitable UNSC anti-India resolutions only if India kept the offensives limited to East Pakistan / Bangladesh; it could be justified as "self-defense" given the enormous economic and social costs of millions of Bengali refugees spilling into India. If Indian offensive formations were photographed rolling towards West Pakistan, then they couldn't justify shielding India any longer.
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Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

Probable but not plausible. How was the Basantar operation authorized?
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Post by ramana »

Role of BSF in Bangladesh. 61 pages pdf from Official history
https://www.bharat-rakshak.com/archives ... pendix.pdf
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Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by ParGha »

ramana wrote:Probable but not plausible. How was the Basantar operation authorized?
The Blood Telegram (Bass, G.J., 2013) references the Haksar Papers extensively, and documents the Soviet concerns and conditions throughout the war. Bottom Line: Neither the US, nor the USSR, were okay with India dismembering West Pakistan.

The Battle of Basantar was a spoiling-attack by a smaller Indian formation against a larger and stronger Pakistani formation. It would not have registered the kind of alarm and international reaction that an Indian Armoured Division rolling west would have evoked.
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Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by nachiket »

ParGha wrote:
ramana wrote:Probable but not plausible. How was the Basantar operation authorized?
The Blood Telegram (Bass, G.J., 2013) references the Haksar Papers extensively, and documents the Soviet concerns and conditions throughout the war. Bottom Line: Neither the US, nor the USSR, were okay with India dismembering West Pakistan.

The Battle of Basantar was a spoiling-attack by a smaller Indian formation against a larger and stronger Pakistani formation. It would not have registered the kind of alarm and international reaction that an Indian Armoured Division rolling west would have evoked.
There was also an offensive planned against Islamgarh and RYK by 12 Inf Div. This got pre-empted by the paki attack on Longewala which ended in disaster. But what happened later? Did the offensive go through in later days? And what armoured units were supposed to take part in it? Lots of details on the internet about Longewala but I couldn't find a whole lot about our planned offensive.
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Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by chetak »

https://twitter.com/rajnathsingh/status ... 40737?s=20 --->
Rajnath Singh@rajnathsingh
This Day, That Year!
8:26 am · 16 Dec 2021
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Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by Rakesh »

Chetak-ji, please put a link to the tweet when posting. I have edited your post to add the above link.
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Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by Rakesh »

1971: How Pakistan Walked Into India’s Trap

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Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by Bishwa »

ramana wrote:One surprise to me is the total lack of activity of 1st Armoured Division, aka Black Elephant division.

On the Western front, we saw action in Kashmir(defensive), Shakargarh(Basantar), Rajasthan (Longewala and the Para raids).
But not much action in the Punjab sector except for the Battle of Basantar (a brigade-level attack).

Why?
Was Basantar a prelude to launch 1 st Armored?
I believe 1st Armoured Div was kept in reserve to counter the Pakistan Armoured Division. It may have been in Punjab, Muktsar area.
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Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

A few posts about the Battle of Longewala

First wiki to give a general description.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Longewala

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A few accounts and appraisals:

Lt Gen Zamiruddin Shah
https://theprint.in/opinion/the-1971-ba ... ly/329321/
A group of eight Army veterans and four wives of soldiers posted in 185 Light regiment (Camel Pack) visited the battlefield of Longewala on 23 November where my regiment had fought a pitched battle in the 1971 India-Pakistan war from 3-6 December. It was a trip down memory lane after almost half a century. We visited the Longewala post and the gun positions we had occupied to provide fire support to the beleaguered post commanded by Major (later Brigadier) Kuldip Singh Chandpuri. He was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra for his exceptional leadership.

The Battle of Longewala is etched in our memories courtesy of J.P. Dutta’s 1997 film Border that romanticised the battle, highlighting the heroic actions of Major Chandpuri and the Indian Air Force ‘Hunters’ destroying the Pakistani tanks.


Sam Manekshaw’s charisma

In late October 1971, several hundred officers, including me, of the Battle Axe Division, were seated on tarpaulin sheets on the desert sands in Rajasthan’s Jaisalmer sector awaiting the address of then-Chief of Army Staff General (later Field Marshal) Sam Manekshaw. There was a table covered with a blanket, chair and a microphone set up in front. We heard his helicopter land. He breezed in, brushed aside the microphone, climbed on the table and stood facing us with his hands on his hips. His address was short and crisp: “Boys, I am sending you across. Victory must be ensured. I want you to remember three things. First, prisoners of war will not be ill-treated, second, there will be no plunder or booty hunting, and lastly, keep away from the begums (Pakistani women).”

He jumped off the table, had a cup of tea with us in an enamel mug, standard Army issue, and flew off. His speech was succinct and left no doubts in our minds. He was not verbose. Sam Manekshaw’s address had us spellbound. He had incomparable charisma which is a strange alchemy of inner spirit, energy, fire, radiance, enthusiasm and spontaneity. It was a spark that ignited the fire within us.


The “Cold Start”

For several months, we had been rehearsing our role of breaking through the Pakistani defences with our objective being the town of Rahim Yar Khan, a rail and road communication centre in Pakistan. Our shortfall in vehicles, equipment and manpower was made-up. We began receiving new vehicles, reservists and ammunition, the markings on which we could not decipher. They were in Hebrew. Our camels had been replaced by vehicles as camels in modern warfare were an incongruity. It would have taken take us seven days of hard riding to travel from our location in Bikaner, where we were stabled, to our operational location in Jaisalmer. So much for ‘Cold Start’. :?: :?: :?:

Our Commanding General, Major General J.F.R. Jacob, in 1968, was a great exponent of mobile warfare and disfavoured this medieval mode of transport. Once, after I had given him a demonstration of Camel-Mounted Artillery, in order to impress him, he asked me if there was any terrain which modern mechanical transport could not traverse. I told him there were several impenetrable dunes. He challenged me to find one where his jeep, fitted with ‘balloon’ tyres, could not traverse. I did so and on the appointed day, Majoral General Jacob, accompanied by his aide-de-camp, drove over the sand dune we had selected. That episode sounded the death knell for the camel regiment and we were ordered to shed them to the Border Security Force (BSF). We got gun-towing vehicles instead, much to the dismay and sorrow of our Rajasthani troops.

Pakistan’s surprise

One battery of the 170 Field Regiment, which I subsequently commanded, was deployed at Sadhewala to provide fire support to 23 PUNJAB that had company at Longewala, sans artillery support. This post had been established to check any outflanking attack by Pakistan during the Battle Axe Division’s thrust to Rahim Yar Khan (RYK) planned for 4 December 1971. RYK was our objective in the desert. We had to traverse rugged and inhospitable terrain.

The Sadhewala and Longewala posts protected the western flanks of the division. We also did not expect the Pakistanis to take the approach via Longewala. But they surprised us by taking it and surrounded our post on the night of 3/4 December 1971. This had been preceded by massive preemptive strikes on our airfields in the west, including Jodhpur. Our ammunition replenishment column was on its way from Jodhpur that night and reached us with great difficulty.



The night of massive confusion

The Battle Axe Division was concentrated further east at Tanot, preparing for a divisional thrust on 4 December 1971. The Pakistani armour, comprising Chinese Type 59 tanks of 22 Armoured Regiment, surrounded the Longewala post. The Pakistani armour had overshot its infantry elements, a cardinal error in warfare, and paused awaiting their arrival. They were also, probably, inhibited by the wire fence which they mistook as markers of a minefield. It was really meant to keep out dogs and stray cattle.

