Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 31 March 2005

Rishi · Post by **Rishi** » 17 May 2005 04:39

Kgoan, have u seen this:

http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/h ... 110800.asp

(in view of Ijaz taking credit)

Alok_N · Post by **Alok_N** » 17 May 2005 10:59

oops, wrong thread ... moved to Pak News and Dissection Thread.

Sunil · Post by **Sunil** » 17 May 2005 21:07

Hi,

Apropos a discussion with fellow forumites, something caused the hair on the back of my neck to stand up.

That report of the Maglev construction project and the associated scam involving Musharraf's samndhi (Brig(r) Aftab Siddiqui) is very suspicious. Assuming that Musharraf stashes away ~60% of the 300 Mil USD for personal use, that still leaves 100 Mil USD in the black financial system. I am assuming that this is money that would not have been there otherwise.

That kind of money could be used for serious purchases - esp if it is in greenbacks.

I stress this is speculative but post Sept 11.

1) The Hawala channels have become unreliable due to USG surveillance and

2) after the exposure of the AQK and the Humayun Khan network there are pressure points on the entire nuclear black market.

The 100 Mil or so could be an end run around existing controls - the largish number suggests a very high value purchase may be in the offing.

It is also possible that this is a transfer of funds related to the drug trade but I would think that the channels for that are still open.

I remain skeptical that Musharraf was trying to make off with 200 Mil USD as a retirement fund. He has quite a bit already stashed away - the 200 Mil in such an obvious fashion would only attract unnecessary attention. IMO that angle to this is a red-herring. My gut tells me that this maglev thingy is a cover for a high-end nuclear tech purchase that has to be off the books.

Dileep · Post by **Dileep** » 17 May 2005 22:12

My gut tells me that this maglev thingy is a cover for a high-end nuclear tech purchase that has to be off the books.

And some high-tech stuff can also be purchased for the namesake!

Scary man! Scary! Is it a desperate effort to loose the nook-nood situation? Have the cake and eat it too?

Raj Malhotra · Post by **Raj Malhotra** » 17 May 2005 23:11

ramana wrote:kg, He is blowing the cover on Mahmood Ahmed and protects Baig (and Gul?) He is still not very clear on why Iran turned in the AQK network? and If Iran turned AQK why is US still angry with them?

Forget his bragging. If people trusts him they deserve whats due to them. We should stick to his facts and see how they match other evidence. Note the full extent of the transfers. Even Chinese designed shell casings for the "toys".

Did the AQK network revelations out other investigations before their time?

Also why did Iran turn in TSP and AQK?

Ramana

I have been saying this for many many years now AQK has been unable to produce weapon grade Uranium through his spinning tops.

Iran knew that AQK is just a trap which uncle is setting for them to get into their real programme which is to use reactor grade Plutonium for weapons.

So they pulled out the rabbit first.

this is also the reason Libya pulled out.

this is also the reason why nobody now believes pak has any balls sorry nukes as china took its own back after 9/11 and AQK delivered nothing.

this also the reason that Saudi s till now dont have any nukes.

this is also the reason why NKorea is unable to do Munna.

AQK is impotent reagaring nuke tech that is

Sunil · Post by **Sunil** » 17 May 2005 23:33

Hi Dileep,

According to informed sources, American Maglev is not the old American Maglev which hit the headlines ten-fifteen years ago for its revolutionary attempt at making an all American competitor to Japanese and German tech. at Old Dominion - the American Maglev of today looks suspiciously similar to a shell corporation used offshore money laundering.

All there is of American Maglev currently is a website, and a few news reports of a pending law suit against American Maglev by its "partners" i.e Old Dominion University and Lockheed Martin.

Even if we assume that the Pakistani end of this is in good faith and the American Maglev end of it is shady. The prospect of ~100 Mil USD entering the black financial system should ring alarm bells in the FBI and the CTC.

jrjrao · Post by **jrjrao** » 20 May 2005 13:21

This column by Jim Hoagland in the Washington Post is an intriguing read by itself. Of course, the jhapad to Pakistan makes it even more interesting.

Global Power Plays
By Jim Hoagland
Washington Post Op-ed

President Bush and Vice President Cheney fight an inexorable tide that pushes their goal of restoring presidential and national power farther away even as they accelerate their efforts to reach it.

