Ground Attack by IAF: History and Doctrine

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Rakesh
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Ground Attack by IAF: History and Doctrine

Post by Rakesh »

ramana wrote:Folks, I think we need a volunteer team to gather published data on IAF experiences in ground attacks since the 1948 Kashmir war.
Incidents, weapons, pilot experiences, how the situation has changed?
Kashmir, Congo, Goa, 1965, 1971, Kargil, Balakot.
Should be a solid 100-page plus monograph.
So let us gather the data in a separate thread and get a good writer to tell the story.

Rakesh, Please start a thread.
Thanks, ramana
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Re: Ground Attack by IAF: History and Doctrine

Post by ramana »

I think among modern Airforces, IAF has plenty of experience in ground attacks since the early days of the 1948 Kashmir war.
By ground attack, I mean what is also called close air support or army support.
I include raids on PAF airfields near the border as those are to reduce PAF close air support.
I do not include the bombing raids on Peshawar and Karachi strikes as these are more strategic in objectives.
A lot has been written about air combat and bombing raids. Not much on these ground attack roles.
One of the most important strategic attacks was the raid on the Governors' House in Dacca.

I would like to look at the aircraft, the weaponry, the pilots, and the accounts of actual raids.
And prefer refs to written accounts.

I hope this will serve as both a historical as well as a learning thread.

ramana
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Re: Ground Attack by IAF: History and Doctrine

Post by ramana »

Official History of 1965 war Chapter 9 on IAF

https://www.bharat-rakshak.com/archives ... pter09.pdf
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Re: Ground Attack by IAF: History and Doctrine

Post by Aditya G »

The history of air strikes by IAF is essentially history of the IAF itself. Its a rich history right from Wapitis to 47/48 to 2019.

From an aircraft perspective:
- it is in large portion history of the Canberra jet bomber in service with us. Absolutely legendary strikes including raid on Badin radar.
- Then ofcourse Hunter - recall missions on Pathankot.
- Lastly Mirage-2000

Couple of tweet threads on the subject:

https://twitter.com/Aditya_G_Social/sta ... 0306894849

https://twitter.com/rhinohistorian/stat ... 08160?s=20

https://twitter.com/Aditya_G_Social/sta ... 37856?s=20

https://twitter.com/Aditya_G_Social/sta ... 71077?s=20

my 2 cents
ramana
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Re: Ground Attack by IAF: History and Doctrine

Post by ramana »

Great inputs.
Let's go chronologically to get the ground attack story.
BTW long ago 250lb bombs were acquired for Gnats from Spain.
Those could be the ones mentioned by AM Nambiar?
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Re: Ground Attack by IAF: History and Doctrine

Post by Karan M »

ramana wrote:Great inputs.
Let's go chronologically to get the ground attack story.
BTW long ago 250lb bombs were acquired for Gnats from Spain.
Those could be the ones mentioned by AM Nambiar?
Yes, 250kg iirc as I recall. They were indeed acquired from Spain.
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Re: Ground Attack by IAF: History and Doctrine

Post by ramana »

Air Marshal Tirlochan Singh VrC
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/histo ... #gsc.tab=0

Tank busting in Chamb
Introduction

By the end of 1964 I was back with a Mystere Squadron at Pathankot, No. 3 Squadron ("Cobras") having been equipped from Ouragans to Mysteres to Ouragans and now back to Mysteres. Though grossly underpowered, the Mystere IVA was a powerful anti-armour platform. Carrying two rocket pods of 68mmX38 hollow charged rockets that could only be fired in a salvo. These were carried under the wings but another 55 of this RPs could be carried in the belly in lieu of a 100 gal fuel tank. Once the target was in gun sight it had little chance of escape as the hollow-charged head pierced through the armour plating and exploded inside with catastrophic consequences.

By early 1965, after the Rann of Kutch fiasco, it was obvious that we were heading for a showdown with Pakistan and war clouds loomed large on the horizon. By July, flying activity increased substantially and each of us putting in 2-3 sorties per day on regular basis. No.3 squadron was commanded by Wg Cdr Paul Roby with whom I had served earlier and knew closely.

