Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 25 Dec 2003

Umrao
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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 25 Dec 2003

Postby Umrao » 10 Jan 2004 09:26

Now think of it why is it that

Iran rated on Pakis
Libya rated on Pakis
Koreans are worried and ready to negotiate?

Ans

Paki stuff doesnt work.
why
they cant figure out when they buy stuff like this

But Perkin Elmer irreparably disabled the devices first.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 25 Dec 2003

Postby Kuttan » 10 Jan 2004 16:46

If Pakistan is “Nuke Nood” then this crosses one more proliferation red line besides raising the question as to who is the ultimate beneficiary.

Alternatively Pakistan is not “Nuke Nood”. I am inclined to this view.
If they had developed working nukes of their own, why did they need to order these, ah, surgical items?

If they had not developed working nukes, but had a dependable, ready stock of imported warheads ready, why did they need to order triggering devices for 200?

"nook-nood" may not have resulted in removal of all capability to produce (or import) fissile material. It just removed all functional warheads.

So the Perkin-Elmer report is actually a strong indicator that the Bhutto Cattle Grazing Project is still very much in the "hope" stage.

BTW, what exactly are these gizmos? If they can be used to blast kidney stones, and are made by an OptoElectronics company, they must be something that sends out beams of high-energy particles. Neutron generators? Electron beams?

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 25 Dec 2003

Postby Kumar » 10 Jan 2004 18:13

N^3,

I am not sure what these triggered spark gaps were exactly made for. Triggered spark gaps are normally used in high frequency switching for very high voltages (say switching thousands of volts rapidly at ultrasonic frequencies).

A spark gap can also be a very strong source for very wideband electromagnetic waves. Especially ones made with Xenon gas inside the spark making tube. If the spark gap is modulated by an external variable voltage then you can modulate the envelope of amplitude of these waves to create pulses of strong EM radiation at a certain frequency. So say, a piece of tissue/tumor absorbs the radiation more than a nearby tissue. The pulses cause this tissue/tumor to heat and cool rapidly due to absorption of EM waves. This can in principle break it up. Such pulses of EM waves have been known to cause cell wall rupture and have been experimented with in treatment of tumors.

Kidney stones can be broken by the use of Lithotripters, that use ultrasonic shock waves created by an electromagnetic coil that activates the piezo elements at ultrasonic frequency above 20kHz. Ultrasonic shocks are focused using a lens and directed at the stone.

Lithotripters can also be made of lasers. Again spark gaps can be used to switch the power to the lasers to create laser pulses.
laser lithotripter

Added later:
Triggered spark gaps

This Perkins Elmer site mentions that their spark gaps can be used in switching power to the lithotripters:
Perkin Elmer Triggered Spark Gaps

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 25 Dec 2003

Postby Kumar » 10 Jan 2004 18:42

Lithotripters and nuke switches and Iraq

DEPT. OF MASS DESTRUCTION:Saddam's nuclear shopping spree.
Last year, the Iraqi government ordered half a dozen lithotripters, which are state-of-the-art machines for getting rid of kidney stones. (The word "lithotripter" comes from the Greek for "stone breaker.") A lithotripter uses a shock wave to pulverize these painful objects without surgery. Machines like the ones Iraq bought require a high-precision electronic switch that triggers a powerful burst of electricity. In addition to the lithotripters, Iraq wanted to buy a hundred and twenty extra switches. That is at least a hundred more than the machines would ever need.
...
According to a knowledgeable U.N. inspector, each bomb of the type that Iraq is trying to build requires thirty-two switches. Thus, a hundred of them would outfit three bombs. It is hardly a coincidence that, as the former U.N. inspector Scott Ritter testified at a Senate hearing last year, the inspectors had "intelligence information which indicates that components necessary for three nuclear weapons exist" in Iraq.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 25 Dec 2003

Postby Kuttan » 10 Jan 2004 18:57

So the Pakis got enough for 2 "bums" in the 1st shipment, with a few more "bums" coming later.

Clearly, then, they were short of working bums, heh?

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 25 Dec 2003

Postby Kumar » 10 Jan 2004 19:21

Yes that is curious, 66 come to be just enough for two bombs. A total of 200 switches were ordered, just enough for "six" bombs! What is with this number "six"? Didn't TSP claim to have exploded "six" bombs to India's five? Were these meant to be replacement switches?

At least Iraqis were smarter, they made sure their order of 120 swtches was not close to a multiple of 32. But Pakis, we can of course count on their dumbness!

Paki arithmetic:

32x2 = 66
32x6 = 200

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 25 Dec 2003

Postby Calvin » 10 Jan 2004 19:22

What is Khushab's Pu generation capacity?

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 25 Dec 2003

Postby rgosain » 10 Jan 2004 19:38

Regarding these high speed switches which are imperative for a synchronised and simultaneous compression of the core, from where does India obtain her switches?

Secondly, is it possible to design the conventional detonation which would require fewer switches. I believe work was done in the 60's on pinching - if that's the correct term.

It would seem there that the limiting factors for wannabe WMD merchants are a supply of switches in addition to availabilty of U and pu. Seems so much more difficult.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 25 Dec 2003

Postby Kuttan » 10 Jan 2004 19:46

Perhaps the above explains the sequence of events, and the American priorities, a little better.