They swim against a tide of the global fragmentation of power in all its forms -- economic, political and military. More nations today possess the ability to make and sell inexpensive, good-quality shirt buttons than ever before. The same is true for costly but workable nuclear weapons.
...
Nuclear proliferation has been pushed significantly forward by a privatized, for-profit international network ostensibly (and implausibly) run by a single Pakistani scientist, A.Q. Khan. Yet the Bush administration, while proclaiming that proliferation is the greatest danger in the world, lets other concerns take priority.

The White House fails to put effective pressure on Pakistan to let American investigators question Khan. Nor will Islamabad punish him for what by Pakistan's own account should be classed as crimes against humanity. Washington has also made an overly generous plea bargain arrangement with a Khan client, Libya's Moammar Gaddafi.

China and South Korea similarly cannot be convinced that Kim Jong Il's possession of nuclear weapons is a greater threat to them than a collapse of the North Korean regime would be. They rationalize their fears by claiming that Kim has no nuclear weapons, or that he won't use them if he does.

Laks · Post by **Laks** » 20 May 2005 15:40

Saudis want to limit nuclear inspections

In other words, once a state has signed the protocol it is assured that U.N. inspectors will have virtually relinquished their authority to uncover secret activities, a diplomat said.

"Once you sign the small quantities protocol, you're off the hook," said the diplomat from an IAEA member state.

Earlier this year, Pakistan denied media reports that Abdul Qadeer Khan, the disgraced founder of Pakistan's atomic weapons program linked to a global nuclear black market, had sold Saudi Arabia nuclear technology usable in atomic weapons.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 20 May 2005 17:52

From above CNN report

One result of the protocol is that it allows NPT states to remain exempt from rules which compel them to notify the IAEA of stocks of natural uranium up to 10 metric tons, which experts say could be purified into fuel for at least one bomb.

This is madness to allow upto 10 metric tonnes of radioactive material. It could be used for dirty bombs as "poison pill" defence or last ditch offence.

Tim · Post by **Tim** » 26 May 2005 05:27

up

Bad idea to let this thread lapse on the forum.

Rangudu · Post by **Rangudu** » 26 May 2005 20:16

Tim,

Ask and ye shall receive...

http://www.freenewmexican.com/news/14151.html

Khan's nuclear network still trying in 2004 to buy nuclear technology: Swiss report

Associated Press
May 26, 2005

BERN, Switzerland (AP) - The clandestine network of the father of Pakistan's atomic bomb continued to operate last year even though its founder _ Abdul Qadeer Khan _ was under virtual house arrest in Pakistan, according to a report released Thursday by Swiss authorities.

Khan's network, which has passed on bomb-making technology to other countries, tried twice to buy Russian nuclear technology through a Dutch and a Swiss firm last year, said Switzerland's annual report on national security.

Swiss authorities helped foil the two attempts, which sought to export 120 tons of Russian aluminum tubes used for enriching uranium to Pakistani front companies for Khan Research Laboratories, the report said without naming the firms.

Khan, who spearheaded Pakistan's secret nuclear program throughout the 1990s, was identified in 2003 as the head of the network that supplied the illicit programs of Iran, Libya and possibly North Korea. He has been under house arrest in Pakistan since December 2003.

The report said the Dutch firm tried to export one shipment of tubes to Pakistan through the Swiss company, but that authorities kept them from leaving Switzerland.

Information from the Swiss firm also enabled authorities in Dubai to halt a previous shipment by the same Dutch firm to a different Pakistani front company, it said.

Q: How can Khan's network keep buying stuff after Khan is boxed up?

A: It's a trick question. Khan's network is actually Musharraf's network.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 26 May 2005 20:46

R, If you re-read the old book "Islamic Bomb" by the two UK TV journalists you will find Swiss were the site of many transactions.

vinodv · Post by **vinodv** » 26 May 2005 21:03

BBC: Pakistan helps Iran nuclear probe

Pakistan has sent parts of its nuclear centrifuges to the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna.
The components are to be examined as part of an investigation by the UN nuclear watchdog into whether Iran has been trying to building an atomic bomb.

The IAEA wants to check whether traces of enriched uranium found at an Iranian nuclear site were illegally supplied by Pakistan's Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan.

He has admitted involvement in the transfer of nuclear secrets to Iran.