The post commander, Major Chandpuri kept his nerve and so did his commanding officer, Lt Col Khursheed Hussain at Sadhewala. Unfortunately, the movie Border depicted the latter in ambivalent light, probably to add grist to the mill and to project Indian Muslim soldiers in poor light. This was unfair and challenged by our armed forces personnel, who were in the know of actualities.

There was massive confusion on the night of 3/4 December 1971. We were asked to veer west from our assembly area north of Tanot and head for Longewala. The single arterial road was clogged and we were sitting ducks for the Pakistani Air Force. We called in our Air Force at dawn on 4 December 1971. We saw our ‘Hunter’ aircraft dive and play merry hell with the Pakistani armour, the bulk of which was decimated. 34 Pakistani tanks were destroyed or abandoned.

The artillery battery at Sadhewala was rushed and deployed to support Longewala. Major Chandpuri, not well-versed in artillery terminology, thus carried out the correction of artillery fire in Punjabi: “Reference Longewala Khu, Gole Barsa” and “400 sajje”, “200 khabbe”. The Artillery Officer Capt Santosh Datta reached the post at dawn on 4 December and subsequently controlled the fire. I moved with the remaining Regiment and deployed in support of the post by noon.



Pakistan’s plan foiled

We seized five field guns and three anti-aircraft guns. The burning tanks eerily lit the night sky. Every artillery piece in range brought down a barrage of fire and contributed significantly to the defence of Longewala. Had it not been for the Indian Air Force, our armour of obsolescent AMX-13 tanks — buttressed by a few Russian T-54 tanks — would have been no match for the Pakistani Armour.

The Pakistani plan was bold and audacious. They planned to outflank us and head for Jaisalmer, their objective. They, however, made the cardinal error, in execution, by allowing their armour to overshoot the Infantry and not allocating enough air resources for their thrust to Longewala.

The destruction of the Pakistani armoured regiment gave us respite and it took another two days for us to stabilise the situation. The Pakistani divisional commander, 18 Infantry division, was reportedly sacked. According to military tradition, the Commander on the spot gets credit for victory but must also bear the ignominy of defeat.

Lt Gen Zameer Uddin Shah PVSM, SM, VSM (retired) is a former Deputy Chief of Army Staff and the former Vice-Chancellor of Aligarh Muslim University. Views are personal.

So Battleaxe Divison objective was Rahim yar Khan.

On the night they were preparing to attack they got surprised by a Pak Brigade attack on Longewala.
The post at Longewala was defended by a company of 23 Punjab and held till the morning when 4 Hunters and 3 Maruts attacked the Pak forces.
They destroyed the Pak armoured regiment.
It took 3-4 days to stabilize the situation.
Meantime battle axe Division did not launch towards its objective.
We don't know why?
Maybe they realized Pak had moved forces to support RYK.
Also, Maj Gen Jacobs again is influential in ensuring camel crops artillery is phased out.
And his penchant for mobile warfare.

Is Capt Sujan Dutta, the film-maker JP Dutta's brother?

Two accounts much later:
Col. James Hattar: https://www.tribuneindia.com/2000/20001 ... /main2.htm
Taking on the enemy at LONGEWALA

In every conflict there comes a turning point. In the 1971 war against Pakistan, the Battle of Longewala in the western sector was one such point. Not only was the Pak attack dented, but it was also forced to withdraw when India launched its own offensive. Longewala was, thus, a decisive battle says Col. James Hattar

In every conflict there comes a turning point. In the 1971 war against Pakistan, the Battle of Longewala in the western sector was one such point. Not only was the enemy attack dented, but they were also forced to withdraw and defend when India launched its own offensive. Longewala was, thus, a decisive battle.

A body of 84 Punjabi infantry soldiers with neither artillery nor tank support, neither minefield of any kind nor air support, and with a lonely long winter night ahead of them, decided the outcome of this battle. There were also four soldiers of the BSF camel division. All this was in favour of the enemy, who launched an offensive with the 51 Infantry Brigade of about 3000 men and 22 Armoured Regiment. This was the scenario on December 4 night (1971), when the Pakistanis crossed the international border heading for Longewala, 16 km from the border. The post was held by ‘A’ Company of 23 Punjab under Major (later Brigadier) Kuldip Singh Chandpuri. The Pakistani plan was to have breakfast at Longewala, lunch at Jaisalmer and dinner at Jodhpur.


The action opened at 2.30 a.m. on a moonlit night when the first Pakistani attack was launched. Much gunfire pierced the desert night. As the enemy tanks, Chinese made T-59s, came within range, ‘A’ Company’s two recoilless (RCL) guns opened up, each eliminating an enemy tank. The assaulting armour was jolted to a halt, but the infantry assault continued. As the Pakistanis approached ‘A’ company defences, they were confronted by a barbed-wire fence of three stands. This halted the infantry attack too, as the enemy thought this indicated a minefield. Smoke and desert dust added to the confusion. This fence was erected just to mark the boundary of the Longewala post, to keep BSF camels in — 10 of them — and keep other animals, like wild camels, out. The enemy’s heads were kept pinned down by the withering small arms fire from the post’s defences.

Two hours later, the enemy attacked again from another direction. The result was much the same, as ‘A’ Company refused to give ground. This attack too petered to a halt, with the perimeter fence again creating doubts in the enemy’s mind.

Just before the first light appeared at 6.30 a.m. on December 5, the Pakistanis attacked yet again with venom from yet another direction. Longewala Post was now virtually surrounded by the enemy. Dawn was not far behind, and it revealed to both the Pakistanis and the Indians their relative positions. An enemy tank lay stalled just 50 metres from the defences — in perfect working condition and abandoned by its Pakistani crew. Smouldering enemy tanks dotted the scene not much further away. {How many?} The night’s work had warmed the hearts of the ‘A’ Company boys and they now anticipated a major armour assault, with the screen of darkness lifted from the battlefield.

Maj. K.S. Chandpuri, briefs Britain’s CIGS, Field Marshall Carver, on the Longewala Battle at Longewala in the Rajasthan sector.

The structures making up the Longewala Post, and much of its defensive positions, had been subjected to a murderous enemy medium artillery battering all night long. The huts, a smouldering rubble at dawn, had lit up the night sky earlier. The tank destruction was aided by barrels of diesel fuel loaded on the tanks to take them to Jaisalmer and beyond, before administrative echelons caught up with the planned Pakistani advance. When a tank was hit, the extra diesel had literally added fuel to the fire.

All night long, Major Chandpuri was requesting for tanks and reinforcements. When day broke, help arrived proverbially from the heavens. A lone air reconnaissance sortie failed to locate enemy tanks and asked for assistance. Two light aircraft of the artillery’s Air Observation Post (Air OP) were quickly on the scene, directing Hunter aircrafts to their kills. It was now a case of a cat being set among the pigeons with the Pakistani air force busy elsewhere. The IAF boys had it all to themselves at will.

Enemy tanks were like sitting ducks, without any cover of even shrubbery to protect them. With extra drums of diesel on them, everytime a tank was hit they were virtually incinerated. When the IAF pilots ran out of tank targets, they took a heavy toll of the enemy vehicles, with hundreds of them pock-marking the sandy panorama. The IAF did a truly first-class job, sending the enemy into complete disarray, back across the border.