Starting circa 9/11/2001 and ending June/July 2002, the priority was "securing" the weapons. This was basically declared accomplished before India stood down Operation Parakram, and George F. happily declared that he was now sure that the Pakistani nuclear weapons were in "reliable" hands.

Although it was well-known by Dec. 2001 that the top echelons of the Paki nuke establishment were Al Qaeda (Ummah Tameer Nau, to be precise), and 6 of them had been "debriefed" right then, and two skipped town to Myanmar, there was little noise on this issue after that.

Then the Shoe Bomber made his appearance, conveying the info that people who knew about shaped implosion charges were behind the Shoe Bomber.

Then came the Dirty Bomber - revealing that there was radioactive stuff available in TSP to the terrorists.

After July 2002, Mush was seen a few times giving speeches to the nook establishment telling them that the weapons phase was over - time to shift to peaceful uses of nukes (like Dirty Bombs..)

The US concern, though, had clearly shifted from ready-made weapons, to fissile material and possible weapon-construction.

There was a report from Kahuta that uranium enrichment there had stopped, and the US-citizen Finance Minister was taken on a conducted tour of Kahuta to see for himself that all the centrifuges etc. had been removed.

Then... slowly, the NoKo deal leaked out. Still surprisingly low-key public reaction from GOTUS.

IOW, the centrifuges had been found. 400 of them.

Then came the pressure about Libya from Israel.

Then the pressure on Iran's nookulear program.

Then about KSA..

Then about more intense "debriefing" of the Paki nuke "scientists". Obviously, if they had been sitting around all these months sans briefs, its a bit curious that all this "debriefing" should start up again, isn't it?

I think the US discovered that Mush&Co were back to developing "bums" since the PRC and the US weren't obliging with ready-made weapons. There was now a lot of cash on hand from the sales of centrifuges and maybe some fissile material to NoKo, Iran, Libya, KSA etc. so it was back to "R&D" for "H&D".

So now the emphasis has shifted to stopping the R&D.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 25 Dec 2003

Postby A_Gupta » 10 Jan 2004 20:07

Originally posted by John Umrao:
mohan raju>> you are on the dot, then there was the spin that Indian tests vented and the samples obtained over Chagai were actually Indian Pu. In the ancient city tubelightabad, anything spins.

Then wallace came down charging shouting Indian Fusion failed, Indian test yields were less than claimed etc etc etc

ourman uneven Cohen, allbrights, kreepons timothys etc etc started variations of the same spin.
So were these SD experts trying to distract us from asking the right questions?

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 25 Dec 2003

Postby rgosain » 10 Jan 2004 20:18

This is FAS's analysis. As usual should be taken with a dose of salts (Epsom perhaps)

"Evidently, however, the jump-start provided by A.Q. Khan's trove of documents was an insufficient basis for a dependable Uranium program. Chinese assistance in the development of gas centrifuges at Kahuta was indicated by the presence of Chinese technicians at the facility in the early 1980s. The uranium enrichment facility began operating in the early 1980s, but suffered serious start up problems. In early 1996 it was reported that the A.Q. Khan Research Laboratory had received 5,000 ring magnets, which can be used in gas centrifuges, from a subsidiary of the China National Nuclear Corporation."

Futher on :

"Perhaps in response to the persistent problems with the Uranium program, around the time of the signing of the 1986 Sino-Pakistani atomic cooperation agreement, Pakistan evidently embarked on a parrallel Plutonium program. Built with Chinese assistance, the heavy water reactor at Khushab is the central element of Pakistan's program for production of plutonium and tritium for advanced compact warheads. The Khushab facility, like that at Kahuta, is not subject to IAEA inspections. Khushab, with a capacity variously reported at between 40 and 70 MWT, was completed in the mid-1990s, with the start of construction dating to the mid-1980s."

On 28 May 1998 Pakistan announced that it had successfully conducted five nuclear tests. According to the announcment, the results were as expected, and there was no release of radioactivity. The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission that the five nuclear tests conducted on Thursday measured up to 5.0 on the Richter scale, with a reported yield of up to 40 KT (equivalent TNT). According to local reports, these detonations took place over a two hour period. One device was said to be a boosted uranium device, with the four other tests being low yield sub-kiloton devices. On 30 May 1998 Pakistan tested one more nuclear warhead with a yield of 12 kilotons. The tests were conducted at Balochistan, bringing the total number of claimed tests to six. It has also been claimed by Pakistani sources that at least one additional device, initially planned for detonation on 30 May 1998, remained emplaced underground ready for detonation.

According to a preliminary analysis conducted at Los Alamos National Laboratory, material released into the atmosphere during an underground nuclear test by Pakistan in May 1998 contained low levels of weapons-grade plutonium. But Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and other agencies contested the accuracy of this finding. The significance of the Los Alamos finding was that Pakistan had either imported or produced plutonium undetected by the US intelligence community."

