Hi,
Some thoughts on the matter at hand.
KSA lacks the following to make a working nuclear device.
a) Manpower for training and research: There simply aren't enough Saudis engineers and physcists. The Saudis have been attempting to train a physics and engineering graduates ostensibly to improve their understanding of the Oil industry, but there aren't a lot of these people.
b) Minerals: There is no Uranium yellowcake production in KSA. The deposits at Ghurayyah are recent finds and there is no way to mine them without attracting international attention.
c) Enrichment: The Saudis are not in a position to develop the Uranium enrichment technology by themselves. It is possible that they secretly purchase the devices from western suppliers, but I feel they will still need metallurgists and engineers to keep those running. It will also be quite hard for them to purchase enrichment technology without assistance and guidance.
d) Testing facilities: There are some Saudi engineers and military officers who may be familiar with controlled detonations. There is also a question of how KSA will test while it remains a signatory to the NPT. So the testing is likely to be complicated.
e) Instrumentation: This will have to come from outside KSA as there are no high reliability electronics production lines in Saudi Arabia.
If you look carefully at this, and think about Pakistan's core competency areas. The areas of cooperation fall out fairly naturally.
Now if the security situation in KSA degrades very rapidly, then it is possible that the Saudis may approach the Pakistanis for a direct deployment of Pakistani nuclear weapons to KSA itself, but to actually do that without safeguards would be extremely risky. So before that happens, there has to be a Saudi and only a Saudi button trained to hold the trigger.
Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
I once had the privilege of associating closely with a team of specially-selected Saudi Air Force personnel. 6 of them. Very interesting team composition and dynamics. Leader was as materialistic and fun-loving as they get - went around proposing to every skirt in sight to come with him to his harem. I had a tough time dissuading people from getting him beheaded.
The most interesting team member, though, was the Beard. Totally dedicated. I don't remember getting him to laugh once. The point is, the Beard was no slouch. He was clearly the smartest in the team, though the leader actually found time to be smart in the midst of his fun-chasing.
It would be very unwise to assume that these people cannot master the skills needed to operate weapons of any sort. They will buy the expertise needed to acquire the weapons, and set up first-class facilities to operate them. The first really luxurious missile silos, with gold-plated prayer rooms. But the operators will included Beards who will most certainly follow orders to push the Big Red Button. Depend on it.
The most interesting team member, though, was the Beard. Totally dedicated. I don't remember getting him to laugh once. The point is, the Beard was no slouch. He was clearly the smartest in the team, though the leader actually found time to be smart in the midst of his fun-chasing.
It would be very unwise to assume that these people cannot master the skills needed to operate weapons of any sort. They will buy the expertise needed to acquire the weapons, and set up first-class facilities to operate them. The first really luxurious missile silos, with gold-plated prayer rooms. But the operators will included Beards who will most certainly follow orders to push the Big Red Button. Depend on it.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
Why are people fixated on engineers, physicsts, instrumentation etc to make a bomb?( probably we Indians believe in derving from the first principles, starting from x = x + delta_x...)
Is NK and TSP not prime example of all you need is good paint and a welder?
Folks like KSA wil buy ready to go device in ckd a translation of the 'Some assembler knowledge required' into arabic. Ther goes the Mushroom cloud 'Vaaaroooooom' as in classics illustrated comics.
Is NK and TSP not prime example of all you need is good paint and a welder?
Folks like KSA wil buy ready to go device in ckd a translation of the 'Some assembler knowledge required' into arabic. Ther goes the Mushroom cloud 'Vaaaroooooom' as in classics illustrated comics.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
Hey GEM is it not called controlled fusion?Originally posted by JE Menon:
Shiv,
Surely, then, the US war against terrorism could be described as COITUS Interruptus?
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
The people at the helm in KSA are used to people of the faith from other countries do their bidding on command.
Such servitude can be observed in circumstances ranging from the mundane to the supremely significant. One button is same as another both to the masters and their servants.
What is alarming is the exodus of official and unofficial Western “training and assistance” personnel from KSA, and their replacement by our sub-continental brothers (probably tied to the Khobar and Vinnell attacks).
IIF and ISI can unite in more than one part of the world.
Such servitude can be observed in circumstances ranging from the mundane to the supremely significant. One button is same as another both to the masters and their servants.
What is alarming is the exodus of official and unofficial Western “training and assistance” personnel from KSA, and their replacement by our sub-continental brothers (probably tied to the Khobar and Vinnell attacks).
IIF and ISI can unite in more than one part of the world.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
>>It would be very unwise to assume that these people cannot master the skills needed to operate weapons of any sort. They will buy the expertise needed to acquire the weapons, and set up first-class facilities to operate them. The first really luxurious missile silos, with gold-plated prayer rooms. But the operators will included Beards who will most certainly follow orders to push the Big Red Button. Depend on it.
Absolutely. It would be a gross error of judgement to underestimate their capability or underrate the threat.
Absolutely. It would be a gross error of judgement to underestimate their capability or underrate the threat.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
Hwang Jang Yop, former secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea and North Korea's highest-ranking official ever to defect, in an exclusive interview with The Yomiuri Shimbun :
Should result in some interesting conversations with the Government of the ROK during the General’s visit there, this coming week.
Referring to North Korea's nuclear program, Hwang said he believes Pyongyang "has plenty of nuclear weapons," noting that he heard about the nuclear arsenal "from a (Workers' Party of Korea's) secretary in charge of munitions factories."
He said the secretary told him that North Korea concluded a nuclear technology transfer agreement with Pakistan in 1996.
Under the pact, Pyongyang was provided with uranium enrichment technology for the production of nuclear arms, Hwang said.
Daily Yomiuri.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
Arnaud de Borchgrave holds his ground on the issue of Saudi-pakistani nuclear collaboration :
To deny is to lie.
Gen. Aziz's comment that, "America is the No. 1 enemy of the Muslim world and is conspiring against Muslim nations all over the world.", is dredged up.
To deny is to lie.
Gen. Aziz's comment that, "America is the No. 1 enemy of the Muslim world and is conspiring against Muslim nations all over the world.", is dredged up.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
CIA: Korea's bomb ready
WASHINGTON | The CIA has told Congress that it now believes that North Korea has mastered the technology of turning its nuclear fuel into functioning weapons, without having to prove their effectiveness through nuclear tests.
Decades ago, the country received early aid on its nuclear program from China, which is now working with the Bush administration to prevent North Korea from going nuclear. Several years ago it reached a deal with Pakistan that swapped North Korean missile technology for Pakistani nuclear aid; many experts believe it was the Pakistani connection that allowed North Korea to make the final leap.
Pakistan’s president, Pervez Musharraf, has denied that his country is now helping North Korea, but he has been vague when asked about any past assistance. He repeated those denials last week.
Pakistan’s aid was chiefly related to a second secret nuclear project in North Korea, involving the production of highly enriched uranium, that intelligence agencies concluded probably had not yet produced a weapon. <u>It was the discovery of that project that touched off the latest nuclear crisis with North Korea, beginning a year ago.</u>
WASHINGTON | The CIA has told Congress that it now believes that North Korea has mastered the technology of turning its nuclear fuel into functioning weapons, without having to prove their effectiveness through nuclear tests.
Decades ago, the country received early aid on its nuclear program from China, which is now working with the Bush administration to prevent North Korea from going nuclear. Several years ago it reached a deal with Pakistan that swapped North Korean missile technology for Pakistani nuclear aid; many experts believe it was the Pakistani connection that allowed North Korea to make the final leap.
Pakistan’s president, Pervez Musharraf, has denied that his country is now helping North Korea, but he has been vague when asked about any past assistance. He repeated those denials last week.
