Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003

Rangudu
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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003

Postby Rangudu » 04 Jul 2003 04:20

From the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists.

Iran: Furor over fuel

Then there’s Pakistan. Despite persistent media reports and statements by U.S. officials about significant and perhaps multi-year Pakistani nuclear assistance to Iran, Pakistan denies that it or any of its nuclear scientists were Iran’s source of centrifuge design or equipment. However, such assistance is widely believed to have been provided in the early 1990s, a time when Iran is believed to have accelerated its centrifuge program (see David Albright’s “An Iranian Bomb,” July/August 1995 Bulletin). Pakistan’s assistance may have been crucial to Iran’s early efforts, although the centrifuges Iran is now building appear to be several generations beyond the first-generation machine whose design could have been provided by a Pakistani. According to one official, the origin of the centrifuges in the pilot plant could not be determined from a cursory visual inspection. However, he added, they did not appear to be of Russian centrifuge design.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003

Postby Rangudu » 04 Jul 2003 04:24

North Korea’s nuclear program, 2003

The latest crisis erupted in early October 2002, when North Korean officials did not deny charges made by James A. Kelly, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, that Pyongyang had a secret uranium enrichment program. According to a June 2002 CIA report, described by Seymour Hersh in the January 27 New Yorker, in 1997 Pakistan gave North Korea high-speed centrifuges and how-to data on building and testing a uranium-triggered nuclear weapon. (Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are based on a Chinese implosion design that uses a core of highly enriched uranium.) In return, North Korea gave Pakistan missile technology and parts.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003

Postby Neshant » 04 Jul 2003 05:21


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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003

Postby Rangudu » 04 Jul 2003 12:36

GERMAN TUBING SOUGHT BY DPRK FIT PAKISTAN'S G-2 TYPE CENTRIFUGES

Nucleonics Week; New York; May 22, 2003;

Mark Hibbs, Bonn;

The dimensions of aluminum tubing ordered in large quantity by North Korean procurement agents last year from a German firm appear to match the requirements of the centrifuge design Pakistan adopted as the workhorse of its secret uranium enrichment program during the 1970s and 1980s.

Pakistan initially misappropriated design data for more than one Urenco machine. While Western experts are convinced North Korea obtained a design from Pakistan, despite official denials from Pakistan, they had been uncertain how advanced a design was sold.

Last year, agents for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) ordered 200 metric tons (MT) of 6061-T6 aluminum tubing from the German firm Optronic GmbH & Co. KG. The firm attempted to ship from the port of Hamburg at least 22 MT of the tubing to a declared end-user in China but did not obtain necessary export authorization; that shipment was halted on the Suez Canal last month. The director of the German firm is now in custody pending conclusion of an investigation by criminal justice authorities.

Officials described the aluminum on the boat as "centrifuge-grade" and said its true destination was North Korea. They said the entire amount sought by the North Korean agents would have been sufficient to produce between 3,500 and 4,000 gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment (NuclearFuel, 12 May, 1).

Last fall the U.S. government asserted that the DPRK had embarked on a secret program to enrich uranium with centrifuges, in violation of the 1994 Agreed Framework. That pact was to swap South Korean power reactors for a freeze on the DPRK's indigenous nuclear program. The DPRK stunned the world by admitting to the program (NW, 24 Oct. '02, 1).

At the time, official sources said Western governments had discovered that the DPRK had been provided considerable assistance in enrichment by Pakistan. They also said the DPRK had attempted to obtain centrifuge-grade aluminum, suggesting that the DPRK might try to develop a gas centrifuge based in part on an aluminum model developed during the 1970s by Urenco in the Netherlands. That design was among the data stolen in the 1970s by Abdul Qadeer Khan, a Pakistani scientist working in the Urenco program who returned to Pakistan to lead its secret bomb program. Last fall, officials suspected the design had been sold in the late 1990s to Pyongyang (NF, 25 Nov. '02, 1).

But now it appears the DPRK is seeking material for a more advanced and powerful design than the low-throughput aluminum model. According to Western government officials last week, the aluminum tubing sought by the DPRK in Germany was sufficient to produce about 3,500 vacuum casings sized to match the requirements of the centrifuge that is the basis of the unsafeguarded Pakistani program, a machine which greatly resembles Urenco's G-2. That design has maraging steel rotor tubes.

According to customs intelligence sources, in Germany the DPRK sought 200 MT of so-called 6061-T6 aluminum tubing. The tubing is considered too soft for rotor tube production but is highly corrosion-resistant and strong enough to meet the needs of the vacuum housings which cover each rotor tube in a centrifuge's rotor tube assembly.

The dimensions of the tubing sought by the North Korean agents, specified on freight documents, are just slightly larger than the dimensions specified by the design of the steel rotor tube for the G-2 centrifuge, according to data provided to Nucleonics Week in 1990 by former experts from the firm MAN Technologie AG, which had co-developed and tested the G-2 machine (NF, 24 Dec. '90, 1).

If the material had been delivered to North Korea, the aluminum tubes would likely have been cut in two. Each segment would have been outfitted with a top section containing openings for feed, product, and waste, and the segment then welded on to a base plate.

Based on the amount of aluminum ordered in Germany, the DPRK might have sought to produce and operate about 3,500 of these centrifuges. Given the estimated throughput of the machine now believed to have been provided by Pakistan, North Korea would be able to produce close to 90 kilograms of weapons-grade high-enriched uranium per year, enough for about a half-dozen nuclear explosive devices.

A detailed report on the DPRK's German procurement effort for its gas centrifuge program will be published in the May 26 NuclearFuel.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003

Postby Chaman » 04 Jul 2003 16:03

GUNMEN ATTACK PAKISTAN MOSQUE

Reports are coming in of an attack on a mosque in the south-western Pakistani city of Quetta, in which at least eight people have been killed.
At least three unidentified gunmen entered the mosque and opened fire on Shia worshippers, the reports say.

A BBC correspondent in Quetta says riots broke out in many parts of the city with shops being set on fire.

Last month, 11 trainee Pakistani police officers were shot dead in what is believed to have been a sectarian attack in Quetta.

As You Sow – So Shall You Reap

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003

Postby JE Menon » 30 Jul 2003 13:20

Rest of discussions on this thread until July 21, before server went offline.



Posted by shiv (Member # 367) on 05 July 2003, 09:29 AM:

cross post

N Korean defector's nuclear claim

The most high-profile defector from North Korea has said he was told in 1996 that the secretive state had already developed nuclear weapons. Hwang Yang-jop, a former tutor to North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, also said that Pyongyang signed a contract with Pakistan the same year to receive help in enriching uranium for its nuclear arsenal.

Mr Hwang's comments will add credence to United States intelligence reports that the North had developed a small number of nuclear weapons before it agreed to mothball its programme in 1994.

The collapse of that agreement last year triggered mounting concern about the North's nuclear ambitions, and speculation as to whether it would be able to increase its arsenal.

Mr Hwang was making his first public comments since he defected to South Korea in 1997. "I heard from Kim Jong-il and others including Jun Byong-ho that nuclear weapons had been produced," Mr Hwang told a parliamentary forum in Seoul.

Mr Hwang said Jun Byong-ho was a secretary of the central committee of the ruling Korean Workers Party in charge of Pyongyang's nuclear weapons development. Mr Hwang said that that the North Korean regime - which he described as "a ring of crime opposing democracy and infringing on human rights" - must be disarmed.

However, Mr Hwang noted that a conventional military assault on North Korea would be "almost impossible". "The North has piled up on weapons of mass destruction and turned the whole country into a fortress," he said.

Mr Hwang's naming of Pakistan is likely to be embarrassing to that country's government.

However, the US indicated earlier this year that it was no longer worried by reports that North Korea and Pakistan had collaborated on nuclear weapons technology.

US Secretary of State Colin Powell said in April that Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf had assured him there were no further contacts of the kind referred to in a newspaper report which said Islamabad provided Pyongyang with gas centrifuges and equipment to make highly-enriched uranium.

Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/3044070.stm

Published: 2003/07/04 10:54:31 GMT

© BBC MMIII


Posted by Sriman (Member # 189) on 05 July 2003, 08:49 PM:

The following is primarily NK related, but this thread looks like a good place to post:
US plans on disrupting NK-Pak trade

[...]
The most hawkish of the North Korea hawks nest, ironically, at the State Department, where Undersecretary of State John Bolton presides over a miniature Pentagon on the seventh floor. Bolton, whose hawkish foreign policy views routinely put him at odds with his State colleagues, has never had much use for the blandishments America's diplomatic corps favors in its dealings with North Korea. In response to the latest round of provocations from Pyongyang, which included an announcement that it possesses a nuclear weapon, Bolton--along with Condoleezza Rice, National Security Council counterproliferation point man Robert Joseph, Donald Rumsfeld, and **** Cheney--has devised a new policy toward the Stalinist state. The Bolton strategy, as Koreawatchers have dubbed it, calls for the selective interdiction of ships from the North carrying drugs, missiles, and weapons technology. These illicit exports, bound for the likes of Yemen and Pakistan, net Pyongyang roughly $1 billion per year, almost twice the amount of its legitimate exports. Administration officials claim the strategy's goals are fairly straightforward: "strangulation" followed by "regime change." Hence, its supporters see no pressing need for negotiations with the North. As Paul Wolfowitz explained during the Bush presidential campaign, it was "totally implausible" that North Korea, "a regime that cares about very little except its military capabilities, would voluntarily give up the ultimate weapon" in exchange for promises of U.S. assistance. Indeed, Pentagon officials lobbied hard against the last round of U.S.-North Korea talks held in April in Beijing. And, when that failed, Rumsfeld recommended that Bolton represent the United States in place of Colin Powell's candidate, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly.