The Kashmir valley had been closed for operations by combat aircraft I believe sometime after the December 1948 ceasefire. I was therefore quite surprised when the CO (Paul Roby) called me in his office one morning in the third week of August 1965 to say that he and I as his No.2 would fly a two aircraft mission into the valley as a sort of flag showing. We went in at low altitude and flew along the valley, over Srinagar and beyond in wide circles and returned to Pathankot when the fuel hit the bingo figure. I then concluded that things were hotting up indeed. I was only a Flt Lt, not party to briefings at higher level and therefore left to my own surmising. Induction of a Vampire squadron to the base in addition to the two Mystere squadrons already based made matters amply clear. The problem was that the blast pens on the base were just adequate for the Mysteres and the Vampires hence remained parked neatly in a straight line on the main tarmac. Juicy target indeed!

The first day at Chamb

1965 GJ small tension was high from early morning on 1st September 1965. All the aircraft were loaded with the operational rocket pods. Additional qualified Mystere pilots from Training Command were attached and had reported the previous day. I had been flown out to Palam in an Otter at night to fly one night sortie in a Hunter and brought back by early morning and declared night-qualified "fully operational"! We did not have a single night qualified till then. As I have said, tension was running high but nothing was happening -just waiting and marking time- a repeat of what I had gone through at Tezpur with No.29 squadron on Ouragans in 1962. Finally at about 1700hrs, the CO was ordered to report to the ops room with three of his pilots for immediate briefing. Gp Capt Roshan Suri, the station commander painted a grim situation of our army's position at Akhnoor and the Pak armour's thrust at Chhamb on the river Tawi (near Jammu). Maps were quickly marked with the GLO giving the overall operational situation on the Tawi. The plan was to launch 12 Vampires in three formations to open the air attack to be followed by our Mystere formation (4 aircraft) and then one more similar formation led by Wg Cdr Goodman. It did seem very odd that the Vampires had been selected to open the innings!

The take off and navigation to the target area went as planned and in the outbound I saw the last Vampire formation of 4 intact and homeward bound. RT silence precluded any reporting. It was a short trip to the target and as we pulled up from low level, the sight of Patton tanks everywhere was awesome. They were out in the open with no camouflage and all that was needed was to pick the one that an accurate dive angle and tracking time for the gun sight for a certain kill. The problem was all the RPs were fired in a salvo on the first pass but the sight of the tank blowing up was unforgettable - the first time that I fired in anger. I now had only gun ammo to hammer the support soft skinned vehicles but that too for one pass only as the airspace had to be vacated for the following formation behind us.

The feeling on the home leg was that of exhilaration. What an easy turkey shoot! The only thing I could not explain to myself were some black spots whizzing past the cockpit in the dive. Only after landing did I realize that they were machine gun tracers being fired from the tanks at the aircraft. Some of the light ammo caused minor damage to the aircraft skin.

I was in high spirits after what I considered had been a fruitful mission and proceeded straight to the wing ops room for the mission debrief along with the C.O. along with other formation members. On reaching we found the mood somber with general sadness in the air only then did the cause did the cause for it become clear. We had lost 4 Vampires out of the 12 launched, one from the first formation and three from the second, shot down by PAF Sabres. It was obvious that the PAF had left the tactical area earlier either owing to our arrival or lack of fuel that is how the last Vampire formation had survived intact.

The question now was planning for the next days. The Vampire squadron was withdrawn immediately and it was decided to induct a flight of Gnats from No.23 squadron to give top cover to the Mysteres so that we could concentrate entirely on our primary mission of ground attack. Till such time as the Gnats actually made their appearance, we cleaned up the Mysteres for high speed reconnaissance of the battle area. In its clean configuration could easily clock 600 Kts at which speed the Sabers would hardly get into gun firing position.

- A Folland Gnat fighter with a Mystere IVa. Mysteres escorted by Gnats wreaked havoc on the Pakistani army formations in Chamb. These particular aircraft are from Adampur.