Suspicions

A spokesman for the IAEA in Vienna, Mark Gwozdecky, told the BBC the investigation was not against Pakistan's nuclear programme, but only to establish whether or not Iran had an active uranium enrichment programme.

Mr Gwozdecky described it as a highly sensitive matter and said all he could confirm was that a team of Pakistani scientists has arrived in Vienna with some samples.

The spokesman said the testing and analysis of the samples brought by the Pakistani team was already under way.

The IAEA has been investigating Iran's nuclear programme for the past two years.

While it has found no proof that Iran plans to build nuclear weapons, it has also been unable to confirm that the programme is entirely peaceful, as Iran insists.

Washington has accused Iran, a state already rich in gas and oil, of pursuing atomic energy as a screen to develop nuclear weapons.

In 2003, the IAEA found traces of uranium in Iran that had been enriched to various levels, some of them close to what would be useable in weapons.

Fears then arose that Iran had been secretly seeking to purify uranium for use in weapons.

Iran blamed the traces on contaminated centrifuge components it had acquired second-hand from Pakistan.

jrjrao · Post by **jrjrao** » 26 May 2005 22:08

First shipment of the H&D has been made.

Pakistan presents centrifuges samples before IAEA
http://in.news.yahoo.com/050526/139/5yp9v.html

arun · Post by **arun** » 27 May 2005 13:55

jrjrao wrote:First shipment of the H&D has been made.

Pakistan presents centrifuges samples before IAEA
http://in.news.yahoo.com/050526/139/5yp9v.html

So true, Honour and Dignity has been shipped to Vienna.

Pakistan Foreign Office spokesman Jalil Abbas Jilani :

March 15, 2005 :

“Pakistan has not been asked to give centrifuges, nor will Pakistan do so,”

May 27, 2005 :

“As regards the used components of an old and discarded centrifuge, which have no bearing on our national security, they have been sent with our experts for their analysis in the presence of our experts,”

Tim · Post by **Tim** » 27 May 2005 17:19

Arun,

Think for a moment about what new initiatives took place in US relations with Pakistan between March and May. My own suspicion is that this will provide a substantial portion of the explanation for Pakistan's change of heart. I'm certain that is the argument that will be made by proponents of the policy shift.

Equally interesting in context (although maybe not appropriate for this thread) is the apparent economic concession just made by US negotiators in return for Iranian concessions on freezing their nuclear program. I wonder if it's related to what will be found (and, presumably, what all sides already know) on the Pakistani centrifuge?

Tim

daulat · Post by **daulat** » 27 May 2005 17:32

so Tim, has AQK been sold for 30 something F-16's? any more 'sales' and the number of F-16's will surely rise... someone somewhere has surely drawn the overlapping timelines...?

AJay · Post by **AJay** » 27 May 2005 20:24

Another thought occurs to me after reading what Tim said. Is this the beginning of Pakistani nuc program rollback? The delivery vehicles are being given to a known WMD proliferator.

Rye · Post by **Rye** » 28 May 2005 19:17

http://beta.inq7.net/world/index.php?in ... y_id=38350

FOR IRAN TESTS
Pakistan hands over centrifuge parts to UN nuclear watchdog

Posted 05:24pm (Mla time) May 27, 2005
Agence France-Presse

ISLAMABAD -- In a major turnaround, Pakistan on Thursday confirmed it had sent some parts of an old centrifuge to the UN atomic agency to help it establish whether Iran has been secretly developing nuclear weapons.

The Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) requested the parts in connection with its investigations to determine whether contamination found at Iran's nuclear facilities had come from Pakistan or any other source, a foreign ministry official said.

"Components of an old and discarded centrifuge, which have no bearing on our national security, they have been sent with our experts to IAEA for their analysis," ministry spokesman Jalil Abbas Jilani told Agence France-Presse.

Pakistan and the IAEA "are cooperating and analysis of the samples is on the way," agency spokesman Marc Gwozdecky said in Vienna, declining to specify where the analyses were being conducted.

Iran, which says its nuclear program is for the peaceful purpose of making electricity, claims the contaminated equipment came from imported machinery and not from enrichment activities in Iran.

Iran has been subject to more than two years of investigations by the international nuclear watchdog after it emerged the country had been covering up its activities for 18 years.

Britain, France and Germany have been trying to convince Iran to give up its nuclear fuel program altogether, a step seen as the best objective guarantee that the country will not develop the capacity to make weapons, as Washington holds it is doing.