Pakistan’s aid was chiefly related to a second secret nuclear project in North Korea, involving the production of highly enriched uranium, that intelligence agencies concluded probably had not yet produced a weapon. <u>It was the discovery of that project that touched off the latest nuclear crisis with North Korea, beginning a year ago.</u>
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/12/politics/12NUKE.html
Taken together, the reports show that Iran and North Korea have each dabbled in separating plutonium — one path to a bomb — and have each set up centrifuges to enrich uranium. The difference, as the C.I.A. told Congress, is that North Korea has fully mastered the complexities of detonating a bomb, perhaps with the help of some of its nuclear suppliers like Pakistan. There is no evidence that Iran has made that much headway.
Taken together, the reports show that Iran and North Korea have each dabbled in separating plutonium — one path to a bomb — and have each set up centrifuges to enrich uranium. The difference, as the C.I.A. told Congress, is that North Korea has fully mastered the complexities of detonating a bomb, perhaps with the help of some of its nuclear suppliers like Pakistan. There is no evidence that Iran has made that much headway.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
NK Prepared Nukes Before Ink Dried on Agreement: Report
A report in the December edition of the Monthly Choson, to hit the shelves on Tuesday, is to reveal that North Korea completed preparations for underground nuclear testing in 1994, when the Geneva Agreement was signed.
Regarding the North’s development of nuclear weapons using enriched uranium, Hwang said, “By 1996, Jeon said the North would no longer have to buy plutonium from Russia, and I heard in 1997 that some uranium came from Pakistan.”
A report in the December edition of the Monthly Choson, to hit the shelves on Tuesday, is to reveal that North Korea completed preparations for underground nuclear testing in 1994, when the Geneva Agreement was signed.
Regarding the North’s development of nuclear weapons using enriched uranium, Hwang said, “By 1996, Jeon said the North would no longer have to buy plutonium from Russia, and I heard in 1997 that some uranium came from Pakistan.”
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
3 Countries ID'd As Iran Atomic Providers
China, Russia, Pakistan Supplied Iran With Uranium Enrichment Technology, Diplomats Say
China, Russia, Pakistan Supplied Iran With Uranium Enrichment Technology, Diplomats Say
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
Iran's Likely Atomic Suppliers: Russia, China, Pakistan </font>
http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2003/11/20/105816.shtml
VIENNA, Austria – The International Atomic Energy Agency has identified Russia, China and Pakistan as probable suppliers of some of the technology Iran used to enrich uranium in its suspect nuclear programs, diplomats told The Associated Press on Thursday.
The disclosure came as the IAEA's board discussed how to react to Iran's nuclear activities. The board is debating the wording of a resolution that would satisfy U.S. calls for strong condemnation of Iran's past cover-ups and European desires to keep Iran cooperating by focusing on its recent openness.
Russia ID'd As an Iran Atomic Supplier http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlatest/story/0,1280,-3411022,00.html
http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2003/11/20/105816.shtml
VIENNA, Austria – The International Atomic Energy Agency has identified Russia, China and Pakistan as probable suppliers of some of the technology Iran used to enrich uranium in its suspect nuclear programs, diplomats told The Associated Press on Thursday.
The disclosure came as the IAEA's board discussed how to react to Iran's nuclear activities. The board is debating the wording of a resolution that would satisfy U.S. calls for strong condemnation of Iran's past cover-ups and European desires to keep Iran cooperating by focusing on its recent openness.
Russia ID'd As an Iran Atomic Supplier http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlatest/story/0,1280,-3411022,00.html
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
Extract :
L.A. TimesNovember 28, 2003
U.N. Agency Says Iran's Nuclear Technology Similar to Pakistan's
IAEA investigates links between the atomic programs of Iran and Pakistan. Tehran acknowledged its centrifuge enrichment program was based on European designs used by Pakistan to make nuclear bombs.
By Douglas Frantz, Times Staff Writer
ISTANBUL, Turkey — The United Nations nuclear agency is investigating potential links between the atomic programs of Iran and Pakistan after discovering that the secret Iranian uranium-enrichment program used technology identical to Pakistani plans, diplomats said.
Tehran acknowledged to the International Atomic Energy Agency that its centrifuge enrichment program was based on designs by a European firm, Urenco. Diplomats said the designs were the same Urenco-based technology used by Pakistan to develop its nuclear bomb in the 1990s.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
Extract :
Reuters via ABC Online.Friday, November 28, 2003. 9:43am (AEDT)
UN probes possible Iran-Pakistan nuclear link
United Nations nuclear agency, the International Atomic Energy Agency, is probing a possible link between Iran and Pakistan after Tehran acknowledged using centrifuge designs that appear identical to ones used in Pakistan's quest for an atom bomb, diplomats say.
Diplomats said the agency was trying to determine whether the drawings had come from someone in Pakistan or elsewhere.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
Around the time of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the Saudis became engaged in extensive religious missionary enterprise by setting up camps adjacent to the Allied tents. Daily they would push the envelop to meet and discuss Islam with the soldiers. These "Beards" were very well trained in the psychology of persuasion and winning in regular discussion. They were trained almost like the salesman who could sell ice to Eskimos. The higher command was told that these were just PR dialogs to make these soldiers understand Arab culture and the traditions of KSA. Not to hurt sensibilities, the higher-ups allowed. The end result was that more than 3000 US soldiers converted to Islam (almost causing a crisis in the command) and hundreds of them chose to remain in KSA. Many of these include experts in the various segments in the profession of the arms. Thus over night KSA had experts among others in the art of operating Patriot batteries or maintaning the missile systems of the F-15s. Don't under estimate the persuassive power of these missionaries. It won't be too difficult to persuade a Muslim scientist from ex USSR to work for KSA if these folks can pull of such a coup among Americans.
Avram Sprinzl
Avram Sprinzl
-
Guest
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
UN Probes Possible Iran-Pakistan Nuclear Link
Thu Nov 27, 6:23 PM ET
By Louis Charbonneau
VIENNA (Reuters) - The U.N. nuclear agency is probing a possible link between Iran and Pakistan after Tehran acknowledged using centrifuge designs that appear identical to ones used in Pakistan's quest for an atom bomb, diplomats say.
Diplomats said the agency was trying to determine whether the drawings had come from someone in Pakistan or elsewhere.
Tehran, accused by Washington of seeking to develop nuclear weapons, told the U.N. nuclear agency it got the blueprints from a "middleman" whose identity the agency had not determined, a Western diplomat told Reuters on condition of anonymity.
It was unclear where the "middleman" got the drawings. The U.N.'s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has said in a report Iran told the IAEA it got centrifuge drawings "from a foreign intermediary around 1987."
Centrifuges are used to purify uranium for use as fuel or in weapons. Experts say the ability to produce such material is crucial for an arms program and the biggest hurdle any country with ambitions to build a bomb must overcome.
Several diplomats familiar with the IAEA said the blueprints were of a machine by the Dutch enrichment unit of the British-Dutch-German consortium Urenco -- a leader in the field of centrifuges.
Iran's ambassador to the IAEA, Ali Akbar Salehi, told Reuters he had no knowledge a Urenco design had been used by Iran. "This is new information to me," he said.
In a statement to Reuters, Urenco said it had not supplied any centrifuge know-how or machinery to Iran.
"Urenco would like to strongly affirm that they have never supplied any technology or components to Iran at any time," it said.
PAKISTAN, IRAN DENY NUCLEAR COOPERATION
Pakistan, which non-proliferation experts and diplomats say used the Urenco blueprint, and Iran have repeatedly denied any cooperation in the nuclear field.
Iran had long insisted its centrifuge program was purely indigenous and that it had received no outside help whatsoever -- not from Pakistan or anywhere else.
The father of Pakistan's atom bomb, Abdul Qadeer Khan, worked at the Urenco uranium enrichment facility in the Dutch city of Almelo in the 1970s.
After his return to Pakistan he was convicted in absentia of nuclear espionage by an Amsterdam court, but the verdict was overturned on appeal. He has acknowledged he did take advantage of his experience of many years of working on similar projects in Europe and his contacts with various manufacturing firms.
But David Albright, a former U.N. weapons inspector and head of the Institute for Science and International Security think-tank, said: "Khan is widely believed to have taken these drawings and developed them."