[...]

Aware that the interdiction policy requires the cooperation of Japan, South Korea, Australia, and China, the Bush team's unilateralists were unusually busy during the last few weeks trying to forge a multilateral consensus on interdiction a campaign that has already yielded a more unified negotiating stance toward the North. At a summit in Madrid two weeks ago, the administration secured the rhetorical backing of ten nations for its Proliferation Security Initiative, the broader policy of clamping down on weapon and drug exports from rogue states. In meetings in Japan, Cambodia, and Hawaii during the past two weeks, representatives from Tokyo, Canberra, and Seoul all pledged to help Washington implement the strategy, and the South Korean government explicitly announced that pressure on the North would help compel Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear program. Japan quickly made good on its promise by detaining two North Korean ships and threatening to board a third, something Australia has done as well. As for China, it likely will never match the pledges made by South Korea, Australia, and Japan.
[...]
Even if China refuses to squeeze its Stalinist neighbor and even if the skeptics who claim the interdiction effort will not detect every weapons shipment turn out to be correct, the strategy still makes sense as a negotiating tool. To begin with, halting 80 percent or even 50 percent of North Korea's deadly exports would be an improvement over the current status quo--halting none at all. It will also probably have an effect on the buying end, prompting countries such as Yemen or Pakistan to think twice about purchasing North Korean weapons that they may never receive. More broadly, the policy shows Pyongyang that crime doesn't pay. "What this strategy does," says Victor Cha, a North Korea scholar at Georgetown University, "is to show the North Koreans that nuclear weapons will diminish rather than enhance their security, to the point of them having even fewer resources than they already have."

[...]
Washington--fearing a repeat of the incident last December when Spanish forces seized a missile-laden North Korean ship on the high seas, only to let it go in the absence of an international convention permitting them to detain it--has urged its allies to invoke their own national laws when halting future shipments.


Posted by Rangudu (Member # 3972) on 08 July 2003, 12:33 PM:

The following is a policy paper at the James Baker Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, Houston.

Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Middle East: The View from Israel
quote:

In the early ’90s, Pakistan concluded a deal with North Korea for the exchange of missile and nuclear technology. Islamabad obtained from North Korea parts of missiles that, among other things, would help produce its Ghauri ground-to-ground missile, capable of carrying a nuclear warhead and identical to attributes of the North Korean No Dong and the Iranian missiles developed subsequently, the Shihab-3. In return, Pakistan passed on know-how and technology for the construction of the uranium-enriching centrifuge. Years later, North Korea passed on this information to Iran and probably to other countries in the Middle East. North Korea and Iran traded in technology for the production of nuclear weapons, which had originally come from Pakistan.




Posted by Arun A (Member # 3120) on 09 July 2003, 12:33 PM:

while dubya is busy linking saddam to 9/11, the commie half of korea has nukes..thanks to TSP..

Added later: This report and the one above it say TSP supplied Uranium enriching centrifuges to NK. IIRC, Tim Hoyt said there is no way TSP could have help NK because the NK program was pu and TSP's was uranium based.

Aide agrees: North testing mini-bomb

The director of the National Intelligence Service, Ko Young-koo, told a National Assembly committee yesterday that the intelligence community believes North Korea has reprocessed “a small number” of the 8,000 spent plutonium fuel rods at its nuclear facility at Yeongbyeon.
Mr. Ko did not say what led to that assessment. He was speaking at a closed-door hearing of the Assembly’s Intelligence Committee. He said the reprocessing was probably done on April 30 and May 1. “It appears to have been done as a threat in connection with the negotiations on its nuclear programs,” sources at the meeting quoted him as saying.
North Korea also imported equipment needed to assemble about 1,000 centrifuges from Pakistan beginning in 1999, the officials said. They are used to enrich raw uranium to produce weapons-grade material.


Posted by rvaidya (Member # 5101) on 09 July 2003, 02:55 PM:

THIS MAY BE AN INTERESTING ITEM IN THE CONTEXT OF DISCUSSION ON TSP ASSETS TAKEN AWAY

http://www.nation.com.pk/daily/July-2003/2/EDITOR/edi3.asp

IT has been reported that for the last six months Kahuta Research Laboratories have reduced the level of uranium enrichment to 20 percent, which is far below the minimum 90 percent level required for nuclear weapons. According to experts this is the base level needed to keep the laboratory functional, and does not contribute to production of weapons-grade fissile material. If true, it is logical to assume that the process of freezing Pakistan’s nuclear programme was put into effect six months ago and though previous production will allow manufacture to go on for a while, the wheels will eventually grind to a halt.The report raises a number of questions. Since Pakistan has always maintained that its nuclear programme is of a minimum deterrent nature, does this development indicate we have achieved that level? There is also the apprehension that if this has been done under pressure and as a precursor to the Washington visit, where does that leave us vis-à-vis New Delhi?There are no indications that India has adopted similar restraints to maintain a regional nuclear balance.

Such reports are likely to raise curiosity about the discussions on our nuclear programme during the President’s Washington visit. It was given out that these were specific to allegations about Pakistan’s assistance to the North Korean nuclear issue and that Pakistan’s own programme was not on the agenda. However this reported freeze on uranium enrichment is likely to give a new spin to events. It would be difficult to ignore that just weeks before the Washington visit, Senator Shaukat Aziz visited Kahuta, an unusual honour denied even to PMs in the past. And then he was the only cabinet member to accompany the President Musharraf to the US.

Islamabad cannot afford to ignore these apprehensions. As recently as four weeks ago Defence Minister Rao Sikander Iqbal said Pakistan will never curtail or compromise its nuclear programme. Now we find the enrichment freeze put into effect five months earlier. Islamabad needs to be transparent on the new policy , if there is one. Such important decisions cannot be kept under the blanket of official secrecy because public curiosity is likely to be fed by the rumour industry, which could prove highly destabilising politically.


Posted by rvaidya (Member # 5101) on 09 July 2003, 02:59 PM:

Further on TSP " assets"
Finance minister --American citizen--gets to see the inside of TSP Nuclear facility--not allowed even to earlier PMs.
http://www.satribune.com/archives/jun15_21_03/opinion_drzafar.htm

Dr Zafar Altaf

LAST WEEK, indifferent, exhausted and tired Pakistanis had to digest two terrible news that are likely to negatively impact the Pakistani society for different reasons in the coming days.

The first startling news was revealed in the Senate that Shaukat Aziz had visited the nuclear stockpiles where even former Director General of ISI, General Hameed Gul was not allowed to enter what to speak of civilians prime ministers Benazir Bhutto or Nawaz Sharif or the Presidents.

The second bad news which in my view is more problematic was the resignation of Amir Mir -- Editor of “Weekly Independent” of Lahore -- a valiant and bold editor in the recent history of journalism in Pakistan. He was being hounded by the government agencies and cronies for exposing them.

Amir was a rare breed of editors in Pakistan and within a period of merely three years, this young man shattered the military regime with hard hitting reports, uncompromising editorials, punching cartoons, and bold stuff which otherwise no newspaper or weekly could afford to use. He was the single editor in Pakistan who never forgot to use South Asia Tribune stuff otherwise officially banned by the military government. Today, Amir is jobless and many would be taunting him why did he choose that course of defiance.

The Finance Minster came in for flak at the National Assembly for his visits to the nuclear sites. The former finance minister of Nawaz Sharif, Ishaq Dar launched a massive attack on Shaukat Aziz who did not deny his visit but gave no reason for doing so. It is therefore widely believed that the visit had other sensitive parameters. Aziz was made the finance minister when Musharraf came to power. He was till then working for an American bank the First National City Bank (FNCB). His credentials as a banker are under question.

It is the unusual nature of the visit to a super sensitive site which arouses suspicions as it is known that he would be visiting the United States soon. If this be the case was he looking at facilities to tell his mentors what it is all about?

It is a litany of love-hate relationship. Every time Pakistan is to do something for the powers that be it is allowed to do as it pleases. The United States turns a blind eye. Is there a nexus between what has happened in Pakistan and the people that were placed here? How are attitudes softened? Through human beings placed in positions of strength. In its home elections the people of the United States do not brook any nonsense and rightly so. As a leader in democratic thought process it has duty towards other nations. Has it done its duty by itself and can it stand proudly today to say that as the leading democracy we have done well by others as well as by ourselves.

The fact remains that evidence is coming through that the arms race between India and Pakistan has been perpetuated by the United States [consider the payment for Nuclear reactor from US in 1960 worth 350,000 dollars, between 1972 and 1978 secretly 6 billion dollars were handed over to the country, Saudi Arabia was asked to send billions more. In 1981 3.2 billion dollar program again came Pakistan’s way, Reagan and Clinton administration played the same game. India received deals from the British and the United States in the same manner. The details can become cumbersome but the fact remains the developed countries imperial efforts bear fruit when two countries are embroiled in a fight no one can win. There are other costs that have to be looked into.

