Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 31 March 2005

arun
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Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 31 March 2005

Postby arun » 31 Mar 2005 07:10

Old thread in Nuclear Issues Archive.


The Middleman
A Special Investigation
Asher Karni was “a genius” in South Africa’s military electronics trade. Now he's in jail in Brooklyn, accused of orchestrating a nuclear black market deal.

Mark Schapiro
March 30 , 2005

This story, which will appear in the May/June issue of Mother Jones magazine, comes out of an investigation jointly sponsored by Mother Jones, the Center for Investigative Reporting and the PBS series FRONTLINE/World. View video clips of interviews with key players in the story at FRONTLINE/World's website.

On New Year’s Day 2004, conditions in the Rocky Mountains seemed ideal for the ski vacation that Asher Karni had long anticipated. Fresh snowfall had slowed Denver to a cool calm, and the mountain resorts were bursting with record-breaking crowds. Karni, a 50-year-old, Hungarian-born Israeli and South African businessman, planned on staying in the area for three weeks, according to the dates on his airline tickets, but he never made it to the slopes. As he stepped off the plane with his wife and a teenage daughter at Denver International Airport, U.S. Customs agents arrested him on charges of violating American export laws. Specifically, he was accused of exporting, without the proper license, quantities of a device known as a triggered spark gap.

Triggered spark gaps are unremarkable in appearance—each is a cylinder set atop a four-inch-square black box—and small enough to fit in the pocket of a raincoat. They emit an intense electrical pulse whose timing and duration are controlled to the microsecond. Hospitals use the devices to power lithotripters, which deliver an electrical punch that pounds kidney stones to dust so they can be expelled from the body. That, however, is not their only function. Installed into an enriched uranium casing, a triggered spark gap can ignite a nuclear explosion. Karni, according to the Justice Department, was in the middle of a deal exporting 200 of the devices to a buyer who might use them for just such a purpose. The buyer was Humayun Khan, an Islamabad businessman with close ties to Pakistan’s military and who has been linked by U.S. government officals to militant Islamic groups, some of which are suspected to be arming fighters in the Kashmiri conflict.

According to Justice Department spokesman Channing Phillips, the U.S. government is now pursuing leads “in several countries” as it attempts to track the extent and nature of Karni’s business dealings. But in March, anonymous law enforcement officials complained to the Los Angeles Times that the State Department—afraid of offending Pakistan, its partner in the war on terror—had blocked agents from the Commerce and Homeland Security departments from pursuing those leads and going to Pakistan to interview Khan and others. A federal judge sealed records in the Karni case last September. But legal documents obtained before then indicate that his transactions reached, tentaclelike, in two directions from the headquarters of his company, Top-Cape Technologies. One tentacle extended from Cape Town through a broker in Secaucus, New Jersey, to the Salem, Massachusetts, laboratories of PerkinElmer Optoelectronics, a high-technology firm that is one of the world’s few manufacturers of triggered spark gaps. The other tentacle extended from Cape Town through Dubai to Islamabad, into the recesses of one of the world’s most dangerous black markets, the international traffic in “dual-use” nuclear technology.

Dual-use items are those, like triggered spark gaps, that are under export restrictions because they have both peaceful and weapons applications. The U.S. Commerce Department subjects these products to varying degrees of licensing and other controls, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) observes their trade as a way of discerning if an illicit nuclear program is under way. The suspect roster includes about 3,000 products, from accelerometers (which can be employed as a guidance system for missiles) to zirconium alloy tubes (which are used in uranium-enriching centrifuges).

Aside from actual uranium and other radioactive material, triggered spark gaps—number 2,641 on the control list—are among the most tightly restricted items in the world. Producing countries like the United States permit them to be shipped to nonnuclear countries like South Africa without a license, but for countries like Pakistan and India, “rogue” nuclear powers outside the existing nonproliferation system, shippers must request an export license. Triggered spark gaps can’t survive a nuclear blast, but when installed in lithotripters, they can fire hundreds of thousands of times, so the demand for new ones is not great. In the 1990s, when the Iraqi Health Ministry requested small numbers of the devices for use in several hospitals, the IAEA confirmed the proper use of every one of them. “The only way for the Iraqis to get a new trigger,” says Mark Gwozdecky, an IAEA spokesman in Vienna, “was to send back the one they used.” The surveillance system worked, he said, and the agency is confident that none were diverted to nonmedical purposes.

Critics of the current patchwork of nonproliferation agreements complain that the system lacks teeth. “None of the regimes are legally binding,” says Seema Gahlaut, a senior research associate at the Center for International Trade and Security (CITS) at the University of Georgia, which completed a survey of the nonproliferation system last fall. “They are more like gentlemen’s agreements, based on each member country’s discretion.” The system is also stymied by a reporting loophole. The Nuclear Suppliers Group, an international coalition to which the United States belongs, asks that its members report export requests for dual-use items that have been denied. But it doesn’t require the reporting of export requests that have been approved. According to the Government Accountability Office, in a report to Congress in 2002, some 45 to 65 percent of denials are never reported. CITS claims that those numbers have changed little over the past three years. That, says Gwozdecky, seriously hobbles the agency’s ability to track “which nations are seeking—even unsuccessfully—technology with potential nuclear application.”

But the main weakness in the oversight is the central feature of the dual-use economy: the overlapping imperatives of commerce and international security. The global trade in parts for nuclear weapons is, for the most part, not conducted through secret espionage channels or along smugglers’ routes. It’s accomplished through straight-ahead business deals between companies operating in the open, trading in the vast commercial gray zone of dual use. The trade is hard to follow and harder still to regulate. The Commerce Department’s control list comprises some 3 percent of all commodities exported from the United States, giving industry a powerful incentive to resist strengthened restrictions.

Ultimately, Karni was tripped up not by the system, but by an odd bit of serendipity: a mysterious individual who, starting in the summer of 2003, guided investigators along Karni’s labyrinthine trail. The government’s complaint against Karni is peppered with references to the “anonymous source in South Africa” who clued them in to the “possible diversion of U.S. origin equipment.”

Gahlaut says, “I believe there’s a fifty-fifty chance the Karni deals would never have been discovered if it had not been for that anonymous tipster.” In other words, Top-Cape’s blizzard of false end-user certificates, misleading shipping manifests, and concocted usage rationales might have worked, and a shipment of weaponry-capable spark gap triggers might have proceeded unquestioned from Salem, Massachusetts, all the way to Islamabad.

And Karni might have become the latest middleman in a long-simmering chapter of the nuclear arms race.



The deal that allegedly put Karni’s fingerprints on Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions was pieced together in a mansion in the lush Cape Town neighborhood of Sea Point. The tree-lined enclave—locally referred to, not always fondly, as “Millionaires’ Row”—is among the most exclusive in the city. The mansion, rising three stories behind a cream-colored stucco wall on Ocean View Drive, belongs to Asher Karni.

For almost two decades, Karni had thrived in Cape Town. In 1985, he resigned his major’s commission with the Israeli army and emigrated to South Africa to work for a Jewish charity serving the Orthodox community in Cape Town. Karni’s first four years in the country were spent educating Jewish youth and encouraging them to relocate to Israel, according to an article the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz published shortly after his arrest. He became a respected member of the Beit Midrash congregation, teaching Torah at the synagogue and conducting services when Rabbi Jonathan Altman was out of town. “He is a thoroughly honest, hardworking and responsible person,” South Africa’s chief rabbi, C.K. Harris, wrote to the court after Karni’s arrest. “He enjoys a very good reputation in the Cape Town community, both Jewish and general.”

In 1989, Karni left his official religious duties to take a job with Eagle Technology, a firm owned and run by one of Cape Town’s leading families, Alan and Diana Bearman and their son, Nathan. With an M.B.A. from an Israeli university, and his military background, Karni was a good fit for the job. Eagle Technology has a storefront off Green Market Square in downtown Cape Town, where it sells to the public high-tech spying devices like surveillance video systems and recording machines; an adjacent outlet, Eagle Appliances, sells espresso makers, electric radiators, and other consumer electronics. But the real action goes on upstairs, where Eagle plies a more serious trade. It specializes in obtaining sophisticated electronic, optical, and other sensitive equipment, originally for the South African military during the long years of the country’s apartheid government, and now for a wide variety of clients in the “new” South Africa. These items became Karni’s specialty.

When Karni joined the company, South Africa’s apartheid government was operating under severe international sanctions, making the country a smugglers’ paradise. Everything from rifles to ammunition to missile casings had to be obtained on the black market. Importers learned the circumlocutions necessary to evade foreign prohibitions on exports to South Africa.

“We had a government then of vipers,” says Michael Bagraim, a Cape Town attorney who would play a large role in Karni’s fate, “and companies did what they had to in order to obtain equipment for the military.” Eagle had no connection to the country’s illicit nuclear program; its work was exclusively for the conventional armed forces. But with the blanket sanctions then in place, buying even conventional ordnance required guile. “Anyone procuring those kinds of technologies would have had to be familiar with all kinds of clandestine sources and networks,” says Jean du Preez, who served on South Africa’s Nonproliferation Council in the 1990s and is currently director of the International Organizations and Nonproliferation Program at the Monterey Institute of International Studies.

Then, in 1991, Nelson Mandela was released from prison on Robben Island and Eagle and similar companies found their universe turned upside down. South Africa held its first democratic elections in 1994 and, with Mandela as president, joined the world community. International sanctions were lifted. Eagle Technology, accustomed to life in the shadows, was suddenly operating in the open, governed by laws of transparency that would be the envy of any Western democracy.