Khan is known to have visited Iran, but the diplomats said there was no proof of a link involving him and his laboratories in Pakistan.
The United States accuses Iran of using its nuclear power program, parts of which it kept hidden from the IAEA for 18 years, as a front to build an atom bomb. Tehran denies this.
On Wednesday, the IAEA Board of Governors unanimously approved a resolution that "strongly deplores" Iran's two-decade concealment of its centrifuge enrichment program, while praising its promises to be transparent from now on.
The IAEA is still investigating Iran's enrichment program in order to identify the origin of traces of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) inspectors found at the Natanz enrichment plant and the Kalaye Electric Co.
But when IAEA experts visited Iran's pilot enrichment plant at Natanz earlier this year, they saw it bore the marks of the centrifuges outlined in the Urenco designs, diplomats said.
They said Tehran later acknowledged it had used the Urenco designs and recently showed them to the IAEA. Iran also admitted to a massive procurement effort to get centrifuge components.
Iran says some of these components, purchased through "middlemen" in the middle of 1980-88 Iran-Iraq (news - web sites) war, were contaminated with HEU. This, the Iranians say, is why the IAEA found HEU traces at Natanz and Kalaye, where centrifuge parts were tested and manufactured.
Diplomats and non-proliferation experts say Iran's centrifuge program based on the Urenco design appears to have been more successful than Pakistan's. They say Pakistan eventually abandoned the Urenco model and chose another one.
http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tm...ar_designs_dc_7
Thu Nov 27, 6:23 PM ET
By Louis Charbonneau
VIENNA (Reuters) - The U.N. nuclear agency is probing a possible link between Iran and Pakistan after Tehran acknowledged using centrifuge designs that appear identical to ones used in Pakistan's quest for an atom bomb, diplomats say.
Diplomats said the agency was trying to determine whether the drawings had come from someone in Pakistan or elsewhere.
Tehran, accused by Washington of seeking to develop nuclear weapons, told the U.N. nuclear agency it got the blueprints from a "middleman" whose identity the agency had not determined, a Western diplomat told Reuters on condition of anonymity.
It was unclear where the "middleman" got the drawings. The U.N.'s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has said in a report Iran told the IAEA it got centrifuge drawings "from a foreign intermediary around 1987."
Centrifuges are used to purify uranium for use as fuel or in weapons. Experts say the ability to produce such material is crucial for an arms program and the biggest hurdle any country with ambitions to build a bomb must overcome.
Several diplomats familiar with the IAEA said the blueprints were of a machine by the Dutch enrichment unit of the British-Dutch-German consortium Urenco -- a leader in the field of centrifuges.
Iran's ambassador to the IAEA, Ali Akbar Salehi, told Reuters he had no knowledge a Urenco design had been used by Iran. "This is new information to me," he said.
In a statement to Reuters, Urenco said it had not supplied any centrifuge know-how or machinery to Iran.
"Urenco would like to strongly affirm that they have never supplied any technology or components to Iran at any time," it said.
PAKISTAN, IRAN DENY NUCLEAR COOPERATION
Pakistan, which non-proliferation experts and diplomats say used the Urenco blueprint, and Iran have repeatedly denied any cooperation in the nuclear field.
Iran had long insisted its centrifuge program was purely indigenous and that it had received no outside help whatsoever -- not from Pakistan or anywhere else.
The father of Pakistan's atom bomb, Abdul Qadeer Khan, worked at the Urenco uranium enrichment facility in the Dutch city of Almelo in the 1970s.
After his return to Pakistan he was convicted in absentia of nuclear espionage by an Amsterdam court, but the verdict was overturned on appeal. He has acknowledged he did take advantage of his experience of many years of working on similar projects in Europe and his contacts with various manufacturing firms.
But David Albright, a former U.N. weapons inspector and head of the Institute for Science and International Security think-tank, said: "Khan is widely believed to have taken these drawings and developed them."
Khan is known to have visited Iran, but the diplomats said there was no proof of a link involving him and his laboratories in Pakistan.
The United States accuses Iran of using its nuclear power program, parts of which it kept hidden from the IAEA for 18 years, as a front to build an atom bomb. Tehran denies this.
On Wednesday, the IAEA Board of Governors unanimously approved a resolution that "strongly deplores" Iran's two-decade concealment of its centrifuge enrichment program, while praising its promises to be transparent from now on.
The IAEA is still investigating Iran's enrichment program in order to identify the origin of traces of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) inspectors found at the Natanz enrichment plant and the Kalaye Electric Co.
But when IAEA experts visited Iran's pilot enrichment plant at Natanz earlier this year, they saw it bore the marks of the centrifuges outlined in the Urenco designs, diplomats said.
They said Tehran later acknowledged it had used the Urenco designs and recently showed them to the IAEA. Iran also admitted to a massive procurement effort to get centrifuge components.
Iran says some of these components, purchased through "middlemen" in the middle of 1980-88 Iran-Iraq (news - web sites) war, were contaminated with HEU. This, the Iranians say, is why the IAEA found HEU traces at Natanz and Kalaye, where centrifuge parts were tested and manufactured.
Diplomats and non-proliferation experts say Iran's centrifuge program based on the Urenco design appears to have been more successful than Pakistan's. They say Pakistan eventually abandoned the Urenco model and chose another one.
http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tm...ar_designs_dc_7
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
ROTFL! Geez, don't you feel sorry for the Saleems of the world? 
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
Iran and the West find modus vivendi.
Meanwhile, the issue continues to cast a shadow on Pakistan. Iran has reportedly told the IAEA that its centrifuge enrichment programme is based on designs by a European firm, Urenco. Western diplomats say the designs are the same Urenco-based technology used by Pakistan to develop its nuclear bomb in the 1990s. “Centrifuges are used to process uranium into fuel for reactors or fissile material for bombs. The purification process is complex, and perfecting the machines, which spin at twice the speed of sound, can take years.” According to the IAEA, Iran started research in 1985 and reportedly got the centrifuge designs “from a foreign intermediary in 1987”. Tehran says the designs came from a middleman whose identity remains a “mystery”.
One can be sure that in the days to come the spotlight will fall on the alleged connection between Pakistan and Iran. The IAEA would certainly try to press Iran to divulge the identity of this middleman. Prima facie no case can be made against Pakistan on the basis of information that the source of the centrifuge design of Pakistani and Iranian programmes is the same. There is always a possibility that Iran got the Urenco designs from a source that stole it from that firm. This kind of thing is fairly normal business and most countries have resorted to it, including Israel.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/nm/20031127/wl_nm/iran_nuclear_designs_dc_7
Does this suggest Chinese Uranium, or Chinese plutonium?Diplomats and non-proliferation experts say Iran's centrifuge program based on the Urenco design appears to have been more successful than Pakistan's. They say Pakistan eventually abandoned the Urenco model and chose another one.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
Iran-Pakistan Atomic Link
An Iran-Pakistan nuclear link has been suspected for some time by intelligence analysts. Establishing such a missing link could prove vital in the final determination whether Iran intends to pursue a nuclear program for peaceful purposes or for weapons of mass destruction.
The United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency is investigating potential links between Iran and Pakistan after discovering that the secret Iranian uranium enrichment program used technology identical to Pakistan plans.
A diplomat stated the IAEA had not determined whether the centrifuge plans had come directly from Pakistan or were obtained or stolen from a Pakistani nuclear laboratory by the mysterious “middle man” and later provided to Pakistan.
Iran has acknowledged to the IAEA that its centrifuge enrichment program was based on designs from a European firm Urenco. Urenco based technology was used by Pakistan to develop its nuclear bomb in the 1990’s. Urenco, is a British, Dutch and German consortium and a world leader in centrifuge design and operation. The company denied supplying centrifuge technology or blueprints to Iran.
Pakistan has repeatedly denied providing any assistance to Iran and Iran has denied any cooperation with Pakistan.