A few to ponder : 1) mentions the problems with the Urenco stolen centrifuges which were later sold to DPRK, Libya, Iran OBL etc
2) the curious incident of the plutonium. Incidentally a Monte Carlo simulation will demonstrate that it is 95% unlikely to be from the Indian explosions. I have the details on an old SPARC workstation.
3)even more baffling the device entombed in the cement.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 25 Dec 2003

Postby Div » 10 Jan 2004 21:39

Experts question Pakistan's nuclear link with Libya
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/americas/view/65400/1/.html
Frank Gaffney, US Center for Security Policy, said: "Unfortunately, it's no surprise that we are finding, now that we are getting insights into the Libyan programme, that it had ties to the Pakistani programme. This is in fact a piece with obvious connections, with Pakistani scientists, and I suspect, with the Pakistani government."

After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, President Musharraf vowed his nation was committed to nuclear non-proliferation.

However, Western officials familiar with the investigation into Libya's nuclear programme said it had all the hallmarks of a Pakistani system, and it appears the assistance came after President Musharraf made his promises.

Mr Gaffney added: "Unfortunately, no matter how you cut it, the evidence of Libya's access to Pakistan's nuclear technology does not reflect well on President Musharraf, who has been, I think, by-and-large, a remarkably courageous and stand-up guy in the war against terror.

"But whether he knew and he allowed that transfer of technology or he did not know, it suggests that he is not entirely reliable in this war on terror."

The Bush administration appears to be willing to give its key regional ally the benefit of the doubt. :mad:

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 25 Dec 2003

Postby Johann » 10 Jan 2004 23:14

Mohan, this was the original media report on the revised identification of the sample.

The original airborne sampling missions were reported to have been carried out by the USAF's WC-135W, a one of a kind modified Boeing 707 used for overt sample collection.

All of the reports from the early 1980s onwards regarding the Pakistanis consistantly spoke of a design based on the third Chinese nuclear test (October 1966), a U-235 based implosion device with a yield of ~20kt. A plutonium sample would have been an unexpected and perhaps unwelcome surprise.

Nuclear Fuel
February 7, 2000

VENTED INDIAN PLUTONIUM DEEMED SOURCE OF REPORTS PAKISTAN TESTED PU WEAPONS

Mark Hibbs, Washington

Rumors last year that Pakistan had secretly separated plutonium and then used it in at least one of several nuclear fission bombs it detonated in 1998 are unfounded, U.S. official sources said this week.

Reports to that effect apparently have their origin in U.S. intelligence findings, made shortly after the tests were carried out, that now suggest instead that some plutonium used in Indian nuclear weapons tests, conducted a few weeks before Pakistan's, had escaped deep underground shafts at the Pokaran test site and then blew back across the border into Pakistan.

India tested three nuclear weapons near Pokaran, in the Thar Desert, on May 11, 1998. It is believed that all the devices used plutonium in their cores. On May 28, Pakistan responded by exploding at least two devices at a test site in the Chagai Hills.

In late May 1998, U.S. nonproliferation officials, bracing for a Pakistani test after the State Department failed to dissuade Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif not to respond in kind, said they were certain that Pakistan had assembled fission weapons based on cores of U-235.

Several months after Pakistan exploded the devices, however, rumors began to circulate that Pakistan had tested at least one weapon containing plutonium. Based on sources who asserted that U.S. intelligence data found plutonium in the atmosphere following the Pakistan tests, media reports surfaced that Pakistan had used plutonium in the nuclear weapons it tested.

Last week, experts in the U.S., including official sources with access to U.S. intelligence information on the Pakistan and Indian test series, denied that was the case.

Sources concurred that, after the Pakistan tests in late May 1998, U.S. intelligence collected environmental samples from the area of the Pakistan test site. Analysis in the U.S. then confirmed the presence of plutonium in the samples. Some U.S. officials briefed on the finding then told media outlets that meant Pakistan had used plutonium in its devices.

But on Feb. 3 U.S. officials close to the matter confirmed instead information from other sources suggesting that, when analysts at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and the National Nonproliferation Center of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) obtained the raw data collected in Pakistan, a battle broke out among experts on how to evaluate it. Since then, sources said, the report that Pakistan used plutonium in its devices has been discredited.

Sources said it is currently believed that the plutonium found in the environmental samples in Pakistan was instead of Indian origin, and that comparative isotopic analysis suggests the plutonium was vented to the atmosphere by the explosions at Pokaran carried out two weeks before. One official said that meteorological data corroborated the hypothesis that small amounts of plutonium which were dispersed by an Indian blast out of the test shaft were transported by air currents to the area surrounding the Pakistan test site, which is located about 500 miles northwest of Pokaran.

U.S. officials said last month that, regardless of rumors of plutonium in Pakistan's weapons, no additional information has come to light suggesting that U.S intelligence was wrong in its May1998 assessment that Pakistan's nuclear weapons were all based on U-235, not plutonium.

Just weeks before the tests, Pakistan had announced that a reactor near Khushab, under construction with some clandestine foreign assistance since the late 1980s, had begun operation. Regardless of that development, one senior U.S. nonproliferation official said just before the tests, a ''firewall'' was in place around the Khushab reactor since the CIA was confident Pakistan had not developed an independent spent fuel reprocessing capability. Pakistan had set up a pilot scale hot cell operation at Rawalpindi during the 1970s but it was not believed capable of separating bomb quantities of plutonium. Pakistan later obtained design know-how from the French firm SGN for a commercial-scale reprocessing plant but, the U.S. believes, Pakistan did not use it to build a plutonium separation facility which would have been in operation in time to produce bomb-quantities of plutonium for the tests carried out in May 1998.