Iran had been threatening to resume fuel work but agreed at a Wednesday meeting to hold off and the two sides are expected to resume talks in August after the European countries detail a package of incentives.

The transfer marks an about-face for Islamabad, which had been insisting it would not surrender the components despite admitting that its disgraced nuclear scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan, had given centrifuges to Tehran.

IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei has said Pakistan and other countries involved in an international nuclear black market that supplied Iran must cooperate if the IAEA is to answer the US charges that Tehran was secretly developing atomic weapons.

Jilani said "we are cooperating with the IAEA in line with our commitment to promote nuclear non-proliferation."

He said the Iranian government also asked Pakistan to cooperate with the IAEA to clear up the controversy, and that the UN body would share the outcome of the analysis with Pakistan.

The IAEA is investigating contamination by microscopic particles of highly-enriched uranium found in Iran at a Tehran workshop, at a pilot enrichment plant at Natanz and at other sites where there were centrifuges.

Enriched uranium can be used both for civil or military purposes, depending on the level of enrichment.

Pakistan's top nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, who is now under detention, publicly admitted early last year he had passed nuclear secrets to Iran, North Korea, and Libya.

President Pervez Musharraf gave Khan a conditional pardon and has said that no government or military body was involved in the proliferation scandal.

But Islamabad has refused to let the IAEA carry out the analysis on Pakistani soil because it did not allow foreigners to visit its sensitive facilities.

Musharraf said in March that Islamabad could send the centrifuge parts to end the controversy "once and for all."

The parts remain technically under Pakistan's control during the entire process.

"The analysis would be conducted in the presence of our own people and they would remain under the custody of our people all the time," said the Pakistani foreign ministry spokesman.

"After the analysis the parts would be brought back by our experts."

The last bit is a nice bit of pak lying. These parts are not coming back, but admitting it would cause H&D loss.

Alok_N · Post by **Alok_N** » 28 May 2005 22:33

Folks, help me out in trying to understand what actually is being tested ...

the fact that TSP gave Iran its centrifuges has been established, right?

the fact that samples taken in Iran had unnaturally hig U-235 concentration is also established, right?

ok, so now they are going to make detailed comparisons of isotope signatures between the Iranian samples and the TSP samples, right?

the two conclusions would be:

1. the signatures are same => Iran did not attempt any new enrichment, right?

or,

2. the signatures are different, in which case Iran did attempt enrichment, right?

or,

3. the signatures are same, but TSP gave Iran both centrifuges and fuel. The signatures would be identical. You can differentiate this from #1 above by comparing with a sample of the fuel used in Iranian reactor. If they don't match then the fuel is form TSP. ok, so far.

Now, how do you test for the following scenario:

4. In the past few months Iran gave TSP some fuel. TSP used this fuel in clean new centrifuges, banged them up a bit and has now sent them to Vienna for testing as "old discarded parts". This also is indistinguishable from #1 above. However, it avoids the secondary test listed in #3.

in other words, if Iran and TSP have colluded to manufacture "fake samples" what can the nerds in Vienna do about it?

Rye · Post by **Rye** » 28 May 2005 23:11

Alok_N wrote:

in other words, if Iran and TSP have colluded to manufacture "fake samples" what can the nerds in Vienna do about it?

The whole exercise seems to be so that the nerds in vienna can give a clean chit to pakistan and provide the US with an excuse to go after Iran. This whole drama seems to be setting the stage for "Iran's WMD program is in an advanced stage and the pakis have provided us proof" to provide the fig leaf required to place sanctions on Iran, leading to eventual aggression against Iran.

Alok_N · Post by **Alok_N** » 28 May 2005 23:51

Rye wrote:
The whole exercise seems to be so that the nerds in vienna can give a clean chit to pakistan and provide the US with an excuse to go after Iran. This whole drama seems to be setting the stage for "Iran's WMD program is in an advanced stage and the pakis have provided us proof" to provide the fig leaf required to place sanctions on Iran, leading to eventual aggression against Iran.

so, the nerds will try to prove scenario #2 above ...

but, what if they can't find differences in the signatures? you think they'll manufacture evidence?

or,

do you think TSP has deliberately contaminated its sample with Uncle's help to confound the nerds?

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 29 May 2005 02:25

Is Iran telling the truth about nuclear program?
How Pakistan is helping IAEA investigate Iran's nuclear intentions.