Within the company, Karni was, according to his colleagues, a superior executive. He’d taught himself the basics of electrical engineering and developed a familiarity with the worldwide manufacturers of sophisticated electronic technology. He rose to be the company’s top purchasing officer, bringing in as much as $100,000 a month in new orders from companies in the United States, Europe, and Israel. He, like the rest of the company’s top executives, flourished. His salary and commissions amounted to about $10,000 a month, according to his employment records. He mingled with the Cape Town elite and lived in Sea Point with his wife and three daughters in a house provided by the company, rent free.


Asher Karni in a Denver Police Department mugshot
Karni’s extraordinary slide from those heights to a cell in the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, where he is now incarcerated, began in the fall of 2001, when his coworkers at Eagle began to sense something amiss. Karni seemed distracted, heading off for meetings without explanation and spending a lot of time apparently working but without the results the company was accustomed to seeing. Given the sensitivity of Eagle’s line of work, such behavior elicited suspicion. The company hired a private detective.

The detective’s findings alarmed Eagle’s managers: Karni was leaving work in the middle of the day to meet a recently fired executive secretary of the company, the 36-year-old, American-born Marisa Kirsh. Kirsh, the company discovered, was on the lam from the United States, which she had fled in 1996 with her then 10-year-old son in violation of a joint custody order with her former husband. She’d left a trail of arrest warrants and missing-person alerts in South Carolina and Texas. Eagle subsequently discovered that Karni had helped Kirsh set up a trading company, which was importing from some of Eagle’s own overseas clients and underbidding Eagle’s prices. Furthermore, an independent company that Karni had created, Top-Cape Technologies, was contacting those clients and supplying assistance to Kirsh. Karni’s email traffic revealed odd behavior: He’d send messages from his office at Eagle to his Top-Cape address, then delete them from his office computer. By October 2002, the company had a dossier of Karni’s outside deals, and had evidence he was competing with Eagle’s own import business. There were hints he was depositing some of the profits from his sales in offshore accounts. His deals had the potential to tarnish the company’s good standing inside South Africa. Alan Bearman, Eagle’s chief executive, confronted Karni, accused him of being in competition with his employer, and fired him.

Karni did not seem unduly damaged by this professional setback, at least judging by his living conditions. He moved his family out of their Eagle-supplied house and into the much grander Sea Point mansion on Ocean View Drive.

Had the matter rested there, Karni very likely would have remained just one more ordinary (albeit self-employed) executive in Cape Town—a nonentity, certainly, from the point of view of American law enforcement, and anonymous to the world. But Karni made a fateful misstep: He challenged his firing. As attorney Bagraim explains: “Up to that point, nobody really cared what it was that Karni was actually selling. But rather than just packing up and moving on, he disputed the grounds for his dismissal. And that’s where I got involved.”

Michael Bagraim is sturdily built, articulate, and gregarious; he has the wiliness of a lawyer, and the outgoing ease of a politician—which he is, in a way. As chairman of the South African Jewish Board of Deputies, the largest Jewish organization in the country, he represents the community’s political, economic, and cultural interests in Parliament. He’s also one of the country’s leading practitioners of labor law, representing some of South Africa’s most prominent companies. Early in his practice, Bagraim defended individuals wrongfully dismissed by employers, who in those days needed little rationale to get rid of unwanted workers. This role, too, was upended by the collapse of apartheid. In 1995, South Africa’s democratic government passed the Labour Relations Act, intended to reverse the extreme discrimination and abuse tolerated by the old regime, and established a new body to mediate labor disputes: the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration, or CCMA. Bagraim now found himself going before the CCMA to defend companies hit with wrongful-dismissal claims by fired employees. Karni, being white, white-collar, and wealthy, was atypical of CCMA claimants. (The crowd camped on folding chairs awaiting interviews with counselors when I visited the CCMA offices in March was overwhelmingly black and Indian, and working class.) When Karni decided to contest the grounds for his dismissal, Eagle Technology turned to Bagraim.

The hearing commenced in late September 2003. Karni’s attorney, Peter Kantor, argued that his client had done little more than assist a friend in establishing her business, and that Eagle’s desire to get rid of him was prompted by Karni’s own complaints about commissions he claimed the company owed him. The proceedings concluded in early October, after Bagraim had cross-examined Karni for four days, with a settlement in which Karni withdrew his demand for a year’s back salary, and the company apologized for any distress his firing might have caused.

His distress was just beginning.



The antagonism the labor dispute had engendered between Karni and the Bearmans had forced open the portals to Karni’s business deals through Top-Cape. Those dealings had been venturing into increasingly dangerous terrain since Karni’s firing. Throughout the summer of 2003, as Karni prepared to face Eagle in the hearing room, he was simultaneously negotiating with Pakistani contacts to cement a deal to supply them with triggered spark gaps. The negotiations were not as private as Karni presumed.

Even as Michael Bagraim was amassing evidence of past misbehavior, including reams of old emails pried from Karni’s Eagle Technology computer, Karni’s current email correspondence to and from Top-Cape was being intercepted, and those emails spelled out an ongoing plot with sinister ramifications. In July and August, some individual who was surveying Karni’s every step—the “anonymous tipster”—began feeding the plot’s details to the U.S. Commerce Department’s Office of Export Enforcement.

Few people around Karni had access to that information, yet the identity of the tipster is still a mystery. Was it the police? The Bearman family? (Alan Bearman refused a request for an on-the-record interview while I was in Cape Town.) Or was it someone else at Eagle with the technical expertise to eavesdrop on email traffic? Certainly, Eagle would derive double benefit from Karni’s demise—removing a competitor from the field and redressing a perceived personal and professional betrayal. In addition to the benefit of interrupting a nuclear caper. “I’d like to think it was Eagle,” Bagraim told me, “because it would have been the right thing to do.” He added, “It wasn’t me.”

The source informed the agents that Karni was attempting to purchase “between one hundred and four hundred triggered spark gaps… from PerkinElmer…of Salem, Massachusetts,” with the intention of diverting those items to Pakistan. The tips kept coming, alerting the Commerce Department to Karni’s every move through the fall of 2003.That same fall, Pakistan was about to capture the world’s attention as the most rampantly metastasizing nuclear power. On October 4, 2003, a German freighter, the BBC China, was intercepted in the Mediterranean by U.S., Italian, and British agents. In its hold, they found uranium-enrichment facility parts destined for Libya. The deal had been arranged by A.Q. Khan, the creator of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb. The discovery blew the lid off Khan’s global enterprise, in which he was marketing sophisticated nuclear technology to Libya, Iran, and other nations. The trail, as it happens, also led investigators to South Africa, where they discovered that Khan had ordered a turnkey enrichment facility, to be built on the outskirts of Johannesburg, for export directly to Libya. The South African businessmen involved, Gerhard Wisser and Daniel Geiges, are now awaiting trial in Johannesburg.

The plot the Americans were uncovering through Karni’s email was operating through separate channels from A.Q. Khan’s nuclear arms bazaar; Karni’s buyer was most likely part of Pakistan’s own military-procurement effort. The customer was Humayun Khan (no relation), owner of an Islamabad-based firm called Pakland that has long been one of the suppliers to Pakistan’s conventional and nuclear weapons programs. As a Pakistani company, Pakland could purchase some products on the U.S. control list after obtaining a proper export license from the Commerce Department. A license for 200 triggered spark gaps would almost certainly have been denied had it been requested. As Jacob Blackford, a research analyst at the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) in Washington, D.C., puts it: “In terms of dual-use technology, those triggers are very threatening because you can directly use them in a weapon. They’re a component in a weapon, like enriched uranium, and Pakistan already has enriched uranium. At the end of the day, you need both to set off a bomb.”

For an international buyer shopping for spark gaps, South Africa is well positioned as a middleman, thanks to its unique nuclear history, and thanks to its recent political ascendancy. It has progressed from a country so suspect that its military procurers were experts in avoiding export controls to one currently so clean it is not restricted from importing sensitive technologies. South Africa decommissioned its nuclear arsenal in 1989; now the United States places no special controls over exports to the country. Triggered spark gaps can be exported there for medical uses without the license that would be required for nuclear powers like Pakistan. Karni’s deal would illuminate a black hole in the current nonproliferation regime: Because South Africa does not itself produce triggers, there is no law prohibiting their export from that country.

“While attention was focused on the vulnerabilities of Russian and other nuclear facilities, a nuclear black market in dual-use machinery was evolving in South Africa,” says David Albright, president of ISIS. Wisser and Geiges, it turned out, had ties to South Africa’s own illicit efforts to build an atomic bomb, just as Karni had experience in apartheid-era technology trading.



In the summer of 2003, Karni, judging from his correspondence, was engaged in arranging an elaborate chain of transactions to move a large number of triggers to Pakistan.

June 11: Karni, in Cape Town, receives a fax from a company called Polytec, the French subsidiary of PerkinElmer, stating that he will need an export license from the United States to fill his order for spark gaps.
June 12: Karni emails Humayun Khan in Islamabad, forwarding the Polytec letter and declining to pursue the deal.
June 17: Karni receives Khan’s reply: “I know it is difficult but that’s why we came to know each other, please help to renegotiate this from any other source. We can give you an end user information as it is genuinely medical requirement.”
Nine hours later: Karni sends a two-word response: “WILL DO.”