Abdel Qhader Khan, the primary developer of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb, worked at the Urenco enrichment plant in the Dutch city of Almelo in the 1970’s. After returning to Pakistan, he was accused of stealing centrifuge plans from the facility.
Two former Iranian diplomats told the Los Angeles Times last summer that Khan made several trips to Iran, beginning in 1987, to help with Iran’s nuclear program. One of them, Ali Akbar Omid Mehr, reported that Khan was given a villa on the Caspian Sea in return for his assistance and cooperation.
Discovering the origins of the uranium enrichment process is a key to solving the secret nuclear development program of 18 years by Iran. Iran’s centrifuge program is at the top of the IAEA inquiry list because traces of weapons-grade uranium were found in two locations where the machines had been assembled and tested.
One of the locations was the massive underground enrichment plant being constructed near Natanz in central Iran. IAEA inspectors spotted the similarity to the Urenco designs when they visited the plant. The centrifuges at Natanz appeared to have been modified to produce enriched uranium more efficiently than the original design.
Traces of weapons-grade uranium also were discovered at Kalaye Electric Co. Iran later reluctantly acknowledged having performed extensive tests on purifying uranium with centrifuges at the Kalaye plant, once identified as a watch factory. The machinery had been removed and extensive construction had been done by the time IAEA inspectors visited the site. The inspectors found the enriched uranium particles through tests they conducted. Confronted with the cover-up discovery, Iran stated that some components were contaminated with enriched uranium when they purchased outside the country “on the black market” through middlemen.
Iran has long maintained its centrifuge program was indigenous.
Centrifuges are used to process uranium into fuel for reactors or fissile material for bombs. The purification process is very complex, and perfecting the machines, which spin at twice the speed of sound, can take years.
The most recent IAEA report on Iran’s nuclear program notes that research was started during 1985 and got the centrifuge designs “from a foreign intermediary in 1987.” Iran admitted finally that the centrifuge designs came from a “middle man” whose identity still remains a mystery.
The U.S. has accused Iran of using a civilian program to develop an atomic bomb. IAEA inspections in recent months have uncovered numerous instances in which Iran concealed nuclear activities that could have played a role in developing an atomic bomb.
Iran has maintained that its nuclear program exists solely to generate electricity. Iran has agreed to full disclosure of its nuclear program despite the fact it omits then later admits crucial information and key facts in a “cat and mouse” diplomatic game. Iran has exhibited a pattern of concealment and there is a large gap missing in the IAEA report presently. Iran, under international pressure, also finally agreed to tougher inspections of its nuclear facilities.
The IAEA governing board condemned Iran for its long cover-up of sensitive nuclear research and warned that any future violations of its nonproliferation obligations could result in sanctions. The board stopped short of referring Iran to the U.N. Security Cuncil for possible sanctions as the Bush Administration favored initially.
U.S. officials still believe Iran is hiding its activities and that the matter will be referred to the U.N. Security Council for sanctions eventually.
The IAEA report said Iran had been conducting research using exotic laser technology to enrich uranium for 12 years before disclosing the program this fall. Some of the laser technology appears to have come from Russia and some of it may have European origins.
Mohammed El Baradei, IAEA Director-General, stated a new report on Iran will be ready for the agency’s board in mid-February. El Baradei stated the agency’s inspectors had “a lot of work to do before we can conclude that Iran’s program is exclusively for peaceful purposes.” The IAEA must reconstruct 18 years of hidden activities.
The inquiry into the origins of the centrifuge designs is only one aspect of a widespread investigation by the IAEA of what has turned out to be a surprisingly broad and expansive nuclear program in Iran.
The Iran-Pakistan atomic nuclear energy “missing link” may provide us with the answers to the mystery of whether Iran’s nuclear program is for peaceful purposes or for weapons of mass destruction.
An Iran-Pakistan nuclear link has been suspected for some time by intelligence analysts. Establishing such a missing link could prove vital in the final determination whether Iran intends to pursue a nuclear program for peaceful purposes or for weapons of mass destruction.
The United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency is investigating potential links between Iran and Pakistan after discovering that the secret Iranian uranium enrichment program used technology identical to Pakistan plans.
A diplomat stated the IAEA had not determined whether the centrifuge plans had come directly from Pakistan or were obtained or stolen from a Pakistani nuclear laboratory by the mysterious “middle man” and later provided to Pakistan.
Iran has acknowledged to the IAEA that its centrifuge enrichment program was based on designs from a European firm Urenco. Urenco based technology was used by Pakistan to develop its nuclear bomb in the 1990’s. Urenco, is a British, Dutch and German consortium and a world leader in centrifuge design and operation. The company denied supplying centrifuge technology or blueprints to Iran.
Pakistan has repeatedly denied providing any assistance to Iran and Iran has denied any cooperation with Pakistan.
Abdel Qhader Khan, the primary developer of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb, worked at the Urenco enrichment plant in the Dutch city of Almelo in the 1970’s. After returning to Pakistan, he was accused of stealing centrifuge plans from the facility.
Two former Iranian diplomats told the Los Angeles Times last summer that Khan made several trips to Iran, beginning in 1987, to help with Iran’s nuclear program. One of them, Ali Akbar Omid Mehr, reported that Khan was given a villa on the Caspian Sea in return for his assistance and cooperation.
Discovering the origins of the uranium enrichment process is a key to solving the secret nuclear development program of 18 years by Iran. Iran’s centrifuge program is at the top of the IAEA inquiry list because traces of weapons-grade uranium were found in two locations where the machines had been assembled and tested.
One of the locations was the massive underground enrichment plant being constructed near Natanz in central Iran. IAEA inspectors spotted the similarity to the Urenco designs when they visited the plant. The centrifuges at Natanz appeared to have been modified to produce enriched uranium more efficiently than the original design.
Traces of weapons-grade uranium also were discovered at Kalaye Electric Co. Iran later reluctantly acknowledged having performed extensive tests on purifying uranium with centrifuges at the Kalaye plant, once identified as a watch factory. The machinery had been removed and extensive construction had been done by the time IAEA inspectors visited the site. The inspectors found the enriched uranium particles through tests they conducted. Confronted with the cover-up discovery, Iran stated that some components were contaminated with enriched uranium when they purchased outside the country “on the black market” through middlemen.
Iran has long maintained its centrifuge program was indigenous.
Centrifuges are used to process uranium into fuel for reactors or fissile material for bombs. The purification process is very complex, and perfecting the machines, which spin at twice the speed of sound, can take years.
The most recent IAEA report on Iran’s nuclear program notes that research was started during 1985 and got the centrifuge designs “from a foreign intermediary in 1987.” Iran admitted finally that the centrifuge designs came from a “middle man” whose identity still remains a mystery.
The U.S. has accused Iran of using a civilian program to develop an atomic bomb. IAEA inspections in recent months have uncovered numerous instances in which Iran concealed nuclear activities that could have played a role in developing an atomic bomb.
Iran has maintained that its nuclear program exists solely to generate electricity. Iran has agreed to full disclosure of its nuclear program despite the fact it omits then later admits crucial information and key facts in a “cat and mouse” diplomatic game. Iran has exhibited a pattern of concealment and there is a large gap missing in the IAEA report presently. Iran, under international pressure, also finally agreed to tougher inspections of its nuclear facilities.
The IAEA governing board condemned Iran for its long cover-up of sensitive nuclear research and warned that any future violations of its nonproliferation obligations could result in sanctions. The board stopped short of referring Iran to the U.N. Security Cuncil for possible sanctions as the Bush Administration favored initially.
U.S. officials still believe Iran is hiding its activities and that the matter will be referred to the U.N. Security Council for sanctions eventually.
The IAEA report said Iran had been conducting research using exotic laser technology to enrich uranium for 12 years before disclosing the program this fall. Some of the laser technology appears to have come from Russia and some of it may have European origins.