One expert said that the conclusion of U.S. intelligence analysts that Indian tests two years ago vented plutonium might be construed as a technical violation of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which India signed in 1963.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 25 Dec 2003

Postby ramana » 10 Jan 2004 23:34

rgos, in light of the above report could you put up a write up of the Monte Carlo analysis? My simpler probability analysis of the five or six events needed to find Indian test vented Pu sample over Chagai as an extremely unlikely event.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 25 Dec 2003

Postby Umrao » 10 Jan 2004 23:47

If you ever wanted to find jokers in the Non proliferation crusaders, read this part form the above mentioned report

<I> "One expert said that the conclusion of U.S. intelligence analysts that Indian tests two years ago vented plutonium might be construed as a technical violation of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which India signed in 1963."</I>

another aspect that needs to be investigated is that wind patterns, weather conditions subsequent to the test in Pokharan. In all probablity the wind patterns would not be towards North/North west to gently waft over Chagai for CIA to pick up.

If by chance the drift be true then we have to test again with real good venting so that areal plume settles over Islamabad too. :D

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 25 Dec 2003

Postby rgosain » 10 Jan 2004 23:55

I will try my best to dig out the methodology and the results over the coming month, but one thing we didn't think about back in late '99 when this story of the venting came is the characteristic signature of the isotope the US recovered. A simple comparison of this with those from chinese airborne tests would have sufficed, but I have yet to see any results along those lines. Maybe it's just an absence of evidence.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 25 Dec 2003

Postby Vivek_A » 11 Jan 2004 00:41

cross posting.

Pyongyang shows 'nuclear deterrent' to US visitors

SEOUL -- North Korea said on Saturday that it showed its 'nuclear deterrent' to an unofficial US delegation that visited the communist country's disputed Yongbyon nuclear facility.
'As is known, the United States compelled us to make a nuclear deterrent force, which we displayed to Lewis and his group,' North Korea's official KCNA news agency quoted a foreign ministry spokesman as saying.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 25 Dec 2003

Postby svinayak » 11 Jan 2004 00:44

Originally posted by John Umrao:
If you ever wanted to find jokers in the Non proliferation crusaders, read this part form the above mentioned report

"One expert said that the conclusion of U.S. intelligence analysts that Indian tests two years ago vented plutonium might be construed as a technical violation of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which India signed in 1963."

another aspect that needs to be investigated is that wind patterns, weather conditions subsequent to the test in Pokharan. In all probablity the wind patterns would not be towards North/North west to gently waft over Chagai for CIA to pick up.

If by chance the drift be true then we have to test again with real good venting so that areal plume settles over Islamabad too. :D
It is a good thing that TSP tested within 2 weeks of India.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 25 Dec 2003

Postby Calvin » 11 Jan 2004 02:09

rgos: We were quite aware of the isotope signature of Pu. However, the fact that the story was suppressed in the media so quickly led us to believe that the match was made, and linked to the Chinese, and that Clinton/Gore did not wish to rock the boat with regard to the Chinese (and possibly their electoral contributions.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 25 Dec 2003

Postby Bharat » 11 Jan 2004 06:31

rgos:
Can you mail me at bharat_19@hotmail.com
I am also working on the Monte Carlo simulation for an entirely different topic and would like your help if it's possible.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 25 Dec 2003

Postby Rangudu » 11 Jan 2004 21:50

Report from the Brookings Institution

The first challenge is to forge new relationships with countries so far passed over by the Nunn-Lugar program. The most obvious candidate on this list is Pakistan: There is little reason to trust President Pervez Musharraf when he insists that his nuclear technology is secure, and there is even less reason to trust that his leadership itself is stable, especially after two assassination attempts in the last few weeks alone.

But the reason the United States has not yet taken major steps to secure the Pakistani arsenal is not money; it's a lack of diplomatic creativity. Time and again, American emissaries have offered to physically protect Pakistani weapons--as a former Pakistani ambassador to Washington described it, the United States had offered to baby-sit their bombs. Not only did the Pakistanis find such offers insulting, they also found them dangerous, as they would have required giving Americans access to Pakistan's secrecy-shrouded arsenal. A wiser American administration would shift tacks with Pakistan and develop ways to enable the Pakistanis to secure their arsenal themselves. <u>It would also be more careful to assuage the Pakistanis' egos.</u> :roll:

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 25 Dec 2003

Postby Rangudu » 11 Jan 2004 21:53

From Today's LA Times. Posting in full.

Keeping a Nuke Peddler in Line

By Jon B. Wolfsthal
Jon Wolfsthal is deputy director of the Non-Proliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment. He is co-author of "Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction."

January 11, 2004

WASHINGTON — It's been a poorly kept secret for several years that Pakistan helped develop nuclear programs in Iran, North Korea and probably in Libya. For the United States, however, Pakistan's help in the war on terror has been more important than its peddling of nuclear technology to rogue states. As a result, Islamabad has felt no significant U.S. pressure to impose tighter controls on Pakistani nuclear experts, expertise or equipment. But as evidence of Pakistan's role in nuclear proliferation mounts, that's no longer an acceptable trade-off. A country that arrests terrorists one day and sells nuclear technology the next is not contributing to greater U.S. security.