Karni arranged the deal through a U.S. intermediary in Secaucus, Giza Technologies, who placed the order from within the United States and arranged to have the devices sent to South Africa in three shipments of 66 or 67 triggers each. Karni’s office informed Giza that the end user would be Baragwanath Hospital in Soweto, the biggest public hospital in Africa. But there was no correspondence indicating that the hospital had expressed the slightest interest in triggered spark gaps. In March, Dr. Lloyd Thompson, a urologist there, told me that the hospital has only one lithotripter in its operating theater. That one, its first, was purchased in November 2004. Hospital authorities said they had no idea who Asher Karni was, and had never purchased anything from him. At any rate, hospitals don’t normally order the devices by the hundreds. According to Daniel Sutherby, spokesman for PerkinElmer, the most common quantity requested is five or six. (On Giza's part, Zeki Bilman, the company's president, told me through a spokesperson: "We have been cleared, we have no comment.")

August 11: Email from Karni to Humayun Khan affirming that “all is in place” for the shipment of 200 triggered spark gaps.
October 6: First shipment of 66 triggers arrives in Cape Town by DHL.
October 21: Same triggers arrive in Islamabad via Dubai, by DHL, from Cape Town.

What neither Karni nor Humayun Khan knew was that the triggers just received by Pakland were utterly useless for any purpose, peaceful or warlike. As part of a sting operation orchestrated out of the Commerce Department, they had been rendered inoperable by PerkinElmer, which agreed to go through with the transactions Karni requested, using disabled triggers. Karni’s deal had been tracked every step of the way; now the authorities were ready to close the net.

December 11: A team of investigators from the Crimes Against the State division of the South African Police Service, accompanied by U.S. investigators, descends on Karni’s home office at Ocean View Drive.

As Karni watched, the police went upstairs to his Top-Cape office and carted away more reams of computer records and files. He called his attorney, Peter Kantor, and several days later paid him a visit. Kantor, who works out of his home in the leafy Cape Town suburb of Rondebosch, had no sense that his client felt he was in deep trouble, or was anxious about his upcoming trip to Colorado. He recounts that Karni never told his wife about the police raid of their home until after his arrest. “I sat across from him at this table,” Kantor told me as we sat in his study, its wall lined with law books and its door opening onto a tree-shaded yard. “He didn’t seem concerned, and I said, almost flippantly, ‘Asher, you should talk to the Americans in Pretoria. Because if there’s a problem, then you could just disappear and never come back.’” Karni, of course, was not a U.S. citizen, and he had not violated the laws of South Africa, where selling triggered spark gaps is no crime. Whatever his reasoning, he did not appear to be concerned that he might have done anything illegal, and he never called the U.S. Embassy in Pretoria. Kantor, a reflective man, says now of their final talk: “It is one of those things I’ve regretted. Because it stings, thinking of how he must remember that conversation.”

A week after the meeting between Kantor and Karni, the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Washington, D.C., issued a warrant for Karni’s arrest, for violating the Export Administration Act.



Asher Karni’s arrest stunned Cape Town. “I felt shock and horror,” Michael Bagraim says. “It was mind-boggling—how such a devout Jew could be supplying nuclear triggers for the nuclear weapons of a staunch Islamic country.” Whether or not Karni knew the destructive potential of those triggers is a question that has split the Jewish community. “This is a highly intelligent man,” Bagraim says. “He had spent his career in the business of buying very sophisticated electronic technology. In this field, he was a genius. He is an efficient trader, and has deep insights into the armaments industry. If you were to tell me that a widget was some kind of weapon, I wouldn’t know enough to say it was not. But Asher Karni would know.”

Others in Israel and America share a faith in his innocence. Yosef Singer, head of the Young Israel Ezras congregation in Potomac, Maryland, offered Karni a job teaching Torah if the government would let him out on bail. He was denied. “Asher was a businessman,” says Rabbi Jonathan Altman, interviewed in the synagogue where he and Karni worship in Cape Town. “Maybe he did something wrong with some forms. But the thought that he would sell to a mortal enemy of Israel is inconceivable. His family is there; his wife is an Israeli; two of his daughters live there.”

Shulamit Karni also finds the accusations preposterous; she says her husband thought that he was selling medical equipment. Speaking by phone from her mother’s home in Israel, she said that her husband began selling to Pakistan only two years ago, after the couple watched President Bush with President Musharraf of Pakistan on CNN, proclaiming to the world, as she recalled, “ ‘We are now friends, and we shall cooperate, especially in the medical field.’ We thought it was real.”

Peter Kantor says, “If Asher did it, it would go against everything he believed in.”

Despite repeated requests to his lawyers, Karni himself was not made available to be interviewed for this article. But he did speak for himself publicly, in U.S. District Court, in his first court appearance, the day after his arrest. Presented with a list of his alleged crimes and a description of the penalties, and after being apprised of his rights, he told Judge Patricia A. Coan, “Your Honor…I would like to make life easy. I…I admit everything, there’s no need to…to go for a long procedures of….”

Coan interrupted him to ask if he were just admitting to his identity.

“My identity and the charges,” Karni replied. The court, noting Karni’s lack of a lawyer and reminding him of his right to remain silent, admonished him to go no further.

Asher Karni has reportedly since pled guilty and is assisting with the U.S. government’s investigation. On November 23 last year, after spending nearly a year in prison, Karni signed a consent decree that was sent to the Crimes Against the State division in Pretoria. In it, he agreed to grant access to the financial records of Top-Cape Technologies, himself, and his wife for 2002 and 2003. In the meantime, citing findings from the Karni case, the Commerce Department recently banned Pakland and Humayun Khan from purchasing any items on the export control list for six months. Contacted by the Los Angeles Times, Khan claimed the U.S. was selectively enforcing its nonproliferation laws. “It’s all about politics,” Khan told the Times. “If they don’t want us to develop these things, they would do everything they can to stop it.... You [the American government] close one eye and open the other at particular times to these things that have been going on.” Khan also claimed that somebody else had ordered the equipment in his name and had seized it en route.



The Karni case raises questions about the use of third-country conduits for nuclear proliferation, about loopholes in the reporting of the sales of dual-use items, and about the ability of middlemen to mask dangerous transactions in the cloak of ordinary business. Those questions pervade the industry. On a gray day in late January, a hundred or so Silicon Valley technology executives filed into a ballroom at the Biltmore Hotel off Highway 101 in the bedroom community of Santa Clara, California. The scene was like any other gathering of specialists in a suburban hotel: airless, loaded with lexicon, scattered with porcelain cups of half-finished coffee. The subject, however, was far from mundane. The U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security was making its Northern California stop for a two-day seminar in Export Control regulations—informing the assembled salesmen and designers of some of America’s most sophisticated technology how to maneuver through the bureaucracy established to control the sale of dual-use technology to “the bad guys,” as one Commerce Department official explained to me.

Tensions at that gathering, between the desire for commerce and the imperatives of security, were palpable. The assembly felt haunted by the specter of Asher Karni, whose strange saga called up all the ambiguities of the dual-use economy. As Rabbi Altman said of his former congregant, “If you want to find a terrorist, you can find a terrorist. If you want to find a businessman, you can find a businessman.” Karni pursued his deal (on which he would have made about $80,000 profit) on a purely commercial basis, leaving a paper trail of invoices and bank deposits that, at least on the surface, look like any other international transactions. “Karni did not use a gun or some other weapon,” reads a motion filed by the U.S. government. “Karni was able to accomplish the export of the triggered spark gaps from the United States to Pakistan through the use of little more than a computer, a modem, and an overseas bank account.”


Mark Schapiro is editorial director of the Center for Investigative Reporting.

Additional reporting by Center for Investigative Reporting correspondent Mads Ellesøe.



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Alok_N
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Postby Alok_N » 31 Mar 2005 08:02

I am copying this post from the previous thread in its entirity for the benefit of the reader before I quote it partially.

Tim wrote:kgoan,

I think it became a canard on May 28, 1998. I recognize that not everyone agrees with me. But certainly it became a canard in late October or early November 2003, as knowledge of the AQ Khan network leaked into the open sources.

First off, I don't think anyone is arguing that Pakistan has a "sophisticated" nuclear capability. They can produce fission devices, with yields in the Hiroshima range, that are probably deliverable by missile and aircraft. That's not sophisticated, when compared to US or Soviet model tactical or strategic weapons in the late Cold War, for example. The point is simply that they are sophisticated enough. Detonation of such a weapon in a city would produce Hiroshima-like casualties, which has a deterrent effect.

Second, I wouldn't argue that Pakistan's capability is indigenous. They clearly sought assistance from a variety of sources, and continue to do so. Can they independently design and create a fusion-based thermo-nuclear weapon? I don't know, but tend to doubt it. The point is that over twenty years, they acquired both the technological knowledge and the nuclear infrastructure to produce enriched uranium and plutonium, to weaponize these materials in at least a first-generation fission format, and to not only stockpile these arms but also transfer that proven technology to other parties.

Third, I am talking about the assumption, apparently still shared by some on this forum, that Pakistan has no nuclear capability "in house" - that the Khan labs and PAEC are simply fronts, and that China provides intact nuclear weapons that are the only source of Pakistan's deterrent. I consider that argument as bankrupt as the assumption that the US controls all of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Therefore, I call it a canard - it is, at best, an inaccurate assumption based on disputed information, that should be largely superceded by the evidence of the Khan network.