The next days, upto 5 September were very satisfactory for our attacks on enemy armour, vehicles and troop concentrations. With Gnats giving top cover, our ground attack missions were highly effective and there are three missions which I recall vividly. The first when I was over the Chhamb area at very low altitude (Under 50ft) and suddenly flew over a Patton tank, too late for an effective attack. I made a wide circuit and came back but by the time I had relocated the tank, I was not settled in the dive. As I closed in to my surprise and satisfaction, saw the crew had abandoned their tank and were running away. I was so close that I could virtually see the terror on their faces. Sure that my target was static, I could take my time for a bullseye as if on a practice firing range. After this tank was blown up. I spotted another in a pond of water that too was a dead duck.

I once got separated from the rest of my formation owing to RT channel error. However two escorting Gants and I were on the correct one and in contact. Hence I decided to carry on alone and found very large numbers of soft skin vehicles near some tanks. After firing the rockets, I went in with my cannon, one short burst each pass to conserve ammo and made about 0-10 such passes till such time as the Gant leader (my course mate Mana Murdeshwar) called to say that they were running very low on fuel, and so made a quick last pass, really satisfying to see the vehicles brewing up one after another.


On the night of 5th September 1965, at about midnight, I was in the ops room awaiting target allocation for the next morning, a signal arrived to state that the Indian Army was opening up the whole western front in Punjab and Rajasthan to relive pressure on the Jammu front the following morning, 6th September 1965. Very strangely, the same signal also ordered that enemy airfields were not to be attacked. It was hard to understand such a decision and I was certain that no such restraint would be exercised by the P.A.F. so early next morning I bundled off my family for safety to Delhi by road, ready for an all out war. Full attention would be focused on planning and operational flying in the war ahead.

September 6th : Raid on Pathankot

As expected. Pathankot got full attention of the PAF on 6th September evening. I was leading a four aircraft formation and had just touched down when I heard a voice on RT informing ATC that the radar unit at Amritsar was reporting a large formation of aircraft from the west heading towards Pathankot. Fg Offr Mike McMahon who had been launched in his Mystere to become the voice link between Amritsar radar and Pathankot ATC as all landlines were unreliable. My two Gnat escorts had landed first as they were low on fuel.

At the end of my landing run, I taxied to the designated blast pen and an airman placed the ladder and came up to take my helmet and assist in unstrapping. Just then I looked up to see what seemed like 8 Sabres positioning themselves to dive on our aircraft parked in the open. I too was parked in the open just outside the blast pen, and was sure I would get some attention from the PAF. I saw a Sabre diving towards me at a range of about 800mts but not fully settled and still banking for alignment. My first reaction was to push my airman off the ladder to save him somewhat and the to sit tight in the cockpit hoping that the unsettled dive of the attacking aircraft would make him miss. And that is what actually happened; his 6 x 0.5 bullets sprayed the ground from about 10ft in front kicking up a lot of debris but recording not hits on my aircraft. As he passed overhead, I jumped down without the ladder and ran to the nearest bunker to helplessly watch the attacks.

The Sabres continued their attack for about 7-8 minutes and I could see aircraft fires all around. There was some sporadic ack-ack firing by our guns but to no effect and then the attackers set course westwards. I stood up to take stock, with thick clouds of black smoke all around and the odd cannon shells and rockets going off owing to the heat of the fire. The final count of our losses: 5 Mysteres, 2 MIG-21, 2 Gnats (my escorts) and one packet transport aircraft. What a Tally!.

That night as the moon came out to provide minimum light conditions PAF B-57 bombers started their runs, one aircraft at a time but at regular intervals. The damage caused was not significant, except we could not get much sleep, shunting between our beds and the trenches. From 7th September onwards, No.3 squadron continued with close support and anti armour missions but were not assigned the task of attacking PAF airfields which was left to the Mysteres and Hunters from Adampur and Halwara.