After Sept. 11, 2001, news reports revealed that two Pakistani scientists had direct contacts with Osama bin Laden while he was operating in Afghanistan. Investigators later alleged that Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear program, had traveled almost a dozen times to North Korea to help Pyongyang develop a uranium-enrichment program. And International Atomic Energy Agency officials reported that uranium-enrichment equipment inspected in Iran was identical to that found in Pakistan. Now, Pakistani officials confirm that several of the country's top nuclear experts are being questioned for providing nuclear technologies to other countries. And there is a growing possibility that Libya's nuclear program, which Libyan leader Moammar Kadafi recently pledged to shut down, bears Pakistan's nuclear signature.

The U.S. has had little success in convincing high-level Pakistani officials to safeguard the country's nuclear materials and technology. Last year, for example, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell raised the issue with Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, offering U.S. assistance. The Pakistani response was the equivalent of: "Butt out, we can handle our own affairs." Last month's announcement that the Pakistani army was assuming control of the country's nuclear program was strictly a public-relations move.

It's possible that the Pakistani scientists being questioned were operating without government permission. But Pakistan had a heads-up about such contacts from the U.S. two years ago, which should have prompted authorities to be more vigilant about monitoring nuclear personnel. It's also possible that Pakistani nuclear experts helped Iran and North Korea as part of official policy. Pakistan received intermediate-range missiles from North Korea, but it was never clear how cash-strapped Islamabad could afford them. Similarly, cash and oil from Iran may have been lures for Pakistan's nuclear technology.

Regardless of why its scientists peddled nuclear assistance, Pakistan has a problem it cannot or will not control: It has become the world's No. 1 nuclear proliferator.

Accordingly, some say that Pakistan should be sanctioned or treated as a rogue state. It's unclear, however, that punishment — or the threat of punishment — would stop Pakistan from selling nuclear technology or compel it to monitor its nuclear facilities more closely. Instead, it might increase economic pressures and destabilize Pakistan, reducing even its nominal control over nuclear weapons and facilities.

There's a better course.

The U.S. should make clear at the presidential level that Pakistan's past nuclear misconduct has damaged American security, and that to ensure its partnership with Washington, Islamabad must satisfy U.S. concerns about its nuclear program. This would have to include acceptance of American assistance to establish a personnel-reliability program, which would include use of background checks, polygraphs and drug tests; to improve physical protection of nuclear weapons, materials and equipment by deploying modern security systems; and to adopt international standards on the protection of nuclear materials at production and storage sites.

At the same time, Washington must emphasize that its top priority in its relations with Pakistan is nuclear proliferators, not assistance in the pursuit of Bin Laden and members of Al Qaeda. Concern is already running high in Pakistan that the U.S., just as it did after the Soviets had left Afghanistan, will cut its ties after Bin Laden is captured. Making nuclear nonproliferation the goal might reduce this fear because it would require the U.S. to work with Pakistan over the long haul, including helping to reform its economy. Furthermore, India's and Pakistan's agreement to talk peace could give Islamabad more leeway to work with Washington to secure its arsenal.

The belief in Pakistan is that the U.S. cannot fight the war on terror without its help. But the price for such cooperation cannot be Pakistan's continuing complicity in spreading nuclear technology to rogue states. That price is simply too high.

Washington has promised a brighter future for Kadafi because he has abandoned his nuclear ambitions. It should do the same for Pakistan as long as Islamabad acts responsibly and stops selling its nuclear knowledge to the highest bidders.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 25 Dec 2003

Postby kgoan » 11 Jan 2004 22:44

Hey folks, we keep mentioning Iran, N Korea and Libya, but for the sake of completeness and making sure every lurker knows Pak perfidity, lets keep to the fully documented list eh?

A few months before the invasion of Iraq Saddam Hussein submitted a 10,000-page dossier to the UN containing a plethora of documents pertaining to his weapons programmes. One of these was a memo from an Iraqi undercover operative in which he reported that he had been approached by a Pakistani who claimed he represented a top nuclear scientist (currently being 'debriefed' in Islamabad) and offering to sell Iraq nuclear blueprints. Although this report surfaced briefly in the western media, not much was made of it at the time in the rush of events.
From: http://www.dawn.com/weekly/mazdak/mazdak.htm

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 25 Dec 2003

Postby Umrao » 11 Jan 2004 23:18

somebody should compile year wise

US aid to Pkistan and coresponding Nook prolif in that year by TSP, country to which Nukes were offered and money paid (or barter goods like oil/no dongs etc) by the country .

You will get a facinating curve with no drooping but upward and firm u curves.

that will tell us how pakis financed their nooks and the revenue it generated.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 25 Dec 2003

Postby NRao » 12 Jan 2004 00:03

WRT the Jon B. Wolfsthal article, I am amazed that even in the year 2004 some (if not all) US based Pundits STILL wear blinders. A very shallow article IMHO. The same problem, the same solution, only the label has changed. Good Lord!!

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 25 Dec 2003

Postby JE Menon » 12 Jan 2004 01:11

Furthermore, India's and Pakistan's agreement to talk peace could give Islamabad more leeway to work with Washington to secure its arsenal.

Phultroo, u there?