Mohammed El Baradei, IAEA Director-General, stated a new report on Iran will be ready for the agency’s board in mid-February. El Baradei stated the agency’s inspectors had “a lot of work to do before we can conclude that Iran’s program is exclusively for peaceful purposes.” The IAEA must reconstruct 18 years of hidden activities.
The inquiry into the origins of the centrifuge designs is only one aspect of a widespread investigation by the IAEA of what has turned out to be a surprisingly broad and expansive nuclear program in Iran.
The Iran-Pakistan atomic nuclear energy “missing link” may provide us with the answers to the mystery of whether Iran’s nuclear program is for peaceful purposes or for weapons of mass destruction.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
I heard 5 minutes of an interview on cspan with the under Secretary for Arms Control John Bolton(i.e. Ayatollah of the non-proliferation jihadis in the SD).
Of all the people, Manzur Ijaz asked him a question on TSP proliferating nuclear weapons to Iran and North Korea and whether that posed a danger. Bolton didn't deny the report but went on to say they had raised it at the highest level and that all such transfers were a thing of the past.
I.e. TSP DID transfer nuclear technology to Iran and North Korea.
Of all the people, Manzur Ijaz asked him a question on TSP proliferating nuclear weapons to Iran and North Korea and whether that posed a danger. Bolton didn't deny the report but went on to say they had raised it at the highest level and that all such transfers were a thing of the past.
I.e. TSP DID transfer nuclear technology to Iran and North Korea.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
Six-Party North Korea Talks Likely to Be Delayed
"For our part, the United States will continue its efforts to prevent the transfer of sensitive nuclear and ballistic missile technology to Iran, from whatever source, and will monitor the situation there with great care," Bolton said, in a warning to countries such as Pakistan, China and Russia that are suspected of aiding Iran's program.
"For our part, the United States will continue its efforts to prevent the transfer of sensitive nuclear and ballistic missile technology to Iran, from whatever source, and will monitor the situation there with great care," Bolton said, in a warning to countries such as Pakistan, China and Russia that are suspected of aiding Iran's program.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
Finally, some non-proliferation jihadis are coming around to seeing the truth on TSP. First we had Gary Milhollin and now Leonard Weiss.
Leonard Weiss article in the latest "Arms Control Today"
Leonard Weiss article in the latest "Arms Control Today"
Not that Russia was alone. How China and the United States dealt with Pakistan’s situation also illustrates how some nuclear-weapon states have either violated or skirted their NPT commitments vis-à-vis Article I.
China/Pakistan
Chinese assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program began more than 20 years ago. It has reportedly included in 1983 the design for a 25-kiloton nuclear explosive device that was the object of the fourth nuclear test carried out by the Chinese. In addition, China reportedly gave Pakistan enough HEU in 1983 to fuel two nuclear weapons, sold tritium to Pakistan in 1986 that can be used to “boost” the explosive yield of nuclear weapons, and provided technical support for the construction of the Kahuta gas centrifuge nuclear-enrichment complex that has since been the major source of Pakistan’s nuclear-weapon material production.
All of this activity took place prior to China’s accession to the NPT in 1992. In the years leading up to and following China’s decision to sign and ratify the NPT, China went through a series of policy moves that gradually moved it closer to alignment with the other nuclear powers on nonproliferation policy. Initially, Chinese policy was characterized by support for proliferation and open hostility to the treaty when it was presented for signature in 1968. It gradually ended its support for proliferation, joining the IAEA in 1984 and agreeing to place all its nuclear exports under safeguards. It took further positive steps in the 1990s, signing the NPT in 1992 and calling on nuclear-weapon states to issue no-first-use pledges and positive and negative security assurances and voting for the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. This record of apparent continual progress in the evolution of China’s legal support for nonproliferation has unfortunately not always been backed up by appropriate action. In particular, China’s support of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program did not end with China’s accession to the treaty in 1992.
In 1994 the China National Nuclear Corporation sold 5,000 ring magnets to the unsafeguarded A.Q. Khan Research Laboratory at Kahuta. This equipment is used in special suspension bearings at the tops of rotating cylinders in gas centrifuges allowing for the production of weapons-grade HEU. The magnets were delivered in three shipments between December 1994 and mid-1995. Although both the CIA director and the U.S. secretary of defense were reported to believe that the Chinese government approved the sale and had therefore violated Article I of the NPT as well as U.S. law, the Clinton administration in 1996 chose not to impose sanctions on China. The grounds for this decision were stated to be that there was no evidence that the Chinese government had “willfully aided or abetted” Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program via the ring magnet sale and that China had (1) promised to provide assistance only to safeguarded facilities, (2) reaffirmed its commitment to nonproliferation, and (3) agreed to consultations on export control and proliferation issues. Pakistan was also not penalized.
Contemporaneous with these events, China sold to Pakistan in 1996 and helped install a special industrial furnace that can be used to melt plutonium or HEU into the shape of bomb cores and was reported to have provided assistance to Pakistan during 1994-1996 in the construction of an unsafeguarded production reactor at Khushab that could produce plutonium suitable for use in nuclear weapons.
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that China was indeed in violation of Article I but got away with it with U.S. complicity. That was not, however, the first time nor the last time that U.S. policy involving Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program found itself at odds with its own expressions of support for nonproliferation.
United States/Pakistan
For nearly three decades, except for two short periods, the United States has largely turned a blind eye to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, emphasizing other more immediate foreign policy priorities, such as using Pakistan as the main supply base for supporting the mujahideen against the Soviets in Afghanistan during the 1980s. In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent war in Afghanistan, the Bush administration has renewed this emphasis on short-term tactical goals over more important long-term strategic needs. The administration moved quickly to lift many remaining sanctions on Islamabad that had been imposed following Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear tests. As part of a U.S.-supplied program of stepped-up defense assistance, Pakistan is now seeking Bush administration approval to upgrade its fleet of F-16s, at least some of which are believed to have been refurbished to carry nuclear weapons. The United States is now providing hundreds of millions of dollars in assistance to Islamabad, and some U.S. aid, even if not specifically nuclear, can release Pakistani resources that can be used to fund additions to its nuclear arsenal and that increases the risk of nuclear war in South Asia. Pakistan’s egregious record, along with the history of U.S. assistance in the face of that record, provides an arguable case that the United States has been and is in violation of its Article I commitment not to, in any way, assist or encourage the making of nuclear weapons by a non-nuclear-weapon state as defined by the NPT.
Yet, some supporters of U.S. policy toward Pakistan want to compound these errors further. They argue that the presence in Pakistan of radical Islamic groups allied with or sympathetic to the Taliban and al Qaeda makes it imperative for the United States to shore up Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf’s regime in order to make a coup less probable and to help the Pakistanis protect their nuclear weapons from theft, even though doing so might also be a violation of Article I. History has shown, however, that the instability of Pakistani politics means there are no guarantees that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons will not ultimately fall (by inheritance or otherwise) into the hands of elements unfriendly to the United States. Our previous abandonment of a strong nonproliferation stance in South Asia for a tactical advance in the Cold War ended badly for all involved, and a further dilution of Article I obligations for the current war on terrorism is sure to do so again.</font>
Consequences of Article I Violations
The result of collaborating with or turning a blind eye to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program can be seen in the better-known and more recent attempts of North Korea and Iran to develop nuclear weapons. There has been much hand-wringing, attempted diplomacy, and thinly veiled threats over Pyongyang’s decision to withdraw from the NPT and proceed to reprocess 8,000 spent fuel rods in order to obtain plutonium for nuclear weapons. If North Korea were to succeed in producing an arsenal of nuclear weapons, the subsequent political turmoil in the region and globally would be difficult to overestimate. Likewise, a nuclear Iran might well inflame a region that is already a tinderbox. Yet, the major role of Pakistan in assisting these illicit programs has been insufficiently publicized. Pakistan traded nuclear weapons-related technology to North Korea in return for missile technology, and Iran has recently admitted that its clandestine work on nuclear enrichment was also aided by Pakistan.