Normally a finance minister is invited by an organization to demonstrate what is being done is worthwhile and that more funds are required. That argument is not valid because the nuclear program was never short funded. It always had enough resources to meet its logical and illogical requirements. The real arguments are different. Dar has been an outstanding example in the budget previews and has done extensive work before going on to these debates [Incidentally Dar was responsible along with Shahbaz Sharif for my transfer from Ministry of Food and Agriculture where I was working as Federal Secretary). So please do not blame me for being politically savvy with one or the other parties.

Credit is due to Dar and Sartaj Aziz, both Finance Ministers with Nawaz Sharif. Both have done their homework and both are as articulate as you can get. Sartaj has an added advantage of having served the FAO in the capacity of Senior Vice-President. So he has a bit of planning division in him, a lot of international experience and a great amount of gray matter.

So if they get after any one we must admire their scholarship and their ability at analysis and examination. They questioned the macro figures but the current attack on Shaukat Aziz is in a totally different field. The nuclear program is going to be discussed during the US visit as has been indicated by Dar and the visit has not been not denied by Shaukat. He, Shaukat, is not of Pakistan vintage and has an ambiguity when it comes to determining what is good or bad for the country. His dimensions at omissions in the budget are phenomenal. But that would come in another article later on.

His visits to the world arena are now proverbial but he has no idea of the places in Pakistan and frequently he keeps asking where this place is? The same was true of the other World Bank sages who have come to Pakistan. The latest one to try and curry favor is Shahid Javed Burki. His reasons are reasonable and only he can tell how illegitimates can become legitimates?

Does this mean that Shaukat will sell Pakistan short? No indication I assure you. He might bargain and get a better deal for Pakistan. But the winner is the National Assembly where it has been demonstrated time and again the openness with which matters are addressed. This is excellent for the purpose of setting up a dialogue and the surreptitious activities of the government could be kept in check. All modern governments [we are primitive] allow this debate to continue in the national assemblies and resolve issues in a civil manner. In the current governance culture consensus is arrived at through a process of managed democracy. The argument goes when political systems are managed why not the economic systems.

There are a number of such dissonances in the current governance of the country. The fact is that there are not very many who would be able to take on the complexities that are there. Governance is not a one to one act and especially in the field of nuclear technology. The attitudes and the development has to move pace with the technology and the more dangerous and the more hazardous the more transcendental the attitudes. Imagine what the Japanese requested of Pakistan but NS was adamant. Had we played the psychological game well Pakistan would not be a pariah country and may be, just may be, well on the way to becoming a nation.

I tried to figure out the cost of our nuclear program. Despite concentrated efforts the cost figures are not available. So I went through the other countries and I found that Iraq had spent about 89 billion dollars. Now that is a hefty sum and could have done so much for the country and its economic well being. The fact that it was used for saber rattling has led to what it is at the moment. Evidence coming out of the interviews suggests that the Kargil episode had much more to it than was indicated to the decision makers of the time.

It was also apparent that when NS was going to Kargil to try and see for himself some of the Khakis were trying to promote people to civil jobs. My guesstimate is that about 100 billion dollars came from elsewhere courtesy Mr. ZA Bhutto. He was a great proponent of this and wanted to see the Pakistanis match India in technology on the war front. Had this 100 billion been better used what could have happened to our debt and what could have happened to our poverty program? Would we have to beg, borrow, and steal?

These are now hypothetical questions. The question now is having got the weapon is it a liability round our neck or are we Pakistanis still comfortable with the fact that we have matched our arch enemy? If things have changed vis a vis India someone should tell me and I shall stand corrected.

Recently sycophants were saying Kargil changed all this. How? What is the basis for airing this opinion except to curry favor with its author? I have some questions to ask of the Director Operations of the time. But he is not available because he is busy in correcting the affairs of Pakistan cricket since 1999. As a loose canon in the hands of the nearest to the homo sapiens Pakistani decision makers have to take their discussion to the level to which it should normally belong.

Money wisely spent in the service of the people of Pakistan is money well spent. But then bankers have never learnt to spend money they have only learnt how to collect and collectors they all are. Does it mean that Shaukat Aziz will barter Pakistan away? No and yes. He has the chance of a lifetime to steer the rudder to safer waters and make a clean breast of it.

In the near future if some one thinks that they can get something by force they are mistaken. In fact strong institutional changes are needed not only in the civil service but in all the segments of this society. There are no holy cows any more. Those days are over and the sooner we realize that we are in the realm of reason and reason that is applied compassionately the better it will be for the country and its people. But the reason part is the more difficult. One can build the Atom Bomb but the reason configuration is rather difficult.

My own brilliant class mates are the ones involved. There brilliance has taken them to destructive powers. The others who had chosen the productive path have relatively little to offer this country except a better civil society.

We come back to the main actor in this drama. The central figure seems to be Shaukat Aziz and we know that the Americans can be very patient and the targets that are set by them need some one to project. They had that opportunity and they seized it. The Finance Minister came from elsewhere, the State Bank Governor came from other sources. A case can be made out of how this team has played havoc with the country and its thinking. The order seems to be that the more the educated the worse the decisions and the implementation. The articulate can make any thing stick. Since all this is in the future one can strut around and then at the end of the day say bad luck.

The breaks never came my way. They had been telling the CEO General Pervez Musharraf that poverty was on the decline. They tell me the parameters and I bet you that the evidence available will convict these major players for not only their deeds but also their lopsided thinking.

The question remains to be answered. Why did Shaukat Aziz visit the nuclear site? The answers are all ambiguous for they have been interpreted differently. Can Pakistan change its foreign policy and hence its defense policy? Can Pakistan use this destructive aspect and change it to a productive base. Can all Pakistanis be nationalized on a decent and ease of option basis or should people be crushed?

What crimes have been committed by the people living in the border to suffer the consequences of the effects of those living in comfort in Islamabad?

The options are clear. Either we maintain a nuclear program under the aegis of the world body or we roll it back or we give it up and concentrate on the well being of the people of this country. There is no other way out.

My choice would be to work this amount on the well being of the people. There is much to do. The debt could be retired, the economic wealth of the nation could be increased, and funds wasted by bloated chesty and unchaste people could be saved for better use. The opportunity cost of this money is dear. We could have been proud of ourselves and found a place in the comity of nations. It can still be done. It’s a long haul and cannot be done by the present economic team which believes in talking and not performing, which lies in your face and does not place facts as they are. Can they walk their talk? Let them try and play with a straight bat rather than a crooked hockey stick.
PS: Amir Mir is a fresh towering role model in our otherwise morally, financially and ethically corrupt society. My hats off to this young and defiant editor of our times


Posted by John Umrao (Member # 3015) on 09 July 2003, 03:21 PM:

Every life we has some trouble
When you worry you make it double
Don't worry, be happy ho…
(Don't worry, be happy yeah)
Uh uh uh uh don't worry be happy….(4x)

One more term and N Korea
will vanish from the globe
(Don't worry, be happy yeah)
Uh uh uh uh don't worry be happy….(4x)


Posted by Viren (Member # 4031) on 10 July 2003, 09:03 AM:

Statement of Magnus Ranstorp to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
quote:

As the world scrambled to pre-empt another 'mega-terrorist' attack with an unprecedented coalition waging a global war on terrorism and as the U.S. unleashed its military against the Taliban regime and al-Qaeda camps within Afghanistan, CNN's investigative team in Kabul located a manual entitled 'Super bomb' - a manual that contained the words 'nuclear fission, isotopes and heating temperatures for uranium-235 and 238.' This 'Super bomb' was not a manual for a workable nuclear fissionable device, though al-Qaeda had received extensive scientific assistance from Pakistani nuclear physicists according to intelligence sources. Instead the manual contained al-Qaeda's blueprint for the detonation of a radiological device - a so-called 'dirty bomb.'




Posted by John Umrao (Member # 3015) on 10 July 2003, 03:35 PM:

Musharraf hoodwinked US: Expert

PTI[ THURSDAY, JULY 10, 2003 03:19:40 PM ]

NEW DELHI: Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf has "blatantly lied" to the United States about the supply of Pakistani nuclear technology to North Korea, a leading South Asia expert has said.

"Musharraf had blatantly lied to (US Secretary of State Colin) Powell that no Pakistani nuclear technology had been supplied to North Korea", renowned American expert Selig S Harrison told 'South Asia Tribune' in an interview.

Harrison, who is the Asia Director at Washington-based Center for International Policy, was also quoted as saying, "British intelligence contacts at the Pakistani High Commission in London last year obtained incriminating documents that Musharraf was fully involved in supplying uranium enrichment technology to Pyongyang".

He told the Pakistani web magazine that the idea of "lionising" Musharraf was wrong as the Pakistani General was "badly isolated at home and was totally dependent on US economic life support for his political survival".

Harrison, a former Bureau Chief of Washington Post in South Asia, expressed concern that "some of the latest Nodong missiles from North Korea may have been purchased by Musharraf through hard cash originally meant for social uplift," the magazine said.

Stating that "duplicity had been a hallmark of Musharraf during his entire military career", he said in the last elections "while vowing (US-led anti-terror) alliance to end terrorism, his (Musharraf's) administration at the same time ensured the victory of fundamentalists in the two provinces of Frontier and Baluchistan".