It's all very well and good to boast about scientific prowess - both Indians and Americans (among others) are justifiably delighted in the innovations created by their scientists, engineers, software designers, etc. But innovation is not the only measure of military effectiveness. Sometimes the ability to imitate and replicate is sufficient for many military purposes. The Germans, in the Second World War, created many new military innovations, but lost the war for other reasons. The Allies also were very active with technological innovation, but this was not a panacea - sonar, for instance, did not "solve" the U-Boat problem. The Japanese, who were only able to innovate in very selective niches (24" torpedos and Oka rocket suicide bombs, to name two), still put up a heck of a fight.

My reading on the international (including Indian) response to the Khan network is that it verifies Pakistan's ability to imitate and replicate basic nuclear weapons technologies - in short, a concession that Pakistan does NOT receive its nuclear weapons direct from China. That is the canard I am referring to - the assumption, for whatever reason, that the Pakistanis are utterly reliant on China for any nuclear weapons they may possess. Pakistan undoubtedly received both nuclear and missile technology from China and other sources. They have mastered this technology sufficiently, and have created a domestic infrastructure to support this technology, so that they can now independently produce nuclear weapons without relying on outside technology. The point is that based on the Khan network analysis, it appears the Pakistanis have mastered it to the point that they are capable of independent production - perhaps replicating external technologies and designs, or perhaps with minor indigenous modifications (that might be one argument for the second series of tests on May 30, 1998).

If you're very focused on relative scientific capability, Pakistan's ability to independently create new technology is an important indicator. If you're focused on relative military capability, and especially on the ability to deter through the stockpiling of nuclear devices and weapons, the innovation is not as important as evidence of the ability to replicate and independently produce. My read on the Khan network is that it demonstrates quite decisively that Pakistan can independently produce nuclear weapons components and the devices themselves.

The argument that China supplied all of Pakistan's nuclear capability (and, perhaps, therefore controlled it) might have been plausible when Ravi Rikhye and others raised it in the late 1980s. It might have been possible in the mid-1990s, despite reports by Seymour Hersh and others. It might have been comforting, if perhaps an act of willful self-delusion, after the 1998 tests. But after the Khan network disclosures, and the international response, anybody who seriously thinks that Pakistan relies on Chinese nuclear weapons, and can't do anything on its own, is on the intellectual equivalent of drugs.

That's what I mean by a canard. While I respect the rights of others to disagree, I think they're simply not looking at the evidence.

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Postby Alok_N » 31 Mar 2005 08:20

Tim wrote:Third, I am talking about the assumption, apparently still shared by some on this forum, that Pakistan has no nuclear capability "in house" - that the Khan labs and PAEC are simply fronts, and that China provides intact nuclear weapons that are the only source of Pakistan's deterrent. I consider that argument as bankrupt as the assumption that the US controls all of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.


Tim,

why is it bankrupt, besides your saying so? I am talking of Pakistan's capabilities here, not the nude-nuke thingy which is another discussion.

If you wish to evaluate any country's technical know-how/capability, you will look at all aspects of their technical prowess and then attempt to interpolate it towards the nuclear regime ...

In Pakistan's case, let's take stock. Their capabilities in automobiles is limited to some Sitara buggy ... you expect them to machine devices with critical tolerances like those of a nuke?

They have no capabilities in electronics worth mentioning ... you expect them to design triggers and control systems?

All of Pakistan produces approximately ZERO papers in Physics journals (except for Hoodbhoy and Riazuddin who collaborate in the US/EU ... I had posted an evaluation of this in some earlier thread) ... you expect them to compute the yield/criticality of a nuclear weapon?

You'd think that in a country of such hidden genius, an occasional, just a wee-bit of that brilliance would leak out into the public sphere, no?


Therefore, I call it a canard - it is, at best, an inaccurate assumption based on disputed information, that should be largely superceded by the evidence of the Khan network.

...

But after the Khan network disclosures, and the international response, anybody who seriously thinks that Pakistan relies on Chinese nuclear weapons, and can't do anything on its own, is on the intellectual equivalent of drugs.



guilty as charged on the drug thingy ...

however, which particular aspect of "Khan network disclosure" has raised your view of Pakistani capabilities ... I must have missed it, please feel free to educate me.

From what I have seen, he was a two-bit peddler ... stealing from Peter and giving it to Paul ...

what was technically impressive about smuggling?

That's what I mean by a canard. While I respect the rights of others to disagree, I think they're simply not looking at the evidence.


would love to see the evidence ...
Last edited by Alok_N on 31 Mar 2005 09:22, edited 2 times in total.

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Postby Alok_N » 31 Mar 2005 08:36

Tim,

Just to clarify ... if you are arguing that they have imported lock, stock and barrel all the technologies needed to fabricate and assemble a nuke (which I think that you are), I will not disagree too strongly ... but there are some caveats ...

They probably have CNC machines with pre-written (and compiled, I hope) gerber files for machining all the requisite parts ...

but then, where do they get beryllium if they need it ... sure they can have an underwater machining capabilities (unless they don't give a crap about their workers getting berylliosis ...)

They have most likely imported/stolen triggers ...

They can't just throw some jehadis at the problem and hope to produce more, can they?

They don't have to worry about yields because those were already calulated/measured by others ...

so, yes, they have the "technical capability" of producing nukes ...

However, it doesn't end there ... if they were to go from Nuke Version 1.000 to Nuke Version 1.001, they'd be sweating ...

their triggers will deteriorate and they will not be able to manufacture new ones ...

they will need to miniaturize in order to improve deliverability, but they can't ...

etc etc ...

My point is that their capability is not 100% indigenous ...

convince us otherwise with evidence to the contrary.

...

As an aside, it reminds me of a story in Feynman's book ...

In some island like Bora Bora or something, there is a ritual in the folklore ... every full-moon the village chief wears a weird head-dress, climbs into a thatched tower, waves some wands for a half-hour ... everybody looks to the North sky ...

but nothing happens ...

[it turns out that during WWII, there was an airport with a control tower and a controller who helped US supply airplanes land once a month ... the story has been passed through the generations ...

now, the chief wears "headphones" made out of leaves and goes through the motions once a month hoping that his gestures/prayers will land an airplane full of goodies ... ]

how will paki generations to follow learn how to make better nukes unless "someone" keeps training them and giving them the hardware?
Last edited by Alok_N on 31 Mar 2005 09:28, edited 2 times in total.

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Postby rajivg » 31 Mar 2005 08:38

AlokN,

I can only find that Pakistan produces a total of 425MWe from one nuclear power plant. The rest of the reactors in Pakistan are designated as "research" reactrors. The Chasma 2 reactor is suppose to start construction in 2007 and add another 300MWe. Do you have any further information or links to Pakistani nuclear facilities? I'm starting to doubt the Paki uranium enrichment capabilities. I also suspect the Pakis lack any plutonium production.

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Postby Alok_N » 31 Mar 2005 09:18

rajive,

I am not sure what you are asking. Pakis produce HEU via the gas centrifuge and oxidation/metallization route ... their "research" reactor program for plutonium enrichment is not very effective ... I don't have numbers but several gurus here are very conversant with those figures ...

excuse me if I caused the wrong impression ... I am only talking in broadstrokes here ... I feel like responding everytime I hear claims of paki "capabilities" ... I have some direct experience in that matter which would make great stories but I believe that I can make my case without resorting to that sort of info.

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Postby SSridhar » 31 Mar 2005 13:08

TSP is widely believed to have done a cold test in 1983 and a clandestine device test in Lop Nor in 1989. It is now clear that TSP indeed possessed a device (or several devices) by 1985. In a recent interview, Madam BB asserted that TSP possessed all necessary components for a nuke as early as 1977. If today's TSP does not produce a motorcycle of its own design, we can well imagine the state of affairs in the 70s & 80s. It is inconceivable that a country with so little investment in higher education, industrial base, R&D institutions, a faltering economy to boot and where only 8 patents have been registered in the 43 years since its independence, could build a nuclear weapon. There has been no mastery of nuke technology then and there is none now. It could well be true that certain aspects, like production of HEU, were mastered due to circumstances and stealing. But, that was it.

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Postby kgoan » 31 Mar 2005 14:52

Tim,

We're looking at different viewpoints and end results.

I've seen way to much western analysis that has only one purpose: To discuss Pak nukes within a "normative" framework. Or to put it another way, it promulgates the fiction of Pak *independent* nuke capability.

And what that does is to acquiece in Pak nuke *buying* (not selling) as normal and something all good pragmatists should get used to.

Anything else is non-pragmatic and plainly silly.

Sorry, I don't buy it.

They don't have it full stop. And the ok-ing it normalises something that is *not* normal.

BTW, as Alok's sort of implied, the forum has folk here who literally could look through every citation index out there to find the sum total of Pak publications to find out what they can do.

No comment as to whether that's been done or not, but the point about *technical* arguments won't work.

I'm not sure how good you're with the tech, but let me give you this example, (with apologies if it sounds patronising):

Any one can, with a little trouble build their own computer. Simply buy a motherboard and a chip, a case a dvd-rom and burner and screw them together. And some folk are even clever enough to get a soldering iron and *modify* the chips for speed etc.

Anyone from 12 year old school kids can do this.

But that's a far cry from *buliding* the chip or mainboard or a cd-rom. That requires a jump in technology that is far higher than most people seem to realise. In Paks case it simply isn't even possible. They just don't have the engineering.

Of course, for someone who doesn't have a clue about computers, what the average 14 year old could do may seem like some marvel. But the real trick is simply finding a good handbook to show you how to go about buying the correct parts and screwing them together.