It was on 8th September that I carried out what turned out to be a very successful mission. In an attack north of Lahore against artillery positions, I was about to release my RPs when I saw a well camouflaged cluster of tents and what looked to be an important headquarters of an army formation. I called off that attack and made a wide circuit for a second pass, giving enough time to reacquire the camouflaged headquarters and make an accurate strike. The whole camp blew up spectacularly. When I reported to the ops room, it was confirmed from radio intercepts that this PAK army formation had suffered a major blow, whether it was Division or Brigade headquarters. There were no further PAF day fighter strikes on Pathankot after the one on 6th September but the B-57 came every evening, his raid time determined by the moon rise. Accordingly I fell into a routine of being already in a comfortable trench with a bottle of beer and my transistor radio. Listening to the progress of the war on All India Radio. I was in this trench on the night of 10th September that I heard of gallantry award winners, my name included! I was not aware that I had been recommended for a VrC. The others in our squadron awarded were Wg Cdr S.Bhattacharya, the new C.O. and Flt Lt Doriaswamy. I felt that I had made my contribution to the war effort, having flown the maximum number of missions in No.3 squadron besides being actively involved in the planning of many more.
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Re: Ground Attack by IAF: History and Doctrine

Post by Barath »

ramana wrote: what is also called close air support or army support.
I include riads on PAF airfields near the border as those are to reduce PAF close air support.
ramana ji -

Just a level setting:

You have close air support, where your friendly forces/ground forces are close to the target being bombed and deep air support or air interdiction, where your friendly forces/ground forces are far away.

Both can include support for army - stopping the enemy from marshaling his forces deep behind the frontline can be pretty important too. You can kill hundreds in their camps,, destroy ammunition dumps etc (more tactical DAS). destroying a bridge or railway head that stops enemy from getting there or destroy ball bearing factories

Then you have strategic bombing/sead/dead etc. Did you want to have folks classify as above as you collect ?

----

IAF itself includes history even pre-independence

In 1948, it talks about Spitfires and Tempests providing support at various points,
On 30 October, the first Spitfires from the Advanced Flying School at Ambala reached Srinagar and were soon engaged in strafing the raiders beyond Pattan. Within a week, the Tempests of No. 7 Squadron were playing a decisive role in the battle of Shelatang which halted the forward momentum of the insurgents.
https://theprint.in/opinion/crucial-rol ... ar/140390/

Has some of the details

I have also always enjoyed some of the accounts on BR IAF history page.

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/histo ... #gsc.tab=0

Wg Cdr Mathur's account has elan http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/histo ... #gsc.tab=0
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Re: Ground Attack by IAF: History and Doctrine

Post by ramana »

URL: https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/featu ... sta-325615

Flying Maha Virs


Image
by Sujan Dutta

THEY used to say he saw better blindfolded. Squadron Leader Madhabendra Banerji was among the first batch of pilots from the Indian Air Force trained in the Sukhoi-7 fighter bomber in the then Soviet Russia. “There is nothing as good as total darkness for navigation. Try being a blind person and you will know,” Banerji recalled his instructor telling him, two years before the 1971 war. (Source: Anchit Gupta/bharat-rakshak.com)

As Squadron Leader (later Air Vice Marshal), Banerji was based in Adampur, close to and north-east of Jalandhar. He was flying bombing missions for close air support to the land battles in the Shakargarh sector.

The many battles in the Shakargarh bulge, in part a consequence of a change in the role of an Army formation from an offensive to a defensive strategy, often blurred lines for both the land and the air force. The Army often called for close air support that was tasked to Banerji’s squadron (among others).

Image

Air Chief Marshal PC Lal, the Chief of Air Staff in 1971, writes in his book (‘My Years in the IAF’) about the operations over Shakargarh that “although adequate air effort was available, the right kind of targets were not identified. The Sukhois were large aircraft that could be spotted from a great distance and despite packing quite a punch, whenever they delivered rockets against Pakistani armour, they proved to be quite vulnerable to ack-ack (anti-aircraft) guns and came out second-best when engaged by PAF F-86 Sabres and F-6s in aerial combat, losing three aircraft in battle.” At another point, he reports pilots telling him that the situation in Shakargarh was so confusing “that it is difficult to distinguish between friend and foe”.

In his own squadron, the 101 Falcons, where he was the flight commander, Banerji experienced the vulnerability his Air Chief later wrote about. One of his pilots was shot down over no-man’s land. The pilot ejected, broke a leg, but limped to a sparse forest to hide. Hours later, a 1-tonne with soldiers came to him, each side unsure whether he was friend or foe. The soldiers turned out to be Indian. The Captain leading them verified this by asking him for passwords. The pilot was transported to Adampur first, where Banerji met him, before he was sent onward to be hospitalised in Delhi.