Never since Independence has the IAF knocked out 36 enemy tanks in a single battle. ‘A’ Company’s own anti-tank weapons, accounted for another 12. In addition, one tank was recovered in working condition after the war, on which the men performed bhangra. In many cases, tanks had been struck by more than one rocket. This is understandable, for due to the high speed of the Hunter aircraft at great heights, the target comes to sight for just a few seconds, making it difficult to differentiate between an already dead target and a moving one. Air Chief Marshall P.C. Lal in his book My Years With The IAF made a claim of "about 40 tanks." He also paid a glowing tribute to ‘A’ Company 23 Punjab’s determined stand at Longewala. His book had this to say:

"Major Kuldip Singh Chandpuri, the company commander who took the brunt of the attack, and fought with great grit, courage and determination, was awarded a very well deserved Maha Vir Chakra (MVC)."

The Pakistani Divisional and Brigade Commanders, assigned to capture Longewala, were both sacked. It is believed that the three Pakistani infantry commanding officers and the armoured regiment commander, and many more, also suffered the same ignominy.

Indian field intelligence acquisition was poor. Such a large combined Pakistani force, concentrating opposite Longewala, should have been known in advance.

Indian strategic intelligence was virtually inadequate, as it was unaware of enemy troop movements opposite the Jaisalmer sector. The Indian 12 Infantry Division made attack plans in the absence of this information, forcing last minute changes in plans from attack to defence.


Excellent Army and Air Force cooperation ensured our success at Longewala. Pakistan had no air cover for its attack, resulting in its virtual rout.

It is not solely the numbers that matter. Determination, resoluteness and leadership too count. Major Chandpuri had not even a full company complement of infantry, and no other protection yet he stood firm against an overwhelming Pakistani attack. Pakistan’s infantry force was almost 30 times greater in strength. The Punjabis had no armour all night long, whereas the enemy had about 60 tanks. It was the Pakistani leadership that did not press its attacks with determination and showed no resoluteness and poor leadership in front of the Longewala Post fencing. This was especially, when the post was surrounded. The Punjabis’ refusal to capitulate, confused the enemy leaders.

What would have happened if ‘A’ Company of 23 Punjab had lost heart and abandoned Longewala Post? The Pakistanis would really have had dinner at Jodhpur as there was virtually no Indian defence in between and there is no prize for guessing what that would have entailed. This really was an epic battle that saved Rajasthan.

Three weeks after the battle, the then Defence Minister, Jagjivan Ram, speaking at Jalandhar, described the people of Punjab (Regt) as brave and heroic. He congratulated them for making a grave for Pakistani tanks at Longewala.

A very significant tribute was paid to the Punjabis’ achievement, against unbelievable odds, by none other than Britain. Its Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal R.M. Carver, especially visited the battle scene a few weeks later, to see for himself the miracle at Longewala.
So 36+12= 48 tanks were destroyed and 1 captured. This is about the same magnitude at Asal Uttar where 97 tanks were destroyed or captured. If one takes out the number of Patton tanks captured at Assal Uttar(35) its a similar number.

I hope IAF later counted the damage from the T-10 rockets vs 30m mm shells. And took photos to study the tanks vulnerability.

Another article from the Tribune:

By Thakur KS Ludra: https://www.tribuneindia.com/2001/20010 ... /main4.htm
An assessment of the battle of Longewala
By Thakur K. S. Ludra

VIJAY DIVAS to commemorate the Indian victory over Pakistan has come and gone. There has been a lot of chest thumping and self-congratulatory notes exchanged as the old soldiers fought and won, all over again. The Battle of Maj K.S. Chandpuri briefing Britain’s CIGS, Field Marshall Carver, on the Longewala Battle at Longewala in the Rajasthan sector.

Longewala has been bruited about as a classic example of grit, determination and how this Indian version of the Battle of Thermopylae put paid to Pakistan ambitions of having breakfast in Longewala, lunch at Jaisalmer and dinner at Jodhpur. Colonel Hattar’s piece on December 16, commemorates Brigadier (then Major) Kuldip Singh Chandpuri’s gallant action whereby he, with an undersized company of just 84 men along with just two 106 mm recoilless guns, held the Pakistani attack on the night of December 4/5. He held on against one complete infantry brigade and one complete armoured regiment. His action permitted the Indian Air Force to go in for a partridge shoot the next morning, in which they bagged 36 of the pick of the Pakistani armour. A superb and an inspiring action if there was any. Major Chandpuri was deservedly awarded one of the highest gallantry award that the country could give him — the Maha Vir Chakra. Though personally, I feel he should have been given a Param Vir Chakra, for but for him, Pakistan would have not lost a complete regiment worth of tanks. Tactically speaking, this was the sort of operation which makes traditions and history.



However, now we come to the crux of this article — the impact of this operation on further developments in Pakistani and Indian operations, and who was, eventually, successful in achieving its aims. In the region, Rahim Yar Khan, a critical railway station on the Sind-Punjab railway line is well within 24 hours striking distance from the Indian border. If it was in Indian hands at that time, it would have cut off the rail as well as the road link between Sind (read Karachi) and Punjab, the main theatre of operations in the West. With the cutting off of the link, Punjab would have been starved of fuel and replenishment of weapons and munitions which was being off loaded at Karachi. In other words notwithstanding all the tall talk there was a complete lack of strategic understanding of what was required.

The Indian plan in this region envisaged a strike across the international border towards Islamgarh, through Sarkari Tala. After securing Islamgarh the plan was to advance through Baghla and secure Rahim Yar Khan. With the capture of Rahim Yar Khan the Pakistani position in Punjab and for that matter in Jammu and Kashmir would have become precarious indeed. In the next ten days or so the Indian strike through Shakargarh would have gained momentum even as the Pakistani forces devoid of any maintenance support and fuel would have been caught in a trap.

Under the circumstances, the only way Pakistan, which was not very strong in the region and whose plans envisaged Punjab as the operational centre, could have reacted was to take a big risk and launch a pre-emptive attack. The aim being to ensure that the 12 Indian Division which had been tasked to secure Rahim Yar Khan did not cross the border. The Pakistani plan envisaged the advance through Kishangarh to the area behind of south of Ramgarh where 12 Infantry Division was concentrated. In this their intelligence was remarkably good. However they also failed to analyse the implication of the Longewala Post, originally held by the BSF. However there is still no denying the fact that Pakistani intelligence was particularly effective.

And it should have been, for they had, over a period of time, engineered infiltration by a number of Pakistanis who had settled down in small hamlets on the Indian side of the border. In this, they had been helped by the corrupt politicians and bureaucrats who had helped them get ration cards and got their names included in voters lists. On the Indian side as Colonel Hattar has, very rightly, stated that the intelligence was poor as always. That is if it was available at all.

Operations started when Pakistan launched its pre-emptive air strikes on the evening of December 3, 1971. In a discussion I had with the Brigadier, Intelligence, Southern Command, some time in 1975 I learned that the General Officer commanding-in-chief, Southern Command, who was responsible for operations in Rajasthan, was petrified, and the launching of 12 Infantry Division which should have commenced on December 4 morning was stalled. The Pakistani spoiling attack on the night of December 4/5, in turn, aggravated the situation and the General Officer Commanding, 12 Infantry Division, thereafter just did not move an inch. Under the circumstances, while the General Officer Commanding, 12 Infantry Division, should have been sacked, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief should have taken over the operations and continued with the offensive after the stalling of Pakistani spoiling attack, for then Pakistan just did not have any armour in this region.

However, nothing of that kind happened and Pakistani forces in the region which had been more or less become hors de combat were allowed to withdraw to safety and no efforts were made to capitalise on the more or less complete elimination of Pakistani armour in that region. In other words, Pakistan had achieved her aim though she lost heavily. In war that is what the battles are all about. The achieving of the aim. Without achieving of the aim set out, all the battles and gallantry awards are meaningless.