The wearing of caps of the army chief and the President was "a mockery of democracy", he added in the interview.
**************
"The road to Nucklear disarmament starts in Islamabad travels thru Bejing and ends in Pongyong " Spnster 1999


Posted by Arun A (Member # 3120) on 10 July 2003, 09:09 PM:

ft.com..I think this will be subscription-only in a few days..

Plenty of intelligence but few facts available on North Korea's weapons of mass destruction

When US satellitesdetected a bigunderground construction site at Kumchang-niin North Korea five years ago, reports quickly surfaced that Washington believed the communist state was building a nuclear reprocessing plant.

The US alleged last October that North Korea had supplemented its Yongbyon-based nuclear activities with a second programme, using highly-enriched uranium (HEU). Washington is believed to have reached the conclusion after tracking shipments of nuclear technology from Pakistan to North Korea, although this is denied by Islamabad.

Diplomats say the intelligence about North Korea's HEU programme is much firmer than the US and British evidence of Iraq's alleged imports of uranium from Niger. However, Washington does not know where in North Korea the HEU programme is located, nor how advanced it is.


Posted by jrjrao (Member # 3103) on 14 July 2003, 04:19 AM:

Op-ed in the WSJ today.


July 14, 2003
COMMENTARY

Nuclear Terrorism Poses The Gravest Threat Today

By GRAHAM ALLISON

What is the gravest threat to the lives and liberties of Europeans and Americans today? Europeans and Americans differ profoundly in their answers to this fundamental question. Recent conversations with 100 security experts at NATO in Brussels and in Berlin, London and Athens underscored for me just how profoundly.

The American security community is unanimous. Democrats as well as Republicans agree with the Bush administration that the gravest threat to civilization as we know it is the marriage of terrorism with weapons of mass destruction. The specter is not just 9/11, but a nuclear 9/11.

Europeans disagree. Many express a mixture of skepticism and bemusement with what they imagine is a peculiar Bush fixation. Even as good a friend of America as Czech President Vaclav Klaus summarized his own view of the matter in what he called "a fundamental question: Was 9/11 an isolated act, or typical of phenomena the world will face in the first half of the 21st century?"

Beneath the headlines, deeper trendlines point to the latter. The relentless diffusion of deadly technologies allows progressively smaller groups to wreak increasingly greater destruction. Globalization has enhanced terrorists' ability to travel, communicate, and transport weapons. America's overwhelming dominance on all conventional battlefields drives rational adversaries to asymmetric responses like WMD terrorism.

In 1993, an al Qaeda-linked terrorist, Ramzi Yousef, tried to collapse the World Trade Center by exploding a truck filled with fertilizer-based explosives. Had that same truck carried an elementary nuclear weapon, the blast would have vaporized not just the World Trade Center, but also the entire New York financial district. Two miles from ground zero, only the shells of buildings would remain.

Imagine an equivalent explosion in Paris at the Eiffel Tower -- a terrorist target, as demonstrated by the 1994 attempt to crash an airliner into it. The result would be absolute devastation out to the Arc de Triomphe, with substantial destruction out to and encompassing the Louvre.

How likely is such an event? No one knows. But if we followed the methodology of Sherlock Holmes in analyzing crime, we would examine "MMO": motive, means and opportunity.

Before 9/11, experts debated motive. Conventional wisdom concluded that terrorists sought not to maximize victims, but rather publicity that could engender sympathy for their cause. Post 9/11, bin Laden's spokesman, Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, announced that al Qaeda had "the right to kill four million Americans, including one million children," in response to casualties perceived to have been inflicted on Muslims.

If motivated, could terrorists acquire the means for a nuclear attack? Because of the vastness of its arsenal and stockpile of highly enriched uranium and plutonium, Russia remains the most probable source of a nuclear weapon or material from which one could be made. Despite a decade of significant improvement, many of these weapons remain vulnerable to theft by a serious organized effort. Pakistan is next on the list, given close historical links between elements in its security services and al Qaeda. Next comes North Korea, the world's most promiscuous proliferator.

Were al Qaeda terrorists to acquire a nuclear device, could they successfully seize an opportunity to bring it to Paris, London, Berlin or Rome? As a colleague of mine has noted, they could always wrap it in a bale of marijuana. Reviewing this evidence, the world's most successful investor, Warren Buffett, has concluded: "It will happen. It's inevitable."

September 11 awakened Americans to existential vulnerability. The Bush administration has led the American security community to one profound conclusion: The status quo is fatally flawed. The U.N.-chartered, rule-based international security order that was accepted pre-9/11 leaves America or Europe vulnerable to a series of nuclear 9/11s. Such conditions are incompatible with our survival as free nations whose fundamental institutions and values are intact.

The assault on the World Trade Center shocked Americans into recognizing that the leading nations were essentially standing by and letting this happen. In an Afghan sanctuary, behind the accepted shield of sovereign immunity, al Qaeda trained thousands of terrorists for attacks like 9/11. The West's perceived helplessness emboldened groups like al Qaeda. In Osama bin Laden's apt metaphor, the West had become the "weak horse" that could be defied with impunity.

What President Bush surely has right is the conviction that the U.S. and other civilized nations can no longer allow the presumption of sovereign immunity to permit developments inconsistent with our common survival. In a process of fits and starts the Bush administration is seeking to invent a new "new" world order. Confronting both Iran and North Korea's aspirations for nuclear arsenals, the administration has been enlisting European Union support to just say no.

***
What the Bush administration has not yet fashioned is a coherent strategy for combating WMD terrorism. Such a strategy will have to be multi-layered, from detection at borders to denial of weapons and materials; all-azimuth, from space to container cargo on ships; and root-and-branch, addressing motivations as well as means.

For Europeans committed to partnership with the United States, this unprecedented threat presents a grand opportunity. Europeans should not simply enlist in the American-led campaign. Rather, they should marshal their own intelligence and strategic sense to design and create an international order in which such catastrophic threats can be prevented.


Mr. Allison is director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government.

URL for this article:
http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB105813273777796800,00.html


Posted by Tim (Member # 272) on 14 July 2003, 07:19 AM:

Arun A,

Actually,that's NOT what I said. What I said was that the near-term concern for North Korean nuclear capbilities lies in the issue of reprocessing Pu from existing spent fuel rods - a program that did not have Pakistani involvement. The HEU program, which was based on Pakistani assistance, is at least 3-5 years away from completion.

My point was that North Korea has TWO programs - one apparently capped by the Agreed Framework, which provides the near-term threat, and one begun with Pakistani assistance which bypassed the Agreed Framework and constitutes a longer-term, but still significant, capability.

Tim


Posted by John Umrao (Member # 3015) on 14 July 2003, 08:28 AM:

It is dumb to expect N Korea to produce EU to make bomb, they will use the EU to produce Pu.

EU bomb is too heavy, very energy intensive.
As usual the S Asian experts here are trying to shield the TSP from culpability. After all TSP had been certified as a rational nucklear power well ahead of India.


Posted by Amber G. (Member # 4967) on 14 July 2003, 05:09 PM:

From Duke University Media clips an article about Fuel-rod treatment is claimed


Posted by jrjrao (Member # 3103) on 15 July 2003, 05:38 PM:

Dung op-ed edges that much closer to the edge:

Nuclear silhouette
quote:


The American intelligence believes that infiltrated al-Qaeda fighters are sheltered in Pakistan and aided by military/intelligence agencies....

What's being posed is a nation penetrated by lured Islamic radicals, in precarious possession of nuclear and reportedly proliferating them to other dictatorial countries. For US, the fabricated excuse that Pakistan cannot put a tight lid on its nuclear proliferation activities gives a false incentive to intervene. After all if kegs could disappear from the Russian inventory, who says Pakistan can't misplace a few. In fact... I wonder if US has given thought to the possibility of one sitting in Washington this very moment. Or maybe London or even Delhi for all that we know...

...the fact remains that someone is waiting to change the fate of Pakistan's nuclear. Somebody is sniffing around for an excuse. Somebody else really wants to screech, 'I told you so'. Somebody is misleading someone somewhere for some reason. Someone is about to smirk, 'Guess who!'...And it isn't me, nor is it you...

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003

Postby Arun A » 04 Aug 2003 21:05

Iran Closes In on Ability to Build a Nuclear Bomb

Tehran's reactor program masks strides toward weapons capability, a Times investigation finds. France warns against exports to Islamic Republic

But a three-month investigation by The Times — drawing on previously secret reports, international officials, independent experts, Iranian exiles and intelligence sources in Europe and the Middle East — uncovered strong evidence that Iran's commercial program masks a plan to become the world's next nuclear power. The country has been engaged in a pattern of clandestine activity that has concealed weapons work from international inspectors. Technology and scientists from Russia, China, North Korea and Pakistan have propelled Iran's nuclear program much closer to producing a bomb than Iraq ever was.

As early as 1989, Pakistani generals offered to sell Iran nuclear weapons technology. Abdul Qadeer Khan, a Pakistani nuclear scientist regarded by the United States as a purveyor of nuclear secrets, has helped Iran for years. "Pakistan's role was bigger from the beginning than we thought," said a Middle Eastern intelligence official.

In addition to China and Russia, Pakistan and North Korea have played central roles in Iran's nuclear program, according to foreign intelligence officers and confidential reports prepared by the French government and a Middle Eastern intelligence service.