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 25 Dec 2003

Postby Prof Raghu » 12 Jan 2004 02:03

To add to kgoan's post above, such a "Pak-Iraq" link was there in the early 1990s as well -- remember reading it in Businessweek or Time/Newsweek sometime in 1991/92, if memory is right.

A Lexis/Nexis search can find that article or more of that ilk.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 25 Dec 2003

Postby Leonard » 12 Jan 2004 07:36

A Conversation between BHL and Moshe Yaalon CS of Israeli Army, Spring 2002.

BHL:

The Missile Sites, for instance, the places where fissile materials are stored--- Are they not far more dangerous than Saddam Hussein's ?

As a result, hasn't the international community lost control of the situation ?



MH Surprised, and vaguely mocking, with a gleam in his eye that makes him look like
young Rabin:

MH: So you are interested in Pakistan ? How about that, so are we ..but don't get it wrong ---

PAKISTAN is NOOK NUDE .... :D :D

The international community knows, down to the Single Unit, where the warheads are in that country.....

if one budges, <u> if it moves a single millimeter </u> ---he holds
his thumb and index finger apart to indicate a millimeter----
<u>"we'll know how to operate</u> !!!



BHL: Does that mean there could be a Pakistani Osirak ????

Would that kind of operation---the declaration of a nuclear installation under construction---be concievable in the world of bin Laden and post-September 11 ???

MH: That's a good question; but I don't have a answer ???

BHL: An Osirak in Kahuta, Chagai, Khushab ?? An Israeli commando unit capable of parachuting onto a nuclear site if hijacking were imminent?

The thought is both reassuring and terrible !!!!

More Details .....

Who Killed Daniel Pearl by BHL.

Comments:

Many be that's what US PACOM and Indian Para-troopers were doing practice runs... ;)

ldev
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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 25 Dec 2003

Postby ldev » 12 Jan 2004 08:22

Eric Margolis upto his dirty tricks again

Right after the Libyan charade, Washington opened a major new campaign to deprive Pakistan of its nuclear arsenal. The U.S. media trumpeted leaked government reports alleging Pakistan had secretly supplied Iran, North Korea, and Libya with nuclear technology. These reports blurred the lines between exports of civilian and military nuclear technology.

Washington accused Pakistan of being a major nuclear proliferator. Pakistan nervously :D admitted some of its nuclear scientists may have privately aided neighbour Iran, which has sought nuclear weapons for the past 28 years.

So far, accusations that past or current Pakistani governments were involved with covert nuclear weapons exports remain unproven. :rotfl:

Whatever the case, this whole business is worthy of Alice in Wonderland. Who came down from the mountain to ordain that only the U.S., Russia, Britain, France, China, North Korea, India and Israel are allowed to possess nuclear weapons or sell nuclear technology?

The U.S. is about to build a new generation of earth-penetrating nuclear weapons. China and Russia are working on new nuclear systems.

India is building a very powerful nuclear arsenal and developing intercontinental missiles.

Israel has sold India advanced nuclear warhead and missile technology.

Muslim nations, it appears, are the only ones not allowed to possess WMD.

India used to rightly call this "nuclear apartheid" until President Bush allowed Delhi into the nuclear club.

Now that Iraq has been crushed, the White House's next targets are clearly Iran and Pakistan.

Neither pose any threat to the U.S.

Political and economic pressure on Pakistan will intensify.

President Pervez Musharraf, who has been unfailingly responsive to U.S. demands (GUBO-in-Chief), may soon be asked to place Pakistan's nuclear weapons under joint U.S.-Pakistani control, a prelude to the total elimination of its nuclear arsenal, scientists, and weapons manufacturing capability.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 25 Dec 2003

Postby kgoan » 12 Jan 2004 10:49

>>India used to rightly call this "nuclear apartheid"

Gawds above. Blow a trumpet someone, and save that article! Eric "I-love-Pathans" Margolis has actually said that India did something right!!!

Lordy, the times, are surely a'changin'.

Rich
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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 25 Dec 2003

Postby Rich » 12 Jan 2004 14:05

Originally posted by L Dev:
Eric Margolis upto his dirty tricks again

Now that Iraq has been crushed, the White House's next targets are clearly Iran and Pakistan.

Neither pose any threat to the U.S.
What a nincompoop :roll: . Hey Eric, we'd like you to repeat that statement when AQ detonates a Paki bomb in NY or LA.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 25 Dec 2003

Postby Baruah » 12 Jan 2004 14:49

So far, accusations that past or current Pakistani governments were involved with covert nuclear weapons exports remain unproven. A director general of Pakistan's intelligence agency, ISI, once told me Iran had offered to pay Pakistan's entire defence budget for 10 years in exchange for nuclear technology, but Islamabad refused.
:p

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 25 Dec 2003

Postby svinayak » 12 Jan 2004 20:53

Assertive U.S. foreign policy produces diplomatic payoff
Mon Jan 12, 6:28 AM ET Add Op/Ed - USATODAY.com to My Yahoo!