Rye · Post by **Rye** » 29 May 2005 04:32

Alok_N wrote:

so, the nerds will try to prove scenario #2 above ...

but, what if they can't find differences in the signatures? you think they'll manufacture evidence?

Since I am not competent to comment on the technical aspect of this, I will stick to the "motive and oppurtunity" part. I am assuming here that the "signature" of the evidence can be traced back to the centrifuges that created the evidence? Is that correct? If not, what ties these unique signatures to a bunch of centrifuges? (please correct if this is wrong; will assume that signatures are tied to the centrifuges that produced the nuke material for the rest of this post).

It is reasonable to say:

1)Pakis will not be handing over their equipment to IAEA, if the evidence is self-incriminating. Their self-preservation genes won't let them.
2) Iran handed over all of the centrifuges it acquired from Xerox Khan to western agencies, so it is not just Iran that can produce evidence to incriminate Iran anymore.
3) The US has a vested interest in not getting Mushy's Musharraf in any more trouble than he already is in, for handing over his country's nuclear arsenal to the west.
4) Musharraf is openly pointing fingers at Iran, which means that he is reasonably sure that the pakis will not be implicated for some reason.

Musharraf: Mullahs very anxious to obtain a nuclear bomb

do you think TSP has deliberately contaminated its sample with Uncle's help to confound the nerds?

I am not entirely sure TSP can do such thing without severly fukking up, given their general low scientific capabilities...but then maybe that is underestimating their capabilities. I would think it is more likely that they have some help in these quarters -- after all, the US and Pakistan's interests coincide when it comes to screwing Iran.

Alok_N · Post by **Alok_N** » 29 May 2005 04:44

Rye,

By "signature" I meant the composition of the nuclear fuel. In that sense, evidence can be manufacture via contaminations.

Let's see ... there are 3 possibilities for why Iranian equipment had traces of HEU:

1. It was packee HEU given to Iran.

2. It was Iranian attempt at making its own HEU.

3. It was from somewhere else.

I hope there is no 4th possibility, as in two other countries gave Iran HEU, so let's stick to these 3.

TSP has to save its musharraf only if #1 is true. But by giving IAEA some parts to examine does not prove or disprove #1. So TSP has no way of incriminating itself.

If #2 is true, IAEA would have already known it because they have samples of both reactor grade U and the traces of HEU. They coul have compared directly.

So, it follows that #3 must be the agenda. But against who? Which shade of red?

ok, my head is spinning, so I will think some more later. I'm off for a few days. Cheers.

Alok_N · Post by **Alok_N** » 29 May 2005 05:13

one more post ... because there are more possibilities:

4. Another possibility is that #3 is true, but the whole tamasha is intended to make it look like benign #1 (some traces of HEU left on old centrifuge parts).

That is to say, the country that provided the HEU to Iran has provided TSP with the same stuff and asked them to contaminate some of their new centrifuges with this stuff and give it to IAEA.

In that case, the likely country is the dragon.

5. Yet another possibility is that the packees never had any HEU to begin with because AQK was blowing smoke. In that case, the dragon gave TSP ready-made bumbs. Then, either TSP gave it to Iran or the dragon gave it to Iran. Now the dragon needs to cover its butt, so it has ordered TSP to go through the drama to make it look like "nothing ever happened and the Iranians have some traces of indigenous packee HEU onlee".

--------------

Rye · Post by **Rye** » 29 May 2005 19:08

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4590955.stm

x-posted: Musharraf denies having pointed fingers at Iran. Iran says Mushy knows better that to make claims on Iran's weapons program. Der Spiegel does not "misquote" quotes made in private interviews such as this one, so what's the deal?

added later: surprise, surprise. Mushy is a liar. Here is his quote from Der Spiegel.

Musharraf: In the present environment it would be disastrous because it would agitate the Muslim world. Why keep opening new fronts?

SPIEGEL: What would you suggest for keeping the Iranians from producing the bomb?

Musharraf: I can't say. They are very keen on building the bomb.

SPIEGEL: As Pakistan was.

Musharraf: Yes, we were keen. Nobody can accept a threat to its existence. Therefore we are very proud to have nuclear weapons.

SPIEGEL: Did Pakistan help Iran and North Korea to go nuclear?