Image

Banerji’s own attempts to initiate night-flying with the Su-7 got mixed responses from Air Headquarters at first. :?: But he did fly late in the night/early in the morning of December 4, hours after Pakistani aircraft had attacked Indian airbases and war was formally declared. Strangely, the Su-7 flew most of its missions in daylight.

{Nothing strange as identifying friend or foe is difficult as mentioned above}

“When war happens, human behaviour changes,” he would often repeat to his trainees when he was an instructor. Banerji acknowledged later that implementing night-flying drills was quite a task.

“In the coming months, the letter from Air Headquarters came clearing one squadron in each command to do the night-flying syllabus. The Command gave the task to 26 Squadron, but the squadron did not have their heart in it and did not really utilise the opportunity to its potential, resulting in suboptimal results.

“My CO in 101 Squadron, KC Khanna, got the go-ahead from WAC (Western Air Command), and he gave the task to me. We started the task and had initial difficulties, but slowly we started to make it work. While we could not get the entire squadron operational, but most of the senior pilots had got operational. Simultaneously, TACDE (Tactics and Combat Development Establishment) was formed and moved to Adampur and they were actively testing out night flying too. Sure enough, as soon as the war began, TACDE put in night flying to full use and they were the only force to reach Sargodha and were effective.”


His MVC citation reads:

“Squadron Leader M Banerji, a senior pilot in a fighter bomber squadron, led no fewer than 14 missions within the first week of the conflict with Pakistan against enemy targets, most of them in support of our Army in the Chhamb battles. During these missions, Squadron Leader Banerji destroyed two enemy tanks and two guns. On these occasions, Squadron Leader Banerji was personally responsible for attacking the enemy in the face of heavy ground fire, thus relieving pressure on our own troops. Squadron Leader Banerji displayed conspicuous gallantry and skill in repeatedly attacking enemy forces in the face of extremely heavy ground fire.”

Banerji and his senior from a different squadron, Wing Commander Allan Albert D’Costa, were among the first pilots to be trained in the Sukhoi-7 and were required to train others. D’Costa was in fact the leader of the first batch that was trained in (erstwhile) Soviet Russia in 1968.


Wing Commander (later Group Captain) D’Costa was the officer designated to induct the Sukhoi-7 aircraft into the Indian Air Force, a new acquisition.

For months before the outbreak of the war, D’Costa was priming both the aircraft that were being flown from Russia to India and training the flying and the ground crew. The day after the formal outbreak of hostilities, he flew a low-level photo recce over Pakistan’s Walton airfield and located the radar unit. He conducted repeated strikes over Risalwala and Chander airfields and took out three tanks in Christian Mandi.

Lal wrote in his book: “No.222 (Tigersharks) Squadron led by Wing Commander D’Costa flew against the airfield at Risalwala near Lyallpur on December 4 (from Halwara) in the morning and later gave close support at Sulaimanke and further north along the river at Hussainiwala and Dera Baba Nanak and Narowal in the Shakargarh Bulge.”

His MVC citation reads:

“On December 4, 1971, Wing Commander AA D’Costa, the commanding officer of a fighter bomber squadron, was the first to strike at the enemy’s Risalwala airfield. Next day he led a mission to Christian Mandi and destroyed three tanks. The following day he led an attack on a concentration of tanks at Dera Baba Nanak, notwithstanding intense anti-aircraft fire. On December 7, he carried out a low-level photographic reconnaissance mission in the Sulaimanke area. He followed this up by leading an attack on the same day on the railway station at Narowal, where he personally destroyed and damaged many railway wagons and some installations. Thereafter, he flew a number of reconnaissance missions, bringing back a large volume of intelligence and other missions against railway marshalling yards and Raiwind and the Kasur-Lahore railway track, destroying a large number of wagons and causing devastation at each target in the face of intense anti-aircraft fire, and against Pakistani air opposition. Throughout the operations, Wing Commander D’Costa displayed conspicuous gallantry, determination, leadership and professional skill.”
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Re: Ground Attack by IAF: History and Doctrine

Post by Haridas »

Love this attack fighter.