That's easily available for computers - but a little harder for nukes. But once a handbook is obtained, it's simply passed around.

The Paks are in the first category. Not the second. They *have* to buy the nuke equivalent of cd-roms to build their nukes because they haven't got a hope in hell of anything else.

I realise it may be impossible for you to accept this viewpoint, but that's okay - we'll just have to disagree there. But let me point out an obvious fact: The reports on the Libya episode that I've seen so far seem to agree that Libya could have built a bomb by following the recipe and tapping into the clandestine networks.

They ran out of time, but if they had succeeded, would it also have meant that the Libyans have a nuke capability? And if we denied their capability or simply laughed it off, would that also be a "canard".

BTW: Here's a tech type question you might be interested in looking up or getting say a friend with access to look up:

For certain source code (I'm talking real tech now, not an analogy) the Paks require something easily checkable: compilers for certain base languages widely used in mil-tech.

Have a search done on how, many the Paks bought. Trust me on one thing, they did *not* make their own compilers from scratch. And while they can use open source things, none of the specialised libraries are available so that's out.

Besides how many they bought, ask how many times they *upgraded* the ones they bought. The answer there will tell you everything about Pak mil-tech.

No more comments from me on the above, but you might want to keep that question in the back of your mind.

Sure the Paks can "build" nukes. But at that tech level, so can Somalia .

One last thing. PINSTECH, PAEC etc: They can do certain things, no doubt. But there is simply no independent capability without the clandestine buying networks.

To use the analogy above: Go to a computer "mart" some time. Place is filled with pimply little kids with soldering irons doing all sorts of things that are, without a doubt, very clever.

But thats all it is, nothing more.

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Postby jrjrao » 31 Mar 2005 15:22

"Until recently it (Pakistan) could not manufacture a crankshaft".

Page 248, "The Idea of Pakistan" by Stephen Cohen, Brookings Press, 2004.

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Postby Alok_N » 31 Mar 2005 18:45

jrjrao wrote:"Until recently it (Pakistan) could not manufacture a crankshaft".


yes, they had cranks who got shafted, but not until recently did they have it (musharraf) perfected.

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Postby Tim » 01 Apr 2005 08:01

Gents,

I'm not sure we're actually disagreeing that much.

My point is that the Khan evidence suggests (very strongly, to my mind) that Pakistan has imported technology and is now capable of replicating it. They may not be able to move from, for example, the Khan network's reported 10 kt weapon to a 100 kt weapon - but they can replicate the 10 kt weapon in some numbers. And those numbers are sufficient to have an impact on regional and global calculations.

If Pakistan CAN'T replicate nuclear designs without foreign components, what is all the fuss about? Why does the Khan network matter so much?

I would never make the argument that Pakistan is competitive with modern industrial societies. But they've put enormous resources, time, and effort into achieving one specific capability - the ability to replicate a technology that is 60 years old. I don't think that's out of the question. As I read it, the Khan network was basically selling the crown jewels - the technology, infrastructure and designs necessary to create a fission device. That is why the international community has freaked out.

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Postby Rangudu » 01 Apr 2005 08:09

Tim,

Far from freaking out, the international community has been quite blase about the whole thing given the magnitude of it.

Perhaps a sign of something.

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Postby Tim » 01 Apr 2005 08:16

Rangudu,

By the standards of the international community, I think it's freaking out.

1) Pressure from a number of countries and the IAEA to get access to AQ Khan

2) Increased concern about what the heck is actually going on in Iran

3) The brutally muddled North Korea - Libya connection (for which the US bears some substantial responsibility)

4) Genuine concerns about what Libya did, and what other unnamed states have been involved

5) Continuing efforts to keep a multilateral appraoch to Norht Korea (again, partly driven by US preference)

Is this going to fix anything? Probabyl not. But compared to previous international efforts to ensure nonproliferation, it's much more specific and intrusive.

Oh - by the way - did I mention the relative lack of opposition to PSI, which arguably is an attack on freedom of the seas?

In combination, this is a pretty unusual and significant short-term international consensus. It could fall apart, certainly, but the fact that it's unusual suggests a sense of relative importance, at least in my jaundiced eye. :)

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Postby Alok_N » 01 Apr 2005 09:55

Tim wrote:If Pakistan CAN'T replicate nuclear designs without foreign components, what is all the fuss about? Why does the Khan network matter so much?


My guess is that Pakis can replicate everything but the triggers ... which is why the news of 200 stolen triggering devices made a lot of sense ...

the fuss could partially be because of "dirty bomb" scenarios ... those don't need triggers and all AQK clients have that capability now.

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Postby AnantD » 01 Apr 2005 10:24

Posted by Tim:

"But they've put enormous resources, time, and effort into achieving one specific capability - the ability to replicate a technology that is 60 years old."

Does this imply they can actually replicate, i.e. indigenously manufacture
without smuggling thru its illegal network. Do you really know this for a fact? Enormous resources are needed just to smuggle in the parts on the black market!

If that were the case, why the need for the network at all? They could do it on their own. I don't think thats the case!

The AQK network may have had goals to proliferate ( for greed and/or religious reasons) but I think they really can't put together even a hiroshima type bomb 100% indigenously. Thats the main reason there are reports even today about TSP trying to revive its network, so they can atleast increase their quantity of weapons, if not the quality.

I think if TSP were not able to smuggle in ANY parts and components today, they would probably lose even the capability to detonate the ones they have, since the triggers degrade in time. Hence the reports that they are trying to revive the network, even under the current trying conditionsfor them.

The malaysian part of the network may have been doing some of the more challenging machining/manufacturing etc.

All the above is an educated guess on my part, no hard facts.

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Postby rajivg » 01 Apr 2005 11:04

AlokN,

Thanks. What I was hinting at was - The process of refining U235 from U238 (using centrifuges with SF6) takes a great deal of time. Despite Pakistan's progress in centrifuge development, it seems this process is painstakingly long and may not yeild sufficient enrichment. Thus, how many kilograms of HEU U235 do they have?

Further, given Pakistan's limited industrial capabilities, does it have actual implosion devices or are all of their weapons based upon ramming two parts of uranium together for fast neutrons in a Hiroshima type chain reaction?

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Postby Alok_N » 01 Apr 2005 11:50

rajivg wrote:Further, given Pakistan's limited industrial capabilities, does it have actual implosion devices or are all of their weapons based upon ramming two parts of uranium together for fast neutrons in a Hiroshima type chain reaction?


the ramming together of two pieces of a core would be a "triggerless" device in the sense that the trigger would be mechanical in nature... but these devices are notoriously bulky ...

an electronically triggered device uses a large current impulse to disintegrate a chunk of matter therby provinding for a primary discharge leading to a secondary pulse of nuclear material inserted into a compact core ... the so-called "exploding wire" type of devices ...

implosion devices are usually thermonuclear in nature, i.e., "hydrogen bumb" ... in this case the idea is not just to have a trigger but to have a primary fission explosion that creates instantaneous densities of gamma rays that heat a secondary core to fusion temperatures ...

once again, I am talking in general terms ... but, if you put two and two together, the pattern of stealing by Pakis would imply that they use an exploding wire type of device for triggering a fissionable core ...

pure guesswork boss ... working in the absence of hard data is simultaneously very easy and very difficult :)

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Postby kgoan » 01 Apr 2005 12:24

If Pakistan CAN'T replicate nuclear designs without foreign components, what is all the fuss about? Why does the Khan network matter so much?

Because of the financial and distribution networks.

Drugs can be produced in various locations - Myanmar, Afghanistan, Colombia whatever. But it's the distribution networks that do the damage. If production is interrupted in one place, the networks switch to some other production facility in another geographical region.

Which is why the US has never been successful in getting rid of the drug thing - no matter how many chemicals they spray in how many countries - because they can never eradicate the distribution networks.

That's the whole point. Not production.

Pakistan doesn't have to produce aluminium components - it can be done in factories in Malaysia. Triggering devices can be made by above-board companies in the US.

Again, Pakistan's importance is not it's production abilities - which are laughable - but it's blackmarket networks that can deliver anything you want anywhere you want it. And there's nothing laughable about that.

Otherwise, why bother with PSI? Khan's genius is *not* in his technical or engineering ability, which is irrelevant to his networks. It's in his management ability. Look up why Linus Torvalds was so succesful with Linux. Khan is the Linus** of the nuclear world.

**(With apologies to Mr Torvalds!)

Anyway, no point going on about this. We'll find out in time. If you're correct and it's Paks production facilties that are the key, thaen US access to Pak ensures that the possibility of a JDAM (jihadi delivered atomic munition) on CONUS is impossible.

If we're correct that the Paks have no production facilities worth sweating over and it's the netorks that represent the real danger - then a JDAM remains a possibility.

Far as I'm aware, I've yet to hear of a security conference/meet/jabber session anywhere in the world that discounts the latter possibility.

And that, IMO, is precisely because of the recognition that it's the networks, not Pakistans non-existent technology/engineering and production facilities, that are the real danger.

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Postby Sunil » 01 Apr 2005 22:07

The US winked and nodded at Pakistani proliferation in the 80s. As a result the entire proliferation chain had a huge US component in it. It was possible to do this because the Pakistanis were an ally in the Anti-Soviet Jihad.

Now its not clear whose side the Pakistanis are on. So there is a need to revisit even old things that the Pakistanis did and examine what was lensed out by the "US-Pakistan friends" euphoria.