Thus we see a complete contrast in the behaviour of the Junior Officers at the Battalion level who have time and again helped the Indian Armed Forces to keep their head high and the Indian Senior officers who have continuously let the country down. We saw it in the Jammu and Kashmir Operations where they just did not understand the importance of Skardu or Haji Pir Pass or for that matter the Pandu Feature and let them slip out of our hands. It was repeated in 1962 when the Generals let down the troops and the junior officers. It was repeated in 1965 when time and again successes of junior officers were not capitalised upon, and we see it again in Rajasthan, where the glorious opportunity provided by Major Chandpuri was allowed to slip out of our hands by the Generals.

There is an old dictum which states that an army of sheep led by a lion is more dangerous than an army of lions led by a sheep. The Indian political leadership has over a period of time ensured that the Indian officer cadre starts getting weeded out from the very first level of selection and only those who conform to their ideas are allowed to get promoted. Thereafter, any promotion beyond the rank of a brigadier has to be politically acceptable. In this they are very ably assisted by a Machiavellian bureaucracy and self-seeking senior officers. The eventual loser is the nation and the common man.
The GOC Southern command later became Army Chief after Field Marshal Manekshaw.
The same officer chickened out in LAC in 1967 where he withdrew and PLA promptly occupied the pass.
OTH Lt Gen Sagat Singh stayed put at Nathu La and gave the PLA a bloody nose.
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Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by Haridas »

ramana wrote:A few posts about the Battle of Longewala

...... .. The GOC Southern command later became Army Chief after Field Marshal Manekshaw.
The same officer chickened out in LAC in 1967 where he withdrew and PLA promptly occupied the pass.
OTH Lt Gen Sagat Singh stayed put at Nathu La and gave the PLA a bloody nose.
Gen Bewoor it was.
His son was in IAF (my dad's CO at AEB, met him at that time), I am in touch with him though till recently.
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Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

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ramana
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Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

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Air Marshal C.V. Gole in USI journal

Air Operations in Western Sector in 1971 War
Air Operations in the Western Sector during 1971 Indo-Pak War
Author: Air Marshal CV Gole (Retd)


Period: October 2021 - December 2021

Abstract

The decisive sector in the 1971 war was the Eastern Sector from the eyes of the Indian Armed Forces. However, in Pakistani eyes with their declared military strategy of ‘the defence of the East lies in the West’, the war in the Western Sector was their prime focus. This explains their pre-emptive air strikes on 03 Dec 1971. With only one combat squadron in the East, the PAF was soon hors de combat. This article covers the operations in the Western Sector in its entirety. It gives the air war perspective from the highest-level planning to the lowest level execution. It covers the air support to the army operations battle-wise and, hence, serves as a useful concise history of the war in its entirety.

Introduction

The uprising on 26 March in East Pakistan and Bangladeshi expectations of direct support from India brought the realisation of a likely requirement of some direct action by India. However, to avoid a military confrontation, India made a number of diplomatic moves and appealed to the major nations to help in averting such a crisis. Instead of seeing the writings on the wall, Yahya choose to blame and accuse India to subversion and interference in Pakistan’s internal affairs. In July, Yahya spoke, for the first time, of a total war with India. This was followed by another warning on September 1 in his interview to Le Figaro. Increasing harassment by Bangladeshi guerrillas brought about increasingly frenzied reaction by Pakistani forces and by November incursion by Pakistani Army and Air Force into Indian Territory, become frequent. Finally, on 22 November, direct action had to be taken by India. Four Sabres intruded into Indian air space in the Boyra Salient. Four Gnats of Kalaikunda detachment at Dum Dum airport were scrambled and intercepted these Sabres and shot down three; one got away. India Air Force (IAF) had fired its first shot in anger. On 23 November, Yahya promised to wage a total war against India in 10 days. He kept his promise, and so began the 1971 Indo-Pak conflict.

Preparation for War

On 27 March, the Prime Minister called a meeting of the defence minister and the three Service Chiefs to review the situation and Indian preparedness. The three services started taking stock of their state of preparedness, training, serviceability and availability of weapon systems, and the inventory. The IAF found itself well-equipped and trained except for night operations and low-level air defence capability. Among the various measures taken to improve the state of preparedness of the Air Force, a delegation under the VCAS, was sent to the USSR to assess and evaluate the aircraft and weapons systems offered by the Soviets to make up these shortcomings. However, what was offered by them was either not suitable or not available in the desired timeframe. In any case, it was too late to acquire, assimilate and bring to operational readiness any new weapon system within the anticipated timeframe. The offer, therefore, had to be declined. A more pragmatic way was to enhance the operational effectiveness and availability of the existing equipment. In August, Exercise ‘Cactus Lily’ was declared — which so far as Defence Services were concerned, was the declaration of the eminence of War.

Preparations

It was surmised that the forces in East Pakistan had been substantially bolstered up, though in reality only one Division plus, and half a fighter Squadron were added. On our side this resulted in transfer of increasing number of troops from West to East and tying down the Air Force’s Squadrons in the East. A major consequence was that the main role of Western Command changed from offensive to defensive. The Chiefs of Staff spelt out the following main objectives in the order of priority:

- To gain as much ground as possible in East Pakistan and to neutralise Pakistani forces to the extent possible. (It is interesting to note that even at this stage total collapse in East Pakistan was not envisaged because of the supposedly large Pakistani forces).
- To hold against any Pak offensive in the West. Some limited offensives, mainly to rationalise the border, were however permitted. (Since UN or the major nations were expected to intervene soon enough, major territorial gains in the West were not envisaged nor was there any intention to destroy West Pakistan).

Pakistani Assessment

In keeping with their almost dogmatic believe that defence of the East lay in offensive in the West, the Pakistani top brass had proposed opening the war with a major offensive in the West. The actual location was to be decided after a few probing thrusts. To that extent not much consideration was a given to the East, except giving them enough troops to hold Indian offensive for a limited period. To assuage (or intimidate) the Bengalis, however, repeated declarations and promises were made for increased military build-up. Whether intentional or not, these did cause India to over-provide in the East and thus abandon an opening offensive or a counter offensive in the West. If this was deliberate, then Yahya must be given more credit for shrewdness than generally acknowledged. In the event, the Pakistani offensive in the West also never got off the ground.

Once the three Chiefs agreed on the principal objectives, the IAF set about working out its own plans. Commanders at various levels were consulted and discussions were held at Command and Air Headquarters. The new priorities that emerged were:

Air Defence of own air space and establishment of favourable air situation over specific areas as required by the ground forces.
Offensive Air support (i.e., CAS and interdiction).
Reconnaissance.
Counter Air against enemy airfields and support installation.
Offensive strikes against other targets of importance.
Support to the Navy and other special tasks.
Air Defence

While planning for Air Defence some serious shortcomings emerged. These were:

Inadequate radar cover at medium and high altitudes.
Total lack of detection and identification capabilities against low level intruders.
Lack of suitable Air borne interception radars and air-to-air missiles which could be used at low level by our fighters.
Lack of adequate modern AD Artillery (e.g., L-70 guns) and surface-to-air missiles (SAMS) to defend important Vulnerable Areas (Vas) and Vulnerable Points (VPs).
The inadequacy of radar cover and lack of dedicated and reliable air defence communications forced the IAF to evolve the Base Air Defence concept were important bases with aircraft and AD weapons were given local autonomy, without conflicting with the overall Air Defence arrangements. Since it was not possible to acquire new radars within the available time frame, available radars were suitably deployed to cover important VAs and VPs and to double bank with the static high-power radars. The MIG 21s and Gnats were earmarked for air defence tasks and placed under various Air Defence Direction Centres (ADDCs). Surface-to-air missiles were redeployed to provide cover to forward airfields.