North Korean technicians worked for years helping Iran develop the Shahab-3 missile, unveiled last month in Tehran. A foreign intelligence official and a former Iranian intelligence officer said the Koreans are now working on a longer-range Shahab-4 and providing assistance on designs for a nuclear warhead.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003

Postby Rangudu » 06 Aug 2003 02:22

LA Times Editorial

Pakistan has been less helpful. President Pervez Musharraf denies that his country has provided nuclear assistance to Iran, despite ample contrary evidence. Washington should make clear to him that Pakistan must help stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Iran's atomic aspirations, abetted by the North Koreans, also underscore why the United States and the world need to engage Pyongyang to curb its rogue nuclear programs.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003

Postby AJay » 06 Aug 2003 03:10

From LA Times article

Technology and scientists from Russia, China, North Korea and Pakistan have propelled Iran's...

is in actuality

Technology and scientists from Russia, China, China (via North Korea), and China (via Pakistan) have propelled Iran's...

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003

Postby Arun A » 11 Aug 2003 17:37

John Bolton is the Foggy Bottom non-proliferation ayatollah...so the North Koreans weren't off the mark by much.

THE NUCLEAR COSA NOSTRA

August 11, 2003 -- AFTER hurling some choice diplomatic words such as "human scum" and "bloodsucker" at State Department Under Secretary John Bolton last week, North Korea finally agreed to discuss its nuclear weapons program next month in Beijing at the Six-Party Talks (U.S., Japan, South Korea, Russia, China and North Korea.)
But on the heels of this promising development came bad news: The Los Angeles Times reported last Monday that Iran now has highly enriched uranium, secret nuclear labs and scientists from Russia, China, Pakistan and (tahdah!) North Korea running around the country working on nuclear and missile projects.

Then came unconfirmed reports that North Korea plans to export its long-range Taepo Dong-2 missile to Iran, letting Tehran strike as far away as London. (It can already reach Israel.)

It is completely plausible that the North Koreans, Pakistanis and Iranians are working together on ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons, with some help from Chinese and Russians scientists. Heck, it's likely.

This cabal of the world's most notorious weapons proliferators has long roots. For instance, the Russians fathered North Korea's nuclear program during the Cold War. In the '90s, Moscow built nuclear reactors for Tehran (and is still probably providing technical assistance). The Chinese begat the Pakistani nuclear weapons program that came into full bloom in 1998. And Pakistan has likely assisted North Korea's and Iran's atomic quests. China may have also given Iran fissile material in 1991.

Pyongyang, for its part, has helped Islamabad and Tehran with their missile programs. North Korea has sold both nations its No-Dong medium-range missiles, which are the basis for Pakistan's nuclear-capable Ghauri and Iran's Shahab ballistic missiles.

Tehran and Pyongyang have also collaborated on nuclear matters. The number of North Korean technicians in Iran is sufficient to warrant an exclusive Caspian Sea resort for their use. Equally alarming, Pakistan has been implicated in nuclear dealings with the terrorist-supporting nations of Libya and Syria.



The apparent willingness of these diverse regimes to share nuclear secrets is alarming. And considering the company they keep, the possibility that these weapons might eventually fall into the hands of other rogue regimes - or terrorists - is legitimate cause for insomnia.

Can anything be done short of sending the Marines over the beaches? Fortunately, yes. America should:

* Move ahead on the Bush administration's Proliferation Security Initiative, which includes planning for the land, air and sea interdiction of nuclear contraband, should diplomacy with North Korea (or Iran) not look promising. Cutting off North Korea's export of missiles (and the hard currency flows, which sustain the regime) would squeeze Kim Jong Il and convince him we're deadly serious.

* Tighten the economic-sanctions noose around Iran for its noncompliance with U.N. nuclear inspections. Get the European Union to put its trade agreement with Iran on the line. And push Japan, France and Britain to curtail high-dollar Iranian energy deals until Tehran forswears a nuclear future. The Iranian economy is already in the doldrums - making it worse will make the mullahs squirm and the students even more restive.

* Insist Moscow halt all cooperation with Iran's nuclear program and use its influence to get Tehran to open to full inspections.

* Demand Pakistan end all support for Iran's and North Korea's programs (and all others); condition aid and the vitality of the Washington-Islamabad relationship on agreement.

* Get Beijing to curtail its proliferation activities and lean on Islamabad to comply.

* Educate other countries about the clandestine front companies that smuggle nuclear contraband, and insist they shut them down.

* Bring North Korea and Iran's brigand-like behavior before the U.N. Security Council, forcing member nations to take a stand on proliferation.

These measures are certainly not a panacea for these nuclear nightmares. The international community must pull together to defeat nuclear proliferation, or there is no telling where it will end. But taking tough steps now could preclude the possibility of a nuclear Iran, North Korea, Libya, Syria - or worst of all: a nuclear al Qaeda.

Peter Brookes is a senior fellow for National Security Affairs at the Heritage Foundation (heritage.org)

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003

Postby svinayak » 15 Aug 2003 06:31

Nuclear weapons have created insecurity, say panelists

CHENNAI: India's nuclear weapons programme has only created more insecurity in the region, said panelists in a discussion held recently in connection with the publication of the book "Prisoners of the Nuclear Dream."

Pakistan also followed suit soon after Pokhran-II and shortly, India had to deal with a conventional war with its neighbour, pointed out co-editor of the book and Deputy Editor of The Hindu C Rammanohar Reddy.

But what was more alarming was the silence and in some cases, support for the tests from the intellectuals, said Rammanohar Reddy.

And that was how "Prisoners of the Nuclear Dream" was born, he said.

The passive acceptance of the tests was so widespread that the US-based physicist M V Ramana and Rammanohar Reddy decided to compile arguments against India's nuclear weapons programme from the point of view of scientists, defence personnel, economists and journalists.

The contributors to the book include Kanti Bajpai, Admiral Ramdas, Ejaz Haider, Ye Zhengjia, Amartya Sen, Amulya K N Reddy, M V Ramana, Siddharth Mallavarapu, Jean Dreze, V Krishna Ananth, Srirupa Roy, Rammanohar Reddy, Surendra Gadekar and Thomas George.

Panelist and convenor of "Movement Against Nuclear Weapons" J Sriraman said nuclear hawks here were supporting India's nuclear weapons programme by citing that US attacked a non-nuclear Iraq, but not North Korea which is supposed to have nuclear weapons.

"Iraq was attacked for its oil," said Sriraman. Moreover, the country's strategic geo-political position in relation to West Asia made it convenient for US to wage a war on Iraq, he added.

Fellow panelist and senior assistant editor of The Hindu V Krishna Ananth said a large section of the Indian political class, including the Left parties, did not find anything wrong when the BJP-led coalition government conducted Pokhran-II.

This attitude, he said, was more dangerous than the weapons themselves because it not only showed a lack of respect for human life, but the passive acceptance due to the fear of being dubbed as an "anti-national".

The scope of the discussion was widened when V Pugazhendi, a member of "Doctors for a Safer Environment", dwelt at length on the health hazards faced by the Kalpakkam residents.

The scientist's angle was provided by D Indumathi, member of "Indian Scientists Against Nuclear Weapons" and Tamil Nadu Science Forum.

According to her, scientists should provide basic information about nuclear weapons to the public so that they would be able to make an informed choice.
-

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003

Postby Arun A » 15 Aug 2003 19:41

[url=http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A60042-2003Aug14.html]N. Korea Shops Stealthily for Nuclear Arms Gear
[/url]

Front Companies Step Up Efforts in European Market

The dimensions of the tubes suggest to nuclear experts that North Korea is attempting to build a type of gas centrifuge designed by the European consortium Urenco -- a design stolen by Pakistani scientists in the 1970s. The Urenco centrifuge uses an aluminum casing that is roughly the same size as the tubes exported by Optronic, said David Albright, a physicist and president of the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003

Postby P Babu » 15 Aug 2003 23:29

The scope of the discussion was widened when V Pugazhendi, a member of "Doctors for a Safer Environment", dwelt at length on the health hazards faced by the Kalpakkam residents.
Driving the car is dangerous because of accidents, and the solution is increase safety features in car, and the solution is not getting rid of car. If nuclear plants are dangerous, then it is scientific community's duty to make it safety.

All the parties supported Pokran-II, not out of fear or anything. There was popular support for Pokran test among people who realized that there is dangerous from our nothern neighbor. Politicians who want to speak were silenced by people's voice [democracy at work].

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003

Postby Raj Singh » 18 Aug 2003 12:50

Why Americans looked the other way as Pakistan made the bomb

* Book claims Zia assured US congressmen Pakistan would not build a delivery system
* US believed cutting aid could replace Zia with anti-US govt
* CIA started replacing Ojhri weapons soon after blast

WASHINGTON: General Ziaul Haq extracted a promise from President Ronald Reagan as the war in Afghanistan raged that Pakistan would work with the CIA against the Soviets in return for massive US aid and a US promise “to look the other way” when it came to Pakistan’s nuclear programme, which was then on the verge of producing a weapon.

According to ‘Charlie Wilson’s War,’ a book about former congressman Charlie Wilson, Zia had no illusions about Reagan standing up for Pakistan if Congress found out what was going on. Stephen Solarz, chairman of the sub-committee in the House dealing with South Asia was no friend of Pakistan and was getting ready to order hearings so that aid to Pakistan could be cut.