These unholy trading activities have the potential of morphing into a threat that was not envisioned when the NPT was drafted nearly four decades ago: terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons. North Korea is well known for financing its nearly bankrupt regime through exports of ballistic missiles, and Pyongyang has shown few scruples in terms of screening out potential buyers; it is not unimaginable that a desperate Kim Jong Il might sell nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons technology to terrorists. The United States lists Iran as the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism.
Pakistan may even prove more of a tempting target for terrorists than these two better known rogue states. Pakistan is an authoritarian-led country with significant sympathy for al Qaeda at high levels within its powerful military and its nuclear establishment. It is a country that has at least 30 nuclear weapons waiting to be seized in the event of a coup, a country that sponsored the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in the 1990s, a country that has supported terrorism in Kashmir, and a country that is evidently prepared to trade its nuclear-weapon technology to anyone who will provide it with a quid pro quo that enables it better to confront its larger and stronger Indian neighbor.</font>
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
X post of article orginally posted by Manku Thimma :
KRL director detained for questioning.ISLAMABAD: The authorities are detaining a director of the Kahuta Research Laboratories for questioning on suspicion of a role in Iran’s nuclear programme, Daily Times has learnt......
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
Terrorism has altered the nuclear equation forever
by
Bennett Ramberg
http://www.iht.com/articles/120834.html
by
Bennett Ramberg
http://www.iht.com/articles/120834.html
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
KRL kidnappings
THE detention of two KRL scientists shows that Pakistan’s frontline role in the US-led War on Terror has not availed to absolve it from groundless suspicions, and it is still forced to accept humiliating erosions of sovereignty. There is a faint possibility that Pakistan is not being targetted, but Iran certainly is. These detentions are supposed to be about Pakistan’s alleged nuclear cooperation with Iran. This is to investigate the accomplice of a criminal, even though no crime has taken place. The International Atomic Energy Agency has reported that Iran has no nuclear weapons programme, so how can anyone, including Pakistani nuclear scientists, help in a non-existent programme? It was bad enough for a retired PAEC scientist to be handed over for months of interrogation by Americans over Al-Qaeda having obtained nuclear technology surreptitiously, or for other Pakistani citizens to be deprived of state protection. But for a serving scientist to be handed over on a plate by his own government, <u>for something he could not have done without its permission</u>, is mind-boggling. Is there no limit to this supine acceptance of ignominy? (aka GUBO..)</font>
THE detention of two KRL scientists shows that Pakistan’s frontline role in the US-led War on Terror has not availed to absolve it from groundless suspicions, and it is still forced to accept humiliating erosions of sovereignty. There is a faint possibility that Pakistan is not being targetted, but Iran certainly is. These detentions are supposed to be about Pakistan’s alleged nuclear cooperation with Iran. This is to investigate the accomplice of a criminal, even though no crime has taken place. The International Atomic Energy Agency has reported that Iran has no nuclear weapons programme, so how can anyone, including Pakistani nuclear scientists, help in a non-existent programme? It was bad enough for a retired PAEC scientist to be handed over for months of interrogation by Americans over Al-Qaeda having obtained nuclear technology surreptitiously, or for other Pakistani citizens to be deprived of state protection. But for a serving scientist to be handed over on a plate by his own government, <u>for something he could not have done without its permission</u>, is mind-boggling. Is there no limit to this supine acceptance of ignominy? (aka GUBO..)</font>
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
Pakistan Detains Scientist for Possible Transfer of Nuclear Information to Iran
Authorities in Pakistan have detained a nuclear scientist who is being questioned about possible links to the transfer of nuclear-related information to Iran.
Reports in the Pakistani media say the detained scientist was taken into custody at his residence in the garrison town of Rawalpindi on Sunday night.
Family members and colleagues are quoted as saying they believe that the scientist Farooq Mehmood has been seized for interrogation.
Mr. Farooq is a director of Pakistan's prestigious nuclear facility, Kahuta Research Laboratories (KRL), which developed the country's nuclear and ballistic missile programs.
A Pakistan foreign ministry statement issued Wednesday has indirectly confirmed the detention of the nuclear scientist, saying that people associated with the country's sensitive programs are governed by stringent personnel rules.
The statement says this is a normal practice, especially in nuclear weapon states. It again rejected as baseless, allegations that Pakistan helped Iran develop its nuclear program.
The detention of Mr. Farooq comes after Iranian revelations to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that Tehran received nuclear-related information from people of Pakistani origin.
In November 2001, Pakistan detained another of its nuclear scientists for his alleged links to al-Qaida terror network, but released him after months of interrogation
Authorities in Pakistan have detained a nuclear scientist who is being questioned about possible links to the transfer of nuclear-related information to Iran.
Reports in the Pakistani media say the detained scientist was taken into custody at his residence in the garrison town of Rawalpindi on Sunday night.
Family members and colleagues are quoted as saying they believe that the scientist Farooq Mehmood has been seized for interrogation.
Mr. Farooq is a director of Pakistan's prestigious nuclear facility, Kahuta Research Laboratories (KRL), which developed the country's nuclear and ballistic missile programs.
A Pakistan foreign ministry statement issued Wednesday has indirectly confirmed the detention of the nuclear scientist, saying that people associated with the country's sensitive programs are governed by stringent personnel rules.
The statement says this is a normal practice, especially in nuclear weapon states. It again rejected as baseless, allegations that Pakistan helped Iran develop its nuclear program.
The detention of Mr. Farooq comes after Iranian revelations to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that Tehran received nuclear-related information from people of Pakistani origin.
In November 2001, Pakistan detained another of its nuclear scientists for his alleged links to al-Qaida terror network, but released him after months of interrogation
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
Bombshell: Americans pick KRL officials...
Two KRL officials being interrogated
Two KRL officials being interrogated
Foreigners = AmericansISLAMABAD - Two officials of Kahuta Research Laboratory (KRL) are being interrogated for their alleged links with Iranian nuclear programme as the government said Wednesday it is “simply carrying out procedures” without sufficiently clarifying about the whereabouts of detainees and reasons behind their sudden arrest.
Sources told The Nation that Dr Engineer Farooq Ahmed was nabbed on last Sunday from his residence by security agencies who were accompanied by “foreigners”.
And since then Farooq has not returned home.
His arrest followed detention of another KRL official Yasin Chohan . Both arrested one after another are being suspected to have links with Iranian nuclear programme something Foreign Office categorically denied on Wednesday but said “We, for our part, simply carrying out our own procedure”.
When contacted Secretary Information Anwer Mehmood said the report was first carried by an Indian newspaper and was lifted by Pakistani newspapers from there without independently verifying the facts. On Wednesday two Pakistan newspapers, an English and an Urdu, had carried this report without quoting any sources.
Foreign Office in a statement said “people associated with sensitive programmes in Pakistan are governed by stringent personnel dependability and debrief programme which is a normal practice especially in nuclear weapon states”.
These people are aware of their responsibilities in terms of their efficiency and conduct,” it adds.
While responding to alleged involvement of Yasin and Farooq in transfer of technology to Iran, official statement by the foreign ministry said: “As for Iran there are reports about many sources from where Iran could have obtained nuclear technology including several western companies and individuals. Therefore, the focus should be on checking out with those sources. We, for our part, are simply carrying out our own procedure.
Farooq and Yasin are senior officials in Pakistan’s nuclear research laboratory, a source familiar with the alleged detainees told The Nation.
“My father is on leave from KRL and since Sunday he is in Karachi” Asim, son of Dr Farooq, told The Nation. However, he was unable to explain as to for what purpose Farooq has been staying in Karachi and what is his contact number. He contradicted reports of his father’s arrest saying he spoke to him two days back by telephone.
Responding to another question a senior official of the foreign ministry explained “Pakistan as a responsible nuclear power takes its obligations with utmost seriousness. This includes uncompromising adherence to a policy of not exporting any sensitive technology to third country. The allegations that Pakistan has cooperated with any country in the nuclear field are baseless and malicious. There is no substance whatsoever in these reports”.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
On AP and MSNBC now.