In 2002, the "Doomsday Clock" that symbolizes how close the world is to nuclear war advanced to a scary seven minutes to midnight, partly because of three worrisome developments: Nuclear powers India and Pakistan were edging toward a conflict; fears were growing that terrorists would obtain nuclear materials; and President Bush (news - web sites) was spurning international treaties in favor of a tough, go-it-alone foreign policy.

web page
Fast forward to this week. While the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has not changed its 57-year-old clock officially, the world is breathing easier. India and Pakistan are beginning to talk peace. North Korea (news - web sites) hints it may follow fellow rogue states Libya and Iran in allowing nuclear inspections. And both of those shifts have ignited an intriguing debate over whether Bush's strategy has been, in fact, provocative or a positive catalyst for the promising new developments.

Though time will be the ultimate judge, certainly a case can be made that these tentative peace overtures were spurred by the threat of Bush's 2002 pre-emptive strike doctrine. It warns those who might use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons that they are vulnerable to a first strike from the U.S. A similar argument is made by many historians who credit President Reagan's military buildup and "Evil Empire" rhetoric for pushing the Soviet Union toward collapse.

Regardless of cause, the challenge for the Bush administration is to seize the diplomatic opportunity to transform these encouraging events into lasting gains that make the world safer. Among the possibilities:

Libya. Dictator Moammar Gadhafi, a long-time patron of terrorism, has agreed to scrap his nuclear weapons program in the hope that the U.S. will lift economic sanctions on his country. Libya can provide information about illicit nuclear suppliers, such as Pakistan and North Korea, and help identify al-Qaeda and other terrorist networks.

North Korea. A member of Bush's "axis of evil," it is believed to have at least one or two nuclear weapons that could obliterate the South Korean capital Seoul and about 37,000 U.S. troops stationed there. But last week it made a conciliatory gesture, saying it would dismantle its nuclear program in exchange for U.S. aid and a guarantee against attack. While difficult diplomacy will be required to strike a deal, disarming North Korea would remove a major threat to U.S. allies in Asia and curb the country's sale of missiles to other rogue regimes.

Iran. Another "axis of evil" member, it is long suspected of trying to develop nuclear weapons. Iran's new promise to allow U.N. inspections can help curb the spread of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. The U.S. is trying to capitalize on the concession by offering to hold talks, but Iran so far has rebuffed the overtures.

Bush's critics, including Democratic presidential candidates, are hammering away at the argument that his aggressive posture has made the world a more dangerous place. They say the U.S. must return to its past practice of resolving conflicts through diplomacy. But that view is as one-sided as that of foreign policy hawks, who claim Bush's threatened - or actual - use of force doesn't need to be applied cautiously.

New-style U.S. assertiveness combined with the equally powerful "old" tools of international dialogue can best nudge that Doomsday Clock away from midnight.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 25 Dec 2003

Postby JE Menon » 12 Jan 2004 22:46

Margolis references to Pak nukes and US "leaks" suggest that he is either ignorant or a liar. From our perspective it makes no difference. It looks like this fool has been talking to that mighty strategist Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 25 Dec 2003

Postby Rangudu » 12 Jan 2004 22:49

JEM,

Margolis says he spoke to a DG of the ISI, which sounds like Gulbaaz Hameed.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 25 Dec 2003

Postby jrjrao » 12 Jan 2004 22:54

TIME reports:

Inside The A-Bomb Bazaar
Evidence mounts that Pakistani scientists sold nuclear know-how to a triad of rogue nations

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1101040119-574887,00.html
Now Khan is earning new renown as the godfather of nuclear proliferation, a dangerous salesman who helped bring the Bomb within closer reach of other eager powers. Since Iran and Libya were exposed in recent months as nuclear-weapon owners in the making, Khan and more than six other scientists who worked with him, plus an undisclosed number of Pakistani diplomats and intelligence agents posted abroad, have been under investigation in Islamabad for sharing the playbook of atomic weapons with those states, well-placed foreign intelligence sources tell TIME. Khan has long been suspected of orchestrating Pakistan's nukes-for-missiles swap with North Korea, and his name even appeared in a 1990 letter from a Dubai middleman to Saddam Hussein offering to sell Iraq the scientist's nuclear know-how.

U.S. intelligence officers have joined the Pakistani probe, :eek: :eek: Investigators in Islamabad tell TIME that a handful of scientists now being interrogated were selling the nation's nuclear secrets for their own profit or for ideological reasons. Those investigators absolve the government and steer clear of fingering Khan as the ringleader. Eager to keep Musharraf in power and a partner in the war on terrorism, the Bush Administration also tiptoes around the issue of Pakistan's official role. Yet some proliferation experts in the U.S. doubt that rogue scientists and their cronies in the security services could have arranged such supersecret, high-level deals without government approval.

U.S. officials are convinced that Khan was the key player in the barters that Pakistan made with North Korea. A 1994 agreement with the U.S. froze work at Pyongyang's nuclear-fuel reprocessing plant. Three years later, in exchange for the design of the centrifuges plus components to enrich uranium, Pakistan obtained from North Korea 600mile-range, nuclear-capable Nodong missiles that Khan's lab retooled and renamed the Ghauri. U.S. intelligence alleges he made a dozen or so visits to Pyongyang over several years.

...The U.S. thinks oil-rich Libya first began funding Pakistan's nuclear development in the 1970s and periodically supplied raw uranium. Washington officials say Gaddafi was eventually rewarded with Pakistan's centrifuge designs and secret supplies of essential materiel that helped Libya close in on nuclear-fuel production.