The book says that in 1985, the CIA had managed to penetrate Pakistan’s nuclear programme and was reporting on its progress. At the Solarz hearings, the CIA said that if funding to Pakistan was cut, Gen Zia might present a bill to the US for helping the CIA in Afghanistan running into several billion dollars a year. Zia told Washington’s UN ambassador Vernon Walters that Pakistan was not making a bomb.

When later two senior State Department officials told the military president that he had misrepresented the situation, Zia replied, “It is permissible to lie for Islam.” Despite continuing US pressure, Pakistan did not stop work on the bomb.

Wilson, the book claims, was also responsible for “putting Pakistan and Israel together” in a “back channel of communications and areas of mutual interest that they were pursuing. This was of enormous value to Pakistan which otherwise would have had to worry more about Israel sending planes or saboteurs to blow up its nuclear facilities.”

Wilson maintains in the book that it was clear to the administration that “without Zia running Pakistan by martial law, there could be no Afghan war”. Solarz, who was working ceaselessly to have all aid to Pakistan cut off, was confronted at a Pakistan embassy dinner by Zbigniew Brzezinski, former US national security adviser, who asked him point blank if he knew what the success of his move would result in. The Afghan resistance would collapse. The Soviets would triumph. The Zia government in Pakistan would disappear and be replaced by an anti-American one in Pakistan armed with a nuclear weapon.

To fight the opposition to Pakistan in Congress, Wilson organised a powerful delegation to Pakistan during the Thanksgiving holiday when Americans normally don’t leave home. In a speech at the official banquet, he turned to Zia and said, “Mr President, as far I’m concerned you can make all the bombs you want because you are our friends and they, the Indians, are our enemies. But not all Americans feel the same way, and there are some questions, Mr President, that you have to answer because this issue is getting hot.” In answer, Zia put away his prepared speech, sent out all the attendants, had the door bolted and assured the congressmen that Pakistan’s nuclear programme was peaceful and that it would never build a delivery system. He said at this stage in the Afghan war, if the Americans cut off aid, it would amount to a “betrayal of history.”

He said whether there was American aid or not, Pakistan would continue to fight the Soviets. He also declared that Pakistan was not prepared to accept any “conditional elements”. The final decision on what to do with Pakistan was to be taken at the joint conference between the relevant House and Senate committees. Wilson’s adroit lobbying bore fruit and Pakistan won the day. Wilson thinks that the Zia victory in Congress was an important factor in the Soviet decision to pull out of Afghanistan.

The book says Zia stalled the Geneva talks for a month to give the CIA enough time to stockpile weapons in Pakistan to deal with the remnants of Soviet-backed elements in Afghanistan after the pullout. These weapons were stored at the Ojhri Camp which blew up and with it went $100 million worth war equipment, made up of 30,000 rockets, millions of rounds of ammunition, vast number of mines, Stingers, SA-7s, Blowpipes, Milan anti-tank missiles, multiple-barrel rocket launchers and mortars. A hundred Pakistanis died and 1,000 were injured.

Zia called his ambassador in Washington, Jamshed KA Marker, and asked him to tell the CIA and Wilson to replace the weapons. Within 24 hours, huge US cargo planes were unloading Stingers and other weapons into Pakistan direct from the frontline stores of NATO.

In 1988, Wilson rushed to Islamabad to attend Gen Zia’s funeral. He walked up to Gen Hamid Gul, Gen. Akhtar Abdul Rehman’s successor, broke into tears and said, “I have lost my father on this day.” The victory parade in Kabul that Wilson and Zia had planned was to have both of them riding white horses side by side down the main avenue with the Mujahideen lining the street and shouting Allah au Akbar.

Wilson was planning to get married in Pakistan and it was going to be a grand occasion with all those who had played a role in the CIA’s conduct of the Afghan war. However, the wedding did not take place nor would the CIA have allowed all those who had played such an important role in the war to be publicly identified.

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_18-8-2003_pg1_1

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003

Postby Raj Singh » 18 Aug 2003 13:42

Wilson was planning to get married in Pakistan and it was going to be a grand occasion with all those who had played a role in the CIA’s conduct of the Afghan war.
This reminds me of Sunil S once saying on this board, the pleasures Pakistanis offer to the likes of S Cohen...

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003

Postby ptraj » 21 Aug 2003 19:05

Hoagland bashes Pakistan again:

"Russia and China give some signs of being sobered by the awareness that they have helped create nuclear Frankenstein's monsters in North Korea, Pakistan and soon in Iran. Awareness is not enough. They must now become part of the solution rather than of a globe-endangering problem"

web page

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003

Postby Div » 23 Aug 2003 22:39

From the recent arrest of TaliPakis in Canada.

Other associates have access to nuclear gauges used in construction that contain cesium-137, a possible ingredient for a dirty bomb, while one of the raided homes had airplane schematics and pictures of guns on the wall, the briefing says.

"It certainly gives one cause for concern, there's no doubt about that," said Premier Ernie Eves when asked about the arrests. He added that standards for security at nuclear plants are determined by the federal government.
http://canada.com/national/story.asp?id=649AA681-EA43-4EBE-97C9-EAB2CE9D78DA

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003

Postby Roop » 24 Aug 2003 01:24

Re. the Pakis and their "nuclear gauges":

What are the nuclear gauges that everyone is talking about. Do they mean Geiger-Mueller counters?

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003

Postby Div » 24 Aug 2003 02:44

I think so.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003

Postby arun » 25 Aug 2003 10:00

Originally posted by Arun A:
[url=http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A60042-2003Aug14.html]N. Korea Shops Stealthily for Nuclear Arms Gear
[/url]
Here is Part I of the two part series, which I think was missed on BR (?).

This is on the seizure of the North Korean ship by India at Kandla.

The URL :

On North Korean Freighter, a Hidden Missile Factory.

Two excerpts from the article.

Excerpt I :

"In the past we had seen missiles or engine parts, but here was an entire assembly line for missiles offered for sale," said an Indian government official familiar with the discovery. "This was a complete technology transfer."
And Excerpt II :

While the ship was somewhere en route, Indian customs officials were tipped off to its possible contraband. The Kuwolsan was rumored to be carrying arms or ammunition, perhaps intended for India's neighbor and rival, Pakistan . When the North Korean freighter steamed into Kandla on June 25, port officials were waiting for it.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003

Postby member_331 » 25 Aug 2003 10:24

I find the discussions on the thread to be just brilliant and insightful. Take for instance the latest news coup: http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_18-8-2003_pg1_1

If USA wants to promote US-Bharat bhai-bhai, the US policy makers should undo the damage done in pre-cold war days and de-nuke Pakistan in the post-cold war uni-polar world; US super-cop can do it.

Kalyan

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003

Postby Div » 26 Aug 2003 19:10

Terrorists getting nukes is Asia's greatest risk: Sinha
http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/holnus/03261902.htm
In an obvious reference to Pakistan, External Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha today warned that proliferation with the "attendant" risk of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists groups was now the "greatest" in Asia.

"This is particularly so in the immediate neighbourhood of India where it is possible to find the conjunction of authoritarian rule, religious fundamentalism, terrorism, drug trafficking and weapons of mass destruction," he said, delivering a lecture at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies here on the theme "Asia--A Period of Change".

Sinha, who is on a short visit to the city-state said, "some of the most deliberate and well-documented instances of nuclear and missile transfers have taken place in this (Asian) region".

Referring to yesterday's twin blasts in Mumbai that have claimed 52 lives, the Minister said India's commercial capital was deliberately chosen because what these terrorists and their sponsors envied the most was the country's success in the economic field.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003

Postby Rangudu » 27 Aug 2003 07:56

Iran Admits Foreign Help on Nuclear Facility

While Iran has not yet identified the source of the foreign help, evidence collected in Iran by the U.N. nuclear watchdog agency implicates Pakistani companies as suppliers of critical technology and parts, officials familiar with a U.N. investigation of Iran's program said yesterday. Pakistan is believed by many proliferation experts to have passed important nuclear secrets to both Iran and North Korea. Pakistan has denied providing such assistance.

The equipment said to be tainted was from a type of centrifuge acquired by Pakistani scientists in the 1970s and used in Pakistan's domestic nuclear program, two officials familiar with the findings said.

Iran told inspectors it acquired design plans for the centrifuge in 1987, although the transfer of technology appears to have continued over several years, officials said. Iranian officials promised to provide the IAEA with a full account of where it acquired each piece of equipment and how it was used, the officials said

Pakistan has never acknowledged providing uranium-enrichment technology to Iran. One of only a handful of countries that remain outside the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Pakistan technically is not bound by many of the international restrictions on the export of nuclear technology.