Musharraf: An individual from Pakistan did.

SPIEGEL: His name is A.Q. Khan and it is very hard for people like us to accept that he indulged in a clandestine enterprise without anybody in Pakistan being aware of it.

arun · Post by **arun** » 30 May 2005 12:12

Building on Rye's above post, nuclear proliferation related extract from President Genera Musharraf's May 2005 interview with Der Spiegel :

SPIEGEL: Did Pakistan help Iran and North Korea to go nuclear?

Musharraf: An individual from Pakistan did.

SPIEGEL: His name is A.Q. Khan and it is very hard for people like us to accept that he indulged in a clandestine enterprise without anybody in Pakistan being aware of it.

Musharraf: That is exactly what happened. When India went nuclear in 1974, Dr. A.Q. Khan was brought in (to Pakistan). He came from Holland. He is only an expert in enriching uranium, bringing it to weapons grade. He is not an expert in making nuclear bombs. He started establishing the process. This had to be kept secret from the world because otherwise the world would not have allowed it. For reasons of secrecy, A.Q. Khan was given total autonomy. He was doing a job nobody else knew about except for the President, the army chief and the scientists.

SPIEGEL: And you -- when did you become aware of what was going on?

Musharraf: During my career in the army I was never involved in nuclear affairs. I came in as army chief in 1998, in 1999 I became President. I realised that this man was doing something wrong. Nobody was checking. I removed him in January 2001, much before 9/11 because, as my intelligence told me, he was behaving suspiciously on two or three occasions. To remove him was the most difficult job. He was a national hero. I organised the custodial system.

SPIEGEL: What was A.Q. Khan driven by? Greed?

Musharraf: Greed, ego and dreams, because he is not religious. That I know. And in any case, North Korea is certainly not an Islamic country.

SPIEGEL: It is amazing that there was supposedly no security and checking system to deal with atomic knowledge.

Musharraf: That's different now. In February 2000 I established the National Command Authority with the President as the boss, the Prime Minister as chairman, and a number of ministers and military chiefs as members. Its responsibility is to create an institutionalized command and control mechanism, consistent with our obligations as a nuclear power. The co-ordinating body is the Strategic Planning Division, which includes two institutions. One is the Employment Control Committee, which takes cares of the use and deployment of the nuclear weapons and which is headed by the Foreign Minister. The second is the Development Control Committee, responsible for the technical development of our nuclear weapons and headed by the Joint Chief of Staff Committee, which includes the chiefs of the three services as well as scientists. The strategic forces of Army, Navy and Air Force are also under the control of the NCA.

Sunil · Post by **Sunil** » 02 Jun 2005 05:27

Alok_N,

Vis-a-vis the US/Israel, the Pakistanis want to maintain an ambiguity about what they gave Iran. To this end they are only grudgingly permitting access to the centrifuges.
Vis-a-vis the IAEA, it is credibility problem. IAEA is quite shocked by the sudden appearance of a huge nuclear blackmarket so it is keen to prove that it can get on top of things. If it can find something that others have missed in the centrifuges, then Pakistan will be in the dock. So that part of it is imo essentially a damage limitation exercise from the Pakistani POV.

If the Pakistanis can contaminate their centrifuges then they can hide the true nature of the Iranian program while appearing to make the IAEA look good.

Irrespective of the amount of enrichment - there are two conclusions.

1) the Iranian signature is the significantly similar to the Pakistani signature.
2) the Iranian signature is significantly different from the Pakistani signature.

I think abundances of some elements will be give the IAEA an idea of where the fuel came from and the percentage of U235 will tell the IAEA about the efficiency of the Iranian process versus the Pakistani process. This should give people a clear idea of where the Iranians stand in the ability to build a bomb.

The Pakistani objectives should be met if it appears that the Iranians got their fuel from sources other than Pakistan but managed to operate the centrifuges at a comparable or high efficiency. This would indicate to the world that the Iranians are close to building a nuclear bomb while absolving Pakistan of the responsibility of supplying them fuel.

Khan could have supplied the centrifuges but the fuel had to come from other hands. If it comes out now that the fuel was also given then "Lone Khan did it" theory will not hold water (saare Pakistani reactor waalon ka band baj jayega). So efforts will be to camoflage any fuel transfers. Musharraf is trying to put some distance between this Pak Iran lovefest and himself. The centrifuges will be contaminated to make that happen.