To achieve at least a semblance of low-level cover, Visual Observation Posts (VOPs) and Flights (MOPs and MOUs) were formed and deployed just inside the border. These were integrated in the Air Defence Network and the base Air Defence Organisations by HF communications. These VOPs (MOPs) become functional just a few days before the conflict. Even with these last-minute inductions, they did prove their worth wherever they were intelligently integrated with the Base Air Defence Centres. The only constraint was their thinly spread-out locations for reliable HF equipment.

A word regarding the AD guns. Immediately on declaration of exercise “Cactus Lily” a mix of L-60 and L-70 guns was allotted to all major airfields radar stations and other important installations of the Air Force. In the intervening period, the gun crew were well trained on aircraft recognition, airfield procedures and procedures of the new Base Air Defence Organisation and were expected to give a good account of themselves. The shock, however, both to the affected air force commanders and the AD Gunners themselves, was when on declaration of war on 3 December, Plan ‘A’ was executed and all the regular AD Artillery units were moved to army’s forward formations, leaving the airfields to the mercy of Territorial AD regiments, who were still being embodied. Had Pakistan persisted in pressing home their counter-air operations against our airfields, this late switchover could have been rather telling.

Offensive Air Support

For the all-important Offensive Air Support operations, special efforts were made to drastically minimised the time lag between the demand and the appearance of close support aircraft overhead by devolution of power and allocation of CAS aircraft to lower levels, i.e., Corp HQs and in some cases even to Division HQs. At the Army Command level, advanced HQs, under Air Commodores were established to represent the respective Air Force Commands. Under them, Tactical Air Centres, commanded by Group Captains, were established at the Corps HQ level. Each TAC had several forward Air Controllers (FACs) with their Air Contact Teams (ACT) which moved with the advancing troops and were responsible to guide the CAS aircraft to the targets indicated by the Army. The TACs were allotted specific air effort from nearby airfields and had full freedom to use them as required by the Corps HQ. this helped to reduce the time lag between the initiation of demands and aircraft overhead to about 1 – 1 ½ hrs. Another innovation was the allotment of dedicated air effort directly in support of 1 Armoured Division which was meant to spearhead a major offensive should any materialise. The Division located at Kot Kapura was to be supported by aircraft from Halwara. Direct communications had been established, bypassing the normal air support network (ASSU). Unfortunately, the scheme could not be tested as the Division was never committed to war.

Reconnaissance

For FR/PR a system was developed wherein the stations with photo-recce aircraft were equipped and trained to develop the films immediately on return of PR aircraft. These were then transported by air or by road either to Army intelligence or through command HQ to AHQ. It must be confessed here that the Air Force could not provide necessary PR before commencement of hostilities because of likely international complications in flying over Pakistan territory. The requirement was made up in the first few days of the War. At the tactical level, however, the procedures proved too time-consuming and cumbersome. There was also a shortage of night photography equipment.

Counter Air Operations

The counter air operations were split in two parts — those by the fighter-bombers under Western Air Command (WAC) and those by Canberras and modified transport aircraft under Central Air Command. Operations by the later were planned at Air HQ and the frontline command, WAC, was merely informed to provide a safe transit. Such arrangements are justified for genuinely strategic operations. However, most of these operations were of tactical nature, in direct support of front-line operations. It is, therefore, debatable whether such dual control was called for in such a purely tactical situation.

For the counter air tasks, Air HQ decided as the following targeting priorities:

PAF airfields, radars, and other support installations.
Energy targets like major fuel dumps.
Transportation system, i.e., roads and railways, especially the lines of supply to the Front.
Support to the Navy.
Other tasks.

Naval Support

For naval operation, Maritime operation rooms were set up at each naval command to coordinate the requirements. In the event, however, they were hardly employed. Even the Navy’s attack on Karachi was not known to the Air Force and it was an extremely fortunate coincidence that the IAF attacked Karachi just before the appearance of naval missile boats, inadvertently softening the target, so to speak.

Passive Air Defence

Airfield camouflage had improved since special attention had been given to adopt agricultural field patterns right up to the runways, merging them with the surrounding countryside. However, with the induction of additional aircraft and missile squadrons at forward locations, it became apparent that a number of these stations were ill-equipped to house, deploy and maintain the new inductions. Hurried innovative measures, therefore, had to be taken — including camouflage and hiding combat aircraft under cover of trees. Even sandbags were in short supply.

PAF Preparations

While the IAF was thus preparing for December 1971 operations, it would be interesting to consider the preparations across the border. PAF had chosen the following objectives in terms of their priority:

The foremost was the close air support (CAS) for the major offensive to be launched by Gen Tikka Khan. This never happened, since Tikka remained “frozen”.
Air Defence of PAF airfields and installations, and achievement of favourable air situation over the ground battle areas.
Counter air operations against IAF airfields and installations.
Air support to Pak Navy. PAF had repeatedly warned Pak Navy that the effort would be extremely limited and would be given only if adequate notice was given. In the event, this never materialised and PAF got blamed for not protecting Karachi against the IAF and Indian Navy attacks.

Order of Battle (ORBAT)

By 03 December both sides were poised and itching for the word ‘go’. The IAF had a total of 32 Combat Squadron of which 17 were with WAC, 6 were with Central Air Command and 9 were deployed in the East. According to PAF, however, IAF had nearly 44 combat sqns of which 10 were in the East and rest 34 in the West. For themselves they claimed to have only 10 ½ Sqns in the West. In the overall analysis, IAF (Like Indian Army on ground) had numerical superiority, but the forces were spread rather thinly over 14 airfields perhaps because of our over-estimation of Pak strength.

The War

On 01 December, Yahya took the decision to launch and all-out war on 3 December with pre-emptive air strikes and tentative army probes to be followed by the much-awaited massive offensive by General Tikka Khan. Formal declaration was made at 1630 hrs on 3 December, and within half an hour PAF was on its way to strike four IAF bases — Srinagar, Awantipur, Pathankot and Amritsar. Halwara was also on the hit list, but PAF instead attacked the nearby Advanced Landing Ground at Faridkot. This was either because Halwara was difficult to locate or because a dusk Combat Air Patrol (CAP) of two Gnats happened to be airborne at that time. More strikes followed at night by B-57s against Ambala, Agra, Halwara, Amritsar, Pathankot, Srinagar, Sirsa, Adampur, Nal, Jodhpur and Jamnagar. These strikes were carried out with a little more determination than the earlier pre-emptive strikes by the fighter bombers. However, the damage inflicted was peripheral. Runways were created at a few airfields but promptly repaired, without hampering IAFs operations. The IAF launched its retaliations with about 24 Canberras, one AN 12 and six Sukhoi/Mig sorties, within hours of the first PAF strike. Targets were PAF airfields at Rafiqi, Sargodha, Mianwali, Rasalewala, Murid, Chander and Masrur. These strikes were followed up waves of counter-air strikes in the next two days by Sukhois and Hunters. These operations continued till 6/7 December and a fair amount of damage was caused to PAF runways and aircraft on ground. PAF admitted major damage at Sargodha, Chander, and Masrur. Thereafter the counter air operations generally declined. In the first two days i.e., 4 and 5 December, about 280 counter air sorties were flown in the Western Sector. Their effect became obvious when PAF counter air effort not just slackened but almost ceased after the 3rd day. Total counter-air sorties against Pakistan military installations and energy targets in the Western Sector amounted to 437 or 9.5% of the total effort in the West.