Two nuclear scientists being questioned in Pakistan, sources say
Two nuclear scientists being questioned in Pakistan, sources say
http://famulus.msnbc.com/FamulusIntl/ap12-11-053820.asp?reg=ASIAThe nuclear scientists at the Khan Research Laboratories were being interrogated after complaints were made against them, a government official and two Pakistanis affiliated with the country's nuclear programs said. All three spoke on condition of anonymity.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
Hmm. What to make of this article in the neo-con National Review?
Nuclear Spinning - The Iran-Pakistan link
Nuclear Spinning - The Iran-Pakistan link
Nuclear Spinning - The Iran-Pakistan link
By Simon Henderson
Forget, for the moment, Saddam's weapons of mass destruction — or lack thereof. Consider instead the other WMD conundrum: Iran. Events in Pakistan, where two nuclear scientists were arrested last week, suggest the whole issue is about to blow. (Figuratively, that is.)
Last month, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United Nations nuclear watchdog, declared, implausibly, that there was no evidence of Iran's trying to build an atomic bomb. Washington was gob-smacked. As with the proverbial duck, Iran's efforts looked like a nuclear-weapons program and sounded like a nuclear-weapons program. The trouble was the lack of proof sufficient to convince the pedants of the IAEA (which, incidentally, has never by itself discovered a clandestine nuclear-weapons program).
The Pakistani link is crucial to showing Iran's true motives. Pakistan, which tested two nuclear bombs in 1998, used centrifuges to make "highly" enriched (i.e., bomb-grade) uranium. Iran also has centrifuges. The IAEA discovered traces of highly enriched uranium on some of them. Tehran's reported explanation? "They came like that." From where? "We bought the equipment from a middleman."
The gossip is that Pakistan sold, directly or indirectly, the centrifuge equipment to Iran. The technology involves aluminum tubes — confusingly, the same technology that Saddam Hussein was reported to be interested in, although, to the glee of the war doubters, aluminum tubes found in Iraq so far have proved to be nothing more dangerous than casings for battlefield rockets. Aluminum tubes for centrifuges are decidedly "old-tech" but, in the absence of an alternative, can do the job, given enough time.
Officially, Pakistan denies it transferred centrifuge technology to Iran. But that still leaves open the possibility that Pakistani scientists did a private deal with Tehran, for money or mischief. The suspect in the frame? Dr. Abdul Qader Khan, who retired nearly three years ago as head of the eponymous Khan Research Laboratory (KRL). But despite Khan's background, there is evidence that he is being set up and is, on this issue, innocent.
The current state of the friendship between the U.S. and Pakistan is complicated at best, as American soldiers being shot at from Pakistani positions along the border with Afghanistan will testify. Osama bin Laden was reportedly sighted in the remote north-Pakistani town of Chitral recently. A more likely lair is somewhere in the vast, sprawling townships that make up Karachi, Pakistan's largest city on the Arabian Sea coast. President Musharraf, who retains the army uniform he was wearing when a 1999 coup brought him to power, juggles these tensions with Washington.Last month he was reported in the Los Angeles Times as saying that a trip by Khan to Iran had been about short-range missiles rather than nuclear issues. </font>And, earlier this year, the Los Angeles Times quoted former Iranian diplomats as saying that Khan made several trips to Iran, beginning in 1987, and was given a villa on the Caspian Sea coast in return for his assistance.
This last report caught my eye as I once asked Khan whether he had ever been to Iran. I can remember his reply clearly: "Never." I have spoken with Khan or exchanged letters with him frequently over the years. He is often evasive but I think I can tell when he is telling a diplomatic lie. For the rest of the time, I think he is straightforward with me. I understand he stands by his claim of never having visited Iran.
The two nuclear scientists arrested last week were departmental directors at KRL. Dr. Mohammed Farooq and Dr. Yassin Chowhan were picked up at 10 P.M. on the night of December 1. They were taken away by Pakistani intelligence agents, accompanied, it is alleged, by English-speaking men, apparently CIA officers. Their homes in Rawalpindi, the city which merges into the capital, Islamabad, are reportedly under surveillance.
Dr. Farooq was in charge of the section at KRL that dealt with ties to foreign suppliers and customers for KRL products. KRL also makes a range of battlefield products for the Pakistani army, such as a version of a Chinese handheld antiaircraft missile. (It also makes the Pakistani version of the North Korean nuclear-capable Nodong missile.) Dr. Chowhan ran one of the assembly lines at KRL.
The assumption is that the two men will be held until they confess to assisting Dr. Khan in supplying centrifuges to Iran. Dr. Khan, now retired, is nominally an adviser to President Musharraf, but there is little evidence to show that his advice is sought very often. In the bitchy world of Pakistani politics, there is resentment that Dr. Khan is popularly considered "the father of the Islamic bomb."
So if Dr. Khan or some other Pakistani scientist did not supply centrifuge technology to Iran, who did? Suspicion falls on a Sri Lankan merchant formally based in Dubai, a member of his country's Muslim minority who has now returned home. The businessman acted as a conduit for Pakistan's orders of components and manufacturing equipment. Using that knowledge, he put in for extra orders of equipment and arranged a side deal with Iran. This scenario dates the start of Iran's centrifuge project to 1979, eight years earlier than the IAEA's assessment. Iran has refused to tell the IAEA the identity of this middleman.
But what about the traces of highly enriched uranium the IAEA found on the equipment in Iran? KRL apparently still uses some of its aluminum centrifuges alongside the later and more efficient ones made out of special steel. Others have been "scrapped and crushed." None has been exported. Perhaps Iran has been more successful at enrichment than it wants to admit.
Washington's motives are reasonably clear, even if not fully explained in public. Relations with Pakistan are very important. Iran's nuclear ambitions must be curtailed. Presumably if Dr. Khan is blamed, President Musharraf is forced, through embarrassment, into more cooperation with the U.S. But Iran's nuclear progress might be understated, and activities of an unscrupulous middleman might escape closer inspection. As with centrifuges themselves, there is a lot of spin.
— Simon Henderson is a London-based energy consultant and associate of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
And, earlier this year, the Los Angeles Times quoted former Iranian diplomats as saying that Khan made several trips to Iran, beginning in 1987, and was given a villa on the Caspian Sea coast in return for his assistance.Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
Pak nuke scientists under FBI/ISI questioning!
http://my.netscape.com/corewidgets/news/story.psp?cat=50600&id=200312111045000236310
FBI arrests Pak Nuke scientists in Pakistan
http://us.rediff.com/news/2003/dec/11shyam.htm
http://my.netscape.com/corewidgets/news/story.psp?cat=50600&id=200312111045000236310
FBI arrests Pak Nuke scientists in Pakistan
http://us.rediff.com/news/2003/dec/11shyam.htm
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
Here is the Pak version of the "missing isotopes"!
Top KRL scientists go missing
By Syed Irfan Raza
ISLAMABAD, Dec 10: Two senior officials of Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) have gone missing under mysterious circumstances, sources in the KRL told Dawn on Wednesday.
The sources said director general Dr Yasin Chohan and director laboratories Dr Farooq were missing for the last one week.
Responding to a query in this regard, a foreign office spokesman said that people associated with sensitive programmes in Pakistan "are governed by a stringent personnel dependability and debrief programme.
This is a normal practice, especially in nuclear weapons states. These people are aware of their responsibilities in terms of their efficiency and conduct." He said under the programme, individuals may have to undergo debriefing sessions and that "the matter referred to falls within the scope of this practice".
The official added that as for Iran, there are reports about many sources from where Iran could have obtained nuclear technology, including several Western companies and individuals. The focus should be on checking out with those sources. "We, for our part, are simply carrying out our own procedures," he said.
Meanwhile, it was learnt that director laboratories Dr Farooq used to be very close to the founder of the KRL Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan and was known as a "King" of the laboratories.