Johann · Post by **Johann** » 02 Jun 2005 14:56

Alok,

The Iranian position is that the centrifuges were used for enrichment by Pakistan before they were sold to them, and that the HEU traces are therefore only indicative only of Pakistani rather than Iranian enrichment activity.

I dont know what a Pakistani match would prove one way or another. The R&D runs on lab scale cascades would have required UF4 feedstock at a time when Iran's uranium mining and processing industries were still being developed. Like Libya the Iranians would have had to acquire it from someone else. Pakistan would have been an excellent candidate, especially if the transfer was in the late 1980s to mid 1990s.

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 02 Jun 2005 18:30

Dunno how credible this is.
No access to full article.

U.S. Intel: Plutonium sent by N. Korea this year makes Iran direct threat

U.S. intelligence officials have told President Bush news that has left him stunned: Iran has completed all of the elements required for an atomic bomb. The intelligence information asserted that North Korea this year transferred components to Iran to assemble a plutonium-based nuclear warhead. The components were believed to have originated in Pakistan.

Umrao · Post by **Umrao** » 02 Jun 2005 19:30

U.S. intelligence officials have told President Bush news that has left him stunned:

If only they had read BRF discusions

"BRF where tomorrow comes today while other wait for it to dawn'

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 02 Jun 2005 19:51

If they had read these threads they would have found that Umraojaan and Sunil had replied to my question "Why did Iran turn in the TSP?" The answer was "The TSP transfer was a scam and TSP would have told uncle to get into GOAT good books and uncle would have run with it. Instead Iran told the IAEA which needs a credibility revival. Besides by turning in the TSP on the centrifuges the real Pu program could be kept under wraps."

I think Uncle knew all along about the Pu program but couldnt find the origins. Hence they blamed the two Indians hoping to smoke the real proliferators. The dubious thing was Pu enrichment and separation is even more tricky not to mention the reaction is not simple stuff. So the key to the Iran thing was outside sources of the entire weapon cycle.

This story now unmasks the real 'axis of evil' circle- China->TSP->Noko->others while uncle was chasing GOATs.

AshishN · Post by **AshishN** » 02 Jun 2005 22:45

Umrao wrote:
U.S. intelligence officials have told President Bush news that has left him stunned:
If only they had read BRF discusions

"BRF where tomorrow comes today while other wait for it to dawn'

Umrao Jaan, Mush has asked me to report you to Bush for vulgar comments (Dawn is a good old desi underwear brand. "Jyada chale aur de aaram" the ad ran, IIRC)

Sunil · Post by **Sunil** » 02 Jun 2005 23:22

The Pakistanis can't sustain another hit on the proliferation front. They can't be seen as having supplied fuel to Iran. Neither can they sustain a situation where the Iranians do not look like they have nuke capability. The idea that the Iranians would be able to palm off the U-235 to Pakistani efforts and not Iranian ones does not suit the Pakistani purpose.

Either ways they have to contaminate the signature to make it significantly different from the Iranian one.

Umrao · Post by **Umrao** » 03 Jun 2005 00:12

The Pakis are firing on Uncle with his own guns in this game of Nuke proliferation.

In the 80 uncle taught TSP how to proliferate ( the nukes) with the help of PRC , while focusing on ejecting the Soviets from Afghanistan, now that short sighted policy is resulting in blow back.

In effect PRC has surrounded all the strategic areas of interest to uncle with defacto Nuke countries.

kgoan · Post by **kgoan** » 03 Jun 2005 03:23

For the plutonium route, I think it's worth keeping an open mind on whether it's:

China --> TSP --> NoKo --> others

or, China --> NoKo --> TSP --> others via Paks distribution and financial networks.

I think the latter has more credibility - but only for the plutonium route.

kgoan · Post by **kgoan** » 03 Jun 2005 03:35

Rishi, apologies for the late reply, and thanks for the article.

Sunil · Post by **Sunil** » 03 Jun 2005 03:52

I think the khan network/nuclear blackmarket did the following

1) Centrifuge tech to

a) Iran,
b) DPRK,
c) Libya,
d) Syria (?)
e) Iraq (?)
f) KSA (?)
g) Egypt (?)

(?) indicates I am unsure about this part.

2) U-235 based bomb design (Chin-3/4) to all of the above or anyone else who wanted it.