{Very significant statement. PAF counter-air ops i.e against Indian airbases ceased within 72 hours of commencement. And it took 437 sorties of which 280 were in the first two days!}

The PAF, however, has claimed that their counter air operations continued right till the end, since Tikka’s offensive did not materialise, thus keeping IAF under constant pressure. We, however, know what happened. Most of these sorties never materialised and, in any case were never pressed home, the PAF aircraft occasionally dropping the load in the fields or on built up areas. Where they could not avoid coming on IAF airfields — merely because of the proximity (e.g. Amritsar and Pathankot ) — bombs were delivered in great hurry, causing no damage.

Air Defence

In the preparatory period techniques had been perfected to reduce the reaction period for getting the interceptors airborne in about one to one and a half minute. For base protection, CAP Controller techniques had been developed and a system of local AD control from the Base Air Defence centres had been practised. In keeping with PAF counter air strikes, IAFs’ air defence effort work also maximum in the first two days, amounting to 185 sorties. Most of these were devoted to CAPs over the airfields and over VAs/VPs, based on radar warning or as dawn/dusk patrols. Results were rather disproportionate because, as said earlier, PAF never really pressed home their attacks. Even then, our tally would have been substantial if we had low looking radars and fighters with low looking air borne interception radars and low-level missiles. It is rather intriguing that though dusk CAPs were more or less mandatory during the “wait and watch” period, when the PAF actually struck at the four airfields, no CAPs were air borne. In later part of the operations, air defence CAPs were also flown to give cover to our ground attack aircraft in the tactical area.

Air Defence sorties in Western Sector totaled 2074 i.e., about 46%. Considering that the PAF aircraft shot down in air combat totalled not more than 12 in the Western Sector, this effort would look rather infructuous, but it was necessary because of lack of radar cover. Also, the fact that we lost only 2 aircraft on ground as against a PAF loss of 18 on ground in the Western Sector proves the effectiveness of our air defence versus that of PAF.

During the last two/three days, fighter sweep sorties were flown deep in Pakistani territory, well visible to their radars as a challenge to force some response from PAF. None came — by day or by night.

Support of the Army

Dedicated air effort had been allotted for this very important role and except for the Army’s requirements, the effort built up gradually. What was important to note was that in most cases the effort was asked for after the ground action had started. Air Force response was fairly quick and did produce the desired results of stemming enemy’s advance or breaking this resistance. However, real effectiveness of air power lies in its employment before i.e., in the preparatory, softening-up stage, paving the way for advance by the ground forces and ensuring air superiority over the area. This requires not just joint, but integrated planning.

In the absence of such planned employment, the demands for air support came rather sporadically but always in an urgency. On the first day, for instance only 23 sorties were demanded which rose to 81 next the day. Even this effort was well below what was catered for. Perhaps a better way of recounting the ground support effort would be to examine it for each major land battle. Simultaneously with the pre-emptive air raids, the Pak Army had started its probing operations at Poonch, Chhamb, DBN, Lahore/Kasur sector, Hussainiwala, Suleimanki and further southwest near Ramgarh-Logewala. Some of these probes developed into major battles.

Chhamb

In Chhamb area, it appears that the role for 10 Division was changed at the last minute from offensive to defensive. The necessary redeployment was still in progress, when, true to their obsession of cutting off Kashmir valley, the Pak 23 Division launched its offensive. PAF was employed right from the beginning and flew nearly 117 sorties in support. In the face of this mounting pressure, on 6 December we had to withdraw to east of the Tawi. In the later stages of this battle, air support was demanded and given in full. In the next three days, Air Force flew (20 + 28 + 30) 78 sorties (135 were available). Yet a report reached at the Chiefs level that air support was lacking. Whatever be the reality, the fact stands that because of air action which included night bombing, no further advance was made by Pakistanis. Incidentally, the PAF which was active initially, shied away once IAF established air superiority.

Poonch

Simultaneously with the Chhamb thrust, Pak 12 Division opened a probing attack in Poonch area to cut off Indian Territory south of Peer Panjal. Air support was called for but because of the terrain, slower Vampires and Harvards had to be employed. These obsolete aircraft could not achieve much. Air Chief Marshal Lal claims that the real demoralising punch was provided by an AN-12 modified for bombing which plastered the area at night.

Shakargarh

The only major offensive of Western Command was launched by 1 Corps against a Pakistani salient near Shakargarh village South of Jammu. This operation was planned despite an Army HQ directive against any offensive, mainly to relieve pressure up North. This action was of a set-piece type since Pakistan expected it. Pak 2 Corps (8 and 15 Divisions) was well prepared to receive the Indian attack. Our offensive opened on 5 December with 54 Division pressing from North, 39 Division from East, 36 Division from South. All the three met with extensive minefields and well-prepared Pak defences. Predictably the advance was slow and casualties high. Matters were made worse by PAF which flew a total of 306 sorties in CAS and interdiction. From our side, air effort for 1 Corps was to be provided through 8 TAC. Coming from its peace location at Mathura, the air support organization including the communications network, was not up to the mark. Hence, although considerable air effort was earmarked for this TAC, with more availability if required, initially, hardly any air effort was called for, surrendering it back to the Advanced HQ. It was only in later stages that the air was called in. IAF quickly established air superiority in the area and mounted massive effort with Sukhois from Adampur, Amritsar and Halwara. However, the type of operations and the weapons demanded were not quite the right one (e.g., bombing to explode minefields). So perhaps the results were not commensurate, but the presence of IAF did prevent PAF from any further interference.

Kasur – Hussainiwala

There are three critical bridges along the Indo-Pak border. The one on river Ravi and Dera Baba Nanak were blown up by our troops. The second was on the Sutlej — the Hussainiwala bridge near Ferozepur which provides direct access to the Grand Trunk Road straight to Ambala and beyond. 7 Infantry Division was to guard this route. The bridge is in Indian territory with a small enclave west of the river. Just before the hostilities, a battalion with the necessary ordnance stocks was positioned in this enclave. The bridge was heavily guarded but was also prepared for demolition in an emergency. This was known to the enemy. On the evening of 3 December, Pak 106 Brigade Group launched an attack to eliminate this enclave and to capture the bridge. To support our troops, one squadron of tanks was rushed across the bridge. Unfortunately, their fate was sealed when enemy shelling set off the bridge demolition, stranding the battalion on the west bank of Sutlej. The Air Force was called in on 4 December afternoon. Over 24 sorties were flown to prevent Pakistani armour and aircraft from mauling the battalion, which managed to pull back across the river on 4th December night.

Fazilka-Suleimanke

The third critical bridge was across the Sutlej at Suleimanke Headworks in Fazilka area. This bridge and an enclave east of the river falls within Pakistan — unlike at Hussainiwala. This provided an excellent ingress route for a Pak offensive. Such an attempt was therefore anticipated by the Army and Indian positions around the Pak enclave had been well prepared and fortified. As expected, Pak 105 Brigade Group launched its offensive against Indian positions on 4 December and captured the bridge over the Sabuna drain. A determined stand was made by the Army to stem further enemy advance and to recapture the lost positions. Called in at this stage, the Air Force did two things, close support with Sukhois from Halwara and Mysteres from Sirsa, and intensive interdiction behind enemy lines along the routes leading to Suleimanke, to stop reinforcements. In fact, an all-out offensive was declared on all road and rail movement from Montgomery upwards, flying near 300 missions. This played an important part in stemming the Pak advance and any likelihood of major Pak break-through along this axis. Like all other Pak offensive actions, their Air Force was brought in at a very early stage, and flew nearly 51 missions before the IAF stepped in. Thereafter, as on cue, PAF disappeared from the scene.