The basic ideas/assumptions during the "US-Pakistan friends" era were (and the problems therein are):

1) Pakistan is smuggling nuke related tech for its own program only. (Since shown to be false. The Khan network proves that there were many other clients)

2) Pakistanis may indulge in nuclear smuggling for private profit reasons - but proliferation is not an instrument of Pakistani national policy. (Very hard to believe seeing how consistently high Pakistani government officials proliferated irrespective of who was in power).

3) Pakistanis do not harbor any ill will towards the US and will not use their nuclear weapons or their participation in the nuclear market to produce scenarios inimical to the security of the US. (Yep and the moon ... is made of cheese.. Sultan Bashiruddin Mehmood and the other fella who tried to buy nuclear materials for the ZP Reactors at Kandahar and Khowst).

4) The Pakistanis' presence in the nuclear blackmarket is favorable because in some way it offers a window into the place. It is easy to track Pakistani nuclear scientists and their movements, and that means we can keep track of the goings on in the Nuclear blackmarket. If there is intense competition in the nuclear black market, say between the Russians, the Israelis, the South Africans, the Germans, the Swiss, the Americans etc... then even the Pakistanis will want to compete and that means everyone will watch everyone. Given the low volume of the market - it will help keep track of sales. (Yes.. sure .. but what about the overlap between the narcotics trade and the nuclear blackmarket? can you guarentee that every boatload of heroin smuggled into the US was actually heroin? and not something else? Can you actually see something that the Pakistanis actively want to hide from you? what can you do when a "notorious drug smuggler" like Maj. Munnawar Shah is caught enroute to Heathrow with several samples of HEU? - what do you do about hidden volumes in the Pakistani end of the trade?)

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Postby Rangudu » 02 Apr 2005 20:46

http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_04/focus.asp

Arming Dictators, Rewarding Proliferators

Daryl G. Kimball

April 2005

Last year, Pakistani leader Gen. Pervez Musharraf pardoned his former nuclear weapons program chief Abdul Qadeer Khan for masterminding a global black market trade that delivered advanced nuclear weapons technology to Libya, Iran, and North Korea. For more than a decade, the Khan network secretly transferred some of the most sensitive technology, including uranium-enrichment devices and, in the case of Libya, even design and engineering plans for nuclear bombs.

U.S. officials claim there is no evidence of official Pakistani government involvement, but they also acknowledge they still do not understand the full extent of the Khan network or whether it is shut down. New evidence has recently emerged that Pakistan continues to advance its own nuclear program through illegal means.

Yet, even as Musharraf continues to shield Khan from outside interrogation, President George W. Bush announced last month that he wants to supply Pakistan with F-16 jets to facilitate Musharraf's continued support in fighting al Qaeda. As a counterbalance, Bush has held out the possibility of selling advanced fighter jets and missile defenses to Pakistan's longtime rival, India.

The Bush administration's F-16 decision not only symbolizes Washington's abandonment of meaningful efforts to curb Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, but it contributes to the escalating South Asian arms race. The move further undermines the credibility of Bush's nonproliferation policies and global efforts to reinforce the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which neither India nor Pakistan have joined.

U.S. policymakers first began to overlook Islamabad's nuclear activities when they sought Pakistan's support to counter the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. But with the end of the Cold War and the steady advance of the Pakistani bomb effort, Washington began to condition its support in order to push Pakistan toward a more responsible nuclear policy.

It was President George H. W. Bush who, in 1990, stopped earlier deliveries of F-16s to Pakistan by invoking the U.S. law that blocks military assistance to Pakistan if it acquires nuclear weapons. At least three years earlier, Pakistan had completed its quest to build the bomb with the help of Khan's clandestine network and foreign technology.

Following India and Pakistan's 1998 nuclear tests, Washington imposed further sanctions and urged the nuclear rivals to refrain from deploying their arsenals, join the nuclear test ban treaty, halt the production of fissile material, and improve export controls. Although India and Pakistan waited out the sanctions and resisted most of the U.S. arms control overtures, these and earlier nonproliferation efforts tempered the South Asian arms race.

The current U.S. policy favoring South Asian arms procurement rather than restraint is based on the erroneous assumptions that the nuclear rivalry can be managed and U.S. military technology is needed to buy "strategic partnerships" with New Delhi and Islamabad. Under this formula, Indian and Pakistani nuclear forces will be neither minimal nor stable. Certain U.S. arms transfers can lead each side to make countermove after countermove.

Pakistan says the F-16s will help it close the conventional weapons gap with India. However, Pakistan will likely outfit its new F-16s with nuclear weapons and base them in hardened shelters to reduce the vulnerability of its nuclear-armed forces to Indian air attacks. India, in turn, will surely seek U.S. assistance to improve its early warning and air strike capabilities.

India's strategic doctrine already calls for deploying a larger number of nuclear weapons on missiles, submarines, and aircraft, in part to counter Pakistan's nuclear-capable missile force. Future U.S. missile defense cooperation with India would likely prompt Pakistan to deploy a larger number of its nuclear-capable ballistic missiles.

As Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons capabilities have increased, crises have persisted and the consequences of war have grown. Although tensions between India and Pakistan have eased, it was as recently as 2002 that the two states were on the verge of their fourth war. The United States has a strategic interest in maintaining close relations with both India and Pakistan, but it can and should do so without exacerbating their nuclear arms buildup.

Although Khan may be under house arrest, there are disturbing signs that the regime continues to use the black market to improve its nuclear capability. An ongoing U.S. Department of Commerce investigation has found that in 2003 a front company with close ties to the Pakistani government made clandestine purchases of U.S. high-tech components used in nuclear weapons in violation of U.S. laws.

Pakistan's support for anti-terrorism can be maintained without sacrificing the effort to stop the spread of the world's most dangerous weapons. The United States should use its aid to support Pakistan's economic and political development and should condition further military assistance on Islamabad's support for nuclear restraint. At a minimum, U.S. officials must leverage aid to win full cooperation from Pakistan in stopping nuclear smuggling and to certify that it has finally ended all black market nuclear activity.

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Postby Roop » 03 Apr 2005 04:29

Khan's genius is *not* in his technical or engineering ability, which is irrelevant to his networks. It's in his management ability. Look up why Linus Torvalds was so succesful with Linux. Khan is the Linus of the nuclear world.


Yes, just call him Khanus Turdvalds.

"Canards"? "The intellectual equivalent of drugs"??? :roll:

Look, people, can we talk here? I mean, can we talk?!!! The notion that Pakistan has some genuine independent capability to design/manufacture nukes is farcical in the extreme, but it is the official line spouted by GOTUS and various other liars/poodles/enablers of GOTUS. It is a line you'll often hear repeated in the US Congress, State Dept., various think tanks and media outlets. "Analysts" and "experts" in DC echoing this line will be a dime a dozen. You should therefore not be surprised to see that same line show up here on BR from time to time.

It's great that people here emphatically refute such silly assertions, and those refutations should continue, by all means, but I think it is useful to remind everyone of why this myth of Paki technical genius still survives today in spite of all evidence to the contrary -- it is because GOTUS wants it to survive.

Just call this my little effort to expose canards and people on the intellectual equivalent of drugs.

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Postby Alok_N » 04 Apr 2005 05:00

Cross-posting Gerard's post from the International Nuke thread:

Gerard wrote:Pakistani scientists had meetings with Osama bin Laden

Daily Pioneer
http://www.dailypioneer.com
2005/04/03
Posted in full since site does not archive
Agencies/ New Delhi

Pakistani scientists Abdul Qadeer Khan and Sultan Bashiruddin Mehmood had held meetings with Osama bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders, exchanged letters with militant organisations like the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and attended their gatherings and rallies, a media report said.

"When the CIA searched (Sultan Bashiruddin) Mehmood's UTN (Umma Tameere-Nau) office in Kabul, they found large amounts of data on the construction and maintenance of nuclear weapons from the Kahuta Laboratories. It also found letters exchanged between the UTN and Islamist extremist organisations including Lashkar-e-Toiba", a report in Pakistani weekly 'The Friday Times' said.

Mehmood, a close confidante of A Q Khan and a former Director of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, was arrested on October 23, 2001, at the headquarters of the UTN, which he had set up for "humanitarian work in Afghanistan", it said.

Quoting the famed journal 'Bulletin of Atomic Scientists', the article said Khan and Mehmood and other scientists of his organisation "attended Lashkar-e-Toiba gatherings".

Khan also appeared in the rallies of the LeT headed by Hafeez Saeed. The militant outfit, which later changed its name to Jamaat al-Dawaa after being banned, "is alleged to have helped in equipping Al Qaeda with 'dirty' bombs", the article said.

Mehmood, who was used to enrich uranium in Pakistan's Khushab plant, and Khan were also known to have held meetings with top Al Qaeda leaders including Osama bin Laden, the paper said.


The emphases are Gerard's ... it got me thinking about what we were discussing earlier regarding Pakistan's capabilities ...

Q: Why would AQK offer a "dirty" bomb and not the real bumb?

A: Pakis don't have triggers to spare, i.e., they can't make new triggers. They may have a few chinese ones left. Or, they have none and they are nook-nude.

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Postby A_Gupta » 04 Apr 2005 06:23

Can we make a list of crucial manufactures needed for the
Paki nuke & missile programs, that Pakistan definitely cannot
manufacture? That will explain why the "network" is so important.