Saw it first in 1972 static air show in Lohegaon/Poona, it's cost of 97 Lakh rupees was painted on its nose, as a treadition. IIRC Mig21 cost was 57 Lakh.

8 yrs later at AF Station Hindon, has 2 Su7 squadrons. My father in law was in 222 Sqn.

The Kendriya Vidyalaya at Hindon was located adjoining SU7 building. When its engine were ground tested, all teaching would come to halt.

IIRC it's 22,000 Lb thrust engine is and was the biggest baddest individual engine of all fighters in IAF. Same class as the beast SU30 s AL31 at 27,000 Lb thrust.

At Air power demonstration the SU7 will always show up as determined high speed aggressors

Sturdy ship...

Image
Image
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Re: Ground Attack by IAF: History and Doctrine

Post by nachiket »

Haridas wrote:
Love this attack fighter.

IIRC it's 22,000 Lb thrust engine is and was the biggest baddest individual engine of all fighters in IAF. Same class as the beast SU30 s AL31 at 27,000 Lb thrust.
The Tumansky R-29 on the Mig-23 and 27 was bigger and badder I believe. The M2k's M53-P2 is slightly more powerful as well.
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Re: Ground Attack by IAF: History and Doctrine

Post by ramana »

When google is there why post beliefs?
Besides context is Haridas is talking about the planes in 1971.
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Re: Ground Attack by IAF: History and Doctrine

Post by Kersi »

The 1965 war.
I hope we have not forgotten Sqdn Leader Devayya who shot down a F 104, circumstantial evidence. He got MVC in late 1980s
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Re: Ground Attack by IAF: History and Doctrine

Post by Kersi »

1971 war.
A SU 7 piloted by Sqdn Leader Mangat returned after a sortie, very badly shot up. Any pics ?
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Re: Ground Attack by IAF: History and Doctrine

Post by Kersi »

I wonder if any of us have seen any of the 1965 war aircraft like Vampire, Ouragan, Mystere, SU 7, Mi 4, Caribou, Otter ? I have seen only the Ouragn at the college, aeronautical dept
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Re: Ground Attack by IAF: History and Doctrine

Post by Kersi »

I wonder if any of us have seen any of the 1965 war aircraft like Vampire, Ouragan, Mystere, SU 7, Mi 4, Caribou, Otter ? I have seen only the Ouragn at the college, aeronautical dept
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Re: Ground Attack by IAF: History and Doctrine

Post by ramana »

Kersi wrote:1971 war.
A SU 7 piloted by Sqdn Leader Mangat returned after a sortie, very badly shot up. Any pics ?
I have seen it in IAF museum.
Let me ask around.
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Re: Ground Attack by IAF: History and Doctrine

Post by Kersi »

ramana wrote:
Kersi wrote:1971 war.
A SU 7 piloted by Sqdn Leader Mangat returned after a sortie, very badly shot up. Any pics ?
I have seen it in IAF museum.
Let me ask around.
WOW.
Is it in the same battered condition ? Pics ?
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Re: Ground Attack by IAF: History and Doctrine

Post by g.chaks »

WOW.
Is it in the same battered condition ? Pics ?[/quote]

Yes, almost in the same battered condition, but painted over with "Mangat" written in Hindi and unit logos of the Su7 squadrons operating in the '71 war also painted.

Pasting here the link to the photo as putting the picture might be a copyright violation.

https://www.airliners.net/photo/India-A ... MK/2642494
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Re: Ground Attack by IAF: History and Doctrine

Post by Kersi »

g.chaks wrote:
WOW.
Is it in the same battered condition ? Pics ?

Yes, almost in the same battered condition, but painted over with "Mangat" written in Hindi and unit logos of the Su7 squadrons operating in the '71 war also painted.

Pasting here the link to the photo as putting the picture might be a copyright violation.

https://www.airliners.net/photo/India-A ... MK/2642494[/quote]

THANKS
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