Longewala

The most spectacular achievement of that Air Force was at Longewala in Rajasthan, northwest of Jaisalmer. This operation also proved beyond doubt the much-quoted advantages of air power namely quick reaction time, concentration of force, flexibility, and lethality. The battle was fought with armour on one side and air on the other.

In the preparatory stage, Southern Command, which was responsible for Rajasthan-Gujarat sector, had planned some probing thrusts North of Jaisalmer towards Rahimyar Khan. Four Hunters from Jamnagar had been positioned to support the Army and deal with Pak intrusions if any. On 4 December night, while 12th division was prepared for the northward drive, a squadron of tanks from Pak 18 Division crossed the Indian border from the West and made a dash for Ghotaru-Ramgarh Road, bypassing a small post at Longewala. The noise of Pak tanks was heard and reported by the company commander at Longewala but HQ 12 Division doubted the report. The Pak armour halted short of Ramgarh and turned back, apparently to await a join-up with following troops. This led to another warning from the Longewala post. The next morning the Air Force was brought in to investigate. A recce by two Hunters revealed the incursion by Pak T-59 tanks, which were engaged by the Hunters with guns and rockets. A succession of two aircraft missions followed to seek out and destroy Pak tanks and troops in the area. The task was left entirely to the Air Force without any interference by the PAF. The four Hunters from Jaisalmer launched 17 sorties and destroyed or damaged all the 40 odd tanks. The PAF did not have to apologise for this debacle because the PAF claimed that they had warned the Pak Army that an advance notice was imperative to activate the Jacobabad airfield for air cover in this area.

Naya Chor

While the 12 Division’s proposed thrust to Rahimyar Khan stalled, Southern Command launched a thrust through Gadra towards Naya Chor. Air support was allotted from Uttarlai but, unfortunately, was never fully utilised. From the Pak side, on the other hand, PAF claims to have launched its second largest effort after Shakargarh, flying 150 sorties and claiming it to be the decisive factor in halting Indian advance — a mini reversal of Longewala.

Other Tasks

As per plan, once the opening barrage of counter air strikes against PAF airfields and installation was accomplished, other targets were engaged according to the targeting priorities. These were the energy targets such as Attock oil refinery, Sui gas plant, oil storage tanks at Karachi etc. Considerable damage was done to these installations, which took nearly a year to repair after the hostilities. In any case these attacks certainly inhibited Pakistani war activities. Next came attacks on transportation —trains, marshalling yards, bridges, roads etc. — right from Hyderabad onwards to Lahore and beyond. Pakistan military writers admit the direct effect these had on Pak’s supply and reinforcements to their forward troops.

Good work was done by No 106 Squadron and most of the important target areas were covered. Tactical recce was a different matter. Only the Sukhoi were equipped to carry a single camera under the wing. Even to photograph an area like the Changa Manga Forest, three aircraft had to fly line abreast at 12,000 ft. We also loaded night-photography equipment.

Innovations

There were up a few innovations, which taken to logical conclusion, could have given good dividends. A “Tripod” bomb was devised, which when dropped on runways, taxi tracks or tarmac, would spread steel tripods firmly sticking them to the surface, making them unfit for aircraft operation till they were bulldozed off. Two bombs were dropped. One was on Chunder, and according to an interview given by Air Marshall Rahim Khan, did manage to puncture tires of an aircraft on a take-off run. The Pak C-in-C had wondered why more such bombs we are not dropped. Base Air Defence organisation against low level raids were another innovation which was accepted rather late to be properly practiced and be effective.

Like the IAF, PAF had also concluded that their most important task was offensive support to the Army. In the waiting period, only those tasks which contributed to this aim e.g. air defence and immobilising of the IAF, were to be undertaken. PAF seems to have followed these priorities but without any zeal. One wonders what their performance would have been if Tikka had indeed gone on the offensive.

Result and Analysis

The best is to tabulate the results and let them speak for themselves. However, results of any battle unfortunately depend on statistics compiled after the war. Often the real lessons are forgotten or lost side of. Official archives are not written or if so, are held as top secret. PAF indeed did bring out its history but changed its contents every time to suit the ruling regime. The latest was published in 87 and is an apologia for its indifferent performance in 1971. From IAF side there is only one authentic source, Air Chief Marshal Lal’s book. Unfortunately, even there, a slight discrepancy exists from the information released by AHQ earlier.

There is no doubt that IAF had significant superiority — both quantitative and qualitative. This helped in the East in annihilating PAF elements based there. In the West, however, the results are not so astounding, mainly because both sides seemed to have been waiting for their own ground offensive. Also, in the case of IAF, nearly four Squadrons were kept exclusively for air defence of hinterland. The effective Squadrons left for the combat area were thus about 16 vs PAF’s 13 — not such a big difference. Secondly, the IAF had to disperse these Squadrons at a much larger number of airfields — 14 in the West as against PAFs 6-7. While this did help in cutting down losses on the ground, it also thinned out the force. A point to note is the inordinate large effort devoted to the air defence i.e., 2074 stories by the IAF against a total of 290 counter-air sorties launched by PAF. I have already mentioned the reasons, i.e., lack of continuous radar cover, especially at low levels. Hence wasteful CAPs had to be mounted as a routine. PAF also seemed to have had the same problem.

The next largest chunk on both sides went to offensive air support. Given the priorities, this is understandable. The point to note is that, both quantity-wise and percentage wise, IAF devoted much more than PAF in this roll.

The percentage for counter air was remarkably close on both sides (9.0 vs 9.4). The only difference is that IAF flew larger number of sorties against smaller number of targets — hence more saturation and consequent devastation.

The overall combat sorties rate per day for IAF was more than twice that of PAF. Both sides have indicated that much more could have been put in if the demand arose.

Gains & Losses

It is always difficult to obtain accurate figures of losses/damage inflicted on the enemy. While aircraft losses are comparatively easier to determine, damage to other targets on ground can only be checked by eye witnesses, gun cameras and occasionally by tactical photo recce. As regards PAF aircraft losses, various figures have been quoted which fluctuate between 15 & 82. PAFs overall attrition rate was 2.47, unbearable high to be sustained for long. If aircraft destroyed on ground are not considered, the remaining rate of 1.12 for 100 sorties, is still quite high, considering that PAF aircraft never really stood back to fight.

The IAF lost 56 combat aircraft, of which 21 fell to enemy fighters and 35 to Air Defence artillery. Largest number (29) was lost in offensive support operations, majority to guns and small arms fire. One of the reasons for this was wrong employment directly attributable to lack of understanding of air tactics. Missions like ‘search and destroy’ when applied to seek out entrenched /camouflaged tanks, guns, and troops, not only become futile but also expose the aircraft to all kinds of random fire from ground. Secondly, wrong tactics. In peace time training, undue stress is laid on marksmanship, leading to adaptation off tactics like shallow or medium dives for guns and Rocket Projectiles (RPs). We learned after bitter experience that steep dives, specially where there was no fear of enemy interception by SAMs were safer in close support operations. Curiously PAF came to the same conclusions and went further to abandon Guns R/P combination altogether, in favour of Guns/Bombs.