For a start, I don't think Pakistan can manufacture maraging steel,
and I think they import it via North Korea.

-Arun

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Postby Alok_N » 04 Apr 2005 07:21

pardon my ignorance, but what is "maraging steel" and why is it crucial?

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Postby SaiK » 04 Apr 2005 08:52


It said Mehmood "may have been a genius, but he was crazy in his religious zeal" and had a firm belief that plutonium enrichment in Pakistan "should not be kept secret and should be passed around to Islamic countries to challenge Israel and the West. He also had expert knowledge of the global nuclear black market". After his arrest, Mehmood had denied he had ever met bin Laden. However, after months of questioning "he admitted to having met Osama, Al Zawhiri and other al-Qaeda members repeatedly, including on the day al-Qaeda struck in New York (9/11)".


http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/arti ... urpg-2.cms

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Postby Anoop » 04 Apr 2005 09:39

Alok_N wrote:pardon my ignorance, but what is "maraging steel" and why is it crucial?


Alok_N, see here:

http://www.key-to-steel.com/Articles/Art103.htm

The 18% Ni-maraging steels, which belong to the family of iron-base alloys, are strengthened by a process of martensitic transformation, followed by age or precipitation hardening. Precipitation hardenable stainless steels are also in this group.

Maraging steels work well in electro-mechanical components where ultra-high strength is required, along with good dimensional stability during heat treatment. Several desirable properties of maraging steels are:

Ultra-high strength at room temperature
Simple heat treatment, which results in minimum distortion
Superior fracture toughness compared to quenched and tempered steel of similar strength level
Low carbon content, which precludes decarburization problems
Section size is an important factor in the hardening process
Easily fabricated (Comment: probably does not preclude problems for Pakistanis, since this refers to fabricating it into shapes, not making the steel in the first place)
Good weldability.

These factors indicate that maraging steels could be used in applications such as shafts, and substitute for long, thin, carburized or nitrided parts, and components subject to impact fatigue, such as print hammers or clutches.
---
The properties of maraging steels clearly indicate that these steels have many potential applications in mechanical components of electro-mechanical data processing machines. Use of these steels in shafts that require good dimensional control following heat treatment should be pursued for two reasons. First, maintaining dimensions should be easier because quenching and tempering are not necessary. Second, wear data indicate that equivalent or better wear resistance is obtained from the maraging steel than from the more commonly used shaft materials.

Impact-fatigue strength of 18% Ni-maraging steels indicates that these steels could be used in repeated impact loading situations. The good fracture toughness, compared to that of quenched and tempered alloy steels at the same strength level, indicates possible use in high-impact low-cycle load applications.

Finally, due to the relatively low temperature of aging, the use of the maraging steels for long, thin parts should be considered. Here, their use as a replacement for some case hardened or nitrided components is indicated that the potential application should be carefully studied.


Any of these ring a bell as far as nuclear application goes?

Added later:

From FAS.org, talking about the Pakistani nuclear weapons program timeline:

1987--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: Pennsylvania, maraging steel & beryllium (used in centrifuge manufacture and bomb components).


and talking about Libya's:

Libya began purchasing components for a relatively simple gas centrifuge made mostly of aluminum beginning in the late 1990s. After acquiring parts for about 100 machines, Libya instead began to focus on a more sophisticated maraging steel centrifuge design. Libya had arranged to purchase 10,000 of the maraging steel centrifuges, sufficient to produce as many as ten bombs a year. Some of the centrifuge parts came from factories built expressly to manufacture nuclear components for the black market, including one possible manufacturing site in Malaysia. Libya's centrifuges are of the same design as machines used in Pakistan.


and from
http://www.iraqwatch.org/profiles/nuclear.html

[quote]Iraq planned an ambitious research and development effort for its centrifuges. From mid 1987 to late 1989, Iraqi scientists conducted trials on a "model 1" centrifuge. It was an early Beams-type gas centrifuge using oil bearings, which ran into difficulties with vibration. It also consumed large amounts of power. Then from mid-1988 to mid-1991, Iraq ran trials on a "model 2" centrifuge. This was a Zippe-type centrifuge using magnetic bearings and a maraging steel rotor spinning at sub-critical speeds, for which the design drawings were provided by an ex-employee of the German firm MAN Technologie AG.
Last edited by Anoop on 04 Apr 2005 09:52, edited 2 times in total.

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Postby Arun_S » 04 Apr 2005 09:46

Alok_N wrote:pardon my ignorance, but what is "maraging steel" and why is it crucial?


Thus to make strong yet light mechanical parts. E.g. light payload, solid rocket motors with high fuel mass fraction, lighter liquid rocket engine, aircraft pilot protection armour, tank parts and of course centrifuges for greatly superior performance. So steal AQ Khan may the centrifuge design but TSP does not even have basic steel stock to start making something out of it. It has to sumggle it from US/Europe or barter with rough nations (aka N.Korea) or China to get the steel feed stock.

So much capability for excuse for a national that claim competence to make and prolifrate real original nukes.
Last edited by Arun_S on 04 Apr 2005 10:04, edited 2 times in total.

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Postby Alok_N » 04 Apr 2005 09:53

Thanks Anoop and Arun,

So, it seems that the maraging steel is used in centrifuges. Is it also used in bomb casings? Beryllium is the lightest metal and hence, is a favorite for use in objects whose weight needs to be minimized. It is also a good neutron absorber.

Paki capability in centrifuge manufacturing and export is not in doubt. (although, I do recall that they had stolen magnetic bearings from somewhere ... wonder if they can make those in TSP now?) ...

Added later: Anoop, I did not see your edit. So, does that confirm that maraging steel is not for bomb casings or some other critical component in bomb assembly?

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Postby Anoop » 04 Apr 2005 16:33

Alok_N wrote:Added later: Anoop, I did not see your edit. So, does that confirm that maraging steel is not for bomb casings or some other critical component in bomb assembly?


Alok_N,

No idea at all about its possible used in bomb casings. Please look at the diagram of the bomb at the end of the Iraqi bomb program document in the iraqwatch site linked in that post. It says iron is used, but I don't know if that's the casing of the bomb. It's surrounded by what I assume are explosive lenses. You may be able to understand it better. I'll google around some more...

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Postby A_Gupta » 04 Apr 2005 17:22

Think not just of the bomb, but also the needs for the missile program.
Maraging steel is used for rocket motor casing.

What are Pakistan's machine tool building capabilities? What are its liquid or solid fuel manufacture capabilities? etc.

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Postby JE Menon » 04 Apr 2005 17:59

Well there's the Heavy Industries Taxila, renamed since the AQ Khan affair to

Superior Heavy Industries Taxila

:twisted:

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Postby jrjrao » 05 Apr 2005 15:05

The official Pakliar lies in a letter to the NY Times:
Pakistan is not a nuclear-weapons proliferator by any means. :eek:

http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/05/opini ... istan.html

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Postby ramana » 05 Apr 2005 20:44

Op-Ed in Pioneer, 5 April, 2005

Is Iran on nuclear threshold?

Kanchan Gupta

When Abdul Qader Khan, the "father" of Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme, was exposed as a rogue scientist who indulged in black market nuclear proliferation by selling technology and components to despotic regimes across the world from North Korea to Libya, few realised the true dimension of his deeds and their implications.

The revelation and subsequent public shaming of AQ Khan's black-marketing of nuclear know-how came in February 2004. A year later, the huge jigsaw puzzle that is the legacy of his hawking bomb-making blueprints and equipment continues to remain unsolved with many crucial bits and pieces still missing.

Some of the missing pieces have now been found in Iran, which is in the eye of a raging storm over its covert nuclear programme whose real purpose is doubted by both the US and the European Union. The IAEA is in the midst of verifying Iranian claims that its programme is meant for peaceful purposes and not for creating a nuclear arsenal.

Not surprisingly, like the proverbial Jack-in-the-box, Khan's name has popped up in the ongoing controversy over Iran's uranium enrichment programme. It was first put out by the US Administration that Khan had provided the Iranians with crucial centrifuges that are required for producing weapons grade uranium.

Later, in a surprise public admission of Khan's guilt, the Pakistani Government, in a not-so-nuanced statement, said he had indeed supplied the Iranians with used centrifuges. Pakistan's admission of guilt was followed by a statement out of the IAEA headquarters in Geneva, saying its experts had been given access to used centrifuges at Pakistani facilities for "comparative analysis" purposes.

These amazing disclosures, which indicate that Khan is going to give the world sleepless nights for months and years to come as further evidence of nuclear proliferation under his tutelage surfaces, have left strategic analysts looking for answers to two key questions.

First, why did Pakistan - only Islamabad claims and Washington concurs that neither the Pakistani Army nor the Pakistani Government were aware of Khan's dangerous deeds - agree to provide Iran with critical weapons related know-how and components? If Iran were to develop nuclear weapons, Pakistan would have every reason to be worried more than any other country in the neighbourhood.

Second, why has Pakistan made a public admission of Khan providing centrifuges to Iran and, related to that, why is Islamabad offering an inspection of its used centrifuges by IAEA experts?

In response to the first question, some experts have pointed out that Pakistani Army generals, who could not but have been complicit partners in the black-marketing of nuclear technology, blueprints and components - Khan often travelled by special military aircraft to North Korea, Libya and Iran - may be good tacticians, but are awfully poor strategists.