Nobody in the Khan Research Laboratories exactly knew about the whereabouts of the two scientists and it is believed that they have been picked up by the personnel of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). When contacted, public relations officer of the KRL said he was completely in the dark about the issue.
The founder of the KRL Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan could not be contacted for his comments despite repeated efforts. "Dr Khan is not at home and it is very difficult to tell where he will be at this time," a person who received the telephone call at the residence of Dr Khan at Banni Gala told Dawn.
Top KRL scientists go missing
By Syed Irfan Raza
ISLAMABAD, Dec 10: Two senior officials of Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) have gone missing under mysterious circumstances, sources in the KRL told Dawn on Wednesday.
The sources said director general Dr Yasin Chohan and director laboratories Dr Farooq were missing for the last one week.
Responding to a query in this regard, a foreign office spokesman said that people associated with sensitive programmes in Pakistan "are governed by a stringent personnel dependability and debrief programme.
This is a normal practice, especially in nuclear weapons states. These people are aware of their responsibilities in terms of their efficiency and conduct." He said under the programme, individuals may have to undergo debriefing sessions and that "the matter referred to falls within the scope of this practice".
The official added that as for Iran, there are reports about many sources from where Iran could have obtained nuclear technology, including several Western companies and individuals. The focus should be on checking out with those sources. "We, for our part, are simply carrying out our own procedures," he said.
Meanwhile, it was learnt that director laboratories Dr Farooq used to be very close to the founder of the KRL Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan and was known as a "King" of the laboratories.
Nobody in the Khan Research Laboratories exactly knew about the whereabouts of the two scientists and it is believed that they have been picked up by the personnel of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). When contacted, public relations officer of the KRL said he was completely in the dark about the issue.
The founder of the KRL Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan could not be contacted for his comments despite repeated efforts. "Dr Khan is not at home and it is very difficult to tell where he will be at this time," a person who received the telephone call at the residence of Dr Khan at Banni Gala told Dawn.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
It might be pointed out to Mr. Henderson that the experts in Washington have yet to unearth a "clandestine" program even when it was being paid for and transported on American planes.
It is quite interesting how quickly the western media is quick to pounce on the "acting on their personal interest" viewpoint, as though the alternative had been firmly ruled out.
Groupthink or propaganda?
It is quite interesting how quickly the western media is quick to pounce on the "acting on their personal interest" viewpoint, as though the alternative had been firmly ruled out.
Groupthink or propaganda?
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
Interesting.
Simon Hendersons alleging a frame up against Dr. A.Q. Khan entirely contradicts Robert J. Einhorn's (Assistant Secretary of State for Non Proliferation in the Clinton Administration) description, "If the international community had a proliferation most-wanted list, A. Q. Khan would be most wanted on the list," quoted in the dated but classic L.A.Times article, "The Evil Behind the Axis?"
No matter. One can now add the further appelation of having a rogue nuclear establishment to Pakistan.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
So, looks like the Pakistanis have given in to the demand to interrogate the Pakistani Nuclear scientists. I wonder what that means.\
And in the quotable quotes section on the Forum today we have Pervez Hoodabhoy.
" " He is not a fundamentalist, though he is nationalist -- and sometimes nationalism and religion get mixed up in Pakistan," said Pervez Hoodbhoy, an anti-nuclear activist and MIT-trained physicist who teaches at Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad, Pakistan's capital. "He has been in it for the power, the money and the glory." "
In Axis behind the evil.
Thank you Dr. Hoodabhoy for that candid admission.
And in the quotable quotes section on the Forum today we have Pervez Hoodabhoy.
" " He is not a fundamentalist, though he is nationalist -- and sometimes nationalism and religion get mixed up in Pakistan," said Pervez Hoodbhoy, an anti-nuclear activist and MIT-trained physicist who teaches at Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad, Pakistan's capital. "He has been in it for the power, the money and the glory." "
In Axis behind the evil.
Thank you Dr. Hoodabhoy for that candid admission.
-
Prof Raghu
- BRFite -Trainee
- Posts: 61
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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
Interesting story -- remember reading about this long ago in Readers' Digest, but the Pakistani angle is new:
The A-Bomb Kid
Leafing through a waiting room copy of Book Digest, I came across the following proposition: "Suppose an average—or below-average in my case—physics student at a university could design a working atomic bomb on paper."
The premise was not fanciful. The author had done it. In 1977, John Aristotle Phillips found worldwide fame as the Princeton junior who designed a working Nagasaki-class weapon the size of a beach ball. In fact, after calling DuPont and asking for a good detonator for imploding, ahem, a dense sphere of metal—"God, how obvious," he scoffed to himself. "Why don't you just say you want to implode Pu-239?"—he actually improved on the original model.
Phillips was no Lex Luthor. He was the mascot who ran around in the Tiger outfit at Princeton games, a duty he acquired after being fired as cowbell player in the marching band. His academic prospects were none too bright. "If I flunk another course," he admitted, "I'll be bounced out of the Big U right on my ass."
So Phillips proposed a Term Paper to End All Term Papers: "How to Build Your Own Atomic Bomb." His instructor was Freeman Dyson, famed colleague of bomb-meisters Hans Bethe and Richard Feynman. But Dyson carefully avoided giving his student extra help. Phillips gathered declassified documents at the National Technical Information Service—"Oh, you want to build a bomb too?" a librarian asked him dryly—and many sleepless nights of calculations later, he pulled it off. Phillips did this while camped out with a broken typewriter in the campus Ivy Club. For extra surrealism, the club members who observed his mysterious work included fellow student Parker Stevenson. Yes, the Hardy Boys' star Parker Stevenson.
So how good was his design?
"I remember telling him I would give him an A for it," Dyson e-mails me, "but advised him to burn it as soon as the grade was registered." Phillips was spared the trouble of procuring matches: The U.S. government kept his term paper and classified it. Soon Phillips was pursued by hack journalists and trench-coaters alike: The Pakistani embassy tried to get a copy; agents trailed him; the FBI and CIA got involved.
...
The A-Bomb Kid
Leafing through a waiting room copy of Book Digest, I came across the following proposition: "Suppose an average—or below-average in my case—physics student at a university could design a working atomic bomb on paper."
The premise was not fanciful. The author had done it. In 1977, John Aristotle Phillips found worldwide fame as the Princeton junior who designed a working Nagasaki-class weapon the size of a beach ball. In fact, after calling DuPont and asking for a good detonator for imploding, ahem, a dense sphere of metal—"God, how obvious," he scoffed to himself. "Why don't you just say you want to implode Pu-239?"—he actually improved on the original model.
Phillips was no Lex Luthor. He was the mascot who ran around in the Tiger outfit at Princeton games, a duty he acquired after being fired as cowbell player in the marching band. His academic prospects were none too bright. "If I flunk another course," he admitted, "I'll be bounced out of the Big U right on my ass."
So Phillips proposed a Term Paper to End All Term Papers: "How to Build Your Own Atomic Bomb." His instructor was Freeman Dyson, famed colleague of bomb-meisters Hans Bethe and Richard Feynman. But Dyson carefully avoided giving his student extra help. Phillips gathered declassified documents at the National Technical Information Service—"Oh, you want to build a bomb too?" a librarian asked him dryly—and many sleepless nights of calculations later, he pulled it off. Phillips did this while camped out with a broken typewriter in the campus Ivy Club. For extra surrealism, the club members who observed his mysterious work included fellow student Parker Stevenson. Yes, the Hardy Boys' star Parker Stevenson.
So how good was his design?
"I remember telling him I would give him an A for it," Dyson e-mails me, "but advised him to burn it as soon as the grade was registered." Phillips was spared the trouble of procuring matches: The U.S. government kept his term paper and classified it. Soon Phillips was pursued by hack journalists and trench-coaters alike: The Pakistani embassy tried to get a copy; agents trailed him; the FBI and CIA got involved.
...
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 14 Jan 2003
> The Pakistani embassy tried to get a copy