The possibility that Pakistan could be implicated in Iran's nuclear program presents a diplomatic challenge to the Bush administration, which has been reluctant to publicly criticize Pakistan because it has provided crucial assistance in the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan. :roll: :roll:

"The notion that Pakistan wasn't involved is getting less and less tenable," said Henry D. Sokolski, a top nonproliferation official in the Pentagon during the George H.W. Bush administration. [color=red]"Some might make the claim that this was something that happened in the past. But it wasn't all that long ago."</font>


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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003

Postby Umrao » 05 Sep 2003 18:07

Attn: N guru. Note the word "social work"

***
http://www.stratmag.com/issueMar-15/page01.htm
The 'father' of Pakistan's atomic bomb A.Q. Khan could be preparing to hire out his services to other Islamic countries. Khan hinted that could be one of his options <u>(including social work)</u> after Chief Executive Musharraf removed him as head of the Kahuta atomic complex and made him his scientific adviser. Khan has refused to accept the new post. Also kicked upstairs is Ishfaq Ahmed, head of the atomic energy commission. There are also unconfirmed reports that uranium enrichment has been stopped although this seems unlikely.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003

Postby Rangudu » 10 Sep 2003 22:02

From Nuclear Fuel magazine

Urenco report said to concur aluminum for DPRK fits centrifuge

Mark Hibbs, Bonn

7 July 2003
Nuclear Fuel - Vol. 28, No. 14

A confidential document compiled by Urenco experts in late June concurred with a report in NuclearFuel one month before that the dimensions of aluminum tubing sought by North Korean procurement agents in Germany last year met the design requirements for a Urenco gas centrifuge, German investigative sources said last week.

In May, Western officials told NuclearFuel that an investigation by customs intelligence agents in Germany had revealed that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) had tried to import 6061-T6 aluminum tubing matching the dimensions of casings for a rotor assembly for a G-2 Urenco centrifuge. The DPRK had ordered enough aluminum tubing to make equipment for about 3,500 centrifuges, estimated to have a throughput of about 5 SWU/machine/yr, enough to produce about 90 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium/yr (NF, 26 May, 3).

According to U.S. intelligence last fall, North Korea embarked on a crash centrifuge enrichment program in violation of the 1994 Agreed Framework, in which North Korea pledged to freeze its indigenous nuclear program. Procurement agents then sought aluminum for the centrifuges in Germany and elsewhere in Europe. A German firm this year exported a quantity of the tubing without obtaining required export authorizations, and the cargo was seized in Egypt in April. The dimensions of the tubing matched the casings for the G-2 machine, according to data provided to NuclearFuel by a former employee of MAN Technologie AG, then a Urenco partner, in 1990. The German government, monitoring nonproliferation-relevant developments and a pending criminal prosecution of suspects in the case, sought to confirm whether Urenco's data had been relied upon by procurement agents ordering equipment for a centrifuge enrichment program.

Thirty years ago, design data for the G-2 centrifuge was stolen by Pakistan. According to U.S. intelligence officials, the DPRK later obtained the design data for its centrifuge program from Pakistan notwithstanding steadfast denials by Islamabad. Pakistan Prime Minister Pervez Musharraf was in Berlin last week and again denied that Pakistan has proliferated its nuclear technology.

Sources said last week that Urenco experts examined the data in the attempted export case to North Korea and concluded that the material involved matched the requirements for their centrifuge. They said that the report compiled on the matter for German government has been classified by German authorities, but that the dimensions of equipment in the report were identical to data provided to NuclearFuel by Western officials in May.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003

Postby Rangudu » 11 Sep 2003 02:46

No URL

IAEA may explore suspected Iran-Pakistan enrichment link

Mark Hibbs, Bonn

4 August 2003

Nuclear Fuel, Volume 28, No. 16

Based on preliminary results from IAEA environmental samples taken last month at the centrifuge enrichment plant site at Natanz, officials in July considered dispatching Director General Mohamad ElBaradei to Pakistan to try to find out whether Iran had obtained material assistance in developing and building centrifuges from the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) in Kahuta, well-placed official sources told NuclearFuel.

Samples taken at Natanz by the IAEA in July indicated three discrete levels of U-235 above the 0.71% found in natural uranium, including a concentration of U-235 normally associated with high-enriched uranium (HEU).

Some officials initially interpreted the finding of HEU-levels of U-235 as a sign that Iran had secretly enriched uranium outside of IAEA safeguards. That was denied by ElBaradei on July 19 as ``speculation.'' An internal discussion of the finding, sources said a few days later, led experts to suggest instead that the U-235 in the samples may have resulted from contamination of equipment or materials at the Natanz site which were derived from a foreign enrichment program which had aided Iran.

Iran has steadfastly denied that it has enriched any uranium at Natanz, where it is presently installing centrifuges. The IAEA samples, officials said, were taken at the site of a nearly completed pilot plant which features about 160 centrifuges.

In mid-July, official sources said that during internal consideration of the sensitive issue it had been proposed that ElBaradei on short notice travel to a foreign country which may have assisted Iran's centrifuge enrichment program. Last week, with such a trip apparently not on ElBaradei's schedule, official sources identified that country as Pakistan.

Queried on July 29, officials in ElBaradei's office said that no travel has been planned until ElBaradei returns from vacation in mid-August. They would neither confirm nor deny that there was any internal discussion of whether ElBaradei should go on a mission to Pakistan. ``Right now there is enough work to do on Iran here in Vienna,'' one official said.

One source said on July 31 that, regardless of the interest at the IAEA in finding out whether Iran had obtained aid from Pakistan which might explain current and future sampling results at Iranian installations associated with the enrichment program, `'this would not be a good time, because Pakistan is still in total denial'' that KRL assisted Iran's program. `'ElBaradei wouldn't be able to get anything out of Pakistan now.''

In off-record discussions with Western government officials, he said, Pakistan's leaders `'will admit (KRL) helped North Korea but they won't admit yet that they helped Iran.'' :roll:

Earlier this year, sources with routine access to classified Western government dossiers on nuclear programs in Pakistan and Iran said that Iran obtained uranium enrichment know-how from KRL, providing the basis of the design for the Iranian centrifuge at Natanz (NF, 20 Jan., 1). Officials then disclosed that the centrifuge was a supercritical aluminum machine (NF, 7 March, Special). Last month, Vienna officials described the centrifuge as `'Urenco-derived'' and resembling in some technical aspects a supercritical machine with an aluminum rotor tube known as SNOR (NF, 14 July, Special).

Urenco executives said Iran could not have penetrated the Urenco program directly to obtain the design, since development of SNOR was frozen over a decade before Iran's centrifuge program got started. By then, Urenco had abandoned aluminum rotor tubes in favor of maraging steel and, afterwards, composite materials.

But the Netherlands concluded that KRL obtained the SNOR design after the scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan had stolen it in 1975, and that Pakistan set up some SNOR machines in Pakistan and began enriching uranium with them. Western government officials suspect the design in Pakistan then found its way into the hands of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. The U.S. government likewise believes that KRL provided the design of another centrifuge Khan purloined, the G-2, to North Korea (NF, 26 May, 2).


Vienna officials raising questions in mid-July about the sampling results at Natanz suggested that Iran may have also obtained enrichment-related equipment or materials from the Pakistan enrichment program which may have been contaminated with U-235, since, sources said, initial reports on the sampling did not prove Iranian enrichment by showing that U-234 or depleted uranium (DU) corroborated the U-235 findings. U-234, enriched together with U-235 in centrifuges, should be present in levels varying from near-zero for low-enriched uranium to about 1% for weapons-grade HEU. DU should also be present together with the U-234 and U-235 in amounts which precisely correlate to the enrichment level at specific product and tails assays. It would be theoretically possible, officials said last week, for Pakistan to tell the agency on the basis of KRL records whether its assay data for enriched uranium matched the results of sample-taking in Iran.

But while sources in mid-July suggested ElBaradei might be heading for Pakistan soon, sources reported at the end of the month that no trip was apparently planned imminently. Officials said that the IAEA will send another team into the field to take samples in Iran as early as this week. In addition to sample-taking at Natanz, the IAEA wants to take samples at other sites, including the Kalaye Electric Company, named by an Iranian opposition group as having hosted centrifuge development and enrichment.

At the same time, Israeli officials told media there last week that the U.S. has compiled a battery of questions which it wants to ask the Pakistan government regarding suspected assistance to Iran's enrichment program.

But with Pakistan resolutely denying any proliferation of its enrichment know-how, diplomatic sources said that the IAEA might now instead try to encourage Iran to divulge any links to the Pakistan enrichment program, toward the goal of overcoming rapidly mounting pressure from the board of governors which in September or November could result in a call for United Nations Security Council sanctions related to technical violations by Iran of its safeguards agreement, given that Iran has thus far refused to sign and implement the Additional Protocol for safeguards, and that key board members deeply suspect that Iran has secretly enriched uranium. `'If Iran can explain the presence of HEU-levels of U-235 at Natanz by having imported equipment or working with people from (KRL), it would be in their best interest to do that,'' one Vienna official said.

Intelligence sources said that the U.S. suspected that Iran obtained design help from KRL by the early 1990s. That may have been about the same time, according to documents which surfaced during the IAEA's invesigation of Iraq's nuclear program, that Khan apparently offered to sell KRL's know-how to that country (NF, 3 Feb., 3). The sources suggested last week that, during the mid-1990s, Iran might have also obtained some parts from SNOR machines or small cascades in Pakistan that were no longer required since KRL--like Urenco itself over a decade before--had given up on the aluminum centrifuge in favor of a more powerful model.

At that time, Pakistan was ruled by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, described by one former U.S. government official as having `'lost control'' over Khan and KRL. Khan, he said, acted increasingly independently from Islamabad in charting the course of Pakistan's strategic nuclear program, until he was fired by the government as head of KRL in 2001, ostensibly for embezzlement.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003

Postby Rangudu » 11 Sep 2003 20:48

A very good summary of recent TSP-DPRK nuclear collaboration and the US reaction from JINSA.