At some stage, it may have made good sense, and therefore amounted to good tactics, to pass on nuclear technology to the Iranians for cheap oil and other benefits whose beneficiaries were Khan and his friends in the Pakistani Army. But they did not have the foresight to think ahead as to how they would deal with a nuclear Iran.

Of course, there are others who believe that Pakistan, by passing on nuclear know-how to Iran, was cocking a snook at America; it was an expression of defiance. Hence, the careful selection of countries that were to receive nuclear largesse from it: North Korea, Iran and Libya, each one a declared "enemy" of America.

The Pakistanis guessed, and correctly so, that in the end the USA would mollycoddle a defiant Pakistan, rather than punish it - Washington's gift of F-16s is a fraction of the rewards planned for Islamabad. By making Khan the fall guy, Pakistan's men in khaki have escaped opprobrium; on the contrary, they have been handsomely rewarded by a strangely grateful American Administration which has pledged $ 640 million in aid during the coming fiscal.

It is in the elaborate charade staged by the Pakistani establishment to proclaim its innocence that we can locate the answer to the second question. Pakistan's Information Minister, Sheikh Rashid Ahmed's public admission of Khan's nefarious role in Iran's nuclear programme can be viewed as an outraged innocent denouncing the guilty. And it has been received as such in Washington.

As for offering used Pakistani centrifuges for IAEA inspection, it is more than likely that it is yet another elaborate ploy to get Iran off the hook. If the genetic imprint of the substance on the used centrifuges at Pakistani facilities matches those found on the centrifuges being used in Iran, then the Iranians can claim that it is a carry over from the original site where they were used before being handed over by Khan.

It is unlikely, though, that the Bush Administration will give up on Iran so easily. While nobody in the second Bush Administration is spoiling for a fight, at least not yet, if the EU were to fail in its diplomatic efforts in taming Iran's nuclear ambitions, then US-sponsored harsh UN sanctions are a very real possibility.

European Union diplomats have been engaged in intense negotiations with the Iranian Government and are trying to work out a mutually acceptable declaration that would tie Tehran down to a non-weapons nuclear programme. A draft was circulated at the last round of discussions that concluded in end-February, but it did not meet Iranian approval.

The Iranian Government has reiterated its willingness to resolve the dispute, which is fast gathering a momentum of its own and may spin out of Tehran's control, through discussions and expressed the hope that its talks with the EU will yield positive result.

The EU, too, is keen to deliver a peaceful resolution; that would underscore Europe's emphasis on skillful diplomacy as opposed to America's coercive sabre-rattling. However, if negotiations were to fail in the face of Iranian stubbornness, the EU would have no other option but to accede to punitive action by the US.

There are other implications of Iran's alleged covert nuclear programme, too, that are gradually surfacing.

The Bush Administration has made it abundantly clear that it does not favour India going ahead with the pipeline project to access Iranian natural gas. It has conveyed its reservations and wants the project put on hold for the time being, if not scrapped entirely.

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice raised the issue with her interlocutors during her visit to New Delhi last month. Later, she said at a joint press conference: "I think our views concerning Iran are very well known by this time and we have communicated to the Indian government our concerns about the gas pipeline between Iran and India through our ambassador."

It is believed that the US wants India to put its plans on hold for six months. During the interregnum, it has been politely conveyed by the US, India can look into other options, for instance procuring gas from Turkmenistan instead Iran. Clearly, the Bush Administration want to send across a message to Iran as well as use this opportunity to promote American business interests which have a stake in Turkmenistan gas sales.

Informed sources claim that according to American intelligence estimates, if Iran is indeed feverishly pursuing a covert nuclear weapons programme, as is being alleged, it will conduct tests within six months. While Iranian scientists piece together the components and produce sufficient enriched fuel, Iranian diplomats will keep their European interlocutors engaged in drawn-out negotiations, thus staving off punitive action till the tests are conducted.

If what is being claimed is even partly true, we have interesting times ahead of us.

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Postby SaiK » 07 Apr 2005 10:17


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Postby Rangudu » 09 Apr 2005 02:17

http://www.dfw.com/mld/dfw/news/breakin ... 347553.htm

Pakistani Accused of Exporting Devices

By LARA JAKES JORDAN, Associated Press Writer

WASHINGTON - A Pakistani businessman illegally exported devices from the United States that could be used to test, develop and detonate nuclear weapons, the government alleged on Friday.

A federal indictment against Humayun A. Khan was unsealed along with a guilty plea by his alleged partner, who admitted routing high-speed electrical switches through South Africa to avoid raising authorities' suspicions. The switches — which can be used in medical and military devices — were then shipped to Pakistan.

The United States prohibits the export of the switches, also known as "triggered spark gaps," to Pakistan and a handful of other countries to prevent potential nuclear proliferation.

Khan, of Islamabad, is not in custody. He is believed to be in Pakistan, Homeland Security officials said.

The case raised "serious concerns," said Homeland Security Assistant Secretary Michael Garcia, because of the nature of the devices, the fact they were going to Pakistan, and efforts by Kahn to disguise the ultimate destination.

"The proliferation of nuclear components is not only a homeland security threat, but a global threat," Garcia said Friday.

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Postby Manu » 09 Apr 2005 03:11

Pakistani Accused of Nuke Device Exports - White House - AP Cabinet & State

43 minutes ago White House - AP Cabinet & State

By LARA JAKES JORDAN, Associated Press Writer

WASHINGTON - A Pakistani businessman illegally exported devices from the United States that could be used to test, develop and detonate nuclear weapons, the government alleged on Friday.

A federal indictment against Humayun A. Khan was unsealed along with a guilty plea by his alleged partner, Asher Karni, who admitted routing sophisticated oscilloscopes and high-speed electrical switches through South Africa to avoid raising authorities' suspicions. The scopes and the switches were then shipped to Pakistan.

The United States prohibits the export of the switches — also known as "triggered spark gaps," which can be used in medical and military devices — to Pakistan and a handful of other countries to prevent nuclear proliferation.

Khan, of Islamabad, maintained his innocence in an interview with The Associated Press last year. Homeland Security officials said he was not in custody and was believed to be in Pakistan.

The case raised "serious concerns," said Homeland Security Assistant Secretary Michael Garcia, because of the nature of the devices, the fact they were going to Pakistan, and efforts by Khan to disguise their destination.

"The proliferation of nuclear components is not only a homeland security threat but a global threat," Garcia said.

The indictment was unsealed Friday in U.S. District Court in Washington.

Authorities said Khan, owner and chief executive officer of Pakland PME Corp. in Islamabad, sought help from Karni, an Israeli citizen living in Cape Town, South Africa, to export oscilloscopes manufactured in Oregon. Oscilloscopes can be used to test and develop nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems. They require special Commerce Department licenses to be exported.

Karni exported the oscilloscopes without the licenses three times between March and August 2003, routing them through South Africa to Pakistan, officials said.

Meanwhile, authorities believe, Khan asked Karni to buy triggered spark gaps for a Pakistani customer. The switches can be used in medical equipment to treat kidney stones, but they also can be used as nuclear weapons detonators.

An anonymous source tipped federal authorities to Karni's plans to ship 200 triggered spark gaps from New Jersey to Pakistan through South Africa, authorities say. But the switch manufacturers, Perking Elmer Optoelectronics of Salem, Mass., agreed to ship malfunctioning triggered spark gaps in a plot to foil Khan and Karni.

Karni was arrested on New Year's Day 2004 as he entered the United States at Denver International Airport. He pleaded guilty in September to five federal felonies, including conspiring to export controlled nuclear technology items to Pakistan.

It was unclear Friday whether Pakistani authorities would take Khan in custody.

During a February 2004 interview with the AP, Khan acknowledged his ties to Karni, but he said he had done nothing wrong.

Though his company is a supplier of high-tech for the Pakistani military, Khan told the AP he imported military products only for use in armed forces repair shops. He said he also supplied civilian companies and Pakistan's Education Ministry.

"There is a saying we have that robbers and thieves wear masks," Khan said in the interview. "Would I openly go and ask this man for something that I wanted to put in a nuclear system and use my own name? It is absurd."


Simple, donate more $ and weapons. :wink:

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Postby Alok_N » 09 Apr 2005 03:33

Manu wrote:
An anonymous source tipped federal authorities to Karni's plans to ship 200 triggered spark gaps from New Jersey to Pakistan through South Africa, authorities say. But the switch manufacturers, Perking Elmer Optoelectronics of Salem, Mass., agreed to ship malfunctioning triggered spark gaps in a plot to foil Khan and Karni.



heh ... clueless pakis at work ... Perking Elmer used to be EG&G, one of the original manufacturers of nuclear electronics ... those guys have been around for a very long time ... it probably amused them no end to hear of some paki trying to buy triggered gaps for "medical purposes" in South Africa :lol:

the article doesn't say it, but I bet that the scopes were from Tektronix, another oldie ...

oh, pakis, pakis, pakis :lol:

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Postby Gerard » 09 Apr 2005 03:38

Japan to resume yen loan to Pakistan, urges nuclear cooperation
Japan said Thursday it is to resume yen-loans to Pakistan, halted in 1988 over Islamabad's atomic tests, but added that Pakistan should give more information about rogue nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan.

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Postby Alok_N » 09 Apr 2005 03:43


arun
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Postby arun » 09 Apr 2005 16:03



So will Humayun A. Khan shortly be extradited to the US and spill his guts out on the Pakistani nuclear and missile program or will we be shortly hearing that as a relative of Abdul X. Khan he too is a “national hero” and will be punished by “national humiliation” ?


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