3) Unknown nuclear knowhow to Al Qaida and other anti-US, anti-Israel groups. Quite possibly relating to the production of dirty bombs or low yeild Pu devices that are compact.

4) Pu ref technology to (?)

I am coming to the view that (1) and (2) were approved by the USG - and even quite possibly carried out on behalf of USG as they represented old, ineffective technology that would actually slow the progress of any program and cause nations to spend resources buying basically useless junk. I agree with the view that the Iranians and the Libyans realised it. I am not sure who else understood this. This lends credence to the idea that the Khan network was not seen as a significant threat to the USG until Sept 11 2001. Before 1989, I suspect that the Khan network was believed to supply things only for the Pakistani program but things changed after transfers to Iran were detected.

(3) and (4) are however most likely outside of any unwritten agreements with the USG or any other US security bodies. These actions were carried out on behalf of PRC or even possibly with a purely Pan Islamist agenda. I feel that Pakistani Puref tech mostly comes from PRC. As with the missile transfers to Syria, Iran etc... Pakistan and DPRK are serving as proxies for puref transfers from PRC to other nations. It remains to be seen if the Puref routes are exposed.

Arun_S · Post by **Arun_S** » 03 Jun 2005 08:15

North Korea Boasts Of The Bomb, But Can It Deliver?

Seoul (AFP) Jun 01, 2005

North Korea's boast that it has made nuclear weapons has caused global concern, but the jitters could turn to panic if Pyongyang masters the art of miniaturisation.

Most experts are keeping an open mind on North Korea's nuclear weapons programme because the country is so tightly controlled and they have too little information to work on.

Many believe that Pyongyang has one or two nuclear bombs but that they are so big they cannot effectively be loaded into planes, let alone fired by missiles.

The technology to build the bomb is one thing, but in order to use them effectively, particularly on ballistic missiles, North Korea would have to acquire the tricky skill of miniaturising a nuclear warhead.

.... ... ..

"We believe North Korea has not acquired enough technology to miniaturize nuclear bombs which must weigh less than 500 kilograms to be mounted on a missile."

North Korea has a well-advanced missile programme and among Washington's greatest fears is that Pyongyang could breech the technical threshold of marrying its ballistic missile development with its nuclear weapons drive.

In April, the head of the US Defense Intelligence Agency, Vice Admiral Lowell Jacoby, told a Senate committee hearing in Washington that US intelligence agencies believed North Korea had mastered the technology for arming its missiles with nuclear warheads, though he did not say Pyongyang had actually done so.

The Pentagon later took a step back from Jacoby's assessment, saying it was "theoretical in nature" but US President George W. Bush said it was safer to err on the side of overstatement when dealing with North Korean capabilities.

"There is concern about his capacity to deliver," he said. "We don't know if he can or not, but I think it's best when dealing with a tyrant like Kim Jong Il to assume that he can."

Abdul Qadeer Khan, the disgraced father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb who is now under house arrest, has admitted playing an important role in North Korea's atomic development.

Clandestine cooperation between Khan and the North Koreans since the 1990s has reportedly included the provision of warhead designs to North Korea.

Khan has also claimed that during one of his many visit to North Korea he saw a missile carrying a nuclear warhead.

"That is not impossible," said Kang Jungmin, a South Korean nuclear analyst based in Seoul.

He said that leading experts think North Korea may have developed crude nuclear weapons similar to the devices dropped by the United States on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945.

The Nagasaki "Fat Man" bomb weighed more than four tonnes and was overloaded with chemical explosives used to trigger the plutonium blast. North Korean nuclear scientists have been working feverishly to refine their version.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, they carried out more the 100 tests of high-explosive triggers that would help them in their weaponization efforts.

"We don't know for certain, but North Korean scientists may have been able to weaponize a Rodong missile," said Kang.

North Korea's medium range Rodong can travel up to 1,300 kilometers, meaning it is capable of hitting targets in most areas of Japan.

Pyongyang in 1998 test-fired a Taepodong-1 missile with a range of up to 2,500 kilometers that overflew Japan and is said to be developing the Taepodong-2 with a range of 6,700 kilometers.

Nicholas Reader, an analyst with the International Crisis group, said the preponderance of circumstantial evidence suggested that North Korea had already weaponized its missiles.

"The argument that they don't have a missile delivery system is spurious, according to most experts," he said.