A world on counter air. Many losses in these operations were not exactly during the actual attacks on Pak VAs & VPs, but during transit and from PAF planes, expertly directed by the low-level organization, enabling pursuit attacks. IAF’s overall attrition rate was 0.86, this was well within sustainable limit of 1.0 and compares well with Israel’s rate of 1.1 in the Yom Kippur War.

Conclusion

The conflict in the West was of a set piece type as stated earlier. Both sides had correctly guessed each other’s intentions. Perhaps, a little boldness or innovation from one side could have paid off handsome dividends. Both Air Forces resolved to give top priority to ground support. This was laudable but without a corresponding major ground offensive, only helped to tie down the aircraft. After the first four days, many of our aircraft were largely idle. With prior knowledge of Army’s plans, these aircraft could have been used to continue counter air operations to cause further damage to PAF.

PAF showed low morale and very little enthusiasm, right from the pre-emptive raids. This could be attributed to Pak politicians’ pursuit of a wrong cause, the secondary position given to the PAF and its weak leadership which led to lack of motivation.

On our side, excellent inter service cooperation existed but there was very little coordination. There was much praise and ‘Shabashi’ (back patting) for each other, but little understanding of each other’s capabilities and even lesser inclination to integrate Air in Army’s operational plans. Air Force was invariably called in after the action started, but never for pre-emptive, softening up strike or diversionary tactics. The Chhamb operation was unfortunate and avoidable. Air is a powerful weapon not only for physical destruction of enemy war machine but even more so, as a potent weapon against enemy’s morale. Air Force should be considered as a partner right from the evaluation of war plans, rather than as a bonus. To this extent more stress needs to be laid on inter-service interaction and training exercises. Junior commanders need to be made aware of capabilities and limitations of each service and of inter-service procedures.

Inadequacy and ineffectiveness of central intelligence agencies has been mentioned by most of the writers on 1971 conflict. Even a major piece of information like strength of Pak forces in the East was not available, leading to significant changes in the Army’s plans. There was also a futile search for Pakistan’s second reserve Armoured Division. It was reported at various times to be between Montgomery, Changa-Manga Forest up to Sialkot. Even whether it was 1 or 6 Division was being debated.

So far as Air Force plans were concerned, full latitude was given to Commands to formulate their own plans and there was no instance of any major interference from above. The problem in the West, however, was that WAC had no advance knowledge of Western Army Command plans, except that it was to be a holding operation.

One important aspect that was missing was a general briefing to the Base and TAC commander, who were given piecemeal information. There was also no systematic information gathering and analysis of events and experience of the combat units, to assess efficacy of the tactical plans and the tactics adopted. There was no daily dissemination of the war situation a sitrep, so to say, to Air Force Commanders in the field. Often, therefore, we did not know what was happening at even the neighbouring stations, nor could benefit from their experiences and innovations.

Inductions of new weapon systems has to be a continuous, ongoing process in peace time. It cannot be done in haste when hostilities become evident. We had known our low-level air defence deficiencies since 1965 conflict, but the 1971 war still found us with same problems. Interestingly, the one-point predominant theme in all Pakistani books on 1971 war is the lack of low-level cover. This explains PAF’s desperate effort to acquire AWACS capability — the only answer to full low-level cover.

Figures of aircraft that fell to ground fire from both sides highlight the effectiveness of AD artillery and small arms fire against low flying aircraft. These would become worse in future with induction of SAMs. For the Air Force therefore, dedicated AD artillery units are a necessity if last minute surprises are to be avoided.

The preparatory period should be utilised in stocking up the inventory with the right type of spares and ordnance stores and in devising tactics relevant to the obtaining circumstances, rather than running around to shop for new systems. For instance, Sukhois could carry S-24 R/Ps which had a tremendous wallop, and which could penetrate concrete bunkers/aircraft shelters. Yet these arrived on the last-but-one day of war. The IR flares for Sukhois, to ward off air-to-air missiles, also did not arrive till late. We lost at least three aircraft to PAF’s Sidewinder missiles. There was also an example of wrong tactics, unwise choice of rockets and shallows glide bombing against entrenched targets.

Our weakness in PR has already been mentioned. While this was so, there was also an instance of an unfair criticism for PR to locate the mysterious Pak reserve Armd Div.

One glaring weakness in IAF’s plans was total lack of electronic warfare (EW) capability. PAF had up their sleeve a fully modified B-57 which, fortunately, was damaged early in a raid on Masrur. PAF did, however, use other Electronic Counter Measures. In the second week of war, one night suddenly our radar screens were dotted with large blips. Three of our stations shot off a total of 9 missiles at these suspicious blips. Aircraft were also scrambled and in the ensuring excitement, there was a sad instance of the No 1 being guided by our radar to intercept and shoot down his own No 2.

The conflict is now two decades old. The specific lessons have no relevance now, since the circumstances and weapons have changed, and the necessary corrective measures have been hopefully taken. However, long term measures like accurate and relevant intelligence, pragmatic planning, timely displacement or modernisation of weapon systems and realistic training, continue to be relevant and must be adopted at the earliest. Next time the enemy may not be as confused, weak-kneed and co-operative.

#This is the text of a talk given to the members of the USI of India on 23 August 1989 and published in the USI Journal.

Air Marshal Chandra Kant Viswanath Gole, PVSM, AVSM (Retd), commissioned in 1949, was a former Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief and Deputy Chief of the Air Staff.

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CLI, No. 626, October-December 2021.
Very useful summary from AM CV Gole(R).
I read that he was tasked by ACM PC. Lal to do an after-action analysis of the air operations in the 1971 war. This talk could be from that.
His last para is still valid.
However, long term measures like accurate and relevant intelligence, pragmatic planning, timely displacement or modernisation of weapon systems and realistic training, continue to be relevant and must be adopted at the earliest.
ramana
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Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

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ramana
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Posts: 59773
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: 1971 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

Post by ramana »

Rohitvats, You might like this:

Other side of Hill- Pak Reorganization and Strategy for War.
Conclusion

The Pakistani strategy of ‘the Defence of the East Lies in the West’ was dependent upon the ‘Main Attack Counter-Offensive’ to capture Bhatinda and then threaten Ludhiana. Whatever may have been the chances of this audacious (or utopian) offensive succeeding, what happened in reality was that this plan could not be implemented because out of the assigned force of 1 Armoured Division and 7 and 33 Infantry Divisions, 33 Division got sucked into other sectors. 33 Division less two brigades was moved to counter the Indian 11 Infantry Division operations in the Chor Sector, one brigade was sent to Pakistan I Corps in response to the battle of Shakargarh (which was actually supposed to have been a small action to fix the Indian 1 Corps) and one brigade was sent to reinforce 18 Division after its debacle at Longewala. With a force which was even before these detachments too weak to carry out the ambitious plan — capture of Bhatinda as per this plan would have involved an almost 130 km ingress into India — the ‘defence in the West’ strategy had no hope of success. The Pakistanis had not catered for the rapid Indian/Mukti Bahini success in East Pakistan. As a result, when the forces in the East surrendered on 16 Dec 1971, the II Corps main attack had not even started. This abortive plan also reportedly led to four PAF squadrons being kept out of active employment as they were meant for the grand strategy of the Main Attack-Counter Offensive9. Far away from the glare of the lightning campaign in Bangladesh and the slogging battles of Chamb and Shakargarh, the sideshow of the Indian 11 Infantry Division in the Munabao-Chor sector and the rash operations of Pakistan’s 18 Infantry Division without air cover at Longewala, sealed the fate of the Counter Offensive and Pakistan’s grand strategy of ‘the Defence of the East lies in the West’.
Importance of Brig Chandpuri's stand at Longewala.
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