Pakistan-North Korea Weapons Trade Continued Through 2002

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003

Postby Umrao » 11 Sep 2003 22:19

What if Iran had out source Uranium ore to TSP and get it enriched and shipped back?

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003

Postby Rangudu » 13 Sep 2003 03:15

N. Korea Working on Missile Accuracy

The SS-N-6 is estimated to have a range of 1,497 to 1,920 miles. If that is true, the missile alone would not be powerful enough to hit Los Angeles, which is about 5,900 miles from Pyongyang. The question is whether the new North Korean missile is a three-stage missile — an SS-N-6 with the two-stage Taepodong 2 on top of it, Pike said.

If so, it might be able to deliver a nuclear warhead to Los Angeles or other U.S. cities. North Korea is believed to be attempting to miniaturize its nuclear warheads, based on relatively sophisticated, smaller designs tested by Pakistan in 1998, Pike said.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003

Postby Rangudu » 27 Sep 2003 01:10

New Iran uranium find reinforces bomb fears

Tehran explains the presence of weapons-grade uranium by tracing it to centrifuge equipment bought covertly on the black market. Pakistan is the prime suspect as the source of the imported equipment. The IAEA ultimatum a fortnight ago also required any countries which have supplied Iran with centrifuge equipment to assist in the investigation.

Diplomats said intense efforts were under way to receive answers from Islamabad, but the results were not yet clear. :roll:

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003

Postby AJay » 27 Sep 2003 01:16

From artcile posted by Rangudu:
New Iran uranium find reinforces bomb fears

[b]Diplomats said intense efforts were under way to receive answers from Islamabad, but the results were not yet clear. :roll:
[/b]
Basically they made some phone calls and left messages with the Bakwasi clone and eagerly waiting for a return call. :rotfl:

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003

Postby ramana » 27 Sep 2003 01:31

From the Mark Hibss article posted by R
Intelligence sources said that the U.S. suspected that Iran obtained design help from KRL by the early 1990s. That may have been about the same time, according to documents which surfaced during the IAEA's invesigation of Iraq's nuclear program, that Khan apparently offered to sell KRL's know-how to that country (NF, 3 Feb., 3). The sources suggested last week that, during the mid-1990s, Iran might have also obtained some parts from SNOR machines or small cascades in Pakistan that were no longer required since KRL--like Urenco itself over a decade before--had given up on the aluminum centrifuge in favor of a more powerful model.

At that time, Pakistan was ruled by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, described by one former U.S. government official as having `'lost control'' over Khan and KRL. Khan, he said, acted increasingly independently from Islamabad in charting the course of Pakistan's strategic nuclear program, until he was fired by the government as head of KRL in 2001, ostensibly for embezzlement.
So the story is released and the scape goat also highlighted!!!

But seriously could this have happened taking into account the TSP domestic compulsions - Shia Sunni divide, competetion with Iran for Afghan hegemony etc etc... Also TSP's stuff didint work that is why the Chinese had to step in. So is there someone else behind the Iranis? All in all very convienent to blame AQK from thief to smuggler to proliferator? BTW what is his religious inclinations? I know he is from Bhopal.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003

Postby svinayak » 27 Sep 2003 01:44

Originally posted by ramana:
All in all very convienent to blame AQK from thief to smuggler to proliferator? BTW what is his religious inclinations? I know he is from Bhopal.
Khan has a photo in his office of dead bodies of muslims on the train coming from India after partition in 1947. There is no need for religious affilitation.

The hand of chicom is being hidden in all this tamasha.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003

Postby ramana » 27 Sep 2003 01:55

A, Emotional responses will not cloud the mind of the closet jihadi. Moreover the RATS would have kept a firm check on the AQK's shenanigans for their own reasons.

I am sure that it does matter to TSP if Iran goes over the wall. Soon after Chagai there were disgruntled comments from Tehran worrying about the Sunnah having acquired the magic weapons and they even sent their foreign minister to Islamabad to read the tea leaves.
So something is not right with this story.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003

Postby Div » 27 Sep 2003 02:18

Originally posted by acharya:
The hand of chicom is being hidden in all this tamasha.
Not in this instance;

Apart from terrorist campaigns designed to persuade India to give up the Vale of Kashmir and to put Taliban fanatics back in control in Afghanistan, Pakistan, with its nuclear weapons, has the potential of contributing to much wider destabilization.

Its nuclear bomb is a Chinese bomb, and it has an estimated one dozen to two dozen of them. But Pakistan also acquired nuclear components illegally, and this led the United States to refuse to deliver to it some 28 F-16 fighter planes. Moreover, Western officials have confirmed that Islamabad transferred Chinese nuclear-weapons technology to both Iran and North Korea -- in the latter case, in exchange for missiles with which Pakistan's generals targeted Indian cities. Gen. Musharraf threatened to use these nuclear-tipped missiles in 2002.
Ottawa's unwelcome visitor

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003

Postby ramana » 27 Sep 2003 02:34

OK. Why dont we ennumerate what technology can TSP give?

1) Purloined Al rotor based HEU centrifuge technology
2) How to setup clandestine buying program and contact list of agents/procurers of prohibited technology.
3) Design of the Chinese 4th test
4)Lessons learned from failures (very crucial)
A big ? is what happened on May 16th that led to the German-Japanese leadership press conf later retracted? If that was fizzle than someone is using the TSP name to ransfer stuff.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003

Postby svinayak » 27 Sep 2003 03:47

Originally posted by Div:
Not in this instance;

Div, look at this way. TSP and Iran in the 90s were moving towards becoming surrogate power of a future super power.
TSP is just a messenger in this.
NK comes in the picture as the TSP for Japan

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003

Postby Div » 27 Sep 2003 03:54

I guess North Korea must fit somewhere in there aswell? This article puts forth a theory on the Chinese proliferation angle; somewhat simplistic imo, but greed is universal within all people.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003

Postby Sohum » 29 Sep 2003 01:16

http://www.nti.org/db/nuclear/1991/n9106652.htm

Abstract:
On 13 December 1991, Argentina and Brazil signed an agreement allowing for mutual inspection of their respective nuclear facilities. The agreement is the culmination of efforts by the two countries to put an end to their rivalry in the area of atomic research. Argentina and Brazil have been exchanging visits to their nuclear facilities since 1987 and in July 1991 the two nations signed an accord to use nuclear energy for only peaceful purposes. The accord established a Brazilian-Argentine agency for accounting and control of nuclear materials. Argentina and Brazil previously had several of their nuclear facilities under international safeguards, but until now a number of operations, including fuel reprocessing, enrichment and fabrication, were excluded from the safeguards. Both nations are believed to be able to produce enriched uranium of almost weapons-grade, but neither has signed the NPT, a document which many Latin American countries consider unfair to non-nuclear states. Presidents Collor de Mello of Brazil and Menem of Argentina have pledged to push their countries toward ratification and enforcement of the Treaty of Tlatelolco which bans nuclear weapons from Latin America. Hans Blix, director general of the IAEA and Marlin Fitzwater, US White House spokesman applauded the Brazil-Argentina agreement as a significant event in the nuclear non-proliferation arena. Fitzwater encouraged other Latin American nations to follow the lead of Argentina and Brazil. ..... Related Articles: The IAEA safeguards pact signed on 13 December 1991 by Brazil and Argentina "covers all nuclear materials in all nuclear activities within the territories of Argentina and Brazil, under their jurisdiction or carried out under their control anywhere. It further provides for the application of safeguards to exports of nuclear material." The agreement was signed by the Brazilian ambassador to the IAEA Thereza Maria Machado Quintella, her Argentine counterpart Jorge Alberto Taiana, IAEA Director General Hans Blix and Jorge Coll, secretary general of the Brazilian- Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material. A draft version of the agreement was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors on 7 December 1991. The final draft of the agreement will enter into force as soon as Brazil and Argentina formally ratify it. (Nuclear News, January 1992, p. 18, "Argentina and Brazil Signed a Joint IAEA Safeguards Pact.") ..... The Brazilian-Argentine safeguards agreement signed with the IAEA on 13 December 1991 will cost the IAEA $400,000 to enforce in 1992. This amount covers the cost of ad hoc inspections and negotiation of subsidiary arrangements. In 1993 ad hoc inspections and equipment will cost the IAEA another $1.5 million. Staffing costs over both years will amount to $850,000. Costs of installing the safeguards equipment cannot yet be estimated. (Nucleonics Week, 9 January 1992, p. 12 by Gamini Seneviratne, "Argentina-Brazil Pact Called Big Boost to Safeguards.")

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003

Postby Arun A » 30 Sep 2003 07:08

Iran Acknowledges Enriched Uranium Found

VIENNA, Austria - Iran acknowledged Monday that additional traces of weapons-grade uranium have been found on its soil but argued they came from abroad _ a claim U.N. and other experts said cannot be discounted.

Iran has refused to say where it bought the contaminated equipment, but diplomats have told The Associated Press the most likely country of origin was Pakistan. Former IAEA inspector David Albright said that could mean Iran was telling the truth.

The isotopes found in the traces of weapons-grade uranium on centrifuges at Natanz this year do "not have the signature of Europe," he said by telephone from Washington. "The finger points at Pakistan."


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