...The investigators tell TIME that Khan acknowledges "authorizing" some of their trips to Libya, Iran and North Korea but says he had "no idea" whether they were conducting clandestine business on their own. But Khan is widely regarded as the man with the knowledge and the authority to make the big deals. He was in complete, unchallenged control of KRL until 2001. A former colleague of his claims that Khan could fly anywhere without permission, make any deal he wanted. The tall, silver-haired scientist amassed a personal fortune that pays for a lavish lifestyle. His position and revered status would earn plenty of perks. But many, including U.S. intelligence officials, believe he acquired those riches peddling his nuclear expertise.

...Khan's travel has been restricted, and even inside Pakistan, he is always accompanied by two military officers. He rarely leaves his Islamabad mansion except to venture out to feed wild monkeys that swing down in the nearby forest. Officials in Washington meanwhile cross their fingers that Musharraf can and will make sure that with Khan sealed away, Pakistan's nuclear giveaway is over.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 25 Dec 2003

Postby ramana » 13 Jan 2004 00:54

One thing to wonder is if AQK was so dangerous then where is the Israeli reaction? For he would endanger it the most by prolif to Libya and Iran. Lesser threats like Bull got what was coming to them.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 25 Dec 2003

Postby svinayak » 13 Jan 2004 01:00

Originally posted by ramana:
One thing to wonder is if AQK was so dangerous then where is the Israeli reaction? For he would endanger it the most by prolif to Libya and Iran. Lesser threats like Bull got what was coming to them.
It looks like they were monitoring AQK and trying to nail all the govts which were lining up to do business. AQK was a handyman as long as it lasted.

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 25 Dec 2003

Postby Umrao » 13 Jan 2004 01:04

Bhutto, Gaddaffi families slug it out on nuke issue
Shyam Bhatia in London | January 12, 2004 22:32 IST
The Bhutto and Gaddaffi families find themselves at opposite ends of the argument about how nuclear weapons technology supplied by Islamabad found its way to Tripoli after 1975.

This follows last week's decision by Libya to open up its nuclear, chemical and biological warfare laboratories to UN inspectors following Colonel Muammar Gaddaffi's admission that he did secure nuclear help from Pakistan.

The Libyan policy announcement comes in the wake of the well-documented exchange of Libyan oil dollars for Pakistani nuclear warhead design and uranium enrichment technology promised to Gaddaffi by the late President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

Not so, according to a spokeswoman for the Pakistan Peoples Party now led by Bhutto's daughter Benazir. "This wrong information regarding the Libyan connection was dreamt up by the Zia regime that was pitted against the PPP," the spokeswoman says. "It was spread with greater intensity at the time to cover up the murder of Shah Nawaz Bhutto Shaheed."

Much of the early information about how suitcases stuffed with US dollar notes were sent on PIA flights from Tripoli to Pakistan was provided by Bhutto senior's then press secretary Khalid Hassan, who is now a Pakistani journalist based in the United States.

Commenting on Khalid Hassan's revelations, the PPP spokeswoman said, "The claim that Libya helped finance Pakistan's quest for a nuclear bomb was first made by journalist Mr Khalid Hassan in a BBC documentary called the 'Islamic Bomb'.

"It is not known who the source for Mr Khalid Hassan's information was except that it was wrong. As a press adviser to the Government of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, he had no access to the nuclear secrets.

"Nuclear secrets were dealt with by Mr Munir Ahmad Khan of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, a foreign affairs official and Mr Ghulam Ishaq Khan, who was then the finance secretary before going on to become president of Pakistan."

But the PPP has been wrong footed by Gaddaffi's son, who admits in a letter to London's Sunday Times newspaper that as far as nuclear matters are concerned, 'we acquired plans through Pakistani individuals and networks'.

Pakistani High Commission spokesman in London Javed Akhtar says in a separate letter to the same newspaper: "Our official investigations are continuing and any Pakistani scientist found culpable of breaching the rules will be dealt with according to the law."

He goes on to say: "President George W Bush has expressed full confidence in Pakistan's commitment against proliferation. In any case this commitment stems from our own policies and national interests rather than international pressures."

********************
Also Israel must have known that Paki Tech is not aasli maal.

Probably the nearest they could have thought of acting could be the 1987 offer to Rajiv who developed cold feet.

May be unkil promised that it would not go out of TSP and Israel settled 'For a few (billion)dollars more'?

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Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 25 Dec 2003

Postby Johann » 13 Jan 2004 01:16

Ramana,

Please see the "Pakistan after Musharraf - xtra" thread. Sharon has spoken out in two periods in the last two years at a number of gatherings about Pakistani assistance to the Libyans.

Sharon would be happy to go further but Israelis have strong and detailed assuarances that their interests have not been forgotten, and appreciate that their direct public involvement could make things worse for both themselves and their allies.

In 1981, when no one was willing to take action against Iraq the Israelis acted on their own.

In 1991 swift and intensive British and American work in the Western Desert persuaded Israel to avoid a direct response to Iraqi scuds.

The Israelis maintain that they remain wiling to act on their own if the US and UK are unable to respond swiftly. The Osirak raid and the fact that Likud are also in power make those sentiments very credible.

In 2002-2003 proliferation to Libya and Iran, Israel's direct foes, has been accorded a high priority by the same parties, as are the issues of safeguards and contingency plans elsewhere.


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